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"date_created": "2026-09-22T14:39:45.985483-07:00",
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"case_name": "Adrian Dickey v. Shawna Husted",
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"stt_transcript": "You may proceed when you're ready. Thank you. May it please the court. My name is Sam Gray, and I'm an attorney for Adrian Dickey. After Adrian prevailed in a knowingly false lawsuit brought by Shawna and Alan Husted, he brought claims for abuse of process and malicious prosecution. Now, I want to be clear that Adrian didn't sue simply because he won, or even because he won and the district court found simply no evidence of wrongdoing. He sued because discovery in the state court lawsuit revealed that the Husteds possessed evidence that disproved the court allegations of their claims. Yet they sued anyway because prevailing on the merits was not their goal. Their goal was to harm Adrian, who the Husteds disagree with politically and dislike personally. Ultimately, Adrian's claims were dismissed, and the issues on appeal can really be boiled down to a simple question, which is can filing a knowingly false lawsuit to harm someone constitute an abuse of process and malicious prosecution? I'll start with abuse of process. And the analysis for this claim all focused on the second element of that tort, which is that the process was used in an improper or unauthorized manner. Specifically, the district court got that wrong for two separate reasons. First, the district court concluded that the Husteds' lawsuit couldn't be an act improper in the regular prosecution of the proceeding or an act unlawful or irregular, and also ignored the other allegations besides just the lawsuit, for instance, discovery abuses, severe ones. Now, starting with the first point of the lawsuit as an abuse of process, the court really looked to language of an act improper in the irregular prosecution of the proceeding or an act unlawful or irregular. And that ultimately stems from the restatement, specifically 682. And the district court interpreted that as meaning that a meritless lawsuit cannot support an abuse of process claim. To that principle, we agree, but that's not what we're dealing with here. There's a meaningful difference that wasn't recognized by the district court between a meritless lawsuit, one that simply happens to be false, and one that's filed knowing it's false, knowing that you will never obtain the relief that's purportedly being sought. What's missing here, though, I think, for both claims is something, it's like the improper purpose, which is, for example, I think this guy was running, or your client was running for office, so an allegation like, well, you know, he's very vulnerable right now, so if we could get a quick settlement and get some money, that'd be great, because he doesn't want to deal with it during the political campaign. That probably gets you over the finish line, but I didn't see anything like that. I saw what one side is saying, these are really abusive tactics, but I got news. Abusive tactics happen all the time in litigation. And so that's why I think courts have required this extra sort of extortion-like, it doesn't have to be extortion, extortion-like element for special damages and for a wrongful intent. Yes, Your Honor, so I think starting with how the claim was pled and the specific improper purposes, respectfully, I would say that the reelection type of behavior and harms were pled. I would say that what was pled for the improper purpose was pretty broad. It was that this lawsuit was specifically timed to, as you mentioned, coincide with Adrian's reelection campaign to try to harm his ability to effectuate his conservative political views. It was also for the primary purpose, as Adrian alleged, of harming his relationship with his and Shawna's daughter. That kind of stuff happens all the time in family law. As a state court judge, we saw that where one parent is trying to harm the other, often through litigation, and then everything is an abusive process or malicious prosecution. Your Honor, I wouldn't say that that would transform everything to an abusive process or malicious prosecution because I think the fact that what we're dealing with here is a knowingly false lawsuit, I think that that limits it pretty significantly. I think it's extremely uncommon that you had mentioned kind of the extortion-like element. It's pretty uncommon for a party to put what they're trying to extort in their prayer for relief in a lawsuit. We would say that doing so doesn't somehow save them from that claim. A wolf without the sheep's clothing is still a wolf. Sticking on that extortion element, I would say that ultimately it's not required. I think the district court's order did require it, though. If you look at specifically the language of the order, it starts by recognizing the principle that it's not required that's on page 6. The very next page, though, says that, put simply, Adrian hasn't identified anything that was extorted from him. And then ultimately at page 10, the same thing, that his claim fails because he doesn't allege a collateral advantage. Do the allegations of witness tampering and destruction of evidence put this in a different category than the frivolous case? I think that the allegations of fabricating evidence, deleting evidence, bribing testimony, all of those allegations are important for two separate reasons. One, it's important because those are all factual allegations that support the reasonable inference that Adrian's claim was brought for an improper purpose. And by that I mean a purpose other than obtaining a proper court-ordered remedy. And that category of cases has been recognized as an abusive process in at least four cases in Iowa. Van Stelten, Schmidt, International Motors, Poonzack. That's the first part where it comes in. The second is it goes back to that first point where I think the judge got this wrong, which was concluding that a lawsuit can't be the basis of an abusive process claim. We disagree with that, including for those cases that I just mentioned, but it also ignores those discovery allegations. Iowa follows a very broad definition of process. They follow the definition in the American Jurisprudence Treatise, and that defines a process as including discovery. And so then the question is, was that conduct in the discovery improper or irregular in the proceeding? And I would sure say fabricating testimony, bribing a witness to put on the academy performance of her life. I would certainly say that those are outside the ordinary prosecution of the proceeding. You know, I think we've touched on the two points on abusive process, so I'll just very briefly say on malicious prosecution that we stated a claim there as well. I think that the biggest problem with the district court's ruling is that she recognized the correct standard, which is looking for a special injury not present in like causes of action. But then the analysis was totally absent of applying the injuries to like causes of action. It would not be surprising if some kind of a family law dispute, for instance, caused relationship harm. But accepting Adrian's allegations, this was a case about a security interest, and irreparably damaging the relationship with someone's daughter is not a natural damage that would flow from a security interest case. And that kind of analysis, the like causes of action, was totally absent from the district court's ruling. Unless the court has additional questions, I'll reserve my remaining time for rebuttal. All right. And you may do so. All right. We'll hear from the appellee. Counsel, you may proceed. Sorry, I apologize. I left one thing. Good morning, Your Honors. Brittany Levine on behalf of the appellees, Shawna and Alan Husted. What this case actually boils down to is really a second attempt to recover attorney's fees after a contingent lawsuit filed by the Husteds. Recognizing that this is really just an impermissible second bite at the apple, the district court, in applying the appropriate Iqbal Twombly standard, determined that the allegations of this complaint did not nudge it from conceivable to plausible, given the contents of the complaint itself. And the court's dismissal of this improper lawsuit should be affirmed for three reasons. First, the district court did apply the proper test. What the appellant is trying to recharacterize the district court's recognition of the high standard as imposing an additional burden, and that is just not the case. It's recognizing the context that a court needs to know in order to assess plausibility. Second, there was no improper purpose or motive asserted in the complaint. For each of the allegations that were alleged, Iowa state courts have said that does not constitute an abuse of process for malicious prosecution. Well, has there ever been a case quite like this one? There have been very similar cases like this. For example, Johnson v. Farm Bureau, which was an Iowa Supreme Court case. And importantly in that case, the Farm Bureau had filed a reverse bad faith claim, which had not been recognized at all in Iowa at that time. And then also for abuse of process claim as well. That's a frivolous claim, but I don't see the same allegations of tampering with witnesses and destroying evidence. That is correct, Your Honor. It was focused on the merits or lack thereof and for putting forth a new theory of liability as opposed to the discovery issues. With respect to the discovery issues that you've raised, Judge, are found in the third restatement of torts, which is just instructive here. But it does reference that discovery abuse is not sufficient for an abuse of process. And further, when you look at what the remedies are for discovery abuse, that is within the vessel of the initial complaint. And that lawsuit is where the remedies for discovery abuses are appropriate. Counsel, if the primary purpose of the hostage here was not an impermissible or improper or illegal purpose, what was it? The purpose of the lawsuit was to recover the insurance proceeds for a vehicle that the hostages, including Corrine, had compensated for the insurance policy for several years. So your position requires us to believe that recovering insurance proceeds was predominant or predominated over the purposes of harassment and embarrassment and things like that? Not exactly, Your Honor. That was the primary purpose, was to recover the funds. But the reputation… What does the word primary mean? Is there really evidence that that was the primary purpose rather than harassment? Yes, Your Honor, for the fact that they continue to pursue the case. But there's evidence that they knew it was baseless. That's incorrect, Your Honor. At least not at the time they filed the complaint. I would like to direct the Court's attention to the fact that Mr. Dickey's complaint references the Husted's Iowa State Court action. And therefore, this Court can consider those pleadings, and they have been referenced and encompassed by Mr. Dickey's complaint. If you look at, and actually even within this complaint as well, there's evidence to show that the Husted's did not actually know at the time that Mr. Dickey was a lien holder. And that even comes from Mr. Dickey's own pleadings. Mr. Dickey, in the underlying Iowa State Court action, asserted counterclaims against his daughter. He asserted a total of three. And then asserted counterclaims against Allen and Shawna Husted as well. And in that, the counterclaims actually state that the Husted's were not aware of the lien until they tried to recover the proceeds of the insurance. And it was after the accident that they learned. Who was the title holder of the vehicle? The title was in the name of Corinne with Mr. Dickey as the lien holder, is my understanding. Right. So, who would be entitled to the insurance proceeds? In this case, it was the, at the time the lawsuit was filed. Wouldn't it be Corinne? And Corinne was a... Well, she's not a party to this lawsuit. Corinne was a party to the underlying Iowa State Court action. But not this lawsuit. Correct, because Mr. Dickey did not sue Corinne in this matter. Okay, but you're saying the Husted's wanted to recover insurance proceeds. Yes, sir. But they were not entitled to them if Corinne was entitled to them. They were compensating for the insurance benefits. And then also another component of their lawsuit... So, what would the primary purpose of the Husted's be to recover insurance proceeds rather than harassment if they were not entitled to recover them? They pursued a claim also for unjust enrichment because they had paid compensation for the insurance proceeds, which were then paid out ultimately to Mr. Dickey. So, that there is their interest. And they also assumed a position of being the guardians for Corinne Husted at that time. So, they were, just to be clear, your argument is that they were suing on her behalf because they were the guardian? Is that, no? No, your honor. There were two components of that. The Iowa State lawsuit was initially filed by Corinne in her individual capacity as well as Shawna and Alan Husted. Later on, they were appointed as the guardians due to Corinne's mental and emotional implications that affected her ability to represent herself. So, maybe I'm confused. She was a party to the original lawsuit to recover insurance proceeds? Correct, your honor. But she is not a party here. And then also, I do, to go back to my point about that there's actually evidence in the complaint and then the Iowa State pleadings that show at the time the Husted's were not aware that there was a lien, is even in the complaint itself there is a screenshot of a text message exchange where Shawna Husted is asking Corinne Husted, was there an agreement? Did he send you anything? Those types of questions of where she was exploring, was there a factual basis to pursue a lawsuit? To which Corinne responded, I don't know. And what happened in the underlying state court case is what we see frequently in litigation, is that memories have faded. We are looking three years after the purchase of the vehicle. Even Mr. Dickey, in his own counterclaim, stated that the Husted's were not aware of the lien. And then you go back through and you do some electronic discovery and you find text messages and emails that provide greater context that our memories have faded. That is typical in the litigation process. And just because then the Husted's did not end up getting a judgment in their favor, does not mean that pursuing that action was for an improper purpose. They also included the treasurer due to the fact of there was a failure to perfect the security interest and the Husted's had a good faith belief that the security interest was not appropriately registered. And that's why they included the treasurer who moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety and only one claim for civil conspiracy was actually dismissed at that stage. I want to get to what could have been. This is not far from getting over the finish line, at least in my view, even under your view, which is had there been an allegation that said Mr. Dickey is running for election, this was a means to extort him trying to get a quick settlement so it wouldn't hurt his re-election prospects. Would you agree that that would have gotten them over the finish line had they included that? No, Your Honor, because this court is bound to the rationale of Johnson v. Farm Bureau, Iowa Supreme Court case from 1995, where the court said that even an improper motive or malicious intent is not enough and that the defendants in that case had brought their claim to gain leverage for settlement. Just the same here, if we were to adopt the question you just posed, is if they had pursued for hopes of settlement, that is still a proper purpose. As you so astutely recognize in family law, it is very contentious. There is fight and malice. What's the difference between a favorable leverage and extortion? I mean, where does that line get crossed? Well, here there was nothing that was extorted outside the scope of the discovery process itself. Yes, there might have been some discovery mishaps, but all of the conduct was within the normal part and parcel of litigation. Where it would cross the line to extortion would be, for example, either you pay this or you need to resign as your position. It has to be something outside the scope of what a lawsuit could actually allow you to prevail. I see that my time is winding up. If I may very briefly address the special injury for the malicious prosecution. Just very briefly, Your Honor. Very briefly. The special injury is akin to search of a seizure or confinement. Here, what plaintiff is proposing is essentially a special test just because Mr. Dickey was a legislator. But Iowa courts have consistently shown that there have been two medical malpractice cases where the courts did not put this special injury analysis in the light of just because you're a doctor, your reputation then carries greater weight. They held it to the same standard. And it is what plaintiff is arguing is not appropriate for a federal court to expand the scope of Iowa's rationale, which is to look at special injury just uniformly across all defendants, which is the appropriate framework. And if not, Judge Rose recognized that it is not appropriate for her to expand policy. That is for Iowa's state legislature. Thank you so much for your time, and we ask you affirm the dismissal. You may proceed. Thank you. There are a handful of points I'll briefly address. Initially, I will say that on the standard of pleading in the district court's application of a higher bar, I just want to clarify that's not my characterization or my language. That's Judge Rose's language at the bottom of page 5 of her order, where she's the one who interprets that restrictive view as meaning a higher pleading bar, and that's simply incorrect. On the discovery abuses question, I will say that Restatement 24 that the Husteds rely on has never been adopted in Iowa. By contrast, American Jurisprudence 2nd has, and that confirms Adrian's theory on the discovery abuses point. On the point of needing to extort something outside of the litigation, first, as explained, extortion is not an actual requirement. If we look to the Restatement, for instance, 676, it describes that there are, quote, numerous situations where an improper purpose can be found. Extortion is just one of four examples. One or the other is where a party knowingly files a false lawsuit. Finally, on the medical malpractice case examples that were just brought up, I think that is, frankly, a very great illustration of why Adrian did plead special damages. In those cases, the court considered the damages to the doctor and said, yeah, obviously if you're sued for malpractice, you're going to lose patients. People are going to be skeptical about hiring you as a doctor. The question that needs to be answered here is the damages to Adrian's re-election campaign, to his ability to represent his constituents, and perhaps most crucially to the relationship with his daughter. Would those have been present in other security interest cases? And the answer is no, and as a result, the specialty damages have been that. Thank you. All right. Thank you very much, counsel. We appreciate your arguments this morning. The case is submitted. The court will render a decision as soon as possible. Does that conclude our calendar for this morning? Yes, Your Honor. All right. Very well. The court will be in recess until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning."
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