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"case_name": "Logan Riffenburg v. Mark Rice",
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"stt_transcript": "Case 26-1086 Logan Riffenburg v. Mark Rice Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Logan Riffenburg v. Appellant Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell Hamilton Mitchell was that the dissent opposed dismissal and wanted the case to be heard on appeal on the merits. But the majority dismissing the appeal did not consider the merits of the appeal itself. remedy at this point? Or is the case moot? Or does the record not? There's some indication, I forget, I think maybe in the BAP opinion, that talks about the status of the property in question. Is there any update that's appropriate for us to consider here? When you say can the bankruptcy offer a remedy, do you mean to the petitioner? Right. I don't think that the petitioner filed this appeal to bar the sale of the property. And the sale has been completed. Then I don't think that there's any relief that can be granted. And so far, the sale's completed. It can't be barred at this point. Why can't it be unraveled at this point? Well, I mean, the sale is concluded. The conveyance has been made. Now, I mean, I don't know a statutory mechanism by which the sale could be set aside under this circumstance. I know 363N, as in Nancy of the Bankruptcy Code, that's 11 U.S.C. 363N, provides for the avoidance of a sale order that was obtained by fraud or collusion or something of that nature. But that's a motion that would be brought by a trustee in bankruptcy or a debtor in possession. And so I don't know of a mechanism by which the co-owner of a property would have a remedy. When was the first time that the good faith of the buyer was raised as an argument by the parties? As Judge Kelly pointed out, there was evidence at trial about the buyer. But when was the first time the argument was made that it matters? In exactly those words, I would say the first time the appellant raised it was on appeal. As far as— On what part of the appeal? Was it on the motion to stay? I think it was in response to the motion to dismiss that was filed before that. So not in the motion to stay. Or in the—yeah, in the motion to stay. To my knowledge, it was not raised in the motion to stay. And if I'm missing something, I apologize, but that's my— Thank you. And so far as the evidence at trial, I think there was sufficient evidence to establish good faith purchaser status. Looking at the trustee's testimony, again, with respect to what is a good faith purchaser, as the back dissent noted, it's somewhat muddled in this circuit, and it reads kind of like you know it when you see it. But on one hand, one standard is, you know, a good faith purchaser is one who purchases for value in good faith, which is kind of redundant and circular, but—and without notice of adverse claims. Lack of good faith may be shown by misconduct surrounding the sale process, including fraud, collusion, or attempt to take advantage of other bidders. Kind of something in the nature of cartelling to drive a price down, something of that nature. And looking at the court—the bankruptcy court's findings, the bankruptcy court did specifically find that the sale transaction was for value and in good faith. As far as notice of an adverse claim, I don't think there's an adverse claim to have notice of in this case. The trustee sold only the estate's undivided interest in the underlying 80 acres, and mobile home, that was the property that was the subject of the sale. The bankruptcy court had already determined by way of adversary proceeding that that is property of the estate. It was property of the estate at the time that the sale hearing was heard by the—came before the bankruptcy court. That had been decided in an adversary proceeding filed before the bankruptcy court, and the bankruptcy court had wiped out any claim that the petitioner might have as to the undivided interest that was being sold. So with all of that being the case, I don't think—the petitioner does not have an adverse claim to the property that was sold, that the issue's already been decided against him, and he did not take an appeal from that. And so I don't see that there would be an adverse claim for the purchaser to have taken about the property with notice of. And likewise, the trustee provided testimony that the asset was marketed to third-party buyers, including Blue Sun Capital, the buyer in this case, who the trustee knew to be a buyer of distressed assets. So the identity of the buyer was sufficiently and fully disclosed. It was just a disinterested third-party buyer. Is it undisputed, though, that there were no—it's undisputed there were no specific findings, is that correct, at trial? Of? Of good faith for the buyer. Well, you know, again, the court in several instances referred to good faith. It did not specify good faith on whose part. And so that would be something that I would submit that this court could infer could mean good faith of the buyer. Do you think if we were to adopt the BAP majority position that we would create a split with the Third Circuit? Yeah, I don't know. I mean, I see that it sounds like— It's pretty close to one, isn't it? It'd be close, but I think that's already the law of this circuit. So to the extent there—I mean, I would say there is already— There is already a split? A split. And I see that my time is up. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Mitchell. Mr. Keech, your rebuttal. Thank you. Briefly, Humphrey, good faith was, in my reading of the case, was not necessarily at issue, so I don't find it a posit in this particular situation. The court asked Mr. Mitchell about what remedy would be appropriate. The appellant's preferred remedy would be to reverse the BAP and have the BAP hear the appeal on the merits and allow it to take up the issue of the stay. The other issue that I think was very important to understand is Judge Cubbs, I believe, asked what remedy is still available. Can you unwind the sale? I think it's important to note this is a consumer debtor who had a homestead, a mobile home, got divorced, very sort of tragic circumstances. But having said that, we're dealing with the buyer is a third party out of state who appears to be sophisticated in the contract itself, which is part of the record. It indicates that if the sale doesn't close for whatever reason, the trustee can return the money back to the buyer, and that's it. So there appears to be potentially a remedy of unwinding the sale, as Judge Norton mentioned below. But you said you were asking us to send it back to the BAP to consider the stay? To consider the merits of the appeal, and then I believe it also could hear again the stay issue. Now, I don't know if that's the case or not, but I know that at the moment the BAP both dismissed the appeal. What would the BAP stay? The partition action, the buyer exercising its rights of ownership, which it hasn't done as of this time. Would the BAP then determine whether it was a good face sale? Judge Greger, I noticed my time's out. Is it okay if I respond? I wouldn't ask the question if I didn't. Certainly. And your question again was can the BAP determine whether it's a good face purchase? I mean, is that what you would put before them? They're not a fact finder, I don't think. No. I think the more important issue is the record's devoid of that. Therefore, the appellee is not entitled to rely on it as a safe harbor, meaning that the court, the BAP, can hear it as a substantive appeal. So you want us to close the door on the mootness argument and send the merits back. Am I understanding this? Yes, that is correct. Okay. Thank you. Thanks to both counsel for your appearance and argument. It's been helpful. We've lost our lights. We will consider the case and issue an opinion in due course."
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