CourtListener.com Custom Search Feedhttps://www.courtlistener.com/2024-01-04T00:00:00-08:00Free Law Projectfeeds@courtlistener.comCreated for the public domain by Free Law ProjectConduent State Healthcare, LLC v. AIG Specialty Insurance Co.2024-01-04T00:00:00-08:00Superior Court of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9457440/conduent-state-healthcare-llc-v-aig-specialty-insurance-co/
<p>IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE CONDUENT STATE HEALTHCARE, ) LLC, f/k/a/ XEROX STATE ) HEALTHCARE, LLC, f/k/a ACS STATE ) HEALTHCARE, LLC, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) C.A. No. N18C-12-074 MMJ CCLD v. ) ) AIG SPECIALTY INSURANCE ) COMPANY, f/k/a CHARTIS SPECIALTY ) INSURANCE COMPANY, et. al., ) ) Defendants. ) ) Submitted: November 28, 2023 Decided: January 4, 2024 On Defendants’ Motion for Reargument DENIED ORDER Orrie A. Levy, Esq., Robin L. Cohen, Esq., Keith McKenna, Esq., Cohen Ziffer Frenchman & McKenna LLP, New York, New York; Jennifer C. Wasson, Esq., David A. Seal, Esq., Carla M. Jones, Esq., Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Attorneys for Plaintiff Kenneth J. Nachbar, Esq., Megan Ward Cascio, Esq., Courtney Kurz, Esq., Emily C. Freidman, Esq. Neal M. Glazer, Esq., Izak Weintraub, Esq., London Fischer, LLP; Robert J. Katzenstein, Esq., Julie O’Dell, Esq., Smith Katzenstein & Jenkins, LLP; Maaren A. Shah, Esq., Michael B. Carlinsky, Esq., Todd G. Bettie, Esq. Jonathan E. Feder, Esq., Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, LLP; Robert S. Harrell, Esq., 1 Mayer Brown; Peter H. Kyle, Esq., John L. Reed, Esq., DLA Piper LLP (US); Attorneys for Defendants JOHNSTON, J. 1. By Opinion dated February 14, 2023, the Court granted a new trial. The Court held: The Court finds that there are four principal reasons compelling retrial. The Court acknowledges that, in hindsight, the Winter Submission was so replete with evidentiary problems (hearsay, double or triple hearsay, inability to cross-examine the declarant, admitted lack of knowledge by the declarant), that it never should have been admitted—despite the agreement of the parties. As the trial progressed, that document, and speculative evidence about the bias and credibility of the absent witness, became a central focus. Contrary to several explicit written and bench rulings of the Court, AIG’s counsel repeatedly referred to the jury a Press Release that had been unequivocally deemed inadmissible. Despite repeated admonishments by the Court, AIG’s closing argument was intended to persuade the jury to draw improper inferences from information set forth in privilege logs. AIG further inaccurately and improperly argued that AIG never had any coverage obligation to Conduent. This argument is directly in violation of the Court’s pretrial holding that AIG breached its contractual duty to pay defense costs. The Court finds that, in order to prevent manifest injustice, exceptional circumstances exist demonstrating that justice would miscarry if the jury’s verdicts were allowed to stand. THEREFORE, Plaintiff’s Motion to Set Aside the Judgment 2 Under Rule 59(d) and for a New Trial Under Rule 59(a) is hereby GRANTED. FURTHER THEREFORE, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law pursuant to Rule 50 is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Court finds, as a matter of law, that AIG’s initial denial of coverage, and continued repudiation of coverage obligations, relieved Conduent of any duty to cooperate or to seek consent with regard to settlement with the Texas Attorney General. IT IS SO ORDERED. Plaintiff’s Application to Maintain Sealing is hereby …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/9457440/conduent-state-healthcare-llc-v-aig-specialty-insurance-co/">Original document</a>
ETC Northeast Pipeline, LLC v. Associated Electric & Gas2023-12-01T00:00:00-08:00Superior Court of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9448448/etc-northeast-pipeline-llc-v-associated-electric-gas/
<p>IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE ETC NORTHEAST PIPELINE, LLC, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) ASSOCIATED ELECTRIC & GAS ) INSURANCE SERVICES LIMITED, ) NATIONAL FIRE & MARINE ) INSURANCE COMPANY, NATIONAL ) UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY ) OF PITTSBURGH PA., ASPEN ) C.A. No. N21C-10-177 MMJ CCLD SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, ) HDI GLOBAL INSURANCE ) COMPANY, IRONSHORE SPECIALTY ) INSURANCE COMPANY, LIBERTY ) SURPLUS INSURANCE ) CORPORATION, GENERAL ) SECURITY INDEMNITY CO. OF AZ, ) ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE ) COMPANY, XL INSURANCE ) AMERICA, INC., WESTPORT ) INSURANCE CORPORATION, ) ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE ) COMPANY, AND CERTAIN ) UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S, ) LONDON, ) ) Defendants. ) Submitted: November 15, 2023 Decided: December 1, 2023 1 On Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s Dismissal of Counts II, III, and IV of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint DENIED ORDER Kenneth H. Frenchman, Esq. (pro hac vice), Robin L. Cohen, Esq. (pro hac vice), Cohen Ziffer Frenchman & McKenna LLP, New York, NY, Jennifer C. Wasson, Esq., Carla M. Jones, Esq., Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP, Wilmington, DE, Attorneys for Plaintiff Richard D. Gable, Esq. (pro hac vice) (Argued), Adam B. Masef, Esq. (pro hac vice), Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Francis J. Murphy, Esq., Murphy & Landon, P.A., Wilmington, DE, Attorneys for Defendants Counsel for Defendants Associated Electric & Gas Insurance Services Limited, National Fire & Marine Insurance Company, Aspen Specialty Insurance Company, HDI Global Insurance Company, Liberty Surplus Insurance Corporation, General Security Indemnity Co. of AZ, XL Insurance America, Inc., Westport Insurance Corporation, Zurich American Insurance Company and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London Jacob Stutzman, Esq. (Argued) (pro hac vice), Carroll Warren & Parker PLLC, Jackson, MS, Attorneys for Defendants ACE American Insurance, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, P.A., and Lloyd’s Syndicate No. 1183 Rachel R. Hager, Esq. (pro hac vice), Finazzo Cossolini O’Leary Meola & Hager, LLC, Morristown, NJ, Attorney for Defendant Ironshore Specialty Insurance Company JOHNSTON, J. 2 1. By Opinion dated September 5, 2023, the Court granted Defendants Insurer’ Motion to Dismiss Counts II-V. The Court held: The Court finds that New York law applies to Counts II– V of ETC’s Amended Complaint. New York law does not recognize a separate claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the first-party insurance context when a plaintiff also pleads a breach of contract claim based on the same facts. New York law also does not recognize claims under Pennsylvania and Texas statutory law. The Amended Complaint fails to set forth any claims asserting Pennsylvania or Texas statutory law, or seeking statutory remedies, that are based solely on, and arise independently from, statutory rights and obligations. All claims are related to the Policy and will involve interpreting and construing contract provisions in order to determine whether ETC is entitled to relief.1 2. Plaintiff has moved for reconsideration of the Court’s dismissal of Counts II, III and IV. 3. Plaintiff argues that Count II …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/9448448/etc-northeast-pipeline-llc-v-associated-electric-gas/">Original document</a>
NewWave Telecom and Technologies, Inc. v. Ze Jiang2023-10-19T00:00:00-07:00Superior Court of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9433864/newwave-telecom-and-technologies-inc-v-ze-jiang/
<p>IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE NEWWAVE TELECOM AND ) TECHNOLOGIES, INC., ) ) Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. N20C-09-215 MMJ CCLD ) ZE JIANG, et al. ) ) Defendants/Counterclaim-Plaintiffs. ) Submitted: October 11, 2023 Decided October 19, 2023 On Defendants Jiang, Asarsa and Dolph’s Motion for Reargument DENIED ORDER 1. Following a non-jury trial, the Court issued an Opinion dated September 27, 2023.1 The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. The Court held: The Court finds in favor of NewWave and against Defendants on: Count I - Breach of Contract; 1 2023 WL 6548673 (Del. Super.). Count II - Fraud in the Inducement; Count III and Counterclaim VI - Declaratory Judgment; Counterclaim IV - Tortious Interference with Business Relations; Counterclaim V - Defamation; and Breach of Contract - Earn-Out Agreement. The parties are directed to present supplemental expert opinions as to the value of the assets subject to the SPA. Counsel shall confer as to a schedule for these submissions.2 2. Defendants Jiang, Asarsa and Dolph (“Defendants”) have moved for reargument. Defendants contend that the Court misapprehended critical facts, misapplied applicable law, and Plaintiff failed to satisfy each and every element as to each Defendant. 3. Defendants are correct that the Court erred by identifying Charles Berg as a Defendant in the following sentence: “As previously set forth, Defendant[]s Berg, Jiang and Asarsa made statements that constitute admissions that representations to NewWave, including those in the SPA, were not true.” Berg is not a Defendant. Non-party witness Berg was, during the relevant time period, iQuartic’s Chief Technical Officer. The Court considered Berg’s testimony as 2 Id. at *9. 2 relevant to whether Jiang, Dolph and Asarsa knew that their representations to Plaintiff were false or made with reckless indifference to the truth. Therefore, the Court hereby corrects the Opinion as follows: “As previously set forth, Defendants Jiang and Asarsa made statements that constitute admissions that representations to NewWave, including those in the SPA, were not true. The testimony of Berg confirms that Defendants had knowledge that the EHRProfiler was only a minimum viable product and not fully functional, and that Berg specifically warned Jiang and Dolph that they should not ‘lie to [NewWave] anymore about what we really have.’” 4. Defendants argue that the Court improperly relied on extra-contractual statements, in contravention of the anti-reliance provision. The Court considered and rejected this argument, which was made in Defendants’ post-trial briefs. External sources of information may be considered for the purpose of determining whether a “contractually identified fact was false or misleading.”3 5. Defendants contend that Plaintiff failed to prove fraud or fraud in the inducement by Dolph. This argument also fails. The testimony of both Berg and Dobbin demonstrates that Dolph had knowledge of the falsity, or at least reckless indifference to the truth, of the statements made to induce Plaintiff to enter into the SPA. Dolph did not deny at trial that he took no steps to …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/9433864/newwave-telecom-and-technologies-inc-v-ze-jiang/">Original document</a>
REM OA Holdings, LLC v. Northern Gold Holdings, LLC2023-10-19T00:00:00-07:00Court of Chancery of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9433829/rem-oa-holdings-llc-v-northern-gold-holdings-llc/
<p>COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE LORI W. WILL LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER VICE CHANCELLOR 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400 WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734 Date Submitted: September 28, 2023 Date Decided: October 19, 2023 Thomas W. Briggs, Jr., Esquire Martin S. Lessner, Esquire Alexandra M. Cumings, Esquire Elisabeth S. Bradley, Esquire Alec Hoeschel, Esquire M. Paige Valeski, Esquire Morris, Nichols, Arsht Young Conaway Stargatt & Tunnell LLP & Taylor, LLP 1201 North Market Street 1000 North King Street Wilmington, Delaware 19801 Wilmington, Delaware 19801 RE: REM OA Holdings, LLC, et al. v. Northern Gold Holdings, LLC, C.A. No. 2022-0582-LWW Dear Counsel: I write regarding Northern Gold Holdings, LLC’s Motion for Reconsideration (the “Motion”) pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 59(f). The Motion concerns my September 20, 2023 Post-Trial Memorandum Opinion (the “Post-Trial Opinion”). The Motion is denied for the reasons that follow. I. BACKGROUND The facts of this case are described in detail in the Post-Trial Opinion.1 In that decision, I granted judgment for plaintiffs REM OA Holdings, LLC and SIFT 1 Post-trial Mem. Op. (Dkt. 198) (“Post-trial Op.”). Capitalized terms in this letter have the definitions set forth in the Post-Trial Opinion. C.A. No. 2022-0582-LWW October 19, 2023 Page 2 of 7 Fixed US002, LLC. I concluded that immediately before the Capital Raise, SIFT Fixed was a 2.5% member of the Company, REM OA was a 48.75% member of the Company, and Northern Gold was a 48.75% member of the Company.2 In coming to this conclusion, I considered whether Northern Gold authorized the issuance of warrants to SIFT in approving the Commitment Letter. I addressed the enforceability of the Warrant Agreement, and considered whether its terms materially differ from the Commitment Letter that Northern Gold authorized.3 And I held that the Commitment Letter was “expressly subject to future ‘definitive documentation’” and superseded by the Warrant Agreement, “which contains an integration clause.”4 Northern Gold has now moved for reconsideration. It argues that the “Commitment Letter unambiguously provided the material terms and conditions for issuing the Warrants” and that, because Northern Gold “did not enter into an agreement containing pre-emptive rights” as addressed in the Commitment Letter, the court erred in finding that the subsequent Warrant Agreement was validly 2 Id. at 76. 3 Id. at 66. This argument was given limited attention by Northern Gold in its 106-page post-trial answering brief. See Northern Gold’s Post-trial Answering Br. (Dkt. 183) 60. It is the sole focus of the Motion. 4 Post-trial Op. 66. C.A. No. 2022-0582-LWW October 19, 2023 Page 3 of 7 entered into by the Company.5 The plaintiffs oppose the Motion because, among other reasons, the matter was squarely addressed in the Post-Trial Opinion.6 II. ANALYSIS “The manifest purpose of all Rule 59 motions is to afford the Trial Court an opportunity to correct errors prior to appeal.”7 The movant bears a “heavy burden.”8 “To succeed and obtain reargument, the moving party must demonstrate that the Court’s decision was predicated upon a misunderstanding of a material …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/9433829/rem-oa-holdings-llc-v-northern-gold-holdings-llc/">Original document</a>
GMG Insurance Agency v. Margolis Edelstein2023-05-17T00:00:00-07:00Superior Court of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9400083/gmg-insurance-agency-v-margolis-edelstein/
<p>IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE GMG INSURANCE AGENCY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. N21C-07-002 MMJ ) MARGOLIS EDELSTEIN, ) ) Defendants. ) Submitted: May 9, 2023 Decided: May 17, 2023 On Plaintiff’s Motion for Reargument DENIED ORDER Michael R. Ippoliti, Esq., Ippoliti Law Group, Wilmington, DE, Attorney for Plaintiff Sally J. Daugherty, Esq., Salmon Ricchezza Singer & Turchi, LLP, Wilmington, DE, George M. Vinci, Jr., Esq. (pro hac vice), David B. Picker, Esq. (pro hac vice), Spector Gadon Rosen Vinci P.C., Philadelphia, PA, Attorneys for Defendant JOHNSTON, J. 1. By Opinion dated April 10, 2023, the Court granted Defendant Margolis Edelstein’s (“Defendant”) Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court held: The Court finds the evidence fails to support Plaintiff’s legal malpractice claim. The Court finds that there was no reason to conclude Defendant breached the standard of care when developing the factual record, or when presenting the Underlying Litigation Motion for Summary Judgment on the tortious interference issue. The Court finds the Wilson Affidavit was a superseding cause of Plaintiff’s alleged loss. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.1 2. Plaintiff GMG Insurance Agency (“Plaintiff”) has moved for reargument. Plaintiff contends: (1) the Court erred by holding as a matter of law that the Wilson Affidavit was a superseding cause of Plaintiff’s alleged loss; (2) the Court erred by not recognizing that had Defendant conducted organized, systematic discovery, Defendant would have learned enough about Mr. Wilson to reasonably anticipate he might change or reverse his future testimony; and (3) the Court erred by not recognizing that the Court of Chancery would have dismissed the tortious interference claim if Defendant had competently briefed the Underlying Litigation Motion for Summary Judgment. 3. The purpose of moving for reargument is to seek reconsideration of findings of fact, conclusions of law, or judgment of law.2 Reargument usually will be denied unless the moving party demonstrates that the Court overlooked a precedent or legal principle that would have a controlling effect, or that it has 1 GMG Ins. Agency v. Margolis Edelstein, 2023 WL 2854760, at *5 (Del. Super.). 2 Hessler, Inc. v. Farrell, 260 A.2d 701, 702 (Del. 1969). 2 misapprehended the law or the facts in a manner affecting the outcome of the decision.3 “A motion for reargument should not be used merely to rehash the arguments already decided by the court.”4 To the extent the parties asserted issues that were not raised in the submissions in support of summary judgment motions, new arguments may not be presented for the first time in a motion for reargument.5 4. The Court has reviewed and considered the parties’ written submissions and arguments. The Court did not overlook a controlling precedent or legal principle, or misapprehend the law or the facts in a manner affecting the outcome of the decision. THEREFORE, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reargument is hereby DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. /s/ Mary M. Johnston The Honorable Mary M. Johnston 3 Ferguson v. Vakili, 2005 WL …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/9400083/gmg-insurance-agency-v-margolis-edelstein/">Original document</a>
Thompson v. Fernbach2022-12-21T00:00:00-08:00Supreme Court of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9354163/thompson-v-fernbach/
<p>IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE JAMES THOMPSON, § § Plaintiff Below, § No. 219, 2022 Appellant, § § Court Below—Superior Court v. § of the State of Delaware § JEFFREY FERNBACH and § C.A. No. S20C-08-025 FERNMOOR HOMES, INC. a/k/a § FERNMOOR HOMES AT § WOODLANDS PEPPER CREEK, § DE LLC, § § Defendants Below, § Appellees. § Submitted: October 14, 2022 Decided: December 21, 2022 Before VALIHURA, VAUGHN, and TRAYNOR, Justices. ORDER Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record below, it appears to the Court that: (1) On June 27, 2022, the plaintiff below-appellant, James Thompson, filed this appeal from the Superior Court’s order, dated June 7, 2022, denying his motion for reconsideration of the Superior Court’s order, dated April 1, 2022, granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants below-appellees, Jeffrey Fernbach and Fernmoor Homes, Inc. a/k/a Fernmoor Homes at Woodlands Pepper Creek, DE LLC (collectively, “Employer”). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. (2) On August 18, 2020, Thompson filed a complaint against Employer for violating 19 Del. C. § 2365. Section 2365 provides that it is unlawful for an employer to discharge, retaliate, or discriminate against an employee based on the employee seeking workers’ compensation benefits. Thompson alleged that Employer had engaged in retaliation by terminating him as a model home host shortly after he sought workers’ compensation benefits for a workplace injury he suffered in October 2016. On January 12, 2017, Employer notified Thompson that January 20, 2017 would be his last day due to declining activity at the model home. Employer advised that it would reach out if Thompson was needed in the spring and hoped to have him back then. (3) Employer did not contact Thompson about returning. In a letter dated November 19, 2018, Thompson’s counsel demanded that Employer pay Thompson a year-and-a-half of salary. In a letter dated December 15, 2018, Employer’s counsel stated that Thompson was terminated in January 2017 for lack of business. (4) After the Superior Court denied Thompson’s motion for default judgment on November 6, 2020 and Employer’s motion to dismiss on December 18, 2020, the parties engaged in discovery. On September 30, 2021, Employer filed a motion for summary judgment. Employer argued, among other things, that the 2 two-year statute of limitations under Section 2365 began to run on January 20, 2017, Thompson’s last day of employment, and had expired by the time Thompson filed his complaint on August 18, 2020. Thompson argued that the two-year statute of limitations did not begin to run until December 15, 2018 when he learned for the first time that he had been terminated in January 2017, not temporarily laid off. (5) On April 1, 2022, the Superior Court issued a decision granting the motion for summary judgment. The Superior Court held that Thompson’s action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations and that there was no causal connection between Thompson’s filing for workers’ compensation and …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/9354163/thompson-v-fernbach/">Original document</a>
ITG Brands, LLC v. Reynolds American, Inc.2022-11-07T00:00:00-08:00Court of Chancery of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/8510083/itg-brands-llc-v-reynolds-american-inc/
<p>COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE LORI W. WILL LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER VICE CHANCELLOR 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 11400 WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801-3734 November 7, 2022 Stephen C. Norman, Esquire Matthew D. Perri, Esquire Matthew F. Davis, Esquire Robert L. Burns, Esquire Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP Richards Layton & Finger, P.A. 1313 North Market Street 920 North King Street Wilmington, DE 19801 Wilmington, DE 19801 RE: ITG Brands, LLC v. Reynolds American, Inc., et al. C.A. No. 2017-0129-LWW Dear Counsel: This Letter Opinion resolves ITG Brands, LLC’s Motion for Reconsideration (the “Motion”) pursuant to Court of Chancery Rule 59(f). The Motion raises arguments that were previously considered in the September 30, 2022 Memorandum Opinion (the “Summary Judgment Opinion”) or new arguments that are waived. The Motion is denied for the reasons that follow. I. BACKGROUND The facts of this case are described in several prior decisions of the court, including the Summary Judgment Opinion.1 In that decision, I granted summary 1 Dkt. 328 (“Mem. Op.”). Capitalized terms in this Letter Opinion have the definitions set forth in the Summary Judgment Opinion. C.A. No. 2017-0129-LWW November 7, 2022 Page 2 of 9 judgment in support of Reynolds American Inc. and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company’s argument that a “Florida Judgment Liability” imposed on Reynolds is an “Assumed Liability” under § 2.01(c)(iv) of the parties’ Asset Purchase Agreement. As a result, I held that Reynolds is entitled to indemnification from ITG under § 11.02(a)(vi) of the APA. My holding turned, in part, on a determination that this court was not bound by a Florida state court decision interpreting § 2.01(c)(vii) of the APA.2 After reviewing supplemental briefing by the parties, I concluded that the matter of issue preclusion was governed by Florida law.3 Four of the five elements of issue preclusion were satisfied but the fifth—mutuality of the parties—was not because Reynolds and ITG were not adverse in the Florida litigation.4 ITG has now moved for reconsideration on three grounds. ITG argues that the court erred by: (1) determining that Florida issue preclusion law requires adversity;5 (2) finding Reynolds and ITG were not adverse;6 and (3) overlooking a 2 See id. at Section II.A. 3 Id. at 23. 4 Id. at 26-29. 5 ITG Brands, LLC’s Mot. Recons. (Dkt. 329) ¶¶ 3-6. 6 Id. ¶¶ 7-17. C.A. No. 2017-0129-LWW November 7, 2022 Page 3 of 9 Delaware choice of law provision in the APA.7 Reynolds filed an opposition to the Motion, contending that none of these arguments support reconsideration or would change the outcome in the Summary Judgment Opinion.8 II. ANALYSIS “The manifest purpose of all Rule 59 motions is to afford the Trial Court an opportunity to correct errors prior to appeal.”9 The movant bears a “heavy burden.”10 It must demonstrate “the Court has overlooked a decision or principle of law that would have controlling effect or the Court has misapprehended the law or the facts so that the outcome of the decision would be affected.”11 “[A] …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/8510083/itg-brands-llc-v-reynolds-american-inc/">Original document</a>
Trust-Ed Solutions, LLC v. Gilbert LLP2022-11-02T00:00:00-07:00Superior Court of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/8441760/trust-ed-solutions-llc-v-gilbert-llp/
<p>IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE TRUST-ED SOLUTIONS, LLC, ) ) Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant, ) ) v. ) ) GILBERT LLP, ) C.A. No. N20C-06-229 MMJ CCLD ) Defendant/Counterclaim- ) Plaintiff/Third-Party Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) RACHEL L. COSGROVE, ) ) Third-Party Defendant. ) Submitted: November 1, 2022 Decided: November 2, 2022 On Trust-Ed Solutions, LLC and Rachel L. Cosgrove’s Motion for Reargument DENIED On Gilbert LLP’s Motion for Limited Reargument DENIED On Trust-Ed Solutions, LLC and Rachel L. Cosgrove’s Motion to Supplement the Summary Judgment Record DENIED ORDER 1 1. By Opinion dated October 18, 2022, the Court considered cross motions for summary judgment. The Court held: The Court finds: (1) that the only applicable processing rate is the “All- Inclusive” $35 per gigabyte rate included in the Pricing Model; (2) that Gilbert did not waive its contractual rights; (3) that MCS validly assigned the breach of contract claim to Gilbert and champerty does not apply; (4) that there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the total amount that Gilbert should have been charged for hosting data; (5) that Trust-ED is not entitled to any additional forensic collection fees; (6) that Gilbert’s failure to pay in full was not a termination of the contract and a genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Trust-ED is entitled to post-termination storage fees; (7) that Trust-ED’s account stated claim is dismissed; (8) that there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the alleged fraud; (9) that summary judgment is granted in favor of Trust-ED regarding Counts I–IV of Gilbert’s counterclaims for lack of record evidence of damages; (10) that quantum meruit may proceed as a potential measure of damages; (11) that the Third-Party Complaint adding Cosgrove as a party is appropriate; and (12) that the Consulting Agreement limits incidental damages for breach of contract claims. 2 Gilbert’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Gilbert’s request for a declaration that the only applicable processing rate be the “all-inclusive” $35 per gigabyte rate included in the Pricing Model is hereby GRANTED. Gilbert’s request for a declaration that Trust-ED breached its contract with MCS by failing to pay MCS for its work, and that Gilbert, as a valid assignee of MCS’s breach of contract claim is hereby GRANTED. The amount of damages will be determined at trial. Gilbert’s request for a declaration that Trust-ED is not entitled to any post- termination storage fees is hereby DENIED. Trust-ED’s account stated claim is hereby DISMISSED. Gilbert’s request for summary judgment in its favor on Trust-ED’s quantum meruit claim is hereby DENIED. Gilbert’s request for a declaration that it does not owe Trust-ED additional forensic collection fees is hereby GRANTED. Gilbert’s request for a declaration of the maximum amount Gilbert should have been charged for hosting is hereby DENIED. Trust-ED’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Trust-Ed’s account stated claim (Count III) is hereby DISMISSED. 3 Trust-ED’s request for summary judgment in its favor for the breach of contract counterclaim Counts VI (Hosting Fees) and …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/8441760/trust-ed-solutions-llc-v-gilbert-llp/">Original document</a>
State v. White2022-09-07T00:00:00-07:00Superior Court of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7863079/state-v-white/
<p>IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE STATE OF DELAWARE, ) ) v. ) ID. No. 1703022008 ) RICHARD C. WHITE, ) Defendant. ) Submitted: August 8, 2022 Decided: September 7, 2022 ORDER Upon Defendant Richard C. White’s Motion for Reargument of his Motion for Postconviction Relief, DENIED. This 7th day of September, 2022, upon consideration of the Defendant Richard C. White’s Motion for Reargument of his Motion for Postconviction Relief (D.I. 62), the State’s response thereto (D.I. 64), and the record in this matter, it appears to the Court that: (1) In September of 2017, a grand jury indicted Mr. White for 11 counts of Rape in the Second Degree, one count of Continuous Sexual Abuse of Child, one count of Dangerous Crime Against a Child, five counts of Sexual Exploitation of a Child, one count of Dealing in Child Pornography, and six counts of Possession of Child Pornography.1 (2) Mr. White pleaded guilty to a single count of Rape in the Second Degree.2 He did so in exchange for dismissal of all his remaining charges and the State’s favorable sentencing recommendation.3 (3) Following a presentence investigation, Mr. White was sentenced to serve a natural life term in prison.4 (4) Mr. White docketed a timely direct appeal; his conviction and sentence were affirmed.5 (5) Mr. White then filed a timely motion for postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. In that motion, Mr. White’s single claim was that his plea colloquy was somehow inadequate and, therefore, his guilty plea cannot stand.6 Time and again during the litigation of his postconviction motion, Mr. White insisted his claim was that “a ‘structural 1 Indictment, State v. Richard C. White, ID No. 1703022008 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 2017) (D.I. 6). 2 Plea Agreement and TIS Guilty Plea Form, State v. Richard C. White, ID No. 1703022008 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2018) (D.I. 15). 3 Id. 4 Sentencing Order, State v. Richard C. White, ID No. 1703022008 (Del. Super. Ct. May 18, 2018) (D.I. 21). 5 White v. State, 2018 WL 6167326, at *3 (Del. Nov. 21, 2018). 6 State v. White, 278 A.3d 680, 684 (Del. Super. Ct. 2022). -2- error’ invalidat[ed] his plea”7—not that he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel.8 After fully considering Mr. White’s arguments, the Court denied his motion finding that he had uncovered only a harmless omission from his plea colloquy and that postconviction relief was not warranted.9 (6) Mr. White then filed this present motion to reargue that seems to suggest the Court: (a) should not have taken him at his word when he said he was not bringing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; and (b) should have afforded greater weight to his claim that, due to lack of knowledge, he could not have raised his specific Rule 11 complaint earlier.10 (7) Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e) (made applicable to criminal cases pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 57(d))11 permits the Court to reconsider its findings of fact, conclusions of …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/7863079/state-v-white/">Original document</a>
State v. Wright2022-04-01T00:00:00-07:00Superior Court of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/6457118/state-v-wright/
<p>SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE PAUL R. WALLACE LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER JUDGE 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 10400 WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801 (302) 255-0660 Submitted: February 10, 2022 Decided: March 9, 2022 Withdrawn and Reissued with Clarifications: April 1, 2022 Mr. David R. Wright SBI# 158184 James T. Vaughn Correctional Center 1181 Paddock Road Smyrna, DE 19977 RE: State v. David R. Wright I.D. No. 0802023870 Request for Certificate of Eligibility under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f) Dear Mr. Wright: On March 9, 2022, the Court issued a letter order denying your request for a certificate of eligibility to seek review and modification of your sentence under Title 11, Section 4214(f).1 Two weeks later you “move[d] the court reconsider the certificate of eligibility and grant [your] review status”—that is, you seek reargument of the Court’s earlier denial. 2 In Delaware, there is no specific criminal rule governing motions for 1 D.I. 105. 2 D.I. 106. No matter the label or wording, yours is a motion for reargument under this Court’s rules. See Samuel v. State, 2010 WL 3245109, at *1 (Del. Aug. 17, 2010) (“A timely- filed motion for reargument is ‘the proper device for seeking reconsideration” of [this Court]’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.”) (citations omitted); State v. Brooks, 2008 WL 4350085, at *1 n.10 (Del. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2008) (“[A] motion for reconsideration is tantamount to a motion for reargument” so Rule 59(e) and its standards apply); State v. Brown, 2019 WL 3249402, at *1-2 (Del. Super. Ct. July 18, 2019) (same as to application of Rule 59(e)’s timeliness requirement). State v. David R. Wright I.D. No. 0802023870 March 9, 2022 Page 2 of 6 reargument. 3 Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 57(d), however, the Court “regulate[s] its practice in accordance with the applicable Superior Court civil rule or in any lawful manner not inconsistent with these rules or the rules of the Supreme Court.” 4 Thus, Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e) is controlling in this criminal matter.5 And under that rule, your motion for “reconsideration” (i.e., reargument) had to be served and filed within five days of this Court’s March 9th denial order.6 So you had until March 16th to serve and file your motion for reargument.7 Your reargument motion was docketed a week thereafter—on March 23, 2022—and is, therefore, untimely. 8 Under settled Delaware law, this Court has no authority to extend the time in which to move for reargument.9 And because your reargument motion is untimely, this Court has no jurisdiction to consider it. 10 On 3 State v. Binaird, 2016 WL 1735504, at *1 n.2 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2016); State v. Zachary, 2013 WL 5783388, at *1, n.1 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 23, 2013). 4 DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 57(d). 5 Dickens v. State, 2004 WL 1535814, at *1 n.3 (Del. June 25, 2004); Parker v. State, 2001 WL 213389, at *1 n.4 (Del. Feb. 26, 2001); Binaird, 2016 WL 1735504, at *1 n.2; Zachary, …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/6457118/state-v-wright/">Original document</a>
State v. Melpar, LLC2022-01-10T00:00:00-08:00Superior Court of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5793767/state-v-melpar-llc/
<p>IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE THE STATE OF DELAWARE, UPON ) THE RELATION OF THE SECRETARY ) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ) TRANSPORTATION, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) C.A. No.: S21C-03-017 FJJ v. ) ) MELPAR, LLC, 1,7761995 SQUARE ) FEET (0.0408 ACRES) OF LAND, ) 711.9788 SQUARE FEE (0.0163 ACRES) ) OF LAND, 3,598.7712 SQUARE FEET ) (0.0826 ACRES) PART OF TAX MAP ) AND PARCEL NUMBER ) 234-23.00-269.14 SITUATE IN INDIAN ) RIVER HUNDRED, and DASH-IN ) FOOD STORES, INC. ) ) Defendants. ) Submitted: December 16, 2021 Decided: January 10, 2022 ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR REARGUMENT - DENIED Brady Eaby, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for the State of Delaware, Richard A. Forsten, Esquire, Saul, Ewing, Arnstein & Lehr, LLP, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant Dash In Food Services, Inc. Richard L. Abbott, Esquire, Abbott Law Firm, Hockessin, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant Melpar, LLC. Jones, J. 1. On December 9, 2021 this Court issued an Opinion and Order in this condemnation case. The opinion and order resolved a number of issues, the most significant of which were to deny the Defendants’ Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing, Deny the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, and to Grant the State’s Motion for Possession. Defendant, Melpar, LLC (“Melpar”) has moved for Reargument of this Court’s December 9, 2021 Opinion and Order and it’s December 9, 2021 Order Granting the State’s Possession. 2. In support of its Motion for Reargument Melpar maintains: a. The Court ignored binding Delaware Supreme Court precedent in Lawson v. State, 72 A.3d 84 (Del. 2013); b. The Court overlooked the undisputed evidence that DelDOT’s appraisal was fundamentally flawed on a number of levels; c. The Court relied upon allegations made by DelDOT that were directly rebutted by the record evidence thereby in failing to conduct an Evidentiary Hearing; and d. The Court applied the wrong legal standard in its determination 3. A Motion for Reargument is governed by Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e). Delaware law places a heavy burden on a party seeking relief pursuant to Rule 59.1 The purpose of such motion is to seek reconsideration of findings of fact, 1 Kostyshyn v. Comm’ers Town of Bellefonte, 2007 WL 1241875 (Del. Super. 2007). 2 conclusions of law, or judgment of law.2 Pursuant to 59(e), such motion will be denied unless the movant demonstrates that the Court “has overlooked precedent or legal principles, or the Court has misapprehended the law or the facts such as would have changed the outcome of the underlying decision.”3 A motion for Reconsideration or Reargument is not an opportunity to rehash arguments already decided by the Court, or to present new arguments that were not previously raised. 4. The Court has reviewed and considered the parties’ written submissions and arguments. The Court did not overlook a controlling precedent or legal principle, or misapprehend the law or the facts in a manner affecting the outcome of the decision. Therefore, Melpar’s Motion for Reargument …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/5793767/state-v-melpar-llc/">Original document</a>
West v. Access Control Related Enterprises, LLC2021-12-01T00:00:00-08:00Superior Court of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5302216/west-v-access-control-related-enterprises-llc/
<p>IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE WILLIAM WEST, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) C.A. No. N17C-11-137 MMJ CCLD ACCESS CONTROL RELATED ) ENTERPRISES, LLC; LLR EQUITY ) PARTNERS, IV, L.P.; LLR EQUITY ) PARTNERS PARALLEL IV, L.P.; ) SETH LEHR, an individual; ) DAVID STIENES, an individual; ) GREG CASE, an individual; ) ROBERT CHEFITZ, an individual; and ) JOSEPH GRILLO, an individual. ) ) Defendants. ) Submitted: October 19, 2021 Decided: December 1, 2021 On Plaintiff’s Motion for Reargument DENIED ORDER 1. By Order dated September 27, 2021, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss. 2. Plaintiff has moved for reargument. Plaintiff contends that the Court misapprehended material facts about the status of the related case pending in California. 1 3. Plaintiff further asserts that the Court misapprehended material facts about the status of the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff also cites a decision of the California Court that Defendants would not be prejudiced by proceeding in California on all claims. 4. The purpose of moving for reargument is to seek reconsideration of findings of fact, conclusions of law, or judgment of law. 1 Reargument usually will be denied unless the moving party demonstrates that the Court overlooked a precedent or legal principle that would have a controlling effect, or that it has misapprehended the law or the facts in a manner affecting the outcome of the decision.2 “A motion for reargument should not be used merely to rehash the arguments already decided by the court.”3 To the extent Plaintiff has asserted issues that were not raised in the submissions in support of its motion, new arguments may not be presented for the first time in a motion for reargument. 4 5. The Court has reviewed and considered the parties’ written submissions and arguments. The Court did not overlook a controlling precedent or legal principle, or misapprehend the law or the facts in a manner affecting the outcome of the decision. 1 Hessler, Inc. v. Farrell, 260 A.2d 701, 702 (Del. 1969). 2 Ferguson v. Vakili, 2005 WL 628026, at *1 (Del. Super.). 3 Wilmington Trust Co. v. Nix, 2002 WL 356371, at *1 (Del. Super.). 4 Oliver v. Boston University, 2006 WL 4782232, at *1 (Del. Ch.). 2 THEREFORE, Defendants’ Motion for Reargument is hereby DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. /s/ Mary M. Johnston The Honorable Mary M. Johnston 3 N17C-11-137 MMJ CCLD Superior Court of Delaware delsuperct Del. Super. Ct. West v. Access Control Related Enterprises, LLC Johnston J. 1 December 2021 Published a1b6fd02014f2ac18896fd3ebcbb28bb87e80adf</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/5302216/west-v-access-control-related-enterprises-llc/">Original document</a>
Richardson v. Christiana Care Health Services, Inc.2021-11-19T00:00:00-08:00Superior Court of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5299061/richardson-v-christiana-care-health-services-inc/
<p>IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE TAMEKA RICHARDSON, as NEXT ) FRIEND OF N.D., a minor, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. N18C-10-026 JRJ ) CHRISTIANA CARE HEALTH ) SERVICES, INC., ) ) Defendant. ) Date Submitted: September 14, 2021 Date Decided: November 19, 2021 ORDER Upon consideration of Defendant Christiana Care Health Services, Inc.’s “Motion for Reargument as to Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Certain Causation Testimony from Dr. Neil Silverman and Dr. Harold Wiesenfeld and as to Portions of Plaintiff’s Omnibus Motion in Limine,”1 Plaintiff’s Opposition thereto;2 and the record in this case, IT APPEARS THAT: 1. Defendant and Plaintiff Tameka Richardson (“Plaintiff”), as next friend of her grandson (“N.D.”), filed several motions in limine in this case.3 Following 1 Defendant’s Motion for Reargument (“Def. Mot.”), (Trans. ID. 66721030). 2 Plaintiff’s Response (“Pl. Resp.”), (Trans. ID. 66733571). 3 Trans. ID. 65863005; Trans. ID. 65863041; Trans. ID. 65946141; Trans. ID. 65946227; Trans. ID. 65946338; Trans. ID. 65946477; Trans. ID. 65946740. extensive oral argument on those motions,4 the Court issued a Memorandum Opinion deciding the motions on June 21, 2021.5 2. On June 28, 2021, Defendant filed a timely Motion for Reargument.6 In its Motion for Reargument, Defendant argues the following: (1) the Court erred in precluding Dr. Neil Silverman and Dr. Harold Wiesenfeld’s causation testimony;7 and (2) the Court failed to address whether evidence that N.D.’s mother had been noncompliant with certain medical treatments could be used for a purpose other than arguing comparative negligence.8 3. According to Defendant, the Court erred in several respects: Dr. Silverman and Dr. Wiesenfeld’s causation opinions are based on their experience, research, and knowledge of the literature—not merely the six articles that were produced;9 the Court misapplied Timblin v. Kent General Hospital;10 the Court’s exclusion of the doctors’ causation opinions is inherently unfair to Defendant because the Court has not prohibited Plaintiff from offering opinions based on 4 See Trans. ID. 66454859. 5 Memorandum Opinion (“Mem. Op.”), (Trans. ID. 66703354). 6 Def. Mot., Trans ID. 66721030. 7 Id. at 1. The specific causation testimony Defendant seeks to reargue is the doctors’ shared opinion that when a mother is infected with HIV during pregnancy, the risk that her baby will be infected with HIV in utero is greater than 50%. Mem. Op., Trans. ID. 66703354. 8 Def. Mot., Trans. ID. 66721030 at 7. This second issue is not properly before the Court on a Motion for Reargument because it was not addressed in the Plaintiff’s Omnibus Motion, and the Court did not rule on this issue in its June 21, 2021 Memorandum Opinion. Consequently, this issue will be addressed as a motion in limine in a separate order. 9 Id, at ¶¶ 2–3. 10 Id. at ¶ 4 (citing Timblin v. Kent General Hosp., 640 A.2d 1021 (Del. 1994)). 2 statistics;11 and the Court’s exclusion of the doctors’ causation opinions was overbroad in that the Court excluded all of the doctors’ causation opinions, whereas Plaintiff sought exclusion …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/5299061/richardson-v-christiana-care-health-services-inc/">Original document</a>
Guaranteed Rate, Inc. v. ACE American Insurance Co.2021-10-11T00:00:00-07:00Superior Court of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5289017/guaranteed-rate-inc-v-ace-american-insurance-co/
<p>IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE GUARANTEED RATE, INC, Plaintiff, V. C.A. No. N20C-04-268 MMJ CCLD ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, XL SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, AXIS INSURANCE COMPANY and ENDURANCE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY , New Nore Nee Nee Nee ee nee” nee ee” nee nee ee ee ee” Defendants. Submitted: September 1, 2021 Decided: October 11, 2021 On Defendant’s, ACE American Insurance Company’s Motion for Reargument DENIED ORDER Brian M. Rostocki, Esq., Reed Smith LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, Lilit Asadourian, Esq., Reed Smith LLP, Los Angeles, California, Thomas A. Marrinson, Esq., Reed Smith LLP, Chicago, Illinois, Counsel for Plaintiff Robert J. Katzenstein, Esq., Smith, Katzenstein & Jenkins LLP, Wilmington, Delaware, David Newmann, Esq., Jessica K. Jacobs, Esq., Hogan Lovells US LLP, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Counsel for Defendant ACE American Insurance Company JOHNSTON, J. THE MOTION The Court issued an Opinion dated August 18, 2021. The Court found that the Professional Services Exclusion does not apply to prevent coverage under the policy. The Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. The Court denied Insurers’ Cross Motion for Judgment on the pleadings. Additionally, the Court found that the Plaintiff properly stated a claim for coverage under the EPL. The Court denied the Insurers’ Cross Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on this issue because of several outstanding questions of fact. Defendant has moved for reargument based on the Courts interpretation of the Professional Services Exclusion and the timing of which GRI submitted a copy of the CID. STANDARD OF REVIEW Delaware law places a heavy burden on a plaintiff seeking relief pursuant to Rule 59. | The purpose of moving for reargument is to seek reconsideration of findings of fact, conclusions of law, or judgment of law.? Reargument usually will be denied unless the moving party demonstrates that the Court overlooked a precedent or legal principle that would have a controlling effect, or that it has misapprehended the law or the facts in a manner affecting the outcome of the ' Kostyshyn v. Comm’rs of Town of Bellefonte, 2007 WL 1241875, at *1 (Del. Super.). * Hessler, Inc. v. Farrell, 260 A.2d 701, 702 (Del. 1969). 2 3 “A motion for reargument should not be used merely to rehash the decision. arguments already decided by the court.”* A court cannot “re-weigh” evidence on a motion for reargument.° ANALYSIS Professional Services Exclusion Defendant ACE asserts that the Court did not consider pertinent policy language. ACE argues that the Court misconstrued the Professional Services Exclusion to require that the services be provided directly to borrower clients. Defendant states that the Opinion did not address the material differences between the policy language at issue in [beriabank Corp. v. III. Union Ins. Co. ° and the policy language at issue here. Defendant specifically contends that the court mischaracterized the services at issue in the government investigation as “quality- control standards,” instead of “professional services” that are provided directly to borrower clients. The Court reiterates that insurance policies should be read as a whole.’ …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/5289017/guaranteed-rate-inc-v-ace-american-insurance-co/">Original document</a>
Zurich American Insurance Company v. Sygenta Crop Protection, LLC2021-09-15T00:00:00-07:00Superior Court of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5093975/zurich-american-insurance-company-v-sygenta-crop-protection-llc/
<p>IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY and AMERICAN GUARANTEE AND LIABILITY COMPANY, Plaintiffs, C.A. No. N19C-05-108 MMJ CCLD V. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) SYNGENTA CROP PROTECTION, _) LLC, ) ) ) Defendant. Submitted: August 19, 2021 Decided: September 15, 2021 On Plaintiff's Motion for Reargument DENIED ORDER JOHNSTON, J. 1. The Court heard oral argument on Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel. At the conclusion of the argument, the Court reviewed its prior opinion on the related issue and found that certain documents must be produced. The Court’s ruling is set forth in the transcript dated August 5, 2021. 2. Plaintiffs have moved for reargument. Defendants request that the Court expand the scope of the August 5, 2021 ruling. Plaintiffs concede that their Motion to Compel did not address certain facts supporting the application for expansion. Defendant opposes Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reargument. 3. The purpose of moving for reargument is to seek reconsideration of findings of fact, conclusions of law, or judgment of law.' Reargument usually will be denied unless the moving party demonstrates that the Court overlooked a precedent or legal principle that would have a controlling effect, or that it has misapprehended the law or the facts in a manner affecting the outcome of the decision.?, “A motion for reargument should not be used merely to rehash the arguments already decided by the court.* To the extent Plaintiffs have asserted issues that were not raised in the submissions in support of their Motion to Compel, ' Hessler, Inc. v. Farrell, 260 A.2d 701, 702 (Del. 1969). 2 Ferguson v. Vakili, 2005 WL 628026, at *1 (Del. Super.). 3 Wilmington Trust Co. v. Nix, 2002 WL 356371. At *1 (Del. Super.). new arguments may not be presented for the first time in a motion for reargument.* A court cannot “re-weigh” evidence on a motion for reargument.° 4. The Court has reviewed and considered the parties’ written submissions and arguments. The Court did not overlook a controlling precedent or legal principle, or misapprehend the law or the facts in a manner affecting the outcome of the decision. THEREFORE, Defendants’ Motion for Reargument is DENIED. IT ISSO ORDERED. é The Hgfiorable > Mary M. Johnston 4 Oliver v. Boston University, 2006 WL 4782232, at *1 (Del. Ch.). > Manichean Capital, LLC v. Sourcehov Holdings, Inc., 2020 WL 11660067, at *3 (Del. Ch.). N19C-05-108 MMJ CCLD Superior Court of Delaware delsuperct Del. Super. Ct. Zurich American Insurance Company v. Sygenta Crop Protection, LLC Johnston J. 15 September 2021 Published 814d589dc3e4849435fbfab3b402f76b741f2129</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/5093975/zurich-american-insurance-company-v-sygenta-crop-protection-llc/">Original document</a>
Mikkilineni v. PayPal, Inc.2021-08-09T00:00:00-07:00Superior Court of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4906440/mikkilineni-v-paypal-inc/
<p>IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE MAHESWAR MIKKILINENI, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. N19C-05-123 ) PRW CCLD ) PAYPAL, INC., GODADDY.COM, LLC, ) SHIJIL TS, CEO, HARVARD ) COLLEGE OBSERVATORY & ) HARVARD UNIVERSITY, AND ) UPWORK INC. ) Defendants. ) Submitted: August 2, 2021 Decided: August 6, 2021 Reissued with Clarification: August 9, 20211 ORDER DENYING REARGUMENT This 9th day of August, 2021, upon consideration of Plaintiff Maheswar Mikkilineni’s Motion for Reargument (D.I. 118) of this Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order dated July 1, 2021 (D.I. 115); Defendants PayPal, Inc., GoDaddy.com, LLC, and Upwork Inc.’s responses thereto (D.I. 124, 125, 126); Mr. Mikkilineni’s reply (D.I. 130); and the record in this matter, it appears to the Court that: 1 The Court issues this Order to clarify the record and assure the parties that—although it need not under Rule 59—it has considered Mr. Mikkilineni’s prolix reply that was filed just hours before the Court issued its original Order. (D.I. 130). Having painstakingly appraised Mr. Mikkilineni’s thirty-five page reply, the Court finds no basis for Rule 59 relief. (1) On July 1, 2021, this Court granted Defendants PayPal, Inc., GoDaddy.com, LLC, and Upwork Inc.’s Motions to Dismiss and dismissed Mr. Mikkilineni’s claims against those defendants with prejudice.2 (2) On July 7, 2021, Mr. Mikkilineni moved for an extension of time under Superior Court Civil Rule 6(b) to file a Request for Reconsideration of the Court’s July 1 Memorandum Opinion and Order.3 Mr. Mikkilineni requested the extension of time due to the length of the Court’s decision (thirty-three pages) and his status as a pro se plaintiff.4 (3) On July 12, 2021, the Court denied Mr. Mikkilineni’s request for an extension of time because it lacked authority to extend the time for him to move for reargument.5 The Court also made it clear that it would lack jurisdiction to consider any untimely motion under Civil Rule 59.6 2 Mikkilineni v. PayPal, Inc., 2021 WL 2763903 (Del. Super. Ct. July 1, 2021). For a full recitation of the facts underlying the dispute in this litigation, refer to Section I of that opinion and order. Id. at *1. 3 Mot. for Enlargement of Time under Rule 6(b), July 7, 2021 (D.I. 116). 4 Id. 5 Mikkilineni v. PayPal, Inc., 2021 WL 2909758 (Del. Super. Ct. July 12, 2021). See also Del. Super. Civ. R. 6(b) (the Court “may not extend time for taking any action under Rules . . . 59(b), (d), and (e) . . ., except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.”). 6 Mikkilineni, 2021 WL 2909758, at *1. -2- (4) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Mikkilineni filed a “Motion for Reargument under Rule 59(e) and/or to Alter or Amend Summary Judgment under Rule 59(d).”7 (5) A motion for reargument permits a trial court to reconsider its findings of fact, conclusions of law, or judgment.8 “Delaware law places a heavy burden on a [party] seeking relief pursuant to Rule 59.”9 The moving party has …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/4906440/mikkilineni-v-paypal-inc/">Original document</a>
Mikkilineni v. PayPal, Inc.2021-08-06T00:00:00-07:00Superior Court of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4906021/mikkilineni-v-paypal-inc/
<p>IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE MAHESWAR MIKKILINENI, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) C.A. No. N19C-05-123 ) PRW CCLD ) PAYPAL, INC., GODADDY.COM, LLC, ) SHIJIL TS, CEO, HARVARD ) COLLEGE OBSERVATORY & ) HARVARD UNIVERSITY, AND ) UPWORK INC. ) Defendants. ) Submitted: August 2, 2021 Decided: August 6, 2021 ORDER DENYING REARGUMENT This 6th day of August, 2021, upon consideration of Plaintiff Maheswar Mikkilineni’s Motion for Reargument (D.I. 118) of this Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order dated July 1, 2021 (D.I. 115); Defendants PayPal, Inc., GoDaddy.com, LLC, and Upwork Inc.’s responses thereto (D.I. 124, 125, 126); and the record in this matter, it appears to the Court that: (1) On July 1, 2021, this Court granted Defendants PayPal, Inc., GoDaddy.com, LLC, and Upwork Inc.’s Motions to Dismiss and dismissed Mr. Mikkilineni’s claims against those defendants with prejudice.1 (2) On July 7, 2021, Mr. Mikkilineni moved for an extension of time under Superior Court Civil Rule 6(b) to file a Request for Reconsideration of the Court’s July 1 Memorandum Opinion and Order.2 Mr. Mikkilineni requested the extension of time due to the length of the Court’s decision (thirty-three pages) and his status as a pro se plaintiff.3 (3) On July 12, 2021, the Court denied Mr. Mikkilineni’s request for an extension of time because it lacked authority to extend the time for him to move for reargument.4 The Court also made it clear that it would lack jurisdiction to consider any untimely motion under Civil Rule 59.5 (4) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Mikkilineni filed a “Motion for Reargument under Rule 59(e) and/or to Alter or Amend Summary Judgment under Rule 59(d).”6 1 Mikkilineni v. PayPal, Inc., 2021 WL 2763903 (Del. Super. Ct. July 1, 2021). For a full recitation of the facts underlying the dispute in this litigation, refer to Section I of that opinion and order. Id. at *1. 2 Mot. for Enlargement of Time under Rule 6(b), July 7, 2021 (D.I. 116). 3 Id. 4 Mikkilineni v. PayPal, Inc., 2021 WL 2909758 (Del. Super. Ct. July 12, 2021). See also Del. Super. Civ. R. 6(b) (the Court “may not extend time for taking any action under Rules . . . 59(b), (d), and (e) . . ., except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.”). 5 Mikkilineni, 2021 WL 2909758, at *1. 6 Mot. for Reargument, July 12, 2021 (D.I. 118). -2- (5) A motion for reargument permits a trial court to reconsider its findings of fact, conclusions of law, or judgment.7 “Delaware law places a heavy burden on a [party] seeking relief pursuant to Rule 59.”8 The moving party has the burden to demonstrate that the Court must correct an error of law in or prevent manifest injustice deriving from its judgment.9 But “[a] Rule 59(e) application is not an avenue for the moving party to raise new arguments or to rehash arguments already decided by the Court.”10 And such motion will be denied unless the Court has “overlooked a …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/4906021/mikkilineni-v-paypal-inc/">Original document</a>
Mikkilineni v. PayPal, Inc.2021-07-12T00:00:00-07:00Superior Court of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4899056/mikkilineni-v-paypal-inc/
<p>SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE PAUL R. WALLACE NEW CASTLE COUNTY COURTHOUSE JUDGE 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 10400 WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801 (302) 255-0660 Date Submitted: July 7, 2021 Date Decided: July 12, 2021 Mr. Maheswar Mikkilineni 64 Welsh Tract Road, #203 Newark, DE 19713 RE: Mikkilineni v. PayPal, Inc., et al. C.A. No. N19C-05-123 PRW CCLD Dear Mr. Mikkilineni: The Court is in receipt of your filing of July 7, 2021, which you caption a “Motion for enlargement of time under Rule 6(b) to submit a Request for reconsideration of the partial-Order on July 1, 2021.” (D.I. 116). You request this extension due to the length of the Court’s July 1st order and your status as a self- represented plaintiff. Id. As Superior Court Civil Rule 6(b)’s terms expressly state, the Court “may not extend the time for taking any action under Rule[] . . . 59(b), (d) and (e) . . . except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.” Civil Rule 59(e) governs a motion for reargument,1 and there is no exceptive provision to that rule’s time 1 The label attached by a litigant—“motion for reconsideration” or “motion for reargument”—is neither here nor there, any such application is governed by this Court’s Civil Rule 59(e). See Patterson-Woods & Assoc., LLC v. Independence Mall, Inc., 2019 WL 6329069, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 26, 2019) (“A motion for reconsideration or reargument is governed by Superior Court Civil Rule 59(e).”); see also State v. Brown, 2019 WL 2429402, at *1 n.11 (Del. Super. Ct. July 18, 2019) (where movant styled his request a “letter memorandum requesting . . . reconsideration” of the Court’s prior order, the Court observed that “no matter the label, [Movant]’s is a motion for reargument under this Court’s rules” and controlled by Civil Rule 59(e)). Mikkilineni v. PayPal, Inc., et al. C.A. No. N19C-05-123 PRW CCLD July 12, 2021 Page 2 of 2 deadline stated therein. Indeed, under long-settled Delaware law, this Court has no authority to extend the time in which to move for reargument.2 And this Court would have no jurisdiction to consider the substance of any untimely motion for reargument.3 Consequently, Mr. Mikkilineni, your motion made under Superior Court Civil Rule 6(b) must be DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED. Paul R. Wallace, Judge Original to Prothonotary cc: All Counsel via File and Serve 2 See Hessler, Inc. v. Farrell, 260 A.2d 701, 701 n.1 (Del. 1969) (Under Civil Rule 6(b), this Court “has divested itself of the power to enlarge the time for a motion for reargument.”). 3 Lewis v. Coupe, 2016 WL 6081825, at *1 (Del. Oct. 17, 2016) (concluding that this Court “would have lacked jurisdiction to consider” the substance of an untimely motion for reargument) (citing Boyer v. State, 2007 WL 452300, at *1 (Del. 13, 2007) and Preform Building Components, Inc. v. Edwards, 280 A.2d 697, 698 (Del. 1971)); Gunn v. Zurich American Ins. Co., 2013 WL 1859349, at *1 (Del. Super. …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/4899056/mikkilineni-v-paypal-inc/">Original document</a>
CRE Niagara Holdings, LLC v. Resorts Group, Inc.2021-05-25T00:00:00-07:00Superior Court of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4886065/cre-niagara-holdings-llc-v-resorts-group-inc/
<p>SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE PAUL R. WALLACE NEW CASTLE COUNTY JUDGE COURTHOUSE 500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 10400 WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801 (302) 255-0660 Date Submitted: April 23, 2021 Date Decided: May 25, 2021 Richard P. Rollo, Esquire Garvan McDaniel, Esquire Travis S. Hunter, Esquire HOGAN MCDANIEL Dorronda R. Bordley, Esquire 1311 Delaware Avenue RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A. Wilmington, Delaware 19806 920 North King Street Wilmington, Delaware 19801 David S. Rosner, Esquire Paul J. Burgo, Esquire J. David Washburn, Esquire KASOWITZ BENSON TORRES LLP Charles L. Perry, Esquire 1633 Broadway Michael J. Chiusano, Esquire New York, New York 10019 Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP 2121 North Pearl Street, Suite 1100 Dallas, Texas 75201 David A. Crichlow, Esquire Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP 575 Madison Avenue New York, New York 10022 Re: CRE Niagara Holdings, LLC, et al v. Resorts Group, Inc. C.A. No. N20C-05-157 PRW CCLD Dear Counsel: Last month, the Court issued its Memorandum Opinion (the “Opinion”) CRE Niagara Holdings, LLC, et al v. Resorts Group, Inc. C.A. No. N20C-05-157 PRW CCLD May 25, 2021 Page 2 of 25 resolving Resorts Group, Inc.’s (“RGI”) Motion to Dismiss.1 This Letter Order now addresses RGI’s ensuing Motion for Reargument of that decision2 and its separate Motion for Stay or Enlargement of Time.3 For the reasons that follow, both motions are DENIED. I. THE UNDERLYING DISPUTE4 This dispute arises from RGI’s 2017 sale of a resort and timeshare business to Cerberus Capital Management, LP—the non-party equity fund that owns the plaintiff entities. CRE Niagara Holdings, LLC, and its co-plaintiffs (collectively “CRE”) bring this action charging RGI with fraud and breach of contract for alleged false representations made in an effort to induce CRE to execute the contested agreements. In May 2017, RGI and CRE entered into a Unit Asset Purchase Agreement (“UAPA”), through which CRE Niagara Holdings, LLC, acquired certain timeshare 1 CRE Niagara Holdings, LLC v. Resorts Grp., Inc., 2021 WL 1292792 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 7, 2021). 2 Def.’s Mot. for Reargument, Apr. 16, 2021 (D.I. 76). 3 Def.’s Mot. for Stay or Enlargement of Time, Apr. 19, 2021 (D.I. 77). 4 For a fuller recitation of the facts underlying the dispute in this litigation, refer to Section I of the Opinion: CRE Niagara, 2021 WL 1292792, at *1-3. CRE Niagara Holdings, LLC, et al v. Resorts Group, Inc. C.A. No. N20C-05-157 PRW CCLD May 25, 2021 Page 3 of 25 resort assets and ownership of certain entities, including CRE Bushkill, LLC.5 CRE Niagara purchased the timeshare business and existing contracts with the timeshare members and RGI retained the majority right to the payment stream on those existing contracts.6 This transaction was effectuated via multiple written agreements. The agreements relevant here are:7 (1) the UAPA, through which CRE purchased the assets of the timeshare resorts and acquired ownership of certain entities including the CRE Bushkill Group, LLC;8 (2) the Servicing Agreement that addressed the servicing of receivables from sales by RGI;9 and (3) the Participation Agreement that provided CRE …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/4886065/cre-niagara-holdings-llc-v-resorts-group-inc/">Original document</a>
Skinner v. Peninsula Healthcare Services, LLC2021-03-19T00:00:00-07:00Superior Court of Delawarehttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4865869/skinner-v-peninsula-healthcare-services-llc/
<p>IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE CHAROLETTE SKINNER, ) Individually and on behalf of the ) Estate of ALBERT SKINNER; ) JUDITH POWERS; and BRUCE ) SKINNER, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) C.A. No.: N20C-09-178 FJJ v. ) ) PENINSULA HEALTHCARE ) SERVICES, LLC, a Delaware ) Limited Liability Company, ) Individually and d/b/a CADIA ) REHABILITATION ) RENAISSANCE; and LONG ) TERM CARE CORP., ) ) Defendants. ) Submitted: March 15, 2021 Decided: March 19, 2021 ORDER ON DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR REARGUMENT: DENIED Kelley M. Huff, Esquire, Shelsby & Leoni, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Plaintiffs Maria R. Granaudo Gesty, Esquire, Burns White LLC, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendants Jones, J. On March 1, 2021 this Court issued an Opinion and Order finding that plaintiffs’ Wrongful Death Claims were not subject to binding arbitration and denying Defendant’s Motion to Stay the instant action until the survivor claims had been arbitrated. Defendant has moved for reargument on both decisions. For the reasons stated below Defendant’s Motion is DENIED. STANDARD OF REVIEW A motion for reargument permits a trial court to reconsider its findings of fact, conclusions of law, or judgment.1 “Delaware law places a heavy burden on a [party] seeking relief pursuant to Rule 59.2 The moving party has the burden to demonstrate the Court must correct an error of law or prevent manifest injustice deriving from its judgment.3 A Rule 59(e) application is not an avenue for the moving party to raise new arguments or rehash arguments already decided by the Court.”4 And such motion will be denied unless the Court has “overlooked a controlling precedent or legal principles,” or “has misapprehended the law or facts such as would affect the outcome of the decision” challenged.5 Upon a Rule 59(e) 1 See Ramon v. Ramon, 963 A.2d 128, 135 (Del. 2008) (“A motion for reargument is the proper device for seeking reconsideration by the Trial Court of its findings of fact, conclusions of law, or judgment.”) (internal citations omitted.) 2 Kostyshyn v Comm’rs of Town of Bellefonte, 2007 WL 1241875, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 27, 2007).. 3 See Hesslr, Inc. v. Farrell, 260 A.2d 701, 702 (Del. 1969) (“manifest purpose of all Rule 59 motions is to afford the Trial Court an opportunity to correct errors”). 4 Maravilla-Diego v. MBM Construction, II, LLC., 2015 WL 5055955, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2015) (citing cases). 5 Commings v. Jimmy’s Grille, Inc. 2000 WL 1211167, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug 9, 2000). 2 reargument motion, the Court “will determine from the motion and answer whether reargument will be granted.”6 ANALYSIS Defendant claims that the Court’s original decision overlooks the Supreme Court decision in Deuley, et.al. v Dyncorp In’L, Inc., et.al., *A3d 1156 (2010)7 and Deuley requires that the wrongful death claims be arbitrated. In Deuley an employee signed a release which provided that the acceptance of insurance benefits was the exclusive remedy for any cause of action related to his employment including a wrongful …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/4865869/skinner-v-peninsula-healthcare-services-llc/">Original document</a>