CourtListener.com Custom Search Feedhttps://www.courtlistener.com/2010-09-14T00:00:00-07:00Free Law Projectfeeds@courtlistener.comCreated for the public domain by Free Law ProjectIn Re the Reinstatement of Stewart2010-09-14T00:00:00-07:00Supreme Court of Oklahomahttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2260979/in-re-the-reinstatement-of-stewart/
<p>240 P.3d 666 (2010) 2010 OK 61 In the Matter of the Application for REINSTATEMENT OF Jami Lynn STEWART a/k/a Jami Watts, to Membership in the Oklahoma Bar Association and to the Roll of Attorneys. SCBD No. 5444. Supreme Court of Oklahoma. September 14, 2010. Mack K. Martin, Martin Law Office, Oklahoma City, OK, for Applicant for Reinstatement. Lorraine D. Farabow, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma Bar Association, Oklahoma City, OK, for Respondent, Oklahoma Bar Association. ORDER ¶ 1 Rehearing is granted. The May 12, 2009, majority and dissenting opinions in the above-styled matter, published at 2009 OK 29, are withdrawn and the opinion issued this date is substituted therefor. The vote below *667 is on the grant of rehearing only. The vote on the substituted opinion is shown thereon. ¶ 2 EDMONSON, C.J., KAUGER, COLBERT, REIF, JJ., and LAVENDER, S.J., concur. ¶ 3 TAYLOR, V.C.J., OPALA, WATT, and WINCHESTER, JJ., dissent. ¶ 4 HARGRAVE, J., disqualified. OPINION ON REHEARING REIF, J.: ¶ 1 On May 12, 2009, this Court issued an opinion that denied Jami Lynn Stewart's application to be reinstated to the practice of law. Both the General Counsel of the Oklahoma Bar Association and the Professional Responsibility Tribunal had recommended denial of Ms. Stewart's application for reinstatement. ¶ 2 The point of contention over Ms. Stewart's reinstatement centers on her failure to pay the tax liability that led to her suspension in 2002.[2] Ms. Stewart concedes that the tax liability has not been fully paid, but explains that the tax liability was discharged in bankruptcy in 2006. ¶ 3 Relying on prior cases in which reinstatement turned on payment of the tax liability that lead to suspension[3] the opinion of May 12, 2009, held that the discharge in bankruptcy "cannot be treated as tantamount to having paid the [tax] debt as did the attorneys in [the prior reinstatement cases]." The opinion tied restoration of Ms. Stewart's fitness to practice law to the fulfillment of her moral obligation to pay the tax liability, notwithstanding its discharge in bankruptcy. The dissenting opinion argued that the discharged tax liability can not be a basis to deny Ms. Stewart a license to practice law. ¶ 4 In her petition for rehearing, Ms. Stewart argued (as did the dissenting opinion) that refusing to restore her license based on her nonpayment of the discharged tax liability is contrary to 11 U.S.C. § 525(a),[4] and the United States Supreme Court's decision *668 in Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971). Upon further consideration, we now conclude that § 525(a) precludes any consideration of a debt discharged in bankruptcy in connection with the debtor's application for a government granted license. ¶ 5 To be sure, an important state interest is served by recognizing that suspended attorneys have a moral obligation to pay any tax liability that led to their suspension. Likewise, this Court has an interest in applying such a standard fairly and consistently to achieve justice, to rehabilitate errant …</p><br>
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In Re Reinstatement of Gunter2008-03-27T00:00:00-07:00Oregon Supreme Courthttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/835309/in-re-reinstatement-of-gunter/
<p>182 P.3d 187 (2008) 344 Or. 368 In the Matter of the Application for Reinstatement of Bruce A. GUNTER, Applicant. (SC S053579). Supreme Court of Oregon, En Banc. Submitted on the Record December 11, 2007. Decided March 27, 2008. *189 Bruce A. Gunter filed the briefs for himself. Jeffrey D. Sapiro, Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego, filed the brief for the Oregon State Bar. PER CURIAM. Applicant Bruce A. Gunter requests that this court reinstate him as an active member of the Oregon State Bar pursuant to Rule of Procedure (BR) 8.1. The Bar admitted applicant to practice in 1982. After moving to California in 1985, applicant transferred to inactive status. The Bar suspended him in 1995 for non payment of Bar dues. Applicant submitted a Form A (nondisciplinary) resignation in 2001. Applicant moved back to Oregon and filed an application for reinstatement in 2005. The Board of Governors determined that applicant had failed to demonstrate that he presently possessed good moral character and general fitness to practice law, and recommended denying reinstatement. This court referred the matter to the Disciplinary Board. After a hearing, a trial panel issued an order denying reinstatement. The trial panel found that, in light of applicant's past alcohol and drug use, and some of his personal financial dealings, applicant had failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he presently possessed good moral character and the requisite knowledge and legal ability to practice law. We review that order pursuant to BR 10.2. We agree with the trial panel's ultimate recommendation and deny reinstatement. REINSTATEMENT STANDARDS BR 8.1 requires that an applicant make the following showings: "(b) Required Showing. Each applicant under this rule must show that the applicant has good moral character and general fitness to practice law and that the resumption of the practice of law in this state by the applicant will not be detrimental to the administration of justice or the public interest. No applicant shall resume the practice of law in this state or active membership status unless all the requirements of this rule are met. "(c) Learning and Ability. In addition to the showing required in BR 8.1(b), each applicant under this rule who has remained in a suspended or resigned status for more than three years or has been enrolled voluntarily or involuntarily as an inactive member for more than five years must show that the applicant has the requisite learning and ability to practice law in this state." The Bar has the initial burden to provide evidence that the applicant should not be readmitted to the practice of law. BR 8.13. Applicant stipulated prior to the trial panel hearing that the Bar had come forth with sufficient evidence to meet that burden. Accordingly, under BR 8.12, applicant bore the following burden of proof: "An applicant for reinstatement to the practice of law in Oregon shall have the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the applicant has the requisite good moral character and general fitness …</p><br>
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In Re WDP2004-06-16T00:00:00-07:00Hawaii Supreme Courthttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2508592/in-re-wdp/
<p>91 P.3d 1078 (2004) 104 Hawai`i 435 In the Matter of the Application of W.D.P. for Admission to the Bar of the State of Hawai`i. No. 26494. Supreme Court of Hawai`i. June 16, 2004. MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, and DUFFY, JJ. PER CURIAM. Bar Applicant W.D.P. (Applicant or Petitioner) timely petitioned for review of a Board of Bar Examiners' hearing panel's recommendation to deny Petitioner's requests to sit for the Hawai`i bar examination and for admission to the Hawai`i bar. See Hawai`i Board of Bar Examiners Rules of Procedure (HBBE) § 4.4;[1] Rule 1.3(e)[2] of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai`i (RSCH). We deny Petitioner's request to sit for the Hawai`i bar examination and his Application for Admission to the Hawai`i Bar. I. BACKGROUND Petitioner submitted an application for admission to the Hawai`i bar on April 23, 2002. Petitioner received his law degree from the University of Missouri at Kansas City in May 1980. Petitioner is licensed to practice law in Missouri, before the United States District *1079 Court for the Western District of Missouri, and before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. At the time of his application, Petitioner was in good standing with the Missouri Bar. Petitioner reported that he was suspended from the Missouri and federal bars from April 1998 to December 2001. Petitioner reported the suspension resulted from convictions on three felony counts, that the Kansas Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded the case for new trial, and that the State of Kansas dismissed the criminal charges upon remand. Concerning the three felony convictions, the record shows that in 1995 and 1997 Petitioner was charged and recharged with three counts of "unlawfully, knowingly, willingly, and feloniously engag[ing] in lewd fondling or touching of a person under eighteen years of age" in violation of Kansas Statutes Annotated (K.S.A.) §§ 21-3603[3] and 21-4501(d).[4] Count 1 concerned Petitioner's adopted daughter, the daughter of Petitioner's second wife; Counts 2 and 3 concerned the daughter of Petitioner's third and current wife. The acts were alleged to have occurred in 1991, 1992, and 1993 respectively. A jury found Petitioner guilty of all three counts in 1998. Petitioner also reported a 1991 charge of aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer. The record shows that the officer was serving a "protection from abuse" order when the event occurred. Prosecution on the aggravated battery charge was deferred by Petitioner's agreement to enter a diversion program. One of the conditions of the diversion was "enrollment in a drug education program and/or anger control counseling or treatment." Petitioner complied with the diversion conditions and the case was dismissed in September 1992. *1080 When Petitioner submitted his Hawai`i bar application, Petitioner was reinstated to practice before the Missouri state courts and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, but had not been reinstated to practice before the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. In addition to the disciplinary and …</p><br>
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In Re Disciplinary Action Against Haugen1996-02-16T00:00:00-08:00Supreme Court of Minnesotahttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1734634/in-re-disciplinary-action-against-haugen/
<p>Syllabus by the Court Respondent's misconduct warrants indefinite suspension from the practice of law. OPINION Respondent, Marlon O. Haugen, is an attorney who has been practicing law in Minnesota since 1954. This disciplinary proceeding was initiated by the Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility (Director) after the Director received notice that Haugen's trust account was overdrawn on December 18, 1991. The Director commenced an audit of Haugen's trust account. That audit identified a number of trust account violations. As a result, the Director filed this petition for disciplinary action. The petition alleges two counts of unprofessional conduct warranting public discipline. The first count alleges that Haugen improperly handled his trust account and failed to maintain adequate trust account books and records. The second count alleges that Haugen failed, on two occasions, to pay *Page 374 court reporter fees. A hearing was held on June 23, 1995, before Referee Michael H. Seibel. On the first count, the referee found that from January 1990 through May 1994, Haugen failed to: (1) maintain adequate client subsidiary ledgers, cash receipts and cash disbursements journals, and duplicate deposit slips; (2) adequately attribute trust account deposits and disbursements to individual clients; and (3) perform monthly trial balances and reconciliations. In addition, the referee found that: (1) Haugen issued numerous trust account checks when there were insufficient funds in the account; (2) paid business and personal expenses from the trust account; (3) issued checks to himself without attributing payment to a client matter; (4) commingled earned attorney fees with client funds in the trust account; and (5) falsely certified to this court that he maintained his books and records as required by Minn.R.Prof.Conduct 1.15(g). The referee further found that while Haugen's trust account violations did not directly harm any client, all of the client funds in the account were at risk. Finally, the referee found that Haugen did not intentionally violate the rules with respect to maintaining trust account books and records and has a "sincere desire" to comply with the trust account rules. The referee noted, however, that Haugen has practiced law for nearly 40 years and should have been fully aware of the bookkeeping requirements, that he continued to violate the trust account rules after the Director's Office pointed out these violations, and that his trust account books and records were still inaccurate at the time of the disciplinary hearing. Based on these findings, the referee concluded that Haugen's "continued violations and his failure to comprehend the trust fund accounting requirements makes it highly probable that future violations will occur." Ultimately, the referee determined that Haugen had engaged in a pattern of conduct from 1990 through May 1994 that violated Minn.R.Prof.Conduct 1.15(a), (g), and (h) and 8.4(c), in addition to Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board Amended Opinion No. 9. On the second count, the referee found that on two occasions Haugen failed to timely pay court reporter fees. In each case, the court reporter complained to the Director's Office. In the Linton matter, Haugen …</p><br>
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Board of Law Examiners of State of Tex. v. Stevens1993-03-10T00:00:00-08:00Court of Appeals of Texashttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1717601/board-of-law-examiners-of-state-of-tex-v-stevens/
<p>850 S.W.2d 558 (1992) The BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS OF the STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant, v. Edward H. STEVENS, III, Appellee. No. 3-92-005-CV. Court of Appeals of Texas, Austin. December 23, 1992. Rehearing Overruled March 10, 1993. *559 Before POWERS, ABOUSSIE and B.A. SMITH, JJ. ON MOTION FOR REHEARING BEA ANN SMITH, Justice. We withdraw the previous opinion of this Court, dated October 7, 1992, and substitute the following in its place. The Texas Board of Law Examiners (the "Board") denied Edward H. Stevens, Ill's application for admission to the State Bar of Texas on the basis that he lacks "good moral character." Stevens appealed the Board's denial to the Travis County district court, which concluded that the Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the district court reversed the Board's decision and remanded the cause for further proceedings. By a single point of error, the Board complains that the district court erred in failing to find that the Board's order was supported by substantial evidence. We will affirm the district-court judgment. BACKGROUND Stevens, a member of the Mississippi State Bar for approximately twenty years, applied for admission to the State Bar of Texas in August 1985. In his application, Stevens disclosed two civil judgments entered against him for certain debts. Stevens indicated that he was financially unable to satisfy the judgments. Supplemental investigations revealed a third unsatisfied judgment as well as past difficulties with the Internal Revenue Service stemming from Stevens' failure to pay income taxes and file returns. Following a hearing in February 1988, the Board notified Stevens that his request for admission to the Texas Bar was denied. DISCUSSION "Good Moral Character" Applicants seeking admission to the state bar of Texas must possess good moral *560 character.[1] The Board of Law Examiners is empowered to investigate the moral character of each applicant for a license. Tex.Gov't Code Ann. § 82.028(a) (West 1988); Rule 111(d), Rules Governing Admission to the State Bar of Texas.[2] The purpose of requiring an applicant to possess good moral character is "to exclude from the practice of law those persons possessing character traits that are likely to result in injury to future clients, in the obstruction of the administration of justice, or in the violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility." Rule 11(b). The legislative directive to the Board to certify the "good moral character" of each attorney admitted to practice law in this state is troublingly indefinite. The Rule adds little precision: "Good moral character is a functional assessment of character and fitness of a prospective lawyer." Rule 11(b). The remainder of the rule suggests excluding those with character traits of dishonesty or lack of trustworthiness in carrying out responsibilities, "but such traits must have a rational connection with the applicant's present fitness or capacity to practice law and accordingly must relate to the State's legitimate interest in protecting prospective clients and the system of justice." Id. The United States Supreme Court has warned that "good moral character" is a …</p><br>
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Board of Law Examiners of the State of Texas v. Edward H. Stevens III1992-12-23T00:00:00-08:00Court of Appeals of Texashttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2857565/board-of-law-examiners-of-the-state-of-texas-v-edw/
<p>Tx Bd. of law exmrs v. stevens IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS, AT AUSTIN ON MOTION FOR REHEARING NO. 3-92-005-CV THE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLANT vs. EDWARD H. STEVENS, III, APPELLEE FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 250TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 441,226, HONORABLE JERRY DELLANA, JUDGE PRESIDING We withdraw the previous opinion of this Court, dated October 7, 1992, and substitute the following in its place. The Texas Board of Law Examiners (the "Board") denied Edward H. Stevens, III's application for admission to the State Bar of Texas on the basis that he lacks "good moral character." Stevens appealed the Board's denial to the Travis County district court, which concluded that the Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the district court reversed the Board's decision and remanded the cause for further proceedings. By a single point of error, the Board complains that the district court erred in failing to find that the Board's order was supported by substantial evidence. We will affirm the district-court judgment. BACKGROUND Stevens, a member of the Mississippi State Bar for approximately twenty years, applied for admission to the State Bar of Texas in August 1985. In his application, Stevens disclosed two civil judgments entered against him for certain debts. Stevens indicated that he was financially unable to satisfy the judgments. Supplemental investigations revealed a third unsatisfied judgment as well as past difficulties with the Internal Revenue Service stemming from Stevens' failure to pay income taxes and file returns. Following a hearing in February 1988, the Board notified Stevens that his request for admission to the Texas Bar was denied. DISCUSSION "Good Moral Character" Applicants seeking admission to the state bar of Texas must possess good moral character. (1) The Board of Law Examiners is empowered to investigate the moral character of each applicant for a license. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 82.028(a) (West 1988); Rule III(d), Rules Governing Admission to the State Bar of Texas. (2) The purpose of requiring an applicant to possess good moral character is "to exclude from the practice of law those persons possessing character traits that are likely to result in injury to future clients, in the obstruction of the administration of justice, or in the violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility." Rule II(b). The legislative directive to the Board to certify the "good moral character" of each attorney admitted to practice law in this state is troublingly indefinite. The Rule adds little precision: "Good moral character is a functional assessment of character and fitness of a prospective lawyer." Rule II(b). The remainder of the rule suggests excluding those with character traits of dishonesty or lack of trustworthiness in carrying out responsibilities, "but such traits must have a rational connection with the applicant's present fitness or capacity to practice law and accordingly must relate to the State's legitimate interest in protecting prospective clients and the system of justice." Id. The United States Supreme Court has …</p><br>
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Kwasnik v. State Bar1990-05-31T00:00:00-07:00California Supreme Courthttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1233986/kwasnik-v-state-bar/
<p>50 Cal.3d 1061 (1990) 791 P.2d 319 269 Cal. Rptr. 749 RICHARD E. KWASNIK, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent. Docket No. S010199. Supreme Court of California. May 31, 1990. *1063 COUNSEL Richard E. Kwasnik, in pro. per., for Petitioner. Diane C. Yu, Truitt A. Richey, Jr., and Richard J. Zanassi for Respondent. *1064 OPINION THE COURT. Petitioner Richard E. Kwasnik seeks review of the refusal of the State Bar to certify him to this court for admission to the bar on the ground that he lacks the requisite good moral character. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6066; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 952(c); Rules Regulating Admission to Practice Law, rule I, § 11.)[1] For the reasons set forth below, we conclude petitioner should be admitted to the bar. FACTS Petitioner graduated from Brooklyn Law School in June 1966. He was admitted to the practice of law in New York in 1967. In November 1970 petitioner was involved in an automobile accident that resulted in the death of Steven Smilanich, a husband and father of three children. Although a grand jury investigated the accident, no criminal charges were filed. Petitioner pleaded guilty to "driving while impaired," a traffic infraction, and was fined $50. The decedent's widow (hereafter Smilanich) and decedent's three minor children filed a wrongful death action against petitioner in a New York court, which resulted in a judgment against him in the amount of $232,234.16 in July 1974. Petitioner's automobile insurance carrier paid the policy limit of $10,000 to Smilanich. In 1975 Smilanich filed attachment proceedings against petitioner to enforce the judgment by garnishing his wages; he previously had made no payments on the judgment. Once he received a notice of levy, petitioner began making payments of approximately $42 every two weeks. Between 1975 and January 1980, petitioner paid $4,685. He has paid nothing since January 1980. In November 1980, after Smilanich's attorney rejected a settlement offer of $15,000, petitioner filed a petition for bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida. (See Florida Bd. of Bar Examiners Re: Kwasnik (Fla. 1987) 508 So.2d 338, 339 (hereafter Kwasnik).) The only debt scheduled for discharge in the bankruptcy petition was the Smilanich judgment; petitioner listed none of his other then-existing debts. The Smilanich judgment was discharged by the bankruptcy court in March 1981. *1065 A. Florida Bar Proceedings In response to petitioner's 1979 application to the Florida State Bar, the Florida Bar Examiners (Florida Bar) found that he failed to meet the standards of conduct and fitness and concluded that he should be denied admission. In a 1980 hearing regarding petitioner's admission to the Florida State Bar, he was charged with three instances of wrongful conduct that he does not dispute. First, in a deposition taken during the wrongful death suit, petitioner testified falsely that he had no joint interest in any checking account or other item of personal property. In fact, he was a signatory on a joint account with his …</p><br>
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In Re Petition for Disciplinary Action Against Pokorny1990-03-30T00:00:00-08:00Supreme Court of Minnesotahttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1807702/in-re-petition-for-disciplinary-action-against-pokorny/
<p>453 N.W.2d 345 (1990) In re Petition for DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST Wayne A. POKORNY, an Attorney at Law of the State of Minnesota. No. C9-89-719. Supreme Court of Minnesota. March 30, 1990. Rehearing Denied April 12, 1990. William Wernz, Director of Lawyers' Bd. of Professional Responsibility, Martin A. Cole, Sr. Asst. Director of the Office of Lawyers' Professional Responsibility, St. Paul, for appellant. Wayne A. Pokorny, Excelsior, for respondent. Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc. OPINION PER CURIAM. Respondent missed three court hearings in two separate matters, issued an insufficient fund check to opposing counsel in payment of court-awarded fees, and failed to pay two judgments for law-related debts. Respondent's prior private disciplines aggravated this misconduct. The Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility (Director) and the referee recommended respondent be publicly reprimanded, placed on two years supervised probation, and required to successfully complete the professional responsibility exam and pay the remaining unpaid judgment against him. While we agree with most of this recommended discipline, we feel the nature of this misconduct is not well suited to supervised probation and thus order respondent suspended indefinitely, with conditions for reinstatement. I. Respondent Wayne A. Pokorny was admitted to practice law in Minnesota in 1961, and has continuously practiced here since then, most recently as a solo practitioner. After a hearing, the referee found respondent's conduct violated professional rules in three general areas. First, respondent failed to attend three scheduled court appearances. Robert Jensen retained Pokorny to represent him in his marriage dissolution. Mrs. Jensen's motion for temporary relief was scheduled for July 3, 1985. Pokorny's request for a continuance from opposing counsel was refused and, without seeking a continuance from the court, neither Pokorny nor his client appeared at the July 3rd hearing. After finding the nonappearance to be unjustified, the court assessed $550.00 in attorney fees against Mr. Jensen. Pokorny later requested review of the court's findings in the dissolution, but did not appear for that hearing scheduled on October 27, 1986. Pokorny was retained by Steven Spitzer, but respondent failed to appear at a October 20, 1987, hearing on discovery motions. The court assessed Pokorny $150.00 in attorney fees for the missed appearance, *346 which was to be paid to opposing counsel, M. Sue Wilson. The referee found respondent did not pay the court-ordered fees to Wilson within the required 14 days. Several months later, Pokorny gave Wilson a check drawn on his law office business account for $150.00; in exchange she agreed not to raise the non-payment issue at their upcoming pre-trial conference. The check was returned by the bank for insufficient funds. Pokorny told Wilson's office he would send another check, but did not. After Wilson filed an ethics complaint against Pokorny, for which he demanded an apology from her, he issued a $100.00 check to Wilson and later sent her a check for the remaining $50.00. The third category of respondent's misconduct relates to his failure to pay judgments arising out of …</p><br>
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Hippard v. State Bar1989-12-11T00:00:00-08:00California Supreme Courthttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1147558/hippard-v-state-bar/
<p>49 Cal.3d 1084 (1989) 782 P.2d 1140 264 Cal. Rptr. 684 RICHARD M. HIPPARD, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, Respondent. Docket No. S008378. Supreme Court of California. December 11, 1989. *1087 COUNSEL Larson & Weinberg, Joel C. Johnson and Doron Weinberg for Petitioner. Diane C. Yu, Truitt A. Richey, Jr., and Richard J. Zanassi for Respondent. *1088 OPINION THE COURT. This is a proceeding to review the State Bar's denial of Richard Hippard's petition for reinstatement to the practice of law. We hold that petitioner's discharge in bankruptcy of indebtedness to clients arising from misconduct did not preclude the State Bar from considering, as an indicator of rehabilitation, petitioner's efforts, if any, to make restitution; that petitioner did not meet his burden of demonstrating rehabilitation because he failed to prove either an inability to make restitution in whole or in part or an objectively verifiable effort to make restitution reasonably related to his ability to pay; and that the appropriate showing regarding restitution must be made before the granting of reinstatement, and not thereafter as a condition of reinstatement. We conclude petitioner should not be reinstated at this time. FACTS Petitioner was admitted to the practice of law in 1966. The State Bar initiated three separate disciplinary proceedings against petitioner based on misconduct that occurred between 1971 and 1975. In one of the proceedings, the Local Administrative Committee of the State Bar recommended in June 1976 that petitioner be disbarred. The recommendation was based on the finding that petitioner had misappropriated $3,967.66 from a client, Maxine Peairs. It was made after the entry of a judgment in favor of the client based, in part, on judicial findings that petitioner had converted funds and had wilfully and knowingly engaged in conduct which created an undue hardship on his client in breach of his fiduciary duties. Thereafter, in August 1976, petitioner submitted his resignation to the State Bar. The Board of Governors adopted a resolution recommending acceptance by this court of petitioner's resignation subject to the completion of proceedings to perpetuate the evidence in the remaining two pending disciplinary matters. Petitioner and the State Bar then entered into "Stipulations and Admissions" in both of the remaining proceedings. Those stipulations and admissions, signed by petitioner on January 18, 1977, address a total of five counts and numerous instances of misconduct for the period 1972 to 1975. Petitioner admitted the commission of the following acts of misconduct: (1) seven instances of borrowing money from clients either for himself or, in one instance, for a friend, totaling more than $22,000, without providing security or disclosing his poor financial condition and his probable inability to repay; (2) one instance of advising a client to loan funds at a usurious rate; (3) three separate instances of abandoning clients; (4) four instances of *1089 knowingly issuing checks drawn on either a closed account or on accounts with insufficient funds; (5) two instances of misappropriating funds from clients; (6) one instance of fraudulently representing to his client …</p><br>
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Christmas v. Maryland Racing Commission (In Re Christmas)1989-06-15T00:00:00-07:00United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Marylandhttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1819462/christmas-v-maryland-racing-commission-in-re-christmas/
<p>102 B.R. 447 (1989) In re William G. CHRISTMAS, Debtor. William G. CHRISTMAS, Plaintiff, v. MARYLAND RACING COMMISSION, Defendant. Bankruptcy No. 88-5-3712-JS, Adv. No. A88-0379-JS. United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Maryland. June 15, 1989. Joseph A. Imbesi, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff. Bruce C. Spizler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Licensing & Regulation, Baltimore, Md., for defendant. MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING DEBTOR'S AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF JAMES F. SCHNEIDER, Bankruptcy Judge. The issues before the Court are whether the suspension of a debtor's license as a horse trainer by the Maryland Racing Commission constitutes discriminatory treatment prohibited by Section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code; whether the suspension violates the automatic stay provisions of Section 362(a); and whether the state regulations upon which the suspension was based are therefore unconstitutional as violative of the Supremacy Clause. Based upon the conclusions that the license was not suspended solely because the debtor had filed bankruptcy, and that the suspension of the license falls within an exception to the automatic stay, the complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief will be denied. PROLOGUE "Horse racing, the sport for which Maryland is most widely known, had an early origin in the State, though the exact date of its introduction is not definitely known. A deed filed in 1695 says that a tract of land in Talbot County `starts at the race course,' indicating that the colonial gentry followed the sport even before that date. "The colonial track at Annapolis was under the auspices of the Maryland Jockey Club. Although this organization dates from 1745, Francis Barnum Culver, in his *448 Blooded Horses of Colonial Days, expressed the opinion that an organized racing association existed in Annapolis as early as 1740 or '43. The widespread interest in racing created an early demand for swifter strains of horses and the more common stock was soon replaced by pedigreed animals. "Among the history-making blooded stock were Spark, imported by Governor Ogle; Governor Horatio Sharpe's Othello; the brood Queen Mab (out of the royal stud at Hampton Court); Colonel Tasker's importation, Selima, and Samuel Galloways's famous Selim, son of Othello and Selima. Arriving from England in 1780, Selima was destined to be one of the most important sources of thoroughbred blood in the country. To Selima many great horses, such as Man o' War, Seabiscuit, and War Admiral trace their pedigrees. "The Revolution brought horsebreeding and racing to a standstill in Maryland. Fully half a century later, when Baltimore had superseded Annapolis as the metropolis of Maryland, a new track, the Baltimore Central Course, was established on a plateau near the Old Frederick Road, not far from the present Franklintown. About sixty horses took part in the opening meet which was held late in October 1831. "Today there are four one-mile tracks in Maryland. Pimlico, the oldest (1870) and the most famous of the four, is one of the country's major tracks. `Old Hilltop,' as it is known to the racing fraternity, is a semiannual rendezvous for famous horses …</p><br>
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In Re Zbiegien1988-12-23T00:00:00-08:00Supreme Court of Minnesotahttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2048192/in-re-zbiegien/
<p>433 N.W.2d 871 (1988) In Re Petition of John A. ZBIEGIEN for Review of the State Board of Law Examiners' Decision. No. C1-88-509. Supreme Court of Minnesota. December 23, 1988. Charles T. Hvass, Minneapolis, for appellant. Theodore J. Collins, St. Paul, for respondent. *872 Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc. PER CURIAM. Petitioner, John A. Zbiegien, appeals from a recommendation of the State Board of Law Examiners that he not be admitted to the Bar of Minnesota because he had failed to prove that he possesses the requisite character and fitness to be so admitted. Our review of the record before us does not persuade us that petitioner must be barred from the practice of law for lack of character. We direct the Board to recommend his admission. Petitioner was a fourth year student at William Mitchell College of Law when he enrolled in a products liability seminar taught by Professor Michael Steenson. The requirements for the class included a research paper, to be submitted in two drafts. Petitioner chose the topic, "Accident Prevention in Products Liability Litigation." Petitioner submitted the first draft of his paper on November 11, 1986. The paper was plagiarized in large part from the works of other authors. Nearly all of the first 12 pages were taken verbatim or nearly verbatim from a number of law review articles without proper citation in the endnotes. In addition, some endnotes were taken from other sources in such a way as to give the appearance that they were petitioner's own work. Several other portions of the paper were paraphrased or had words or phrases omitted or substituted for the originals as they appeared in various published sources. Again, no proper citation was given. The paper, as submitted, was a violation of the academic rules at William Mitchell, as well as basic academic and law school standards. On December 5, 1986, petitioner kept a scheduled appointment with Professor Steenson to discuss the paper. At that time, Steenson succinctly informed him that the paper was unacceptable because it was plagiarized and that Steenson was recommending he be expelled from William Mitchell. In a subsequent interview with Associate Dean, Matthew Downs, petitioner was informed that he would receive a course grade of "F" and that he would lose credit and tuition for the course but he would be permitted to remain in school. Petitioner did not deny the plagiarism in his conversation with Dean Downs. When asked for an explanation of the circumstances, he replied that he had been under stress of time pressures, that he had just begun a new job, and that his wife had been injured in an automobile accident, causing additional stress at home. In a letter to petitioner dated four days later, summarizing the conversation, Downs stated: "I appreciated your candor * * *, and I believe that it [the plagiarism] is conduct that will not be repeated." Petitioner did not appeal the sanction. On April 15, 1987, petitioner submitted his application for …</p><br>
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Application of Swanson1984-02-17T00:00:00-08:00Supreme Court of Minnesotahttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1997599/application-of-swanson/
<p>343 N.W.2d 662 (1984) In the Matter of the Application of Carl Sigurd SWANSON for Reinstatement as a Member of the Bar of the State of Minnesota. No. C2-75-46057. Supreme Court of Minnesota. February 17, 1984. *663 Robert T. White, St. Paul, for petitioner. Michael J. Hoover, Director of Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board, and William J. Wernz, St. Paul, for respondent. Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc. PER CURIAM. This is a petition for reinstatement by Carl Sigurd Swanson, who was disbarred on March 1, 1976. The Director of the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board investigated petitioner's request and recommended against reinstatement. The matter was heard before a panel of the Lawyers Professional Responsibility Board on July 20, 1983. The panel also recommended against reinstatement. We affirm the panel's recommendation. Petitioner was disbarred for converting funds from various clients' trust and estate accounts. By stipulation, he admitted the allegations set forth in the Amended Petition for Disciplinary Action which resulted in his disbarment. The Amended Petition recited the following complaints: 1. Mr. Swanson failed to distribute $31,525.01 from an estate. 2. Mr. Swanson issued NSF checks of $6,748.42 from his own trust account and $16,762.74 from a client's estate as executor in payment of distributive shares. 3. Mr. Swanson forged the signature of an executrix on a check of $11,650 payable to his own trust account and later withdrew this money to pay a distributee of another estate. 4. Mr. Swanson withdrew $5,500 from a client's estate account and deposited the money in his own personal checking account, thus delaying final distribution to a residuary legatee. 5. Mr. Swanson deposited $13,375.93 from a client's estate account into his own trust account and, without making additional deposits, withdrew $3,000 from his trust account and deposited the money into his wife's personal account. He also drew two checks of $901.50 and $750 on his trust account and deposited this money into his own business account. 6. Mr. Swanson deposited $13,000 from the proceeds of the settlement of a will contest into his trust account. He later withdrew these funds and, by the date of the decree of distribution of the settlement, his trust account was closed with a closing balance of $2.08. These activities took place between 1971 and 1974, with most of the offenses occurring in October and November of 1974. Petitioner was temporarily suspended by this court on July 18, 1975, and disbarred on March 1, 1976. On January 19, 1977, he was convicted of a felony (theft exercising temporary control). He received a 10-year sentence, which was stayed pending service of a 1-year sentence in the Ramsey County Workhouse, restitution to his clients, payment of a $5,000 fine, and compliance with a 10-year probationary period. Petitioner has documented restitution to all clients. On June 16, 1981, he was honorably discharged from probation. For the 3 years following his disbarment, petitioner worked at terminating his practice and served his term in the workhouse. During the tax seasons of …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/1997599/application-of-swanson/">Original document</a>
Application of Matthews1983-07-21T00:00:00-07:00Supreme Court of New Jerseyhttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2373992/application-of-matthews/
<p>94 N.J. 59 (1983) 462 A.2d 165 IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF DONALD G. MATTHEWS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF NEW JERSEY. The Supreme Court of New Jersey. Argued June 16, 1983. Decided July 21, 1983. *62 Bernard F. Conway argued the cause for Donald G. Matthews (Stern, Steiger, Croland & Bornstein, attorneys; Bernard F. Conway and Jay D. Rubenstein, on the brief). Colette A. Coolbaugh, Assistant Director, argued the cause for Division of Ethics and Professional Services (Colette A. Coolbaugh, attorney; Harold L. Rubenstein, on the brief). The opinion of the Court was delivered by HANDLER, J. The issues raised by these proceedings concern the standards for evaluating the fitness of a bar applicant to practice law and the procedures that must be followed in determining the candidate's fitness. The individual whose application for admission to practice law has occasioned these proceedings is Donald Matthews. While in law school, Matthews was involved in a fraudulent investment scheme that eventually resulted in civil litigation by defrauded investors against Matthews and his partner. This unlawful venture also led to criminal proceedings against his partner, resulting in the partner's conviction and imprisonment. Matthews has maintained that he was deceived by his partner and that throughout his involvement he believed in good faith in the legitimacy of the investment scheme for which he solicited funds. Initially, a designated part of the Committee on Character concluded that Matthews had knowingly participated in the investment fraud, demonstrated a serious lack of understanding *63 of the enormity of his misdeeds and displayed little, if any, remorse. Accordingly, it recommended that Matthews be denied admission to the bar for lack of the required good moral character. Matthews appealed this determination to a Hearing Panel of the Committee on Character, which, following a formal hearing, found that although Matthews should have known of the fraud, the evidence was insufficient to prove Matthews had actual knowledge. The Committee concluded that while Matthews' misconduct had been serious, his character had changed over the six intervening years, and that the six-year delay in admission had been sufficient discipline. Accordingly, on November 1, 1982 the Committee certified to the Board of Bar Examiners that Matthews was fit to practice law. Upon initial review of the certification, we issued an order to show cause in order to review the Committee's certification of Matthews' fitness to practice and to determine whether he should be admitted to practice law. I The heart of this matter concerns Matthews' relationship and business dealings with Ralph Cucciniello. In the late summer of 1973, as Matthews prepared to enter law school, Cucciniello offered Matthews the opportunity to enter into an extraordinarily profitable investment scheme. Cucciniello who was a social acquaintance of Matthews told Matthews that he had an opportunity to invest in some land deals that promised to yield a return greater than 40 percent on a term of merely four to six weeks. Matthews' understanding of the structure of these deals was that the money …</p><br>
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Application of Taylor1982-06-29T00:00:00-07:00Oregon Supreme Courthttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1173579/application-of-taylor/
<p>647 P.2d 462 (1982) 293 Or. 285 In the matter of the APPLICATION OF Ronald Curtis TAYLOR, for Admission to Practice Law in the State of Oregon. OSB 89-AD; SC 27292. Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc. Decided June 29, 1982. Argued and Submitted February 9, 1982. William B. Wyllie, Salem, filed a brief for applicant. Gary E. Rhoades, Portland, argued the cause for the Oregon State Bar. With him on the brief was Albert A. Menashe, Portland. PER CURIAM. Applicant requests admission to the Oregon State Bar. He passed the Bar examination in the summer of 1980, but was not recommended for admission by the Board of Bar Examiners. On his petition for review, a hearing was held before a trial board pursuant to the Rules for Admission of Attorneys. The trial board recommended that applicant be denied admission to the Bar and, with one modification, this recommendation was adopted by the Disciplinary Review Board. Applicant then requested review by this court. ORS 9.535. This case comes under ORS 9.220, which, at the time these proceedings began,[1] required: "An applicant for admission as attorney must apply to the Supreme Court and show that he or she: "* * * "(2) Is a person of good moral character, which may be proved by any evidence satisfactory to the court." *463 The objections to applicant's admission are in the form of allegations of specific acts by applicant which purportedly demonstrate a lack of good moral character. Though the statute places on the applicant the burden of proving his good moral character, the Oregon State Bar went forward and proved the various facts on which it relies. Cf. In re Easton, 289 Or. 99, 101, 610 P.2d 270 (1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 862, 101 S.Ct. 166, 66 L.Ed.2d 79 (1980). We cannot overstate the necessity that one who seeks admission to the Bar be of good moral character. An applicant must possess this character in addition to intellectual abilities, and intellect alone cannot make up for deficiency of moral character.[2] In our opinions in cases of this kind, we have sought to stress this aspect of joining the profession, but the unfortunate fact is that these opinions are probably read only by the applicant involved and persons already admitted to practice. The person entering law school, for whom the process of admission to the organized Bar is several years down the road, is the very person to whom statements of this kind are addressed and by whom they should be read. This applicant's want of the requisite good moral character appears from his theft, perjury and bankruptcy. THEFT In 1977, while he was a first-semester law student, applicant was arrested at a Salem department store and charged with the theft of a shirt. Applicant was tried and at the close of the evidence the case was taken under advisement. Some time later, the charge against applicant was dismissed. In reviewing this application, the Disciplinary Review Board decided that applicant's arrest was …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/1173579/application-of-taylor/">Original document</a>
Board of Trustees v. Bruce (In Re Bruce)1980-02-27T00:00:00-08:00United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinoishttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1970534/board-of-trustees-v-bruce-in-re-bruce/
<p>3 B.R. 77 (1980) In the Matter of Geneva BRUCE, Bankrupt. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY, Plaintiff, v. Geneva BRUCE, Defendant. Bankruptcy No. 78 B 3500. United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D. February 27, 1980. Alan Kawitt, Chicago, Ill., for debtor. Shari R. Rhode, Carbondale, Ill., for plaintiff. OPINION AND ORDER RICHARD L. MERRICK, Bankruptcy Judge. This cause comes on to be heard upon a motion for summary judgment of the Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University that the student loan debt owed to it by Geneva Bruce be held non-dischargeable under Section 17a of the Bankruptcy Act.[1] The reasoning of the opinion will go somewhat beyond the contentions of the parties in their pleadings, arguments and briefs in *78 order that the principles enunciated here may serve as a basis for decision in other student loan dischargeability proceedings under the same and other federal student loan programs which are pending before this court. The facts in the case are not in dispute and follow the common familiar pattern of other student loan cases around the country; the details will be described after a general discussion of the nature of the broad problem and the approaches made to its solution by other courts. STUDENT LOAN PROGRAMS Of a wide variety of federally supported student assistance programs for veterans and non-veterans there are two which are of particular significance to bankruptcy courts because of the frequency with which the former students have sought to have their loans discharged in bankruptcy proceedings: (a) direct loans under the National Defense Education Act of 1958,[2] and (b) insured or guaranteed loans under the Higher Education Act of 1965, Part B.[3] A brief description of those two assistance programs may facilitate an understanding of the decisions which have been reported to date and of the wide variation in the results in those cases. The National Defense Education Act in broad terms provided that educational institutions or their affiliates or foundations could create funds of which 10% of the capital had been supplied by the institution and 90% by the federal government to make student loans on a revolving basis at 3% interest repayable in equal annual installments over ten years, with repayment commencing nine months after the student ceased receiving one-half of normal full time instruction. Repayment could be delayed for up to three years because of service in the Armed Forces, the Peace Corps or Vista.[4] Up to 50% of the debt could be cancelled by teaching in needy schools. The debt was cancelled by the death or permanent disability of the former student. Part B of the Higher Education Act of 1965 established a more comprehensive program which has had a broader impact because the annual funding has been six times as large as that of the direct National Defense loan program. The principal distinguishing feature between Higher Education Act, Part B loans and those granted as National Defense Student loans is that the latter were direct loans by …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/1970534/board-of-trustees-v-bruce-in-re-bruce/">Original document</a>