CourtListener.com Custom Search Feedhttps://www.courtlistener.com/2020-08-10T00:00:00-07:00Free Law Projectfeeds@courtlistener.comCreated for the public domain by Free Law ProjectB.B. v. County of Los Angeles2020-08-10T00:00:00-07:00California Supreme Courthttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4774043/bb-v-county-of-los-angeles/
<p>IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA B.B., a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Respondents. T.E., a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Appellants. D.B., a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Defendants and Appellants. S250734 Second Appellate District, Division Three B264946 Los Angeles County Superior Court TC027341, TC027438 and BC505918 August 10, 2020 Justice Chin authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, and Groban concurred. Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Cuéllar concurred. B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES S250734 Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. In this case, we consider the application of Civil Code section 1431.21 to tortfeasors held liable for injuries based on the commission of an intentional tort. Here, the intentional tort was a battery that, combined with other factors, tragically led to the death of Darren Burley. While attempting to subdue Burley, deputies from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, after getting Burley facedown on pavement, used their knees to pin him to the ground with as much body weight as possible. One of the deputies — defendant David Aviles — pressed one knee into the center of Burley’s back and another onto the back of Burley’s head, near the neck. Aviles disengaged after Burley’s hands were cuffed behind his back and his ankles tightly cinched together with a nylon cord. But when paramedics arrived, they found Burley, still cuffed and facedown on the pavement, with a different deputy pressing a knee into the small of his back and with no pulse. They restored Burley’s 1 All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Civil Code. 1 B.B. v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. pulse through resuscitation efforts, but he never regained consciousness and died 10 days later.2 A jury found that Aviles had committed battery by using unreasonable force against Burley. The court later entered a judgment against Aviles for the entire amount of the noneconomic damages the jury awarded — $8 million — even though the jury also found that only 20 percent of the responsibility for Burley’s death was “attributable to” Aviles’s actions. On review, the Court of Appeal held that the judgment against Aviles had to be reduced in accordance with the jury’s allocation of responsibility to him. (B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2019) 25 Cal.App.5th 115.) It relied on section 1431.2, which provides in relevant part: “In any action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, based upon principles of comparative fault, the liability of each defendant for non- economic damages shall be several only and shall not be joint. Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of non- 2 Burley was African American. We are cognizant that the facts of this case bear similarities to well-publicized …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/4774043/bb-v-county-of-los-angeles/">Original document</a>
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court2018-07-26T00:00:00-07:00California Court of Appealhttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4521000/pacific-gas-electric-co-v-superior-court/
<p>Filed 7/26/18 (unmodified opn. attached) CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) ---- PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY et al., C085308 Petitioners, (Super. Ct. No. JCCP4853) v. ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO REHEARING AND COUNTY, MODIFYING OPINION Respondent; [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT] RICHARD ABI-HABIB et al., Real Parties in Interest. THE COURT: Real parties in interest have filed a petition for rehearing with this court. It is ordered that the published opinion filed herein on July 2, 2018, be modified as follows: 1. At page 5 of the slip opinion, in the first full paragraph beginning with “At the hearing on the motion for summary adjudication,” add the word “clearly” so the first sentence reads as follows: 1 At the hearing on the motion for summary adjudication, plaintiffs argued clearly for the first time that punitive damages are appropriate because (1) PG&E has a nondelegable duty to operate its power lines safely, (2) PG&E sought to delegate responsibility for this duty to independent contractors, and (3) PG&E failed to ensure that contractors hired employees who were qualified and properly trained, such that (4) PG&E’s conduct demonstrates conscious disregard of the safety of others, whether or not PG&E was aware of its contractors’ alleged deficiencies. There is no change in the judgment. Real parties in interest’s petition for rehearing is denied. BY THE COURT: /S/ MAURO, Acting P. J. /S/ MURRAY, J. /S/ RENNER, J. 2 Filed 7/2/18 (unmodified version) CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) ---- PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY et al., C085308 Petitioners, (Super. Ct. No. JCCP4853) v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent; RICHARD ABI-HABIB et al., Real Parties in Interest. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in mandate. Petition Granted. Allen H. Sumner, Judge. Quinn, Emanuel, Urquhart & Sullivan, Kathleen M. Sullivan, Robert Feldman and Daniel H. Bromberg for Petitioners. No appearance for Respondent. Dreyer, Babich, Buccola, Wood, Campora, Steven M. Campora, Robert A. Buccola, Catia G. Saravia; Corey, Luzaich, de Ghetaldi, Nastari & Riddle, Dario de 1 Ghetaldi, Amanda L. Riddle; Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy and Frank M. Pitre for Real Parties in Interest. This coordinated proceeding arises out of the Butte Fire, a devastating wildfire that swept through Calaveras and Amador counties in September 2015. The fire started when a tree came into contact with an overhead power line owned and operated by petitioners Pacific Gas and Electric Company and PG&E Corporation (together, PG&E or the company). Real parties in interest (plaintiffs) brought suit against PG&E, seeking punitive damages under Public Utilities Code section 2106 and Civil Code section 3294.1 PG&E sought summary adjudication of plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages under section 3294 only. The trial court denied the motion. PG&E seeks writ relief from the trial court’s order. We conclude there are no triable issues of fact which, if resolved in plaintiffs’ favor, could subject PG&E to punitive damages under section …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/4521000/pacific-gas-electric-co-v-superior-court/">Original document</a>
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court2018-07-02T00:00:00-07:00California Court of Appealhttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4513598/pacific-gas-electric-co-v-superior-court/
<p>Filed 7/2/18 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT (Sacramento) ---- PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY et al., C085308 Petitioners, (Super. Ct. No. JCCP4853) v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SACRAMENTO COUNTY, Respondent; RICHARD ABI-HABIB et al., Real Parties in Interest. ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in mandate. Petition Granted. Allen H. Sumner, Judge. Quinn, Emanuel, Urquhart & Sullivan, Kathleen M. Sullivan, Robert Feldman and Daniel H. Bromberg for Petitioners. No appearance for Respondent. Dreyer, Babich, Buccola, Wood, Campora, Steven M. Campora, Robert A. Buccola, Catia G. Saravia; Corey, Luzaich, de Ghetaldi, Nastari & Riddle, Dario de 1 Ghetaldi, Amanda L. Riddle; Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy and Frank M. Pitre for Real Parties in Interest. This coordinated proceeding arises out of the Butte Fire, a devastating wildfire that swept through Calaveras and Amador counties in September 2015. The fire started when a tree came into contact with an overhead power line owned and operated by petitioners Pacific Gas and Electric Company and PG&E Corporation (together, PG&E or the company). Real parties in interest (plaintiffs) brought suit against PG&E, seeking punitive damages under Public Utilities Code section 2106 and Civil Code section 3294. 1 PG&E sought summary adjudication of plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages under section 3294 only. The trial court denied the motion. PG&E seeks writ relief from the trial court’s order. We conclude there are no triable issues of fact which, if resolved in plaintiffs’ favor, could subject PG&E to punitive damages under section 3294. 2 Accordingly, we grant the petition. I. BACKGROUND A. The Butte Fire The Butte Fire started on September 9, 2015, near Butte Mountain Road in Jackson, California. 3 The fire spread rapidly through drought-stricken Amador and Calaveras counties. By the time the blaze was contained some three weeks later, the fire had consumed more than 70,868 acres, damaging hundreds of structures and claiming two lives. It is undisputed that the fire started when a gray pine (the subject tree) came into contact with one of PG&E’s power lines. 1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code. 2We express no opinion as to PG&E’s potential liability for punitive damages under Public Utilities Code section 2106. 3 The Butte Fire was named for its point of origin near Butte Mountain Road. 2 B. The Litigation More than 2,050 plaintiffs brought suit against PG&E and others. Plaintiffs’ complaints were consolidated in a Judicial Council Coordinated Proceeding in Sacramento Superior Court. A master complaint was filed on behalf of plaintiffs (many of whom have been named as real parties in interest) who suffered personal injuries and losses to real and personal property as a result of the fire. The master complaint names PG&E, ACRT, Inc. (ACRT) and Trees, Inc. as defendants. According to the master complaint, ACRT and Trees, Inc. (together, contractors) provided vegetation management services to PG&E as independent contractors. The master complaint alleges that PG&E and the contractors failed to properly maintain the power line and adjacent vegetation. According to …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/4513598/pacific-gas-electric-co-v-superior-court/">Original document</a>
Guan v. Hu2017-06-02T00:00:00-07:00California Court of Appealhttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4396884/guan-v-hu/
<p>Filed 6/2/17 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE LI GUAN, B276546 Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC572177) v. YONGMEI HU, Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from an order and a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Richard L. Fruin, Jr., Judge. The order is affirmed; the judgment is reversed with directions. Arent Fox, Malcolm S. McNeil, Allan E. Anderson and Ismael Bautista, Jr., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan, Dominic Surprenant and Daniel H. Bromberg for Defendant and Appellant. Defendant Yongmei Hu (Hu) appeals from a judgment entered in favor of plaintiff Li Guan (Guan). Guan initially sued Hu for breach of a contract. However, several months before trial, the trial court dismissed the breach of contract claim with prejudice. As a result, Guan proceeded to trial on various fraud-based claims (e.g., rescission, cancellation, and fraud in the inducement) that effectively disaffirmed the validity of the parties’ contract. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that Guan had failed to prevail on any of his claims because, while his evidence in support of those claims was “considerable,” it was nonetheless “insufficient.” However, because there was evidence showing that Hu had breached the parties’ contract, the trial court awarded damages to Guan. The trial court justified its decision in favor of Guan on language in Civil Code section 1692,1 which purportedly allowed it under these circumstances to “ ‘adjust the equities’ ” between the parties. We hold that the trial court’s interpretation of section 1692 was flawed and, as a result, we reverse the judgment and direct that judgment be entered in favor of Hu. We further hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Guan’s posttrial motion to conform his pleadings to the proof presented at trial. 1 All further statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated. 2 BACKGROUND I. The parties’ dispute In 2010, Hu, a concert pianist, became romantically involved with QiWei Chen (Chen), a professor at a university in China. At Chen’s request, Guan, a Chinese businessman and friend of Chen’s, loaned $2.55 million to Hu so that she could purchase a house in Malibu. The parties documented the transaction in two separate but related documents, both dated February 23, 2011: a one-page “Agreement” signed by Guan, Hu and Chen; and a one-page “Arrangement” signed by Guan and Hu only. Together, the two documents constituted the parties’ contract. The contract provided, among other things that Hu would hold title to the house as its “nominal owner.” The contract further provided that Hu would sell the house when and if instructed to do so by Chen. Upon sale of the house, Hu was to remit the proceeds to Guan. Under the terms of the contract, Hu would be entitled to certain benefits when she sold the house. Specifically, Hu would “get 20%” if the house was “sold from Jan …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/4396884/guan-v-hu/">Original document</a>
In re: Yuri Plyam and Natalia Plyam2015-05-05T00:00:00-07:00United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuithttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4415650/in-re-yuri-plyam-and-natalia-plyam/
<p>FILED 1 ORDERED PUBLISHED MAY 05 2015 2 SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 3 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL 4 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 5 6 In re: ) BAP No. CC-14-1362-TaDPa ) 7 YURI PLYAM and NATALIA PLYAM, ) Bk. No. 2:13-bk-15020-BB ) 8 Debtors. ) Adv. No. 2:13-ap-01558-BB ______________________________) 9 ) YURI PLYAM; NATALIA PLYAM, ) 10 ) Appellants, ) 11 ) v. ) O P I N I O N 12 ) PRECISION DEVELOPMENT, LLC, ) 13 ) Appellee. ) 14 ) 15 Argued and Submitted on January 22, 2015 at Pasadena, California 16 Filed - May 5, 2015 17 Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court 18 for the Central District of California 19 Honorable Sheri Bluebond, Chief Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding 20 21 Appearances: Dennis P. Riley of Mesisca Riley & Kreitenberg, LLP argued for appellants Yuri Plyam and Natalia 22 Plyam; Leo Daniel Plotkin of Levy, Small & Lallas argued for appellee Precision Development, LLC. 23 24 Before: TAYLOR, DUNN, and PAPPAS, Bankruptcy Judges. 25 26 27 28 1 TAYLOR, Bankruptcy Judge: 2 3 Debtors Yuri Plyam and Natalia Plyam appeal from the 4 bankruptcy court’s summary judgment excepting a state court 5 judgment from discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(4)1 and (a)(6), as 6 to Yuri,2 and pursuant to § 523(a)(6), as to Natalia. 7 The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment based on 8 issue preclusion and the state court judgment’s award of actual 9 and punitive damages for breach of fiduciary duty. We determine 10 that the bankruptcy court erred as the state court judgment did 11 not include a finding equivalent to willfulness as required for 12 § 523(a)(6) nondischargeability, notwithstanding its award of 13 punitive damages under California Civil Code § 3294. The state 14 court judgment also failed to establish the existence of an 15 express or technical trust as required for § 523(a)(4) 16 nondischargeability. 17 As a result, we VACATE the judgment and REMAND to the 18 bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with this 19 opinion. 20 BACKGROUND 21 In 2005, Yuri formed Precision Development, LLC, a Nevada 22 limited liability company (“Precision”), for the purpose of 23 developing residential real property in Southern California. 24 Initially, he was its sole member and manager. 25 1 26 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. 27 2 We refer to the parties hereafter by their first names 28 for sake of clarity; we intend no disrespect. 2 1 Precision obtained significant investment capital from 2 Clare Bronfman and Sara Bronfman (jointly, the “Bronfmans”). 3 According to the Bronfmans, they eventually invested 4 approximately $26.3 million. 5 Between 2005 and 2007, Precision acquired numerous parcels 6 of real property. Yuri’s separate business entity oversaw their 7 development; it did not go well. Precision’s funds ran out in 8 2007 before it successfully completed development of or sold any 9 of the properties. 10 …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/4415650/in-re-yuri-plyam-and-natalia-plyam/">Original document</a>
Plyam v. Precision Development, LLC (In Re Plyam)2015-05-05T00:00:00-07:00United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuithttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2798996/plyam-v-precision-development-llc-in-re-plyam/
<p>OPINION TAYLOR, Bankruptcy Judge. Debtors Yuri Plyam and Natalia Plyam appeal from the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment excepting a state court judgment from discharge pursuant to *460 § 523(a)(4) 1 and (a)(6), as to Yuri, 2 and pursuant to § 523(a)(6), as to Natalia. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment based on issue preclusion and the state court judgment’s award of actual and punitive damages for breach of fiduciary duty. We determine that the bankruptcy court erred as the state court judgment did not include a finding equivalent to willfulness as required for § 523(a)(6) nondischargeability, notwithstanding its award of punitive damages under California Civil Code § 3294. The state court judgment also failed to establish the existence of an express or technical trust as required for § 523(a)(4) nondischargeabili- • ty. As a result, we VACATE the judgment and REMAND to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. BACKGROUND In 2005, Yuri formed Precision Development, LLC, a Nevada limited liability company (“Precision”), for the purpose of developing residential real property in Southern California. Initially, he was its sole member and manager. Precision obtained significant investment capital from Clare Bronfman and Sara Bronfman (jointly, the “Bronfmans”). According to the Bronfmans, they eventually invested approximately $26.3 million. Between 2005 and 2007, Precision acquired numerous parcels of real property. Yuri’s separate business entity oversaw their development; it did not go well. Precision’s funds ran out in 2007 before it successfully completed development of or sold any of the properties. Precision’s operating agreement provided that it would hold title to all real property acquired with Precision funds. The Debtors, however, caused Precision to deed them three parcels of real property (the “Transferred Properties”). And once they acquired title, the Debtors alleged ownership of the Transferred Properties in loan documents and used the Transferred Properties as collateral for construction loans. The Debtors later also transferred a fourth property from Yuri’s business entity to Precision and then from Precision to their family trust. Eventually, the Bronfmans discovered Precision’s dire state; few of its developments were close to completion. Indeed, some remained vacant land. The only projects with significant development were the Transferred Properties. And, the Debtors lost even the Transferred Properties to foreclosure by their construction lender. The Bronfmans attempted to remedy the situation. They subsequently obtained control of Precision and caused it to sue the Debtors in California state court. The complaint alleged that the Debtors misused Precision funds and diverted its as- • sets. Following an 18-day trial, a jury entered a special verdict finding that “Yuri Plyam or Natasha [sic] Plyam” breached their fiduciary duties to Precision and that “Yuri or Natasha [sic] Plyam” acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. The jury awarded $10,100,000 in general damages and $200,000 in .punitive damages (the “State Court Judgment”). The Debtors appealed to the California court of appeal, which affirmed the State Court Judgment. See Precision Dev., LLC v. Plyam, 2013 *461 WL 5801759 (Cal.Ct.App. Oct. 29, 2013). The State Court Judgment …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/2798996/plyam-v-precision-development-llc-in-re-plyam/">Original document</a>
Colombo v. BRP US, Inc.2014-10-30T00:00:00-07:00California Court of Appealhttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2746862/colombo-v-brp-us-inc/
<p>Opinion BENKE, Acting P. J. Defendants and appellants Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc., and BRP US Inc. (collectively BRP) appeal a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs and respondents Haley Colombo and Jessica Slagel (hereafter referred to individually by first name or collectively as plaintiffs). Because plaintiffs were not wearing wetsuit bottoms or similar protective clothing, Haley sustained serious and permanent injury to her rectum and *1445 Jessica to her vagina when, because of operator negligence, they fell off the back of a three-passenger watercraft manufactured by BRP, model GFI 4-TEC. Once in the water, Haley and Jessica were both injured when the powerful jet thrust from the watercraft ripped their flesh. The jury found the owner of the personal watercraft (PWC), Robert Adamson doing business as Mission Bay Jet Sports (store; collectively Adamson), its operator and store employee, Brett Kohl (Kohl), and BRP each one-third liable. The jury also awarded punitive damages against BRP, finding its conduct manifested a reckless or callous disregard for plaintiffs’ rights and safety. On appeal, BRP contends the evidence in the record is insufficient to support the jury’s causation and punitive damages findings, made under federal maritime common law. In the alternative, it contends the trial court erred when it refused, under this same law, to reduce the amount of punitive damages awarded each plaintiff to equal their respective compensatory damages awards; admitted evidence that, at the time of plaintiffs’ accident, BRP had notice of previous claims of orifice injuries to passengers but excluded evidence proffered by BRP to show the causes of the previous claims allegedly were not substantially similar to plaintiffs’ accident; and made a series of other rulings that BRP alleges amounted to a denial of a fair trial. As we explain, we reject each of these contentions and affirm the judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1 In late July 2007, then 16-year-old Haley and her older sister, Megan, visited San Diego to help their sister, Chelsea, move. Haley invited her longtime friend, Jessica, to come along as the group also hoped to go *1446 jet skiing in Mission Bay. 2 Before the accident, Haley had never been on a PWC. Jessica had ridden on and operated a PWC a few times and told Haley it was fun. Kohl—the operator of the BRP watercraft involved in the accident (hereafter sometimes subject PWC)—was the roommate of Chelsea’s boyfriend. As a reward for helping Chelsea, Chelsea’s boyfriend made arrangements for the group to meet Kohl at the store and then go to Mission Bay where they could ride the BRP PWC’s. At Mission Bay, Kohl and Chelsea’s boyfriend unloaded two PWC’s from a trailer while Haley and Jessica waited on the shore. Haley and Jessica each wore a two-piece bathing suit. Nobody in the group, including the operators of the PWC’s, wore a wetsuit bottom or similar protective clothing. After putting on life jackets, Haley and Jessica waded into the water to meet Kohl. When Haley and Jessica boarded the subject PWC from the …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/2746862/colombo-v-brp-us-inc/">Original document</a>
People v. Batchelor2014-10-08T00:00:00-07:00California Court of Appealhttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2740953/people-v-batchelor/
<p>Filed 10/8/14 Unmodified version attached CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, E054475 v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF148873) LARRY JASON BATCHELOR, ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND DENYING PETITION FOR Defendant and Appellant. REHEARING [NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT] THE COURT: The petition for rehearing filed by plaintiff and respondent is denied. It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on September 16, 2014, is modified as follows: On page 21, line 5, the sentence which begins with the words “Perhaps the most straightforward way . . .” is modified to add the words “Under the unusual circumstances of this case” at the beginning of the sentence, so that the sentence reads as follows: “Under the unusual circumstances of this case, perhaps the most straightforward way to do so would have been to inform the jury of the results of the first trial, and to emphasize that its only task, left unresolved by the first trial, was to consider whether the elements of the single remaining offense had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” 1 Except for the above modification, the opinion remains unchanged. There is no change in the judgment. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. HOLLENHORST Acting P. J. We concur: MCKINSTER J. CODRINGTON J. 2 Filed 9/16/14 Unmodified version CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, E054475 v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF148873) LARRY JASON BATCHELOR, OPINION Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Harry (Skip) A. Staley (retired judge of the Kern Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.), Robert E. Law (retired judge of the former Orange Mun. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.), and Roger A. Luebs, Judges.1 Affirmed in part; reversed in part. 1Judge Staley presided over defendant’s first trial. Judge Law presided over the second trial. Judge Luebs sentenced defendant. 1 Christine Vento, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and Lilia E. Garcia and Quisteen S. Shum, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. I. INTRODUCTION Defendant Larry Jason Batchelor appeals from his conviction—in two separate trials—of implied malice murder (Pen. Code, 2 § 187, subd. (a), count 1) and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a), count 2).3 As to the first trial, defendant contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of gross vehicular manslaughter, and (2) the prosecutor improperly commented on defendant’s exercise of his right to a jury trial and improperly vouched for the People’s case. As to the second trial, defendant contends: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of implied malice murder; (2) former section 224 violates principles of due process because …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/2740953/people-v-batchelor/">Original document</a>
Driscoll v. Superior Court2014-01-30T00:00:00-08:00California Court of Appealhttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2651742/driscoll-v-superior-court/
<p>*633 Opinion HOFF, J. * Petitioner Scott M. Driscoll, M.D., is the defendant and cross-complainant in a civil lawsuit filed in state court. Driscoll filed an amended cross-complaint against plaintiffs Todd Spencer, M.D. Medical Group, Inc., and Todd Spencer, M.D. (hereafter referred to collectively as Spencer or real parties in interest). Driscoll alleged a claim of retaliation in violation of title 31 United States Code section 3730(h), which is part of the federal False Claims Act (FCA) (31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq.). Spencer filed a demurrer asserting the trial court had no jurisdiction over the FCA claim, and the trial court sustained the demurrer to the claim without leave to amend. Driscoll petitioned this court for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order sustaining the demurrer to his FCA claim. We asked for an informal response from real parties in interest and then issued an order to show cause why the relief prayed for in the petition should not be granted. We now conclude that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over FCA retaliation claims such as Driscoll’s and, consequently, we grant the requested relief. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORIES Spencer initiated this state court action by filing a complaint against Driscoll in Madera County Superior Court. (Spencer v. Driscoll (Super. Ct. Madera County, 2011, No. MCV057183).) Spencer alleged claims of defamation, corporate disparagement, interference with contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, fraud, slander, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Subsequently, Driscoll filed a complaint, under seal, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. Driscoll named Spencer and two hospitals as defendants and asserted, among other claims, a cause of action for retaliation under the FCA. At the time an answer was due in the state court action, Driscoll filed a cross-complaint alleging whistleblower retaliation and wrongful termination. His first cause of action was for retaliation under the FCA. Spencer filed a demurrer to certain causes of action. The trial court overruled the demurrer in part and sustained the demurrer in part with leave to amend. On September 29, 2012, Driscoll filed a first amended cross-complaint. Driscoll alleged he had worked for the M.D. Medical Group, Inc., as a *634 radiologist for over two years when he was demoted and then terminated. He alleged the primary motivating factors in these employment actions were (1) his demands that he be paid for excess hours worked and (2) his complaints about billing practices that he believed to be fraud against Medicare and Medi-Cal. 1 Again, his first cause of action was for retaliation under the FCA. On November 2, 2012, Spencer filed a second demurrer. With respect to the first cause of action, they alleged the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Spencer argued: “It does not appear that a claim under the Federal False Claims Act for retaliation in violation of 31 U.S.C. Section 3730(h) has ever been resolved in a state court, …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/2651742/driscoll-v-superior-court/">Original document</a>
Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms2011-06-03T00:00:00-07:00District Court, E.D. Californiahttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2169535/escriba-v-foster-poultry-farms/
<p>793 F.Supp.2d 1147 (2011) Maria ESCRIBA, Plaintiff, v. FOSTER POULTRY FARMS, a California corporation, Defendant. No. 1:09-cv-1878 OWW MJS. United States District Court, E.D. California. June 3, 2011. *1151 Elizabeth Kristen, Sharon Anne Terman, Legal Aid Society, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff. *1152 Armand George Skol, William Allen Lapcevic, Arata, Swingle, Sodhi & Von Egmond, Modesto, CA, for Defendant. ORDERS ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION OLIVER W. WANGER, District Judge. I. INTRODUCTION The parties' cross-motions for summary judgment are before the court. Maria Escriba ("Plaintiff") and Defendant Foster Poultry Farms ("FPF" or "Defendant") have respectively moved for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff's interference claims and Defendant's affirmative defenses.[1] Defendant FPF has moved for summary judgment on claims one through six in the first amended complaint and on the punitive damages claim. II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed this action, on October 26, 2009. The operative First Amended Complaint ("FAC") asserts seven causes of action against FPF: (1) Interference under Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"); (2) "Discrimination" under FMLA; (3) Failure to provide leave in violation of the California Family Rights Act ("CFRA")[2]; (4) Unlawful discharge under CFRA; (5) Failure to prevent discrimination in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"); (6) Wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (7) Failure to promptly pay wages owed. On March 30, 2010, FPF answered Plaintiff's FAC and alleged fourteen affirmative defenses. (Doc. 6.) FPF moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff's first through sixth claims on March 28, 2011. (Doc. 32.) Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's father did not have a serious medical condition, Plaintiff did not give timely or adequate notice to invoke FMLA-protected leave, and Plaintiff's failure to comply with the collective bargaining agreement led to her termination. Plaintiff opposes FPF's motion (doc. 57.) and filed a cross motion seeking partial summary judgment on her Interference claims and Defendant's affirmative defenses. (Doc. 40.) III. BACKGROUND FACTS[3] A. UNDISPUTED FACTS 1. Plaintiff was 50 years old at the time of her termination, has a third grade education, and earned $9.71 per hour after 18 years in the same job, eight at FPF. 2. Prior to her termination, Plaintiff was never disciplined for tardiness or *1153 unexcused absence throughout the course of her employment at FPF. 3. Plaintiff's employment at FPF was terminated on December 12, 2007. 4. Plaintiff speaks Spanish and has limited English proficiency. 5. FPF owns and operates a turkey plant which is in the business of packaging turkeys for consumer purchase in supermarkets and other retail outlets. 6. Defendant's turkey plant operations employ approximately 1,300 employees. 7. It is undisputed that Defendant is an employer covered by the FMLA. 8. It is undisputed that Plaintiff worked more than 1,250 hours prior to her time off in November 2007. B. DISPUTED FACTS 1. Serious Medical Condition.[4] 9. During November and December 2007 Plaintiff asserts that her father, Mr. Merlos, had multiple serious and chronic health conditions involving continuing treatment, including the following: diabetes, hypothyroidism, chronic adult malnutrition, arterial hypertension, pneumonia, …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/2169535/escriba-v-foster-poultry-farms/">Original document</a>
Casey v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.2010-02-24T00:00:00-08:00District Court, E.D. Californiahttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2316741/casey-v-metropolitan-life-ins-co/
<p>688 F.Supp.2d 1086 (2010) MayeVern CASEY, Plaintiff, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO., Defendant. Case No. CV F 08-1811 LJO DLB. United States District Court, E.D. California. February 24, 2010. *1089 Kathleen Rivera, William L. Alexander, Alexander & Associates, PLC, Bakersfield, CA, for Plaintiff. Rebecca A. Hull, Michelle Yumi McIsaac, Sedgwick Detert Moran and Arnold LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant. ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT LAWRENCE J. O'NEILL, District Judge. In this action, plaintiff MayeVern Casey ("Casey") seeks to recover life insurance benefits following the death of her ex-spouse, Billy Claborn, under a group life insurance policy issued by defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("Met Life"). The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. FACTUAL BACKGROUND A. The Group Universal Life Policy In November of 1991, Casey was an employee of GTE, Corp. She enrolled in a Group Universal Life insurance plan provided by The Travelers Life Insurance Company ("The Travelers") for employees of GTE. At that same time, Casey elected to obtain coverage in the amount of $100,000.00 on her then-spouse, Billy Claborn, naming Casey as the beneficiary. (At that time, plaintiff's married name was MayeVern Claborn.) The Travelers provided plaintiff with a certificate of insurance which stated that it "applies only to regular Employees of GTE Corporation or one of its subsidiaries . . . It also applies to the spouse of an eligible Employee." (Doc. 33, McIsaac Decl. Exh. A, p. P003.) In November 1994, Casey retired from GTE after 31 years of service.[1] *1090 When Casey retired, she discontinued her coverage under the Plan issued by The Travelers, but continued coverage under the Plan on the life of her husband, Billy Claborn. (Doc. 33, McIsaac Decl. Exh. A, Casey depo. p. 16.) In December 1996, Casey filed for divorce from Billy Claborn, and the divorce became final on July 3, 1997. Casey and Claborn executed a Marital Settlement Agreement on December 9, 1996 which became incorporated into the judgment of divorce and which awarded Casey the policy of life insurance issued by The Travelers on the life of Billy Claborn. B. Notices by Met Life In January 1996, Met Life became the insurer of the Plan. (Doc. 29, Peterson Decl. ¶ 5.) In November 1996, the Plan Administrator Marsh (at that time, called Johnson & Higgins/Kirke-Van Orsdel ("J & H/KVI")), "sent all Plan participants, regardless of whether they were current, retired, or terminated GTE employees, a letter notifying them that MetLife was the new insurer of the Plan." (Doc. 29, Peterson Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. 1.) That November 1996 letter further notified Plan participants of changes to the Plan, including that the Plan did not cover divorced spouses: "Under the new MetLife provisions, an employee cannot keep Group Universal Life coverage on his or her spouse after a divorce; however, the divorced spouse may apply to continue separate coverage under the program. The employee must submit written notification of the date of divorce …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/2316741/casey-v-metropolitan-life-ins-co/">Original document</a>
Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co.2008-03-10T00:00:00-07:00California Court of Appealhttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2279711/buell-wilson-v-ford-motor-co/
<p>73 Cal.Rptr.3d 277 (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1107 Benetta BUELL-WILSON et al., v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY et al., Defendants and Appellants. Nos. D045154, D045579. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth District, Division One. March 10, 2008. *288 Gibson, Dunn &amp; Crutcher, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., William E. Thomson, Los *289 Angeles, Eileen M. Ahern and Theodore B. Olson, for Defendants and Appellants. Arnold &amp; Porter, Ronald C. Redcay, Los Angeles, Murray R. Garnick, Robert A. McCarter; National Chamber Litigation Center, Robin S. Conrad and Amar D. Sarwal, for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. Mayer Brown and Donald M. Falk, Palo Alto, for the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants and Appellants. Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Falk &amp; Rabkin, Jerome B. Falk, Jr., Steven L. Mayer, Keith D. Kessler, San Francisco; Schoville &amp; Arnell, Dennis A. Schoville, Louis G. Arnell, San Diego, and James S. Iagmin, for Plaintiffs and Respondents. NARES, J. This case is before us for a second time, after a GVR[1] order from the United States Supreme Court directed that we reconsider our original opinion in Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Company (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 525, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 147 (Buell-Wilson I) in light of Philip Morris USA v. Williams (2007)-549 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1057, 166 L.Ed.2d 940 (Philip Morris). Philip Morris holds that upon request, courts must adopt procedures to ensure juries do not punish defendants for harm caused to third parties when determining the amount of punitive damages to award. The Supreme Court also reiterated, however, juries could consider harm to third parties in determining the reprehensibility of a defendant's conduct. Ford asserts that based on Philip Morris it is entitled to a new trial (or at least a further reduction in the punitive damages award) because there is a "significant risk" the punitive damages verdict in this case was based on improper evidence and arguments concerning third party harm. Ford also asserts that we should reconsider our original decision's rejection of its arguments that (1) California's punitive damages statute (Civil Code section 3294) is unconstitutionally vague as applied to this case, and (2) the trial court erred in excluding its industry custom and practice evidence. We granted permission to the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America (the Chamber) and the Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc. (PLAC) to file amicus curiae briefs to support Ford's contentions on remand. We have reconsidered our decision in Buell-Wilson I in light of Philip Morris. Based on our analysis of Philip Morris and our review of our original decision and the proceedings in the trial court, we conclude Philip Morris does not compel a reversal or a further reduction of the punitive damages awarded in this case. Ford has forfeited the right to assert there is a significant risk the punitive damages verdict in this case was based on improper evidence and arguments concerning third party harm because Ford …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/2279711/buell-wilson-v-ford-motor-co/">Original document</a>
Connerly v. Schwarzenegger2007-01-10T00:00:00-08:00California Court of Appealhttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2292755/connerly-v-schwarzenegger/
<p>53 Cal.Rptr.3d 203 (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 739 Ward CONNERLY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Arnold SCHWARZENEGGER, as Governor, etc., et al., Defendants and Appellants. No. C050204. Court of Appeal of California, Third District. January 10, 2007. *205 Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Louis R. Mauro, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Van Aken and Michelle Mitchell Lopez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Appellants. *206 Pacific Legal Foundation, John H. Findley and Paul J. Beard II for Plaintiff and Respondent. *204 BUTZ, J. With the passage of Proposition 209 in 1996, California voters added section 31 to article I of the California Constitution (hereafter article I, section 31), outlawing all state discrimination or preferences based on race, gender or national origin. In 2003, the Legislature responded by enacting Government Code section 8315,[1] which attempted to graft onto article I, section 31 a definition of "racial discrimination" that excluded "special measures" taken to secure advancement for certain racial or ethnic groups. Ward Connerly, as a taxpayer and citizen of California, filed a lawsuit in December 2003 against the Governor and Attorney General (defendants), seeking two remedies: (1) a judicial declaration that section 8315 is invalid as in conflict with article I, section 31, and (2) a permanent injunction preventing defendants from implementing or enforcing section 8315. While this lawsuit was pending, this court decided C &amp; C Construction, Inc. v. Sacramento Municipal Utility Dist. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 284, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 715 (C &amp; C Construction), in which we held that section 8315's definition of "discrimination" was ineffective because it conflicted with the plain meaning of that term set forth in article I, section 31 and interpreted by the California Supreme Court. (C &amp; C Construction, at p. 303, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 715.) The Supreme Court denied review in C &amp; C Construction and the parties here agree that section 8315 is, for all purposes, invalid and unenforceable. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, claiming that there was no case in controversy and that Connerly has no standing to pursue this action. Connerly maintained he had taxpayer, citizen or "voter" standing to seek a court order prohibiting defendants from enforcing the statute. Agreeing with the voter standing argument, the court granted Connerly's cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings, issuing a judgment declaring the statute void and prohibiting defendants from enforcing it. We shall reverse the judgment and direct the trial court to dismiss the action. With the finality of C &amp; C Construction and defendants' acceptance of its holding, there is no longer a justiciable controversy surrounding section 8315. Moreover, absent allegations demonstrating that defendants are enforcing or threatening to enforce section 8315, there is no basis upon which to issue an injunction. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND A. Proposition 209 and Section 8315 Article I, section 31 (added by the 1996 adoption of Proposition 209) states in subdivision (a): "The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin …</p><br>
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Lackner v. North2006-01-24T00:00:00-08:00California Court of Appealhttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2258722/lackner-v-north/
<p>37 Cal.Rptr.3d 863 (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1188 Teri LACKNER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Cassidy Bodine NORTH et al., Defendants and Respondents. No. C047061. Court of Appeal, Third District. January 24, 2006. *867 Sands &amp; Associates, Leonard S. Sands, Heleni E. Suydam, Beverly Hills, Tracy Neal-Lopez, Costa, Abrams &amp; Coate, Charles M. Coate, Santa Monica, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Martin S. McHugh, Chico; Halkides, Morgan &amp; Kelley, John P. Kelley; Tucker Ellis &amp; West, Peter J. Koenig, Brian T. Clark, San Francisco, for Defendants and Respondents. BLEASE, Acting P.J. Plaintiff Teri Lackner (Lackner) appeals from the summary judgment entered in favor of defendants Cassidy Bodine North (North), a member of the Chico High School Ski and Snowboard Team, Darryl Bender (Bender) who was North's coach, Chico Unified School District (Chico), Oroville Union High School District (Oroville), and Mammoth Mountain Ski Area (Mammoth). Lackner brought this action to recover for personal injuries sustained at Mammoth while she was standing in a largely deserted area at the base of an advance run used by skiers and snowboarders to stop and rest. As Lackner was conversing with her husband, North, who had just sped down the run on his snowboard, headed directly towards her at a high rate of speed and crashed into her, causing her severe injuries. The trial court granted defendants' summary judgment finding inter alia, that primary assumption of the risk bars their liability to plaintiff and that punitive damages are not recoverable against North. *868 On appeal, Lackner contends the trial court erred by granting North's motion for joinder, summary judgment, and summary adjudication because his motions were untimely and triable issues of fact remain as to whether his conduct was reckless and whether he acted with malice warranting punitive damages. Lackner also contends the trial court erred in granting the remaining motions for summary judgment because primary assumption of the risk is inapplicable to the other defendants, and Chico and Bender are not immune from liability under Government Code section 831.7. We find there are triable issues of fact on the question whether North's conduct was reckless. We shall therefore reverse the judgment in favor of North. Because Lackner does not raise any claim of error as to Oroville, we shall dismiss that portion of her appeal. We shall affirm the judgments in all other respects. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND[1] A. The Parties Mammoth hosted the California Nevada Ski and Snowboard Federation State High School Championships (Championships) from March 3, 2002, through March 7, 2002. The event brought approximately 400 high school participants. Race participants were supposed to train for their respective events on the training courses designated for their event, although Mammoth granted the participants unrestricted access to the entire mountain for free skiing and snowboarding. North, an 18-year-old senior at Chico High School and a member of the Chico High School Ski and Snowboard Team (team), was a participant in the snowboarding championship. He was ranked in the top three on his team and was entered in …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/2258722/lackner-v-north/">Original document</a>
Simon v. San Paolo US Holding Co., Inc.2005-06-16T00:00:00-07:00California Supreme Courthttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2570318/simon-v-san-paolo-us-holding-co-inc/
<p>29 Cal.Rptr.3d 379 (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1159 113 P.3d 63 Lionel SIMON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. SAN PAOLO U.S. HOLDING COMPANY, INC., Defendant and Appellant. No. S121933. Supreme Court of California. June 16, 2005. *381 Knapp Petersen & Clarke, Andre E. Jardini, Kevin J. Stack and Mitchell B. *382 Ludwig, Glendale, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Todd A. Smith; Jeffrey R. White; Smoger and Associates and Gerson H. Smoger, Oakland, for the Association of Trial Lawyers of America as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. Law Office of Daniel U. Smith, Daniel U. Smith, Kentfield, and Ted Pelletier for Consumer Attorneys of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. Amy Bach, Mill Valley; Pillsbury & Levinson, Arnold R. Levinson, San Francisco; Esner & Chang, Stuart B. Esner, Los Angeles, and Andrew N. Chang, Oakland, for United Policyholders as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. Epport & Richman, Epport, Richman & Robbins, Steven N. Richman and Lawrence A. Abelson, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Appellant. Susan Liebeler; Daniel J. Popeo and David Price for Washington Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. Horvitz & Levy, Lisa Perrochet and Curt Cutting, Encino, for the California Chamber of Commerce, the American Chemistry Council, the National Association of Manufacturers, Unocal Corp. and American International Companies as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, Andrew L. Frey, Evan M. Tager, Donald M. Falk, Palo Alto; National Chamber Litigation Center and Robin S. Conrad for The Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Robert A. Olson, Los Angeles, and Feris M. Greenberger for Farmers Insurance Exchange, Truck Insurance Exchange, Fire Insurance Exchange and Mid-Century Insurance Company as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. Hugh F. Young, Jr.; Martin, Bischoff, Templeton, Langlset & Hoffman, Jonathan M. Hoffman; Drinker Biddle & Reath and Alan Lazarus, San Francisco, for The Product Liability Advisory Council, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. Deborah J. La Fetra, Sacramento, for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae. *380 WERDEGAR, J. In an action arising from plaintiff's failed attempt to purchase an office building from defendant, the jury found that the parties had no binding and enforceable agreement but that defendant had committed promissory fraud. On his fraud cause of action, plaintiff was awarded $5,000 in economic compensatory damages and $1.7 million in punitive damages. Considering all the relevant circumstances, we conclude this award of punitive damages exceeds the federal due process limitations outlined in recent United States Supreme Court decisions. We further conclude the maximum award constitutionally permissible in the circumstances of this case is $50,000. The central issue presented is whether, in addition to the $5,000 in compensatory damages awarded, the punitive damages award should be measured against the $400,000 in profit plaintiff claims he would have achieved had defendant sold the property to him at the …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/2570318/simon-v-san-paolo-us-holding-co-inc/">Original document</a>
Snyder v. ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR, SAN LFRANCISCO2005-02-17T00:00:00-08:00District Court, N.D. Californiahttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2496352/snyder-v-enterprise-rent-a-car-san-lfrancisco/
<p>392 F.Supp.2d 1116 (2005) Dale SNYDER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR COMPANY, et al., Defendants. No. C 03-4234(BZ). United States District Court, N.D. California. February 17, 2005. *1117 *1118 *1119 Steven Bauer, Deepa Shailesh Vora, Latham & Watkins LLP, Jennifer L. Scafe, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, San Francisco, CA, Thomas Duley, Latham & Watkins, Menlo Park, CA, for Plaintiffs. Dominique R. Shelton, Thomas P. Laffey, Folger Levin & Kahn LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Robert B. Hunter, Jeffery Richard Vincent, Esq., Martin T. Snyder, Snyder, Cornelius & Hunter, Pleasant Hill, CA, Janine Laura Scancarelli, Folger Levin & Kahn LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendants. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJDICATION AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docket Nos. 76, 86, 98) CHESNEY, District Judge. Before the Court are the motions of (1) defendants Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of San Francisco ("ERAC-SF"), Enterprise Rent-A-Car ("ERAC"), and ELCO Administrative Services Company ("ELCO") for summary judgment or, in the alternative, partial summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and (2) plaintiffs Dale Snyder and Michael Snyder for summary adjudication of the issue of negligence as to Counts I and II, as to all defendants, and for summary judgment on Count IV, as to ERACSF and ERAC, pursuant to Rule 56. Having considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motions, the Court rules as follows.[1] *1120 BACKGROUND On August 18, 2002, Marc Holland ("Holland") rented a 2002 Ford Escort from ERAC-SF. (See Duley Decl., filed October 22, 2004, Ex. 5; Watt Decl., filed November 5, 2004, Ex. B.) At the time Holland rented the subject vehicle, his driver's license was suspended. (See Pls.' Req. for Judicial Notice, filed October 22, 2004, Ex. 2; Defs.' Req. for Judicial Notice, filed November 5, 2004, Ex. A; Defs.' Req. for Judicial Notice Ex. A.)[2] On August 25, 2002, Brooke Snyder was killed as a result of injuries sustained when, while walking across Lombard Street in San Francisco, she was struck by Holland as he was driving the rented vehicle. (See Pls.' Req. for Judicial Notice, filed October 22, 2004, Ex. 5; Defs.' Req. for Judicial Notice, filed November 5, 2004, Ex. B.)[3] On January 23, 2004, Holland pleaded guilty to violating the California Vehicle Code by, on August 25, 2002, driving under the influence of alcohol, a drug, and the combined influence of alcohol and a drug, and by driving with 0.08 percent, or more, by weight, of alcohol in his blood. (See Pls.' Req. for Judicial Notice, filed October 22, 2004, Exs. 3, 4.)[4] Plaintiffs, who are the parents and successors in interest of the decedent, (see First Amended Complaint ¶ 1), allege that defendants are liable for the death of the decedent. In the First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), plaintiffs allege four claims against each defendant: (1) Personal Injury and Property …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/2496352/snyder-v-enterprise-rent-a-car-san-lfrancisco/">Original document</a>
People v. ERIBARNE2004-12-16T00:00:00-08:00California Court of Appealhttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2274955/people-v-eribarne/
<p>22 Cal.Rptr.3d 417 (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1463 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John Edgar ERIBARNE, Defendant and Appellant. No. F044634. Court of Appeal, Fifth District. December 16, 2004. Review Denied March 30, 2005. *418 Deborah Prucha, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Woodland, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, and Clayton S. Tanaka, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. *419 OPINION DAWSON, J. Proposition 36, also known as the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000 (the Act), was approved by the voters of California on November 7, 2000.[1] It requires, with certain exceptions, that "any person convicted of a nonviolent drug possession offense shall receive probation" and "[a]s a condition of probation the court shall require participation in and completion of an appropriate drug treatment program." (Pen.Code, § 1210.1, subd. (a).)[2] For those offenders who qualify for Proposition 36 probation and drug treatment, "[a] court may not impose incarceration as an additional condition of probation." (§ 1210.1, subd. (a).) The Act excludes five listed categories of nonviolent drug possession offenders from Proposition 36 probation. (§ 1210.1, subd. (b)(1)-(5).) The first of these five categories is "[a]ny defendant who previously has been convicted of one or more serious or violent felonies in violation of subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 or Section 1192.7, unless the nonviolent drug possession offense occurred after a period of five years in which the defendant remained free of both prison custody and the commission of an offense that results in (A) a felony conviction other than a nonviolent drug possession offense, or (B) a misdemeanor conviction involving physical injury or the threat of physical injury to another person." (§ 1210.1, subd. (b)(1).) Appellant Eribarne's current nonviolent drug possession offense apparently occurred within five years of his commission of a misdemeanor offense of driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher (Veh.Code, § 23152, subd. (b)).[3] In this case we address the following issue: does a misdemeanor conviction for driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher constitute "a misdemeanor conviction involving ... the threat of physical injury to another person" within the meaning of section 1210.1, subdivision (b)(1)? If the answer is no, as appellant contends, then appellant qualifies for Proposition 36 probation and drug treatment. *420 If the answer is yes, as respondent contends, then appellant is ineligible for Proposition 36 probation and drug treatment. As we shall explain, the answer is yes. FACTS Appellant was convicted of first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460) in 1974. Between 1971 and 1995 inclusive, he incurred 18 other criminal convictions. On October 8, 1998, he was charged with driving with a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 percent or higher (Veh.Code, § 23152, subd. (b).)[4] He was convicted of this crime on November 9, 1998. On September 9, 2003, he was charged with possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11377, subd. (a).) The complaint alleged that …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/2274955/people-v-eribarne/">Original document</a>
People v. Canty2004-05-27T00:00:00-07:00California Supreme Courthttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2634717/people-v-canty/
<p>14 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 (2004) 90 P.3d 1168 32 Cal.4th 1266 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Michelle Elaine CANTY, Defendant and Appellant. No. S109537. Supreme Court of California. May 27, 2004. *3 Sandra Gillies and Bradley A. Bristow, Sacramento, under appointments by the Supreme Court, and Valerie G. Wass, Pasadena, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez, Marc J. Nolan, Janet E. Neeley and Tiffany S. Shultz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. *2 GEORGE, C.J. Following the enactment of Proposition 36, the "Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000," which took effect July 1, 2001, a defendant who has been convicted of a "nonviolent drug possession offense" must receive probation and diversion into a drug treatment program, and may not be sentenced to incarceration as an additional term of probation. (Pen. Code, § 1210.1, subd. (a).)[1] A defendant is ineligible for probation and diversion to such a program, however, if he or she has been "convicted in the same proceeding of a misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs or any felony." (Pen.Code, § 1210.1, subd. (b)(2).)[2] An offense is defined as one "not related to the use of drugs" if it does not involve the defendant's "simple possession or use" of drugs or drug paraphernalia, presence where drugs are being used, or failure to register as a drug offender, or any similar activity. (§ 1210, subd. (d).) The issue in the present case is whether defendant, who was convicted of transporting a controlled substance (methamphetamine), *4 a felony, together with driving a vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance, a misdemeanor, has been "convicted in the same proceeding of a misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs," within the meaning of section 1210.1, subdivision (b)(2) and section 1210, subdivision (d). We conclude that the misdemeanor of driving a vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance is "a misdemeanor not related to the use of drugs" within the meaning of those provisions, and that therefore section 1210.1, subdivision (a) is inapplicable to defendant. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal upholding the trial court's determination that defendant was not entitled to probation and drug treatment diversion under Proposition 36. I At approximately 10:40 p.m. on March 17, 2001, a police officer observed a person driving a vehicle (with two passengers) down the center of a road, straddling the center divider, for approximately one block. The officer, suspecting the driver was under the influence of drugs or alcohol, made a traffic stop. The driver, defendant Michelle Elaine Canty, appeared to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and admitted to the officer that she had ingested methamphetamine, which she also had provided to her two passengers, earlier that evening. The officer conducted a search, discovered that defendant possessed two grams of methamphetamine, and arrested her. …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/2634717/people-v-canty/">Original document</a>
Bolsta v. Johnson2004-03-04T00:00:00-08:00Supreme Court of Vermonthttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2195627/bolsta-v-johnson/
<p>848 A.2d 306 (2004) 2004 VT 19 Sarah BOLSTA v. Michael JOHNSON. No. 03-004. Supreme Court of Vermont. March 4, 2004. *307 Present: AMESTOY, C.J., DOOLEY, JOHNSON, SKOGLUND and REIBER, JJ. ENTRY ORDER ¶ 1. Appellant Sarah Bolsta appeals the trial court's denial of a punitive damages award in her personal injury action based upon a motor vehicle collision caused by a drunk driver, Michael Johnson. We agree that the actions of the driver do not constitute the kind of malicious, intentional acts that punitive damages are designed to address, and therefore, we affirm. ¶ 2. The accident occurred in September 1999. Johnson failed to stop at an intersection controlled by a stop sign, causing a collision with appellant's oncoming vehicle. Appellant's car was totaled, and she suffered several injuries, including a broken kneecap and permanent damage to her knee mechanism. According to witness testimony, immediately after the accident Johnson took beer bottles from his vehicle, and broke them on the road. The officer who conducted the investigation of the accident concluded that Johnson was at fault. Johnson was uninsured. ¶ 3. Johnson was processed for driving under the influence of alcohol, and was found to have a BAC of 0.156 approximately two hours after the accident. Johnson stated that he had consumed two beers and three shots in the hour prior to the accident, and admitted being "slightly" under the influence of alcohol. Johnson had a suspended license resulting from a prior DUI conviction and three prior convictions for driving with a suspended license in Vermont. He was charged in district court with DUI, second offense, and with driving with a suspended license, fourth offense. Johnson entered no contest pleas to both charges. ¶ 4. Appellant commenced a personal injury action against Johnson and against appellant's uninsured motorist insurance carrier, Concord General Mutual Insurance Co. In her complaint, she sought both *308 compensatory and punitive damages for Johnson's negligence. Because Johnson failed to answer or make an appearance, appellant was granted a default judgment. Appellant and Concord Mutual reached a settlement, and the insurance carrier was dismissed from the case. The court then determined that Johnson owed appellant compensatory damages in the amount of $ 131,921.35. The court rejected appellant's motion for punitive damages, finding that the standard articulated in Brueckner v. Norwich University, 169 Vt. 118, 730 A.2d 1086 (1999), had not been met, as there was no evidence of the requisite element of malice. This appeal followed. ¶ 5. Punitive damages are permitted upon evidence of malice, "[w]here the defendant's wrongdoing has been intentional and deliberate, and has the character of outrage frequently associated with crime." Id. at 129, 730 A.2d at 1095 (quoting W. Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 2 (5th ed. 1984)). Actual malice may be shown by conduct manifesting personal ill will or carried out under circumstances evincing insult or oppression, or conduct showing a reckless disregard to the rights of others. Id. In any …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/2195627/bolsta-v-johnson/">Original document</a>
Romo v. Ford Motor Co.2002-06-28T00:00:00-07:00California Court of Appealhttps://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2285027/romo-v-ford-motor-co/
<p>122 Cal.Rptr.2d 139 (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1115 Juan Ramon ROMO, individually and as Administrator, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant. No. F034241. Court of Appeal, Fifth District. June 28, 2002. Rehearing Denied July 23, 2002. Review Denied October 23, 2002.[*] *145 Law Offices of Joseph W. Carcione, Jr., Joseph W. Carcione, Jr., Gerald K. Okimoto, Redwood City, and Gary W. Dolinski, San Diego, for Plaintiff and Appellant Juan Ramon Romo. Drivon & Tabak, Stockton, and Lawrence E. Drivon, for Plaintiffs and Appellants Maria Irene Romo and Evangelina Romo. Snell & Willmer, Douglas W. Seitz, Phoenix, AZ, Richard A. Derevan, Irvine, Barry C. Toone, Phoenix, AZ; Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., Los Angeles, Mark A. Perry, San Francisco, Tanya M. Acker, Los Angeles, William E. Thompson; Dryden, Margoles, Schimaneck, Kelly & Wait and Frank P. Kelly III, San Francisco, for Defendant and Appellant. OPINION VARTABEDIAN, Acting P.J. This case involves an appeal and a cross-appeal after the trial court granted in part and denied in part defendant Ford Motor Company's posttrial motions. The court denied defendant's motion for new trial on liability and compensatory damages; denied defendant's motion to reduce punitive damages as excessive; and denied defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). From these orders defendant appeals. The court granted defendant's motion for new trial on punitive damages grounded on juror misconduct; from this order plaintiffs appeal. We will affirm the judgment for compensatory damages as modified by the trial court. We will affirm the trial court's denial of the JNOV motion. We will conclude the punitive damages award was not excessive. However, we will conclude the trial court erred in granting the new trial motion on punitive damages grounded on juror misconduct. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Ramon Romo bought a used 1978 Ford Bronco in 1992. On June 20, 1993, Ramon's son, plaintiff Juan Romo, was driving the Bronco; other members of the familyRamon, his wife, Salustia, and his children Ramiro, Evangelina, and Maria were passengers. Juan and Ramon were seated in the front, wearing seatbelts. Salustia and Ramiro were in the back seat, also belted. Evangelina and Maria were asleep in the rear of the Bronco, unbelted. Juan was involved in an accident and the Bronco rolled over several times. The 1978 Bronco had a steel roof over the front one-third of the passenger compartment. The rear two-thirds was made of fiberglass. As the Bronco rolled, the steel roof collapsed, killing Ramon Romo. The fiberglass roof broke loose, striking and killing Salustia and Ramiro Romo. Evangelina and Maria Romo were thrown from the car and injured. Juan remained in the car and was injured. Juan Romo, individually and as administrator of the estates of the deceased family members, Evangelina Romo, and Maria Irene Romo through her guardian ad litem Juan Romo, sued defendant on theories of products liability and negligence; they sought compensatory and punitive damages. *146 Defendant did not request a bifurcated trial on the amount …</p><br>
<a href="/opinion/2285027/romo-v-ford-motor-co/">Original document</a>