United States v. SULLIVAN
Motion for Bond — Document #13
District Court, District of Columbia
Description
MEMORANDUM Defendant's Memorandum Concerning Limitations on Conditions of Pretrial Release by JOHN EARLE SULLIVAN (Kiersh, Steven) Modified event title on 2/23/2021 (znmw). (Entered: 02/15/2021)
Case 1:21-cr-00078-EGS Document 13 Filed 02/15/21 Page 1 of 8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V. Case No.: 21-cr-78 (EGS)
JOHN SULLIVAN
MEMORANDUM CONCERNING CONDITIONS OF
PRETRIAL RELEASE
Defendant, by and through undersigned counsel, does hereby
provide the following memorandum concerning conditions of his pretrial
release.
I. Defendant strenuously opposes any restrictions regarding his use
of the Internet, Twitter, Facebook and other forms of social media.
“A prior restraint on expression is a content-based restriction of
speech. A prior restraint exists when the enjoyment of protected expression
is contingent upon the approval of government officials.” Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 711-13 (1931); White v. Baker, 696 F. Supp 2d
1289, 1306 (N.D. Georgia 2010) In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 795 n.5, the Supreme Court held that “A prior restraint on
expression exists when the government can deny access to a forum for
expression before the expression occurs.”
1
Case 1:21-cr-00078-EGS Document 13 Filed 02/15/21 Page 2 of 8
As a condition of defendant’s pre-trial relelase, the government is
seeking to limit his use of the internet and to expressly prohibit him from
using the following: Twitter, Facebook, encrypted platforms.
The requests by the United States to limit defendant’s ability to
communicate the way the vast majority of Americans communicate is
oppressive, overbroad and unconstitional.
While courts have broad discretion to prescribe conditions of release,
The “conditions of supervised release may not restrict more liberty than
reasonably necessary, including constitutional liberty.” See United States v.
Holena, --F.3d--, 2018 WL 4905748, at *5 (3rd Cir. 2018). The Court in Hoena
further noted that computer and internet usage restrictions potentially “limit
an array of First Amendment activity,” and accordingly cautioned district
courts to ensure that any such restrictions “not…restrict (defendants) First
Amendment Rights more than reasonably necessary or appropriate to
protect the public.” See also Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730,
1736 (2017) (Striking down state statute barring sex offenders from using
social media for violating First Amendment.).
The government’s request for limitations on defendant’s right to use
social media is not reasonably related to the crimes for which he has been
indicted. To the contrary, the sweeping restrictions requested to be placed
2
Case 1:21-cr-00078-EGS Document 13 Filed 02/15/21 Page 3 of 8
on Mr. Sullivan are completely unmoored from the conduct that is ostensibly
what is necessary to protect the community. The entirely overboard request
by the government would effectively ban hm from communicating with
friends, interacting, with his family, writing his thoughts, keeping up with the
news, checking on the weather, reading a newspaper outline or any of the
typical reasons why the vast majority of the polukatin uses these social
media platforms. The breadth of the requested restrictions have no
relationship to the conduct for which Mr. Sullivan has been indicted.
Packingham v. United States in instructive. The case involved a
challenge to statute making it a felony for registered sex offenders to access
commercial social networking websites where the sex offender knows that
the site permits minor children to become members. Petitioner was indicted
for violating the subject state law. The specific charge was Petitioner posted
a statement on his Facebook profile about a positive experience in traffic
court. Petitioner challenged the law on grounds that it violated free speech.
The trial court denied the challenge. The State Court of Appeals struck the
statute down on grounds that it cioated the First Amendment. The State
appealed the ruling.
The Supreme Court struck the sstaue down as being violative of rights
guaranteed by the First Amendment. “A fundamental principle is that all
3
Case 1:21-cr-00078-EGS Document 13 Filed 02/15/21 Page 4 of 8
persons have access to places where they can speak and listen, and then,
after reflection, speak and listen once more. Today, one of the most
important places to exchange views is cyberspace, particularly social
media….” 137 S. Ct. at 1732. Justice Kennedy added, “It is well established
that, as a general rule, the Government “may not suppress lawful speech as
the means to suppress unlawful speech.” Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002). That is what North Carolina has done here. Its law
must be held invalid.” supra, 1738.
The government’s argument in support of detention is completely
contradicted by the facts before this Court. The government has argued,
“there are serious risks that this defendant will obstruct or attempt to obstruct
and that he continues to pose a recurring threat to the safety of the
community.” PACER Document,6, page 2.
There is no evidence to support this unfounded claim. Defendant has
not in any manner whatsoever attempted to obstruct justice. His request to
have people attend his release hearing in Utah was a perfectly reasonable
and constitutionally protected request to invite people to his court
proceeding. It is inconceivable that he be punished for this completely lawful
request.
4
Case 1:21-cr-00078-EGS Document 13 Filed 02/15/21 Page 5 of 8
United States Magistrate Judge Daphne A. Oberg of the United
States District Court for the District of Utah debunked the government’s
argument as to John Sullivan’s alleged obstruction of justice.
The government’s proffer simply fails to establish a serious
risk Mr. Sullivan will obstruct justice or attempt to obstruct
justice in the future…The allegation that Mr. Sullivan might
have incited others to resist police officers in a separate
Oregon event adds little to the inquiry. These allegations
are insufficient to meet the government’s burden of establishing
§ 3142 (f)(2)(B) applies in this case, even by a preponderance
of the evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence.
United States v. Sullivan, Case No. 21-mj14 (U.S. District Court Utah),
PACER DOCUMENT, page 4.
II. Defendant should not be restricted from earning his income
through Insurgence USA
Insurgence USA is not charged with any offense in this matter.
Insurgence is not deemed to have been involved in any criminal activity.
Defendant is legitimately self-employed as a documentarian and it is
oppressive to require that he not be allowed to continue his primary area of
employment for an extended period of time. Attached to this pleading are
receipts for services documenting defendant’s employment.
1. Contract with Australian Broadcasting.
2. Contract with Left/Right, LLC;
5
Case 1:21-cr-00078-EGS Document 13 Filed 02/15/21 Page 6 of 8
3. Agreement to release video footage with Rocky Mountain Public
Media.
4. License Agreement with CNN
III. Defendant should not required to wear an ankle bracelet pending
trial
There is absolutely no question that John Sullivan has faithfully
appeared for very court appearance remotely. He is actively engaged with
his trial counsel in preparing a defense to the charges in the indictment.
There is not a reasonable argument that he is a danger of flight. The
government is not making this argument. This begs the question: Why does
John Sullivan have to wear an electronic monitoring device?
John Sullivan has substantial ties to the community. His father is a
retired Army officer having spent 21 years in the military. Defendant’s
parents reside approximately one hour away from him in Utah and are
actively involved in his life.
“Release pending trial is governed by the Bail Reform Act of 1984
which, like its predecessor, the Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C.
Sections 3146-3152 (1982)(repealed October 18, 1984) mandates release
of a person facing trial under the least restrictive conditions or combination
of conditions that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person….”
Banks v. United States, 414 F.2d 1150,1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
6
Case 1:21-cr-00078-EGS Document 13 Filed 02/15/21 Page 7 of 8
The ankle monitor is an overly restrictive and unnecessary
restriction\ on defendant.
CONCLUSION
Defendant is a decent, honest young man who has been utterly
mischaracterized by pleadings filed in this Court and comments attributed
to him have been taken out of context. There is no reason to conclude he is
risk of flight or that he will attempt to obstruct justice. He has promptly
appeared for every court appearance in Utah and the District of Columbia
and there is nothing in the record to reasonably suggest that he will not
continue to abide by conditions of relelease. The government seeks
unconstitutional and oppressive conditions that defendant respectfully
submits should not be permitted by this Court.
Respectfully submitted,
_______/s/_______________
Steven R. Kiersh #323329
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.
Suite 440
Washington, D.C. 20015
(202) 347-0200
7
Case 1:21-cr-00078-EGS Document 13 Filed 02/15/21 Page 8 of 8
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing
was served, via the Court’s electronic filing system, on this the
____15th____day of February, 2021 upon all counsel of record.
______/s/____________________
Steven R. Kiersh
8