{"count":1045003,"next":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/search/?cursor=cz0zNi40OTg4NzUmcz05NDYwOTE2JnQ9byZkPTIwMjYtMDktMjcmcD0y&q=STANDARD+OF+REVIEW+AND+TIMING+APPEALS&type=o","previous":null,"results":[{"absolute_url":"/opinion/6479084/one-elmcroft-stamford-llc-v-zoning-board-of-appeals/","attorney":"","caseName":"One Elmcroft Stamford, LLC v. Zoning Board of Appeals","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":6479084,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2022-06-14","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC41208","docket_id":63396260,"judge":"Elgo; Moll; Lavery","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:38:28.246287Z","date_created":"2022-06-20T18:01:38.726557Z","score":{"bm25":62.98187}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1462637,1471911,1498466,1538438,1956876,2257526,2269905,2281826,2288427,2305219,2308039,2315553,2328039,2368010,2373265,2402443,2558344,3317602,3320448,4183383,4204057,4370923,4434870,4857944,4879042,5118246,6043100,6577797,6588695,6589418,6591612,7839016,7841146,7841963,7842365,7842381,7844530,7845149,7846734,7847628,7850294,7851450,7853607,7854258,7854596,7854748,7857986,7860962,9888643],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP213/213AP270.pdf","id":6351195,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2022/06/14/one_elmcroft_stamford_llc_v._zoning_board_of_appeals_1.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-05T09:24:51.941424Z","date_created":"2022-06-20T18:01:38.727421Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"61b8ebfad87a2a39543bb4b85953660a97367fd9","snippet":"***********************************************\n The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Appeal from the decision by the named defendant granting the application of the defendant Pisano Broth- ers Automotive, Inc., et al. for approval to locate an automotive repair business on certain real property, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain and transferred to the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, where the case was tried to the court, Hon. Taggart D. Adams, judge trial referee; judg- ment denying the plaintiff's appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court, Sheldon, Elgo and Lavery, Js., which reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to that court for further proceed- ings, and the defendant Pasquale Pisano et al., on the granting of certification, appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed this court's judgment and remanded the case to this court for further proceedings. Reversed in part; further proceedings. Jeffrey P. Nichols, with whom was Amy Souchuns and, on the brief, John W. Knuff, for the appellant (plaintiff). Gerald M. Fox III, for the appellees (defendant Pas- quale Pisano et al.).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[6351195],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court from the decision by the defen- dant Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Stamford granting the application of the defendant P, filed on behalf of the defendant P Co., for approval for the location of an automotive repair business on certain real property. The board had referred P Co.'s application to the city's Planning Board and Engineering Bureau for comment. The Planning Board recommended that the application be denied. The Engineering Bureau did not object to the application but expressed various concerns. The board thereafter published notice of a public hearing on the applica- tion, which stated that P Co. sought to operate a used car dealership on the property. The board approved the application subject to certain conditions, which included concerns expressed by the Engineering Bureau. The plaintiff, which owned property that abutted the site at issue, claimed, inter alia, that the board failed to conduct a suitability analysis, as required by statute ([Rev. to 2003] § 14-55). The Superior Court concluded that the board had given due consideration to the suitability of the property and rendered judgment denying the appeal. The plaintiff then appealed to this court, which concluded that the General Assembly had not repealed § 14-55 in 2003, and reversed the Superior Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceed- ings. The defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court, which deter- mined that the General Assembly had repealed § 14-55 in 2003 and reversed in part this court's judgment and remanded the case to this court to consider the plaintiff's remaining claims. Held: 1. The plaintiff's claim that the notice of the public hearing on P Co.'s application was defective and, thus, deprived the board of jurisdiction to consider the application, was unavailing; because the legislature has not enacted a proper substitute for § 14-55, which had set forth the requirements for prehearing notice regarding location approval applica- tions, the board could not have lacked jurisdiction to hear the applica- tion, as it was not statutorily required to provide such notice at the time P Co. filed its application in 2016. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on its contention that the board violated its right to fundamental fairness because the notice of the public hearing was misleading in that it did not sufficiently describe P Co.'s intended use of the property: although the notice stated that the property would be used for the sale of used cars, P clarified at the public hearing that, although used cars occasionally would be sold on the property, the primary intended use of the property was for general automotive repair, and, because the applicable zoning regulation (§ 19.A.3.b) referred to the statute (§ 14-54) applicable to the board's authority to hear and decide location approval applications, the defendants sufficiently apprised the plaintiff of the proposed use of the property, as the statutory (§ 14-51 (a) (2)) definition of used car dealer, which encompassed auto- motive repair and used car sales, accurately described the proposed use of the property; moreover, in accordance with the applicable zoning regulation (§ 20.B.1), the board provided written notice of the public hearing to all owners of property, including the plaintiff, within the applicable boundary area of the property at issue, which described the proposed use of the property as automotive repair and used car dealer. 3. The board applied an incorrect legal standard in ruling on P Co.'s location approval application and mistakenly believed it could not deny such application because the proposed use was permitted in the zone at issue: the board's collective statement of its basis for granting P Co.'s application expressly applied the legal standard under the regulation (§ 19.B.2.a (2)) that governs variance approvals rather than § 19.A.3.b, which is applicable to location approval applications; moreover, the board's assertion that its error was merely clerical was belied by the record, which demonstrated that it exceeded its statutory authority and its authority under § 19.A.3 when it referred P Co.'s application to the city's engineering and planning agencies, and, as the board was required by § 19.A.3 to hear and decide the application, its error in treating the application as a variance request was exacerbated by the terms of its approval, which required P Co. to comply with all concerns articulated by the Engineering Bureau; furthermore, because the members of the board were obligated as agents of the state to make a determination in reviewing P Co.'s location approval application, they were mistaken in their belief that they lacked the authority to deny the application because P Co.'s proposed use was permitted in the zone at issue. 4. The board did not commit an error of law by failing to distinguish the denial by a different municipal entity seven years earlier of a location approval application for a different business to operate a used car dealer- ship on the property at issue; the plaintiff's reliance on the ''impotent to reverse'' rule, which precludes a municipal agency from revisiting its prior decisions and revoking its duly enacted action, was unavailing because the board did not make any prior determinations or render a decision on the earlier application, as that denial was rendered by a different municipal entity that, at that time, had powers and duties distinct from those of the board, and P Co.'s application was filed after the legislature's amendment (Public Acts 2016, No. 16-55, § 4) of § 14- 54, which transferred from that different municipal entity to the board the authority to act on location approval applications. (One judge concurring in part and dissenting in part) Argued September 13, 2021—officially released June 14, 2022"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/6462448/new-milford-v-standard-demolition-services-inc/","attorney":"","caseName":"New Milford v. Standard Demolition Services, Inc.","caseNameFull":"","citation":["212 Conn. App. 30"],"citeCount":7,"cluster_id":6462448,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2022-04-26","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC43874","docket_id":63259852,"judge":"Bright; Elgo; Bear","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:48:00.856276Z","date_created":"2022-04-25T12:01:36.964577Z","score":{"bm25":53.571007}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[99359,1128751,1193388,1279949,1280458,1407287,1548905,1911504,1953363,1973608,2074872,2187150,2441868,2552943,3317543,3323603,4088417,4220428,4224027,4346477,4444703,4558112,4708328,5140653,6479952,7839124,7839184,7839628,7841850,7842897,7854910,7857260,7860778,7860912,7863421,7864446,7864820,7864857,9156986,9638356,9800494],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP212/212AP218.pdf","id":6334559,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2022/04/26/new_milford_v._standard_demolition_services_inc..pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-05T09:23:18.841223Z","date_created":"2022-04-25T12:01:36.967804Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"7c1ae5b1dd3413a5851d285f904d3f7e7bb1d2be","snippet":"***********************************************\n The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Action to recover damages for breach of contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Litchfield, where the defendant filed a counterclaim; thereafter, the matter was tried to the court, Shaban, J.; judgment for the plaintiff on the complaint and on the counterclaim, from which the defendant appealed and the plaintiff cross appealed to this court. Reversed in part; further proceedings. Raymond A. Garcia, with whom were Nyle K. Davey, and, on the brief, Lauren Lyngholm Crowe and Jona- than A. Krumeich, for the appellant-cross appellee (defendant). John D. Tower, with whom was Graham W. Moller, for the appellee-cross appellant (plaintiff)","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[6334559],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiff town sought to recover damages from the defendant contractor for breach of contract. The plaintiff owned a vacant brass mill factory that was contaminated with, inter alia, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). The plaintiff, on the advice of consultants, applied to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for permission to demol- ish and clean up the property and engage contractors to perform the work. The plaintiff issued a notice inviting prospective contractors to provide bids for the third phase of the project, which involved the demolition, abatement and remediation of the property. The notice indi- cated that the contractor would be allowed to keep the scrap value of any structural steel salvaged from the site. The plaintiff made all public information about the project available to prospective bidders, including a report from one of its consultants that referenced the presence of PCBs throughout the building. The plaintiff also provided a letter to all prospective bidders clarifying that the selected contractor would be responsible for the sampling and disposal of any PCB contaminated material. The defendant submitted the winning bid for the contract, in which it did not allocate any funds for the remediation or disposal of any contaminated structural steel on the site, as it believed that the steel was not contaminated and could be recycled without remediation. Once selected, the defendant executed a certification acknowledging that it had read and agreed to abide by all conditions set forth in the EPA's approval letter for the third phase of the project, which included attachments regarding the cleanup of PCB contaminated material and correspondence between the EPA and the plaintiff regarding the PCB contamination of various materials, including steel beams. The parties then entered into a contract for the phase three work, which expressly incorporated the EPA approval letter and established a 140 day deadline for the defendant to complete the job. Two months after the plaintiff had issued the defendant a notice to proceed, the defendant still had not obtained EPA approval of its contractor work plan, which was required before it could begin any substantial demolition work, and it had become engaged in a dispute with the plaintiff regarding the testing and disposal of the structural steel on the property. The defendant contended that the plaintiff mischaracterized the steel, leading it to believe that the steel was not contaminated and could be disposed of without remediation. The defendant claimed that it remained ready, able and willing to perform the work on the project, but it refused to do so if it was required to sample the steel to determine whether it was contaminated and told the plaintiff that it had accidentally executed the contract, as it had submitted its bid without information regarding the contamination of the steel or knowledge that the disposal of any contami- nated steel would be its responsibility. Thereafter, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendant, notifying the defendant that it was in default because, inter alia, it would not be able to timely complete its work under the contract and had anticipatorily breached various provisions of the contract, and, consequently, its employment was terminated. The plaintiff rebid the project and hired C Co. to complete the work on the site, including the testing and disposal of the structural steel. C Co. was unable to finish its work, however, due in part to the increased expense and time required to finish the project as a result of the defendant's intervention, which led to additional testing requirements imposed by both the EPA and the trial court. The trial court found that the plaintiff had established its claim for breach of contract and had suffered dam- ages, limited to the liquidated damages provision of the contract, in an amount equal to 254 days, less the retainage held by the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, and the plaintiff cross-appealed, claiming that the trial court erred in its award of damages. Held: 1. The defendant's claim that the trial court misapplied state and federal environmental laws was belied by the trial court's findings, which were supported by the record: the defendant did not raise before the trial court, nor did the trial court address, the defendant's claims that the plaintiff lacked proper authorization from the EPA to work on the undis- closed waste at the site or that the plaintiff and the trial court disregarded certain statutory (§ 22a-467) requirements relating to the disposal of PCB contaminated material, and, accordingly, this court declined to address those claims; moreover, the defendant's claims that the plaintiff failed to adequately characterize the site and that the plaintiff was required under the contract to paint chip test the steel beams prior to the defendant performing any work at the site lacked merit, as the trial court found that the contract did not require paint chip testing, that the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witnesses that paint chip sampling under such circumstances was not customary was credible, that there was no express statement in the contract that the steel was not contami- nated, that the plaintiff performed its obligations under the contract, and that the contract overwhelmingly placed the obligation for the testing, handling and processing of the material on the site on the defendant and expressly made clear that the risk of the condition of the materials being different than anticipated was solely on the defendant, and such findings were supported by the clear and unambiguous provisions of the contract and the documents related thereto; furthermore, this action involved a breach of contract claim, and the defendant failed to provide a clear explanation as to how its claims concerning the EPA regulations circumvented the trial court's findings regarding the contract and failed to raise at trial its claims that the plaintiff's conduct constituted a viola- tion of the EPA regulations and that the trial court erred in failing to find such a violation; additionally, although the defendant may have made its bid and entered the contract on the basis of a mistaken basic assumption, neither the trial court nor this court was permitted to rewrite the contract or to relieve the defendant of its obligations thereunder, as the defendant was a sophisticated and experienced party with respect to the type of work covered by the contract, it had the opportunity to address any issues it had with the proposed terms and interpretation of the contract prior to its execution, and the circumstances of the contract formation were not unconscionable. 2. This court declined to review the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in finding that the contract was not impossible to perform: because the defendant failed to plead impossibility as a special defense, such issue was not properly before the trial court, which, accordingly, did not undertake the necessary analysis of such claim nor did it make any findings thereon, and, as a result, the trial court could not have erred in failing to find that the defendant's performance under the contract was impossible; moreover, it was incumbent on the defendant to seek an articulation of the trial court's decision as to its failure to make a finding on a claim that the defendant alleged was properly before the trial court, and, in the absence of such an articulation, the record was inadequate for this court to review the claim. 3. The defendant's challenge to the trial court's implicit determination that the plaintiff lawfully had terminated the contract was unavailing: the defendant's claim was premised on a faulty assumption, namely, that the plaintiff was in default under the contract, because the trial court expressly found that the plaintiff had performed its obligations under the contract and that there was ample evidence of the defendant's breach of its obligations under the contract, which findings were supported by the record. 4. The defendant's claim that the change orders granted to C Co. in connec- tion with additional paint chip testing requirements imposed by the EPA—which were not a part of the defendant's contract with the plain- tiff—constituted an admission by the plaintiff that its contract with the defendant could not have been performed without such testing was contrary to the record and unavailing: the defendant's argument failed to acknowledge the basis for the change orders sought by C Co., namely, that the trial court found that the plaintiff was not required to conduct paint chip sampling under the contract with the defendant because the EPA did not require such testing until after the plaintiff had terminated that contract, as the requirement was instituted as a result of the defen- dant's unilaterally contacting the EPA with respect to the paint chip sampling it had conducted on the site as part of this litigation; moreover, such finding was supported by the record and was not clearly erroneous. 5. Although the amount of the trial court's award of liquidated damages was proper, that court erroneously failed to determine whether the plaintiff proved that it had suffered any compensable actual or consequential nondelay damages: a. The trial court improperly determined that liquidated damages were the plaintiff's exclusive remedy under the contract: the language in the liquidated damages provision clearly applied to damages resulting from delay, there was no language in the contract expressly stating that such damages were the plaintiff's exclusive remedy for a breach unrelated to the defendant's delay in performance, and to interpret liquidated damages as the plaintiff's sole remedy would render the contract's damages and losses provision superfluous; accordingly, the trial court erroneously failed to determine whether the plaintiff proved that it had suffered any compensable actual or consequential nondelay damages and, if so, the amount of such damages, and, as a result, the case was remanded to the trial court for a new hearing in damages. b. The trial court did not err in limiting the award of liquidated damages to 254 days: the plaintiff's claim on appeal that liquidated damages instead should have run through the date of the trial court's decision failed, as the plaintiff did not make such a request at trial and the premise of such claim no longer existed because it was based on the trial court's determination that liquidated damages were the plaintiff's exclusive rem- edy under the contract, which this court concluded was made in error. Argued November 30, 2021—officially released April 26, 2022"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4522569/bankers-choice-llc-v-zoning-bd-of-appeals-cincinnati/","attorney":"Barrett & Weber, C. Francis Barrett and Joshua L. Goode, Cincinnati, for Plaintiffs-Appellees,, Paula Boggs Muething, City Solicitor, and Marion E. Haynes, III, Terrance A. Nestor and Kevin M. Todd, for Defendant-Appellant,, Squire Patton Boggs LLP, Scott A. Kane and Larisa M. Vaysman, Cincinnati, for Amicus Curiae Cincinnati Center City Development Corporation.","caseName":"Banker's Choice, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals & Cincinnati","caseNameFull":"BANKER'S CHOICE, LLC, and Stough Development Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF the CITY OF CINCINNATI, Defendant, and City of Cincinnati, Defendant-Appellant.","citation":["2018 Ohio 3030","106 N.E.3d 1271"],"citeCount":6,"cluster_id":4522569,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2018-07-31","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"NO. C-170280","docket_id":7567198,"judge":"Cunningham, Mock","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:08:36.178475Z","date_created":"2018-08-01T13:49:12.304979Z","score":{"bm25":51.33931}},"neutralCite":"2018 Ohio 3030","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":9886941,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-27T08:16:07.742449Z","date_created":"2023-10-06T16:52:08.630418Z"},"ordering_key":1,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nCunningham, Judge.\n{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant the city of Cincinnati appeals the trial court's adoption of a magistrate's decision ordering the issuance of a certificate of appropriateness to plaintiffs-appellees Banker's Choice, LLC, and Stough Development Corporation (\"Banker's Choice\"), to demolish the Davis Furniture Building, a historic structure located at 1119-1123 Main Street. Because ","type":"lead-opinion"},{"author_id":8073,"cites":[3189755,4289288],"download_url":"http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/1/2018/2018-Ohio-3030.pdf","id":4299822,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2018/08/01/bankers_choice_l.l.c._v._zoning_bd._of_appeals__cincinnati.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T16:16:19.463860Z","date_created":"2018-08-01T13:49:12.315678Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"ab5b87624a5c09246d778062f801d2a20c29ad17","snippet":" [Cite as Banker's Choice, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals & Cincinnati, 2018-Ohio-3030.]\n IN THE COURT OF APPEALS\n FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO\n HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO\n\n\n\nBANKER’S CHOICE, LLC, : APPEAL NO. C-170280\n TRIAL NO. A-1501964\n and :\n\nSTOUGH DEVELOPMENT : ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4299822,9886941,9886942],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"ADMINISTRATIVE MISCELLANEOUS – APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL – STANDARD OF REVIEW – ZONING: A court of appeals' review of an administrative appeal under R.C. 2506.04 is a limited one focused on the existence of legal error in the trial court the appeals court's authority is limited to reviewing the common pleas court's decision on questions of law only, does not encompass that court's power to weigh the evidence, and permits reversal only when the court of common pleas errs in its application or interpretation of the law or its decision is unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence as a matter of law. Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d), when a trial court rules on objections to a magistrate's decision, the court must undertake an independent review as to the objected matters, thus when, in exercising its independent review, the trial court's judgment has modified the magistrate's decision and conflicts with it to such a degree by rejecting important factual findings that underpin the magistrate's decision, by employing its new factual findings in its analysis, and by choosing not to reach the magistrate's legal holding regarding constitutional issues, the magistrate's decision and the trial court's judgment cannot be read together as one judgment. [But see DISSENT: Where the trial court cited the proper factors to consider when reviewing the magistrate's decision and the proper standard of review to apply when considering the decision of the administrative agency and the decision of its magistrate, the trial court's decision, based in part on its own analysis and in part on its agreement with the substantial analysis already conducted by the magistrate, may be read together to render the trial court's judgment sufficiently complete to permit this court to affirm under the limited legal-error analysis provided by R.C. 2506.04.]"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10331159/in-re-ccde-senior-living-llc-v-board-of-assessment-review-appeals/","attorney":"","caseName":"In Re: CCDE Senior Living LLC v. Board of Assessment Review Appeals","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10331159,"court":"Superior Court of Delaware","court_citation_string":"Del. Super. Ct.","court_id":"delsuperct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2025-02-11","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"N23A-11-004 KMM","docket_id":69630128,"judge":"Miller J.","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-02-11T22:52:27.987935Z","date_created":"2025-02-11T20:08:40.683795Z","score":{"bm25":47.53011}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1535303,1983906,2009779,2324479,2381700],"download_url":"http://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=375270","id":10797747,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2025/02/11/in_re_ccde_senior_living_llc_v._board_of_assessment_review_appeals.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T02:40:50.165979Z","date_created":"2025-02-11T20:08:40.690730Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"386bdca1a918b352c4ec7abaf6ac745a4c8caa7b","snippet":" IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE\n\n :\nIN RE: CCDE SENIOR LIVING LLC, :\net al. v. BOARD OF ASSESSMENT : C.A. No. N23A-11-004 KMM\nREVIEW APPEALS : (Consolidated)\n :\n :\n\n\n Date submitted: November 19, 2024\n Date decided: February 11, 2025\n\n MEMORANDUM OPINION\n\n Appeal from Board of Assessment Review –","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10797747],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4578105/state-v-chesnic/","attorney":"","caseName":"State v. Chesnic","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2018 Ohio 5327"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4578105,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2018-12-31","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"2018-A-0030","docket_id":8466783,"judge":"Wright","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:24:40.873489Z","date_created":"2018-12-31T20:28:28.137046Z","score":{"bm25":45.163807}},"neutralCite":"2018 Ohio 5327","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8151,"cites":[107564,110976,111788,118391,145654,3742729,4230232],"download_url":"http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/11/2018/2018-Ohio-5327.pdf","id":4355358,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2018/12/31/state_v._chesnic.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T16:55:01.530925Z","date_created":"2018-12-31T20:28:28.161146Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"f9d95e6ff4a9669c66419a99fdde0c83aaef5179","snippet":"[Cite as State v. Chesnic, 2018-Ohio-5327.]\n\n\n IN THE COURT OF APPEALS\n\n ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT\n\n ASHTABULA COUNTY, OHIO\n\n\n STATE OF OHIO, : OPINION\n\n Plaintiff-Appellee, :\n CASE NO. 2018-A-0030\n - vs - :\n\n AMBER M. CHE","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4355358],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"CRIMINAL LAW - motion to suppress properly denied mixed standard of review purse on shoulder and under control at time of arrest State v. Banks-Harvey, 152 Ohio St.3d 368."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/1060586/appellate-court-to-apply-a-clearly-erroneous-stand/","attorney":"","caseName":"Appellate Court To Apply a Clearly Erroneous Standard of Review, Coln v. City of Savannah, 966","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":1060586,"court":"Tennessee Supreme Court","court_citation_string":"Tenn.","court_id":"tenn","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2000-06-20","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"1998-00091-SC-R11-CV","docket_id":346899,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-21T01:32:55.940731Z","date_created":"2014-10-30T08:42:17.471151Z","score":{"bm25":44.149998}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1060893,1535167,1999259,2432582],"download_url":"http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/OPINIONS/TSC/PDF/002/Crossmemp.pdf","id":1060586,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2000/06/20/appellate_court_to_apply_a_clearly_erroneous_standard_of_review_coln_v..pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T01:58:34.546893Z","date_created":"2013-10-09T18:51:42.696714Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"b3b906196380c504d346499d192f0d4b2046f3c8","snippet":" IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE\n AT JACKSON\n\n GEORGIA CROSS, ET AL. v. CITY OF MEMPHIS\n\n Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County\n No. 72984-6 T.D. George H. Brown, Jr., Judge\n\n\n\n No. W 1998-00091-SC-R11-CV — Decided June 20, 2000\n\n\nThis is an appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County which, following a bench trial, allocated\n100% fault to the City ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[1060586],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/6478824/state-v-scott/","attorney":"","caseName":"State v. Scott","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2022 Ohio 2071"],"citeCount":9,"cluster_id":6478824,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2022-06-17","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"L-21-1128","docket_id":63393693,"judge":"Mayle","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T09:49:59.327193Z","date_created":"2022-06-17T18:09:07.144717Z","score":{"bm25":41.729824}},"neutralCite":"2022 Ohio 2071","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[106936,2689579,2692707,2720356,2760668,3722846,4076912,4116601,4209837,4355043,4471430,4653787,4697183],"download_url":"https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/6/2022/2022-Ohio-2071.pdf","id":6350935,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2022/06/17/state_v._scott.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-07-08T03:12:48.531840Z","date_created":"2022-06-17T18:09:07.157126Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"4fb46a08705bea9d395d7ea3b444c3969d69f5d8","snippet":"[Cite as State v. Scott, 2022-Ohio-2071.]\n\n\n\n\n IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO\n SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT\n LUCAS COUNTY\n\n\nState of Ohio/City of Sylvania Court of Appeals No. L-21-1128\n\n Appellee Trial Court No. TRC2000745A\n\nv.\n\nBrian K. Scott DECISION AND JUDGMENT\n\n Appellant ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[6350935],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Error is forfeited where appellant fails to file timely objections to magistrate's decision, thus plain-error standard of review applies. Ohio districts differ in interpreting \"at a clearly marked stop line\" in R.C. 4511.13(C)(1)(a). Officer's interpretation of statute was objectively reasonable in light of ambiguity, thus suppression of evidence not warranted. Officer administered field sobriety tests in conformance with NHTSA guidelines even if performed a little faster than the guidelines recommend."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/889562/citizens-awareness-network-v-montana-board-of-environmental-review/","attorney":"For Appellants: Matthew O. Clifford, Attorney at Law; San Francisco, California., For Appellees: David M. Rusoff, Attorney at Law; Helena {Department of Environmental Quality)-, Michael J. Uda, Susanne F. Bessette; Doney Crowley Bloomquist Payne Uda, P.C.; Helena {Thompson River Power).","caseName":"Citizens Awareness Network v. Montana Board of Environmental Review","caseNameFull":"CITIZENS AWARENESS NETWORK, WOMEN’S VOICES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, and CLARK FORK COALITION, Petitioners and Appellants, v. MONTANA BOARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW, Respondent and Appellees, and MONTANA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY and THE THOMPSON RIVER CO-GEN, LLC, Respondent-Intervenors and Appellees","citation":["2010 MT 10","355 Mont. 60","227 P.3d 583","2010 Mont. LEXIS 13"],"citeCount":1,"cluster_id":889562,"court":"Montana Supreme Court","court_citation_string":"Mont.","court_id":"mont","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2010-01-26","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"DA 09-0070","docket_id":633243,"judge":"Leaphart, Cotter, Rice, Morris, Nelson, Brown, McGrath","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-21T01:04:52.231519Z","date_created":"2014-10-30T11:04:39.504296Z","score":{"bm25":40.43725}},"neutralCite":"2010 MT 10","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":9512363,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-27T06:29:36.667219Z","date_created":"2023-08-06T22:13:43.348561Z"},"ordering_key":2,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nJUSTICE COTTER\ndissents.\n¶34 I dissent from the Court’s decision to reverse the order denying the Conservation Groups’ motion for leave to amend their affidavit. In this connection, I dissent from the Court’s sua sponte decision to modify the standard of review applicable to orders entered pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 15(c). I would continue to adhere to our precedent t","type":"dissent"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":9512362,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-27T06:29:36.657461Z","date_created":"2023-08-06T22:13:43.342146Z"},"ordering_key":1,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nJUSTICE LEAPHART\ndelivered the Opinion of the Court.\n¶1 Citizens Awareness Network, Women’s Voices for the Environment, and Clark Fork Coalition (collectively, “Conservation Groups”) appeal the order of the District Court for the Twentieth Judicial District, Sanders County, denying their motion for summary judgment and upholding the decision of the Montana Board of","type":"lead-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[109827,459064,502773,609789,667161,724909,767044,770973,773773,781934,795406,878709,879216,879526,880212,880608,880682,880728,882057,882198,883139,883259,883270,883607,885969,886925,887778,887856,888111,888250,1136944,1147037,1475960],"download_url":"http://searchcourts.mt.gov/getDocument?vid={33BCD6BD-4298-47A9-AC79-17EAEEEDA7EF}","id":889562,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2010/01/26/citizens_awareness_v._deq.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T19:29:02.778733Z","date_created":"2013-06-05T06:03:54.780033Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"ffa48e56f7fdd154f8000cba1bfa774ce6d36512","snippet":" DA 09-0070 January 26 2010\n\n IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA\n 2010 MT 10\n\n\nCITIZENS AWARENESS NETWORK, WOMEN’S VOICES\nFOR THE ENVIRONMENT, and CLARK FORK COALITION,\n\n Petitioners and Appellants,\n\n v.\n\nMONTANA BOARD OF ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW,\n\n Respondent and Appellees,\n\n and\n\nMONTANA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMEN","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9512362,9512363,9512364,889562],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4833534/jacobson-v-resnick/","attorney":"","caseName":"Jacobson v. Resnick","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2020 Ohio 5424"],"citeCount":2,"cluster_id":4833534,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-11-25","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"108169","docket_id":18690133,"judge":"Celebrezze","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T02:37:04.440744Z","date_created":"2020-11-25T16:11:47.384896Z","score":{"bm25":40.13715}},"neutralCite":"2020 Ohio 5424","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8067,"cites":[2702515,2702662,3156248,3783220,4209536],"download_url":"http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/8/2020/2020-Ohio-5424.pdf","id":4637313,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/11/25/jacobson_v._resnick.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T20:08:44.451938Z","date_created":"2020-11-25T16:11:47.400411Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"58ff387af1d3dd9bda2de2bead55d16faabeca93","snippet":"[Cite as Jacobson v. Resnick, 2020-Ohio-5424.]\n\n\n COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO\n\n EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT\n COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA\n\nWENDY JACOBSON, ET AL., :\n\n Plaintiffs-Appellees, :\n No. 108169\n v. :\n\nBEVERLY RESNICK, ET AL., :\n\n ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4637313],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Summary judgment de novo standard of review inter vivos gift check R.C. 1303.45 intent of donor supporting affidavits Civ.R. 56(F) extension of time abuse of discretion. Appellant failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in determining that no genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to any of the claims in this matter and that summary judgment was appropriate. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion for extension of time under Civ.R. 56(F)."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9500855/mcdermott-v-bd-of-zoning-appeals/","attorney":"","caseName":"McDermott v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2024 Ohio 1780"],"citeCount":1,"cluster_id":9500855,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-05-09","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"113123","docket_id":68515503,"judge":"Boyle","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-23T01:31:34.318306Z","date_created":"2024-05-09T18:07:33.441556Z","score":{"bm25":38.96218}},"neutralCite":"2024 Ohio 1780","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8055,"cites":[2702309,3696139,3700691,3720587,3748685,3759929,4286731,4424280,4530255,4563053,4582918,4644197,6756564,6757221,6758103,6758460,6759250,6781584,9368082,9804393,11151737],"download_url":"https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/8/2024/2024-Ohio-1780.pdf","id":9967468,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/05/09/mcdermott_v._bd._of_zoning_appeals.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-05T09:19:42.740640Z","date_created":"2024-05-09T18:07:33.463834Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"e61ca9b6f253ce65d89b4271e49ab63583cee60a","snippet":"[Cite as McDermott v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2024-Ohio-1780.]\n\n COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO\n\n EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT\n COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA\n\nCHRISTINA MCDERMOTT, TRUSTEE, :\n\n Plaintiff-Appellant, :\n No. 113123\n v. :\n\nBOARD OF ZONING APPEALS,\nCITY OF CLEVELAND, ET AL., ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9967468],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Zoning, R.C. 713.15, use variance, R.C. Chapter 2505, R.C. Chapter 2506, administrative appeal, questions of law, \"grandfather clause,\" C.C.O. 359.01, C.C.O. 329, unnecessary hardship, abuse of discretion. BZA denied a variance to a property owner who built a structure without a permit. The trial court affirmed. After a thorough review of all the evidence in the record, we cannot say as a matter of law that the BZA's denial of appellant's requested variance is unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence on the whole record. As such, the trial court did not err in coming to the same conclusion."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/5145654/tech-one-associates-v-board-of-property-assessment-appeals-review/","attorney":"John A. Straka III, Pittsburgh, for Tech One Associates., John F. Cambest, Dodaro, Matta & Cambest, P.C., Pittsburgh, for West Miff-lin Borough and West Mifflin Borough, West Mifflin Area School District., Michael Henry Wojcik, Allegheny County Law Department, for Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review of Allegheny County.","caseName":"Tech One Associates v. Board of Property Assessment, Appeals & Review","caseNameFull":"TECH ONE ASSOCIATES v. BOARD OF PROPERTY ASSESSMENT, APPEALS AND REVIEW OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY, West Mifflin Borough and West Mifflin Area School District","citation":["53 A.3d 685","617 Pa. 439","2012 Pa. LEXIS 973"],"citeCount":34,"cluster_id":5145654,"court":"Supreme Court of Pennsylvania","court_citation_string":"Pa.","court_id":"pa","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2012-04-25","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"","docket_id":60459449,"judge":"Baer, Castille, Eakin, McCaffery, Melvin, Saylor, Todd","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T03:55:08.429813Z","date_created":"2021-09-24T16:18:27.728331Z","score":{"bm25":38.938293}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":4966181,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-07-06T08:20:57.109345Z","date_created":"2021-09-24T16:18:27.751540Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\n\nOPINION\n\nJustice TODD.\nThis appeal concerns the validity of a single unified assessment of both a tract of land, and the buildings of a shopping center, movie theater, and restaurant located on the land, where the land is owned by one business entity — Appellant Tech One *687Associates — and the buildings and surrounding improvements to t","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4966181],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/5344747/lawless-v-standard-insurance-co/","attorney":"McDermott Law, LLC, Shawn E. McDer-mott, Heather L. Petitmermet, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants., Swift & Bramer, LLP, Clinton P. Swift, Windsor, Colorado; Smith %CO von Schleicher + Associates, Warren von Schleicher, Chicago, Illinois, for Defendant, Appellee Standard Insurance Company., Gregory W. Smith, Adam L. Franklin, Kimberly K. Riccardi, Denver, Colorado; Berenbaum Weinshienk PC, Gary M. Kramer, Eugene M. Sprague, James L. Wooll, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees Colorado Public Employees' Retirement Association, Colorado Public Employees' Retirement Association Board of Trustees, Carole Wright, Maryann Motza, and Rick Larson.","caseName":"Lawless v. Standard Insurance Co.","caseNameFull":"Tracey LAWLESS, Robert Hogan, and Terrilynn Mills v. STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY Colorado Public Employees' Retirement Association Colorado Public Employees' Retirement Association Board of Trustees and Carole Wright, in her official capacity as Trustee, Maryann Motza, in her official capacity as Trustee and Rick Larson, in his official capacity as Trustee","citation":["338 P.3d 398","2013 COA 153","2013 WL 6116134","2013 Colo. App. LEXIS 1780"],"citeCount":4,"cluster_id":5344747,"court":"Colorado Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Colo. Ct. App.","court_id":"coloctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2013-11-21","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Court of Appeals No. 12CA0567","docket_id":61692418,"judge":"Booras, Dailey, Furman","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T04:47:39.419067Z","date_created":"2022-01-06T01:10:11.726005Z","score":{"bm25":38.82244}},"neutralCite":"2013 COA 153","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":5177514,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T00:22:24.322668Z","date_created":"2022-01-06T01:10:11.743415Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nOfiinion by\nJUDGE BOORAS\nT1 This is an appeal from the district court's review of challenges to state agency - action. Consolidated plaintiffs Tracey Lawless, Robert Hogan, and Terrilynn Mills appeal the judgments in favor of defendants, Standard Insurance Company (Standard), as well as the Colorado Public Employees' Retirement Association (PERA), its Board of Trustees, and trustees Carole Wright, Maryann Motza, ","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[5177514],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4325168/meyer-v-industrial-claim-appeals-office/","attorney":"Law Office of Warren Domangue, Warren Domangue, Lakewood, Colorado, for Petitioner, Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Evan Brennan, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colórado, for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office, No Appearance for Respondent Division of Unemployment Insurance, Benefit Payment Control","caseName":"Meyer v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office","caseNameFull":"Lizabeth A. MEYER, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS OFFICE of the State of Colorado and Division of Unemployment Insurance, Benefit Payment Control, Respondents","citation":["2016 COA 172","409 P.3d 624"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4325168,"court":"Colorado Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Colo. Ct. App.","court_id":"coloctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2016-11-17","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Court of Appeals 16CA0369","docket_id":4545208,"judge":"Dailey, Taubman, Preyre","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T00:12:59.134978Z","date_created":"2016-11-28T08:05:00.842751Z","score":{"bm25":37.98102}},"neutralCite":"2016 COA 172","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1212658,1243467,1268724,2616145,2640385],"download_url":"http://www.cobar.org/Portals/COBAR/Repository/Sections/Opinions/11-23-16/16CA0369-PD.pdf?ver=2016-11-26-194342-243","id":4102429,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2016/11/17/meyer_v._industrial_claim_appeals_office.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T13:59:54.378238Z","date_created":"2016-11-28T08:05:00.849428Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"974665ff218fbdda6844e4885796c5d6c75f20db","snippet":"\n\n\n Opinion by\n \n\n JUDGE DAILEY\n \n\n ¶ 1 In this unemployment compensation benefits case, petitioner, Lizabeth A. Meyer (claimant), seeks review of a -final order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel). The Panel upheld a hearing officer’s decision that claimant had received an overpayment of unemployment compensation benefits because of unreported earnings from her","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4102429],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"Unemployment Compensation Benefits","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9444107/mills-v-walnut-twp-bd-of-zoning-appeals/","attorney":"","caseName":"Mills v. Walnut Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals","caseNameFull":"","citation":["229 N.E.3d 207","2023 Ohio 4234"],"citeCount":2,"cluster_id":9444107,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2023-11-16","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"22CA14","docket_id":68030028,"judge":"Wilkin","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-26T17:54:08.125253Z","date_created":"2023-11-22T18:08:10.604933Z","score":{"bm25":37.60418}},"neutralCite":"2023 Ohio 4234","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2697880,2698407,4370230,9882548],"download_url":"https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/4/2023/2023-Ohio-4234.pdf","id":9901932,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/11/16/mills_v._walnut_twp._bd._of_zoning_appeals.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-26T17:54:08.240331Z","date_created":"2023-11-22T18:08:10.617781Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"37b09b5f6aff4d5f0e1b91283a767923860bf73c","snippet":"[Cite as Mills v. Walnut Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2023-Ohio-4234.]\n\n\n IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO\n FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT\n PICKAWAY COUNTY\n\nRONALD MILLS, :\n : Case No. 22CA14\n Appellant-Appellant, :\n :\n ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9901932],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Zoning use variance, practical difficulties test area variance, unnecessary hardship test, preponderance of the evidence board of zoning appeals R.C. 2506.04, administrative appeal standard of review is whether the decision by the board of zoning appeals is \"unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence on the whole record\" Duncan v. Middlefield, 23 Ohio St.3d 83: \"factors to be considered and weighed in determining whether a property owner seeking an area variance has encountered practical difficulties in the use of his property include, but are not limited to: (1) whether the property in question will yield a reasonable return or whether there can be any beneficial use of the property without the variance (2) whether the variance is substantial (3) whether the essential character of the neighborhood would be substantially altered or whether adjoining properties would suffer a substantial detriment as a result of the variance (4) whether the variance would adversely affect the delivery of governmental services (e.g., water, sewer, garbage) (5) whether the property owner purchased the property with knowledge of the zoning restriction (6) whether the property owner's predicament feasibly can be obviated through some method other than a variance (7) whether the spirit and intent behind the zoning requirement would be observed and substantial justice done by granting the variance.\""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4397811/hutchison-v-industrial-claim-appeals-office/","attorney":"Withers, Seidman Rice & Mueller, P.C., David B. Mueller, Grand Junction, Colorado, for Petitioner, No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office ■ ■, ■ Harvey Flewelling, Grant Butterfield, Denver, Colorado, for Respondents Pine Country, Inc. and Pinnacol Assurance ■, William J. Macdonald, Aurora, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Workers’ Compensation Education Association","caseName":"Hutchison v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office","caseNameFull":"Richard HUTCHISON, Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS OFFICE of the State of Colorado; Pine Country, Inc., D/B/A Pine Country Truck & Auto; And Pinnacol Assurance, Respondents","citation":["2017 COA 79","405 P.3d 458","2017 WL 2380536","2017 Colo. App. LEXIS 696"],"citeCount":1,"cluster_id":4397811,"court":"Colorado Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Colo. Ct. App.","court_id":"coloctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2017-06-01","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Court of Appeals 16CA1375","docket_id":6070159,"judge":"Dailey, Plank, Berger","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T00:33:42.457015Z","date_created":"2017-06-07T15:10:43.471743Z","score":{"bm25":37.564877}},"neutralCite":"2017 COA 79","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":9876300,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T22:55:23.767395Z","date_created":"2023-09-26T22:55:48.696460Z"},"ordering_key":1,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nOpinion by\nJUDGE DAILEY\n¶ 1 In this workers’ compensation action, claimant, Richard Hutchison, challenges an order apportioning his benefits award. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that only one-third of claimant’s injury was work-related. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) affirmed the ALJ’s decision. We conclude that claimant’s benefits award was properly apportioned and therefore affi","type":"lead-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[1130368,1145485,1192235,1351501,1398957,1432118,1444224,1483006,1616859,2264189,2334571,2465169,2509261,2550032,2569312,2610427,2613227,2624104],"download_url":"https://www.cobar.org/portals/cobar/repository/sections/opinions/6-1-17/16CA1375.pdf","id":4175064,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2017/06/01/hutchison_v._industrial_claim_appeals_office.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T14:49:48.357395Z","date_created":"2017-06-07T15:10:43.479042Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"b563f0df7967b7b769eb2efb353096e79b42565e","snippet":"COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2017COA79\n\n\nCourt of Appeals No. 16CA1375\nIndustrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado\nWC No. 4-972-492\n\n\nRichard Hutchison,\n\nPetitioner,\n\nv.\n\nIndustrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado; Pine Country, Inc.,\nd/b/a Pine Country Truck & Auto; and Pinnacol Assurance,\n\nRespondents.\n\n\n ORDER AFFIRMED\n\n Division II\n Opinion ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4175064,9876300,9876302],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"Workers' Compensation","syllabus":"Workers' Compensation—Occupational Disease—Apportionment—Previous Injury. Claimant Hutchison has worked as a trailer mechanic for Pine Country, Inc. (employer) since 1990. Claimant began experiencing knee pain in 2012. In October 2014, when his symptoms worsened, claimant reported his knee pain to his employer as a work-related occupational disease. The employer contested the claim on relatedness grounds, and supported its position with an independent medical examination, which concluded that claimant had osteoarthritis and was overweight and suggested that claimant's employment was not the cause of the arthritis. An administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that one-third of claimant's injury was work-related. The Industrial Claim Appeals Office (Panel) affirmed the ALJ's decision.On appeal, claimant challenged the apportionment of his benefits award. Claimant contended that his knee condition arose from repetitive kneeling and crawling necessitated by his work as a trailer mechanic, rather than from a specific incident, and therefore, it should be covered as an occupational disease. Here, because claimant's knee condition was one ongoing disease with both work- and non-work- related causes, there was no separate \"previous injury\" as anticipated by CRS § 8-42-104(3) it was instead one injury with multiple causes. The Panel therefore properly concluded that the CRS § 8-42-104(3) prohibition against apportionment for a previous injury did not apply. Further, the order is consistent with case law. Claimant also contended that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ's apportionment. The Court of Appeals concluded that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's apportionment findings and held that the Panel did not err when it declined to set aside the ALJ's order on that basis. The order was affirmed."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9450515/united-states-court-of-appeals/","attorney":"","caseName":"United States Court of Appeals","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9450515,"court":"Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit","court_citation_string":"2d Cir.","court_id":"ca2","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2023-12-08","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"In the","docket_id":68073182,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-23T01:19:34.879480Z","date_created":"2023-12-08T16:00:37.150374Z","score":{"bm25":37.241947}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[306733,334888,820494,3201953,4699044,7798152,8413177,8414006,9426423,9428383,9430152,9432577,9434456,9490305,9506076,9888773,9888811],"download_url":"http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/fc5b9176-9ff6-41b7-9bab-6ac776b384be/4/doc/22-1741_opn.pdf","id":9908340,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/12/08/united_states_court_of_appeals.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-29T07:30:08.262426Z","date_created":"2023-12-08T16:00:37.151945Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"606dbece973778645b64927282630df315abfda7","snippet":" In the\n United States Court of Appeals\n for the Second Circuit\n\n August Term 2022\n No. 22-1741-cv\n\n\n ATERES BAIS YAAKOV ACADEMY OF ROCKLAND,\n Plaintiff-Appellant,\n v.\nTOWN OF CLARKSTOWN, GEORGE HOEHMANN, CUPON INC., CITIZENS\nUNITED TO PROTECT OUR NEIGHBORHOODS OF GREATER NANUET INC.,\n Defendants-Appellees.\n\n\n On Appeal from","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9908340],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9373827/walmart-inc-v-board-of-review/","attorney":"","caseName":"Walmart, Inc. v. Board of Review","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9373827,"court":"Court of Appeals of Iowa","court_citation_string":"Iowa Ct. App.","court_id":"iowactapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2023-02-08","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"21-1018","docket_id":66795967,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-23T00:59:45.160679Z","date_created":"2023-02-08T16:05:06.279598Z","score":{"bm25":37.057514}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1290380,1599334,1623400,1690515,1708825,1782662,1800158,1921344,1963204,2136226,3176959,7876781],"download_url":"https://www.iowacourts.gov/courtcases/15460/embed/CourtAppealsOpinion","id":9369303,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/02/08/walmart_inc._v._board_of_review.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-07-09T04:09:52.880624Z","date_created":"2023-02-08T16:05:06.280562Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"72afd834169f4c3cbeed9f61edc07f4f695a081e","snippet":" IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA\n\n No. 21-1018\n Filed February 8, 2023\n\n\nWALMART, INC. and SAM'S REAL ESTATE BUSINESS TRUST,\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\n\nvs.\n\nCITY OF DAVENPORT IOWA BOARD OF REVIEW,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n_________________________________\n\nWALMART, INC. and WALMART REAL ESTATE BUSINESS TRUST,\n Plaintiffs-Appellees,\n\nvs.\n\nCITY OF DAVENPORT IOWA BOARD OF REVIEW,\n Defendant-Appellant.\n________","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9369303],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10357085/brown-v-zoning-board-of-appeals/","attorney":"","caseName":"Brown v. Zoning Board of Appeals","caseNameFull":"","citation":["231 Conn. App. 372"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10357085,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2025-03-18","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC46969","docket_id":69744551,"judge":"Alvord; Cradle; Prescott","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:47:54.648370Z","date_created":"2025-03-17T12:05:15.060436Z","score":{"bm25":37.03832}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP231/AP231.138.pdf","id":10823673,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2025/03/18/brown_v._zoning_board_of_appeals.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:47:54.657349Z","date_created":"2025-03-17T12:05:15.062216Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"cd89d6eea28c3970b6a85d43036aaa2ad0b586f6","snippet":"************************************************\n The “officially released” date that appears near the\nbeginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be\npublished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it\nis released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the\nbeginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-\nion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-\ncially released” date appearing in the opinion.\n All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncor","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Appeal from the decision of the defendant affirming the decision of its zoning enforcement officer approving an application for a building permit to build a retaining wall, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis- trict of Hartford and tried to the court, Schuman, J.; judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plain- tiff, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed; judgment vacated. Viriginia Brown, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff). Kari L. Olson, with whom was Joseph D. Szerejko, for the appellee (defendant). The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10823673],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her appeal from the decision of the defendant, which upheld the decision of the defendant's zoning enforcement officer to approve an application for a permit by the plaintiff's neighbors to build a retaining wall along the plaintiff's shared property line. The plaintiff claimed that the court erred in determining that the proposed retaining wall was not a structure within the meaning of applicable zoning regulations. Held: Because the permit approved by the defendant had expired and the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that her claim was reviewable under the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine, this court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal as moot and vacated the judgment of the trial court and the decision of the defendant. Argued January 6—officially released March 18, 2025"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9509079/green-v-zoning-board-of-appeals/","attorney":"","caseName":"Green v. Zoning Board of Appeals","caseNameFull":"","citation":["154 Haw. 259","549 P.3d 344"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9509079,"court":"Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Haw. App.","court_id":"hawapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-05-30","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"CAAP-19-0000567","docket_id":68810787,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-26T17:48:46.693114Z","date_created":"2024-05-30T18:03:16.639799Z","score":{"bm25":36.96703}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1164958,1194922,2562719,2599125,6316558,11180863],"download_url":"https://www.courts.state.hi.us/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/CAAP-19-0000567sdo.pdf","id":9975692,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/05/30/green_v._zoning_board_of_appeals.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-05T09:19:49.827486Z","date_created":"2024-05-30T18:03:16.643651Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"9506b8533a41b1580fc2a8800348d4257f41b319","snippet":" NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAII REPORTS OR THE PACIFIC REPORTER\n\n\n\n\n Electronically Filed\n Intermediate Court of Appeals\n CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX\n 30-MAY-2024\n 07:47 AM\n Dkt. 92 SO\n\n\n NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX\n\n I","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9975692],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9460916/calista-ents-v-oxford-bd-of-zoning-appeals/","attorney":"","caseName":"Calista Ents. v. Oxford Bd. of Zoning Appeals","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2024 Ohio 34"],"citeCount":1,"cluster_id":9460916,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-01-08","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"CA2023-06-063","docket_id":68161788,"judge":"Piper","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-23T01:22:02.118542Z","date_created":"2024-01-16T16:07:34.983111Z","score":{"bm25":36.498875}},"neutralCite":"2024 Ohio 34","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8123,"cites":[4370230,4644197,9380547,9901932],"download_url":"https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/12/2024/2024-Ohio-34.pdf","id":9918741,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/01/08/calista_ents._v._oxford_bd._of_zoning_appeals.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-07-09T04:47:51.295024Z","date_created":"2024-01-16T16:07:35.005048Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"ec57935495f09eef368ccaae78cda30ba1736510","snippet":"[Cite as Calista Ents. v. Oxford Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2024-Ohio-34.]\n\n\n\n IN THE COURT OF APPEALS\n\n TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO\n\n BUTLER COUNTY\n\n\n\n\n CALISTA ENTERPRISES, LLC, :\n\n Appellant, : CASE NO. CA2023-06-063\n\n : OPINION\n ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9918741],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"For an appellate court to conduct a meaningful review in an administrative appeal, sufficiently detailed reasoning should be specified in the common pleas court's order. Sufficient detail was not provided in the common pleas court's decision necessitating a remand."}]}