{"count":185891,"next":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/search/?cursor=cz0xMi44ODA3MTUmcz02NjU1ODQ4JnQ9byZkPTIwMjYtMDktMzAmcD0y&q=RECITALS+OF+OBLIGATION&type=o","previous":null,"results":[{"absolute_url":"/opinion/2454469/in-re-limited-tax-general-obligation-bonds/","attorney":"Steven J. Peiffle, for appellant., William H. Patton and Hugh D. Spitzer (of Foster Pepper PLLC), for respondent.","caseName":"In Re Limited Tax General Obligation Bonds","caseNameFull":"In the Matter of the Limited Tax General Obligation Bonds of the City of Edmonds. the City of Edmonds, Respondent, v. Rowena Rohrbach, as Public Representative, Appellant","citation":["256 P.3d 1242","162 Wash. App. 513"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":2454469,"court":"Court of Appeals of Washington","court_citation_string":"Wash. Ct. App.","court_id":"washctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2011-07-05","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"64492-1-I","docket_id":2326784,"judge":"Schindler, Gkosse, Ellington","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-21T11:50:50.434458Z","date_created":"2014-10-30T23:24:36.764866Z","score":{"bm25":36.338108}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8462,"cites":[134728,1119964,1169269,1181279,1184157,1191734,1194914,1406748,1429896,1658888,2581336,2603607,2603873,2608669,2633359],"download_url":null,"id":2454469,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T19:48:27.595335Z","date_created":"2013-10-30T09:40:01.176012Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"a96748a346789257c014bdf9023ba101db790e5f","snippet":"\n256 P.3d 1242 (2011)\n162 Wn. App. 513\nIn the Matter of the LIMITED TAX GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS OF the CITY OF EDMONDS.\nRowena Rohrbach, Public Representative, Appellant,\nv.\nCity of Edmonds, Respondent.\nNo. 64492-1-I.\nCourt of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.\nJuly 5, 2011.\n*1243 Steven J. Peiffle, At","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[2454469],"source":"LU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/7331865/estate-of-hirshfeld-v-islamic-republic-of-iran/","attorney":"*116Asher Perlin, Hollywood, FL, Paul G. Gaston, Law Offices of Paul G. Gaston, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs., COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, United States District Judge *117This case arises from the March 6, 2008 death of 18-year old Yonadav Hirshfeld, while he was at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva in Jerusalem, Israel where he went to school. See Transcript of April 24, 2018 Bench Trial held before the Honorable Colleen Kollar-Kotelly (\"Tr.\"), ECF No. 38, at 4-5. Plaintiffs-the estate, heirs, and immediate family members of the deceased-allege that Yonadav Hirshfeld (\"Yonadav\") was killed by a shooter affiliated with Hamas, a terrorist organization.1 Proceeding under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (\"FSIA\"), Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Islamic Republic of Iran (\"Iran\") provided material support and resources to Hamas and accordingly should be held liable for Yonadav's death. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs' assessment., Defendant has not answered or otherwise participated in this litigation, and therefore, the case proceeded in a default setting, with Plaintiffs filing a [30] Motion for Default Judgment. The Court held a bench trial on April 24, 2018. Upon consideration of the pleadings, the relevant legal authorities, the demeanor of the witnesses, and the record as a whole, the Court has determined that Plaintiffs have established their claims by evidence satisfactory to the Court and accordingly will GRANT default judgment against Defendant. The Court will also consider the issue of appropriate damages for each Plaintiff., Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on July 10, 2015. Compl., ECF No. 1. An Amended Complaint was filed on December 8, 2015. Am. Compl., ECF No. 7. Plaintiffs then grappled for years to fulfill the requirements for service on Defendant Iran, due to the lack of diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran. On October 10, 2017, this Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order deeming service effective pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1608(a)(4). Memo. Op. and Order, ECF No. 27. Approximately one month later, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for a Default Judgment; a supporting Memorandum and Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and sworn declarations by the Plaintiffs, two witnesses to the incident, and two experts. Mot. for Default Judg., ECF No. 30; Memo. in support of Mot. for Default Judg., ECF No. 30-2. Plaintiffs urged this Court to bypass holding a hearing and to find the sworn declarations and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. Section 1608(e), that a claimant must \"establish[ ] [his] claim or right [to] relief by evidence that is satisfactory to the court.\" Reed v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 845 F.Supp.2d 204, 211 (D.D.C. 2012). In its discretion, however, this Court decided to hold a bench trial with live witnesses instead of relying solely on sworn declarations., Under the FSIA specifically, this Court cannot enter default judgment against a foreign state \"unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.\" 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) ; see Fraenkel v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 892 F.3d 348, 353 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (To obtain a default judgment in a Section 1605A action, plaintiffs have to establish a right to relief by providing \"evidence satisfactory to the court.\"); Roeder v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 333 F.3d 228, 232 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (\"The court ... has an obligation to satisfy itself that plaintiffs have established a right to relief.\"). \"[T]he FSIA leaves it to the court to determine precisely how much and what kinds of evidence the plaintiff must provide,\" Han Kim v. Democratic People's Republic of Korea , 774 F.3d 1044, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and \"[u]ncontroverted factual allegations that are supported by admissible evidence are taken as true,\" Thuneibat , 167 F.Supp.3d at 33. Section 1608(e)\"does not require the court to demand more or different evidence than it would normally receive; ... indeed, the quantum and quality of evidence that might satisfy a court can be less than that normally required.\" Owens v. Republic of Sudan , 864 F.3d 751, 785 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citations omitted), petition for cert. filed , 864 F.3d 751 (Mar. 6, 2018) (No. 17-1406)., The following Findings of Fact recount a tragic event. They detail the murder of Yonadav Hirshfeld, a young man attending a school in Jerusalem, Israel, where a shooter purposefully targeted Jewish students. As discussed further below, in addition to expert testimony received by the Court, three members of Yonadav's family testified at the Court's bench trial regarding the circumstances surrounding the death of their loved one. The Court appreciates that providing such testimony was extremely difficult for each witness, as it required them to revisit publicly what was likely the most tragic event in their lives. The Court also acknowledges that the current legal proceedings cannot make these *119family members whole again or even ease their pain., The Court's Findings of Fact are based on testimony presented at the bench trial held in this matter on April 24, 2018, as well as evidence submitted prior to and during that trial.3 The Court's findings fall into three overarching categories: (1) Hamas and Iran's material support for it; (2) how that support resulted in the death of Yonadav Hirshfeld in this case; (3) facts relevant to the determination of the damages which are warranted with regard to Yonadav's parents, siblings, and his Estate., A. Iran's Material Support for Hamas, The facts contained in this section are largely derived from the testimony of two experts with extensive experience studying, writing, and testifying about Iran: Dr. Patrick Clawson, the Director of Research at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and Dr. Matthew Levitt, a Senior Fellow and Director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Clawson Tr. 71; Levitt Tr. 81.4 As a preliminary matter, Hamas may be characterized as a Palestinian political organization that was founded in 1987 with a purpose of carrying out militant attacks against Israel, and which has effectively controlled the Gaza Strip since 2007.5 Clawson Tr. 74-75; Levitt Tr. 89-90 (\"Hamas is a U.S., European, and other-designated terrorist organization, ... [b]ut it is a movement and it has other components too [political and social welfare] ... [and] these components are used to leverage its ability to wage, in its terms, jihad, or a holy war[.]\"); Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13-14 (\"Hamas is listed by the United States Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (\"FTO\") and has been listed as [such] since 1997.\"); Am. Comp. ¶¶ 15-16 (\"Hamas is listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (\"SDGT\") pursuant to Executive Order 13224\" and has been listed like that \"since October 31, 2001.\") The relationship between Hamas and Iran became close after 1993 - after the Palestine Liberation Organization reached an agreement with Israel, the Iranians turned to Hamas, a more militant organization, to sponsor terrorist attacks against Israel, and this is when Iran started providing Hamas with material support. Clawson Tr. 74-75., *120The Court finds that Iran provided substantial material support to Hamas leading up to and immediately before and including the date of the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva incident, which occurred on March 6, 2008. Clawson, Tr. 79-80. During this period, Iran lent support to Hamas by providing weaponry, munitions, training, and millions of dollars in financial support. Clawson Tr. 75-79. The fact that Iran provided substantial assistance to Hamas was acknowledged by the United States Department of State in its Country Reports on Terrorism covering the years 2007 and 2008. Clawson Tr. 76. Furthermore, Hamas operatives went to Iran for military training, and this connection between Hamas and Iran was openly acknowledged insofar as the head of Hamas, Khaled Mashal, went to Tehran and met with senior Iranian officials, including the Ayatollah Khamenei. Clawson Tr. 76. In June 2007 and again in February 2008, the Iranian foreign minister met with Khaled Mashal. Clawson Tr. 76., The Court finds that Iran provided most of Hamas's financing and resourcing during the period leading up the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva shooting, and this includes material support in the form of funding, weaponry, training, in-kind services, and ideological support. Levitt Tr. 89, 91, 112-113; Clawson Tr. 74 (\"Iran has always provided support for Hamas ... [a]nd during the times when the relationship was close, like that in 2007, 2008, Iran provided Hamas with very substantial material support.\") Millions of dollars were provided by Iran to Hamas, with an uptick in spending in 2003, 2004, and 2007. Levitt Tr. 110-111; Clawson Tr. 77 (\"A very respected Arab newspaper published in London called Al-Sharq Al-Awsat ... said, in May of 2008, that Iran pledged $250 million to Hamas.\") Financial support was not only being provided to the active terrorist wing of Hamas known as Qassam, but also to the rest of Hamas. Levitt Tr. 89-91 (\"[T]he evidence of Iranian funding for Hamas is overwhelming, including statements from Iranian officials themselves, statements from Hamas officials themselves\" as well as \"U.S. officials, again, just days before this attack talking about how the majority of the financing Hamas gets it gets from Iran.\"), In the days leading up to the March 6, 2008 shooting at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva, Hamas had threatened attacks. Levitt Tr. 92-94 (\"In the period leading up to the attack in question, we created the, kind of, environment of tension leading up to what happened in Jerusalem in March 2008.\"). In an attack like the one at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva, a shooter would likely need training to learn to quickly load and reload a weapon, and how to move around a location and fire at the same time to ensure operational success. Levitt Tr. 107. The type of training provided by Iran encompassed everything from small arms and special capabilities to sniper training, making explosives, handling/reassembling weapons, and kidnapping. Levitt Tr. 105-106. A few days after the March 6, 2008 shooting, Iranian and Hamas officials made statements whereby they noted that 300 Hamas operatives had been sent to Iran for training, and 150 of them were still there. Levitt Tr. 90-91., In the immediate aftermath of the attack, the assailant was identified by Israeli authorities as Alaa Abu Dhein. Levitt Tr. 94-95. At that time, there were conflicting claims of responsibility for the attack, and Hamas did not explicitly say whether it took credit for the attack or not, although an official Hamas announcement praised the attack. Levitt Tr. 95-97. There are political and operational/security reasons for a delayed claim of responsibility regarding an attack, particularly in sensitive cases such as this one involving an attack on civilian students in Jerusalem, and *121these reasons include concerns about preparing for reprisal against Hamas in general and Hamas infrastructure in the Gaza Strip, as well as providing time for persons who aided in the attack to escape. Levitt Tr. 99-101. Ultimately, in December of 2010, on the 23rd anniversary of Hamas's founding, the Hamas prime minister and a head of the Qassam Brigade [military terrorist wing of Hamas] made statements in an official Hamas publication called Path to Glory , whereby Hamas took responsibility for the March 6, 2008 Mercaz Harav Yeshiva attack, and this claim of responsibility has never been rescinded. Levitt Tr. 100-104., Next, the Court finds that Hamas, supported by Iran, is responsible for the death of Yonadav Hirshfeld. On March 6, 2008, Yonadav visited his great-grandmother at her house, and he checked in with his mother by telephone around 7:30 p.m. and told her he planned to come home that night after his evening studies at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva because he wanted to lead some boys on a hike the following day. Elisheva Hirshfeld Tr. 15-16. Later that evening, Yonadav was standing near the entrance to Mercaz Harav talking with his fellow students, Shimon Balzam and Zvi Yehuda Kofman, when the three of them saw a man of Arab appearance carrying a large television box. See Transcript of April 10, 2018 Deposition of Shimon Balzam (\"Balzam Depo.\"), at 9-10; Transcript of March 19, 2018 Deposition of Zvi Yehuda Kofman (\"Kofman Depo.\") at 9-10.6 When the man was approximately two or three meters away from the boys, he put down the box and took out a Kalashnikov rifle and began firing in the boys' direction. Balzam Depo. 10; Kofman Depo. 12. The boys saw other students running, and they began running away from the man toward the building which houses the classrooms, which was between 14 and 20 meters away. Balzam Depo. 11; Kofman Depo. 13-14. Yonadav was running behind Mr. Kofman, and Mr. Kofman felt Yonadav's blood spraying onto his arm and vaguely remembered Yonadav shouting as Mr. Kofman ran toward the women's section of the building. Kofman Depo. 13-14. Mr. Kofman was not injured, but as he ran, his shirt became covered with blood that must have been Yonadav's because Mr. Balzam started running later and was farther away. Kofman Depo. 14-15, 24-25., Yonadav was the fifth of thirteen siblings born to Elisheva Hirshfeld (\"E. Hirshfeld\") and her husband Zemach Hirshfeld (\"Z. Hirshfeld\"). E. Hirshfeld Tr. 7, 9, 10. When Yonadav was one year old, his parents, who resided in Israel, registered him as a United States citizen. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 9; see Ex. 2 (Certification of Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States). As a child, Yonadav was full of life and mischievous; he liked challenges and was \"quick on his feet\" during arguments, and he was also friendly and loved to read and play with balls. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 10; Z. Hirshfeld Tr. 40-41. Yonadav's father recalled that Yonadav liked school and enjoyed trips, particularly those that involved a bit of a risk. Z. Hirshfeld Tr. 41. Yonadav always did well in school but it was not until high school that he developed discipline in his studies, particularly his religious studies. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 12-13, Z. Hirshfeld Tr. 41-42. In high school, Yonadav was a talented student who scored high grades, and he liked to learn, write poems and stories, play the recorder, dance and hike. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 12-13. He was also a counselor for a community youth group. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 13-14. Upon completing high school, Yonadav began his studies in 2008 at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva in Jerusalem, which offered religious studies. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 14-15. He was 18 years old and in his first year at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva at the time the shooting incident occurred. Tr. 4; E. Hirshfeld Tr. 15., In the early morning hours of March 7, 2008, Zemach Hirshfeld had to go to Jerusalem to identify his son's body. E Hirshfeld Tr. 19; Z. Hirshfeld Tr. 44. The atmosphere in the house later that day was \"very, very heavy\" and \"[e]verybody was confused, [with] very mixed feelings\" and \"there was no room for anything else but the feelings and thoughts about what ha[d] happened.\" S. Hirshfeld Tr. 54, 56. Yonadav's first funeral service was combined with a service for the other 7 boys who died because of the shooting, and there was also a second, smaller, private service at Kochar Hashachar, where he was buried. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 20-21; Z. Hirshfeld Tr. 44-45. Yonadav's death certificate lists the \"reason for death\" as \"terrorist attack.\" See Ex. 3 (Death Certificate)., Elisheva Hirshfeld's description of the events of March 6, 2008 follows. When Elisheva Hirshfeld (\"Elisheva\") found out that there was an attack in progress at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva and she could not get in contact with Yonadav, she began to have a feeling of dread and imagined Yonadav hiding in a closet and being afraid to come out.9 E. Hirshfeld Tr. 16-17. Elisheva suggested to her husband that they drive to Jerusalem and go look for Yonadav, but her husband told her that the roads were closed anyhow. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 17. Her first thought upon learning that Yonadav was dead was disbelief because \"[h]e was *124such a special boy, [this] can't happen to him,\" and later she felt \"dried out and empty.\" E. Hirshfeld Tr. 18. Discussing the funeral, Elisheva noted that the first service was for all 8 boys that had been killed at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva and it was \"something very big,\" and broadcast over television and the radio. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 20. The second service was a private ceremony for Yonadav, but it drew a crowd of hundreds of people. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 21. Elisheva stated that \"[i]t was like nothing real,\" and her family members were \"crying and hysterical.\" Id., Elisheva and her husband attended a support group comprised of other families dealing with similar attacks, for a period of two years after the incident, which was helpful, and several of her children went to a psychologist, and some went to art therapy for a month or two. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 21-23. The family has memorials every year to remember Yonadav- one sponsored by the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva and a more private memorial at the cemetery-and it makes her feel good that Yonadav is not forgotten. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 23., Elisheva testified that she and her husband opened an estate for Yonadav in New York State, with Dr. Michael Engleberg as the administrator. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 23. See Ex. 4 (2/5/2016 Decree granting Limited Letters of Administration issued by New York County Surrogate's Court)., Zemach testified that he had a strong faith that allowed him to have sorrow without frustration and helped him get through the difficulties of dealing with Yonadav's death. Id. Zemach participates in the annual memorials for Yonadav, as do some members of the community, and every year when Zemach speaks at the memorials, he tries to take \"Yonadav's stories or poems [ ] to build what [he] ha[s] to say around [them].\" Z. Hirshfeld Tr. 46. Zemach misses the \"future that will never be\" in terms of not seeing who Yonadav would have married or knowing Yonadav's children *125or \"how would be his future.\" Z. Hirshfeld Tr. 47., Shalom Hirshfeld (\"Shalom\") testified live before the Court at the April 24, 2018 bench trial. At the time of Yonadav's death, Shalom was 14 years old. S. Hirshfeld Tr. 54. On the evening of the incident, Shalom was traveling back from a visit to the old city in Jerusalem with his friends and some neighbors when he heard a report on the radio that there was an attack at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva. S. Hirshfeld Tr. 50, 52. Shalom started trembling uncontrollably as he contemplated whether Yonadav was safe. S. Hirschfeld Tr. 50-51. The neighbors operating the car had a son who also studied at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva, and the mother was able to contact her son, but she was crying in the car, which added to the \"heavy and intense\" atmosphere in the car. S. Hirshfeld Tr. 52. When Shalom got home, the atmosphere was \"very, very stressed\" for several hours. S. Hirshfeld Tr. 52-53. Shalom sat around and drank water to try to deal with his stress, while more and more people began arriving at his family's home. S. Hirshfeld Tr. 53. Finally, the rabbi arrived and Shalom overheard the rabbi's voice along with a loud cry from his mother, and his father asking for verification, and that's when he knew Yonadav had been killed. S. Hirshfeld Tr. 53-54. Shalom slept that night and when he woke up, the \"atmosphere at home was very, very heavy.\" S. Hirshfeld Tr. 54,, Shalom testified that Yonadav's death did not seem real until he got off the bus going to the place where Yonadav's funeral service was being held and he saw the death announcement with Yonadav's name on it, and then he started to cry. S. Hirshfeld Tr. 55. The funeral service was crowded with people, and many people from inside and outside of the community came to the family's home to show their respect. S. Hirshfeld Tr. 55. For a period after Yonadav's death, Shalom felt like there \"was no room for anything else but the feelings and thoughts about what had happened\" and everyone in the family \"was confused, [with] very mixed feelings\" and family members were laughing and crying over stories about Yonadav. S. Hirshfeld Tr. 56., Zimrat Bracha Zuckerman (\"Zimrat\") is the oldest sibling in the Hirshfeld family, and she was 25 years old when Yonadav died. See Transcript of Zimrat Bracha (Hirshfeld) Zuckerman's April 10, 2018 Deposition (\"Zimrat Depo.\"), at 7. Zimrat thinks that she heard about the terrorist *126attack at Mercaz Harav Yeshiva on an Israeli news website. Zimrat Depo. 8. She contacted her parents, who said that they could not reach Yonadav, but someone had seen him, and Zimrat waited for further information. Zimrat Depo. 9. Zimrat's brother Yedidya later called Zimrat's husband, and from the exchange on the telephone, that's when she realized that Yonadav had been killed even though no one explicitly said so. Zimrat Depo. 10-11. Zimrat and her husband drove to her family's house, and it was a \"very difficult atmosphere\" in the car. Zimrat Depo. 11. There were many people at the house and Zimrat stayed there that night with her parents. Zimrat Depo. 12. Zimrat described the Shiva as a \"very funny week\" when the family kept talking about Yonadav and his jokes and pranks. Zimrat Tr. 14. She indicated that she \"[didn't] think [she] had a more special relationship [with Yonadav] than any of the other siblings\" although she did \"run after him when he was very naughty, when he was younger\" and she babysat for him. Zimrat Depo. 14-15. When Yonadav was older, he would show her poems and stories he wrote, and she thought they were funny. Zimrat Depo. 15. To this day, she thinks of Yonadav and the kind of life he might have and the jokes he would have shared with the family, and she remembers the funny stories he would tell during family car rides. Zimrat Depo. 15-16. Zimrat stated that \"[b]eyond the loss and the sorrow and the pain,\" Yonadav's death affected her health insofar as she was pregnant at the time he was murdered, and she developed diabetes. Zimrat Depo. 16. Zimrat never sought any counseling after Yonadav's death. Zimrat Depo. 16-17., Haya Hamital Novik (\"Haya\") was 24 years old when Yonadav was killed. See Transcript of April 10, 2018 Deposition of Haya Hamital (Hirshfeld) Novik (\"Haya Depo.\"), at 7. She learned about the attack at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva from a neighbor who told her. Haya Depo. 8. Haya called her parents, and they did not have information, so she started praying for Yonadav and others at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva. Haya Depo. 12. Haya realized that Yonadav had been killed when her husband's rabbi asked to come and see them, and she \"couldn't quite comprehend what was happening.\" Haya Depo. 13., Haya described her relationship with Yonadav as her being on \"good terms with all [her] siblings\" in contrast to having \"an unusually special relationship with him.\" Haya Depo. 9. She remembered Yonadav playing the recorder with his friend and always having a joke to tell when he answered the phone. Haya Depo. 11. She described Yonadav as \"very popular\" in their family. Id. Haya thinks about Yonadav on the anniversary of his death and every time there is a family wedding or celebration. Haya Depo. 13-14. Haya speculates that her brother would have been a rabbi considering his \"talents and capabilities.\" Haya Depo. 17. Haya talked about going to the annual memorials for Yonadav and visiting his gravesite. Haya Depo. 14. Haya's husband has started a non-profit religious organization called \"Close to Me\" in Yonadav's memory, and its purpose is \"to increase the study of Torah among Jewish people.\" Haya Depo. 17., Yedidya described his relationship with Yonadav as good; they were \"always very, very happy to meet one another, to be together[,] [a]nd [they] had [their] family jokes that [they] shared[,]\" and they studied the Mishna (basis for Jewish law) together. Yedidya Depo. 10-11. Yedidya was very impressed with Yonadav's knowledge of the Mishna, and he indicated that Yonadav studied seriously and was unusually talented in his knowledge of the Mishna. Yedidya Depo. 11-14. Yedidya misses Yonadav's sense of humor, and he noted that Yonadav was \"dominant\" within the family in a positive way because he was pleasant and made people laugh, and he was interesting. Yedidya Depo. 13-14. Yedidya especially misses Yonadav at family celebrations, and he finds it difficult to talk about Yonadav. Yedidya Depo. 14-15., On the day of the terrorist attack, Hana was at home with her husband and child; when she heard from her brother-in-law about the terrorist attack at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva, she called her parents. Hana Decl. ¶ 7. Hana's father asked if Hana's husband could try to obtain information about the shooting since he was also a student at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva and knew a lot of people, and so Hana's husband made many calls to the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva to get reports of where Yonadav was last seen. Id. Hana was worried, and she felt like she was \"hanging between hope and despair\" and she started to get stomach pains and worried she was going into early labor. Id. When she heard that Yonadav had been killed, Hana was in shock and \"couldn't digest it.\" Hana Decl. ¶ 8. Even today, Hana still feels Yonadav's loss and she misses him, dreams about him, and wishes her children could know him. Hana Decl. ¶ 9. Hana indicated that \"[a]t every family event there is a strong feeling of something lacking, because Yonadav isn't with us\" and she laments that she did not get to see him get married and raise a family. Hana Decl. ¶ 10. Hana's mother testified that Hana was traumatized by Yonadav's death and she was very sad and couldn't accept that someone \"so full of life\" was gone. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 29. Hana attends the memorials for Yonadav, and she talks to her children about Yonadav. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 30., David Hirshfeld (\"David\") was 17 years old when Yonadav was killed. See Transcript *128of April 10, 2018 Deposition of David Yinon Hirshfeld (\"David Depo.\"), at 7. He was in the classroom at the Mitzpe Yericho Yeshiva when he heard about the terror attack at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva, and he started to worry about his brother Yonadav and his bother-in-law, who also studied there. David Depo. 8. David and his classmates gathered in the hall to recite prayers and David remembers that he was crying for hours because he was so worried. David Depo. 9. Someone said that Yonadav had been seen and that he was okay, so David went to sleep in his dormitory, but it was a \"sorrowful atmosphere and a lot of crying.\" David Depo. 10. David was lying in bed when his brother Yedidya arrived and said they needed to go home. Id. They went to Hana's house and David overheard his brother-in-law talking about Yonadav in the past tense and knew for certain he had been killed, although he felt like he \"basically knew it the whole time.\" David Depo. 10. When he got home, \"the dam burst\" and they \"all burst into tears [and] were crying the whole night, basically all of us together.\" David Depo. 11. David slept for an hour or two, and he woke up crying. Id. At the funeral, he was surrounded by friends, and he alternated between weeping and talking about Yonadav. David Depo. 12. Afterward, David could not eat, and he had a hard time returning to the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva. Id. He felt \"disconnected\" from what was going on, and while he did not seek counseling officially, his friends helped him after Yonadav's death. David Depo. 13-14., David had difficulty putting his relationship with Yonadav into words, saying that it went \"beyond just a relationship with brothers,\" and it was more of a friendship where David would wait expectantly for Yonadav to return from the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva. David Depo. 14. David described Yonadav as \"fun to be with\" and \"full of life\" and \"full of humor and joy.\" Id. He noted that he and Yonadav did \"silly things together\" and Yonadav was a \"wonderful person to be with.\" David Depo. 14-15. David and Yonadav went on hikes and talked and laughed together. David Depo. 15. They had a very close relationship-a strong bond-and they enjoyed spending time together. David Depo. 15-16. David misses seeing Yonadav at family events and he cried at his own wedding when someone mentioned that Yonadav was not there. David Depo. 16. Even today, David still experiences a sense of sorrow, and he feels like he is a more sensitive, empathetic person after the loss of Yonadav. David Depo. 17., On the day Yonadav was killed, Aviya was with friends and celebrating \"Rosh Hodesh\" (described by Aviya as \"the new Hebrew month\"), when her friend mentioned that there had been a terrorist attack in Mercaz Harav Yeshiva. Aviya Decl. ¶ 7. Aviya did not really react until she heard that some boys had been wounded and killed and then she got scared for Yonadav and ran home, where the family was praying and trying to contact Yonadav., *129Id. After the rabbi told the family that Yonadav had died, Aviya felt \"great sorrow and confusion\" and she could not understand what had happened and felt a \"feeling of great loss for the family and the whole nation.\" Aviya Decl. ¶ 8. Aviya's mother testified that after Yonadav's death, Aviya had a \"very hard time in school\" and was \"in mourning for a long time\" and she got sick \"with mono the year afterwards,\" which might have been part of her mourning. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 32., Aviya misses Yonadav terribly and feels helpless about being unable to \"turn the clock back\" but she tries to focus on good things that have happened since Yonadav died including \"people learning more Torah because of him.\" Aviya Decl. ¶ 9. Aviya laments the loss that she feels as Yonadav's sister and the \"loss for the whole nation because of his special personality.\" Id. She named her son Yonatan, after Yonadav, and she feels sad that Yonadav was not able to get married and have his own children. Aniya Decl. ¶ 10., Nehemiya Hirshfeld (\"Nehemiya\") was 12 years old when Yonadav was killed. See Transcript of April 10, 2018 Deposition of Nehemiya Hirshfeld (\"Nehemiya Depo.\"), at 7. On the evening of March 6, 2008, Nehemiya was at home with his family when his mom told him about the attack at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva. Nehemiya Depo. 8. Nehemiya did not begin to worry immediately because terrorist attacks are quite common, and someone had said that they saw Yonadav, but as the evening went on, he and his parents became more concerned when they were unable to get in touch with Yonadav. Nehemiya Depo. 8-9. After about four hours, the rabbi came to the family's home. Nehemiya Depo. 9-10. Nehemiya did not attach any significance to the rabbi's visit, and he went to bed where he then heard sounds like laughing or crying. Nehemiya Depo. 10. Finally, he overheard someone saying that Yonadav was dead. Id. When Nehemiya heard the news, he \"felt a chill go through [his] back\" and he got \"dizzy\" and \"was trembling.\" Nehemiya Depo. 11. He felt like he was in shock and did not understand what was going on, and while everyone was crying, he was \"withdrawn into [him]self\" and crying. Nehemiya Depo. 12. He didn't know what to do so he slept for a little while until one of his brothers came in. Nehemiya Depo. 13., Nehemiya spoke to a social worker after Yonadav's death, and he received some support from an organization called \"One Family,\" insofar as he felt \"that there was someone who cared that we'd lost someone that way.\" Nehemiya Depo. 16-17. Nehemiya especially misses Yonadav when he goes to his parents' house for Shabbat meals. Nehemiya Depo. 16. Nehemiya does not like being labeled a \"bereaved brother,\" and he indicated also that he had a lot of anxiety and fear about his loved ones in the period after he lost his brother as opposed to a prior feeling that \"it wo[ul]n't happen to [them].\" Nehemiya Depo. 16, 18., Amiel Hirshfeld (\"Amiel\") was 11 years old when Yonadav died. See Declaration of Amiel Hirshfeld (\"Amiel Decl.\"), ¶ 3. Amiel indicated that Yonadav was his \"favorite older brother\" whom he loved and admired, and he was \"deeply affected by his death.\" Id. After Yonadav's death was confirmed, Amiel \"knew we would never see him again\" but could not believe it, and he felt shocked, but also had \"feelings of anger and despair.\" Amiel Decl. ¶¶ 4-5. Amiel remembers Yonadav vividly, and he considers him his \"most talented and possibly my strongest brother,\" and used to brag about Yonadav to his friends. Amiel Decl. ¶ 6. Amiel's mother testified that Amiel admired Yonadav, was proud to be his brother, looked to him as a role model, and would tell his friends what a great brother Yonadav was. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 33. Amiel and Yonadav had a close relationship and Yonadav \"always had some time for [him].\" Amiel Decl. ¶ 6. Amiel feels \"a deep emptiness\" when he thinks of Yonadav, and he misses him and regrets that he never got to say goodbye. Amiel Decl. ¶ 8. Amiel's mother testified that Amiel attends the memorials for Yonadav every year. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 33., Minor EH was 7 years old when Yonadav died. See Declaration of Elisheva Hirshfeld on behalf of minor EH (\"EH Decl.\"), ¶ 3. EH recalls that Yonadav was playful and kind and that he spent time with him. EH Decl. ¶ 4. EH's mother testified that EH remembers playing with Yonadav and that Yonadav would make up funny stories. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 25. EH remembers when Yonadav styled his hair into a funny look and he still has a feeling of love for Yonadav. EH Decl. ¶ 4. On the *131night of Yonadav's death, while the family was waiting for word from Yonadav, EH asked everyone in the family to pray together, which they did. EH Decl. ¶ 5. EH remembers asking God not to let Yonadav die and he remembers crying the next day when his parents told him Yonadav was dead. Id. EH does not remember his feeling at the time and may not have understood what death was but as he matured, he started missing Yonadav, and sometimes cried because of a strong feeling of sadness and loss. EH Decl. ¶ 6. EH's mother testified that EH did not attend the memorial services for Yonadav for a few years after the death but that he now does, and he misses Yonadav and speaks about him. E. Hirshfeld Tr. 26-27., Considering the totality of the testimony and other evidence in this case, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have presented ample and sufficient evidence that Hamas was responsible for the attack on the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva on March 6, 2008. Levitt Tr. 101-103 (in an official publication of the al-Qassam Brigades, \"Path to Glory,\" Hamas identified the attacker by picture and by name and provided \"details about the [March 6, 2008] attack that glorify[ied] the attacker and the attack.\" They took unequivocal responsibility for the attack, and that claim of responsibility has not been *132retracted).13 Plaintiffs have demonstrated further that this terrorist action would not have been possible without the material support provided to Hamas by Iran. Levitt Tr. 89 (\"The majority of Hamas financing in general, and certainly in this period of time [around March 6, 2008] came from Iran ... and by financing, ..., I really mean financing and resourcing more generally\" which includes not only cash but funding, weaponry, and training.), Clawson Tr. 79 (confirming that Iran provided material support and resources to Hamas in the period immediately before and including March 6, 2008); Levitt Tr. 90 (noting that a British journalist reported just three days after the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva attack that Hamas previously sent some 300 operatives to Iran for training and 150 of them were still there.), The Court's Conclusions of Law relating to liability proceed in three parts. First, the Court concludes that it has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to the FSIA's terrorism exception, and that Plaintiffs have established satisfactorily their claims for relief under the federal cause of action associated with that exception. Second, the Court concludes that it has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. Third, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs brought this action in a timely manner and they have a private right of action against Defendant Iran. The Court then discusses the various claims asserted by the Plaintiffs., \"The FSIA provides a basis for asserting jurisdiction over foreign nations in the United States.\" Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya , 294 F.3d 82, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Pursuant to the FSIA, the Court has \"original jurisdiction\" over \"nonjury civil action[s]\" against foreign states \"without regard to amount in controversy\" if the claims seek \"relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement.\" 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). These elements are clearly satisfied in this case where Plaintiffs did not demand a jury trial, they asserted civil causes of action, and they sought in personam relief against Defendant Iran, which is indisputably a \"foreign state.\" See generally Am. Compl., For this exception to apply, Plaintiffs in this case need to demonstrate that they are making a claim for money damages against Iran, a foreign state, for the death of Yonadav Hirshfeld caused by an act of extrajudicial killing carried out by Hamas with material support and resources provided by Iran. Furthermore, the following two requirements must be met: 1) the foreign state defendant must have been designated a state sponsor of terrorism at the time of the act and remain so-designated when the claim was filed or in the preceding six months, § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(l) ; and 2) the claimant or the victim in the case must have been a national of the United States, a member of the armed forces or otherwise employed by the Government of the United States. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(ii).14 See, e.g. Roth v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 78 F.Supp.3d 379, 395 (D.D.C. 2015) ; Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 782 F.3d 9, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2015)., Some of these elements are clearly satisfied and require little discussion. It is evident that Plaintiffs are making a claim for money damages against Iran, a foreign sovereign, regarding the death of Yonadav Hirshfeld. See generally Amended Complaint, ECF No. 7. Turning next to the requirements set forth in Section 1605(a)(2)(A), Iran is now and has continuously been since 1984, designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. On January 23, 1984, in accordance with the Export Administration Act of 1979, Iran was designated by Secretary of State George P. Shultz as a \"country which has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.\" 49 Fed. Reg. 2836-02 (Jan. 23, 1984) (statement of Secretary of State George P. Shultz). This designation is consistent with Section 1605A's definition of \"state sponsor of terrorism.\" 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(h)(6). Iran continues to be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism. See U.S. Dep't of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism , https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited August 20, 2018). Yonadav Hirshfeld was a United States citizen, and all his family members are United States citizens. Accordingly, the two requirements of Section 1605A(a)(2)(A), regarding Iran's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and Yonadav Hirshfeld's United States citizenship, are satisfied., More analysis is required to determine whether the death in this case was \"caused by\" an \"extrajudicial killing\" or Iran's provision of \"material support or resources\" for such an act. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1). Plaintiffs assert that the murder of Yonadav *134Hirshfeld was an extrajudicial killing that was caused by Iran's material support for the terrorist organization, Hamas. The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have presented satisfactory evidence to support each of these assertions., 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1). As outlined in the Court's Findings of Fact, Iran provided material support to Hamas by, among other things, being the major source of financial assistance totaling millions of dollars in funding for the organization, providing weapons and training for its members, and encouraging Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel. Moreover, individuals associated with the Iranian regime played direct roles in meeting with Hamas officials in Tehran and the relationship between Iran and Hamas was openly acknowledged. Regarding its finding that Iran provided material support to Hamas, the Court relies heavily on the testimony of expert witnesses Dr. Patrick Clawson and Dr. Matthew Levitt. Circuit *135courts, including this Circuit, have acknowledged that expert witness testimony \"is of crucial importance in terrorism cases\" because firsthand evidence relating to terrorist activities \"is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.\" Owens v Republic of Sudan , 864 F.3d at 787 ; see Kilburn v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya , 376 F.3d 1123, 1132-1133 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (jurisdiction satisfied based solely upon the declaration of an expert witness); Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. , 549 F.3d 685, 704 (7th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Damrah , 412 F.3d 618, 625 (6th Cir. 2005) (same).","caseName":"Estate of Hirshfeld v. Islamic Republic of Iran","caseNameFull":"ESTATE OF Yonadav HIRSHFELD v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN","citation":["330 F. Supp. 3d 107"],"citeCount":26,"cluster_id":7331865,"court":"Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit","court_citation_string":"D.C. Cir.","court_id":"cadc","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2018-08-30","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Civil Action No. 15-1082 (CKK)","docket_id":64320350,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T13:39:46.446271Z","date_created":"2022-07-25T05:54:23.549612Z","score":{"bm25":17.565489}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":7249783,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T11:28:38.972298Z","date_created":"2022-07-25T05:54:23.563575Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nIn the instant case, there is more than a \"reasonable connection\" between Iran's provision of material support, in the form of financing, weapons, training and ideological support, and the act of terrorism in this case. Plaintiffs presented expert testimony that Iran's support of Hamas was given to allow this group to commit precisely the type of militant terrorist act in Israel as occurred in this case. Clawson Tr. 74 (Hamas was founded in 1987 to carry o","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[7249783],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4413225/state-v-gibson/","attorney":"","caseName":"State v. Gibson","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2017 Ohio 6995"],"citeCount":3,"cluster_id":4413225,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2017-07-28","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"2017-CA-7","docket_id":6127666,"judge":"Hall","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T00:38:14.090494Z","date_created":"2017-07-28T14:12:30.722386Z","score":{"bm25":15.951377}},"neutralCite":"2017 Ohio 6995","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8098,"cites":[108416,3773321,4162267,4177087],"download_url":"http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/2/2017/2017-Ohio-6995.pdf","id":4190478,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2017/07/28/state_v._gibson.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T15:00:19.450105Z","date_created":"2017-07-28T14:12:30.731625Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"9072b9dca5c3b04b25032449af4e553a8c1716d7","snippet":"[Cite as State v. Gibson, 2017-Ohio-6995.]\n\n\n\n\n                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO\n                                SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT\n                                      GREENE COUNTY\n\n STATE OF OHIO                                     :\n                                                   :\n         Plaintiff-Appellee                        :   Appellate Case No. 2017-CA-7\n                                                   :\n v.                                   ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4190478],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The prosecutor did not breach a plea agreement by remaining silent at sentencing rather than orally recommending community control for the appellant. The prosecutor recommended community control in the written plea agreement itself, and the terms of the agreement did not obligate the prosecutor to repeat that recommendation at sentencing. In addition, the appellant did not object to the prosecutor's silence at sentencing and cannot demonstrate plain error where the plea agreement was memorialized in the record and recited in the PSI report, which the trial court reviewed prior to sentencing. Finally, the appellant's 11-month prison sentence is not contrary to law. Judgment affirmed."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/7330821/indigenous-envtl-network-v-us-dept-of-state/","attorney":"*1119Douglas P. Hayes, Eric E. Huber, Boulder, CO, Timothy M. Bechtold, Bechtold Law Firm, Missoula, MT, Jaclyn H. Prange, Cecilia D. Segal, San Francisco, CA, Selena Kyle, Chicago, IL, Amy R. Atwood, Portland, OR, Jared Michael Margolis, Eugene, OR, for Plaintiffs., Luther L. Hajek, Bridget K. McNeil, U.S. Department of Justice, Denver, CO, Mark Steger Smith, U.S. Attorney's Office, Billings, MT, for Defendants., Jeffery J. Oven, Mark L. Stermitz, Crowley Fleck PLLP, Billings, MT, Jeffrey M. Roth, Crowley Fleck PLLP, Missoula, MT, Lauren C. Freeman, Sidley Austin LLP, New York, NY, Peter R. Steenland, Peter Christopher Whitfield, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant-Intervenors., Plaintiffs Indigenous Environmental Network and Northern Plains Resource Council (collectively \"Plaintiffs\") bring this action against the United States Department of State and various other governmental agencies and agents in their official capacities (\"Federal Defendants\"). Plaintiffs allege that the State Department violated the Administrative Procedure Act (\"APA\"), the National Environmental Policy Act (\"NEPA\"), and the Endangered Species Act (\"ESA\") when it published its Record of Decision (\"ROD\") and National Interest Determination (\"NID\") and issued the accompanying Presidential Permit to allow defendant-intervenor TransCanada Keystone Pipeline, LP (\"TransCanada\") to construct a cross-border oil pipeline known as Keystone XL (\"Keystone\"). Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment. (Docs. 139 & 145.) Federal Defendants and TransCanada have filed cross motions for summary judgment. (Docs. 172 & 170.) The Court held a hearing on these motions on May 24, 2018. (Doc. 194.) The Court is prepared to rule on a portion of Plaintiffs's motion for summary judgment. The Court will rule on the remaining issues in a forthcoming Order., The Court detailed the background of this case in its Order regarding Federal Defendant's and TransCanada's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. (Doc. 99.) The Court will only recite those facts that have arisen since its Order regarding jurisdiction., The Nebraska Public Service Commission (\"PSC\") denied TransCanada's application for its preferred route on November 20, 2017. (Doc. 104-1.) The Nebraska PSC instead approved the \"Mainline Alternative\" route. Id. The Mainline Alternative route goes through five different counties and crosses several different water bodies than the original preferred route. Id. The Mainline Alternative route also would be longer. This added length requires an additional *1120pump station and accompanying power line infrastructure. Id., A court should grant summary judgment where the movant demonstrates that no genuine dispute exists \"as to any material fact\" and the movant is \"entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment remains appropriate for resolving a challenge to a federal agency's actions when review will be based primarily on the administrative record. Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv. , 469 F.3d 768, 778 (9th Cir. 2006)., Plaintiffs argue that the agencies could not properly analyze Keystone's environmental impacts without knowing its route through Nebraska. (Doc. 140 at 17.) NEPA serves as the \"basic national charter for protection of the environment.\" 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(a). NEPA requires all federal agencies to prepare a \"detailed statement\" for any \"major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.\" 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)., This detailed statement, known as an environmental impact statement (\"EIS\"), must describe the environmental impacts of the proposed action. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i), (ii). The EIS must include a \"full and fair discussion\" of the effects of the proposed action, including those on the \"affected region, the affected interests, and the locality.\" 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.1, 1508.27(a). Further, for a \"site-specific action, significance would usually depend upon the effects in the locale ...\" Id. , § 1508.27(a). The agency must finally consider the \"unique characteristics of the geographic area\" when determining the significance of an action. Id. , § 1508.27(b)(2). An agency also may be required to perform a supplemental analysis \"if significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts\" arise during the NEPA review. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii)., Plaintiffs further argue that Federal Defendants must address the Mainline Alternative route pursuant to its NEPA obligations as it proves to be a \"connected *1121action\" to the proposed action. (Doc. 146 at 48.); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1). A federal agency must consider connected actions together in a single EIS. Id. NEPA defines connected actions as any of the following: those actions that \"automatically trigger other actions which may require environmental impact statements;\" those actions that \"cannot or will not proceed unless other actions are taken;\" or those actions are interdependent parts of a larger action and depend on the larger action for their justification.\" 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1). In determining whether two actions are connected for the purposes of NEPA, a court must examine whether the two actions have \"independent utility\" or whether it would be \"irrational, or at least unwise, to undertake the first phase if subsequent phases were not also undertaken.\" Daly v. Volpe , 514 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1975) ; Thomas v. Peterson , 753 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1985) (overruled on other grounds by Cottonwood Environmental Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv. , 789 F.3d 1075, 1088-92 (9th Cir. 2015)., The Ninth Circuit in Thomas considered whether a road and a timber sale were sufficiently related to require combined treatment in a single EIS that covered the cumulative effects of each. Thomas , 753 F.2d at 757. The Forest Service argued that it remained proper for it to consider separately the effects of the road and the timber sale. Id. The Ninth Circuit recognized that administrative agencies must be given considerable discretion in defining the scope of an EIS. The Ninth Circuit further noted, however, that situations exist in which an agency must be required to consider several related actions in a single EIS. Id. The failure to consider several related actions in a single EIS would allow a project to be divided into multiple actions, \"each of which individually has an insignificant environmental impact, but which collectively have a substantial impact.\" Id. at 758. The road construction and the contemplated timbers sales were inextricably intertwined as evidenced by the timber sales not being able to proceed without the road and the road not being built, but for the contemplated timber sales. Id. The road and the timber sales qualified as connected actions. Id., TransCanada argues that the State Department possesses no obligation under NEPA to review the impacts of the Nebraska PSC's decision as there remains no \"ongoing major federal action\" for the agency to take. Id. TransCanada contends that the State Department had completed its federal action when it made its national interest determination and issued the Presidential Permit. TransCanada relies heavily on *1122Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Salazar , 706 F.3d 1085, 1095 (9th Cir. 2013), for the proposition that no ongoing major federal action exists that could require supplementation once an agency action proves complete., The Court further determined in an earlier Order that the State Department remained obligated to comply with NEPA as it took final agency action when it published the ROD/NID for Keystone. The Court viewed the State Department's preparation of the NEPA analysis associated with Keystone as recognition of its legal obligations. (Doc. 99 at 14.) The Court specifically rejected TransCanada's contention that the Federal Defendants conducted the NEPA analysis for Keystone \"as an act of grace.\" Id.","caseName":"Indigenous Envtl. Network v. U.S. Dep't of State","caseNameFull":"INDIGENOUS ENVIRONMENTAL NETWORK and North Coast River Alliance, and Northern Plains Resource Council v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, and TransCanada Keystone Pipeline and TransCanada Corporation, Defendant-Intervenors.","citation":["317 F. Supp. 3d 1118"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":7330821,"court":"District Court, D. Montana","court_citation_string":"D. Mont.","court_id":"mtd","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2018-08-15","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"CV-17-29-GF-BMM; CV-17-31-GF-BMM","docket_id":64319305,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T13:39:29.841771Z","date_created":"2022-07-25T05:41:59.721469Z","score":{"bm25":15.55818}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":7248738,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-07-08T21:47:46.905615Z","date_created":"2022-07-25T05:41:59.727426Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nThe Supreme Court has recognized an agency's obligation to prepare a post-decision supplemental EIS when a project has not been fully constructed or completed. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Res. Council , 490 U.S. 360, 367-72, 109 S.Ct. 1851","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[7248738],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10019903/in-re-the-marriage-of-jeremy-stradtmann-and-andrea-stradtmann-and/","attorney":"","caseName":"IN RE the MARRIAGE OF Jeremy STRADTMANN, and Andrea Stradtmann, and Concerning El Paso County Child Support Services, Intervenor.","caseNameFull":"","citation":["506 P.3d 77","2021 COA 145"],"citeCount":598,"cluster_id":10019903,"court":"Colorado Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Colo. Ct. App.","court_id":"coloctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2021-12-02","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Court of Appeals No. 20CA1536","docket_id":68987480,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-07-29T16:05:47.726548Z","date_created":"2024-07-29T16:05:47.621596Z","score":{"bm25":14.8408375}},"neutralCite":"2021 COA 145","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1130177,1196984,1453454,2588648,3005118,4024930,4163073,4342338,4417883,4494583,4659642,5178556,6533412,9353582,9790802,10486510],"download_url":"https://colorado.vlex.io/vid/in-re-stradtmann-court-907372655/content","id":10486504,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"html/2021/12/02/in_re_the_marriage_of_jeremy_stradtmann_and_andrea_stradtmann_and.html","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-06T07:33:53.410828Z","date_created":"2024-07-29T16:05:47.634631Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"97864c8d51f54366e37585664c28c170b62692c7","snippet":"506 P.3d 772021 COA 145IN RE the MARRIAGE OF Jeremy STRADTMANN, Appellant,andAndrea Stradtmann, Appellee,andConcerning El Paso County Child Support Services, Intervenor.Court of Appeals No. 20CA1536Colorado Court of Appeals, Division III.Announced December 2, 2021Beltz & West, P.C., Daniel A. West, Colorado Springs, Colora","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10486504],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/7920929/duncan-v-commr-of-corr/","attorney":"Craig A. Sullivan, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner)., Nancy L. Walker, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Gail P. Hardy, state's attorney, and Jo Anne Sulik, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent)., *637The petitioner, Patton E. Duncan, a citizen of Jamaica,1 appeals following the denial of *638his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court (1) abused its discretion in denying certification to appeal, (2) improperly concluded that he had received the effective assistance of counsel and (3) improperly denied his due process claim that his pleas were not made knowingly and voluntarily. Because the petitioner did not demonstrate that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, we dismiss the appeal., The following facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The petitioner was charged in two separate informations as a result of events that had occurred at different times in different locations. On April 20, 2011, the petitioner appeared before the court, Vitale, J ., *1172and pleaded guilty, pursuant to the Alford doctrine,2 to one count of larceny in the third degree (Hartford case). At this time, the prosecutor recited the facts underlying this plea: \"Your Honor, this matter goes back to November of 2009. At that time, [the petitioner] was apparently estranged from his wife .... A check came into the residence that they were sharing at that time made out to [the petitioner's wife] in the amount of $6000. The [petitioner] endorsed that check, deposited it to his own account, and took out $6000 of the funds for his own use, thus depriving his estranged wife of the money.\", The prosecutor then stated that if the petitioner paid $6000 to his estranged wife, then the state would agree *639to vacate the plea and nolle the larceny charge. During the canvass, the court informed the petitioner that the case would be continued for sentencing until July 29, 2011. Further, it instructed that if the petitioner appeared on that day with a certified bank check in the amount of $6000, the guilty plea would be vacated and the state would nolle the larceny charge. The court warned the petitioner that if he did not have the $6000, he would be sentenced to up to fifteen months incarceration., On July 29, 2011, the petitioner appeared for sentencing with $3000.3 The state requested a period of nine months incarceration. Freeman argued that the petitioner had used the $6000 to maintain the household while his estranged wife was incarcerated. Freeman further requested a suspended sentence. After reviewing the case file, the court sentenced the petitioner to fifteen months incarceration, execution suspended after sixty days, and three years of probation. The court also ordered full restitution within the first two years of probation., *640On September 15, 2011, the petitioner appeared before the court, Sheridan, J. , to plead guilty to assault in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-61 and reckless endangerment in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-63 (New Britain case). The prosecutor recited the following factual basis for the pleas: The petitioner was involved in a physical altercation with his girlfriend. At this time, the petitioner struck the victim, causing her pain and injuries, while she was holding her one year old son., *1173During the plea canvass, the court stated: \"All right, and if you're not a U.S. citizen, with this conviction you may face consequences of deportation, exclusion for readmission or denial of naturalization pursuant to federal law.\" The petitioner indicated that he understood these consequences of his guilty plea. The court then found that the plea was voluntarily and knowingly made with the assistance of competent counsel. The court ordered consecutive sentences of one year of incarceration, execution suspended, with two years of probation, for the assault in the third degree and reckless endangerment charges. The defendant was represented by Attorney Kelly Goulet-Case, an assistant public defender., On October 11, 2011, Judge Sheridan held a hearing on the petitioner's motion for modification in the New Britain case. During that proceeding, the prosecutor noted that she had no objection to the plea on the reckless endangerment charge being vacated. She further agreed to nolle that charge, leaving only the conviction of assault in the third degree in the New Britain case. The court granted the petitioner's motion for modification., In counts two and three, the petitioner claimed that Freeman and Goulet-Case provided ineffective assistance of counsel in the Hartford and New Britain cases, respectively. Specifically, he alleged that both of his attorneys failed (1) to research adequately the legal issue of the petitioner's immigration status and the possibility of deportation and/or removal as a result of the plea agreements, (2) to advise the petitioner that larceny is an aggravated felony for immigration purposes, subjecting him to automatic removal and ineligibility for cancelation of removal and (3) to make the petitioner's immigration status part of the plea bargaining process. The petitioner also alleged that but for the deficient performance of his attorneys, he would not have pleaded guilty and instead insisted on going to trial., The court, Fuger, J. , held the habeas trial on September 3, 2014, during which Freeman, Goulet-Case, Attorney Anthony Collins, an expert in immigration law,5 and the petitioner testified.6 On September 18, 2014, the court issued a memorandum of decision denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. With respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim against Freeman in the Hartford case, the habeas court concluded *643that the petitioner had failed to establish deficient performance and prejudice. With respect to the New Britain case, the habeas court determined that Goulet-Case performed deficiently by assuming that the petitioner was a United States citizen. The habeas court then noted that the New Britain case \"played no part in the immigration issue, and there was no showing of any other prejudice incurring to the petitioner ....\" Although the court did not explicitly address the petitioner's due process claim, it denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and the subsequent petition for certification to appeal., Following the filing of this appeal, the petitioner filed a motion for articulation, requesting that the court address his due process claim. After the habeas court denied this motion, the petitioner filed a motion for review with this court. We granted that motion and the relief requested, ordering the habeas court to articulate whether it had denied count one of the habeas petition and, if so, on what basis. On October 22, 2015, the habeas court issued its articulation. The court explained that the petitioner's due process claim was \"wholly dependent on the claims alleged in the other two counts .... Stated somewhat differently, the petitioner cannot prevail on the claim in count one, as it is factually and legally pleaded, without also proving the claims in counts two and three.\" The court further clarified that the petitioner's due process claim implicitly had been denied on the same grounds as the ineffective assistance of counsel claims in counts two and three of the operative habeas petition. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary., The petitioner claims that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his *1175petition for certification to appeal7 from the denial of his petition for a writ of *644habeas corpus with respect to his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations. Specifically, he argues that because these issues are debatable among jurists of reason, a court could resolve the issues differently or the issues should proceed further, the habeas court abused its discretion in denying his petition to appeal., \"Faced with a habeas court's denial of a petition for certification to appeal, a petitioner can obtain appellate review of the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus only by satisfying the two-pronged test enunciated by our Supreme Court in Simms v. Warden , 229 Conn. 178, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), and adopted in Simms v. Warden , 230 Conn. 608, 612, 646 A.2d 126 (1994). First, [the petitioner] must demonstrate that the denial of his petition for certification constituted an abuse of discretion.... Second, if the petitioner can show an *645abuse of discretion, he must then prove that the decision of the habeas court should be reversed on the merits.... To prove that the denial of his petition for certification to appeal constituted an abuse of discretion, the petitioner must demonstrate that the [resolution of the underlying claim involves issues that] are debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.... In determining whether the habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petitioner's request for certification, we necessarily must consider the merits of the petitioner's underlying claims to determine whether the habeas court reasonably determined that the petitioner's appeal was frivolous. In other words, we review the petitioner's substantive claims for the purpose of ascertaining whether those claims satisfy one or more of the three criteria ... adopted by [our Supreme Court] for determining the propriety of the habeas court's denial of the petition for certification.\" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sanders v. Commissioner of Correction , 169 Conn.App. 813, 821-22, 153 A.3d 8 (2016) ; see also *1176Vazquez v. Commissioner of Correction , 123 Conn.App. 424, 428-29, 1 A.3d 1242 (2010), cert. denied, 302 Conn. 901, 23 A.3d 1241 (2011). With these principles in mind, we turn to the substantive claims of the petitioner., The petitioner claims that the habeas court improperly concluded that he received the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he argues that the court improperly determined that (1) Freeman did not provide deficient performance and (2) the petitioner was not prejudiced in both the Hartford case and by Goulet-Case in the New Britain case. We agree with the petitioner's first argument. With respect to the issue of prejudice *646in both the Hartford and New Britain cases, we conclude that the petitioner's appellate argument is unavailing and, therefore, his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail. As a result, we conclude that the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying certification to appeal from the denial of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Sanders v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 169 Conn.App. at 827-38, 153 A.3d 8 (reviewing court considered merits of petitioner's claims as to performance and prejudice and concluded that because there was no prejudice, petitioner could not establish abuse of discretion in denial of petition for certification to appeal)., It is well established that the failure to adequately advise a client regarding a plea offer from the state can form the basis for a sixth amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. \"The United States Supreme Court, long before its recent decisions in Missouri v. Frye , [566 U.S. 133] 132 S.Ct. 1399, 182 L.Ed.2d 379 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper , [566 U.S. 156] 132 S.Ct. 1376, 182 L.Ed.2d 398 (2012), recognized that the two part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), applies to ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising out of the plea negotiation stage. Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 57, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)....\" (Citation omitted.), Finally, we recite the familiar test that governs whether a petitioner's constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel has been violated. \"To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must satisfy the two-pronged test articulated in Strickland v. Washington , [supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052].... The petitioner has the burden to establish that (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense because there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had it not been for the deficient performance.... To satisfy the performance prong, a claimant must demonstrate that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not *648functioning as the counsel guaranteed ... by the [s]ixth [a]mendment.... It is not enough for the petitioner to simply prove the underlying facts that his attorney failed to take a certain action. Rather, the petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his counsel's acts or omissions were so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment, and as a result, he was deprived of a fair trial.\" (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jones v. Commissioner of Correction , 169 Conn.App. 405, 415-16, 150 A.3d 757 (2016), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 909, 152 A.3d 1246 (2017) ; see also Hanson v. Commissioner of Correction , 169 Conn.App. 317, 325, 150 A.3d 234 (2016), cert. denied, 324 Conn. 910, 153 A.3d 653 (2017)., \"For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel arising out of the plea process, the United States Supreme Court has modified the second prong of the Strickland test to require that the petitioner produce evidence that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the petitioner] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.... An ineffective assistance of counsel claim will succeed only if both prongs [of Strickland ] are satisfied.... [S]ee also Hill v. Lockhart , [supra, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366] (modifying Strickland prejudice analysis in cases in which petitioner entered guilty plea). It is axiomatic that courts may decide against a petitioner on either prong [of the Strickland test], whichever is easier. Lewis v. Commissioner of Correction , 165 Conn.App. 411, 451, 139 A.3d 759, cert. denied, 322 Conn. 901, 138 A.3d 931 (2016), citing Strickland v. Washington , supra, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (a court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the [petitioner] ).\" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.), *1178The following additional facts are necessary for our discussion. At the habeas trial, Freeman testified that he could not recall advising the petitioner that if he pleaded guilty to larceny in the third degree with a sentence of greater than twelve months and that charge was not subsequently nolled, the petitioner would be deportable without a defense. Freeman admitted that he probably was unaware that larceny in the third degree and a sentence greater than twelve months constituted an aggravated felony for federal immigration purposes. He also acknowledged that he likely was unaware of the fact that a conviction of an aggravated felony would result in a lawful permanent resident being deportable without a defense. Freeman, without a specific recollection of the events pertaining to this case, stated that his general practice was to advise clients facing possible immigration consequences to consult with an immigration attorney.8 Freeman claimed that *650he knew of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky , 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), at the time of the plea canvass in the Hartford case, but could not recall if he had conducted any legal research with respect to the immigration issue., In its memorandum of decision, the habeas court stated: \"[I]t was clear that conviction of larceny in the third degree and a sentence in excess of one year would result in a near mandatory deportation for the petitioner. It is clear to this court that ... Freeman was aware of such a draconic result and [took] appropriate steps to ensure that would not happen. This court is also satisfied that under the totality of the evidence and the logical inferences to be drawn therefrom that ... Freeman did discuss the immigration implications with the petitioner. Moreover, it is also clear that the petitioner was advised and did have access to, as well as the ability to seek, more expert advice had he so desired.\", In addressing the claim that Freeman was constitutionally deficient because he failed to advise the petitioner that deportation would be mandatory and nonappealable, the habeas court cited the Padilla decision, noting that counsel must inform the client when a plea presents a risk of deportation. The habeas court emphasized: \"[T]he [United States] Supreme Court did not lay down a bright line that clearly defines the [parameters] of this duty, leaving that issue instead to the state courts. Here, in Connecticut, our appellate courts ha[ve] previously indicated that [a] defendant need only be made aware of the direct consequences *651of his plea for it to be valid. ... Our Supreme Court has explained that [a]lthough a defendant must be aware of the direct consequences of a plea, the scope of direct consequences is very narrow.... The failure to inform a defendant as to all possible indirect and collateral consequences does not render a plea unintelligent or involuntary in a constitutional sense.... [U]nder Connecticut law, [t]he impact of a plea's immigration consequences on a defendant, while potentially great, is not of constitutional magnitude and cannot transform this collateral consequence into a direct consequence of the plea.\" (Emphasis *1179omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) It concluded that Freeman had satisfied the minimal standard in advising the petitioner of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea in the Hartford case, and therefore did not render deficient performance., In order to assess this conclusion of the habeas court, a review of Padilla v. Kentucky , supra, 559 U.S. at 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, and Budziszewski v. Commissioner of Correction , 322 Conn. 504, 142 A.3d 243 (2016), is necessary. In Padilla , the petitioner, a native of Honduras and lawful permanent resident of the United States for more than forty years, claimed that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. Padilla v. Kentucky , supra, at 359. Specifically, he contended that he had relied on erroneous advice from counsel and pleaded guilty to drug charges that made his deportation a virtual certainty. Id. The United States Supreme Court recognized that the landscape of federal immigration law had changed dramatically since 1920. Id., at 360, 130 S.Ct. 1473. It noted that \"[t]he drastic measure of deportation or removal ... is now virtually inevitable for a vast number of noncitizens convicted of crimes.\" (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. It subsequently observed that congressional actions have eliminated, or greatly reduced, the authority of federal judges and the United States *652Attorney General to grant discretionary relief from deportation. Id., at 363, 130 S.Ct. 1473. \"Under contemporary law, if a noncitizen has committed a removable offense ... his removal is practically inevitable ....\" Id., at 363-64, 130 S.Ct. 1473., The effect of this change to immigration law has \"dramatically raised the stakes of a noncitizen's criminal conviction. The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes has never been more important. These changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law, deportation is an integral part-indeed, sometimes the most important part-of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified crimes.\" (Footnote omitted.) Id., at 364, 130 S.Ct. 1473., In considering the appeal by the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, our Supreme Court first noted the requirement that \"when the immigration consequences under federal law are clearly discernable, Padilla requires counsel to accurately advise his client of those consequences.... For some convictions, federal law calls for deportation, subject to limited exceptions.... In those circumstances, because the likely immigration consequences of a guilty plea are truly clear, counsel has a duty to inform his client of the deportation consequences set by federal law.\" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 511-12, 142 A.3d 243. Addressing the issue of whether the immigration consequences were clearly discernable, it stated: \"In the present case, the legal consequences faced by [Budziszewski] were clear, and federal law mandated deportation. [Budziszewski] was convicted of a drug trafficking offense, which is designated as an aggravated felony under federal immigration law. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(43)(B) (2012). Federal law calls for deportation for aggravated felony convictions, subject to limited exceptions, which the parties agree do not apply in [Budziszewski's] case. See *6558 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) (iii) (2012). Because federal law called for deportation ... his counsel was required to unequivocally convey to [Budziszewski ] that federal law *1181mandated deportation as the consequence for pleading guilty. Warning only of a heightened risk of deportation ... would not accurately characterize the law .\" (Emphasis added; footnotes omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Budziszewski v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 322 Conn. at 512, 142 A.3d 243., Our Supreme Court also instructed that \"there are no fixed words or phrases that counsel must use to convey this information, and courts reviewing Padilla claims must look to the totality of counsel's advice, and the language counsel actually used, to ensure that counsel accurately conveyed the severity of the consequences under federal law to the client in terms the client could understand.\" Id., at 512-13, 142 A.3d 243. In other words, instead of looking for \"magic words\" or \"safe harbor language\"; (internal quotation marks omitted) id., at 513 ; a court's inquiry should be on the essence of the information given by counsel to be sure that it clearly and accurately informs the client of the immigration consequences in a manner understandable to the client. Id. ; see also id., at 516-17 n.2, 142 A.3d 243. \"This requires the court to consider the totality of the advice given by counsel, make findings about what counsel actually told the client, and then determine whether, based on those findings, [Budziszewski] met his burden to prove that counsel's advice failed to convey the information required under Padilla. \" Id., at 513-14, 142 A.3d 243., As a result of these clarifications, our Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the habeas court and remanded the case for a new trial. Id., at 516, 142 A.3d 243. It reasoned that the habeas court had not made factual findings \"regarding what [the attorney] actually told [Budziszewski] about what federal law mandated ....\" Id. Given *656the state of the record, particularly the conflicting testimony from Budziszewski and his attorney regarding the advice regarding the immigration consequences, a new trial was necessary. Id., at 516-18, 142 A.3d 243. \"On remand, therefore, the habeas court must make findings of fact about what [the attorney] actually told [Budziszewski] and then assess whether, based on those findings, [Budziszewski] has proven that [this] advice violated the requirements of Padilla , as clarified by our decision in the present case.\" Id., at 518, 142 A.3d 243. Finally, it observed that the habeas court must presume that the attorney acted competently and that the burden was on Budziszewski to overcome this presumption and prove deficient performance. Id., at 517 n.2, 142 A.3d 243., Through the lens of Budziszewski , we now review the conclusion of the habeas court that Freeman did not perform deficiently in the Hartford case.9 As previously noted, Freeman testified that he could not recall clearly advising the petitioner that he would be deportable without a defense, although it was his practice to have conversations with clients regarding the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. Freeman also admitted that he \"[p]robably\" was unaware that a conviction of larceny in the third degree with a sentence greater than one year constituted an aggravated felony for immigration purposes and that he was unaware that an aggravated felony rendered a noncitizen deportable without a defense. Freeman further testified that he generally did not conduct legal research on immigration issues for noncitizen criminal defendants., The habeas court did find that a conviction of larceny in the third degree and a sentence of greater than one year would result in a \"near mandatory deportation for the petitioner.\"10 It further found that Freeman, mindful of this \"draconian result\"11 discussed the immigration implications with the petitioner. In response to the petitioner's argument that Freeman failed to tell him that removal was mandatory and nonappealable, the habeas court indicated that these collateral consequences were not of constitutional magnitude and could not be transformed into direct consequences., *658In accordance with the clarification in Budziszewski of counsel's duty to unequivocally inform a client of the mandatory deportation as a consequence of pleading guilty to an aggravated felony, the habeas court improperly concluded that Freeman's performance was not deficient. Specifically, Freeman failed to comply with Padilla because he did not explain the clear immigration consequences set forth in federal law in an accurate manner and in terms that the petitioner could comprehend. Budziszewski v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 322 Conn. at 515, 142 A.3d 243. The immigration consequences in this case were clearly discernable; a conviction of larceny in the third degree with a sentence greater than one year constituted an aggravated felony for immigration purposes and thus federal law mandated deportation. Freeman, therefore, was obligated to convey to the petitioner unequivocally this consequence of pleading guilty. See id., at 512, 142 A.3d 243. There was no evidence in the record, nor did the habeas court specifically find that Freeman was aware that the crime and sentence12 to which the petitioner *1183pleaded guilty constituted an aggravated felony for purposes of immigration law. Moreover, even if the habeas court expressly had credited Freeman's testimony that larceny in the third degree is a crime of moral turpitude and therefore could \"create some *659problems with regard to ... immigration,\" this statement does not meet the required standard set forth in Padilla. We conclude, therefore, that this advice is akin to the advice given in Budziszewski where counsel warned of a \"heightened risk of deportation ....\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Budziszewski v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 322 Conn. at 512, 142 A.3d 243., *660The following additional facts are necessary for our discussion. At the habeas trial, the petitioner testified that he would not have pleaded guilty to a crime that was an aggravated felony if he had known of its immigration consequences. He later indicated that because he was not aware of any possible effect as to his immigration status, the petitioner's trepidation about entering a plea related to the loss of his employment and the conviction of a serious crime. During his direct examination, the petitioner was asked if he would have accepted that offer had he known that his guilty plea in the Hartford case would result in his deportation. He responded: \"I would not have submitted a guilty plea in this case. The guilty plea was proposed as a way of trying to, if you will, clear the matter in the-as quick a way as possible. Taking responsibility for what I was involved with ... [by] paying restitution., On appeal, the petitioner, citing to Roe v. Flores-Ortega , 528 U.S. 470, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1029, 145 L.Ed.2d 985 (2000), notes that \"[p]rejudice may be presumed, however, when a violation of the right to counsel rendered the proceeding presumptively unreliable or entirely nonexistent.\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) To the extent that he implicitly claimed that a presumption of prejudice exists in the present case, we reject that view. In Roe v. Flores-Ortega , supra, at 483, 120 S.Ct. 1029, the United States Supreme Court observed: \"In some cases ... the defendant alleges not that counsel made specific errors in the course of representation, but rather that during the judicial proceeding he was-*662either actually or constructively-denied the assistance of counsel altogether. The presumption that counsel's assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage .... Under such circumstances, [n]o specific showing of prejudice [is] required, because the adversary process itself [is] presumptively unreliable.\" (Citations *1185omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) See, e.g., Smith v. Robbins , 528 U.S. 259, 287, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000) (three categories of cases where prejudice is presumed are denial of counsel, various kinds of state interference with counsel's assistance and actual conflict of interest for counsel); Penson v. Ohio , 488 U.S. 75, 85-89, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988) (prejudice presumed when state appellate court improperly granted motion to withdraw filed by appointed appellate counsel and improperly failed to appoint new counsel); United States v. Cronic , 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) (no showing of prejudice required when counsel either was absent totally or prevented from assisting accused during critical stage of proceeding); see also Davis v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 319 Conn. at 555-68, 126 A.3d 538 (complete breakdown in adversarial process occurred, resulting in presumption of prejudice, when defense agreed at sentencing to prosecutor's recommendation of twenty-five years incarceration, thus forfeiting right to argue for lesser sentence)., *663As we previously stated, the Hill prejudice standard provides that \"[i]n the context of a guilty plea ... to succeed on the prejudice prong the petitioner must demonstrate that, but for counsel's alleged ineffective performance, the petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and would have proceeded to trial.\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carraway v. Commissioner of Correction , 317 Conn. 594, 600 n.6, 119 A.3d 1153 (2015) ; see also Thiersaint v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 316 Conn. at 101, 111 A.3d 829 ; Saksena v. Commissioner of Correction , 145 Conn.App. 152, 156, 76 A.3d 192, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 940, 79 A.3d 892 (2013). \"In evaluating whether the petitioner had met this burden and evaluating the credibility of the petitioner's assertions that he would have gone to trial, it was appropriate for the court to consider whether a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances. Padilla v. Kentucky , supra, 559 U.S. at 372, 130 S.Ct. 1473.\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Flomo v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 169 Conn.App. at 280, 149 A.3d 185., During the habeas trial, the petitioner testified that had he known that he would have been deported, he would not have pleaded guilty to larceny in the third degree with a period of incarceration greater than one year. A review of his testimony reveals that had he been aware of the immigration consequences, they would have been the primary factor in his decision as to whether to plead guilty. Cf. id. (petitioner was not concerned with immigration consequences but stigma attached to conviction of sexual assault of minor and reducing jail sentence); Niver v. Commissioner of Correction , 101 Conn.App. 1, 5-6, 919 A.2d 1073 (2007) (petitioner's primary concern was minimizing amount of time in jail and petitioner was not troubled by potential for deportation)., *664The habeas court, however, did not credit the petitioner's testimony that he would have rejected the plea and proceeded to trial. Instead, it concluded that no *1186rational person would have rejected the plea deal in the Hartford case. It also determined that there was no showing of prejudice in the New Britain case. On appeal, however, the petitioner has not directly challenged the court's conclusion that he would not have accepted the plea deal and proceeded to a trial. Instead, the petitioner argues in his brief that he was prejudiced as a result of \"having an aggravated felony conviction on his record ... by having served twenty-two months in immigration detention in addition to the sixty days he served as part of his sentence ... [by having been removed] from this country and from his permanent inadmissibility as a result of his aggravated felony conviction ... [and by the] additional disruption this has caused in his otherwise productive life.\" Undoubtedly, these events have had a negative impact and caused disruption to the life of the petitioner. They do not, however, apply to the relevant legal inquiry, which is the test for prejudice as set forth in Hill v. Lockhart , supra, 474 U.S. at 58-59, 106 S.Ct. 366. Further, the petitioner failed to provide this court with any applicable authority15 that the events detailed in his brief constitute the prejudice necessary to establish a successful claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Simply put, his appellate argument missed the mark and we are left, essentially, with an unchallenged conclusion of no prejudice from the habeas court. \"It is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in *665the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel's work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones.\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fetscher , 162 Conn.App. 145, 155-56, 130 A.3d 892 (2015), cert. denied, 321 Conn. 904, 138 A.3d 280 (2016). The petitioner failed to establish that he was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel and, therefore, the habeas court properly denied counts two and three of the habeas petition. We conclude, therefore, that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that his issues regarding Freeman and Goulet-Case are debatable among jurists of reasons, that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner or that they are adequate to proceed further. Thus, the habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying certification to appeal as to the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Sanders v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 169 Conn.App. at 838, 153 A.3d 8., *1187The following additional facts are necessary for our discussion. In its articulation, the habeas court expressly addressed the petitioner's due process claim: \"Although the claim in count one is alleged as a freestanding separate claim, it nevertheless is, in this court's analysis and a fair reading of the factual allegations, *666wholly dependent on the claims alleged in the other two counts. It is counsel, if anyone, who would have a duty to properly advise the petitioner that he would 'know or understand the probability of deportation/removal under the terms of the plea agreement.' Stated somewhat differently, the petitioner cannot prevail on the claim in count one, as it is factually and legally pleaded, without also proving the claims in counts two and three.\", \"The Boykin constitutional essentials for the acceptance of a plea of guilty are included in our rules and are reflected in Practice Book §§ [39-19 and 39-20]...., We noted that the trial court had informed Flomo that pleading guilty to risk of injury to a child could result in his deportation if he was not a citizen of the United States.16 Id., at 285, 149 A.3d 185. Flomo indicated that he had discussed these immigration consequences with his attorney and that he did not need time for additional discussions. Id. We concluded, therefore, that the trial court had substantially complied with § 54-1j. We also stated that Padilla 's rejection \"as an analytical tool evaluating whether immigration consequences are direct versus collateral\" was limited to sixth amendment claims regarding the right to counsel. Id., We acknowledge that the legal issue in Flomo v. Commissioner of Correction , supra, 169 Conn.App. at 281-86, 149 A.3d 185, of whether the trial judge failed to ascertain if Flomo understood the immigration consequences of his plea and as a result, acceptance of the plea violated his right to due process, differs from the petitioner's claim in the present case. Here, the petitioner claims that as result of both counsel's failure to inform him of the immigration consequences, his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily made and, therefore, a violation of due process. This distinction, however, does not change the fact that \"[i]mmigration consequences of a plea are among those that our Supreme Court already has indicated are collateral in nature and, therefore, cannot implicate the constitutional concerns of Boykin. \" Id., at 283, 149 A.3d 185. Put another way, the immigration consequences of a guilty plea, while significant, do not fall within the *669ambit of the constitutional requirements17 for a valid plea as mandated by Boykin., Additionally, we agree with the habeas court that the petitioner's due process claim is wholly dependent on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which we already have rejected in part II of this opinion. \"In a situation such as this, where the petitioner's claim of a violation of due process is so inextricably bound up in the issue of the effectiveness of his trial counsel, we conclude that a separate claim of a violation of the right to due process is not required.... Because it is primarily the responsibility of defense counsel to advise the defendant of his right to testify and thereby to ensure that the right is protected, we believe the appropriate vehicle for claims that the defendant's right to testify was violated by defense counsel is *1189[through] a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel [pursuant to] Strickland v. Washington , [supra] 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052....\" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Correction v. Rodriquez , 222 Conn. 469, 476, 610 A.2d 631 (1992) ; see also Braham v. Commissioner of Correction , 72 Conn.App. 1, 12-13, 804 A.2d 951, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 906, 810 A.2d 271 (2002) ; Rivera v. Commissioner of Correction , 61 Conn.App. 825, 833-34, 767 A.2d 790, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 903, 772 A.2d 596 (2001) ; see generally Iovieno v. Commissioner of Correction , 67 Conn.App. 126, 129, 786 A.2d 1113 (2001), cert. denied, 259 Conn. 916, 792 A.2d 851 (2002). Therefore, for these reasons, we conclude that the habeas court properly rejected the due process claim raised by the petitioner. We further conclude that the *670habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying certification to appeal with respect to this claim.","caseName":"Duncan v. Comm'r of Corr.","caseNameFull":"Patton E. DUNCAN v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION","citation":["157 A.3d 1169","171 Conn. App. 635","2017 Conn. App. LEXIS 104"],"citeCount":3,"cluster_id":7920929,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2017-03-21","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC 37366","docket_id":65015497,"judge":"Other","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T16:19:38.878837Z","date_created":"2022-09-08T20:33:33.212678Z","score":{"bm25":14.318051}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":7870335,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-25T02:15:45.941836Z","date_created":"2022-09-08T20:33:33.227731Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nIn this opinion the other judges concurred.\n","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[7870335],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10624969/matter-of-fischer/","attorney":"","caseName":"Matter of Fischer","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2025 NY Slip Op 03856"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10624969,"court":"Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York","court_citation_string":"N.Y. App. Div.","court_id":"nyappdiv","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2025-06-26","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"PM-144-25","docket_id":70733040,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-07-08T18:14:06.718385Z","date_created":"2025-07-08T18:13:48.781042Z","score":{"bm25":14.164391}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[5121735,5140086,6342195,8417090],"download_url":"http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2025/2025_03856.htm","id":11091557,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"html/2025/06/26/matter_of_fischer_1.html","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-07T22:06:32.780898Z","date_created":"2025-07-08T18:13:48.789637Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"0cca69ed75e8bf8f3da2544d8f538a3f96116bac","snippet":"Matter of Fischer (2025 NY Slip Op 03856)\n\n\n\n\n\nMatter of Fischer\n\n\n2025 NY Slip Op 03856\n\n\nDecided on June 26, 2025\n\n\nAppellate Division, Third Department\n\n\n\nPublished by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.\n\n\nThis opinion is uncorr","type":"combined-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[5121735,5140086,6342195,8417090],"download_url":"http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2025/2025_03856.htm","id":11084255,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"html/2025/06/26/matter_of_fischer.html","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-14T21:06:26.516864Z","date_created":"2025-06-26T15:10:00.359808Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"a94d2a1b7c1e007412de1ed11b6bd1beeaded4a4","snippet":"\n\nMatter of Fischer (2025 NY Slip Op 03856)\n\n\n\n\n\nMatter of Fischer\n\n\n2025 NY Slip Op 03856\n\n\nDecided on June 26, 2025\n\n\nAppellate Division, Third Department\n\n\n\nPublished by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.\n\n","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11084255,11091557],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4590705/daniel-vega-v-state-of-indiana/","attorney":"Attorney for Appellant: David W. Stone IV, Anderson, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, George P. Sherman, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana","caseName":"Daniel Vega v. State of Indiana","caseNameFull":"Daniel VEGA, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.","citation":["119 N.E.3d 193"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4590705,"court":"Indiana Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ind. Ct. App.","court_id":"indctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2019-02-14","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Court of Appeals Case 18A-CR-942","docket_id":14552249,"judge":"Najam","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:27:58.523509Z","date_created":"2019-02-14T17:03:30.037495Z","score":{"bm25":13.57594}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[852521,2014301,2478577],"download_url":"http://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/pdf/02141902ewn.pdf","id":4367958,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2019/02/14/daniel_vega_v._state_of_indiana.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T17:03:43.814125Z","date_created":"2019-02-14T17:03:30.044914Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"17ac2bb6452a4893dfb1727f78156eab341ca3d3","snippet":"\n\n\n  Najam, Judge.\n \n\n\n   Statement of the Case\n  \n\n\n  [1] Daniel Vega appeals his convictions for one count of child molesting, as a Level 3 felony, and two counts of child solicitation, as Level 5 felonies, following a jury trial. Vega also appeals his fifteen-year sentence. Vega raises six issues for our review, which we restate as follows:\n \n","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4367958],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9368608/appeal-of-town-of-amherst/","attorney":"","caseName":"Appeal of Town of Amherst","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9368608,"court":"Supreme Court of New Hampshire","court_citation_string":"N.H.","court_id":"nh","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2023-01-18","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"2021-0570","docket_id":66737622,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-23T00:58:28.083849Z","date_created":"2023-01-18T14:04:37.401106Z","score":{"bm25":13.538564}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2313314],"download_url":"https://www.courts.nh.gov/sites/g/files/ehbemt471/files/documents/2023-01/2023002townofamherst.pdf","id":9364084,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/01/18/appeal_of_town_of_amherst.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-27T05:38:51.935831Z","date_created":"2023-01-18T14:04:37.402249Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"28e6ef64c07b5d4f7e324c3020242b253c5d22d3","snippet":"NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for rehearing under Rule 22 as\nwell as formal revision before publication in the New Hampshire Reports.\nReaders are requested to notify the Reporter, Supreme Court of New\nHampshire, One Charles Doe Drive, Concord, New Hampshire 03301, of any\neditorial errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion goes\nto press. Errors may be reported by email at the following address:\nreporter@courts.state.nh.us. Opinions are available on the Internet ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9364084],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9997601/matter-of-donohue-v-katerle/","attorney":"","caseName":"Matter of Donohue v. Katerle","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2024 NY Slip Op 03636"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9997601,"court":"Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York","court_citation_string":"N.Y. App. Div.","court_id":"nyappdiv","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-07-03","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"409 CAF 23-01761","docket_id":68916199,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-07-03T21:06:17.058185Z","date_created":"2024-07-03T21:06:16.951260Z","score":{"bm25":13.336614}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[4178392,5534650,5681440,5765745,5973375,6064000,9912775],"download_url":"http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2024/2024_03636.htm","id":10464202,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"html/2024/07/03/matter_of_donohue_v._katerle.html","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-02T17:47:49.766084Z","date_created":"2024-07-03T21:06:16.958598Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"05a401e3786f9c96e5b74d914637ae370a528849","snippet":"\n\nMatter of Donohue v Katerle (2024 NY Slip Op 03636)\n\n\n\n\n\nMatter of Donohue v Katerle\n\n\n2024 NY Slip Op 03636\n\n\nDecided on July 3, 2024\n\n\nAppellate Division, Fourth Department\n\n\n\nPublished by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law §","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10464202],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10644686/matter-of-jdal/","attorney":"","caseName":"Matter of J.D.A.L.","caseNameFull":"In the Matter of the Application of J.D.A.L., For Leave to Change Their Name and Sex Designation","citation":["2025 NY Slip Op 25172"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10644686,"court":"Civil Court Of The City Of New York, New York County","court_citation_string":"Civ. Ct. NYC, NY Cty.","court_id":"nycivctny","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2025-07-28","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Index No. NC-000954-25/NY","docket_id":70966627,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-07-30T20:12:51.062331Z","date_created":"2025-07-30T20:12:34.513032Z","score":{"bm25":13.270757}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"https://nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2025/2025_25172.htm","id":11111178,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"html/2025/07/28/matter_of_j.d.a.l..html","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-14T21:33:45.574861Z","date_created":"2025-07-30T19:12:53.804097Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"4bfd3b92506365405d6deaacb4004e2285071db4","snippet":"Matter of J.D.A.L. (2025 NY Slip Op 25172)\n\n\n\n\n[*1]\n\n\nMatter of J.D.A.L.\n\n\n2025 NY Slip Op 25172\n\n\nDecided on July 28, 2025\n\n\nCivil Court Of The City Of New York, New York County\n\n\nZellan, J.\n\n\nPublished by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary","type":"combined-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"https://nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2025/2025_25172.htm","id":11111273,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"html/2025/07/28/matter_of_j.d.a.l._1.html","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-01T17:24:34.470996Z","date_created":"2025-07-30T20:12:34.520836Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"2d402613aa42f695d81e81d9aa13ed42ad2477a5","snippet":"Matter of J.D.A.L. (2025 NY Slip Op 25172)\n\n\n\n\n[*1]\n\n\nMatter of J.D.A.L.\n\n\n2025 NY Slip Op 25172\n\n\nDecided on July 28, 2025\n\n\nCivil Court Of The City Of New York, New York County\n\n\nZellan, J.\n\n\nPublished by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11111273,11111178],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10315412/in-re-conservatorship-of-sylvia-carlyle-brainard/","attorney":"","caseName":"In Re Conservatorship of Sylvia Carlyle Brainard","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10315412,"court":"Court of Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Ct. App.","court_id":"tennctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2025-01-16","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"W2024-00031-COA-R3-CV","docket_id":69553693,"judge":"Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-01-16T23:17:49.735793Z","date_created":"2025-01-16T23:17:49.682679Z","score":{"bm25":13.256153}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8279,"cites":[],"download_url":"https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/InReConservatorshipofSylviaBrainardOPN.pdf","id":10782000,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2025/01/16/in_re_conservatorship_of_sylvia_carlyle_brainard.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-27T19:01:00.242426Z","date_created":"2025-01-16T23:17:49.692811Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"d74678a91f610a0c3f600530c9f2ff1f6a51dedb","snippet":"                                                                                            01/16/2025\n                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                             AT JACKSON\n                               September 10, 2024 Session\n\n     IN RE CONSERVATORSHIP OF SYLVIA CARLYLE BRAINARD\n\n                  Appeal from the Probate Court for Shelby County\n                   No. PR-11538       Kathleen N. Gomes, Judge\n                     ___________________________________\n\n   ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10782000],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"After two sets of relatives filed competing petitions for the appointment of a conservator over the respondent, the parties entered into an agreed order and settlement agreement that provided that the respondent was not in need of conservator, but that the parties had certain obligations that were subject to review by the court and guardian ad litem going forward. Months later, appellants filed a petition to set aside the agreed order on the basis that appellees had not complied with its terms; appellees responded with a motion to dismiss appellants' petition on the basis that they had not alleged proper grounds to set aside the parties' agreement. After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the trial court entered an order stating that \"[a]ll outstanding orders should be set aside and all petitions and the case dismissed\" without explanation. Because we cannot review the trial court's sua sponte dismissal without an adequate explanation, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4583350/in-the-matter-of-involuntary-termination-of-the-parent-child-relationship/","attorney":"\n  Attorney for Appellant: Joann M. Price, Merrillville, Indiana\n , \n  Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Abigail R. Recker, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana\n ","caseName":"In the Matter of Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: M.R., M.D., and A.D. (Minor Children) and D.D. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)","caseNameFull":"In the MATTER OF Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship Of: M.R., M.D., and A.D. (Minor Children) and D.D. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent, v. the Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner, and Lake County Court Appointed Special Advocate, Co-Appellee, Court Appointed Special Advocate.","citation":["121 N.E.3d 140"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4583350,"court":"Indiana Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ind. Ct. App.","court_id":"indctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2019-01-22","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Court of Appeals Case 18A-JT-1960","docket_id":13585366,"judge":"Robb","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:25:59.338994Z","date_created":"2019-01-22T16:06:59.467333Z","score":{"bm25":13.251777}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2020945,2060578,2165500,2208866,2232733],"download_url":"http://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/pdf/01221901mgr.pdf","id":4360603,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2019/01/22/in_the_matter_of_involuntary_termination_of_the_parent-child_relationship.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T16:58:46.372925Z","date_created":"2019-01-22T16:06:59.474771Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"fc829d4cf51eecda5d9c1671f0e7a2123fca33a7","snippet":"\n\n\n  Robb, Judge.\n \n\n  Case Summary and Issue\n \n\n  [1] D.D. (\"Mother\") appeals the juvenile court's termination of her parental rights to M.R., M.D., and A.D., raising only one issue for our review which we restate as whether the juvenile court's termination of her parental rights was clearly erroneous. Concluding the termination of Mother's parental rights was not clearly errone","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4360603],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4417712/danny-c-garland-ii-v-board-of-professional-responsibility-of-the-supreme/","attorney":"","caseName":"Danny C. Garland, II v. Board of Professional Responsibility Of The Supreme Court of Tennessee - Dissenting","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4417712,"court":"Tennessee Supreme Court","court_citation_string":"Tenn.","court_id":"tenn","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2017-08-10","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"E2016-01106-SC-R3-BP","docket_id":6136127,"judge":"Justice Holly Kirby","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T00:39:29.590619Z","date_created":"2017-08-10T20:10:58.247480Z","score":{"bm25":13.153498}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/garlandd.disopn.pdf","id":4194965,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2017/08/10/danny_c._garland_ii_v._board_of_professional_responsibility_of_the_supreme.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T15:03:21.659141Z","date_created":"2017-08-10T20:10:58.264424Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"363c54697a768dd4f7a47689e990720ad8ce3b46","snippet":"                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE\n                            AT KNOXVILLE\n                                January 10, 2017 Session\n\n        DANNY C. GARLAND, II v. BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL\n     RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE\n\n              Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Knox County\n                 No. 189106-3 Jon Kerry Blackwood, Senior Judge\n\n\n                 No. E2016-01106-SC-R3-BP – Filed August 10, 2017\n\n\n\n\nHOLLY KIRBY, J., dissenting.\n\n       ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4194965],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case.From the majority's recitation of the facts in this case, we can all agree that the complainant, Ms. McKeogh, did not get good service overall from Mr. Garland's office. However, the majority's recitation of the facts also makes it clear that the problems of which Ms. McKeogh complains arise from the actions or inactions of Mr. Garland's staff, particularly Ms. Harris and Ms. Snyder."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9389337/in-the-interest-of-sj-a-child-v-the-state-of-texas/","attorney":"","caseName":"In the Interest of S.J., a Child v. the State of Texas","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9389337,"court":"Texas Court of Appeals, 5th District (Dallas)","court_citation_string":"Tex. App.-Dallas","court_id":"txctapp5","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2023-03-31","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"05-22-01210-CV","docket_id":67138203,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-02-24T13:05:04.683182Z","date_created":"2023-04-05T06:07:05.375392Z","score":{"bm25":13.055482}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"https://search.txcourts.gov/RetrieveDocument.aspx?DocId=36218&Index=%5c%5c10%2e20%2e4%2e7%5cTamesIndexes%5ccoa05%5cOpinion","id":9384813,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/03/31/in_the_interest_of_s.j._a_child_v._the_state_of_texas.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-02-24T13:05:04.698501Z","date_created":"2023-04-05T06:07:05.376763Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"026e4d1f90da0b2fc6d775b909d270defac8c7ca","snippet":"AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed March 31, 2023\n\n\n\n\n                                    S   In The\n                             Court of Appeals\n                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas\n                                No. 05-22-01210-CV\n\n                     IN THE INTEREST OF S.J., A CHILD\n\n                On Appeal from the 305th Judicial District Court\n                             Dallas County, Texas\n                     Trial Court Cause No. JC-21-0985-X\n\n                         M","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9384813],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/7333867/democracy-forward-found-v-white-house-office-of-am-innovation/","attorney":"Karianne Melissa Jones, Pro Hac Vice, Nitin Shah, Javier M. Guzman, Democracy Forward Foundation, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs., Kathryn L. Wyer, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant., COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, United States District Judge *62Plaintiffs bring this action to compel Defendant, the White House Office of American Innovation (\"OAI\"), to respond to Plaintiffs' requests under the Freedom of Information Act (\"FOIA\"), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 1. The two Plaintiff organizations each made a FOIA request to the OAI, asking the OAI to disclose certain documents. Id. at ¶¶ 56, 58. The OAI failed to respond to either FOIA request, and, as a result, Plaintiffs filed suit to enforce compliance under FOIA. Defendants have moved for dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint, arguing that the OAI is not an \"agency\" subject to FOIA's disclosure requirements., The OAI was established within the White House Office by Presidential Memorandum in March 2017 and is led by Jared Kushner, a Senior Advisor to the President. Id. at ¶¶ 12, 17. The OAI was established in part to \" 'focus on implementing policies and scaling proven private-sector models to spur job creation and innovation' \" and to \" 'ensure that America is ready to solve today's most intractable problems, and is positioned to meet tomorrow's challenges and opportunities.' \" Id. at ¶ 12 (quoting Presidential Memorandum on the White House Office of American Innovation, 2017 WL 1130896 (Mar. 27, 2017) (\" 2017 Presidential Memorandum\") ). According to the Presidential Memorandum establishing the OAI, the OAI's sole mission is to \"make recommendations to the President on policies and plans that improve Government operations and services, improve the quality of life for Americans now and in the future, and spur job creation.\" 2017 Presidential Memorandum.2 With this mission in mind, the OAI \"shall launch initiatives with a focus on innovation, coordinate implementation of any resulting plans, and create reports for the President setting forth policy recommendations. In carrying out these activities and producing these reports, the OAI shall gather information, ideas, and experiences from other parts of Government, from the private sector, and from other *63thought leaders and experts outside of the Federal Government.\" Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 14 (quoting 2017 Presidential Memorandum )., Under FOIA, \" 'each agency, upon any request for records which (i) reasonably describes such records and (ii) is made in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, fees (if any), and procedures to be followed, shall make the records promptly available to any person.' \" Id. at ¶ 69 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) ). With some exceptions, an agency must determine whether or not to comply with a party's FOIA request within 20 business days of the receipt of the request and immediately notify the party of its determination. Id. at ¶ 63 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i) ). Despite this obligation, the OAI did not notify Plaintiffs of its determination within 20 days. Id. at ¶¶ 64-67. And, as of this date, the OAI has not responded to Plaintiffs' FOIA requests. Id. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs ask that the Court compel the OAI to comply with the requirements of FOIA. Id. at ¶¶ 80-87., In response, Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint because the OAI is not an agency subject to the requirements of FOIA. Defendant contends that the OAI is not an agency for purposes of FOIA because it is an entity within the White House Office and because it does not exercise substantial authority independent of the President. The Court agrees and concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under FOIA because the OAI is not an agency subject to FOIA., Defendant brings this motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).3 Def.'s Mot., ECF No. 10, 3-4. Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a party may challenge the sufficiency of a complaint on the grounds it \"fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.\" Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). When evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the district court must accept as true the well-pleaded factual allegations contained in the complaint. Atherton v. D.C. Office of Mayor , 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied , 559 U.S. 1039, 130 S.Ct. 2064, 176 L.Ed.2d 418 (2010). \"[A] complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.' \" Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). Rather, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if accepted as true, \"state a claim to relief *64that is plausible on its face.\" Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. \"A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' \" Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits or incorporated by reference, and information about which the Court may take judicial notice. Abhe v. Svoboda, Inc. v. Chao , 508 F.3d 1052, 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2007)., Under FOIA, only \"agenc[ies]\" are required to \"make available to the public\" various specified types of information. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a). Congress originally defined an agency, for purposes of FOIA, as \" 'each authority of the Government of the United States,' \" subject to certain exceptions which are not relevant to this case. Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President , 90 F.3d 553, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) ). In its 1971 opinion in Soucie v. David , 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (\"D.C. Circuit\") addressed the question of whether the Office of Science and Technology, a component of the Executive Office of the President (\"EOP\"), was an agency subject to FOIA. 448 F.2d at 1070-71. In concluding that the Office was an agency subject to FOIA, the D.C. Circuit interpreted Congress's definition of \"agency\" to include \"any administrative unit with substantial independent authority in the exercise of specific functions.\" Id. at 1073. The Court went on to conclude that the Office was an agency because its \"sole function [was not] to advise and assist the President.\" Id. at 1075., This Court must determine whether or not the OAI fits within the Congressional definition of \"agency\" as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit. Defendant has two arguments as to why the OAI is not an agency for purposes of FOIA. First, Defendant argues that the OAI is categorically not an agency because it is an entity within the White House Office. Second, Defendant argues that the OAI is not an agency because it does not exercise substantial authority independent of the President. The Court will address each argument., Defendant argues, and the Court concludes, that entities within the White House Office are not agencies within the meaning of FOIA. And, it is undisputed that the OAI is part of the White House Office. Accordingly, the OAI is not an agency for purposes of FOIA., In Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press , 445 U.S. 136, 100 S.Ct. 960, 63 L.Ed.2d 267 (1980), the Supreme Court concluded that entities within the Office of the President, also referred to as the White House Office, are not agencies under FOIA. In Kissinger , the Supreme Court invalidated a FOIA request for certain notes taken by then-Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger. 445 U.S. at 158, 100 S.Ct. 960. The Court concluded that Mr. Kissinger's notes were not agency records within the meaning of FOIA. Id. at 156, 100 S.Ct. 960. The Court cited the Conference Report of the 1974 FOIA Amendments for the proposition that \" 'the President's immediate personal staff or units in the Executive Office whose sole function is to advise and assist the President' are not included within the term 'agency' under the FOIA.\" Id. (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1380, p. 15 (1974) ). Based on expressed Congressional intent, the Court explained that, while entities within the EOP are subject to FOIA, \"[t]he legislative history is unambiguous ... in explaining that the 'Executive Office' does not include the Office of the President.\" Id. In other words, because the Office of the President, also known as the White House Office, has the sole function of advising and assisting the President, the White House Office is not included within FOIA's scope. See Sculimbrene v. Reno , 158 F.Supp.2d 26, 29 (D.D.C. 2001) (\"[T]he Supreme Court has held that the FOIA definition of 'agency' does not include the 'Office of the President,' also known as the White House Office.\")., It is undisputed that the OAI is part of the White House Office. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 16; see also 2017 Presidential Memorandum. As Kissinger explained, entities within the White House Office are not agencies for purposes of FOIA. 445 U.S. at 156, 100 S.Ct. 960. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the OAI is not an agency subject to Plaintiffs' FOIA requests., The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly interpreted Kissinger to mean that entities within the White House Office are categorically not agencies for purposes of FOIA. And, Plaintiffs have failed to cite any case in which an entity within the White House Office has been held to be an agency under FOIA. Based on FOIA's \"agency\" definition and this Circuit's precedent, the Court concludes that, because the OAI is an entity within the White House Office, the OAI is not an agency subject to disclosure requirements under FOIA. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Complaint is DISMISSED as it does not state a claim for which relief may be granted., The Court has already determined that the OAI is not an agency for purposes of FOIA because it is an entity within the White House Office. Alternatively, the Court further concludes that, even if the OAI's position within the White House Office did not categorically bar it from being an agency, the OAI is not an agency for purposes of FOIA because it does not exercise substantial authority independent of the President., The D.C. Circuit has offered various tests for determining whether an entity within the EOP, such as the OAI, constitutes an agency for purposes of FOIA. United to Protect Democracy v. Presidential Advisory Comm'n on Election Integrity , 288 F.Supp.3d 99, 114-115 (D.D.C. 2017). In Soucie , the D.C. Circuit offered two possible tests for determining whether an EOP component is an agency subject to FOIA: (1) whether the entity exercises \"substantial independent authority,\" and (2) whether the entity's \"sole function [is] to advise and assist the President.\" 448 F.2d at 1073, 1075 ; see also Armstrong , 90 F.3d at 558. Following Soucie , the D.C. Circuit issued its opinion in Meyer , which \"managed to harmonize\" the two Soucie criteria \"by using a three-factor test to determine the status under FOIA of a unit in the Executive Office of the President.\" Armstrong , 90 F.3d at 558. Specifically, the Meyer Court determined that, in \"apply[ing] Soucie to those who help the President supervise others in the executive branch ... it is necessary to focus on three interrelated factors ... how close operationally the group is to the President, what the nature of its delegation from the President is, and whether it has a self-contained structure.\" 981 F.2d at 1293., *67Circuit has] held that an EOP unit is subject to FOIA has been a finding that the entity in question 'wielded substantial authority independently of the President.' \" Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington , 566 F.3d at 222-23 (quoting Sweetland v. Walters , 60 F.3d 852, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ). Likewise, the D.C. Circuit has \"consistently refused to extend FOIA to an EOP unit that lacks substantial independent authority.\" Id. at 223., Accordingly, in determining whether or not the OAI is an agency for purpose of FOIA, the Court's analysis will focus on whether or not the OAI \"wielded substantial authority independently of the President.\" Id. at 222-3 (internal quotation marks omitted). And, the Court finds that it did not., Moreover, according to the OAI's founding document, the President plays a crucial and authoritative role in the OAI's reason for being. The OAI's sole Mission is to \"make recommendations to the President on policies and plans that improve the Government operations and services, improve the quality of life for Americans now and in the future, and spur job creation.\" 2017 Presidential Memorandum. Given that the only mission of the OAI is to advise the President, Plaintiffs' unsupported and conclusory allegations that \"the President [does not] need[ ] to approve of OAI's policies or initiative\" and that \"the President [does not] regularly consult with or interact with OAI\" are not credible. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 22; See Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (explaining that labels and conclusions are insufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted). Accordingly, the Court concludes that the OAI's structure does not support Plaintiffs' contention that the OAI is an agency with substantial authority independent from the President., In addition to their claims about the structure of the OAI, Plaintiffs argue that *68the OAI's responsibilities demonstrate that it wields substantial authority independent from the President. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs focus on the responsibilities of the OAI as outlined in the OAI's founding documents. According to the 2017 Presidential Memorandum, the OAI \" 'shall launch initiatives with a focus on innovation, coordinate implementation of any resulting plans, and create reports for the President setting forth policy recommendations.' \" Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 14 (quoting 2017 Presidential Memorandum ). Quoting a press release on the OAI, Plaintiffs further allege that the OAI has the responsibility of creating \" 'task forces to focus on initiatives such as modernizing Government services and information technology, improving services to veterans, creating transformational infrastructure projects, implementing regulatory and process reforms, creating manufacturing jobs, addressing the drug and opioid epidemic, and developing 'workforce of the future' programs.' \" Id. at ¶ 15 (quoting Press Release, President Donald J. Trump Announces the White House Office of American Innovation (OAI), The White House (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-announces-white-house-office-american-innovation-oai/ (\"2017 White House Press Release\") ). According to Plaintiffs, these statements make clear that the OAI wields authority independent from the President., However, these statements regarding the OAI must be read in context. While the OAI is given many responsibilities, these responsibilities fall under the sole mission of the OAI which is to \"make recommendations to the President on policies and plans that improve government operations and services, improve the quality of life for Americans now and in the future, and spur job creation.\" 2017 White House Press Release4 ; 2017 Presidential Memorandum. If all of OAI's responsibilities are cabined within its overarching mission to make recommendations to the President, it is not clear how the OAI could \"wield[ ] substantial authority independently of the President.\" Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington , 566 F.3d at 222-23., First, Plaintiffs allege that the OAI is responsible for evaluating and directing the modernization of federal technology systems. Plaintiffs contend that the OAI \"launched\" the American Technology *69Counsel (\"ATC\"), which evaluates federal technology programs and released a report prescribing implementation plans for improving those programs. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 25-31. Additionally, Plaintiffs allege that the OAI assisted in drafting the Modernizing Government Technology Act which was later passed by Congress. Id. at ¶ 32. Plaintiffs also contend that the OAI has worked with the Department of Veterans Affairs to address interoperability issues between the Department's medical records systems and outside systems. Id. at ¶¶ 33-35. And finally, Plaintiffs allege that the OAI has supplanted the role of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (\"OSTP\"), which had previously been responsible for evaluating and modernizing federal technology systems. Id. at ¶¶ 36-41. However, the Court finds that these allegations fail to establish that the OAI has been tasked with authority substantially independent from the President., The ATC's Report was also initiated by Presidential Executive Order directing the Secretaries of various Departments and agencies, not including the OAI, to \"provide a report to the President ... with findings and recommendations regarding how to support the growth and sustainment of the Nation's cybersecurity workforce in both the public and private sectors.\" E.O. 13800 § 1(c)(vi)(B), 82 Fed. Reg. 22391, 22393 (May 11, 2017).7 Accordingly, neither the development of the ATC nor the drafting of the ATC's Report provides support for Plaintiffs' contention that *70the OAI exercises substantial independence from the President., Moreover, even if the OAI had been responsible for drafting the Report, it is not clear which portions of the Report are binding as Plaintiffs allege. While the Report does contain some language suggesting that portions of it are binding, the Report's preface states only that it \"outlines the current and envisioned state of Federal IT, and it provides specific recommendations to jumpstart a new wave of modernization efforts.\" See Report to the President on Federal IT Modernization, 2, available at https://itmodernization.cio.gov/assets/report/Report%20to%20the%20President%20on%20IT%20Modernization%20-%20Final.pdf.8 Rather than mandating changes for other agencies, the Report's preface indicates that the Report is meant to provide recommendations. And, many of those recommendations specifically request that \"the President direct the implementation of the plan outlined\" by the Report. See, e.g., Id. at 9, 12, 16. Merely providing policy recommendations for the President to direct does not establish the substantial independence of the OAI. See Rushforth v. Council of Econ. Advisers , 762 F.2d 1038, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (explaining that the Council of Economic Advisers was not an agency because its responsibility to evaluate federal programs was connected to its responsibility to make recommendations to the President)., In arguing that the OAI's responsibility for evaluating and directing the modernization of federal technology systems establishes the OAI's substantial independence, Plaintiffs also highlight the OAI's work drafting the Modernizing Government Technology Act. But, Plaintiffs' contention that the OAI assisted the President in drafting this legislation is similarly unavailing. Providing advice and recommendations to the President in drafting legislation is not a responsibility which affords an entity substantial independence. Rather, assistance in drafting legislation is the sort of responsibility which would be given to an entity whose role is to assist and advise the President. See Soucie , 448 F.2d at 1075 (explaining that an entity is not an agency if its sole function is to assist the President)., Finally, Plaintiffs' assertion that the OAI has supplanted the OSTP is conclusory. Plaintiffs provide no support for the contention that the OAI has taken over the \"independent\" functions which were previously exercised by the OSTP. And, the Court will not assume that the OAI has taken over those \"independent\" functions, especially given that the OAI's sole mission is to \"make recommendations to the *71President.\" 2017 Presidential Memorandum., In addition to the OAI's alleged responsibility for evaluating and directing the modernization of federal technology systems, Plaintiffs also contend that the OAI's role in developing and implementing the federal infrastructure plan demonstrates that the OAI wields substantial independence from the President. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 42-46. Plaintiffs allege that, in concert with the Department of Transportation, the Department of Commerce, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Infrastructure Council, the OAI has \"worked to develop the government's infrastructure plan, including leading at least some portions of the plan's development.\" Id. at ¶ 42., But, even if the Court credits Plaintiffs' allegation that the \"OAI aided in the development\" of the federal infrastructure plan, participation in that task does not establish substantial independence from the President. Id. at ¶ 46. After all, according to the plan itself which was referenced in Plaintiffs' Complaint, the White House, not the OAI released the plan. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶ 46 n.20 (citing White House, Legislative Outline for Rebuilding Infrastructure in America (2018), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/ffile/docs/briefing-room/304441/legoutline.pdf).9 Again, participating in developing and drafting legislation and policy released by the White House does not establish independence from the President. If anything, assisting the White House in developing policies such as the federal infrastructure plan strengthens the argument that the OAI's primary function is to assist and advise the President. See Meyer , 981 F.2d at 1298 (finding that a committee which made recommendations to the President \"concerning significant proposed regulations\" was not an agency under FOIA)., But, Plaintiffs fail to name any source granting the OAI authority over the Centers of Excellence. Plaintiffs admit that the General Services Administration (\"GSA\") created the Centers of Excellence. Id. at ¶ 47. While Plaintiffs allege that the OAI directed the GSA to create the Centers for Excellence, Plaintiffs provide no support for this conclusory allegation. Plaintiffs further allegation that the OAI directed the GSA to undertake other reorganizations, such as creating the Technology Transformation Services and establishing a new Commissioner, similarly fails. Id. at ¶¶ 49-50. According to the GSA Press Release cited in Plaintiffs' Complaint, the GSA decided to undertake these reorganizations in order to be \"[c]onsistent with [its] vision\" of \"being a leading force in the campaign to modernize the federal government.\" Press Release, GSA, GSA Merges Technology and Acquisition (June 7, 2017), Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the OAI's responsibility for negotiating deals between public and private entities demonstrates substantial independence from the President. Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 53-55. Plaintiffs allege that the OAI has engaged in multiple negotiations with private entities, including Foxconn and IT Contractor Center. Id., But, nowhere do Plaintiffs allege that the OAI engaged in these negotiations without the knowledge and consent of the President. Moreover, Plaintiffs do not allege that the OAI has acquisition authority independent from the President, nor do they reference any source providing the OAI with such authority. Based on the claims in Plaintiffs' Complaint, it is not even clear what role the OAI played in these alleged negotiations. Plaintiffs contend that Jared Kushner and Reed Cordish met with Foxconn executives who were considering buying a facility in the United States. Id. at ¶ 54. But, Mr. Kushner is a Senior Advisor to the President and Mr. Cordish was an Assistant to the President at the time. Because Mr. Kushner and Mr. Cordish could have been operating in their capacities as White House staff, this allegation does not establish the independence of the OAI. The same is true for Plaintiffs' example involving Mr. Kushner's negotiations with IT Contractor Center. Id. at ¶ 55. As Mr. Kushner is also a Senior Advisor to the President, his participation in the negotiation does not support the substantial independence of the OAI., Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to establish the OAI's substantial independence from the President based on the OAI's structure and responsibilities. This failure is unsurprising given that the OAI has little in common with the three entities within the EOP that the D.C. Circuit has previously held to be agencies for purposes of FOIA and analogous statutes., Third, the OAI does not exercise the same independence from the President as does the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, which the D.C. Circuit concluded was an agency for purposes of FOIA and the analogous Sunshine Act. Energy Research Found. v. Def. Nuclear Facilities Safety Bd. , 917 F.2d 581, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The D.C. Circuit highlighted the fact that the Board was established by Congress and has the ability to review and evaluate nuclear standards, conduct investigations at nuclear facilities, and make recommendations to the Secretary of Energy. Id. at 582. In completing these tasks, the Board has the independent authority promulgate its own regulations, require the Secretary of Energy to report to it classified information, conduct hearings, compel testimony, hire staff, and obtain assistance from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Id. at 582., Because the Court has determined that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted, the Court also concludes that Plaintiffs' request for jurisdictional discovery is not appropriate. Plaintiffs request jurisdictional discovery to determine whether or not the OAI falls within the jurisdiction of FOIA. Pls.' Opp'n, ECF No. 13, 23-24. But, even assuming that this case presents a jurisdictional problem, district courts have broad discretion in their resolution of jurisdictional discovery requests. FC Inv. Grp. LC v. IFX Mkts., Ltd. , 529 F.3d 1087, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Here, Plaintiffs have not made the required \"detailed showing\" of what discovery they want to conduct and what results such discovery would produce. NBC-USA Housing, Inc., Twenty-Six v. Donovan , 774 F.Supp.2d 277, 295 (D.D.C. 2011). Moreover, the Court concludes that jurisdictional discovery would not produce a different result in this case as D.C. Circuit precedent is clear that an entity within the White House Office, such as the OAI, is not an agency under FOIA. And, Plaintiffs have not set forth plausible allegations that the OAI is different than other entities within the EOP with the purpose of advising and assisting the President which the courts have concluded are not agencies for purposes of FOIA., For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss., *74Plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The OAI is not an agency subject to FOIA as it is an entity within the White House Office and it does not exercise substantial authority independent of the President. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.","caseName":"Democracy Forward Found. v. White House Office of Am. Innovation","caseNameFull":"DEMOCRACY FORWARD FOUNDATION v. The WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF AMERICAN INNOVATION","citation":["356 F. Supp. 3d 61"],"citeCount":20,"cluster_id":7333867,"court":"Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit","court_citation_string":"D.C. Cir.","court_id":"cadc","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2019-01-09","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Civil Action No. 18-349 (CKK)","docket_id":64322353,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T13:40:15.794095Z","date_created":"2022-07-25T06:08:32.991164Z","score":{"bm25":13.024375}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":7251787,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-25T00:18:45.392532Z","date_created":"2022-07-25T06:08:32.999546Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nAn appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.\n","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[7251787],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9443606/state-of-louisiana-in-the-interest-of-dw/","attorney":"","caseName":"State of Louisiana in the Interest of D.W.","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9443606,"court":"Supreme Court of Louisiana","court_citation_string":"La.","court_id":"la","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2023-10-20","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"2022-CK-01654","docket_id":68026011,"judge":"PER CURIAM","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-23T01:17:53.355305Z","date_created":"2023-11-21T19:04:58.364415Z","score":{"bm25":13.01641}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[110138,440355,2492648,7568271,7570109],"download_url":"http://www.lasc.org/opinions/2023/22-1654.CK.OPN.pdf","id":9901431,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/10/20/state_of_louisiana_in_the_interest_of_d.w..pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T23:05:42.911951Z","date_created":"2023-11-21T19:04:58.377870Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"dab43eeb8dfbeb3ff23100df2856b2ca5ebcc63f","snippet":"FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE                                                       NEWS RELEASE #046\n\n\nFROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA\n\n\nThe Opinions handed down on the 20th day of October, 2023 are as follows:\n\nPER CURIAM:\n\n 2022-CK-01654            STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE INTEREST OF D.W. (Parish of St.\n                          Tammany)\n\n                          REVERSED AND REINSTATED. SEE PER CURIAM.\n\n                          Genovese, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by th","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9901431],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"(Parish of St. Tammany) REVERSED AND REINSTATED. SEE PER CURIAM."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9512903/in-the-interest-of-ar-a-child-v-the-state-of-texas/","attorney":"","caseName":"In the Interest of A.R., a Child v. the State of Texas","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9512903,"court":"Texas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco)","court_citation_string":"Tex. App.-Waco","court_id":"txctapp10","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-06-06","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"10-23-00404-CV","docket_id":68836283,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-02-24T13:15:21.809726Z","date_created":"2024-06-07T11:11:05.243734Z","score":{"bm25":12.922294}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[107423,112157,1384755,1633997],"download_url":"https://search.txcourts.gov/RetrieveDocument.aspx?DocId=12272&Index=%5c%5c10%2e20%2e4%2e7%5cTamesIndexes%5ccoa10%5cOpinion","id":9979516,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/06/06/in_the_interest_of_a.r._a_child_v._the_state_of_texas.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-02-24T13:15:21.809770Z","date_created":"2024-06-07T11:11:05.245417Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"e6083ef45a3098f2058aba15a751437374025d13","snippet":"                                         IN THE\n                                 TENTH COURT OF APPEALS\n\n                                      No. 10-23-00404-CV\n\n                              IN THE INTEREST OF A.R., A CHILD\n\n\n                                  From the 361st District Court\n                                      Brazos County, Texas\n                                Trial Court No. 22-000102-CV-361\n\n\n                                 MEMORANDUM OPINION\n\n\n          Appellee, the Texa","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9979516],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10648860/board-of-trustees-of-the-university-of-alabama-v-becerra/","attorney":"","caseName":"Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Becerra","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10648860,"court":"District Court, District of Columbia","court_citation_string":"D.D.C.","court_id":"dcd","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2025-08-06","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Civil Action No. 2022-3367","docket_id":71040874,"judge":"Judge Rudolph Contreras","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-08-06T17:01:21.481952Z","date_created":"2025-08-06T17:01:21.397444Z","score":{"bm25":12.896451}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":710,"cites":[92250,102976,109009,112256,112389,117845,145793,185493,186007,186191,205987,393673,590210,612086,667610,744479,792565,1361144,1471933,2520562,2529925,2576059,2659079,2660007,2671304,2803247,4269447,6680909,7245889,7251119,7254228,9428777,9428863,9429294,9430664,9430668,9431003,9432577,9435068,9435339,9439362,9474480,9480861,9495764,9500740,9502773,9795100,9887977,11066629],"download_url":"https://ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_public_doc?2022cv3367-26","id":11115447,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2025/08/06/board_of_trustees_of_the_university_of_alabama_v._becerra.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-01T19:27:50.725111Z","date_created":"2025-08-06T17:01:21.419943Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"33d1ccbe11412c9bf23f41a544a5b07e9ee6bf7b","snippet":"                           UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT\n                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA\n\nBOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE                         :\nUNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA et al.,                    :\n                                                 :\n       Plaintiffs,                               :      Civil Action No.:      22-3367 (RC)\n                                                 :\n       v.                                        :      Re Document Nos.:      17, 18\n     ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11115447],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/6655848/teller-cnty-v-indus-claim-appeals-office-of-colo/","attorney":"Dworkin, Chambers, Williams, York, Benson & Evans, P.C., David J. Dworkin, Mary B. Pucelik, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioners, No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office, Wheelock Law, P.C., Cullen A. Wheelock, Gerald R. Blixt, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Respondent Michael Smith","caseName":"Teller Cnty. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office of Colo.","caseNameFull":"TELLER COUNTY, Colorado, and Teller County WC Pool v. INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS OFFICE of the State of Colorado and Michael Smith","citation":["410 P.3d 567"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":6655848,"court":"Colorado Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Colo. Ct. App.","court_id":"coloctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2015-04-23","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Court of Appeals No. 14CA1757","docket_id":63634169,"judge":"Booras","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T10:38:17.287064Z","date_created":"2022-07-19T21:20:26.353616Z","score":{"bm25":12.880715}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":6533079,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T07:28:26.916742Z","date_created":"2022-07-19T21:20:26.359892Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nOpinion by JUDGE BOORAS\n¶ 1 Teller County and the Teller County WC Pool challenge an award of workers' compensation benefits to Michael Smith, a volunteer with the Teller County Search and Rescue (TCSAR). We affirm.\nI. Background\n¶ 2 Claimant, Michael Smith, is the president and the incident commander of TCSAR. He served TCSAR in other capacities for several years before his election as president. T","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[6533079],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""}]}