{"count":923677,"next":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/search/?cursor=cz0zNy4yNTExNjcmcz0zMTYwNjY3JnQ9byZkPTIwMjYtMDgtMjQmcD0y&q=RAISING+OF+USES+STATUTE+OF+USES&type=o","previous":null,"results":[{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4378929/people-v-leverton/","attorney":"Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Lisa K. Michaels, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee, Katayoun A. Donnelly, Alternative Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant","caseName":"People v. Leverton","caseNameFull":"The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Randall Eric LEVERTON, Defendant-Appellant","citation":["2017 COA 34","405 P.3d 402","2017 WL 1089557","2017 Colo. App. LEXIS 336"],"citeCount":10,"cluster_id":4378929,"court":"Colorado Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Colo. Ct. App.","court_id":"coloctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2017-03-23","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Court of Appeals 15CA0050","docket_id":4640353,"judge":"Berger, Dailey, Jones","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T00:28:14.509453Z","date_created":"2017-03-28T19:05:36.349121Z","score":{"bm25":50.940933}},"neutralCite":"2017 COA 34","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[108189,108416,111535,111992,134724,145451,1062840,1179200,1221932,1428250,1466054,2078278,2143266,2286441,2304483,2465583,2520328,2632485,4030790,5156615,5158083,5158950,5159302,5177521,5177641,5177675],"download_url":"http://www.cobar.org/Portals/COBAR/Repository/Sections/Opinions/3-27-17/15CA0050-PD.pdf?ver=2017-03-28-120927-593","id":4156182,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2017/03/23/people_v._leverton.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T14:36:43.837259Z","date_created":"2017-03-28T19:05:36.356285Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"9a3b65fdabd722591b8c850505dad71c4b5e57fa","snippet":"\n\n\n  Opinion by\n \n\n  JUDGE BERGER\n \n\n  ¶ 1 A jury convicted defendant, Randall Eric Leverton, of theft by receiving and possession of drug paraphernalia. He appeals, contending the trial- court erred by (1) joining the two offenses in a single trial and not allowing him to plead guilty to the paraphernalia charge before joining them and (2) admitting into evidence two wit","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4156182],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"Theft by Receiving—Possession—Drug Paraphernalia—Mandatory Joinder—Double Jeopardy—Prior Statements—Impeachment—Evidence","syllabus":"Theft by Receiving—Possession—Drug Paraphernalia—Mandatory Joinder—Double Jeopardy—Prior Statements—Impeachment—Evidence. The victim started her car and left it running while she went inside her home to retrieve some belongings. When she returned to where the car had been parked, the car was gone. She immediately reported the theft to the police. A few days later, a police officer pulled over the stolen car. Leverton and two women were passengers. Leverton told the officer that the car belonged to the victim, whom he claimed was his girlfriend. Leverton was arrested and transported to the police station. After removing Leverton from the police vehicle, the officer discovered a pipe typically used to smoke methamphetamine. Leverton was initially charged with possession of drug paraphernalia. Shortly thereafter in a separate case he was charged with theft by receiving. The cases were later joined on the prosecution's motion, over defendant's objection. The women passengers testified at Leverton's trial and were questioned by the prosecutor about oral statements they allegedly had made to police following their arrests. Leverton was convicted as charged. On appeal, Leverton argued that the trial court erred when it rejected his guilty plea on the paraphernalia charge and then permitted the prosecution to add that charge to the theft complaint because the result was that he was effectively charged with the same offense in two separate cases. He claimed that this violated Colorado's mandatory joinder statute and the Double Jeopardy Clauses of both the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions. The Court of Appeals noted that Leverton did not allege that he was reprosecuted for either offense after he was convicted or that he was sentenced or otherwise punished multiple times for those offenses. Here, the prosecution moved to join the two offenses prior to Leverton's attempt to plead guilty to the paraphernalia charge. The court's procedure met the purpose of the mandatory joinder statute, to prevent successive prosecutions, and Leverton raised no claim of unfair prejudice resulting from the procedure. Further, the court acted within its discretion when it rejected Leverton's guilty plea to the petty offense. And because the court had not accepted Leverton's guilty plea on the paraphernalia charge, double jeopardy had not attached and there was no due process violation. Leverton next argued that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to examine the two women witnesses about their prior statements to the police, alleging this evidence was inadmissible and violated his confrontation rights. Both women testified that they did not remember what happened the night the stolen car was pulled over, nor did they remember any statements they made to the police. To impeach the witnesses, the prosecutor was entitled to confront them with the exact language of their prior inconsistent statements. Therefore, the court properly admitted the statements. Leverton also argued that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed theft or possessed drug paraphernalia. A few days after the car had been reported stolen, the police found Leverton sitting in the car's front passenger seat. Though Leverton told the police that the car had been given to him by the victim, his statement was directly refuted by the victim's testimony that she had never met him. This and other evidence was sufficient to support the theft by receiving conviction. There was also sufficient evidence concerning the pipe found in the police vehicle for the jury to convict Leverton of possession of drug paraphernalia. Leverton also argued that his convictions were based on his associations with other persons. Having found that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence proving that Leverton and not some other person committed the crimes, the Court rejected this argument. The judgment was affirmed."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9381036/standifer-v-ohio-dept-of-health/","attorney":"","caseName":"Standifer v. Ohio Dept. of Health","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2023 Ohio 622"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9381036,"court":"Ohio Court of Claims","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. Cl.","court_id":"ohioctcl","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2023-02-10","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"2022-00217PQ","docket_id":66924653,"judge":"Clark","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-23T01:01:42.760665Z","date_created":"2023-03-02T20:06:00.150454Z","score":{"bm25":50.51205}},"neutralCite":"2023 Ohio 622","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2521744,2689859,2690240,2690781,2690902,2691103,2702045,3178326,3754565,4206086,4636627,4636729,4674821,6216494,6760586,6762020,6763800,6770245,6770309,6774511,6774559,6774681,6775380,6788791,6792591,7088998,8209670,9426016,9801505,9801879,9869966,11150408,11152773],"download_url":"https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/13/2023/2023-Ohio-622.pdf","id":9376512,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/02/10/standifer_v._ohio_dept._of_health.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-05T07:24:34.073701Z","date_created":"2023-03-02T20:06:00.156349Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"e6acb3e478c21f3def2ca956e04ab0df64f2dcf5","snippet":"[Cite as Standifer v. Ohio Dept. of Health, 2023-Ohio-622.]\n\n\n\n\n                               IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO\n\n\n\n LAUREN (CID) STANDIFER                                  Case No. 2022-00217PQ\n\n         Requester                                       Special Master Jeffery W. Clark\n\n         v.                                              REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION\n\n OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH\n\n         Respondent\n\n\n\n        {¶1} This case arises from a journalist’s public records r","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9376512],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Public Records R.C. 149.011(G) 149.43(B)(1) R.C. 2743.75 R.C. 3701.17(B) Media use of Public Records Act \"Data base rule\" under R.C. 149.011(G) Redaction does not require the public office to create a new record R.C. 149.43(B)(1) requires release of record containing both public and exempted information if the exempted information can be redacted A public office waives defenses not raised in its initial response to a R.C. 2743.75 complaint Extent of deference to agency's construction of statute Import of agency's change of position on the extent of deference to agency's construction of a statute."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/2568843/uses-manufacturing-inc-v-rocky-mountain-institute/","attorney":"Edward R. Scofield, Douglas John Var-ga, Zeldes, Needle & Cooper, Bridgeport, CT, for Plaintiffs., Joseph W. Bibisi, Richard P. Kuzmak, McVane, Bellobuono, Kuzmak, Wiezalis & Bibisi, Hartford, CT, Lee F. Johnston, Holland & Hart, Denver, CO, Donald A. Degnan, Timothy P. Getzoff, Holland & Hart LLP, Boulder, CO, George D. Roy-ster, Jr., John Burns Farley, Mark Theodore Livesay, Halloran & Sage, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.","caseName":"Uses Manufacturing, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Institute","caseNameFull":"USES MANUFACTURING, INC. and USES, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE and Research New England Power Service Co., Defendants","citation":["94 F. Supp. 2d 218","2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6205","2000 WL 556909"],"citeCount":4,"cluster_id":2568843,"court":"District Court, D. Connecticut","court_citation_string":"D. Conn.","court_id":"ctd","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2000-03-17","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"3:99CV315(JBA)","docket_id":2434639,"judge":"Arterton","lexisCite":"2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6205","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-21T13:02:57.856595Z","date_created":"2014-10-31T00:02:10.911864Z","score":{"bm25":49.97673}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":133,"cites":[539179,539900,584218,595491,718605],"download_url":null,"id":2568843,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T20:47:04.238462Z","date_created":"2013-10-30T10:29:25.458526Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"60d5685b1b834a61babc58dcfefd27761b22787b","snippet":"\n94 F.Supp.2d 218 (2000)\nUSES MANUFACTURING, INC. and USES, Inc., Plaintiffs,\nv.\nROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE and Research New England Power Service Co., Defendants.\nNo. 3:99CV315(JBA).\nUnited States District Court, D. Connecticut.\nMarch 17, 2000.\n*219 Edward R. Scofield, Douglas John Varga, Zeldes, Needle & Cooper, Bridgeport, CT","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[2568843],"source":"LU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4342301/tribal-restrictions-on-sharing-of-indigenous-knowledge-on-uses-of/","attorney":"","caseName":"Tribal Restrictions on Sharing of Indigenous Knowledge on Uses of Biological Resources","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4342301,"court":"Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel","court_citation_string":"OLC","court_id":"olc","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"1999-10-12","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":null,"docket_id":4575084,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-09-03T16:23:50.919826Z","date_created":"2017-01-27T22:40:54.462657Z","score":{"bm25":45.56789}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[94495,99296,109067,109617,112199,249340,296605,311064,313350,332437,349993,390030,397165,426230,431954,461650,751152,1429419,1502632,1868550,9418368,9418724,9419720,9422174,9424665,9425699,9426016,9426968,9427152,9427176,9427761,9431110,9431776,9433193,9462106,9466809,9490677,9776133],"download_url":"https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1999/10/31/op-olc-v023-p0235_0.pdf","id":4119562,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/1999/10/12/tribal_restrictions_on_sharing_of_indigenous_knowledge_on_uses_of.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T14:11:57.628827Z","date_created":"2017-01-27T22:40:54.470226Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"b18fb261095c78faee06e6aab5b8793303e0852f","snippet":"    Tribal Restrictions on Sharing of Indigenous Knowledge on\n                    Uses of Biological Resources\nT he Indian Civil Rights A ct, rather than the federal C onstitution, lim its the pow er o f an Indian tribe\n    vis-a-vis its m em bers. In interpreting provisions o f the IC R A , it is appropriate to look to precedents\n    under analogous constitutional provisions constraining federal and state action, although particular\n    facts about tn b al structure and traditions may be releva","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4119562],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4800112/northwest-hills-chrysler-jeep-llc-v-dept-of-motor-vehicles/","attorney":"","caseName":"Northwest Hills Chrysler Jeep, LLC v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4800112,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-10-27","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC42899","docket_id":18571399,"judge":"Lavine; Alvord; Cradle","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:38:01.663818Z","date_created":"2020-10-26T12:02:18.289526Z","score":{"bm25":45.388145}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2557149],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP201/201AP12.pdf","id":4580459,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/10/27/northwest_hills_chrysler_jeep_llc_v._dept._of_motor_vehicles_1.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:38:01.594561Z","date_created":"2020-10-26T12:02:18.291417Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"37e42c0474ad718fac4189144b2d98d213f36f14","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Appeal from the decision of the named defendant finding that good cause existed to allow the defendant FCA US, LLC, to establish a certain automobile dealer- ship, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis- trict of New Britain and tried to the court, Huddleston, J.; judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Affirmed. Jason T. Allen, pro hac vice, with whom were James J. Healy and, on the brief, Richard N. Sox, pro hac vice, for the appellants (plaintiffs). Eileen Meskill, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney gen- eral, for the appellees (named defendant et al.). George W. Mykulak, pro hac vice, with whom were Charles D. Ray and, on the brief, Shawn S. Smith, for the appellee (defendant FCA US, LLC).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4580459],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiffs, four automobile dealerships, sought to preclude the defendant franchisor from establishing a certain new automobile dealership in the relevant market area of each plaintiff. The defendant Department of Motor Vehicles, after a hearing, found that good cause existed, pursuant to statute (§ 42-133dd (c)), to establish the proposed dealership. The plaintiffs appealed to the trial court, claiming, inter alia, that the depart- ment's decision was inconsistent and not supported by substantial evi- dence. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal. On the plaintiffs' appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly dismissed the appeal and rendered judgment for the defendants; because the claims raised by the plaintiffs in this court essentially reiterated the claims they raised in the trial court, this court adopted the trial court's thorough and well reasoned memorandum of decision as a proper statement of the facts and applicable law on the issues. Argued September 8—officially released October 27, 2020"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4801852/northwest-hills-chrysler-jeep-llc-v-dept-of-motor-vehicles/","attorney":"","caseName":"Northwest Hills Chrysler Jeep, LLC v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4801852,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-10-27","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC42899","docket_id":18589079,"judge":"Lavine; Alvord; Cradle","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:38:01.823550Z","date_created":"2020-10-30T13:02:35.357104Z","score":{"bm25":45.042572}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2557149],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP201/201AP12.pdf","id":4582199,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/10/27/northwest_hills_chrysler_jeep_llc_v._dept._of_motor_vehicles_3.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:38:01.714728Z","date_created":"2020-10-30T13:02:35.359037Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"7bb1ff2cf689403f71a506af9ebeef718dda3ae8","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Appeal from the decision of the named defendant finding that good cause existed to allow the defendant FCA US, LLC, to establish a certain automobile dealer- ship, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis- trict of New Britain and tried to the court, Huddleston, J.; judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Affirmed. Jason T. Allen, pro hac vice, with whom were James J. Healy and, on the brief, Richard N. Sox, pro hac vice, for the appellants (plaintiffs). Eileen Meskill, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for the appellees (named defendant et al.). George W. Mykulak, pro hac vice, with whom were Charles D. Ray and, on the brief, Shawn S. Smith, for the appellee (defendant FCA US, LLC).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4582199],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiffs, four automobile dealerships, sought to preclude the defendant franchisor from establishing a certain new automobile dealership in the relevant market area of each plaintiff. The defendant Department of Motor Vehicles, after a hearing, found that good cause existed, pursuant to statute (§ 42-133dd (c)), to establish the proposed dealership. The plaintiffs appealed to the trial court, claiming, inter alia, that the depart- ment's decision was inconsistent and not supported by substantial evi- dence. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal. On the plaintiffs' appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly dismissed the appeal and rendered judgment for the defendants; because the claims raised by the plaintiffs in this court essentially reiterated the claims they raised in the trial court, this court adopted the trial court's thorough and well reasoned memorandum of decision as a proper statement of the facts and applicable law on the issues. Argued September 8—officially released October 27, 2020"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10131783/moon-v-commissioner-of-correction/","attorney":"","caseName":"Moon v. Commissioner of Correction","caseNameFull":"","citation":["227 Conn. App. 838"],"citeCount":2,"cluster_id":10131783,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-09-10","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC46198","docket_id":69235685,"judge":"Elgo; Suarez; Keller","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:47:21.499198Z","date_created":"2024-10-08T18:05:38.490422Z","score":{"bm25":44.981964}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1946669,1965654,1972958,2136160,2155047,2331665,2404795,4446658,5140651,7838822,7839742,7840975,7841113,7842158,7843446,7845079,7846908,7847234,7847818,7850799,7853829,7854128,7855873,7858301,7858356,7860338,7861495,7870337,8225897,9059064,9540661,9723191,9896947,9901317],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP227/AP227.300.pdf","id":10598384,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/09/10/moon_v._commissioner_of_correction.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-06T08:42:07.154230Z","date_created":"2024-10-08T18:05:38.492672Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"21ee67a9a986ad79f08e04a582f990c7766138ae","snippet":"************************************************\n   The “officially released” date that appears near the\nbeginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be\npublished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it\nis released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the\nbeginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-\nion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-\ncially released” date appearing in the opinion.\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncor","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Newson, J.; judgment denying the petition; thereafter, the court, Newson, J., denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Affirmed. Naomi T. Fetterman, assigned counsel, for the appel- lant (petitioner). Linda F. Rubertone, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state's attorney, and Angela R. Macchiarulo, supervi- sory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respon- dent).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10598384],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was actually innocent of the crimes of which he had been convicted. The petitioner had planned to steal property from the victim with two other individuals, M and T, although T ultimately did not participate in the robbery. During the commission of the robbery by the petitioner and M, M shot and killed the victim. After a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of felony murder, robbery in the first degree, and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. In a subsequent trial, M was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of the crimes with which he was charged stemming from the robbery. In his habeas petition, the petitioner claimed that, as a matter of law, he could not have conspired with M or formed an agreement with him to participate in a robbery of the victim because M lacked the mental capacity to engage in the charged crimes. The habeas court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and subsequently denied the petition for certification to appeal. On the petitioner's appeal to this court, held: 1. The habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certifica- tion to appeal; the petitioner's actual innocence claim involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason, that could have been resolved by a court in a different manner, and that raised a question that was adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 2. Even assuming, as this court did, that the fact of M's incapacity was newly discovered evidence, which was essential for the petitioner's claim regarding actual innocence, the petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court improperly concluded that he failed to prove that he was actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted: a. The petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving his actual innocence with regard to his conviction of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree: although there was no question that M was unable to form any intent to conspire with the petitioner to rob the victim and that, therefore, no crime of conspiracy could have been committed with M, the aggregate evidence at the petitioner's criminal trial and his habeas trial, all of which was required to be considered by the habeas court, would not prevent a reasonable jury from finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner was guilty of conspiring with T to commit the robbery, and, as such, even if evidence of M's incapacity had been presented at the petitioner's criminal trial, there was still sufficient evi- dence from which the jury could have found the petitioner guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery. b. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that he was actually innocent of robbery in the first degree and felony murder because M's mental state prevented him from forming any intent to participate in the robbery, which was the predicate felony for the felony murder charge: because the plain language of the statute governing first degree robbery (§ 53a-134 (a) (2)) provides that an individual may be guilty of first degree robbery if he or another participant in the crime uses or threatens the use of a deadly weapon, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that, during the commission of the robbery, the petitioner acted in concert with M; moreover, because the petitioner never disputed that M shot and killed the victim, the petitioner's criminal liability as an accessory for acts perpetrated by M was inherent in § 53a-134 (a) (2), and the fact that M lacked the ability to form any criminal intent due to his mental disease or defect did not excuse the petitioner from liability; furthermore, the felony murder statute (§ 53a-54c) does not require proof of intent and, because the petitioner was criminally liable as a participant in the robbery and the homicide was committed by the other participant, M, in the execution of that robbery, he was also guilty of felony murder pursuant to § 53a-54c. Argued February 7—officially released September 10, 2024"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9502075/robert-h-beckham-v-city-of-waynesboro-tennessee/","attorney":"","caseName":"Robert H. Beckham v. City of Waynesboro, Tennessee","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9502075,"court":"Court of Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Ct. App.","court_id":"tennctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-05-14","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"M2023-00654-COA-R3-CV","docket_id":68528072,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-23T01:31:51.839830Z","date_created":"2024-05-14T20:11:11.387932Z","score":{"bm25":44.863064}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1045819,1047317],"download_url":"https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Majority%20Opinion%20-%20M2023-00654-COA-R3-CV.pdf","id":9968688,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/05/14/robert_h._beckham_v._city_of_waynesboro_tennessee.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-07-09T05:17:21.949452Z","date_created":"2024-05-14T20:11:11.390006Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"261fccefa4ad357fd0519a6651679b36fb5fac25","snippet":"                                                                                          05/14/2024\n               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                           AT NASHVILLE\n                                  April 3, 2024 Session\n\nROBERT H. BECKHAM ET AL. v. CITY OF WAYNESBORO, TENNESSEE\n\n                  Appeal from the Circuit Court for Wayne County\n                    No. 4820    Christopher V. Sockwell, Judge\n                     ___________________________________\n\n     ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9968688],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"In this personal injury action, the plaintiff slipped and fell while jumping off of a diving board during a visit to a city owned pool, injuring his knee. Thereafter, the plaintiff sued the city based on negligence to recover for his injuries sustained from the accident and his wife sought damages for a derivative claim for loss of consortium. The city filed an answer, raising the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute (hereinafter \"the TRUS\") as an affirmative defense. The city then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from liability under the TRUS because the city is a \"landowner\" as defined by the TRUS, the plaintiff was engaged in a \"recreational activity\" listed in the TRUS at the time of the accident, and none of the exceptions or limitations to the TRUS were applicable. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The trial court found that the language of the TRUS is not ambiguous and found that the city was immune from liability under the TRUS because the city pool, which is government-owned property, was being used for recreation at the time of the plaintiff's injury and involved an activity included in the TRUS, \"water sports.\" The plaintiffs appeal the trial court's holding that swimming in a city pool is a recreational activity protected under the TRUS. For the reasons stated below, we affirm."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10664578/roger-b-v-commissioner-of-correction/","attorney":"","caseName":"Roger B. v. Commissioner of Correction","caseNameFull":"","citation":["234 Conn. App. 630"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10664578,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2025-08-26","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC47136","docket_id":71192192,"judge":"Elgo; Moll; Lavine","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:47:42.365841Z","date_created":"2025-09-02T12:02:59.234772Z","score":{"bm25":44.337994}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP234/AP234.319.pdf","id":11126564,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2025/08/26/roger_b._v._commissioner_of_correction.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-14T21:49:20.156924Z","date_created":"2025-08-25T14:05:41.252955Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"ddde7ddf00759d48aa05cd04b259bd90bfc321fc","snippet":"************************************************\n   The “officially released” date that appears near the\nbeginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be\npublished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it\nis released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the\nbeginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-\nion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-\ncially released” date appearing in the opinion.\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncor","type":"combined-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[1862308,1909009,2324211,2404942,2405168,2554848,4162913,4170895,4409439,4678447,7839924,7842433,7843742,7845408,7849619,7849621,7857231,7862297,7875045,8205575,9429592,10745195,10783205],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP234/AP234.319.pdf","id":11131165,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2025/08/26/roger_b._v._commissioner_of_correction_1.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-08T09:18:54.263035Z","date_created":"2025-09-02T12:02:59.238421Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"6ba766f7810492e90e20cf47dcb60cad7ada7119","snippet":"************************************************\n   The “officially released” date that appears near the\nbeginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be\npublished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it\nis released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the\nbeginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-\nion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-\ncially released” date appearing in the opinion.\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncor","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where the petition was withdrawn in part; thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Bhatt, J.; judgment denying the petition, from which the peti- tioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment directed. Jeremy A. Kemp, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Joseph Patten Brown III, assigned coun- sel, for the appellant (petitioner). Rebecca R. Zeuschner, deputy assistant state's attor- ney, with whom, on the brief, were David R. Shannon, state's attorney, and Elizabeth M. Moseley, senior assis- tant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11126564,11131165],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The petitioner, who had been convicted of various crimes as a result of incidents that occurred between 1995 and 2000, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment denying his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that his criminal trial counsel, C, and his counsel in two previous habeas trials, R and B, had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a statute of limitations defense regarding the eighteen month delay between the issuance of the warrant for the petitioner's arrest in 2005 and the execution of the warrant in 2007. Held: The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner was required to present new evidence in his third habeas trial, which B had not previously introduced, to demonstrate that C and B had rendered ineffective assistance, as the petitioner's claim that the court improperly applied the law of the case doctrine was based on his misunderstanding of that doctrine. The habeas court incorrectly determined that the petitioner failed to estab- lish that C and B had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, as the new evidence presented at the third habeas trial established that the police had made no attempts at all to serve him with the arrest warrant, and an expert's testimony laid bare C's misunderstanding of the required showing of preju- dice under State v. Crawford (202 Conn. 443) that was the basis of C's failure to file a motion to dismiss the charges against the petitioner. The petitioner satisfied his burden to establish that he was prejudiced under Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668) as a result of C's failure to rely on the delay in the execution of the arrest warrant, and, in conjunction with other evidence adduced at the habeas trial, B's failure to introduce into evidence a blank arrest warrant service record form that had been in the possession of the police, which provided a devastating counterpoint that would have undermined the credibility of the state's vague and unsupported assertions at the criminal trial regarding its efforts to execute the warrant, left no question that the police did not exercise due diligence in executing In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to use the petitioner's full name or to identify the victims or others through whom the victims' identities may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. the warrant without unreasonable delay; accordingly, the habeas court's judgment was reversed and the case was remanded with direction to grant the writ of habeas corpus, to vacate the petitioner's conviction and to order a new trial. Argued February 19—officially released August 26, 2025"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/5293624/rachel-victory-v-state-of-tennessee/","attorney":"","caseName":"Rachel Victory v. State of Tennessee","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":5293624,"court":"Court of Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Ct. App.","court_id":"tennctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2021-10-29","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"M2020-01610-COA-R3-CV","docket_id":60686769,"judge":"Presiding Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr.","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T04:34:38.185737Z","date_created":"2021-10-29T21:13:41.502839Z","score":{"bm25":43.638683}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8266,"cites":[1060355,1060736,1627417,1729478,2376031,2388306,2441758,2449782,5103993],"download_url":"https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/victory.rachel.opn_.pdf","id":5122186,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2021/10/29/rachel_victory_v._state_of_tennessee.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-22T23:43:34.915965Z","date_created":"2021-10-29T21:13:41.519408Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"33d0b5a71e95df14e903398df933a883b0aee424","snippet":"                                                                                           10/29/2021\n                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                            AT NASHVILLE\n                               September 9, 2021 Session\n\n            RACHEL VICTORY ET AL. v. STATE OF TENNESSEE\n\n          Appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission (Middle Division)\n               No. T20191169      James A. Haltom, Commissioner\n                     ________________________________","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[5122186],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"This appeal arises from an action before the Tennessee Claims Commission for personal injuries filed on behalf of a minor child who broke her arm when she fell from playground equipment at Tims Ford State Park. The complaint asserted claims for negligence, gross negligence, and gross negligence per se. It alleged that the State was negligent by failing to adequately maintain its property, and by failing to discover, rectify, and/or warn against a dangerous condition, and allowing park visitors \"to use the playground which did not have a safe surface area.\" The State denied liability under Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(C), insisting it had no notice of any dangerous condition it also raised the \"Recreational Use Statute,\" Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 70-7-101 to -105, as an affirmative defense. Following discovery, the State filed a motion for summary judgment, which the claims commissioner granted. The commissioner found the State was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on two grounds. The commissioner found that Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-102 of the Recreational Use Statute provided immunity to the State as a landowner against premises-liability claims and that the gross negligence exception under the statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 70-7-104(a)(1), did not apply. The commissioner also held that the claimants failed to show that notice of the alleged dangerous condition had been provided to the State, which is an essential element of the Claims Commission Act. The plaintiffs appeal one issue, asserting a genuine issue of material fact existed concerning whether the State's failure to maintain the playground was gross negligence. We affirm the Commissioner's decision on both grounds."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/8508954/jaynes-v-commissioner-of-correction/","attorney":"","caseName":"Jaynes v. Commissioner of Correction","caseNameFull":"","citation":["216 Conn. App. 412"],"citeCount":1,"cluster_id":8508954,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2022-11-08","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC44620","docket_id":65735274,"judge":"Elgo; Suarez; DiPentima","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:46:39.066270Z","date_created":"2022-11-07T13:02:04.229547Z","score":{"bm25":43.56089}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[4017002,4020676,4645090,6325092,7855877,7859567,9919706],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP216/216AP385.pdf","id":8481323,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2022/11/08/jaynes_v._commissioner_of_correction.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-05T06:47:37.704501Z","date_created":"2022-11-07T13:02:04.230440Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"0d538a10dbb63e36d304c9b706d84f99c8257e5b","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Oliver, J.; judgment dismissing the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed. James E. Mortimer, assigned counsel, for the appel- lant (petitioner). Brett R. Aiello, deputy assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, state's attorney, and Craig Nowak, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[8481323],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crime of murder, sought a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner had previously filed numerous habeas petitions that were either withdrawn or dismissed. The respon- dent Commissioner of Correction filed a motion pursuant to statute (§ 52-470 (d)) for an order to show cause as to why the petitioner's habeas petition should not be dismissed as a result of undue delay. The petitioner did not dispute that the petition was untimely filed but claimed that he suffered from a mental illness that impaired his ability to file a habeas petition in a timely manner. The habeas court dismissed the petition for the petitioner's failure to demonstrate good cause to over- come the statutory presumption of unreasonable delay. On the petition- er's certified appeal to this court, held: 1. This court declined to reach the merits of the petitioner's claim that the habeas court erred in dismissing his petition because it included a claim of actual innocence, which, pursuant to § 52-470 (f), cannot be dismissed for failure to meet the statutory deadline of § 52-470 (d), that claim having been asserted for the first time on appeal: the habeas petition did not use the phrase ''actual innocence'' and, at the show cause hearing, because the petitioner did not assert a claim of actual innocence, the court did not address it, instead, addressing the reason for the delay on which the petitioner expressly relied, namely, claims of mental illness; accordingly, the petitioner's claim plainly reflected a strategic shift by him to raise a new argument on appeal, and it would amount to nothing more than an ambuscade of the habeas court for this court to consider a newly raised argument that was neither raised by the petitioner nor considered by that court at the time that the petitioner attempted to demonstrate that the petition should not be dismissed as untimely. 2. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the habeas petition, the petitioner having failed to demonstrate good cause for an untimely filing pursuant to § 52-470 (e): the court found that the petitioner's testimony explaining his mental illness as the reason for the delay consisted of bare assertions that, without more, did not over- come the statutory presumption of unreasonable delay, and the record contained ample support for the court's conclusions, specifically, that, during the show cause hearing, the petitioner stated that his mental illness did not prevent from filing prior habeas petitions because he received assistance in filing the prior petitions; moreover, the court found that the petitioner's testimony, insofar as he testified that his mental illness or stress level was the reason for the delay in filing the petition, was not credible, and, as a reviewing court, this court must defer to the credibility findings of the habeas court based on its firsthand observation of a witness' conduct, demeanor, and attitude; furthermore, even if the habeas court had found that the petitioner credibly testified that he suffered from mental illness, it did not relieve the petitioner of his burden of demonstrating that his delay in filing the petition was attributable to his mental illness, which the petitioner failed to do. Argued May 9—officially released November 8, 2022"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4372518/carmen-rohena-as-parent-and-natural-guardian-of-josue-espinal-v-city-of/","attorney":"For Plaintiff: Daniel J. Neal, Esq., For Defendants: Megan K. DiSanto, Esq.","caseName":"Carmen Rohena as Parent and Natural Guardian of Josue Espinal v. City of Providence","caseNameFull":"Carmen ROHENA as Parent and Natural Guardian of Josue Espinal v. CITY OF PROVIDENCE Et Al.","citation":["154 A.3d 935","2017 WL 830942","2017 R.I. LEXIS 29"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4372518,"court":"Supreme Court of Rhode Island","court_citation_string":"R.I.","court_id":"ri","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2017-03-02","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"2016-128-Appeal (PC 06-5374)","docket_id":4612724,"judge":"Suttell, Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, Indeglia","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T00:26:27.926597Z","date_created":"2017-03-02T17:16:14.600414Z","score":{"bm25":43.231197}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1472838,1540607,1957610,1966073,2195574,2274434,2308187,2370012],"download_url":"http://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SupremeCourt/SupremeOpinions/16-128.pdf","id":4149771,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2017/03/02/carmen_rohena_as_parent_and_natural_guardian_of_josue_espinal_v._city_of.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T14:32:14.644094Z","date_created":"2017-03-02T17:16:14.606754Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"78a60e9dc55a05bc931e4eb6180e120abe4f46c8","snippet":"\n\n\n  OPINION\n \n\n  Justice Goldberg,\n \n\n  for the Court.\n \n\n  Because the state and its cities and towns are immune\n  \n   from\n  \n  liability for injuries suffered by members of the public who use public recreational facilities, the claim brought by this mother on behalf of her seriously injured child must fail. This case came before the Suprem","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4149771],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiff, Carmen Rohena (plaintiff), as parent and natural guardian of Josue Espinal (Josue), appealed from a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the City of Providence (the city or defendant), on the basis that the city was not immune from liability under Rhode Island's Recreational Use Statute. The plaintiff argued that the city was put on notice that the conditions of the public park owned by the city were dangerous and that the city failed to guard or warn against those known dangerous conditions. The Supreme Court held that it was precluded from hearing this argument under the well settled \"raise-or-waive\" rule, because the argument was not raised in the Superior Court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/6466657/vandeusen-v-commissioner-of-correction/","attorney":"","caseName":"VanDeusen v. Commissioner of Correction","caseNameFull":"","citation":["212 Conn. App. 427"],"citeCount":1,"cluster_id":6466657,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2022-05-10","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC43895","docket_id":63295166,"judge":"Prescott; Alexander; DiPentima","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:46:45.122329Z","date_created":"2022-05-09T12:01:42.669070Z","score":{"bm25":42.53893}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1994428,2330500,2356011,4106735,4165118,4440670,4539229,4542645,5131944,6114349,6357297,6357357,7841112,7846705,7846855,7859573,7869567,8225562,8383502,9429592,9433986],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP212/212AP245.pdf","id":6338768,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2022/05/10/vandeusen_v._commissioner_of_correction.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-05T07:50:57.062591Z","date_created":"2022-05-09T12:01:42.671564Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"7ff1e8b3e5f88005ed6c1bba9bd6a4775be80059","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Bhatt, J.; judgment denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed. James E. Mortimer, assigned counsel, for the appel- lant (petitioner). Marcia A. Pillsbury, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Dawn Gallo, state's attorney, and Kelly A. Masi, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[6338768],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The petitioner, who had been convicted of several crimes in connection with a shooting, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to request that the trial court instruct the jury regarding the elements of the applicable sentence enhancement statute (§ 53-202k) and the statutory (§ 53a-3 (19)) definition of firearm in § 53-202k with respect to the charge of accessory to attempt to commit assault in the first degree. The petitioner and another individual, K, had driven to the residence of a woman, J, where K fired a handgun at the residence before he and the petitioner drove away. The trial court imposed a five year sentence enhancement on the petitioner's conviction of being an accessory to an attempt to commit assault in the first degree. The habeas court denied the habeas petition, concluding that the jury unanimously had determined that the state proved each element of § 53-202k and that any error caused by the trial court's failure to instruct the jury as to the elements of § 53-202k was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The habeas court further concluded that the petitioner failed to demon- strate that the outcome of her trial or appeal would have been different even if trial counsel had requested an instruction as to the elements of § 53-202k or objected to the court's instruction concerning § 53-202k. Held: 1. The petitioner could not prevail on her claim that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by neglecting to request a jury instruction regard- ing the elements of § 53-202k and the definition of firearm in § 53a-3 (19), or by failing to object to the instruction the court gave, which did not define firearm or instruct as to the elements of § 53-202k: the jury's guilty verdict on the charge of attempted assault as an accessory was predicated on the undisputed evidence the state presented that K dis- charged a loaded handgun at J's residence, from which the jury necessar- ily found both that the state proved each element of § 53-202k and that the handgun K used satisfied the definition of firearm in § 53a-3 (19); moreover, because the jury necessarily accepted the state's theory that K had used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense, it logically followed that the handgun was a loaded weapon from which he dis- charged gunshots at the residence, and, thus, the court's failure to instruct the jury as to the elements of § 53-202k was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; furthermore, because of the harmlessness of the court's failure to instruct the jury on the elements of § 53-202k, the petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving that there was a reason- able probability that, but for trial counsel's failure to object to the court's instruction concerning § 53-202k, the result of the underlying criminal proceeding would have been different. 2. This court declined to review the petitioner's unpreserved claim that she was prejudiced by her trial counsel's failure to request that the jury be instructed as to the definition of firearm in § 53-3 (19) because the sentence enhancement under § 53-202k would not have applied if the weapon K used was an assault weapon; the petitioner's claim of preju- dice, which she conceded was raised for the first time before this court, was distinct from her allegation before the habeas court that she was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to request a jury instruction as to each element of § 53-202k or to otherwise object to the instruction the court gave. Argued September 9, 2021—officially released May 10, 2022"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4551545/state-of-tennessee-v-demetrius-grimes/","attorney":"","caseName":"State of Tennessee v. Demetrius Grimes","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4551545,"court":"Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Crim. App.","court_id":"tenncrimapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2018-11-07","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"E2017-01022-CCA-R3-CD","docket_id":8150241,"judge":"Judge Alan E. Glenn","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:16:46.866129Z","date_created":"2018-11-07T23:30:33.761233Z","score":{"bm25":40.09652}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8284,"cites":[110138,1058888,1060577,1060681,1060733,1060826,1060945,1516927,1518420,1531833,1720938,1747577,1780609,2408703,2456081,2466667],"download_url":"http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/demetrius_grimes_cca_majority_opinion.pdf","id":4328798,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2018/11/07/state_of_tennessee_v._demetrius_grimes.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T16:36:38.264015Z","date_created":"2018-11-07T23:30:33.775243Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"ccb20c0323b972ee891e7f624490e1da5f2ad309","snippet":"                                                                                           11/07/2018\n        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                         AT KNOXVILLE\n                           Assigned on Briefs April 24, 2018\n\n              STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DEMETRIUS GRIMES\n\n                  Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County\n                       No. 103500A Bobby R. McGee, Judge\n                     ___________________________________\n\n          ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4328798],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The Defendant, Demetrius Grimes, was convicted of two counts of attempted first-degree murder five counts of employing a firearm during a dangerous felony four counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony with a prior dangerous felony conviction two counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery two counts of attempted carjacking one count of attempted first-degree murder with serious bodily injury two counts of assault and one count of simple possession of a controlled substance, third offense. The sentences for the attempted first-degree murders of Michael Dixon and Carl Chesney were ordered to be served consecutively to each other, as well as to both of the 10-year sentences for employing a firearm during a dangerous felony, which were, in turn, to be served consecutively to each other, resulting in a total effective sentence of sixty years. Further, all the sentences were to be served consecutively to a sentence for a prior conviction. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that, since the State argued at trial that Michael Dixon was the intended target of the shots, the attempted first-degree murder conviction for the shooting of Carl Chesney could not stand. Further, the Defendant argues on appeal that the multiple convictions for employment of a firearm during the commission of multiple dangerous felonies cannot stand, for the evidence showed that the Defendant used only one weapon, thus supporting only a single firearm conviction and that the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. The State agrees on appeal that the court erred as to sentencing in Counts 15 through 18, which enhanced the Defendant's sentences for employing a firearm during the commission of four attempted dangerous felonies, for the prior felonies upon which the enhancement was based, were not \"dangerous\" felonies, as required by statute, but, rather, were simple drug possession convictions. Accordingly, we reverse the convictions as to Counts 15 through 18 and dismiss those charges. We reinstate the convictions for Counts 2, 4, 8, 10 and 12, which were merged into Counts 15 through 18, and remand for entry of amended judgments. We conclude that the other issues raised on appeal by the Defendant are without merit."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/6479100/doe-v-board-of-education/","attorney":"","caseName":"Doe v. Board of Education","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":6479100,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2022-06-07","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC44153, AC44122","docket_id":63396281,"judge":"Moll; Alexander; Bear","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:38:29.051012Z","date_created":"2022-06-20T18:01:52.373029Z","score":{"bm25":39.24783}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1440673,1470291,2552007,4191002,4230024,4303136,4370874,4546207,4658677,4687423,4691024,4706360,4994886,5134315,6043128,6115694,7840173,7842553,7842554,7843624,7849575,7854565,7855764,7858172,7859300,7864176,9766257,9837825,9888848],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP213/213AP262.pdf","id":6351211,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2022/06/07/doe_v._board_of_education.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-05T08:15:39.590808Z","date_created":"2022-06-20T18:01:52.373838Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"224fc35cc1877c599ad3e243c86b3e6ed57880ed","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Action, in each case, to recover damages for, inter alia, the defendants' alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis- trict of Fairfield, where the court, Bellis, J., granted the defendants' motion to consolidate the cases; thereafter, the court, Abrams, J., transferred the cases to the judi- cial district of Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket; subsequently, the court, Bellis, J., granted the defen- dants' motions for summary judgment with respect to certain counts of the complaints and rendered judg- ments thereon, from which the plaintiffs filed separate appeals to this court. Affirmed. Piper A. Paul filed briefs for the appellants (plaintiffs in each case). Jonathan C. Zellner, with whom, on the brief, was Ryan T. Daly, for the appellees (defendants in each case).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[6351211],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"In each case, the plaintiff minor child, A and B, respectively, and his parents, sought to recover damages from the defendants, the town of Westport, its board of education, the town's superintendent of schools, L, and certain employees of one of the town's middle schools, namely, the principal, S, the vice principal, M, and a physical education teacher, Q, for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of, inter alia, the defendants' negligence in responding to reports of bullying of A and B by their classmates while they attended the middle school. Both cases arose out of the same incident, during which A and B were attacked by other students while in gym class. The plaintiffs filed reports detailing the gym incident and prior incidents of bullying with the school's administration. Thereafter, A and B both had bullying complaints filed against them by other students involved in the gym incident and they received suspen- sions as a result thereof. A few weeks later, A was again bullied by a fellow student. He reported the incident to S, who insisted that he write down his account of what had occurred. When A instead asked to speak with his father, S grabbed his arm in a hostile manner and shook it. The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that, in their handling of the bullying incidents, the defendants failed to comply with the safe school climate plan that had previously been implemented at the direction of the board in accordance with the applicable statute ((Rev. to 2015) § 10-222d). The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants retaliated against them for filing their bullying complaints by, among other things, issuing sus- pensions to A and B. Additionally, in the first action, the plaintiffs alleged that S assaulted A when she grabbed and shook his arm. The trial court consolidated the cases and granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment with respect to all claims except those against S in connection with the first action, as it found that there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning her alleged assault of A. Thereafter, the plaintiffs in each case separately appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiffs' inadequately briefed their claims that, in granting the motions for summary judgment, the trial court failed to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to them; accordingly, the plaintiffs abandoned such claims and this court declined to review them. 2. The trial court did not err in granting the motions for summary judgment as to the claims of negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress against M, Q, L and the board in the first case and against S, M, Q, L and the board in the second case: the trial court properly determined that the individual defendants and the board were protected by statutory immunity (§ 10-222l) with respect to the claims of negligence alleged against them for violations of the plan because the plaintiffs failed to set forth any argument in their appellate briefs challenging the trial court's determination that the defendants demonstrated the absence of a genuine issue of material fact that they reported, investigated and responded to the bullying complaints in a manner that was consistent with the safe school climate plan and the plaintiffs failed to present the necessary factual predicate to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants acted in bad faith for purposes of § 10-222l; moreover, this court deemed abandoned any claim relating to the trial court's determination that the defendants were protected by governmen- tal immunity pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 52-557n (a) (2) (B)) from negligence claims relating to their discretionary acts because, on appeal, the plaintiffs failed to raise a claim challenging such determina- tion and did not even reference the applicability of governmental immu- nity prior to filing their reply briefs. 3. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of M, L and Q in the first case and in favor of S, M, L and Q in the second case with respect to the plaintiffs' recklessness claims: the allegations merely used the term ''recklessness'' to describe the same conduct that the plaintiffs previously described as negligence, which was insufficient as a matter of law to support a claim of recklessness; moreover, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, failed to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact that the individual defendants intentionally, wilfully, wantonly and recklessly violated the plan, as the defendants submitted evidence demonstrating that they responded to and investigated the acts of bullying reported and took steps to avoid further instances of bullying, and there was no evidence demonstrating that the defendants had notice of any bullying against A and B prior to the gym incident; furthermore, the plaintiffs' claims of retaliation with respect to A were unpersuasive, as he was suspended on the basis of admitted acts, his gym class was changed due to informa- tion S received concerning his interactions with another child in the class, and the plaintiffs failed to address how the ordering of a special education planning and placement team meeting for A constituted retali- ation, and the allegations of retaliation against B did not rise to the level of recklessness necessary to defeat the motion for summary judgment; accordingly, the conduct of the individual defendants could not be char- acterized as an extreme departure from ordinary care in a situation where a high degree of danger was apparent. 4. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the town and the board with respect to the plaintiffs' claims of respondeat superior liability as it related to the alleged negligence of M, L and Q in the first case and S, M, L and Q in the second case: because the trial court properly granted the motions for summary judgment as to the negligence claims against the individual defendants, there was no individual liability to which vicarious liability against the town or the board could attach. 5. The trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of L and the board with respect to the allegations that they retaliated against the plaintiffs for advocating for A and B, as L and the board were protected against the negligence claims by statutory and governmental immunity and there was no genuine issue of material fact that the actions of L did not amount to recklessness. Argued January 4—officially released June 7, 2022"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10278615/diaz-v-commissioner-of-correction/","attorney":"","caseName":"Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction","caseNameFull":"","citation":["344 Conn. 365"],"citeCount":2,"cluster_id":10278615,"court":"Supreme Court of Connecticut","court_citation_string":"Conn.","court_id":"conn","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2022-08-16","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"SC20536","docket_id":69396486,"judge":"Robinson; McDonald; D’Auria; Mullins; Kahn; Ecker","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-04-01T02:58:41.716823Z","date_created":"2024-11-21T00:35:48.719625Z","score":{"bm25":39.228405}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROcr/CR344/344CR57.pdf","id":10745203,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2022/08/16/diaz_v._commissioner_of_correction.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-14T18:30:29.199196Z","date_created":"2024-11-21T00:35:48.721340Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"21bcf20fd9b2ae18a2503967d38cc973972b699d","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":11297805,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2022/08/16/diaz_v._commissioner_of_correction_1.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-04-01T03:50:23.861849Z","date_created":"2026-04-01T02:50:09.894006Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"725c50cce187d30a0375b901f918f747511b8613","snippet":"DANIEL DIAZ v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION\n                 (SC 20536)\n                  Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,\n                       Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.\n                                    Syllabus\nPursuant to statute (§ 54-1f (b)), a police officer ‘‘shall arrest, without previ-\n   ous complaint and warrant, any person who the officer has reasonable\n   grounds to believe has committed or is committing a felony.’’\n\fPage 66                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNA","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district 368 AUGUST, 2022 344 Conn. 365 Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction of Tolland and transferred to the judicial district of Fairfield, where the case was tried to the court, Devlin, J.; judgment denying the petition; thereafter, the court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, DiPentima, C. J., and Alvord and Keller, Js., which dismissed the appeal, and the petitioner, on the granting of certifica- tion, appealed to this court. Improper form of judg- ment; reversed; judgment directed. Robert L. O'Brien, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Christopher Y. Duby, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner). Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Brian W. Preleski, former state's attorney, and Angela R. Macchiarulo, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11297805,10745203],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Pursuant to statute (§ 54-1f (b)), a police officer ''shall arrest, without previ- ous complaint and warrant, any person who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe has committed or is committing a felony.'' 366 AUGUST, 2022 344 Conn. 365 Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction The petitioner, who had been convicted of various drug and weapons charges, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel, C, had rendered ineffective assistance. The petitioner spe- cifically alleged that C had a conflict of interest insofar as he was employed as an active duty New Haven police officer while simultane- ously representing the petitioner in criminal proceedings in the judicial district of New Britain. Before C began representing criminal defendants, he sought the advice of corporation counsel for the city of New Haven, who concluded that C's representation of criminal defendants was not inappropriate, so long as it occurred outside of the New Haven judicial district. In his habeas petition, the petitioner alleged, inter alia, that C failed to disclose his employment as a police officer to him and that, as a result of this conflict of interest, C failed to adequately cross- examine the New Britain police officers who arrested the petitioner and searched his apartment. The habeas court denied the petition, conclud- ing, inter alia, that there was no evidence that C's representation of the petitioner was directly adverse to another client or limited by C's responsibilities to the New Haven Police Department. Specifically, the court implicitly agreed with and credited C's view that his obligations as a police officer under § 54-1f (b) did not give rise to a conflict of interest when he represented criminal defendants in locales other than New Haven. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal, which the habeas court denied, and the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, which dismissed the petitioner's appeal. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. This court declined the respondent's invitation to revisit the question of which standard applies to ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on personal conflicts of interest that do not involve the concurrent representation of multiple clients: because the petitioner could not pre- vail under the standard currently followed by this court, as articulated in Cuyler v. Sullivan (446 U.S. 335), which requires a petitioner to establish, inter alia, that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected defense counsel's performance, it was not necessary for this court to consider whether it should instead follow the majority of federal courts of appeals that have concluded that the more stringent standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668), which requires a petitioner to establish that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different, applies in habeas cases involving purely personal conflicts of interest. 2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that it is a per se conflict of interest for an individual to simultaneously serve as a Connecticut police officer and to represent a criminal defendant, even if the alleged crimes were committed, investigated, and prosecuted outside of the city or town in which the officer serves: although the use of the phrase ''shall arrest'' in § 54-1f (b) suggested, as the petitioner argued, that 344 Conn. 365 AUGUST, 2022 367 Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction police officers have a mandatory and nondiscretionary duty to arrest all suspected felons under all circumstances, regardless of when or where the suspected crime was committed, the petitioner's interpreta- tion was not the only plausible reading of the statutory language; more- over, adopting the petitioner's interpretation of § 54-1f (b) would lead to absurd and unworkable results insofar as treating the statute as mandatory would deprive police officers of the necessary discretion as to whether and when to arrest a suspected felon and would require them to make arrests, even when the suspected crime was committed long ago, outside of the statute of limitations, or outside of the officer's jurisdiction; accordingly, this court concluded that, although § 54-1f (b) gives patrolling officers the authority to arrest suspected felons they encounter, it does not require off duty officers, such as C, to arrest their clients whenever they suspect that those clients may have committed other crimes, even outside of the officer's jurisdiction; nevertheless, because the petitioner raised a colorable question of statutory interpreta- tion that previously had not been directly addressed by the appellate courts of this state, this court concluded that the habeas court had abused its discretion in denying the petition for certification to appeal, and, accordingly, the Appellate Court improperly dismissed the petition- er's appeal from that denial. 3. There was no merit to the petitioner's claim that C's undisclosed status as a police officer became an actual conflict of interest during the petitioner's criminal trial insofar as it led C to hold back when cross- examining other police officers; the habeas court thoroughly analyzed the petitioner's claims of inadequate cross-examination and found them to be without merit, the Appellate Court reviewed the petitioner's chal- lenges to the findings and conclusions of the habeas court and found them to be meritless, and this court saw no reason to second-guess the habeas court's determination that there was no constitutionally relevant actual conflict of interest because the petitioner was unable to establish prejudice under Sullivan by showing that C had failed to pursue some plausible, alternative defense strategy or tactic that was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to C's other loyalties; nevertheless, this court emphasized that, although the petitioner did not demonstrate an actual conflict of interest, it did not condone C's failure to disclose to the petitioner that he was also employed as a police officer or C's decision to mislead the Office of the Chief Public Defender by vaguely listing his employment with New Haven as a ''municipal employee,'' rather than as a police officer, on his application for a special public defender contract, which were unbecoming of an officer of the court. (Two justices concurring in one opinion) Argued December 17, 2021—officially released August 16, 2022"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/8337202/cohen-v-dept-of-energy-environmental-protection/","attorney":"","caseName":"Cohen v. Dept. of Energy & Environmental Protection","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":8337202,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2022-10-18","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC44547, AC44551","docket_id":65515589,"judge":"Elgo; Suarez; Lavine","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:38:59.630629Z","date_created":"2022-10-17T12:01:33.067426Z","score":{"bm25":39.157562}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[269260,677437,1901464,1978734,2108111,2298308,2299067,2552415,2552760,3320999,4162905,4170896,4227351,4236784,5155701,6115696,6577092,7841755,7842888,7843950,7847204,7847482,7847648,7848613,7848774,7860836,7861240,7863822,8915612,9516186,9704433,9719347,9753667,9755466,9773998],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP215/215AP368.pdf","id":8305528,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2022/10/18/cohen_v._dept._of_energy__environmental_protection.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-05T09:17:57.843260Z","date_created":"2022-10-17T12:01:33.068401Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"abf2a49f7603ca4ba050738cf456cc1dc4d86190","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Appeals from the decision by the named defendant approving the construction of a dock and boat lift on certain real property of the defendant Mark Marache et al., and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk and trans- ferred to the judicial district of Hartford, Land Use Litigation Docket; thereafter, the court, Moukawsher, J., granted the motion to intervene as party plaintiffs filed by the town of Greenwich et al.; subsequently, the court denied the motions to dismiss filed by the named defendant et al.; thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Moukawsher, J.; judgment dismissing the appeals, from which the plaintiff and the intervenor town of Greenwich et al. filed separate appeals with this court. Affirmed. James R. Fogarty, with whom was Bruce F. Cohen, for the appellant in Docket No. AC 44547 and appellee in Docket No. AC 44551 (plaintiff). Aamina Ahmad, assistant town attorney, for the appellants in Docket No. AC 44551 (intervenor town of Greenwich et al.). Michael W. Lynch, assistant attorney general, with whom were David H. Wrinn, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney general, Clare Kindall, solicitor general, and Matthew I. Levine, assis- tant attorney general, for the appellee in both appeals (named defendant). John P. Casey, with whom, on the brief, were Thomas J. Donlon and Jenna M. Scoville, for the appellees in both appeals (defendant Mark Marache et al.).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[8305528],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiff homeowner and the intervening plaintiffs, the town of Green- wich and its harbor management commission, appealed to this court from the judgment of the Superior Court dismissing the plaintiff's admin- istrative appeal from the final decision of the deputy commissioner of the named defendant, the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, granting an application to construct a residential dock adja- cent to the plaintiff's waterfront property. In their application, the defen- dants M and A proposed to construct the dock on a lot they owned that consisted of tidal wetlands fronting Greenwich Cove and bordering the plaintiff's residence. The plaintiff sought to intervene in the proceedings before the department pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 22a-19) and regulation (§ 22a-3a-6 (k)) to oppose M and A's application. A department hearing officer concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to intervene under § 22a-3a-6 (k) of the regulations but granted her intervenor status under § 22a-19 to pursue her claim of visual degradation to her property and environmental harm that she alleged would be caused by the pro- posed dock. At a hearing the department conducted to receive public comment on M and A's application, the commission submitted a letter, stating, inter alia, that it could not make a favorable recommendation concerning the application and that, pursuant to statute (§ 22a-113n), recommendations made by the commission consistent with the town's harbor management plan are binding on state officials when making regulatory decisions. The hearing officer issued a proposed final decision recommending approval of M and A's application. The hearing officer determined that the commission's comment letter did not constitute substantive evidence and that the department was not bound by its recommendation. The hearing officer further determined that the only recommendations contemplated by § 22a-113n (b) are those contained in a harbor management plan that has been adopted by a harbor manage- ment commission and approved by the department pursuant to statute (§ 22a-113m). The hearing officer concluded that nothing in the town's harbor management plan prevented him from recommending to the department that M and A's application be approved. Finally, the hearing officer concluded that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy her burden of proving that the proposed dock was reasonably likely to have an unreasonable environmental impact on nearby viewpoints and vistas or that it would result in other environmental harm. The deputy commis- sioner thereafter adopted the hearing officer's proposed decision. On appeal to the Superior Court, the intervenors and the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the deputy commissioner improperly concluded that § 22a-113n did not authorize the commission to make recommendations that are binding on the department. The court rendered judgment dis- missing the appeals, concluding, inter alia, that the deputy commission- er's final decision was supported by substantial evidence and that she had properly allocated the burdens of proof between the plaintiff and M and A. The court further upheld the deputy commissioner's determina- tion that § 22a-113n empowers harbor management commissions to make recommendations that are binding on the department only when such recommendations arise from content already included in an approved harbor management plan. Held: 1. The intervening plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the Superior Court incorrectly concluded that § 22a-113n did not authorize the com- mission to make recommendations that were binding on the department concerning dock permit applications within the commission's jurisdic- tion: a. Contrary to M and A's assertion that the intervenors' claim was not properly before this court because it was derivative of the same claim brought by the plaintiff, the intervenors' standing was not dependent on the plaintiff's standing to bring the same claim, § 22a-113n (b) having provided the intervenors with an independent jurisdictional basis to pursue their claim, as § 22a-113n (b) implicated their authority to make recommendations to state and local officials concerning activities affect- ing harbor areas within the intervenors' jurisdiction; moreover, the inter- venors' assertion in their motion to intervene that the deputy commission- er's decision could have far-reaching consequences for them with regard to any application, including future dock applications, that require a permit from the department, was precisely the sort of concrete, particu- larized allegation sufficient to raise a colorable claim of injury; further- more, dismissal of the intervenors' claim would require them to adjudi- cate the claim in another forum, which would be redundant and result in unnecessary delay and a waste of judicial resources in light of the rulings issued by the deputy commissioner and the Superior Court con- cerning the proper construction of § 22a-113n. b. This court was not persuaded by M and A's contention that it should refuse to adjudicate the proper construction of § 22a-113n, which was based on their claim that the issue of whether a harbor management commission's recommendation is binding on the department was never properly raised in the administrative proceedings; although the commis- sion's comment letter was not evidence to be considered in determining whether to grant M and A's application, the commission having elected not to appear in the administrative proceedings and submit written testi- mony pursuant to statute (§ 22a-99), the nature of the intervenors' partici- pation before the Superior Court substantially differed from their involve- ment before the department such that the issue concerning the proper interpretation of § 22a-113n was properly before this court. 2. The intervenors could not prevail on their claim that § 22a-113n granted the commission the authority to make recommendations that are binding on the department concerning individual dock placements within the commission's jurisdiction: the plain text of § 22a-113n authorizes harbor management commissions to make such recommendations only when they arise from content already included in an approved harbor manage- ment plan, and the Greenwich Harbor Management Plan did not discuss the permitting or placement of individual docks; moreover, the relation- ship of § 22a-113n to other statutes within the regulatory framework constrained the department's authority to issue individual permits for docks in areas designated as unsuitable in harbor management plans, which are subject to the department's annual review; furthermore, the lack of broad veto power on the part of harbor management commissions over individual dock permits does not render the plain text of § 22a- 113n unworkable, as harbor management commissions are permitted to set forth criteria concerning individual dock placement that become binding on the department once a harbor management plan is approved. 3. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claims that the hearing officer incorrectly allocated the burdens of proof between her and M and A during the administrative hearing, and that the Superior Court incor- rectly concluded that substantial evidence supported the deputy com- missioner's determination that there were no feasible and prudent alter- natives to the dock proposed by M and A: a. This court declined to review the plaintiff's claim that the Superior Court's determination that she had demonstrated classical aggrievement overruled, sub silentio, the hearing officer's determination that she had failed to demonstrate standing to intervene pursuant to § 22a-3a-6 (k) (1) (B) of the regulations; although the plaintiff contended that the hearing officer incorrectly applied to her the burden of proof for environ- mental intervenors set forth in § 22a-19 when she should not have been required to resort to § 22a-19 as a basis for intervention, she never properly raised in the Superior Court the issue of her standing pursuant to § 22a-3a-6 (k) (1) (B), her argument on appeal confused the hearing officer's determination concerning her standing with the court's determi- nation that she established aggrievement sufficient to invoke the court's subject matter jurisdiction, and the plaintiff pleaded different factual allegations in her complaint to the Superior Court than she did in her motion to intervene before the hearing officer. b. The plaintiff's claim that the hearing officer incorrectly placed the burden of proof on her to show that there were feasible alternatives to the proposed dock was unavailing, as she failed to understand that properly alleging standing under § 22a-19 (a) to be made a party to an administrative proceeding requires a showing of only a colorable claim of environmental harm, whereas an intervenor already joined in the litigation is required to produce evidence of unreasonable environmental impairment before the department is required to consider feasible alter- natives under § 22a-19 (b); moreover, the court did not determine that M and A had the burden of showing the absence of feasible alternatives to the proposed dock only if the plaintiff made a prima facie showing of environmental harm under § 22a-19, as there was no requirement that M and A show the absence of, or that the department consider, feasible alternatives to the dock in light of the plaintiff's failure to set forth substantial evidence that the dock would or was reasonably likely to cause unreasonable environmental harm. c. The court properly concluded that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the hearing officer's determination that there were no feasible and prudent alternatives to the proposed dock; the hearing officer noted that department staff had considered and rejected fourteen alternative designs to the structure before ultimately concluding that the approved structure would have the least adverse impact on the surrounding tidal wetlands, and, although the plaintiff presented expert testimony that the proposed dock would negatively impact the sur- rounding wetlands, the hearing officer acted within his discretion in crediting expert testimony presented by the department and M and A that the proposed structure would have minimal impact on the tidal wetlands. Argued February 14—officially released October 18, 2022"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10131860/brennan-v-board-of-assessment-appeals/","attorney":"","caseName":"Brennan v. Board of Assessment Appeals","caseNameFull":"","citation":["226 Conn. App. 191"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10131860,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-06-11","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC46258","docket_id":69235770,"judge":"Elgo; Suarez; Clark","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:47:20.648836Z","date_created":"2024-10-08T18:06:26.583032Z","score":{"bm25":38.13033}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2298453,6329454,7845078,7848150,7848617,7857244],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP226/AP226.222.pdf","id":10598461,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/06/11/brennan_v._board_of_assessment_appeals.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-06T08:49:06.136049Z","date_created":"2024-10-08T18:06:26.585608Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"c42632284827f309b4766dab72c371c06ba8b9f4","snippet":"************************************************\n   The “officially released” date that appears near the\nbeginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be\npublished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it\nis released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the\nbeginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-\nion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-\ncially released” date appearing in the opinion.\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncor","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Appeal from the decision of the defendant affirming the decision of its tax assessor to, inter alia, declassify the plaintiff's nonresidential land as farmland, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Ansonia- Milford and tried to the court, Hon. Arthur A. Hiller, judge trial referee; judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed. Steven P. Kulas, for the appellant (plaintiff). Raymond J. Rigat, for the appellee (defendant).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10598461],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiff appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court affirming the decision of the defendant board of assessment appeals, which upheld the revaluation of the plaintiff's residential dwelling and the declassification of his nonresidential land as farmland by the town tax assessor. During a trial to the court, the plaintiff presented testimony from H, a licensed appraiser, that the residential portion of the plaintiff's property was valued at $105,000, a valuation which exceeded the asses- sor's allegedly excessive valuation. The court thereafter suggested that it could rely on the $105,000 valuation given by H and issue a decision only as to the plaintiff's claim regarding the declassification of his nonres- idential property, and counsel for both parties agreed. Following trial, the court determined that the plaintiff had abandoned his claim regarding the valuation of his residential dwelling during the trial and that the nonresidential property was not currently being used as farmland in accordance with the factors set forth in the applicable statute (§ 12- 107c). Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in determining that he had abandoned his claim regarding the proper valuation of his residential dwelling; because the plaintiff's counsel agreed with the court at trial that it did not have to resolve the plaintiff's claim regarding the valuation of his residential dwelling and expressly assented to the court's suggestion that it needed to address only the claim regarding the declassification of the plaintiff's nonresidential property as farmland, the plaintiff had abandoned his claim regarding the valua- tion of his residential dwelling. 2. The plaintiff's claim that the trial court improperly considered the factors set forth in § 12-107c (a) in determining whether the plaintiff's nonresi- dential property was still being used as a farm for purposes of the statute (§ 12-504h) governing the termination of a farmland classification was unavailing: this court determined that it was clear that, when §§ 12-107c and 12-504h are read together, the declassification of property previously classified as farmland occurs when the use of such land is changed or when the property is sold by the record owner, and the fact that an assessor makes no actual change in the classification of a property previously classified as farmland for many years after the occurrence of one of the triggering events in § 12-504h is irrelevant; moreover, in the present case, the assessor was required to conduct a townwide revaluation of all the properties for the town's grand list and, during the course of his townwide revaluation, the assessor conducted a field review of the plaintiff's nonresidential property, determined that it was not in actual use as farmland and declassified it as farmland, and the plain language of §§ 12-107c and 12-504h, read within the context of the overall statutory scheme affording favorable tax treatment to certain undeveloped property and case law applying that scheme, makes clear that it was proper for the trial court to consider the factors set forth in § 12-107c when it affirmed the assessor's determination. 3. The trial court's finding concerning the current use of the plaintiff's nonresidential property was not clearly erroneous as there was ample evidence in the record to support the court's determination that the current use of that property did not constitute farm use: in making its determination, the court relied on the assessor's examination of the plaintiff's nonresidential property and his testimony that, inter alia, he had not seen any farming activity on the nonresidential property and had seen sheep on such property on only one occasion when he observed a few sheep run out of the plaintiff's barn, and that he took into account the factors set forth in § 12-107c (a), including the acreage of the land, the portion of the land in actual use for farming or agricultural opera- tions, the productivity of the land or lack thereof, the gross income derived therefrom, or losses, as here, and the nature and value of the equipment, or lack thereof, used in connection therewith; moreover, although the plaintiff testified that his prior use of the nonresidential property consisted of raising multiple species and breeds of livestock and animals, he also testified that during the townwide revaluation he only had four female sheep on his nonresidential property and that he no longer had any farming equipment, such as a tractor or lifting equip- ment, on the nonresidential property. Argued November 13, 2023—officially released June 11, 2024"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4371847/city-of-aurora-v-scott/","attorney":"","caseName":"City of Aurora v. Scott","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2017 COA 24","410 P.3d 720"],"citeCount":4,"cluster_id":4371847,"court":"Colorado Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Colo. Ct. App.","court_id":"coloctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2017-02-23","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"16CA0393","docket_id":4611525,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T00:26:17.298275Z","date_created":"2017-02-28T21:07:33.507438Z","score":{"bm25":37.717255}},"neutralCite":"2017 COA 24","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1184480,1304482,1366316,1388532,1391910,2330828,2602036,2622056,2827719,4024922],"download_url":"http://www.cobar.org/Portals/COBAR/Repository/Sections/Opinions/2-23-17/16CA0393-PD.pdf?ver=2017-02-28-131023-877","id":4149107,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2017/02/23/city_of_aurora_v._scott.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T14:31:48.472717Z","date_created":"2017-02-28T21:07:33.515363Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"0d771b21e0b1ca0f3308f033861dac1e80da40f3","snippet":"COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                           2017COA24\n\n\nCourt of Appeals No. 16CA0393\nArapahoe County District Court No. 15CV31613\nHonorable Charles M. Pratt, Judge\n\n\nCity of Aurora, Colorado, a municipal corporation; and Aurora Urban Renewal\nAuthority, a Colorado urban renewal authority\n\nPlaintiffs-Appellants,\n\nv.\n\nMarc Scott, in his official capacity as Arapahoe County Assessor,\n\nDefendant-Appellee.\n\n\n                         ORDER AND JUDGMENT AFFIRMED\n\n               ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4149107],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"Urban Renewal Law—Delay in Start Date of Tax Increment Financing Period","syllabus":"Urban Renewal Law—Delay in Start Date of Tax Increment Financing Period. Colorado's Urban Renewal Law (URL) authorizes the use of tax increment financing (TIF) to fund renewal projects for redeveloping blighted or slum areas. TIF uses recently assessed property values in an urban renewal area to establish a base tax value. As property values increase above the base value, increased tax revenues are allocated to the financing of the renewal project to pay down the debt against the project. The statute places a 25-year limit on TIF allocations to a renewal fund that runs from \"the effective date of such a [TIF] provision.\" The City of Aurora (City) approved two urban renewal plans (the Plans) with multiple phases of redevelopment. The Fitzsimons Plan included four development phases and stated that TIF would begin immediately for the first two phases but be delayed for the second two phases. The Iliff Plan included two phases and provided for TIF to begin immediately for phase one and be delayed for phase two. After the City approved the plans, the Arapahoe County assessor (Assessor) immediately calculated the base tax value for all development phases. The City and the Aurora Urban Renewal Authority (collectively, Aurora) filed a complaint against the Assessor, asking the court to order him to delay allocating TIF. The Assessor argued that he was complying with the URL, which does not permit a city to delay the start of TIF allocations. On cross-motions for determination of law, the district court entered an order in favor of the Assessor. On appeal, Aurora first argued that the doctrines of waiver, preclusion, and estoppel barred the Assessor's defense because the Assessor did not submit the issue to arbitration or appeal the Plans' approval via a CRCP 106(a)(4) action. The Court of Appeals found that the URL's statutory arbitration procedure does not apply to this dispute, thus the Assessor did not waive his right to assert his defense. The Court did not consider Aurora's Rule 106(a)(4) argument because it was not raised in the district court. The Court determined that claim and issue preclusion were inapplicable to this case. Finally, because neither the Assessor nor the county were part of the URL's public approval process, there was no merit in the argument that the Assessor's defense was equitably estopped. On the merits, the Court found that the URL does not permit a municipality to alter or evade the 25-year time limit on a TIF provision by denominating parts of a plan \"effective\" after the plan is approved. The statute is clear that TIF cannot exceed 25 years from the date the provision is adopted, and a city cannot extend that time limit by denominating certain provisions \"effective\" on a date after they are actually approved. The City also argued that adopting the urban renewal plans involved legislative acts within its home-rule powers. Adopting an urban renewal plan is not a legislative act. Even if approving an urban renewal plan was a legislative act, approving these plans would be beyond the City's power because the plans conflict with the URL's TIF timeline. Thus, even if the City's acts were legislative, they would be invalid. Aurora further argued that the Assessor and the Court could not rely on or be bound by informal guidance from the Colorado Property Tax Administrator (Administrator). The Court did not give the Administrator's guidance even persuasive weight. The order and judgment were affirmed."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/3160667/in-re-arab-bank-plc-alien-tort-statute-litigation/","attorney":"Michael E. Eisner (John M. Eubanks, on the brief), Motley Rice LLC, Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, for Plaintiffs-Appellants., Mark Werbner and Joel Israel, Sayles Werbner, PC, Dallas, TX, (on the brief), for Plaintiffs-Appellants., Kevin Walsh (Douglas W. Mateyaschuk, II, Steven J. Young, on the brief), DLA Piper LLP, New York, New York, for Defendant-Appellee., Stephen M. Shapiro, Timothy S. Bishop, Chad M. damage, Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago, IL, (on the brief), for Defendant Appellee., Richard L. Herz, EarthRights International, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae-Human Rights Organizations., Tyler R. Giannini, Harvard Law School, International Human Rights Clinic, Cambridge, MA, for Amici Curiae-Professors of Legal History Barbara Aronstein Black, William R. Casto, Martin S. Flaherty, .Nasser Hussain, Stanley N. Katz, John V. Orth, and Anne-Marie Slaughter., Neal Kumar Katyal and Jessica L. Ells-worth, Hogan Lovells U.S. LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae-The Hashem-ite Kingdom of Jordan., Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, Ropes & Gray LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae-Union of Arab Banks., Jeffrey B. Wall, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, Washington D.C., for Amicus Curiae-Institute of International Bankers.","caseName":"In Re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litigation","caseNameFull":"In Re ARAB BANK, PLC ALIEN TORT STATUTE LITIGATION","citation":["808 F.3d 144","2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21242","2015 WL 8122895"],"citeCount":49,"cluster_id":3160667,"court":"Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit","court_citation_string":"2d Cir.","court_id":"ca2","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2015-12-08","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"13-3605 (L)","docket_id":3018870,"judge":"Sack, Chin, Carney","lexisCite":"2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 21242","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-21T18:09:04.944179Z","date_created":"2015-12-08T16:05:52.789279Z","score":{"bm25":37.251167}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2507,2673,2703,19314,78201,103012,118288,137006,145730,145875,147513,149289,175476,182881,219099,220584,220730,751625,779781,782716,810759,813901,815628,858289,902769,1038016,1190929,1238229,1380470,2326923,2530597,2649076,2652742,2679549,2682110,2723874,2734038,2745034,2820446,2969190,6933481,7011568,7230783,7266734,8413142,8452880,9241340,9418969],"download_url":"http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/decisions/isysquery/c8d02eea-3228-4327-8363-0cbe965e65ac/2/doc/13-3605_opn.pdf","id":3160667,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2015/12/08/jesner_v._arab_bank.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T03:40:25.240287Z","date_created":"2015-12-08T16:00:33.375428Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"12bb37da99ec2f240313d70f504255c29733b1d8","snippet":"\n\n\n  SACK, Circuit Judge:\n \n\n  The plaintiffs in this case filed five separate lawsuits between 2004 and 2010 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the defendant, Arab Bank, PLC.\n  \n   Oran Almog, et\n  \n \n   *147\n   \n\n   al. v. Arab Bank, PLC,\n  \n  No. 04-CV-556","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[3160667],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""}]}