{"count":1598158,"next":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/search/?cursor=cz0yMi44Njk2NjEmcz0xMDY2NDU3OCZ0PW8mZD0yMDI2LTEwLTA2JnA9Mg%3D%3D&q=RAISING+OF+USES&type=o","previous":null,"results":[{"absolute_url":"/opinion/3193033/wong-v-uses-holding-corp/","attorney":"","caseName":"Wong v. USES Holding Corp.","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":3193033,"court":"Court of Chancery of Delaware","court_citation_string":"Del. Ch.","court_id":"delch","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2016-04-05","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"CA 11475-VCS","docket_id":3052464,"judge":"Slights V.C.","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-21T18:28:31.902729Z","date_created":"2016-04-12T03:06:55.690865Z","score":{"bm25":42.26286}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://courts.delaware.gov/Opinions/Download.aspx?id=239240","id":3192927,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2016/04/05/wong_v._uses_holding_corp..pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T04:03:21.997107Z","date_created":"2016-04-12T03:06:55.698146Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"8462e1e696ffc33b415ed22ea69c98961f414b52","snippet":"                                                      EFiled: Apr 05 2016 12:38PM EDT\n                                                      Transaction ID 58811447\n                                                      Case No. 11475-VCS\n                            COURT OF CHANCERY\n                                  OF THE\n                            STATE OF DELAWARE\n\n                                                                  417 S. State Street\nJOSEPH R. SLIGHTS III                      ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[3192927],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4870668/verdell-driskell-v-concrete-raising-corporation-and-yolanda-duffin/","attorney":"","caseName":"Verdell Driskell v. Concrete Raising Corporation and Yolanda Duffin","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4870668,"court":"Texas Court of Appeals, 14th District (Houston)","court_citation_string":"Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]","court_id":"txctapp14","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2021-03-30","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"14-19-00117-CV","docket_id":59793088,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-02-24T12:40:50.742846Z","date_created":"2021-04-05T07:17:04.252480Z","score":{"bm25":38.2011}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1400098,1404171,1560824,1580288,1665727,1875026,2187257,2274840,2395433,2541882,5286962,5287525,5287614,5287754,6108576],"download_url":"http://www.search.txcourts.gov/RetrieveDocument.aspx?DocId=30763&Index=%5c%5c10%2e20%2e4%2e7%5cTamesIndexes%5ccoa14%5cOpinion","id":4674447,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2021/03/30/verdell_driskell_v._concrete_raising_corporation_and_yolanda_duffin.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-02-24T12:40:50.769351Z","date_created":"2021-04-05T07:17:04.254248Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"8fb6091815b443303119c47ac260119932d26d9d","snippet":"Affirmed in Part and Reversed and Remanded in Part and Memorandum\nOpinion filed March 30, 2021.\n\n\n\n\n                                       In The\n\n                     Fourteenth Court of Appeals\n\n                               NO. 14-19-00117-CV\n\n                       VERDELL DRISKELL, Appellant\n                                          V.\n    CONCRETE RAISING CORPORATION AND YOLANDE DUFFIN,\n                        Appellees\n\n                    On Appeal from the 164th District Court\n        ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4674447],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4721243/advisory-opinion-to-the-attorney-general-re-raising-floridas-minimum-wage/","attorney":"","caseName":"Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General Re: Raising Florida's Minimum Wage","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4721243,"court":"Supreme Court of Florida","court_citation_string":"Fla.","court_id":"fla","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-01-09","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"SC19-548","docket_id":16761649,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T02:06:45.167807Z","date_created":"2020-01-27T08:03:01.929558Z","score":{"bm25":33.877415}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1106301,1128820,1708250,1782145,1854190],"download_url":"https://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pre_opinion_content_download/546564","id":4501570,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/01/09/advisory_opinion_to_the_attorney_general_re_raising_floridas_minimum_wage_1.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T18:36:32.820177Z","date_created":"2020-01-27T08:03:01.932845Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"99e8b5447da84d94d077a71cbd2d424726db703f","snippet":"          Supreme Court of Florida\n                                 ________________\n\n                                   No. SC19-548\n                                 ________________\n\n  ADVISORY OPINION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RE: RAISING\n                FLORIDA’S MINIMUM WAGE.\n\n                                 ________________\n\n                                   No. SC19-736\n                                 ________________\n\n  ADVISORY OPINION TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RE: RAISING\n              ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4501570],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10596500/vivo-v-commissioner-of-correction/","attorney":"","caseName":"Vivo v. Commissioner of Correction","caseNameFull":"","citation":["233 Conn. App. 54"],"citeCount":1,"cluster_id":10596500,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2025-06-03","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC47144","docket_id":70435175,"judge":"Elgo; Clark; Prescott","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:48:02.539457Z","date_created":"2025-06-02T12:04:05.431297Z","score":{"bm25":27.188547}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[4123696,4534615,6115712,6340973,7843275,7843446,7844915,7848180,7862235,7864131,7864582,7872410,8205575,9429592,9485554,9896958,10598358,10733551],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP233/AP233.235.pdf","id":11063088,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2025/06/03/vivo_v._commissioner_of_correction.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-07T15:11:47.075226Z","date_created":"2025-06-02T12:04:05.432979Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"046d9a1c4e17e0a36dbc8b139d9f70e762d37687","snippet":"************************************************\n   The “officially released” date that appears near the\nbeginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be\npublished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it\nis released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the\nbeginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-\nion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-\ncially released” date appearing in the opinion.\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncor","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Bhatt, J.; judgment dismissing in part and denying in part the petition; there- after, the court, Bhatt, J., denied the petition for certifi- cation to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed. Naomi T. Fetterman, assigned counsel, for the appel- lant (petitioner). Timothy F. Costello, supervisory assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Joseph T. Corradino, state's attorney, and Jonathan R. For- michella, deputy assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11063088],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The petitioner, who previously had been convicted of, inter alia, murder, appealed following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying in part his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that the court abused its discretion by denying his petition for certification to appeal. Held: The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petitioner certification to appeal, as the petitioner failed to show that his claim involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason, that a court could resolve them in a different manner or that they were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner's second habeas counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to raise a claim that the petitioner's trial counsel failed to adequately advise him regarding the state's plea offers, as the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the habeas court used an incorrect legal standard in its analysis of the question of whether he was prejudiced by the assumed deficient performance of trial counsel. Argued March 27—officially released June 3, 2025"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9381036/standifer-v-ohio-dept-of-health/","attorney":"","caseName":"Standifer v. Ohio Dept. of Health","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2023 Ohio 622"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9381036,"court":"Ohio Court of Claims","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. Cl.","court_id":"ohioctcl","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2023-02-10","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"2022-00217PQ","docket_id":66924653,"judge":"Clark","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-23T01:01:42.760665Z","date_created":"2023-03-02T20:06:00.150454Z","score":{"bm25":26.444506}},"neutralCite":"2023 Ohio 622","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2521744,2689859,2690240,2690781,2690902,2691103,2702045,3178326,3754565,4206086,4636627,4636729,4674821,6216494,6760586,6762020,6763800,6770245,6770309,6774511,6774559,6774681,6775380,6788791,6792591,7088998,8209670,9426016,9801505,9801879,9869966,11150408,11152773],"download_url":"https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/13/2023/2023-Ohio-622.pdf","id":9376512,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/02/10/standifer_v._ohio_dept._of_health.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-05T07:24:34.073701Z","date_created":"2023-03-02T20:06:00.156349Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"e6acb3e478c21f3def2ca956e04ab0df64f2dcf5","snippet":"[Cite as Standifer v. Ohio Dept. of Health, 2023-Ohio-622.]\n\n\n\n\n                               IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO\n\n\n\n LAUREN (CID) STANDIFER                                  Case No. 2022-00217PQ\n\n         Requester                                       Special Master Jeffery W. Clark\n\n         v.                                              REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION\n\n OHIO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH\n\n         Respondent\n\n\n\n        {¶1} This case arises from a journalist’s public records r","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9376512],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Public Records R.C. 149.011(G) 149.43(B)(1) R.C. 2743.75 R.C. 3701.17(B) Media use of Public Records Act \"Data base rule\" under R.C. 149.011(G) Redaction does not require the public office to create a new record R.C. 149.43(B)(1) requires release of record containing both public and exempted information if the exempted information can be redacted A public office waives defenses not raised in its initial response to a R.C. 2743.75 complaint Extent of deference to agency's construction of statute Import of agency's change of position on the extent of deference to agency's construction of a statute."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4378929/people-v-leverton/","attorney":"Cynthia H. Coffman, Attorney General, Lisa K. Michaels, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee, Katayoun A. Donnelly, Alternative Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant","caseName":"People v. Leverton","caseNameFull":"The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Randall Eric LEVERTON, Defendant-Appellant","citation":["2017 COA 34","405 P.3d 402","2017 WL 1089557","2017 Colo. App. LEXIS 336"],"citeCount":10,"cluster_id":4378929,"court":"Colorado Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Colo. Ct. App.","court_id":"coloctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2017-03-23","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Court of Appeals 15CA0050","docket_id":4640353,"judge":"Berger, Dailey, Jones","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T00:28:14.509453Z","date_created":"2017-03-28T19:05:36.349121Z","score":{"bm25":25.979006}},"neutralCite":"2017 COA 34","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[108189,108416,111535,111992,134724,145451,1062840,1179200,1221932,1428250,1466054,2078278,2143266,2286441,2304483,2465583,2520328,2632485,4030790,5156615,5158083,5158950,5159302,5177521,5177641,5177675],"download_url":"http://www.cobar.org/Portals/COBAR/Repository/Sections/Opinions/3-27-17/15CA0050-PD.pdf?ver=2017-03-28-120927-593","id":4156182,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2017/03/23/people_v._leverton.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T14:36:43.837259Z","date_created":"2017-03-28T19:05:36.356285Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"9a3b65fdabd722591b8c850505dad71c4b5e57fa","snippet":"\n\n\n  Opinion by\n \n\n  JUDGE BERGER\n \n\n  ¶ 1 A jury convicted defendant, Randall Eric Leverton, of theft by receiving and possession of drug paraphernalia. He appeals, contending the trial- court erred by (1) joining the two offenses in a single trial and not allowing him to plead guilty to the paraphernalia charge before joining them and (2) admitting into evidence two wit","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4156182],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"Theft by Receiving—Possession—Drug Paraphernalia—Mandatory Joinder—Double Jeopardy—Prior Statements—Impeachment—Evidence","syllabus":"Theft by Receiving—Possession—Drug Paraphernalia—Mandatory Joinder—Double Jeopardy—Prior Statements—Impeachment—Evidence. The victim started her car and left it running while she went inside her home to retrieve some belongings. When she returned to where the car had been parked, the car was gone. She immediately reported the theft to the police. A few days later, a police officer pulled over the stolen car. Leverton and two women were passengers. Leverton told the officer that the car belonged to the victim, whom he claimed was his girlfriend. Leverton was arrested and transported to the police station. After removing Leverton from the police vehicle, the officer discovered a pipe typically used to smoke methamphetamine. Leverton was initially charged with possession of drug paraphernalia. Shortly thereafter in a separate case he was charged with theft by receiving. The cases were later joined on the prosecution's motion, over defendant's objection. The women passengers testified at Leverton's trial and were questioned by the prosecutor about oral statements they allegedly had made to police following their arrests. Leverton was convicted as charged. On appeal, Leverton argued that the trial court erred when it rejected his guilty plea on the paraphernalia charge and then permitted the prosecution to add that charge to the theft complaint because the result was that he was effectively charged with the same offense in two separate cases. He claimed that this violated Colorado's mandatory joinder statute and the Double Jeopardy Clauses of both the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions. The Court of Appeals noted that Leverton did not allege that he was reprosecuted for either offense after he was convicted or that he was sentenced or otherwise punished multiple times for those offenses. Here, the prosecution moved to join the two offenses prior to Leverton's attempt to plead guilty to the paraphernalia charge. The court's procedure met the purpose of the mandatory joinder statute, to prevent successive prosecutions, and Leverton raised no claim of unfair prejudice resulting from the procedure. Further, the court acted within its discretion when it rejected Leverton's guilty plea to the petty offense. And because the court had not accepted Leverton's guilty plea on the paraphernalia charge, double jeopardy had not attached and there was no due process violation. Leverton next argued that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to examine the two women witnesses about their prior statements to the police, alleging this evidence was inadmissible and violated his confrontation rights. Both women testified that they did not remember what happened the night the stolen car was pulled over, nor did they remember any statements they made to the police. To impeach the witnesses, the prosecutor was entitled to confront them with the exact language of their prior inconsistent statements. Therefore, the court properly admitted the statements. Leverton also argued that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed theft or possessed drug paraphernalia. A few days after the car had been reported stolen, the police found Leverton sitting in the car's front passenger seat. Though Leverton told the police that the car had been given to him by the victim, his statement was directly refuted by the victim's testimony that she had never met him. This and other evidence was sufficient to support the theft by receiving conviction. There was also sufficient evidence concerning the pipe found in the police vehicle for the jury to convict Leverton of possession of drug paraphernalia. Leverton also argued that his convictions were based on his associations with other persons. Having found that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence proving that Leverton and not some other person committed the crimes, the Court rejected this argument. The judgment was affirmed."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4506758/colorado-union-of-taxpayers-foundation-v-city-of-aspen/","attorney":"Attorneys for Petitioner: Mountain States Legal Foundation, Steven J. Lechner, Lakewood, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondents: City of Aspen, James R. True, City Attorney, Andrea S. Bryan, Assistant City Attorney, Aspen, Colorado, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Municipal League: Butler Snow LLP, Terrance Carroll, Martina Hinojosa, Dee P. Wisor, Denver, Colorado, Attorney for Amicus Curiae The TABOR Foundation: Rebecca R. Sopkin, Lakewood, Colorado","caseName":"Colorado Union of Taxpayers Foundation v. City of Aspen","caseNameFull":"COLORADO UNION OF TAXPAYERS FOUNDATION, Petitioner, v. CITY OF ASPEN; Steve Skadron, Adam Frisch, Art Daily, Ann Mullins, and Bert Myrin, All in Their Official Capacities as Members of the Aspen City Council, Respondents.","citation":["2018 CO 36","418 P.3d 506"],"citeCount":14,"cluster_id":4506758,"court":"Supreme Court of Colorado","court_citation_string":"Colo.","court_id":"colo","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2018-05-21","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Supreme Court Case 16SC377","docket_id":7147310,"judge":"Rice, Coats, Hood","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:04:22.570642Z","date_created":"2018-06-13T17:04:41.781687Z","score":{"bm25":25.656134}},"neutralCite":"2018 CO 36","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":9886556,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-27T08:15:56.353072Z","date_created":"2023-10-06T16:17:12.638177Z"},"ordering_key":3,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nJUSTICE HOOD, dissenting.\n¶ 51 Our post-TABOR precedent should control the outcome of this case. And in Barber v. Ritter, 196 P.3d 238, 250 (Colo. 2008), we established the following test for distinguishing a tax from a regulatory fee: Is the primary purpose of the charge to defray the cost of servi","type":"dissent"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":9886555,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-27T08:15:56.826161Z","date_created":"2023-10-06T16:17:12.633948Z"},"ordering_key":2,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nJUSTICE COATS, dissenting.\n¶ 36 In relieving Aspen of compliance with the popular approval requirements of the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights, I believe the majority so far departs from not only the language and clear intent of the constitutional amendment itself, but also the commonly accepted distinction between charging for something in particular and raising revenue for other governmental purposes, as to call for some response. Notw","type":"dissent"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":9886554,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-27T08:15:56.819201Z","date_created":"2023-10-06T16:17:12.629197Z"},"ordering_key":1,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nCHIEF JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.\n*509¶ 1 This case presents the question of whether Aspen's $0.20 paper bag charge is a tax subject to voter approval under the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights (\"TABOR\").1 The trial court held that this charge is not subject to TABOR because it is not a tax, but a fe","type":"lead-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[109301,109703,118025,538902,585778,761266,809122,2823809,2823847,5177240],"download_url":"http://www.cobar.org/Portals/COBAR/Repository/opinions/5-21-18/No. 16SC377.pdf","id":4284011,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2018/05/21/colorado_union_of_taxpayers_foundation_v._city_of_aspen.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T16:05:21.257704Z","date_created":"2018-06-13T17:04:41.787990Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"550f3676a3f1c243c9d03a6b8ebc686fc7e1bac1","snippet":"             Opinions of the Colorado Supreme Court are available to the\n         public and can be accessed through the Judicial Branch’s homepage at\n           http://www.courts.state.co.us. Opinions are also posted on the\n           Colorado Bar Association’s homepage at http://www.cobar.org.\n\n\n                                                        ADVANCE SHEET HEADNOTE\n                                                                      May 21, 2018\n\n                                      ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4284011,9886554,9886555,9886556],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The Supreme Court considered whether a $0.20 charge on paper bags is a tax subject to the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights (TABOR). The Court held that if the primary purpose of a charge is to raise revenue for the general expenses of government, the charge is a tax. Conversely, the Court concluded that a charge is not a tax if the primary purpose of a charge is to defray the reasonable direct and indirect costs of providing a service or regulating an activity, because such a charge does not raise revenue for the general expense of government. After analyzing the charge in this case, the Court held that this charge is not a tax. Aspen imposed this charge as part of a regulatory program aimed at waste management, and the $0.20 charge for the right to use a paper bag bears a reasonable relationship to Aspen's cost of permitting that use. Because this charge is a not a tax, it is exempt from TABOR's requirements. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10593069/the-state-of-oklahoma-ex-rel-panter-v-mcvea/","attorney":"","caseName":"THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. PANTER v. MCVEA","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2025 OK CIV APP 13"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10593069,"court":"Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma","court_citation_string":"Okla. Civ. App.","court_id":"oklacivapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2025-04-11","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"121868","docket_id":70241574,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-11T16:54:31.611633Z","date_created":"2025-05-27T19:11:57.475265Z","score":{"bm25":24.996674}},"neutralCite":"2025 OK CIV APP 13","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[74797,294526,802015,1188910,1271428,2582410,5143895,5155018,5165820,5167154,6702857,9433350,9534076,9846599,11048347],"download_url":"https://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=547976","id":11059657,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"html/2025/04/11/the_state_of_oklahoma_ex_rel._panter_v._mcvea_2.html","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-11T16:54:31.606954Z","date_created":"2025-05-27T19:11:57.486624Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"9658cb3e2b1d9efed8849b75c4ac618e1a28d8f7","snippet":"\n\t\tOSCN Found Document:THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. PANTER v. MCVEA\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\n\n\t\t\t\t\n  \n\n\n\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\tPrevious Case\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\tTop Of Index\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\tThis Point in Index\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\tCitationize\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\tNext Case\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t","type":"combined-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"https://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=547976","id":11048347,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"html/2025/04/11/the_state_of_oklahoma_ex_rel._panter_v._mcvea.html","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-14T20:29:23.009614Z","date_created":"2025-05-09T22:12:40.614788Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"8b6f238eda621d000e7af606548e3090ec3baf66","snippet":"\n\t\tOSCN Found Document:THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. PANTER v. MCVEA\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\n\n\t\t\t\t\n  \n\n\n\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\tPrevious Case\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\tTop Of Index\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\tThis Point in Index\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\tCitationize\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\t\t\tNext Case\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11059657,11048347],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"¶1 Sherral McVea 1 , in her capacity as personal representative of the estate of Larry McVey, appeals the district court's denial of her motion to vacate a default judgment of forfeiture against the property of the late Larry McVey. On review we find that a personal representative was the only proper party to receive notice and an opportunity to raise claims and defenses that the deceased could have raised. No personal representative had been appointed at the time of notice, and the state did not use the 12 O.S. § 2025 procedure to substitute a personal representative for the deceased. As such, we reverse the decision of the district court and remand for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/2568843/uses-manufacturing-inc-v-rocky-mountain-institute/","attorney":"Edward R. Scofield, Douglas John Var-ga, Zeldes, Needle & Cooper, Bridgeport, CT, for Plaintiffs., Joseph W. Bibisi, Richard P. Kuzmak, McVane, Bellobuono, Kuzmak, Wiezalis & Bibisi, Hartford, CT, Lee F. Johnston, Holland & Hart, Denver, CO, Donald A. Degnan, Timothy P. Getzoff, Holland & Hart LLP, Boulder, CO, George D. Roy-ster, Jr., John Burns Farley, Mark Theodore Livesay, Halloran & Sage, Hartford, CT, for Defendants.","caseName":"Uses Manufacturing, Inc. v. Rocky Mountain Institute","caseNameFull":"USES MANUFACTURING, INC. and USES, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE and Research New England Power Service Co., Defendants","citation":["94 F. Supp. 2d 218","2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6205","2000 WL 556909"],"citeCount":4,"cluster_id":2568843,"court":"District Court, D. Connecticut","court_citation_string":"D. Conn.","court_id":"ctd","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2000-03-17","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"3:99CV315(JBA)","docket_id":2434639,"judge":"Arterton","lexisCite":"2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6205","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-21T13:02:57.856595Z","date_created":"2014-10-31T00:02:10.911864Z","score":{"bm25":24.92382}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":133,"cites":[539179,539900,584218,595491,718605],"download_url":null,"id":2568843,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T20:47:04.238462Z","date_created":"2013-10-30T10:29:25.458526Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"60d5685b1b834a61babc58dcfefd27761b22787b","snippet":"\n94 F.Supp.2d 218 (2000)\nUSES MANUFACTURING, INC. and USES, Inc., Plaintiffs,\nv.\nROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE and Research New England Power Service Co., Defendants.\nNo. 3:99CV315(JBA).\nUnited States District Court, D. Connecticut.\nMarch 17, 2000.\n*219 Edward R. Scofield, Douglas John Varga, Zeldes, Needle & Cooper, Bridgeport, CT","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[2568843],"source":"LU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9388372/senske-rentals-v-city-of-grand-forks/","attorney":"","caseName":"Senske Rentals v. City of Grand Forks","caseNameFull":"","citation":["988 N.W.2d 598","2023 ND 55"],"citeCount":5,"cluster_id":9388372,"court":"North Dakota Supreme Court","court_citation_string":"N.D.","court_id":"nd","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2023-03-31","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"20220222","docket_id":67113683,"judge":"McEvers, Lisa K. Fair","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-26T17:58:27.483695Z","date_created":"2023-03-31T14:06:43.899520Z","score":{"bm25":24.746264}},"neutralCite":"2023 ND 55","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[896315,897924,898262,898966,4451060,4567516,4588066],"download_url":"http://www.ndcourts.gov/supreme-court/opinion/2023ND55","id":9383848,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/03/31/senske_rentals_v._city_of_grand_forks.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-26T17:58:27.491870Z","date_created":"2023-03-31T14:06:43.908200Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"045ab34cc4eded93897a352f5c8ef872a5c2f087","snippet":"                                                                            FILED\n                                                                    IN THE OFFICE OF THE\n                                                                 CLERK OF SUPREME COURT\n                                                                        MARCH 31, 2023\n                                                                  STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA\n\n\n\n\n                  IN THE SUPREME COURT\n                  STATE","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9383848],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING","syllabus":"The appellate court has discretion whether to grant a parties' request for judicial notice on appeal. A court's review of special assessments for local improvements is limited to assuring that local taxing authorities do not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably. Special assessments for local improvements are presumed valid, and the burden is on the party challenging the validity to demonstrate they are invalid. A special assessment against any property must not exceed the benefit the property receives from the improvement. An adequate record for review of a special assessment commission's determination must include a showing of how the commission determined the project benefit. A special assessment commission has broad discretion to choose the method used to decide benefits and assess individual properties. Issues not raised in the district court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9506704/state-of-tennessee-v-keedrin-coppage/","attorney":"","caseName":"State of Tennessee v. Keedrin Coppage","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9506704,"court":"Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Crim. App.","court_id":"tenncrimapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-05-23","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"W2023-00205-CCA-R3-CD","docket_id":68559130,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-23T01:32:59.528857Z","date_created":"2024-05-23T18:10:29.855227Z","score":{"bm25":24.681267}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[110138,145781,1053085,1054672,1080076,1506546,1780560,2168903,2431765,5059453,5069991],"download_url":"https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/CoppageKeedrinOPN.pdf","id":9973317,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/05/23/state_of_tennessee_v._keedrin_coppage.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-07-09T05:25:36.583424Z","date_created":"2024-05-23T18:10:29.860646Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"04318fa9d57315b144c33fb9cbd0efee1b8eae85","snippet":"                                                                                           05/23/2024\n        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                          AT JACKSON\n                                 March 5, 2024 Session\n\n               STATE OF TENNESSEE v. KEEDRIN COPPAGE\n\n                 Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County\n                 Nos. 20-02446, C2004012 James M. Lammey, Judge\n                       ___________________________________\n\n       ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9973317],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Defendant, Keedrin Coppage, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and tampering with evidence. The trial court imposed a life sentence for count one, and a consecutive sentence of six years for count two. Defendant raises twelve issues on appeal: (1) sufficiency of the evidence to support his first degree premeditated murder conviction (2) admission of the Defendant's prior bad acts against the victim under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) (3) admission of the victim's statements under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6) (4) denial of his motion for a continuance of the trial date (5) denial of his motion to admit recordings and photographs (6) exclusion of portions of body camera footage (7) denial of Defendant's motion for mistrial (8) exclusion of the victim's family's civil law suit (9) allowing the jury to use transcripts of audio recordings (10) not allowing defense counsel to question an officer regarding explicit recordings sent to him by Defendant (11) not allowing defense counsel to question whether Defendant was charged for the prior bad acts admitted under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) and (12) that he is entitled to relief under the cumulative error doctrine. After a thorough review of the entire record, the briefs, oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/5093044/shaheer-v-commissioner-of-correction/","attorney":"","caseName":"Shaheer v. Commissioner of Correction","caseNameFull":"","citation":["207 Conn. App. 449"],"citeCount":3,"cluster_id":5093044,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2021-09-14","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC43685","docket_id":60378974,"judge":"Bright; Alvord; Elgo","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:46:14.844805Z","date_created":"2021-09-13T12:03:58.521184Z","score":{"bm25":24.567078}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2293723,4693243,6357658,9424363],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP207/207AP372.pdf","id":4910429,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2021/09/14/shaheer_v._commissioner_of_correction_1.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-05T02:34:16.017147Z","date_created":"2021-09-13T12:03:58.524739Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"15b5bd6b711f491fa06026abe14748a93a6db7cc","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Seeley, J.; judgment denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed. J. Christopher Llinas, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner). Linda F. Currie, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese Hodge, state's attorney, Leah Hawley, senior assistant state's attorney, and Tamara Grosso, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4910429],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The petitioner, who had been convicted, on a plea of guilty, of the crimes of robbery in the second degree and tampering with physical evidence, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by, inter alia, failing to provide timely notice of his intention to use expert testimony in support of a duress defense. The habeas court rejected the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims and, with respect to his assertion that trial counsel failed to timely raise a defense of duress, the court found it to be without merit. Thereafter, the habeas court rendered judgment denying the habeas petition, and the petitioner, on the granting certification, appealed to this court. Held that the judgment of the habeas court denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was affirmed; the habeas court having thoroughly addressed the petitioner's argument that his counsel's representation was constitutionally ineffective, this court adopted the habeas court's well reasoned decision as a proper statement of the relevant facts and applicable law on that issue. Argued February 16—officially released September 14, 2021"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10298276/state-of-tennessee-v-jeremy-james-dalton/","attorney":"","caseName":"State of Tennessee v. Jeremy James Dalton","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10298276,"court":"Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Crim. App.","court_id":"tenncrimapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-12-20","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"M2023-01588-CCA-R3-CD","docket_id":69486532,"judge":"Judge Timothy L. Easter","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-12-20T16:16:44.752790Z","date_created":"2024-12-20T16:16:44.667305Z","score":{"bm25":24.370096}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8283,"cites":[105912,106862,107252,109309,109643,110138,111614,111992,134724,147529,1056916,1082966,1354429,1449376,1506546,1516950,1518439,1525276,2276003,2413820,2431765,2438211],"download_url":"https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/E-SIGNED-M2023-1588-CCA-DALTON.pdf","id":10764864,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/12/20/state_of_tennessee_v._jeremy_james_dalton.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T02:33:35.560839Z","date_created":"2024-12-20T16:16:44.685682Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"bdda207afb270ddabee4198987126942aabcaec6","snippet":"                                                                                                     12/20/2024\n           IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                            AT NASHVILLE\n                           Assigned on Briefs December 10, 2024\n\n             STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JEREMY JAMES DALTON\n\n                  Appeal from the Criminal Court for Fentress County\n                       No. 19-85 Zachary R. Walden, Judge1\n                       __________________","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10764864],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder and sentenced to forty years in incarceration after stabbing his neighbor, the victim, several times. Defendant represented himself at trial and now represents himself on appeal. He raises a variety of issues including: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient; (2) whether the trial court erred in admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of the victim; (3) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress; (4) whether the trial court should have granted a continuance; (5) whether the trial court erred in excluding a statement; (6) whether the trial court improperly allowed a witness to use a \"script\"; (7) whether the State violated Brady, Napue, or Giglio; (8) whether the State improperly used Defendant's prior convictions for impeachment; (9) whether Defendant was denied access to court; (10) whether the trial court properly limited Defendant's use of an intake video; (11) whether the trial court properly instructed the jury; (12) whether the State committed prosecutorial misconduct; (13) whether Defendant was denied compulsory process; (14) whether the trial court should have recused itself; (15) whether the appellate record was transmitted in error; (16) whether the sentence is excessive; and (17) whether cumulative error requires reversal of the conviction. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10010472/lanorris-obrien-chambers-v-state-of-tennessee/","attorney":"","caseName":"LaNorris O'Brien Chambers v. State of Tennessee","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10010472,"court":"Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Crim. App.","court_id":"tenncrimapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-07-22","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"M2023-00106-CCA-R3-PC","docket_id":68964285,"judge":"Judge Robert L. Holloway, Jr.","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-07-22T17:11:57.219049Z","date_created":"2024-07-22T17:11:57.165699Z","score":{"bm25":23.738113}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8285,"cites":[109648,111539,1077323],"download_url":"https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Majority%20Opinion%20-%20M2023-00106-CCA-R3-PC.pdf","id":10477073,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/07/22/lanorris_obrien_chambers_v._state_of_tennessee.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-27T17:38:10.860657Z","date_created":"2024-07-22T17:11:57.179549Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"19ead82fce3a36494401f35ab435909caee90cc6","snippet":"                                                                                                    07/22/2024\n           IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                            AT NASHVILLE\n                              Assigned on Briefs May 21, 2024\n\n        LANORRIS O’BRIEN CHAMBERS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE\n\n                  Appeal from the Circuit Court for Williamson County\n                     No. CR-220172      Michael W. Binkley, Judge\n                       ____________","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10477073],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Petitioner, LaNorris O'Brien Chambers, appeals as of right from the Williamson County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his guilty-pleaded convictions for robbery and fraudulent use of a credit or debit card between $1,000 and $2,500 and resulting fifteen-year sentence. After appointed post-conviction counsel filed a notice that no amended petition would be filed, the post-conviction court found that Petitioner had raised a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel however, the court summarily dismissed the petition, reasoning that Petitioner had \"fail[ed] to demonstrate any actual prejudice whatsoever\" because he sought to be resentenced rather than rescind his guilty pleas and proceed to trial. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing based upon his claims of having entered an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea after receiving ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review, we affirm."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4801852/northwest-hills-chrysler-jeep-llc-v-dept-of-motor-vehicles/","attorney":"","caseName":"Northwest Hills Chrysler Jeep, LLC v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4801852,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-10-27","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC42899","docket_id":18589079,"judge":"Lavine; Alvord; Cradle","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:38:01.823550Z","date_created":"2020-10-30T13:02:35.357104Z","score":{"bm25":23.666113}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2557149],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP201/201AP12.pdf","id":4582199,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/10/27/northwest_hills_chrysler_jeep_llc_v._dept._of_motor_vehicles_3.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:38:01.714728Z","date_created":"2020-10-30T13:02:35.359037Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"7bb1ff2cf689403f71a506af9ebeef718dda3ae8","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Appeal from the decision of the named defendant finding that good cause existed to allow the defendant FCA US, LLC, to establish a certain automobile dealer- ship, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis- trict of New Britain and tried to the court, Huddleston, J.; judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Affirmed. Jason T. Allen, pro hac vice, with whom were James J. Healy and, on the brief, Richard N. Sox, pro hac vice, for the appellants (plaintiffs). Eileen Meskill, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general, for the appellees (named defendant et al.). George W. Mykulak, pro hac vice, with whom were Charles D. Ray and, on the brief, Shawn S. Smith, for the appellee (defendant FCA US, LLC).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4582199],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiffs, four automobile dealerships, sought to preclude the defendant franchisor from establishing a certain new automobile dealership in the relevant market area of each plaintiff. The defendant Department of Motor Vehicles, after a hearing, found that good cause existed, pursuant to statute (§ 42-133dd (c)), to establish the proposed dealership. The plaintiffs appealed to the trial court, claiming, inter alia, that the depart- ment's decision was inconsistent and not supported by substantial evi- dence. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal. On the plaintiffs' appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly dismissed the appeal and rendered judgment for the defendants; because the claims raised by the plaintiffs in this court essentially reiterated the claims they raised in the trial court, this court adopted the trial court's thorough and well reasoned memorandum of decision as a proper statement of the facts and applicable law on the issues. Argued September 8—officially released October 27, 2020"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9502075/robert-h-beckham-v-city-of-waynesboro-tennessee/","attorney":"","caseName":"Robert H. Beckham v. City of Waynesboro, Tennessee","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9502075,"court":"Court of Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Ct. App.","court_id":"tennctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-05-14","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"M2023-00654-COA-R3-CV","docket_id":68528072,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-23T01:31:51.839830Z","date_created":"2024-05-14T20:11:11.387932Z","score":{"bm25":23.336462}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1045819,1047317],"download_url":"https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Majority%20Opinion%20-%20M2023-00654-COA-R3-CV.pdf","id":9968688,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/05/14/robert_h._beckham_v._city_of_waynesboro_tennessee.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-07-09T05:17:21.949452Z","date_created":"2024-05-14T20:11:11.390006Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"261fccefa4ad357fd0519a6651679b36fb5fac25","snippet":"                                                                                          05/14/2024\n               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                           AT NASHVILLE\n                                  April 3, 2024 Session\n\nROBERT H. BECKHAM ET AL. v. CITY OF WAYNESBORO, TENNESSEE\n\n                  Appeal from the Circuit Court for Wayne County\n                    No. 4820    Christopher V. Sockwell, Judge\n                     ___________________________________\n\n     ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9968688],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"In this personal injury action, the plaintiff slipped and fell while jumping off of a diving board during a visit to a city owned pool, injuring his knee. Thereafter, the plaintiff sued the city based on negligence to recover for his injuries sustained from the accident and his wife sought damages for a derivative claim for loss of consortium. The city filed an answer, raising the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute (hereinafter \"the TRUS\") as an affirmative defense. The city then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it was immune from liability under the TRUS because the city is a \"landowner\" as defined by the TRUS, the plaintiff was engaged in a \"recreational activity\" listed in the TRUS at the time of the accident, and none of the exceptions or limitations to the TRUS were applicable. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The trial court found that the language of the TRUS is not ambiguous and found that the city was immune from liability under the TRUS because the city pool, which is government-owned property, was being used for recreation at the time of the plaintiff's injury and involved an activity included in the TRUS, \"water sports.\" The plaintiffs appeal the trial court's holding that swimming in a city pool is a recreational activity protected under the TRUS. For the reasons stated below, we affirm."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10131783/moon-v-commissioner-of-correction/","attorney":"","caseName":"Moon v. Commissioner of Correction","caseNameFull":"","citation":["227 Conn. App. 838"],"citeCount":2,"cluster_id":10131783,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-09-10","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC46198","docket_id":69235685,"judge":"Elgo; Suarez; Keller","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:47:21.499198Z","date_created":"2024-10-08T18:05:38.490422Z","score":{"bm25":23.148035}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1946669,1965654,1972958,2136160,2155047,2331665,2404795,4446658,5140651,7838822,7839742,7840975,7841113,7842158,7843446,7845079,7846908,7847234,7847818,7850799,7853829,7854128,7855873,7858301,7858356,7860338,7861495,7870337,8225897,9059064,9540661,9723191,9896947,9901317],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP227/AP227.300.pdf","id":10598384,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/09/10/moon_v._commissioner_of_correction.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-06T08:42:07.154230Z","date_created":"2024-10-08T18:05:38.492672Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"21ee67a9a986ad79f08e04a582f990c7766138ae","snippet":"************************************************\n   The “officially released” date that appears near the\nbeginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be\npublished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it\nis released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the\nbeginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-\nion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-\ncially released” date appearing in the opinion.\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncor","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Newson, J.; judgment denying the petition; thereafter, the court, Newson, J., denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Affirmed. Naomi T. Fetterman, assigned counsel, for the appel- lant (petitioner). Linda F. Rubertone, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state's attorney, and Angela R. Macchiarulo, supervi- sory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respon- dent).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10598384],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was actually innocent of the crimes of which he had been convicted. The petitioner had planned to steal property from the victim with two other individuals, M and T, although T ultimately did not participate in the robbery. During the commission of the robbery by the petitioner and M, M shot and killed the victim. After a jury trial, the petitioner was convicted of felony murder, robbery in the first degree, and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree. In a subsequent trial, M was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect of the crimes with which he was charged stemming from the robbery. In his habeas petition, the petitioner claimed that, as a matter of law, he could not have conspired with M or formed an agreement with him to participate in a robbery of the victim because M lacked the mental capacity to engage in the charged crimes. The habeas court denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and subsequently denied the petition for certification to appeal. On the petitioner's appeal to this court, held: 1. The habeas court abused its discretion in denying the petition for certifica- tion to appeal; the petitioner's actual innocence claim involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason, that could have been resolved by a court in a different manner, and that raised a question that was adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 2. Even assuming, as this court did, that the fact of M's incapacity was newly discovered evidence, which was essential for the petitioner's claim regarding actual innocence, the petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court improperly concluded that he failed to prove that he was actually innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted: a. The petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving his actual innocence with regard to his conviction of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree: although there was no question that M was unable to form any intent to conspire with the petitioner to rob the victim and that, therefore, no crime of conspiracy could have been committed with M, the aggregate evidence at the petitioner's criminal trial and his habeas trial, all of which was required to be considered by the habeas court, would not prevent a reasonable jury from finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner was guilty of conspiring with T to commit the robbery, and, as such, even if evidence of M's incapacity had been presented at the petitioner's criminal trial, there was still sufficient evi- dence from which the jury could have found the petitioner guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery. b. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that he was actually innocent of robbery in the first degree and felony murder because M's mental state prevented him from forming any intent to participate in the robbery, which was the predicate felony for the felony murder charge: because the plain language of the statute governing first degree robbery (§ 53a-134 (a) (2)) provides that an individual may be guilty of first degree robbery if he or another participant in the crime uses or threatens the use of a deadly weapon, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that, during the commission of the robbery, the petitioner acted in concert with M; moreover, because the petitioner never disputed that M shot and killed the victim, the petitioner's criminal liability as an accessory for acts perpetrated by M was inherent in § 53a-134 (a) (2), and the fact that M lacked the ability to form any criminal intent due to his mental disease or defect did not excuse the petitioner from liability; furthermore, the felony murder statute (§ 53a-54c) does not require proof of intent and, because the petitioner was criminally liable as a participant in the robbery and the homicide was committed by the other participant, M, in the execution of that robbery, he was also guilty of felony murder pursuant to § 53a-54c. Argued February 7—officially released September 10, 2024"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4506629/david-michael-blevins-v-state-of-tennessee/","attorney":"","caseName":"David Michael Blevins v. State of Tennessee","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4506629,"court":"Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Crim. App.","court_id":"tenncrimapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2018-06-12","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"E2016-02304-CCA-R3-PC","docket_id":7144389,"judge":"Judge Thomas T. Woodall","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:04:19.200180Z","date_created":"2018-06-13T14:53:52.658976Z","score":{"bm25":23.006882}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8296,"cites":[108590,111170,1057949,1061016,1618013,1769614,2436045,2456151],"download_url":"http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/david_blevins_cca_opinion.pdf","id":4283882,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2018/06/12/david_michael_blevins_v._state_of_tennessee.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T16:05:09.778880Z","date_created":"2018-06-13T14:53:52.669885Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"7acc30a67e2263d22e4a467a7d6a37488ea61147","snippet":"                                                                                            06/12/2018\n        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                         AT KNOXVILLE\n                          Assigned on Briefs August 15, 2017\n\n           DAVID MICHAEL BLEVINS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE\n\n                  Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sullivan County\n                        No. C64574     R. Jerry Beck, Judge\n                      ___________________________________\n\n","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4283882],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Petitioner, David Michael Blevins, appeals the Sullivan County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court improperly found: (1) that he had waived his independent claim regarding a speedy trial violation and (2) that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to raise the speedy trial issue. Having reviewed the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4800112/northwest-hills-chrysler-jeep-llc-v-dept-of-motor-vehicles/","attorney":"","caseName":"Northwest Hills Chrysler Jeep, LLC v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4800112,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-10-27","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC42899","docket_id":18571399,"judge":"Lavine; Alvord; Cradle","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:38:01.663818Z","date_created":"2020-10-26T12:02:18.289526Z","score":{"bm25":22.883995}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2557149],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP201/201AP12.pdf","id":4580459,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/10/27/northwest_hills_chrysler_jeep_llc_v._dept._of_motor_vehicles_1.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:38:01.594561Z","date_created":"2020-10-26T12:02:18.291417Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"37e42c0474ad718fac4189144b2d98d213f36f14","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Appeal from the decision of the named defendant finding that good cause existed to allow the defendant FCA US, LLC, to establish a certain automobile dealer- ship, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis- trict of New Britain and tried to the court, Huddleston, J.; judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Affirmed. Jason T. Allen, pro hac vice, with whom were James J. Healy and, on the brief, Richard N. Sox, pro hac vice, for the appellants (plaintiffs). Eileen Meskill, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney gen- eral, for the appellees (named defendant et al.). George W. Mykulak, pro hac vice, with whom were Charles D. Ray and, on the brief, Shawn S. Smith, for the appellee (defendant FCA US, LLC).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4580459],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiffs, four automobile dealerships, sought to preclude the defendant franchisor from establishing a certain new automobile dealership in the relevant market area of each plaintiff. The defendant Department of Motor Vehicles, after a hearing, found that good cause existed, pursuant to statute (§ 42-133dd (c)), to establish the proposed dealership. The plaintiffs appealed to the trial court, claiming, inter alia, that the depart- ment's decision was inconsistent and not supported by substantial evi- dence. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal. On the plaintiffs' appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly dismissed the appeal and rendered judgment for the defendants; because the claims raised by the plaintiffs in this court essentially reiterated the claims they raised in the trial court, this court adopted the trial court's thorough and well reasoned memorandum of decision as a proper statement of the facts and applicable law on the issues. Argued September 8—officially released October 27, 2020"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10664578/roger-b-v-commissioner-of-correction/","attorney":"","caseName":"Roger B. v. Commissioner of Correction","caseNameFull":"","citation":["234 Conn. App. 630"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10664578,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2025-08-26","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC47136","docket_id":71192192,"judge":"Elgo; Moll; Lavine","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:47:42.365841Z","date_created":"2025-09-02T12:02:59.234772Z","score":{"bm25":22.869661}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP234/AP234.319.pdf","id":11126564,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2025/08/26/roger_b._v._commissioner_of_correction.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-14T21:49:20.156924Z","date_created":"2025-08-25T14:05:41.252955Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"ddde7ddf00759d48aa05cd04b259bd90bfc321fc","snippet":"************************************************\n   The “officially released” date that appears near the\nbeginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be\npublished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it\nis released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the\nbeginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-\nion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-\ncially released” date appearing in the opinion.\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncor","type":"combined-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[1862308,1909009,2324211,2404942,2405168,2554848,4162913,4170895,4409439,4678447,7839924,7842433,7843742,7845408,7849619,7849621,7857231,7862297,7875045,8205575,9429592,10745195,10783205],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP234/AP234.319.pdf","id":11131165,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2025/08/26/roger_b._v._commissioner_of_correction_1.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-08T09:18:54.263035Z","date_created":"2025-09-02T12:02:59.238421Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"6ba766f7810492e90e20cf47dcb60cad7ada7119","snippet":"************************************************\n   The “officially released” date that appears near the\nbeginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be\npublished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it\nis released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the\nbeginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-\nion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-\ncially released” date appearing in the opinion.\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncor","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where the petition was withdrawn in part; thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Bhatt, J.; judgment denying the petition, from which the peti- tioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment directed. Jeremy A. Kemp, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Joseph Patten Brown III, assigned coun- sel, for the appellant (petitioner). Rebecca R. Zeuschner, deputy assistant state's attor- ney, with whom, on the brief, were David R. Shannon, state's attorney, and Elizabeth M. Moseley, senior assis- tant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11126564,11131165],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The petitioner, who had been convicted of various crimes as a result of incidents that occurred between 1995 and 2000, appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment denying his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He claimed, inter alia, that his criminal trial counsel, C, and his counsel in two previous habeas trials, R and B, had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise a statute of limitations defense regarding the eighteen month delay between the issuance of the warrant for the petitioner's arrest in 2005 and the execution of the warrant in 2007. Held: The habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner was required to present new evidence in his third habeas trial, which B had not previously introduced, to demonstrate that C and B had rendered ineffective assistance, as the petitioner's claim that the court improperly applied the law of the case doctrine was based on his misunderstanding of that doctrine. The habeas court incorrectly determined that the petitioner failed to estab- lish that C and B had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, as the new evidence presented at the third habeas trial established that the police had made no attempts at all to serve him with the arrest warrant, and an expert's testimony laid bare C's misunderstanding of the required showing of preju- dice under State v. Crawford (202 Conn. 443) that was the basis of C's failure to file a motion to dismiss the charges against the petitioner. The petitioner satisfied his burden to establish that he was prejudiced under Strickland v. Washington (466 U.S. 668) as a result of C's failure to rely on the delay in the execution of the arrest warrant, and, in conjunction with other evidence adduced at the habeas trial, B's failure to introduce into evidence a blank arrest warrant service record form that had been in the possession of the police, which provided a devastating counterpoint that would have undermined the credibility of the state's vague and unsupported assertions at the criminal trial regarding its efforts to execute the warrant, left no question that the police did not exercise due diligence in executing In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the victims of sexual abuse and the crime of risk of injury to a child, we decline to use the petitioner's full name or to identify the victims or others through whom the victims' identities may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e. the warrant without unreasonable delay; accordingly, the habeas court's judgment was reversed and the case was remanded with direction to grant the writ of habeas corpus, to vacate the petitioner's conviction and to order a new trial. Argued February 19—officially released August 26, 2025"}]}