{"count":328023,"next":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/search/?cursor=cz0xMy44NTAxNDUmcz0xMDU3OTk3NiZ0PW8mZD0yMDI2LTEwLTAxJnA9Mg%3D%3D&q=PROOF+OF+WRITINGS&type=o","previous":null,"results":[{"absolute_url":"/opinion/6035495/qbe-insurance-v-jinx-proof-inc/","attorney":"","caseName":"QBE Insurance v. Jinx-Proof Inc.","caseNameFull":"QBE Insurance Corporation v. Jinx-Proof Inc., Doing Business as Beauty Bar","citation":["102 A.D.3d 508","959 N.Y.S.2d 19"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":6035495,"court":"Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York","court_citation_string":"N.Y. App. Div.","court_id":"nyappdiv","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2013-01-17","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"","docket_id":62395510,"judge":"Andrias, Daniels, Friedman, Manzanet, Román, Sweeny","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T07:51:04.337598Z","date_created":"2022-01-13T03:13:00.893653Z","score":{"bm25":35.20599}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2022372,5486571,5525891],"download_url":null,"id":5898567,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-07-07T20:23:41.415957Z","date_created":"2022-01-13T03:13:00.913286Z"},"ordering_key":2,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nFriedman and Román, JJ.,\nconcur in a separate memorandum by Friedman, J, as follows: While the relevant facts are more *509fully set forth in Justice Manzanet-Daniels’s concurring writing, what I find conclusive for the determination of this appeal are the following undisputed points: (1) the liability policy issued by plaintiff QBE Insurance Corporation to defendant J","type":"concurrence-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[2101105,2140872,2254441,5532143,5542933,5727073,5738796,5811034,5887060],"download_url":null,"id":5898569,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T04:07:00.426032Z","date_created":"2022-01-13T03:13:00.921023Z"},"ordering_key":4,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nAndrias, J.P.,\ndissents in a memorandum as follows: I do not believe that either plaintiff-insurer’s January 31, 2008 or February 26, 2008 letters, both of which plaintiff styled as a reservation of rights, may serve as an effective written notice of disclaimer of coverage of the assault and battery based claims against defendant Jinx-Proof in the underlying litigation. Therefore, I dissent and would modify the order on appeal to ","type":"dissent"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[5898566,5898567,5898568,5898569],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/6035492/qbe-insurance-v-jinx-proof-inc/","attorney":"","caseName":"QBE Insurance v. Jinx-Proof Inc.","caseNameFull":"QBE Insurance Corporation v. Jinx-Proof Inc., Doing Business as Beauty Bar","citation":["102 A.D.3d 508","959 N.Y.S.2d 19"],"citeCount":1,"cluster_id":6035492,"court":"Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York","court_citation_string":"N.Y. App. Div.","court_id":"nyappdiv","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2013-01-17","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"","docket_id":62395507,"judge":"Andrias, Daniels, Friedman, Manzanet, Román, Sweeny","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T07:51:04.261710Z","date_created":"2022-01-13T03:13:00.311262Z","score":{"bm25":33.661808}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2022372,5486571,5525891],"download_url":null,"id":5898561,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T04:06:54.745604Z","date_created":"2022-01-13T03:13:00.327372Z"},"ordering_key":2,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nFriedman and Román, JJ.,\nconcur in a separate memorandum by Friedman, J, as follows: While the relevant facts are more *509fully set forth in Justice Manzanet-Daniels’s concurring writing, what I find conclusive for the determination of this appeal are the following undisputed points: (1) the liability policy issued by plaintiff QBE Insurance Corporation to defendant J","type":"concurrence-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[2101105,2140872,2254441,5532143,5542933,5727073,5738796,5811034,5887060],"download_url":null,"id":5898563,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-26T17:48:52.513092Z","date_created":"2022-01-13T03:13:00.335206Z"},"ordering_key":4,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nAndrias, J.P.,\ndissents in a memorandum as follows: I do not believe that either plaintiff-insurer’s January 31, 2008 or February 26, 2008 letters, both of which plaintiff styled as a reservation of rights, may serve as an effective written notice of disclaimer of coverage of the assault and battery based claims against defendant Jinx-Proof in the underlying litigation. Therefore, I dissent and would modify the order on appeal to ","type":"dissent"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[5898560,5898561,5898562,5898563],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/1812385/default-proof-credit-card-systems-inc-v-friedland/","attorney":"","caseName":"Default Proof Credit Card Systems, Inc. v. Friedland","caseNameFull":"","citation":["992 So. 2d 442","2008 WL 4224345"],"citeCount":8,"cluster_id":1812385,"court":"District Court of Appeal of Florida","court_citation_string":"Fla. Dist. Ct. App.","court_id":"fladistctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2008-09-17","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"3D07-2785, 3D07-1845","docket_id":1389234,"judge":"Green, Suarez, and Cortiã‘as","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-21T06:27:07.214765Z","date_created":"2014-10-30T16:21:36.814069Z","score":{"bm25":25.062508}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[117892,1684369,1752127,1770931,1809580,1827476,2526441],"download_url":null,"id":1812385,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T12:32:53.011406Z","date_created":"2013-10-30T07:30:21.207458Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"8902f430934418c07bd6f76fdd9adb3fc0144f3d","snippet":"\n992 So.2d 442 (2008)\nDEFAULT PROOF CREDIT CARD SYSTEMS, INC., etc. and Vincent Cuervo, etc., Appellants,\nv.\nDavid Kenneth FRIEDLAND, etc.; Leslie Jean Lott, etc.; Lott & Friedland, P.A., a Florida corporation; Sanchelima & Associates, P.A., a Florida corporation; Jesus Sanchelima, etc.; Raymond P. Niro, individually, and Niro, Scavone, Haller & Niro, etc., Appellees,\nDefault Proof Credit Card Systems, Inc., etc. and Vincent Cuervo","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[6914,7087],"panel_names":["Melvia B. Green","Richard J. Suarez"],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[1812385],"source":"L","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4724065/the-electric-employees-civil-service-and-pension-board-of-metropolitan/","attorney":"","caseName":"The Electric Employees' Civil Service and Pension Board of Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee v. Brian Mansell","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4724065,"court":"Court of Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Ct. App.","court_id":"tennctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-02-04","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"M2019-00413-COA-R3-CV","docket_id":16802938,"judge":"Presiding Judge Frank G. Clements Jr.","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T02:07:29.228404Z","date_created":"2020-02-04T20:09:31.062769Z","score":{"bm25":19.013256}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[305500,398841,1051404,1052557,1071745,1367550,1484942,1631349,2185175,2336535,2342242,2355836,2457962],"download_url":"http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/electricemployees.mansell.opn_.pdf","id":4504392,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/02/04/the_electric_employees_civil_service_and_pension_board_of_metropolitan.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T18:38:23.862197Z","date_created":"2020-02-04T20:09:31.077133Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"14e22d49d4b872b674837f0ed540d50dff652ddc","snippet":"                                                                                           02/04/2020\n                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                            AT NASHVILLE\n                               November 6, 2019 Session\n\nTHE ELECTRIC EMPLOYEES’ CIVIL SERVICE AND PENSION BOARD\nOF METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON\n          COUNTY, TENNESSEE v. BRIAN MANSELL\n\n                Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County\n                  No. 18-","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4504392],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"This appeal arises from the decision of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County Electric Power Board to terminate a Nashville Electric Service (\"NES\") cable splicer/working foreman. The foreman allegedly approved fraudulent timesheets for a Metropolitan Nashville Police Department officer, who performed traffic control at NES jobsites for a private contractor. After NES preferred charges against the foreman and suspended him without pay, the board referred the matter to an administrative law judge (\"the ALJ\") for adjudication. Following a two-day administrative hearing, the ALJ made numerous findings of fact and conclusions of law in a 55-page report. The ALJ found that the foreman's job description did not include verifying the accuracy of the timesheets, NES had not trained the foreman on how to verify the accuracy of the timesheets, and a majority of the inaccurate timesheets could be explained by NES's common practice of rounding up hours at the end of an officer's shift. Although there was evidence that the officer overstated his hours, the ALJ found the evidence was insufficient to establish the foreman knowingly approved any false timesheets. Accordingly, the ALJ recommended that the charges of termination be denied and that the foreman be reinstated without back pay. After reviewing the ALJ's report, the board rejected his recommendation and approved NES's termination of the foreman. However, the board did not make its own findings of fact or express disagreement with the ALJ's findings. After the foreman filed his petition for judicial review, the trial court reviewed the administrative record and heard arguments of counsel. In its final order, the trial court concluded that \"NES's lack of proof and the apparent acceptance of time-approval practices combine here to demonstrate a lack of substantial and material evidence to uphold the Board's decision to terminate.\" Thus, the trial court reversed the board's decision, adopted the ALJ's Report in toto, and directed that the foreman \"be reinstated, without backpay.\" On appeal, the board contends the trial court applied incorrect principles of law and reweighed the evidence. We disagree. The Charter of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County requires the Electric Power Board to reduce its findings to writing when taking disciplinary action against an employee. In this case, the board rejected the recommendation of the ALJ without making alternative findings of fact to support or explain its reasoning. Thus, the only findings of fact, credibility determinations, and conclusions of law in the administrative record are those of the ALJ. Because the ALJ's findings are supported by substantial and material evidence, we conclude that NES failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the foreman knowingly approved false timesheets for the police officer. We also conclude that a reasoning mind could not have reached the same conclusion as the board under a proper application of the controlling legal principles. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/6658704/alvarado-v-state/","attorney":"","caseName":"Alvarado v. State","caseNameFull":"Stephen W. ALVARADO v. STATE of Alaska","citation":["440 P.3d 329"],"citeCount":2,"cluster_id":6658704,"court":"Court of Appeals of Alaska","court_citation_string":"Alaska Ct. App.","court_id":"alaskactapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2019-02-22","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Court of Appeals No. A-12105","docket_id":63637180,"judge":"Allard, Mannheimer, Writing","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T10:39:01.182536Z","date_created":"2022-07-19T21:45:07.688309Z","score":{"bm25":18.01291}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":6536114,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-26T20:23:45.400678Z","date_created":"2022-07-19T21:45:07.696504Z"},"ordering_key":1,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nJudge ALLARD, writing for the Court.\nFollowing a jury trial, Stephen W. Alvarado was convicted of four counts of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor based on evidence that he sexually abused his six-year-old daughter, S.S., on two separate occasions.1 At sentencing, the court imposed a composite sentence of 57 years and 6 months to serve. Alvarado challenges both his convictions and his sentence, raisin","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[6536114,6536115,6536116],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10282401/state-v-fisher/","attorney":"","caseName":"State v. Fisher","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2024 Ohio 5520"],"citeCount":5,"cluster_id":10282401,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-11-22","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"L-23-173","docket_id":69406990,"judge":"Zmuda","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-11-22T20:41:24.106688Z","date_created":"2024-11-22T20:41:24.035145Z","score":{"bm25":17.453129}},"neutralCite":"2024 Ohio 5520","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[4529478,6114761,6774673,6775376,6780657,6783630,8375246,9349211,9388795,9390967,9882607,9894950,9894951,9918443,9948464,10453316,10742964],"download_url":"https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/6/2024/2024-Ohio-5520.pdf","id":10748989,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/11/22/state_v._fisher.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T02:29:54.779060Z","date_created":"2024-11-22T20:41:24.050221Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"7704698c0f3c347b6942fb94d91877408b5c4bed","snippet":"[Cite as State v. Fisher, 2024-Ohio-5520.]\n\n\n\n\n                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO\n                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT\n                                      LUCAS COUNTY\n\nState of Ohio                                    Court of Appeals No. L-23-173\n\n        Appellee                                 Trial Court No. CR0202102870\n\nv.\n\nRasheed Fisher                                   DECISION AND JUDGMENT\n\n        Appellant                              ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10748989],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Zmuda, writing for the majority, affirms the judgment; the weight of the evidence supported the jury's finding that the state met the burden of proof in rebuttal of the self-defense claim, and appellant admitted the conduct as to each offense in asserting self-defense, with the state's witnesses proffering testimony to support the essential elements of each charged offense."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/7679191/okuarume-v-s-univ-of-new-orleans/","attorney":"Judge Tiffany G. Chase *1262The Appellant, Augustine Okuarume (hereinafter \"Mr. Okuarume\"), appeals the June 12, 2017 trial court judgment granting the motion for summary judgment filed by his former employer, Southern University of New Orleans (hereinafter \"SUNO\").1 Accordingly, for the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's judgment granting the motion for summary judgment., Mr. Okuarume was hired as an adjunct instructor by SUNO, in the Spring semester of 1991, to teach evening and weekend business courses. He maintained this position from Spring 1991 to Spring 1994. Mr. Okuarume signed a teaching assignment memorandum (hereinafter \"teaching agreements\") for Fall 1991, Fall 1992, Spring 1993, Fall 1993 and Spring 1994.2 The teaching agreements indicated which classes Mr. Okuarume would teach and the projected salary schedule for each class taught.3 On May 12, 1995 Mr. Okuarume filed a petition for damages for unpaid wages arguing that SUNO added classes to his teaching schedule whereby he was teaching the same amount of classes as a full-time instructor but was not being compensated the same. He further argued that SUNO refused to pay him the additional salary in accordance with La. R.S. 23:631.4, On December 1, 2016, SUNO filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that there was no contractual dispute between the parties because Mr. Okuarume was paid the amount he agreed to in his teaching agreement and that the revisions of La. R.S. 23:631 were inapplicable. In support of its motion for summary judgment, SUNO submitted teaching agreements, signed by Mr. Okuarume, for Fall 1991, Fall 1992, Spring 1993, Fall 1993 and Spring 1994; correspondence from Viola D. King, Dean of Evening and Weekend College, regarding Mr. Okuarume's employment; pay stubs for Mr. Okuarume for the relevant semesters; an affidavit from Winston G. DeCuir, Sr. providing excerpts of the rules and policies of SUNO as well as, excerpts from the faculty guide for the evening and weekend college at SUNO; and an affidavit from Dr. Press L. Robinson, former chancellor of SUNO, providing details on the role and responsibilities of an adjunct instructor at SUNO., In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Mr. Okuarume maintained that SUNO expanded his duties and failed to comply with the signed teaching agreements because it added additional courses after the teaching agreements were executed and as such, he was entitled to be paid as a full-time instructor. In support of his opposition to the motion, Mr. Okuarume submitted logs which listed other instructors, the courses assigned to each and the salary received; an unsigned position *1263vacancy announcement indicating the position for which Mr. Okuarume was applying for as a \"tenure\" position; SUNO's evening and weekend college faculty guide; and an affidavit from Mr. Okuarume detailing the specific work he performed as an instructor., Following the hearing, the trial court granted SUNO's motion for summary judgment and dismissed Mr. Okuarume's case. This appeal followed., An appellate court reviews a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment de novo. In Chatelain , this Court set forth the applicable standard of review as follows:, *1264La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3) provides that \"After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\" The applicable statutory authority provides that the initial burden of proof lies with the party moving for summary judgment. However, the burden to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact rests with the adverse party.6, This Court must first determine whether or not a valid contract exists between Mr. Okuarume and SUNO. SUNO argues to this Court, as it did in its motion for summary judgment, that Mr. Okuarume agreed to work as a temporary adjunct instructor and a contract was formed when he signed the teaching agreements accepting the assignment at the stated rate. Mr. Okuarume disagrees with SUNO's assertion, maintaining that the manner in which he was employed and the teaching agreements failed to establish a contractual agreement and designate his specific scope of employment., A contract is an agreement by two or more parties whereby obligations are created, modified, or extinguished.7 \"Four elements are required for confection of a valid contract: (1) the capacity to contract; (2) mutual consent; (3) a certain object; and (4) lawful cause.\"8 As to the capacity to contract and the lawful cause to contract, those elements are not at issue in this litigation., We therefore turn to the issue of mutual consent. \"[A] contract is formed by the consent of the parties established through offer and acceptance. Unless otherwise prescribed, offer and acceptance may be made orally, in writing, or by action or inaction that under the circumstances is clearly indicative of consent.\"9 Mr. Okuarume was offered a position as an adjunct instructor by SUNO. He accepted this position and agreed to be paid a certain rate for each class taught. The teaching agreements indicate that Mr. Okuarume would teach three-hour courses and, as such, would be paid $1,100.00 per three-hour course. Mr. Okuarume signed the teaching agreements prior to the start of each semester and checked where designated to indicate his acceptance of the agreement.10 Mr. Okuarume checked that he accepted the teaching agreements on all but two of the signed teaching agreements.11 However, his acceptance of those two teaching agreements is evidenced by his performance of the duties outlined in the teaching agreement. As such, there was mutual consent between the parties regarding the teaching agreements., Concerning the issue of the contract object, the numerous teaching agreements constitute contracts between Mr. Okuarume and SUNO. The teaching agreements clearly identify which classes Mr. Okuarume would teach and the projected *1265salary schedule for each class taught. As such, we find all of the elements necessary for a valid contract existed between Mr. Okuarume and SUNO., \"An implied in fact contract rests upon consent implied from facts and circumstances showing a mutual intention to contract. Consent to an obligation may be implied from action only when circumstances unequivocally indicate an agreement or when the law presumes it.\"12 The requirement for Mr. Okuarume to hold office hours created no additional duties since it is specified in the faculty handbook that adjunct instructors must make themselves available by appointment, before or after class, when a student requests a conference. Mr. Okuarume's argument is unsupported by the facts presented to the trial court. We likewise disagree with this assertion., We will now consider Mr. Okuarume's argument that teaching additional courses entitled him to full-time pay. Although the teaching agreements list the courses that were assigned to Mr. Okuarume, additional courses were assigned that were not listed on the teaching agreement. Each teaching agreements list two to three courses per semester to be taught by Mr. Okuarume. After the agreements were signed, SUNO added one course to Mr. Okuarume's Spring 1993 semester course load and one additional course to his Spring 1994 semester course load. In total, Mr. Okuarume taught two courses in Spring 1991, two courses in Fall 1991, three courses in Spring 1992, four courses in Fall 1992, three courses in Spring 1993, two courses in Fall 1993 and four courses in Spring 1994. SUNO paid Mr. Okuarume $1,100.00 for each course he taught. The teaching agreements provide that SUNO \"reserve[s] the right to modify this assignment, if necessary.\" The additional courses were modifications of the agreement. Mr. Okuarume was assigned additional courses to teach and was paid accordingly. He presented no evidence to the trial court which would indicate that SUNO intended for him to be hired and paid as a full-time instructor. Furthermore, an implied contract can only be created by mutual intention of the parties and \"there can be no implied contract where there is an express contract between the same parties in reference to the same subject matter.\"13 As evidenced by the teaching agreements, an actual contractual agreement did exist between Mr. Okuarume and SUNO and as such, no implied contract could have existed., We will now consider Mr. Okuarume's breach of contract claim. Based on the petition for damages Mr. Okuarume sought additional compensation that SUNO refused to pay. Essentially, *1266Mr. Okuarume maintains that this refusal to pay is tantamount to a breach of the duty to pay him what was owed. He argues that SUNO breached its obligation to pay him in the manner and level of that equivalent to a full-time instructor. This argument is flawed because it is premised on the existence of an implied contract. As discussed above, an implied contract was not formed. Hence, the only inquiry for the trial court was whether a breach of contract occurred based on SUNO's obligation under the teaching agreements. The trial court noted that the statute Mr. Okuarume filed his petition for damages under, La. R.S. 23:631, requires that a person be paid under the terms of their employment. The trial court reasoned that:, The terms of employment are outlined in the teaching agreements. There is no dispute that Mr. Okuarume was paid the $1,100.00 per three hour course as required by the teaching agreements. \"The essential elements of a breach of contract claim are the existence of a contract, the party's breach thereof, and resulting damages.\"14 Mr. Okuarume was paid under the terms of the teaching agreements he accepted. He does not argue that he was not paid correctly, for each class he taught, nor does he establish that he was a full-time instructor who was entitled to the salary of a full-time instructor. He was paid according to the terms of the teaching agreements, which was $1,100.00 per three hour course. As such, we find the trial court did not err in concluding that there was no breach of contract between Mr. Okuarume and SUNO., Mr. Okuarume has not demonstrated that an implied contract was formed. Further, he has not established that SUNO breached the terms of the teaching agreements. Therefore, we find that as a matter of law, Mr. Okuarume has failed to raise any genuine issues of material fact which would preclude the granting of the motion for summary judgment. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court granting SUNO's motion for summary judgment., The original petition for damages also named the Board of Supervisors of Southern University and Dr. Robert B. Gex, who was the Chancellor of Southern University of New Orleans in 1995 when the original petition for damages was filed., Mr. Okuarume did not sign the teaching agreements for Spring 1991 and Spring 1992., All teaching agreements contained boiler plate language, with the specific courses assigned for that specific semester written in on each document.","caseName":"Okuarume v. S. Univ. of New Orleans","caseNameFull":"Augustine \"Austin\" OKUARUME v. SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS The Board of Supervisors of Southern University and Dr. Robert B. Gex, Chancellor of Southern University of New Orleans","citation":["245 So. 3d 1260"],"citeCount":4,"cluster_id":7679191,"court":"Louisiana Court of Appeal","court_citation_string":"La. Ct. App.","court_id":"lactapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2018-04-25","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"NO. 2017–CA–0897","docket_id":64680312,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T15:13:57.259276Z","date_created":"2022-07-29T11:51:58.951873Z","score":{"bm25":16.363018}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":7613972,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-26T23:05:41.260275Z","date_created":"2022-07-29T11:51:58.960598Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\n4 La. R.S. 23:631. Discharge or resignation of employees; payment after termination of employment.\n5 Chatelain v. Fluor Daniel Const. Co. , 2014-1312, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/10/15), 179 So.3d 791, 793 (citations omit","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[7613972],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10055169/state-v-henson/","attorney":"","caseName":"State v. Henson","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2024 Ohio 3137"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10055169,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-08-16","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"E-23-052","docket_id":69051272,"judge":"Zmuda","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-08-23T15:12:40.504681Z","date_created":"2024-08-23T15:12:40.416270Z","score":{"bm25":15.67462}},"neutralCite":"2024 Ohio 3137","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2749085,3692305,3755524,6323758,6758010,7799112,8482836,9925295,10509170],"download_url":"https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/6/2024/2024-Ohio-3137.pdf","id":10521769,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/08/16/state_v._henson_25.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T01:30:14.158352Z","date_created":"2024-08-23T15:12:40.428599Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"5a9525f86e3206daac3f029fa4d15f07506e9f0f","snippet":"[Cite as State v. Henson, 2024-Ohio-3137.]\n\n\n\n\n                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO\n                                SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT\n                                      ERIE COUNTY\n\n\nState of Ohio                                          Court of Appeals No. E-23-052\n\n        Appellee                                       Trial Court No. 2004 CR 0450\n\nv.\n\nHerbert Henson                                         DECISION AND JUDGMENT\n\n        Appellant              ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10521769],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Zmuda, J., writing for the majority, affirms the trial court's judgment denying leave to file a motion for new trial based on the lack of clear and convincing proof that Henson was unavoidably prevented from filing the motion within the time provided under Crim.R. 33(B). As leave was denied, the trial court never properly reached the merits of Henson's motion for new trial and no review of the merits is necessary on appeal."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4776131/michael-surber-v-mountain-states-health-alliance-dba-johnson-city/","attorney":"","caseName":"Michael Surber v. Mountain States Health Alliance d/b/a Johnson City Medical Center - Concurring","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4776131,"court":"Court of Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Ct. App.","court_id":"tennctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-08-18","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"E2019-01494-COA-R3-CV","docket_id":17454528,"judge":"Judge D. Michael Swiney","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T02:20:59.047490Z","date_created":"2020-08-18T18:10:55.899605Z","score":{"bm25":15.401961}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8281,"cites":[1057568],"download_url":"http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/surber_v._mountain_states_e2019-01494_b.pdf","id":4556478,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/08/18/michael_surber_v._mountain_states_health_alliance_dba_johnson_city.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T19:14:22.664155Z","date_created":"2020-08-18T18:10:55.907317Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"ee9b462a2ffcd652169e290901e105e2fe953bd5","snippet":"                                                                                            08/18/2020\n                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                           AT KNOXVILLE\n                                  July 22, 2020 Session\n\n MICHAEL SURBER v. MOUNTAIN STATES HEALTH ALLIANCE d/b/a\n             JOHNSON CITY MEDICAL CENTER\n\n                Appeal from the Circuit Court for Washington County\n                     No. 33593     J. Eddie Lauderback, Judge\n\n\n                ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4556478],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"I concur in the decision to affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Washington County. I write separately to explain what I think is an additional crucial difference in this case from Barkes v. River Park Hosp., Inc., 328 S.W.3d 829 (Tenn. 2010). In addition to what is stated in this Court's Opinion, I believe what distinguishes this case from Barkes is the respective plaintiff's proof as to the defendant hospital's duty of reasonable care to its patients and the applicable standard of care relative to that hospital's duty."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10706804/papantoniou-v-commissioner-of-correction/","attorney":"","caseName":"Papantoniou v. Commissioner of Correction","caseNameFull":"","citation":["235 Conn. App. 674"],"citeCount":3,"cluster_id":10706804,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":"SA","dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2025-10-14","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC46189","docket_id":71638744,"judge":"Elgo; Seeley; Bishop","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:46:47.623387Z","date_created":"2025-10-20T13:04:09.568811Z","score":{"bm25":15.239969}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP235/AP235.999.pdf","id":11168149,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2025/10/14/papantoniou_v._commissioner_of_correction.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-14T22:32:14.356737Z","date_created":"2025-10-14T13:04:24.280873Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"6afa31722fe6174f33485fcdf8b7f4185ba90205","snippet":"************************************************\n   The “officially released” date that appears near the\nbeginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be\npublished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it\nis released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the\nbeginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-\nion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-\ncially released” date appearing in the opinion.\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncor","type":"combined-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[103050,655295,767895,781300,784911,786594,789897,1547495,1908390,2079049,2306924,4209719,4223555,4309646,4312879,4314763,4995873,5160210,6358026,7840194,7843835,7847244,7858366,7861763,7864506,7923393,8232216,8232322,9422583,9424363,9427906,9430360,9432696,9434209,9497072,10745203,10745210,10745243],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP235/AP235.999.pdf","id":11173391,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2025/10/14/papantoniou_v._commissioner_of_correction_1.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-08T07:33:02.574862Z","date_created":"2025-10-20T13:04:09.573081Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"d3bcc621f9b1625056904e54721cb1a12ad277ca","snippet":"************************************************\n   The “officially released” date that appears near the\nbeginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be\npublished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it\nis released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the\nbeginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-\nion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-\ncially released” date appearing in the opinion.\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncor","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, M. Murphy, J.; judgment granting the petition in part, from which the respondent, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Reversed in part; judgment directed. Rocco A. Chiarenza, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John P. Doyle, Jr., state's attorney, and Craig P. Nowak, supervisory assis- tant state's attorney, for the appellant (respondent). Vishal Garg, assigned counsel, for the appellee (peti- tioner).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11168149,11173391],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The respondent Commissioner of Correction appealed, on the granting of certification, from the habeas court's judgment granting in part the petition- er's petition for a writ of habeas corpus after concluding that the petitioner's sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel had been vio- lated due to an undisclosed, actual conflict of interest on the part of his criminal defense counsel, G. The respondent claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that the petitioner had established that G was burdened by an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his repre- sentation of the petitioner. Held: The habeas court's finding that G simultaneously represented both the peti- tioner at the time of the petitioner's criminal trial and S, a witness who testified on behalf of the state at the petitioner's criminal trial, was clearly erroneous, as it was undisputed that another attorney filed an appearance in place of G in S's criminal case before the commencement of the petitioner's criminal trial, and, thereafter, G did not file any appearances on behalf of S at any time prior to the conclusion of the petitioner's trial or his sentencing, nor was there any documentary or testimonial evidence in the record that G provided legal representation to S in any court proceeding or otherwise at the time of the petitioner's criminal trial. The habeas court's finding that G represented S at a hearing six weeks prior to the start of the petitioner's criminal trial was clearly erroneous, as the relevant court files, considered in tandem with the unequivocal statements that S's defense counsel had filed an appearance in the unrelated criminal case, which were included in conflicting transcripts from that hearing, con- vinced this court that a mistake had been made regarding G's alleged repre- sentation of S at the hearing in question. The habeas court improperly concluded that G's representation of S and the petitioner for four months prior to the start of the petitioner's criminal trial created a conflict of interest with respect to G's representation of the petitioner in his criminal trial, as this court, having considered the facts of this case under the multifactored analysis set forth in State v. Davis (344 Conn. 122), concluded that there was no evidence that G's simultaneous representation of S and the petitioner in the early stages of the petitioner's criminal trial and S's unrelated criminal case was anything other than tran- sient and insubstantial. Even if this court were to conclude that a conflict of interest existed, the petitioner failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that the conflict of interest adversely affected G's representation of the petitioner, as G's failure to use S's prior convictions and pending cases to attack his credibility at trial actually demonstrated that G was acting in the petitioner's best interest with respect to S, who was the only witness to corroborate the petitioner's account of what transpired the night of the murder. The habeas court improperly determined that the petitioner's sixth amend- ment right to the effective assistance of counsel was violated by G's failure to notify the petitioner in writing of his prior representation of S pursuant to rule 1.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, as a party must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his attorney's perfor- mance, and proof that an attorney violated rule 1.7 was not sufficient to establish a violation of a client's sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Argued May 23, 2024—officially released October 14, 2025"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/6658122/in-re-struemke/","attorney":"[¶1] This matter came before the Court upon a Report and Recommendation that Respondent be Transferred to Disability Inactive Status, filed herein January 18, 2019, by the Board of Professional Responsibility for the Wyoming State Bar, pursuant to a stipulated motion and Rule 20 of the Wyoming Rules of Disciplinary Procedure. The Court, after a careful review of the Board of Professional Responsibility's Report and Recommendation, and the file, finds that the Report and Recommendation should be adopted by the Court and that William K. Struemke's membership with the Wyoming State Bar should be transferred to disability inactive status. It is, therefore,, [¶4] ORDERED that, if Mr. Struemke applies for reinstatement prior to his membership being terminated pursuant to Rule 23(f), in addition to the requirements of Rule 23 of the Wyoming Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, Mr. Struemke must also submit proof that he has passed (1) the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam (MPRE) and (2) an accredited college or law school writing class of at least one semester; and it is further","caseName":"In re Struemke","caseNameFull":"In the MATTER OF the Bar Membership of William K. STRUEMKE, Wyoming State Bar No. 7-4619","citation":["433 P.3d 892"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":6658122,"court":"Wyoming Supreme Court","court_citation_string":"Wyo.","court_id":"wyo","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2019-01-30","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"","docket_id":63636591,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T10:38:51.841653Z","date_created":"2022-07-19T21:40:35.023377Z","score":{"bm25":15.069662}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":6535483,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-24T21:36:00.043475Z","date_created":"2022-07-19T21:40:35.027685Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nBY THE COURT:\n/s/\nMICHAEL K. DAVIS\nChief Justice\n","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[6535483],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10019906/city-and-county-of-denver-colorado-v-industrial-claim-appeals-office-of/","attorney":"","caseName":"CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, Colorado v. INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS OFFICE of the State of Colorado and Andrew Sipres","caseNameFull":"","citation":["506 P.3d 100","2021 COA 146"],"citeCount":6,"cluster_id":10019906,"court":"Colorado Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Colo. Ct. App.","court_id":"coloctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2021-12-02","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Court of Appeals No. 21CA0275","docket_id":68987483,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-07-29T16:05:50.059978Z","date_created":"2024-07-29T16:05:50.002544Z","score":{"bm25":15.061105}},"neutralCite":"2021 COA 146","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1213850,1214421,1374959,1444091,2582677,2607418,4024923,4417893,4560824,4880378,5160068,5178096,6533089,10486505],"download_url":"https://colorado.vlex.io/vid/-907372657/content","id":10486507,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"html/2021/12/02/city_and_county_of_denver_colorado_v._industrial_claim_appeals_office_of.html","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-27T17:42:17.034035Z","date_created":"2024-07-29T16:05:50.016270Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"c203b388b06ec1e475cd8ff8f48239679dce73ec","snippet":"506 P.3d 1002021 COA 146CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, Colorado, Petitioner,v.INDUSTRIAL CLAIM APPEALS OFFICE of the State of Colorado and Andrew Sipres, Respondents.Court of Appeals No. 21CA0275Colorado Court of Appeals, Division V.Announced December 2, 2021Kristin M. Bronson, City Attorney, Stephen J. Abbott, Assistant City Attorney, Jo","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10486507],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9352183/postoak-v-bassett/","attorney":"Parker Law Firm, PLLC, by: Michael A. Louden, for appellant., Phyllis A. Edwards, Little Rock, for appellee., *102The appellees contend that the simple fact that Postoak ran a second batch of bad parts so shortly after being reprimanded for doing that very thing was proof of an intentional disregard of the employer's interest. Postoak, however, explains that while he did receive two warnings in a short period of time, each write-up was for a different reason. The first time, it was because \"he ran a batch of undersized parts.\" The second time, \"he ran an oversized pilot.\" Postoak then argues that two separate warnings for different reasons is not sufficient to demonstrate that his mistakes were nothing more than ordinary negligence and that they were not of such a degree or recurrence as to manifest wrongful intent, evil design, or an intentional disregard of the employer's interests.","caseName":"Postoak v. Bassett","caseNameFull":"Bobby POSTOAK v. Daryl BASSETT, Director, Department of Workforce Services and Webb Wheel Products, Inc.","citation":["547 S.W.3d 100"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9352183,"court":"Court of Appeals of Arkansas","court_citation_string":"Ark. Ct. App.","court_id":"arkctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2018-03-07","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"No. E–17–247","docket_id":66667920,"judge":"Abramson, Agree, Glover","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-23T00:54:22.283231Z","date_created":"2022-12-19T20:30:07.256911Z","score":{"bm25":14.8501625}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":9347653,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-27T05:35:27.116520Z","date_created":"2022-12-19T20:30:07.274881Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"MIKE MURPHY, Judge *101Appellant Bobby Postoak appeals from the Board of Review's (Board) decision affirming the Appeal Tribunal's denial of benefits to him under Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-514(a) (Supp. 2017) on finding he was discharged from last work for misconduct in connection with the work. We reverse and remand for an award of benefits.B","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9347653],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10622703/interest-of-bf-if/","attorney":"","caseName":"Interest of B.F. & I.F.","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2025 ND 127"],"citeCount":3,"cluster_id":10622703,"court":"North Dakota Supreme Court","court_citation_string":"N.D.","court_id":"nd","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2025-07-03","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Nos. 20250159 & 20250160","docket_id":70699507,"judge":"Tufte, Jerod E.","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-07-03T14:08:41.477091Z","date_created":"2025-07-03T14:08:40.895484Z","score":{"bm25":14.72571}},"neutralCite":"2025 ND 127","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2653334,2671829,2960712,4581088,8247272,9376670,9835845,9925602,9948492],"download_url":"https://www.ndcourts.gov/supreme-court/opinions/188045","id":11089291,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2025/07/03/interest_of_b.f..pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-07T21:48:07.316750Z","date_created":"2025-07-03T14:08:40.904623Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"150d9330029b8d63483c3d37315c2d484cc978c6","snippet":"                      IN THE SUPREME COURT\n                      STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA\n\n                                   2025 ND 127\n\nIn the Interest of B.F., a Child\n\nSarah Boyer, Cass County\nHuman Service Zone,                                   Petitioner and Appellee\n       v.\nB.F., a child; A.F., father,                                     Respondents\n       and\nC.C., mother,                                      Respondent and Appellant\n\n\n\n                                   No. 20250159\n\nI","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11089291],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"Appeal - Juvenile - Termination of Parental Rights","syllabus":"An appeal from a juvenile court order terminating parental rights is affirmed. A factfinder may rely in its findings on an affidavit if the affidavit is properly offered and received into the evidentiary record. Termination of parental rights proceedings under N.D.C.C. ch. 27-20.3 are governed by the North Dakota Rules of Juvenile Procedure and, to the extent they are not inconsistent with the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. N.D.R.Juv.P. 16 applies to motions to vacate in termination of parental rights proceedings under N.D.C.C. ch. 27-20.3. Rule 16, N.D.R.Juv.P., provides for both mandatory and discretionary modification of orders. A court's exercise of its discretion under N.D.R.Juv.P. 16(b) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A court's discretion to modify orders under N.D.R.Juv.P. 16(b) is narrow when the order at issue is an order terminating parental rights. Under N.D.R.Juv.P. 16(b)(2), a court may only vacate an order terminating parental rights on motion of the parent if the child is not placed for adoption and the person having custody of the child consents in writing to the vacation of the decree. When a parent fails to appear at a proceeding under N.D.C.C. ch. 27-20.3, a juvenile court does not violate the parent's constitutional due process rights if it exercises its discretion to proceed under N.D.R.Juv.P. 10."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10297356/reinstatement-of-kirwan/","attorney":"","caseName":"Reinstatement of Kirwan","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10297356,"court":"Court of Appeals of Maryland","court_citation_string":"Md.","court_id":"md","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-12-19","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"16ag/24","docket_id":69483593,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-12-20T06:34:47.298159Z","date_created":"2024-12-19T20:10:27.436929Z","score":{"bm25":14.681076}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"https://www.mdcourts.gov/data/opinions/coa/2024/16a24ag.pdf","id":10763944,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/12/19/reinstatement_of_kirwan.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T02:33:28.834781Z","date_created":"2024-12-19T20:10:27.438968Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"e4addc41e936c594ae786c5648e6ebd22e2c2ac4","snippet":"                                              *\n                                                     IN THE\n                                              *\n                                                     SUPREME COURT\n IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION\n                               *\n  FOR REINSTATEMENT OF SUSAN\n                                                     OF MARYLAND\n  MYRA GELLER KIRWAN TO THE\n                               *\n       BAR OF MARYLAND\n                                   ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10763944],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/3173166/denver-health-hospital-authority-v-city-of-arvada-ex-rel-arvada-police/","attorney":"Ruegsegger Simons Smith & Stern, LLC, Jeff C. Staudenmayer, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee. •, Christopher K. Daly, City Attorney, Roberto Ramirez, Senior Assistant City Attorney, Arvada, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant., Senter Goldfarb & Rice, LLC,- Eric M. Ziporin, Jennifer F. Kemp, Denver, Colorado,' for Amicus Curiae Colorado Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency., Polsinelli PC, Gerald A. Niederman, Ann McCullough, Bennett L. Cohen, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Colorado . Hospital Association., D. Scott Martinez, City Attorney, Tracy A. Davis, Assistant City Attorney, Joshua L. Roberts, Assistant City Attorney, T. Shaun Sullivan, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae City and County of Denver.","caseName":"Denver Health & Hospital Authority v. City of Arvada Ex Rel. Arvada Police Department","caseNameFull":"DENVER HEALTH AND HOSPITAL AUTHORITY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF ARVADA EX REL. ARVADA POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant-Appellant","citation":["2016 COA 12","405 P.3d 308","2016 Colo. App. LEXIS 85"],"citeCount":7,"cluster_id":3173166,"court":"Colorado Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Colo. Ct. App.","court_id":"coloctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2016-01-28","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Court of Appeals 15CA0164","docket_id":3031966,"judge":"Loeb, Márquez, Vogt","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-21T18:16:15.135420Z","date_created":"2016-01-28T19:30:44.703523Z","score":{"bm25":14.4169035}},"neutralCite":"2016 COA 12","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":9821344,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T22:39:46.349154Z","date_created":"2023-09-01T08:01:01.335067Z"},"ordering_key":2,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nJUDGE VOGT,\nspecially concurring.\n¶ 50 I concur fully in the analysis and the result in the majority opinion. I write separately to highlight issues raised in this case that, in my view, cry out for resolution by the General Assembly.\n¶ 51 As explained in the majority opinion, the constitutional requirement that governmental entities provide medical care to persons in their custody, codi","type":"concurrence-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[109561,110661,110998,1134773,1196196,1302746,1391596,1408095,1430168,1448425,1695055,1844569,2022619,2451789,2457336,2517887,2538204,2584094,2584875,2607755,2621823],"download_url":"http://www.cobar.org/opinions/opinion.cfm?opinionid=10075&courtid=1","id":3173166,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"html/2016/01/28/denver_health_and_hospital_authority_v._city_of_arvada.html","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T03:49:25.728177Z","date_created":"2016-01-28T19:02:43.972108Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"76e759300a7bc07fbc6d90333c16d815f2a18983","snippet":"\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nColorado Court of Appeals Opinions || January 28, 2016\r\n\r\n\r\nColorado Court of Appeals -- January 28, 2016\r\n2016 COA 12. No. 15CA0164. Denver Health and Hospital Authority v. City of Arvada.\n\r\n\n\r\n\t \r\n\r\n\t\r\n\t\t\r\n\t\t\t\r\n\t\t\t\tCOLORADO COURT OF APPEALS\n\r\n\t\t\t\r\n\t\t\t\t2016 COA 12\n\r\n\t\t\r\n\t\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[3173166,9821343,9821344],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4602219/shawn-p-morrell-v-state-of-indiana/","attorney":"\n  Attorney for Appellant: Brian A. Karle, Ball Eggleston, PC, Lafayette, Indiana\n , \n  Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Caroline G. Templeton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana\n ","caseName":"Shawn P. Morrell v. State of Indiana","caseNameFull":"Shawn P. MORRELL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.","citation":["121 N.E.3d 577"],"citeCount":8,"cluster_id":4602219,"court":"Indiana Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ind. Ct. App.","court_id":"indctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2019-03-21","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Court of Appeals Case 18A-CR-1282","docket_id":14765391,"judge":"Sharpnack","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:31:14.711611Z","date_created":"2019-03-21T15:04:25.188881Z","score":{"bm25":14.333097}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[852521,852540,2120891],"download_url":"http://www.in.gov/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03211901jts.pdf","id":4379472,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2019/03/21/shawn_p._morrell_v._state_of_indiana.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T17:11:54.568613Z","date_created":"2019-03-21T15:04:25.195657Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"548bef6951475ab93d26e854b56ada0971006a0f","snippet":"\n\n\n  Sharpnack, Senior Judge.\n \n\n  Statement of the Case\n \n\n  [1] Shawn P. Morrell appealed from the sentence imposed by the trial court after his conviction of one count of domestic battery. We affirmed the trial court's decision in a memorandum decision, and later granted Morrell's request for publication of the opinion.\n  \n   Morrell v. State\n  \n  , 18A-CR-1282,\n  ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4379472],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/6457888/felts-v-odrc-southern-ohio-corr-facility/","attorney":"","caseName":"Felts v. ODRC Southern Ohio Corr. Facility","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2022 Ohio 966"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":6457888,"court":"Ohio Court of Claims","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. Cl.","court_id":"ohioctcl","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2022-02-16","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"2021-00538PQ","docket_id":63230856,"judge":"Clark","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T09:44:36.188137Z","date_created":"2022-04-12T22:23:54.880014Z","score":{"bm25":14.215488}},"neutralCite":"2022 Ohio 966","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2692055,2702942,4206086,4384063,4437818,4441238,4636627,6114274,6131559,6215796,6220788,6763791,6776498,6789875,7088998,9802171],"download_url":"https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/13/2022/2022-Ohio-966.pdf","id":6329999,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2022/02/16/felts_v._odrc_southern_ohio_corr._facility.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-27T19:23:05.134702Z","date_created":"2022-04-12T22:23:54.888981Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"0578d39fb3b607680a8220e15e8cb9ac672fa287","snippet":"[Cite as Felts v. ODRC Southern Ohio Corr. Facility, 2022-Ohio-966.]\n\n\n\n\n BRIAN FELTS                                           Case No. 2021-00538PQ\n\n         Requester                                     Special Master Jeff Clark\n\n         v.                                            REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION\n\n ODRC SOUTHERN OHIO\n CORRECTIONAL FACILITY\n\n         Respondent\n\n\n        {¶1} The Ohio Public Records Act (PRA) requires copies of public records to be\nmade available to any person upo","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[6329999],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Core Terms: public record R.C. 149.43 court of claims R.C. 2743.75 non-existent burden of proof evidence. Overview: Requester sought a record of his settlement of a dispute with the respondent facility. Requester alleged the settlement was reduced to writing but provided no evidence that it was in the respondent facility's possession at the time of the request. Respondent denied that it possessed such a record. The special master found that while respondent had not proven the putative record did not exist somewhere else, it was not required to. The special master found requester had failed to meet his burden to show by clear and convincing evidence the existence of the record in the keeping of the facility from which he requested it."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10649639/matter-of-beckett/","attorney":"","caseName":"Matter of Beckett","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2025 NY Slip Op 04605"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10649639,"court":"Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York","court_citation_string":"N.Y. App. Div.","court_id":"nyappdiv","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2025-08-07","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"PM-174-25","docket_id":71050768,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-08-07T15:29:28.427025Z","date_created":"2025-08-07T15:29:27.245121Z","score":{"bm25":14.0296135}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2025/2025_04605.htm","id":11116226,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"html/2025/08/07/matter_of_beckett.html","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-01T18:02:32.065316Z","date_created":"2025-08-07T15:29:27.254160Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"8a53009dd751004a6892a80586712ef4f238df38","snippet":"Matter of Beckett (2025 NY Slip Op 04605)\n\n\n\n\n\nMatter of Beckett\n\n\n2025 NY Slip Op 04605\n\n\nDecided on August 7, 2025\n\n\nAppellate Division, Third Department\n\n\n\nPublished by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.\n\n\nThis opinion is uncor","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11116226],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10579976/matter-of-charles-b-v-state-of-new-york/","attorney":"","caseName":"Matter of Charles B. v. State of New York","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2025 NY Slip Op 02683"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10579976,"court":"Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York","court_citation_string":"N.Y. App. Div.","court_id":"nyappdiv","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2025-05-02","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"231 CA 24-00660","docket_id":70230606,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-21T17:32:47.226954Z","date_created":"2025-05-08T23:35:33.522465Z","score":{"bm25":13.850145}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[4505888,4669848,5889109],"download_url":"http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2025/2025_02683.htm","id":11046564,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"html/2025/05/02/matter_of_charles_b._v._state_of_new_york_147.html","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-07T11:30:12.429258Z","date_created":"2025-05-08T23:35:33.530988Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"ecdd6613f6cb9485ead83cea71a36f32a699b281","snippet":"\n\nMatter of Charles B. v State of New York (2025 NY Slip Op 02683)\n\n\n\n\n\nMatter of Charles B. v State of New York\n\n\n2025 NY Slip Op 02683\n\n\nDecided on May 2, 2025\n\n\nAppellate Division, Fourth Department\n\n\n\nPublished by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pu","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11046564],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""}]}