{"count":267954,"next":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/search/?cursor=cz0xNS40ODY0MDgmcz05NDQ3MzYwJnQ9byZkPTIwMjYtMDktMDMmcD0y&q=PRESUMPTION+OF+VALIDITY&type=o","previous":null,"results":[{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10627803/in-the-matter-of-the-presumption-of-death-of-janitor-and-mental-patient/","attorney":"","caseName":"In the Matter of the Presumption of Death of Janitor and Mental Patient Audray Johnson: Ashley Bionte Johnson","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10627803,"court":"Mississippi Supreme Court","court_citation_string":"Miss.","court_id":"miss","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2021-01-14","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"2020-CP-00240-SCT","docket_id":70758100,"judge":"Griffis, T. Kenneth, J.","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-07-11T20:04:38.257470Z","date_created":"2025-07-11T14:24:13.464397Z","score":{"bm25":35.223415}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1581380,1615376,1674262,1729080,1800410,1935963,3516087,4923065,9944204],"download_url":"https://courts.ms.gov/images/Opinions/CO151543.pdf","id":11094390,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2021/01/14/in_the_matter_of_the_presumption_of_death_of_janitor_and_mental_patient.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-01T17:15:34.955406Z","date_created":"2025-07-11T14:24:13.473554Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"51f8d15c70847d695be5b09c4766a7ece5a48967","snippet":"                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI\n\n                                NO. 2020-CP-00240-SCT\n\n\n\nTHE MATTER OF THE PRESUMPTION OF\nDEATH OF JANITOR AND MENTAL PATIENT\nAUDRAY JOHNSON: ASHLEY BIONTE\nJOHNSON\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:                          02/28/2020\nTRIAL JUDGE:                               HON. TIFFANY PIAZZA GROVE\nCOURT FROM WHICH APPEALED:                 HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT,\n                                           FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT\nATTORNEY FOR APP","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11094390],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10017780/tambe-v-montgomery/","attorney":"","caseName":"Tambe v. Montgomery","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2024 Ohio 2857"],"citeCount":2,"cluster_id":10017780,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-07-29","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"CA2023-10-082","docket_id":68985516,"judge":"Piper","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-07-29T14:09:33.334332Z","date_created":"2024-07-29T14:09:33.271824Z","score":{"bm25":32.176205}},"neutralCite":"2024 Ohio 2857","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8123,"cites":[2707841,2707877,2707989,3203720,4203478,6753821,9367025],"download_url":"https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/12/2024/2024-Ohio-2857.pdf","id":10484381,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/07/29/tambe_v._montgomery.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T01:16:58.217804Z","date_created":"2024-07-29T14:09:33.286747Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"ae0b25d14885852fad35b37611bb6d721d91d69a","snippet":"[Cite as Tambe v. Montgomery, 2024-Ohio-2857.]\n\n\n\n                                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS\n\n                         TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO\n\n                                        WARREN COUNTY\n\n\n\n\n PAUL TAMBE,                                     :\n\n       Appellee,                                 :   CASE NO. CA2023-10-082\n\n                                                 :          OPINION\n    - vs -                                                   7/29/2024\n     ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10484381],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The trial court did not err by denying a motion to vacate a default judgment where the record showed the defendant was served with certified mail service at her residence, which had been signed, and the defendant failed to rebut the presumption of valid service. The trier of fact was in the best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4674255/estate-of-blikre/","attorney":"","caseName":"Estate of Blikre","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2019 ND 257"],"citeCount":2,"cluster_id":4674255,"court":"North Dakota Supreme Court","court_citation_string":"N.D.","court_id":"nd","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2019-10-29","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"20180162","docket_id":16400409,"judge":"Tufte, Jerod E.","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:52:31.954503Z","date_created":"2019-10-30T15:08:57.239228Z","score":{"bm25":29.845455}},"neutralCite":"2019 ND 257","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[898321,899169],"download_url":"http://www.ndcourts.gov/supreme-court/opinion/2019ND257","id":4451508,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2019/10/29/estate_of_blikre.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T18:01:49.240728Z","date_created":"2019-10-30T15:08:57.253892Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"adc0bb3c2f3286882e810894eabab08ac10fec13","snippet":"                Filed 10/29/19 by Clerk of Supreme Court\n\n             I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T STATE\n                      OF NORTH DAKOTA\n\n                                2019 ND 257\n\nIn the Matter of the Estate of Jacquelynn D. Blikre\n\n\nJean Nordahl, as Personal\nRepresentative of the Estate of\nJacquelynn D. Blikre, Deceased,                         Petitioner and Appellee\n      v.\nSharron Jensen,                                       Respondent and Appellant\n      and\nJennifer Jensen","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4451508],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"PROBATE - WILLS - TRUSTS","syllabus":"A holographic will is valid if the signature and material portions of the document are in the testator's handwriting. The law presumes a missing will has been revoked by the testator. To overcome the presumption, the party petitioning for the probate of a missing will must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the will existed at the time of the testator's death, that the will was fraudulently destroyed in the lifetime of the testator, or that other evidence shows the testator did not intend to revoke the missing will."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/6346949/chase-v-commissioner-of-correction/","attorney":"","caseName":"Chase v. Commissioner of Correction","caseNameFull":"","citation":["210 Conn. App. 492"],"citeCount":4,"cluster_id":6346949,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2022-02-08","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC44048","docket_id":62978360,"judge":"Moll; Suarez; Lavine","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:46:16.842432Z","date_created":"2022-02-07T13:02:02.369950Z","score":{"bm25":25.903154}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[111170],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP210/210AP116.pdf","id":6215636,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2022/02/08/chase_v._commissioner_of_correction.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:46:16.841392Z","date_created":"2022-02-07T13:02:02.371964Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"d4b302ad59bc45b5a9e308add9af4354896d555d","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Chaplin, J.; judgment denying the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed. J. Christopher Llinas, for the appellant (petitioner). Linda F. Rubertone, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Maureen Platt, state's attorney, and Eva Lenczewski, supervisory assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[6215636],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The petitioner, who had previously been convicted of sexual assault in the first degree and risk of injury to a child, sought a writ of habeas corpus claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel had provided ineffective assis- tance. Following a trial, the habeas court rendered judgment denying the petition, concluding that trial counsel's performance was not deficient. Thereafter, the habeas court granted the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Held that the habeas court correctly concluded that the petitioner failed to prove that his trial counsel's performance was deficient: the habeas court reasonably concluded that the petitioner did not overcome the presumption that his trial counsel had familiarized himself with topics germane to child sexual assault cases, as the petitioner failed to present credible evidence that his counsel had failed to achieve a reasonable degree of familiarity with various materials relevant to child forensic interview protocol, disclosure literature and validation criteria; moreover, this court could not second-guess on appeal the court's credibility determinations regard- ing trial counsel's testimony that he had retained an expert, S, to assist with the defense, and the petitioner did not overcome the presumption that trial counsel's decision regarding what topics to develop during the examination of S and which topics to reserve for cross-examination of the state's expert witnesses was based on sound trial strategy. Argued November 29, 2021—officially released February 8, 2022"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4549340/johnson-v-clark-cty-bd-of-revision-slip-opinion/","attorney":"William S. Johnson, pro se., D. Andrew Wilson, Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, and William D. Hoffman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellees Clark County Board of Revision and Clark County Auditor.","caseName":"Johnson v. Clark Cty. Bd. of Revision (Slip Opinion)","caseNameFull":"JOHNSON, Appellant, v. CLARK COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION Et Al., Appellees.","citation":["2018 Ohio 4390","120 N.E.3d 823","155 Ohio St. 3d 264"],"citeCount":8,"cluster_id":4549340,"court":"Ohio Supreme Court","court_citation_string":"Ohio","court_id":"ohio","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2018-11-01","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"2016-1549","docket_id":8118641,"judge":"Per Curiam","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:16:05.718406Z","date_created":"2018-11-01T13:31:41.495203Z","score":{"bm25":25.033873}},"neutralCite":"2018 Ohio 4390","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2018/2018-Ohio-4390.pdf","id":4326593,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2018/11/01/johnson_v._clark_cty._bd._of_revision_slip_opinion.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T16:35:05.360751Z","date_created":"2018-11-01T13:31:41.513387Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"c5217154bbaead2384c159273af561f9b474c15c","snippet":"\n\n\n  Per Curiam.\n \n\n\n   *264\n  \n\n   {¶ 1}\n  \n  In this real-property-valuation case, appellant, property owner William S. Johnson, who is pursuing this appeal pro se, challenges appellee Clark County auditor's determination of the current agricultural use valuation (\"CAUV\") for the subject p","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4326593],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Taxation—Real-property valuation—Current-agricultural-use valuation—Board of Tax Appeals did not misapply burden of proof, improperly apply presumption of validity to county board of revision's decision, fail to properly consider property owner's evidence under owner-opinion rule, err in finding that county auditor complied with his duty to determine property's 2013 value, or err in finding that property owner failed to establish boundaries of portions of property for which he sought reduced valuation—Board of Tax Appeals' decision affirmed."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4597611/in-re-estate-of-charles-e-caldwell/","attorney":"","caseName":"In Re Estate of Charles E. Caldwell","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4597611,"court":"Court of Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Ct. App.","court_id":"tennctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2019-03-07","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"E2017-02297-COA-R3-CV","docket_id":14637231,"judge":"Judge John W. McClarty","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:29:45.186675Z","date_created":"2019-03-07T16:34:25.324075Z","score":{"bm25":24.417305}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8278,"cites":[1060772,1072211,1384193,1499492,1519589,1563435,1668557,1729727,1757801,1775146,1792036,2190335,2371795,2426528,2443313,2452249,3891693,5055175],"download_url":"http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/in_re_estate_of_charles_caldwell_coa_opinion.pdf","id":4374864,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2019/03/07/in_re_estate_of_charles_e._caldwell.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T17:08:34.571790Z","date_created":"2019-03-07T16:34:25.333595Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"5a9e8eecd18131b828a4f04d55e045859d82c5bb","snippet":"                                                                                      03/07/2019\n               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                          AT KNOXVILLE\n                              October 18, 2018 Session\n\n                IN RE ESTATE OF CHARLES E. CALDWELL\n\n                 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Bradley County\n                   No. V-15-396       J. Michael Sharp, Judge\n                     ___________________________________\n\n                 ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4374864],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"This appeal involves a will contest. The decedent's son alleges that his father \"was of unsound mind, without sufficient degree of mental capacity and/or was mentally incompetent to make a valid will\" and \"was unduly influenced . . . in all circumstances surrounding and including the execution of the purported Last Will and Testament\" by his daughter. The trial court found that the decedent had the requisite testamentary capacity to execute the November 2012 will, no confidential relationship existed between the Decedent and his daughter that triggered a presumption of undue influence, and the will was not a product of undue influence. The trial court further found that, in the alternative, the daughter rebutted any presumption of undue influence. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/6480763/peter-scotti-associates-inc-v-seth-yurdin-in-his-official-capacity-as/","attorney":"","caseName":"Peter Scotti & Associates, Inc. v. Seth Yurdin, in his official capacity as a Member of the City Council of the City of Providence","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":6480763,"court":"Supreme Court of Rhode Island","court_citation_string":"R.I.","court_id":"ri","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2022-06-23","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"21-51","docket_id":63405197,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T09:50:32.348548Z","date_created":"2022-06-23T15:11:40.059426Z","score":{"bm25":24.217356}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[799979,1479162,1490591,1494896,1517331,1925642,1935020,1940855,1962308,1981758,2057335,2174928,2200949,2308842,2334422,2334676,2348641,2364427,2366274,2382087,2549343,2549596,3866852,3869565,4947262,4950185,4964622,4968827],"download_url":"https://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SupremeCourt/SupremeOpinions/21-51.pdf","id":6352896,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2022/06/23/peter_scotti__associates_inc._v._seth_yurdin_in_his_official_capacity_as.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-07-08T03:18:38.550763Z","date_created":"2022-06-23T15:11:40.062026Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"09ba16459f4e934aa9593a8b35853410d2ce7002","snippet":"June 23, 2022\n\n\n\n                                                           Supreme Court\n\n                                                           No. 2021-51-Appeal.\n                                                           (PC 19-283)\n\n\n    Peter Scotti & Associates, Inc., et al. :\n\n                     v.                     :\n\n    Seth Yurdin, in his official capacity   :\n    as a Member of the City Council of\n        the City of Providence, et al.\n\n\n\n\n                NOTICE: This opinio","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[6352896],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiffs, Peter Scotti & Associates, Inc. and Building Bridges Providence, sought review by the Supreme Court of a December 14, 2020 judgment of the Providence County Superior Court denying and dismissing all claims in the plaintiffs' second amended complaint. That judgment followed a decision of the Superior Court that there was no legal basis under G.L. 1956 § 45-24-71 for invalidating the zoning amendment at issue, which would allow the construction of a new high-rise building in downtown Providence. The plaintiffs contended before the Supreme Court that \"legislative deference should not apply to a § 45-24-71 challenge\" and that the zoning amendment at issue is inconsistent with \"Providence Tomorrow: The Comprehensive Plan\" (the Comprehensive Plan).<br><br>The Supreme Court initially opined that the correct avenue for review in this case would be by petition for a writ of certiorari, but it then decided to treat the appeal as a petition for a writ of certiorari and grant the petition. The Court went on to hold that the hearing justice did not err in assigning a rebuttable presumption of validity to the zoning amendment at issue when conducting a review pursuant to § 45-24-71. The Court also held that it was unable to say that the hearing justice committed an error of law or was without the support of legally competent evidence when he concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden to rebut the presumption that the zoning amendment at issue was valid by proving that the amendment was inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4854574/bank-of-new-york-mellon-v-tope/","attorney":"","caseName":"Bank of New York Mellon v. Tope","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4854574,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2021-02-09","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC40959","docket_id":59234700,"judge":"Elgo; Cradle; Devlin","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:38:13.467983Z","date_created":"2021-02-08T13:02:43.426607Z","score":{"bm25":22.216465}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2169688,4570202,4584110,7839772,7840296,7861025],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP202/202AP102.pdf","id":4658353,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2021/02/09/bank_of_new_york_mellon_v._tope_1.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T23:02:26.390476Z","date_created":"2021-02-08T13:02:43.429055Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"fb50ba2fcd7d001df2a7a3d4c154633dd38509ec","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain of the defendants' real property, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven, where the defendants were defaulted for failure to appear; thereafter, the named defendant was defaulted for failure to plead; subsequently, the matter was tried to the court, Hon. Thomas J. Corradino, judge trial referee; judgment of foreclosure by sale; thereafter, the court denied the named defendant's motion to open and vacate the judgment, and the named defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed. Thomas P. Willcutts, for the appellant, with whom, on the brief, was Achyut M. Tope, self-represented, the appellant (named defendant). William R. Dziedzic, for the appellee (plaintiff).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4658353],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiff bank sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendant T. The action was commenced in July, 2014, and the trial court first entered a judgment of foreclosure by sale in November, 2014. Subsequently, T filed multiple motions to open and extend the sale date. The court again entered a judgment of foreclosure by sale in November, 2016. T then filed several motions to dismiss, alleging that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the plaintiff did not have standing to commence this action. In September, 2017, T filed a motion to open and stay the judgment, again challenging the plaintiff's standing and the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. The court denied T's motion, and T appealed to this court. Held that T could not prevail on his claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion to open and vacate the foreclosure judgment on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing and the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction: this court was presented with a collateral attack by T on the foreclosure judgment because, although T appeared in this case approximately thirty days prior to the entry of the first foreclosure judgment, he never directly challenged that judgment or the second judgment of foreclosure by sale, did not challenge the plaintiff's standing or the court's jurisdiction until more than two years after he filed his appearance, and failed to demonstrate or even argue that the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction was entirely obvious, failing to rebut the presumption of the validity of the foreclosure judgment; moreover, the facts and circumstances did not constitute the exceptional case in which the lack of jurisdiction was so manifest as to warrant review, as the record revealed that three different trial court judges examined the record and considered T's arguments and reviewed the documents he submitted, and one judge examined the original note upon which both foreclosure judgments were based, specifically finding that the plaintiff had standing to commence the action; furthermore, because T was afforded multiple opportunities to present his arguments in full to the trial court, it could not reasonably be argued that he was deprived of a fair opportunity to litigate the issue of standing, and he similarly failed to furnish any strong policy reason to allow the otherwise disfavored collateral attack on the foreclosure judgment. (One judge dissenting) Argued September 10, 2020—officially released February 9, 2021"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/6346947/glanz-v-commissioner-of-motor-vehicles/","attorney":"","caseName":"Glanz v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles","caseNameFull":"","citation":["210 Conn. App. 515"],"citeCount":3,"cluster_id":6346947,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2022-02-08","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC44189","docket_id":62978358,"judge":"Bright; Alvord; Norcott","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:46:16.959067Z","date_created":"2022-02-07T13:02:00.480743Z","score":{"bm25":22.09402}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[107252,109382,1995091,2163595,2443548],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP210/210AP122.pdf","id":6215634,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2022/02/08/glanz_v._commissioner_of_motor_vehicles.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:46:16.957770Z","date_created":"2022-02-07T13:02:00.483064Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"965850145528a4b99da739aec9fd63a5b6ff8460","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Appeal from the decision of the defendant suspending the plaintiff's motor vehicle operator's license and requiring the installation of ignition interlock devices on the plaintiff's vehicles, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain and tried to the court, Cordani, J.; judgment dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed. Morgan Paul Rueckert, for the appellant (plaintiff). John M. Russo, Jr., assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney gen- eral, for the appellee (defendant).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[6215634],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiff, who had been arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of statute (§ 14- 227a), appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, suspending the plaintiff's motor vehicle operator's license and requiring the installation of ignition inter- lock devices on his motor vehicles pursuant to statute (§ 14-227b). Fol- lowing the plaintiff's arrest, a police officer administered a breath alcohol test on him four times. Although the second test yielded a higher blood alcohol content result than the first, it was invalidated. Only the first and fourth tests yielded valid results, the fourth producing a lower result than the first. At the administrative hearing before the defendant's hearing officer, the plaintiff presented the testimony of an expert, P, that the second test had been scientifically valid and that the plaintiff's blood alcohol content had been rising from the time he operated his motor vehicle to the time when the tests were performed. The hearing officer found that P's testimony was informative but not persuasive. The plaintiff appealed to the trial court, claiming that the hearing officer improperly relied on the presumption in § 14-227b (g) that the results of blood alcohol tests commenced within two hours of operation of a motor vehicle were sufficient to indicate blood alcohol content at the time of operation and that the hearing officer had ignored the exception in the criminal statute, § 14-227a (b), that, if the results of a second blood alcohol test indicated that the ratio of alcohol in the blood was 0.1 percent or less and was higher than the results of the first test, the defendant was required to show that the test results and analysis accurately reflected the plaintiff's blood alcohol content at the time of the alleged offense. The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the appeal, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that his right to procedural due process was violated by the administrative procedures contained in § 14-227b (g) regarding evidence of blood alcohol content in the context of a license suspension hearing: the hearing officer, having considered and found unpersuasive P's opinion that the results of the tests were unreliable, properly applied the permissive presumption that the breath alcohol test results were sufficient to indicate the plaintiff's blood alcohol content at the time of operation without the need for additional evidence; moreover, the state's interest in promoting traffic safety and performing license suspension hearings in an expeditious manner comported with the presumption in § 14-227b (g), and the plain- tiff, as the subject of a license suspension hearing, was not entitled to all of the procedural protections available in a criminal proceeding, thus, the rising blood alcohol content exception in § 14-227a (b) was not applicable to the plaintiff; furthermore; substantial evidence in the record consisting of the plaintiff's valid breath alcohol test results dem- onstrated that his blood alcohol content was falling, not rising. 2. The trial court properly determined that § 14-227b and not § 14-227a applied to the plaintiff's administrative license suspension hearing; §14- 227a (b) expressly provides that it applies to criminal prosecutions, and the plaintiff was the subject of a civil administrative license suspension hearing, which was governed by § 14-227b. Argued October 18, 2021—officially released February 8, 2022"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10749194/versa-pak-ltd-v-sispack-corp/","attorney":"","caseName":"Versa-Pak, Ltd. v. Sispack Corp.","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2025 Ohio 5462"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10749194,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":"SA","dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2025-12-08","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"10-25-10","docket_id":72004757,"judge":"Waldick","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-08T18:12:01.770738Z","date_created":"2025-12-08T18:11:40.330456Z","score":{"bm25":20.71769}},"neutralCite":"2025 Ohio 5462","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2702921,3684684,3733154,3733735,4327347,4442236,4566062,4995589,6325149,6329130,6760079,8207222],"download_url":"https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/3/2025/2025-Ohio-5462.pdf","id":11215779,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2025/12/08/versa-pak_ltd._v._sispack_corp..pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-08T18:11:46.907150Z","date_created":"2025-12-08T18:11:40.387895Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"c6efe760616a3b132edbcecd6d89fc6b3914077b","snippet":"[Cite as Versa-Pak, Ltd. v. Sispack Corp., 2025-Ohio-5462.]\n\n\n\n\n                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO\n                          THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT\n                              MERCER COUNTY\n\n\n\n\nVERSA-PAK LTD.,\n                                                              CASE NO. 10-25-10\n         PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,\n\n    v.\n\nSISPACK CORP.,                                                OPINION AND\n                                                              JUDGMENT ENTR","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11215779],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Civ.R. 4.1; Service by certified mail; Rebuttable presumption of valid service. The trial court did not err in overruling the defendant's motion to vacate the default judgment entered against it, on the basis of the defendant's claim that it had not been validly served with the complaint."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4707417/the-bank-of-new-york-mellon-v-mazzeo/","attorney":"","caseName":"The Bank of New York Mellon v. Mazzeo","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4707417,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-01-21","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC42180","docket_id":16717159,"judge":"Keller; Prescott; Harper","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:37:58.797439Z","date_created":"2020-01-17T13:02:49.959405Z","score":{"bm25":19.56846}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1487893,1977308,1991579,1991876,1995830,2195935,2320600,2325612],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP195/195AP100.pdf","id":4486848,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/01/21/the_bank_of_new_york_mellon_v._mazzeo.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:37:58.629858Z","date_created":"2020-01-17T13:02:49.963204Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"00503ddeb6a477a82b61f1de9bc67d99fc12a863","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real prop- erty owned by the named defendant et al., and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis- trict of Fairfield and tried to the court, Hon. Michael Hartmere, judge trial referee; judgment of foreclosure by sale, from which the named defendant et al. appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment directed. Janine M. Becker, with whom, on the brief, was Patricia Moore, for the appellants (named defendant et al.). Benjamin Staskiewicz, for the appellee (plaintiff).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4486848],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiff bank, M Co., sought to foreclose a mortgage on certain real property owned by the defendants J and L. At trial, the court denied the motion for judgment filed by J and L, which was based on their claim that M Co. failed to make out a prima facie case because a condition precedent to foreclosure, namely, notice of default prior to acceleration, had not been proven. The trial court rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale, from which J and L appealed to this court. Held: 1. J and L could not prevail on their claim that M Co. lacked standing, which was based on their claim that M Co. failed to establish that it was the holder of the note when it commenced the present action: M Co.'s production of the original note at trial, as well as the admission into evidence of the copy of the note through H, a litigation manager for B Co., the subservicer for the loan securing M Co.'s mortgage to J and L's property, raised a presumption that M Co. was the holder of the note, and it then became the burden of J and L to rebut that presumption in order to challenge M Co.'s right to enforce the note, which they failed to do; moreover, even though J and L claimed that the court improperly admitted into evidence the routing history of the loan, that evidence was not necessary to prove that M Co. was a holder of the note, as M Co. produced the note, which was endorsed in blank, and, thus, the challenge by J and L to the admission of the routing history, even if valid, did not rebut the presumption that M Co. owned the debt when this action commenced. 2. The trial court improperly concluded that M Co. proved its prima facie foreclosure case: even though J and L could not prevail on their claim that M Co. did not demonstrate that it was the owner of the debt, M Co. did not prove that all conditions precedent to foreclosure, as established by the note and mortgage, had been satisfied, specifically, M Co. did not demonstrate that it provided J and L with notice of default, as the plain language of the mortgage note required that notices of default be sent by first class mail, and the default notice admitted into evidence and H's accompanying testimony did not provide sufficient facts for a trier of fact reasonably to infer that the notice was mailed to J and L; moreover, A Co., the master servicer of the loan, generated the default notice, and H, as a representative of B Co., the subservicer for the loan, was not able to testify as to the practices A Co. employed to generate or mail default notices, and H's sole basis for claiming that notice was mailed was the existence of the notice and a screenshot from A Co.'s servicing platform that included a breach and expiration date consistent with the date on the default notice; furthermore, H provided no pertinent details regarding B Co.'s boarding process or methods of verification, and although H testified that the screenshot was part of the verification process for the mailing of the default notice, H lacked personal knowledge of the policies and procedures used to generate the screenshot; accordingly, the evidence was insufficient to support the court's determination that a default notice was sent to J and L via first class mail, and, thus, M Co. failed to prove a prima facie foreclosure case. Argued October 15, 2019—officially released January 21, 2020"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10855014/estate-of-vasquez-v-tallmadge-health-rehab-ctr/","attorney":"","caseName":"Estate of Vasquez v. Tallmadge Health & Rehab Ctr.","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2026 Ohio 1647"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10855014,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":"SA","dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2026-05-07","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"115395","docket_id":73308928,"judge":"E.T. Gallagher","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-07T15:32:54.460035Z","date_created":"2026-05-07T15:32:54.281989Z","score":{"bm25":18.205276}},"neutralCite":"2026 Ohio 1647","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[117937,2703545,2703666,2737027,3683592,3690846,3694450,3714226,3738527,3751458,3761900,3766243,3776523,4118784,4450008,4525405,4546071,4636636,4653009,4700402,4709454,6344351,6349964,6777424,6779951,8621628,9416246,9888387,10747878,10790685,10806563,11084269,11104371],"download_url":"https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/8/2026/2026-Ohio-1647.pdf","id":11322409,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2026/05/07/estate_of_vasquez_v._tallmadge_health__rehab_ctr..pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-07T18:09:25.293373Z","date_created":"2026-05-07T15:32:54.316005Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"250ad6f2a34f551a0752fbb76f4e05854b2150fd","snippet":"[Cite as Estate of Vasquez v. Tallmadge Health & Rehab Ctr., 2026-Ohio-1647.]\n\n\n                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO\n\n                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT\n                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA\n\nESTATE OF JEAN L. VASQUEZ,                            :\nBY MICHELLE DODDS-NALLEY,\nADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE                           :\nOF JEAN L. VASQUEZ, DECEASED,\n                                                      :\n                Plaintiff-Appelle","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11322409],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"R.C. Ch. 2711; motion to stay and enforce arbitration agreement; valid agreement; principles of contract; electronic signature; R.C. 1306.01; R.C. 1306.08; rebuttable presumption. Appellee rebutted the presumption that the decedent had electronically signed an arbitration agreement, and appellants failed to submit any evidence demonstrating the validity of the decedent's electronic signature. The trial court did not err in denying appellants' motion to stay and enforce the arbitration agreement."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/7328036/lecky-v-va-state-bd-of-elections/","attorney":"*910Aria Christine Branch, Amanda Rebecca Callais, Perkins Coie LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs., Heather Hays Lockerman, Anna Tillie Birkenheier, Office of the Attorney General, Charles Walker Terry, Michael Robert Ward, McCandlish Holton Morris PC, Michael Gordon Matheson, Thompson McMullan PC, Richmond, VA, Joshua David Tully, Williams & Connolly LLP, Trevor Marshall Stanley, Baker & Hostetler LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendants., This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 36). Plaintiffs, four residents of Virginia House District 28 (\"HD 28\"), brought this suit claiming that their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were infringed when poll workers mistakenly gave ballots for House District 88 (\"HD 88\") to residents of HD 28 at the general election in Virginia on November 7, 2017. Plaintiffs are now seeking a preliminary injunction ordering officers of the Virginia State Board of Elections to vacate the certification results for HD 28, barring the Clerk of the Virginia House of Delegates (\"House of Delegates\") from seating the winner of the HD 28 race, and ordering a new election for HD 28., Plaintiffs are all registered voters and residents of HD 28 in Virginia. Each of the plaintiffs voted in the November 7, 2017 general election in Virginia. On Election Day, three of the plaintiffs, Kenneth Lecky, Dolores (\"D.D.\") Lecky, and Phillip *911Ridderhof were given ballots for HD 88 despite being residents of HD 28. Amy Ridderhof successfully voted in HD 28.1, A brief summary of voting procedures in Virginia will provide necessary context for the events that occurred on November 7, 2017. Voting assignments in Virginia track the United States Census. Following the publication of a Census, the General Assembly redraws districts and assigns localities or precincts2 to each district based on federal and constitutional restrictions. Precincts may be wholly within a particular district or split to include voters from multiple districts. After new districts are finalized, the 133 General Registrars across Virginia manually assign addresses to districts in the Virginia Election & Registration Information System (\"VERIS\"), a statewide database which contains voting data. Because roads and addresses do not follow the locality and precinct boundaries used in the Census, this process of assigning addresses to particular districts is not without significant complexity. Post office accommodations, homeowner petitions, and changes to street names can further complicate this process. When an election occurs, the State Board of Elections provides VERIS data to polling locations so that poll workers can distribute the correct ballots to individual voters., In April 2011, following the 2010 Census, the General Assembly completed redistricting of all 100 House of Delegates seats. The resulting district map split Stafford County and the City of Fredericksburg between HD 28 and HD 88.3 Specifically, using the precincts in existence as of April 1, 2011,4 the General Assembly assigned 12 full precincts and part of another precinct in Stafford County and two full *912precincts and part of another precinct in the City of Fredericksburg to HD 28. See Va. Code § 24.2-304.03. General Registrars statewide then updated the addresses assigned to each district in VERIS, accounting for changes to the boundaries., The general election for the House of Delegates occurred on Tuesday, November 7, 2017. On that day, plaintiffs all went to their respective polling locations to attempt to vote in the HD 28 race between Joshua Cole (\"Cole\") and Thomas. Amy Ridderhof successfully voted in HD 28. Phillip Ridderhof, despite being correctly assigned in the VERIS database as a voter in HD 28, received a ballot for HD 88 due to poll worker error. Kenneth Lecky and D.D. Lecky were given ballots for HD 88 because the VERIS database incorrectly reflected their addresses as falling within HD 88, and not HD 28. When poll workers gave D.D. Lecky a ballot for HD 88, she told the poll workers that she believed she should have been registered to vote in HD 28. After she voted, DD Lecky raised her concerns again to two Board Members, Rodriguez and Markel, who directed her to the map of HD 28. When the map suggested that she had been assigned to the wrong district, the Board Members determined, on the basis of the VERIS database, that the map was incorrect and removed it from the polling place. The election officials also denied provisional ballots to the affected voters on Election Day based on their determination that the VERIS database was entitled to a presumption of validity and that if the database were incorrect, state mechanisms could remedy the errors. Specifically, the Virginia Code allows an unsuccessful candidate in an election to request a recount of the votes cast in the election5 or to contest the validity of the election in the General Assembly on the basis of objections to the conduct or results of the elections.6","caseName":"Lecky v. Va. State Bd. of Elections","caseNameFull":"Kenneth J. LECKY v. VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS","citation":["285 F. Supp. 3d 908"],"citeCount":1,"cluster_id":7328036,"court":"District Court, E.D. Virginia","court_citation_string":"E.D. Va.","court_id":"vaed","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2018-01-11","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Case No. 1:17–cv–1336","docket_id":64316520,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T13:38:42.551491Z","date_created":"2022-07-25T05:18:49.810409Z","score":{"bm25":18.111916}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":7245952,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-07-08T21:42:04.312207Z","date_created":"2022-07-25T05:18:49.821593Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nComplaints prompted the Department of Elections to investigate the reasons for, and the extent of, any irregularities. On November 27, 2017, the Department of Elections issued a summary of the findings of the investigation, including:\n• 260 voters were incorrectly listed in the VERIS database as residing in HD 2 or HD 88, rather than HD 28.\n• 86 of those 260 individuals voted in the November 7 ele","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[7245952],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10914064/in-re-probate-appeal-of-murrell/","attorney":"","caseName":"In re Probate Appeal of Murrell","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10914064,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":"SA","dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2026-07-07","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC47876","docket_id":73575651,"judge":"Clark; Westbrook; Flynn","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-07-06T12:04:14.493570Z","date_created":"2026-07-06T12:04:13.173424Z","score":{"bm25":17.05493}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2323818,3217449,6115716,6356091,7848229,9835726,9896938,9896956,9948462,10803718,11059436,11108777,11124582],"download_url":"https://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP240/AP240.264.pdf","id":11381597,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2026/07/07/in_re_probate_appeal_of_murrell.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-07-06T12:07:03.431598Z","date_created":"2026-07-06T12:04:13.177537Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"e3fa63deae66916886b704a19c1b925377e779d5","snippet":"************************************************\n   The “officially released” date that appears near the\nbeginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be\npublished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it\nis released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the\nbeginning of all time periods for the filing of postopinion\nmotions and petitions for certification is the “officially\nreleased” date appearing in the opinion.\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorrect","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Appeal from two decrees of the Probate Court for the district of Greater Windsor, inter alia, granting the defendant's motion to remove the plaintiff as the fiduciary of the estate of Mark Murrell, denying the plaintiff's petition to administer the estate, and approv- ing the defendant's petition to administer the estate, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and tried to the court, Gordon, J.; judgment denying the appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed. Keith Yagaloff, for the appellant (plaintiff). Robert K. Killian, Jr., for the appellee (defendant). In re Probate Appeal of Murrell","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11381597],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiff appealed from the Superior Court's judgment denying her appeal from decrees of the Probate Court granting the defendant's motion to remove the plaintiff as the fiduciary of the estate of their father, M, denying the plaintiff's petition to administer M's estate, and granting the defendant's petition to administer the estate. The plaintiff claimed that the Superior Court improperly concluded that the defendant was M's biological son because the defendant had failed to satisfy the legal requirements set forth in the Connecticut Parentage Act (§ 46b-450 et seq.). Held: The Superior Court properly upheld the decrees issued by the Probate Court, as the Superior Court's conclusion that the defendant was M's biological son was legally sound and supported by the record, in that a child support judgment rendered by a family support magistrate in 1994 against M con- cerning the support of the defendant and subsequent child support related judgments demonstrated that M's paternity had been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction prior to the January 1, 2022 effective date of the Connecticut Parentage Act, the 1994 judgment was presumptively valid as a final judgment and the plaintiff did not sustain her burden of overcoming that presumption, and, therefore, according to the plain language of the statute (§ 46b-553), the legal requirements set forth in the Connecticut Parentage Act did not apply. Argued December 8, 2025—officially released July 7, 2026"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10298188/rogers-v-rogers/","attorney":"","caseName":"Rogers v. Rogers","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2024 Ohio 5951"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10298188,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-12-20","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"30172","docket_id":69486180,"judge":"Welbaum","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-12-20T15:15:52.544847Z","date_created":"2024-12-20T15:15:31.410620Z","score":{"bm25":16.586418}},"neutralCite":"2024 Ohio 5951","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1673006,1746740,3704572,3738309,3744521,3781681,3782496,4416215,4570263,4646132,4648108,6758337,6762975,8514251,8514308,9882553],"download_url":"https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/2/2024/2024-Ohio-5951.pdf","id":10764776,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/12/20/rogers_v._rogers.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-27T18:55:50.142348Z","date_created":"2024-12-20T15:15:31.423473Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"d03d848f2cbc98b04b13a822d9f502ccac65ec90","snippet":"[Cite as Rogers v. Rogers, 2024-Ohio-5951.]\n\n\n\n\n                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO\n                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT\n                                     MONTGOMERY COUNTY\n\n BRANDY A. ROGERS                                   :\n                                                    :\n       Appellant                                    :   C.A. No. 30172\n                                                    :\n v.                                     ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10764776],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The trial court erred in finding an alleged lost will remained valid and in dismissing appellant's will contest action. Although admission of the will was prima facie evidence of its validity, appellant rebutted the presumption and proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the will failed to comply with statutory formalities. The content of the alleged lost will also could not be proven because a page was missing. Judgment reversed and remanded."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/1634937/in-re-yarn-processing-patent-validity-litigation-no-ii/","attorney":"James W. Crabtree, Charlotte, N.C., for plaintiff., Charles B. Park, III, Bell, Seltzer, Park & Gibson, Charlotte, N.C., for defendants.","caseName":"In Re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation (No. II)","caseNameFull":"In Re YARN PROCESSING PATENT VALIDITY LITIGATION (NO. II)","citation":["602 F. Supp. 159","225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 765","1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21080"],"citeCount":11,"cluster_id":1634937,"court":"District Court, W.D. North Carolina","court_citation_string":"W.D.N.C.","court_id":"ncwd","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"1984-12-20","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"MDL 574","docket_id":1202278,"judge":"McMILLAN","lexisCite":"1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21080","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-21T05:04:39.490743Z","date_created":"2014-10-30T14:59:09.293073Z","score":{"bm25":16.56907}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":2176,"cites":[102610,103020,106848,257579,259704,275208,326801,331091,339083,407919,411198,421707,422184,430782,1396001,1408648,1431884,1468478,1566941,1568835,1667748,2124005,2254735,2288980],"download_url":null,"id":1634937,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T10:31:11.129550Z","date_created":"2013-10-30T06:59:12.171985Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"efa0aeb72bdc4f3f3958f9b602d7e35b54633a5f","snippet":"\n602 F.Supp. 159 (1984)\nIn re YARN PROCESSING PATENT VALIDITY LITIGATION (NO. II).\nMDL No. 574.\nUnited States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Charlotte Division.\nDecember 20, 1984.\n*160 *161 James W. Crabtree, Charlotte, N.C., for plaintiff.\nCharles B. Park, III, Bell, Seltzer, Park & G","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[1634937],"source":"LU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4713851/lawrence-v-lawrence/","attorney":"","caseName":"Lawrence v. Lawrence","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4713851,"court":"Court of Appeals of North Carolina","court_citation_string":"N.C. Ct. App.","court_id":"ncctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-01-21","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"19-668","docket_id":16731708,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-12-13T14:23:18.848829Z","date_created":"2020-01-21T13:05:21.259706Z","score":{"bm25":16.454668}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1201814,1214250,1243878,1364811,1404992,1411240,3643268],"download_url":"http://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&pdf=38709","id":4493628,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/01/21/lawrence_v._lawrenceâ.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T18:31:00.257829Z","date_created":"2020-01-21T13:05:21.263735Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"b7a0d269d0c92f992b4123c40654d79484c6d597","snippet":"             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA\n\n                                 No. COA19-668\n\n                              Filed: 21 January 2020\n\nFranklin County, No. 18 SP 185\n\nLOUISE LAWRENCE, Petitioner,\n\n            v.\n\nCHARLES LAWRENCE, Respondent.\n\n\n      Appeal by respondent from order entered 24 May 2019 by Judge Josephine\n\nKerr Davis in Franklin County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8\n\nJanuary 2020.\n\n\n      McFarlane Law Office, P.A., by Steven H. McFarlane, f","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4493628],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Petition to partition reimbursement to co-tenant statutes of limitations: NCGS 1-52(1) and NCGS 1-56 burden on summary judgment presumption of validity of marriage laches as an affirmative defense, NCGS 1A-1, Rule 8(c)."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/2124211/in-re-yarn-processing-patent-validity-litigation/","attorney":"James L. Armstrong, III and Hugh Turner and James Crabtree, Smathers & Thompson, Miami, Fla., for Lex Tex Ltd., Inc., William K. West, Jr., Cushman, Darby & Cushman, Washington, D. C., for Burlington Industries., Dale H. Hoscheit and Gene W. Stockman, Schuyler, Birch, Swindler, McKie & Beckett, Washington, D. C., for Monsanto of North Carolina, Inc., Wallace D. Newcomb, Philadelphia, Pa., for Collins & Aikman., David Rabin, Greensboro, N. C., for DowBadische Co., National Spinning Co., Collins & Aikman and Glen Raven Mills, Inc., David Klingsberg and David F. Ryan, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, New York City, for National Spinning Co., Dow-Badische Co. and Hoechst Fiber Industries., Philip Koenig, Boston, Mass., and C. Reed Guthridge, Miami, Fla., for Leesona Corp., Arthur O. Cooke, Cooke & Cooke, Greensboro, N. C., for ARCT.","caseName":"In Re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation","caseNameFull":"In Re YARN PROCESSING PATENT VALIDITY LITIGATION","citation":["472 F. Supp. 180","206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 630","1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11778"],"citeCount":2,"cluster_id":2124211,"court":"District Court, S.D. Florida","court_citation_string":"S.D. Fla.","court_id":"flsd","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"1979-06-12","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"M.D.L. Docket 82","docket_id":1975982,"judge":"Atkins","lexisCite":"1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11778","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-21T09:03:26.188712Z","date_created":"2014-10-30T20:57:21.176899Z","score":{"bm25":16.356306}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":135,"cites":[103577,103578,105458,105889,224098,231530,238280,263345,263790,277259,299183,319904,349272,364662,1422436,1425188,1456980,1794161,2124005,2124286,2149209,2364520],"download_url":null,"id":2124211,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T17:28:17.928400Z","date_created":"2013-10-30T08:23:31.802907Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"f5e8b953db43fb5b1efe6345306e33c6fb2d97ca","snippet":"\n472 F.Supp. 180 (1979)\nIn re YARN PROCESSING PATENT VALIDITY LITIGATION.\nM.D.L. Docket No. 82.\nUnited States District Court, S. D. Florida.\nJune 12, 1979.\n*181 James L. Armstrong, III and Hugh Turner and James Crabtree, Smathers & Thompson, Miami, Fla., for Lex Tex Ltd., Inc.\nWilliam K. West, Jr., Cushman, Darby & Cushman,","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[2124211],"source":"LU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10019405/lawrence-v-lawrence/","attorney":"","caseName":"Lawrence v. Lawrence","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10019405,"court":"Court of Appeals of North Carolina","court_citation_string":"N.C. Ct. App.","court_id":"ncctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-01-21","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"19-668","docket_id":16731708,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-07-29T15:51:51.023652Z","date_created":"2024-07-29T15:51:50.979240Z","score":{"bm25":15.964707}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1201814,1214250,1243878,1364811,1404992,1411240,3643268,4166557,6722405,8899697,8901001],"download_url":"http://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&pdf=38709","id":10486006,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/01/21/lawrence_v._lawrence.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-27T17:42:09.739787Z","date_created":"2024-07-29T15:51:50.981825Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"f48b4df09f8a8836e664ff965217394699a8647e","snippet":"             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA\n\n                                 No. COA19-668\n\n                              Filed: 21 January 2020\n\nFranklin County, No. 18 SP 185\n\nLOUISE LAWRENCE, Petitioner,\n\n            v.\n\nCHARLES LAWRENCE, Respondent.\n\n\n      Appeal by respondent from order entered 24 May 2019 by Judge Josephine\n\nKerr Davis in Franklin County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 8\n\nJanuary 2020.\n\n\n      McFarlane Law Office, P.A., by Steven H. McFarlane, f","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10486006],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Petition to partition reimbursement to co-tenant statutes of limitations: NCGS 1-52(1) and NCGS 1-56 burden on summary judgment presumption of validity of marriage laches as an affirmative defense, NCGS 1A-1, Rule 8(c)."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9447360/lafrance-v-ralich/","attorney":"","caseName":"LaFrance v. Ralich","caseNameFull":"","citation":["230 N.E.3d 85","2023 Ohio 4291"],"citeCount":4,"cluster_id":9447360,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2023-11-28","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"23 HA 0003","docket_id":68040538,"judge":"D'Apolito","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-26T18:19:59.290235Z","date_created":"2023-11-28T21:10:14.261062Z","score":{"bm25":15.486408}},"neutralCite":"2023 Ohio 4291","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2196949,2704759,3715869,3784935,4126766,4264177,4645995,4650140,8501272,9395912],"download_url":"https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/7/2023/2023-Ohio-4291.pdf","id":9905185,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/11/28/lafrance_v._ralich.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-26T18:19:59.308093Z","date_created":"2023-11-28T21:10:14.270585Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"6df37dbf30414b4edd360eb1c2dd68b217659aa1","snippet":"[Cite as LaFrance v. Ralich, 2023-Ohio-4291.]\n\n\n\n\n             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO\n                            SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT\n                                HARRISON COUNTY\n\n       MARIE LaFRANCE, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF\n                        MARTHA YANKUS,\n\n                                         Plaintiff-Appellant,\n\n                                                    v.\n\n                                        STEVEN RALICH,\n\n                             ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9905185],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"DECLARATORY JUDGMENT – bench trial promissory note mortgage manifest weight standard of review statute of limitations Appellee seeks to enforce his interest in the property and may do so separate and apart from the note the trial court did not err in holding that Appellee may still seek remedies on the mortgage under the longer statute of limitation periods in ejectment or foreclosure consideration a facially valid mortgage bears a strong presumption of validity evidence of consideration supporting the mortgage exists Appellant fails to prove fraud judgment affirmed."}]}