{"count":116145,"next":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/search/?cursor=cz0xNC4wODQ1NTgmcz0xMDI2NjEwNiZ0PW8mZD0yMDI2LTA4LTIzJnA9Mg%3D%3D&q=MEASURE+AND+TYPES+OF+DAMAGES&type=o","previous":null,"results":[{"absolute_url":"/opinion/7316740/second-measure-inc-v-kim/","attorney":"Nitoj P. Singh, Harmeet K. Dhillon, Dhillon Law Group Inc.,' San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff., Sam N. Dawood, Law Offices of Sam N. Dawood, Thomas V. Christopher, The Law Offices of Thomas V. Christopher, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.","caseName":"Second Measure, Inc. v. Kim","caseNameFull":"SECOND MEASURE, INC. v. Steven KIM","citation":["143 F. Supp. 3d 961","2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152804","2015 WL 6954890"],"citeCount":6,"cluster_id":7316740,"court":"District Court, N.D. California","court_citation_string":"N.D. Cal.","court_id":"cand","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2015-11-10","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Case No. 15-cv-03395-JCS","docket_id":64305223,"judge":"Spero","lexisCite":"2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152804","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T13:35:47.266694Z","date_created":"2022-07-25T04:38:19.251131Z","score":{"bm25":46.040356}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[145730,145875,426434,442906,540085,693410,1115051,1174077,1210025,1214037,2162715,2165753,2185165,2191608,2244638,2247822,2248815,2252662,2271725,2281737,2295653,2301688,2302273,2608931,5665925,5667216,7013787,8710779,9435068],"download_url":null,"id":7234648,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-07-08T21:21:44.489416Z","date_created":"2022-07-25T04:38:19.262482Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\n*964ORDER DENYING COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANT SECOND MEASURE, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FRCP 12(b)(6), AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT PURSUANT TO FRCP 12(e)\nJOSEPH C. SPERO, Chief Magistrate Judge\nI. INTRODUCTION\nPlaintiff Second Measure, Inc. (“Second Measure”) brought this, action against Def","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[7234648],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9998673/in-the-matter-of-the-claim-for-damages-filed-by-josh-longwell-with-the/","attorney":"","caseName":"In the Matter of the Claim for Damages Filed By Josh Longwell With the Wyoming Game and Fish Department: Josh Longwell v. Wyoming Game and Fish Department","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2022 WY 56"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9998673,"court":"Wyoming Supreme Court","court_citation_string":"Wyo.","court_id":"wyo","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2022-04-28","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"S-21-0173","docket_id":68927659,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-07-09T21:41:52.554225Z","date_created":"2024-07-09T21:41:52.478476Z","score":{"bm25":26.400684}},"neutralCite":"2022 WY 56","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"https://documents.courts.state.wy.us/Opinions/Longwell%20S-21-0173.pdf","id":10465274,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2022/04/28/in_the_matter_of_the_claim_for_damages_filed_by_josh_longwell_with_the.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-27T17:33:02.017936Z","date_created":"2024-07-09T21:41:52.488039Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"e2978fe98a93f2ee6e0727698f4fa33b030a37ba","snippet":"              IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING\n\n                                   2022 WY 56\n\n                                                  APRIL TERM, A.D. 2022\n\n                                                          April 28, 2022\n\n\nIN THE MATTER OF THE CLAIM\nFOR DAMAGES FILED BY JOSH\nLONGWELL WITH THE WYOMING\nGAME AND FISH DEPARTMENT:\n\nJOSH LONGWELL,\n\nAppellant\n(Claimant),                                   S-21-0173\n\nv.\n\nWYOMING GAME AND FISH\nDEPARTMENT,\n\nAppellee\n(Respondent).\n","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10465274],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4635926/westfield-ins-group-v-silco-fire-sec/","attorney":"","caseName":"Westfield Ins. Group v. Silco Fire & Sec.","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2019 Ohio 2697"],"citeCount":5,"cluster_id":4635926,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2019-06-28","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"2018CA00122","docket_id":15867908,"judge":"Delaney","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:41:47.315452Z","date_created":"2019-07-02T14:43:25.135334Z","score":{"bm25":20.631784}},"neutralCite":"2019 Ohio 2697","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8076,"cites":[110374,3698555,3702886,3719810,3740238,3745269,3765068,3784847,3785144],"download_url":"http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/5/2019/2019-Ohio-2697.pdf","id":4413179,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2019/06/28/westfield_ins._group_v._silco_fire__sec..pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T17:35:06.397291Z","date_created":"2019-07-02T14:43:25.155473Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"abe44069f1b07649b485a97cf3c070a8789dc1a6","snippet":"[Cite as Westfield Ins. Group v. Silco Fire & Sec., 2019-Ohio-2697.]\n\n\n                                        COURT OF APPEALS\n                                       STARK COUNTY, OHIO\n                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT\n\n\n WESTFIELD INSURANCE GROUP                              :\n A/S/O FIRSTMERIT CORPORATION,                          :    JUDGES:\n ET AL.                                                 :\n                                                        :    Hon. ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4413179],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"measure of damages, privilege"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10019692/king-v-duke-energy-progress/","attorney":"","caseName":"King v. Duke Energy Progress","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10019692,"court":"Court of Appeals of North Carolina","court_citation_string":"N.C. Ct. App.","court_id":"ncctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2021-02-16","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"20-292","docket_id":59842052,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-07-29T15:56:20.615749Z","date_created":"2024-07-29T15:56:20.578542Z","score":{"bm25":20.406988}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1218129,1254975,1325107,1326526,1354096,1383485,3660409,3675844,4108862],"download_url":"http://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&pdf=39945","id":10486293,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2021/02/16/king_v._duke_energy_progress.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-27T17:42:11.770589Z","date_created":"2024-07-29T15:56:20.580542Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"7e21226181e67a0f32dc207492e495c5e858deea","snippet":"                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA\n\n                                         2021-NCCOA-17\n\n                                         No. COA20-292\n\n                                     Filed 16 February 2021\n\n     Scotland County, No. 17-CVS-646\n\n     JOHN WAYNE KING, JR. and LESLIE LYLES KING, Plaintiffs,\n\n                   v.\n\n     DUKE ENERGY PROGRESS, LLC and CAROLINA TREE EQUIPMENT, INC. d/b/a\n     CAROLINA TREE CARE, Defendants.\n\n\n             Appeal by Plaintif","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10486293],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"trespass to timber measure of damages where trees are ornamental and have little or no commercial value after being cut replacement cost constitutes competent evidence of diminution in value of real estate owned for personal use"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4875943/king-v-duke-energy-progress/","attorney":"","caseName":"King v. Duke Energy Progress","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4875943,"court":"Court of Appeals of North Carolina","court_citation_string":"N.C. Ct. App.","court_id":"ncctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2021-02-16","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"20-292","docket_id":59842052,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T02:47:51.580317Z","date_created":"2021-04-21T19:12:47.033507Z","score":{"bm25":20.269075}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&pdf=39945","id":4679722,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"bin/2021/02/16/king_v._duke_energy_progress.bin","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-22T19:55:17.210052Z","date_created":"2021-04-21T19:12:47.035569Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"096ae02fafc6184f34610e83bdefd315af301a31","snippet":"                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA\n\n                                         2021-NCCOA-17\n\n                                         No. COA20-292\n\n                                     Filed 16 February 2021\n\n     Scotland County, No. 17-CVS-646\n\n     JOHN WAYNE KING, JR. and LESLIE LYLES KING, Plaintiffs,\n\n                   v.\n\n     DUKE ENERGY PROGRESS, LLC and CAROLINA TREE EQUIPMENT, INC. d/b/a\n     CAROLINA TREE CARE, Defendants.\n\n\n             Appeal by Plaintif","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4679722],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"trespass to timber measure of damages where trees are ornamental and have little or no commercial value after being cut replacement cost constitutes competent evidence of diminution in value of real estate owned for personal use"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4740790/levine-v-kellogg/","attorney":"","caseName":"Levine v. Kellogg","caseNameFull":"","citation":["153 N.E.3d 663","2020 Ohio 1246"],"citeCount":7,"cluster_id":4740790,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-03-31","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"18AP-694","docket_id":17029165,"judge":"Brown, J.","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-26T18:14:55.778499Z","date_created":"2020-03-31T19:13:58.832448Z","score":{"bm25":17.924797}},"neutralCite":"2020 Ohio 1246","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8060,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/10/2020/2020-Ohio-1246.pdf","id":4521137,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/03/31/levine_v._kellogg.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-26T18:14:55.793921Z","date_created":"2020-03-31T19:13:58.867107Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"dfdf7a18dd347442097bdb6c8494a86eea254417","snippet":"[Cite as Levine v. Kellogg, 2020-Ohio-1246.]\n\n                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO\n\n                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT\n\n\nSteve Levine et al.,                            :\n\n                 Plaintiffs-Appellees,          :\n                 Cross-Appellants,                           No. 18AP-694\n                                                :        (M.C. No. 2016CVF-27321)\nv.\n                                                :       (REGULAR CALE","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4521137],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Trial court erred in applying improper measure of damages, requiring remand for court to re-examine whether appellant suffered actual damages in action in which appellees sought return of security deposit and appellant brought counterclaim for breach of contract."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/7335190/oneida-nation-v-village-of-hobart-wisconsin/","attorney":"*502James R. Bittorf, Kelly M. McAndrews, Oneida Law Office, Oneida, WI, Jessica C. Mederson, Paul R. Jacquart, Hansen Reynolds LLC, Milwaukee, WI, Vanya S. Hogen, William A. Szotkowski, Hogen Adams PLLC, St Paul, Minnesota, Arlinda F. Locklear, Arlinda F. Locklear, Esquire, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff., Christopher T. Koehnke, Derek J. Waterstreet, Joseph M. Russell, Matthew J. Thome, von Briesen & Roper SC, Milwaukee, WI, Frank W. Kowalkowski, von Briesen & Roper SC, Green Bay, WI, for Defendant., William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge *503This case represents another episode in the ongoing dispute between the Oneida Nation and the Village of Hobart over land use regulation and control. The Oneida Nation filed this action for declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the legal authority of the Village to enforce its Special Events Permit Ordinance, Chapter 250 of the Village Code, against the Nation, its officers, and its employees within the Village, which lies entirely within the 1838 boundaries of the Oneida Reservation. The action arises out of the Village's effort to enforce the Ordinance by requiring the Nation to obtain a permit for its annual Big Apple Fest. The Nation argues that as a federally recognized Indian tribe, it is immune from state and local regulations within its reservation and not subject to the Ordinance. The Village, on the other hand, challenges the Nation's claim that the boundaries of the original Oneida Reservation remain intact and contends that it is entitled to enforce the Ordinance to the extent necessary to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its residents and the public. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1362., Presently before the court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. The Nation moves for summary judgment, claiming that its reservation was created by its Treaty of February 3, 1838, with the United States and that the original Reservation boundaries remain intact. It thus follows, the Nation contends, that the Nation and its officials and employees are not subject to the Ordinance as a matter of law and the Village should be enjoined from attempting to enforce it against them. The Village filed a cross-motion for summary judgment in which it argues that the 1838 Treaty under which the Oneida received their land did not create a reservation. Even if the Treaty did create a reservation, the Village argues that a 1933 decision by this court held that the Oneida Reservation was disestablished and that the Nation is collaterally estopped from relitigating its status. Alternatively, the Village argues that, even aside from the 1933 decision, this court should find that the Oneida Reservation has been disestablished or, at a minimum, diminished. The United States filed a brief in support of the Nation as amicus curiae. The motions have been fully briefed and argued by the parties., Having fully considered the arguments set forth, I conclude that the Treaty of 1838 created a reservation that has not been disestablished. But the Nation's reservation has been diminished such that the Village may enforce the Ordinance on those lands not held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the Nation. In addition, I conclude that the Nation's sovereign immunity forecloses the Village's counterclaim for monetary damages. Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth below, the Nation's motion will be only partially granted as to the Village's counterclaim for damages. The Village's motion for summary judgment dismissing the Nation's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief will be granted. Summary judgment on the Village's counterclaim for declaratory relief that the Ordinance may be enforced as to covered activities on fee land owned by the Nation, as well as activities on public roadways, rights-of-way, and neighboring properties is also granted., The Nation is a federally-recognized Indian tribe and is listed in the Notice of the Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States *504Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs. Joint Stipulated Statement of Material Fact (SSOMF) ¶ 1, ECF No. 86; Pl.'s Statement of Proposed Undisputed Material Facts (PSUMF) ¶ 1, ECF No. 93. The Village is an incorporated municipality in Brown County, Wisconsin and is located wholly within the boundaries of the area set aside for the Nation by the Treaty of February 3, 1838. SSOMF ¶ 2; PSUMF ¶ 2. According to U.S. Census Bureau population estimates, as of July 1, 2017, the total Village population was 8,896, of which \"White alone\" residents comprise 79.9% and \"American Indian and Alaska Native alone\" comprise 12.2%. Def.'s Statement of Proposed Undisputed Material Facts (DSUMF) ¶ 127, ECF No. 91., Richard Figueroa, the Nation's Special Events Coordinator in the Tourism Division, is responsible for planning the Big Apple Fest. Figueroa coordinates the event with the Oneida Compliance Division, the Oneida Risk Management Department, the Oneida Environmental Health and Safety Division, Oneida Conservation, the Oneida Utilities Department, the Oneida Public Works Department, Oneida Security, and the Oneida Police Department to ensure compliance with the Nation's laws. PSUMF ¶ 56. The Nation conducts the Big Apple Fest in conformity with its laws, specifically the Emergency Management and Homeland Security Ordinance; the Oneida Safety Law; the Oneida Vendor Licensing Ordinance; the Oneida Food Service Code; the Nation's On-Site Waste Disposal Ordinance; the Recycling and Solid Waste Disposal Law; the Sanitation Ordinance; and Oneida Tribal Regulation of Domestic Animals Ordinance. Id. ¶ 55., On September 2, 2016, counsel for the Village informed the Nation that it needed to apply for a permit under the Ordinance or the Village would enforce the Ordinance's penalty provisions. SSOMF ¶ 18. Although it submitted an Application by Municipality for Permission to Detour State Trunk Highway Traffic to the Wisconsin Department of Transportation and Brown County Public Works Director, id. ¶ 20, the Nation declined to apply for a permit from the Village and, on September 9, 2016, filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin the Village from requiring that the Nation's 2016 Big Apple Fest comply with the provisions of the Ordinance. The court denied the Nation's *505motion on September 13, 2016, finding that the Nation did not demonstrate that it would suffer irreparable harm since the Village agreed it would not seek to prevent the event from going on. The Nation held the Big Apple Fest as planned on September 17, 2016. Id. ¶ 19., Some activities associated with the 2016 Big Apple Fest occurred on non-trust land owned by the Nation in fee simple, including parking and apple picking. DSUMF ¶ 134. During the Apple Fest, security officers, six Oneida Nation police officers, and a registered nurse were on site. PSUMF ¶¶ 58, 60. Two officers of the Hobart-Lawrence Police Department attended the 2016 Big Apple Fest. SSOMF ¶ 22. The Nation contracted with a third-party vendor to place road closure barricades for the event at the intersection of North Overland Road and Riverside Drive and to block both lanes of traffic for the portion of North Overland Road between the North Overland Road/Highway 54 intersection. DSUMF ¶¶ 135-36., On September 21, 2016, the Village's Chief of Police issued Citation No. 7R80F51TJS against the Nation for failing to act in accordance with the Ordinance. The Nation filed an amended complaint on September 28, 2016, asserting that it, its officials, and its employees are immune from the Ordinance in the conduct of special events on the Nation's trust land and Reservation and that the Village lacks the authority to enforce the Ordinance against the Nation, its officials, and its employees. It seeks to enjoin the Village's attempt to impose the Ordinance on the Nation, its officials, and its employees and to enforce the Ordinance through citation or municipal court proceedings. It also seeks to enjoin the Village from enforcing Citation No. 7R80F51TJS against the Nation., While the present dispute between the parties arises out of these recent events, its resolution requires consideration of the Nation's history in Wisconsin and the various shifts in federal Indian policy in the United States over the last 150 years. For this reason, both parties sought a significant period of time for discovery and have submitted extensive documentation and briefing in support of their respective positions. Recognizing the importance of the issues raised to both parties, the court begins its analysis with a consideration of the history to which both appeal., The Oneida Tribe of Indians was one of six Iroquois Nations living in the area that later became the State of New York. In the years following the Revolutionary War, encroachment by the new Americans on their ancestral lands, as well as other factors, gave rise to a plan for the Oneida to move west to the Wisconsin Territory. On February 8, 1831, the United States entered into a treaty with the Menominee Tribe, which was already located in the Wisconsin Territory, under which the Menominee agreed to cede a tract of land to be set apart as a home to the several tribes of the New York Indians, including the Oneida. The tract of land was to be apportioned among the New York tribes \"so as not to assign any tribe a greater number of acres than may be equal to one hundred for each soul actually settled upon the lands.\" PSUMF ¶ 3 (quoting Treaty with the Menominee, 1931, signed Feb. 8, 1831, 7 Stat. 342, ECF No. 92-10 at 4). The Treaty stated that ceded lands \"are to be held by those tribes, under such tenure as the Menomonee [sic] Indians now hold their lands, subject to such regulations and alteration of tenure, as Congress and the President of the United States shall, from time to time, think proper to adopt.\" Id. ¶ 4 (quoting Treaty with the Menominee, 1931, signed Feb. 8, 1831, 7 Stat. 342, ECF, *506No. 92-10 at 4). The Treaty with the Menominee was amended on February 17, 1831, to extend the three-year deadline by which the New York tribes were to relocate to the ceded Menominee lands. Id. ¶ 6. On October 27, 1832, the United States entered into a third treaty with the Menominee to amend the February 8, 1831 Treaty to alter the boundaries of the tract ceded to the United States for the benefit of the New York tribes. The October 27, 1832 treaty provided that the terms of the February 8, 1831 Treaty, as amended, were otherwise confirmed. Id. ¶ 7., Then, on February 3, 1838, the Oneida entered into a treaty with the United States in which it ceded to the United States their title and interest in the 1831 Menominee cession in return for reserving \"to the said Indians to be held as other Indian lands are held a tract of land containing one hundred (100) acres, for each individual, and the lines of which shall be so run as to include all their settlements and improvements in the vicinity of Green Bay.\" Id. ¶ 8 (quoting Treaty with the Oneida, 1838, signed Feb. 3, 1838, 7 Stat. 566, Arts. 1 and 2, ECF No. 92-13 at 3). The number of Oneida who had emigrated to the Duck Creek area totaled 654, resulting in a tract of land consisting of approximately 65,400 acres. DSUMF ¶ 1. The United States agreed to survey the reserved tracts as soon as practicable. PSUMF ¶ 9. In December 1838, John Suydam surveyed the tract of land set aside in the Treaty of 1838. Id. ¶ 10. The map he created of the survey, labeled \"Oneida Reservation,\" consisted of land in what would later become parts of Brown and Outagamie Counties in the State of Wisconsin. ECF No. 92-14. Commissioner of Indian Affairs Crawford wrote to Secretary of War Poinsett on February 7, 1839, advising that the terms of the Treaty of 1838 had been carried out. PSUMF ¶ 11., Federal Indian policy changed dramatically as the nation grew, and in the late 19th century, Congress terminated the treaty-making process with individual tribes, 25 U.S.C. § 71, and moved toward a policy of allotment and assimilation. In 1887, Congress enacted the General Allotment Act, commonly referred to as the Dawes Act, 25 U.S.C. § 331, et seq. , the purpose of which was the eventual assimilation of tribal members into the general population and the elimination of Indian reservations through the allotment of the land in severalty to the Indians residing on those reservations. The allotted lands were to be held in trust by the United States for a period of at least 25 years, after which Indian allottees were to receive fee patents, which removed all restraints on alienation and allowed transfer of the land to non-Indians. See 25 U.S.C. § 348. Once allottees received their patents, they were to \"have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may reside.\" Act of February 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388 at 390. It was believed that, within a generation or two, \"the tribes would dissolve, their reservations would disappear, and individual Indians would be absorbed into the larger community of white settlers.\" South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe , 522 U.S. 329, 335, 118 S.Ct. 789, 139 L.Ed.2d 773 (1998) (citing Hearings on H.R. 7902 before the House Committee on Indian Affairs, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., 428 (1934) )., On September 16, 1887, Commissioner of Indian Affairs J.D.C. Atkins recommended to Secretary of the Interior John Noble that \"the President be asked to authorize allotments in severalty to be made to the Indians on the Oneida Reservation, in Wisconsin, under the Act of February 8, 1887.\" PSUMF ¶ 14 (quoting ECF No. 92-17); DSUMF ¶ 5. The Secretary concurred and relayed the recommendation to President Benjamin Harrison in *507May 1889. PSUMF ¶ 17; DSUMF ¶ 5. The allotment of the Oneida Reservation to tribal members began in 1889. By 1891, with the exception of approximately eighty acres reserved for boarding school and day school purposes, as well as the small allotments of land for use in the satisfaction of additional claims to entitlement, a schedule containing 1,530 allotments with no surplus land remaining was submitted for approval. PSUMF ¶¶ 19, 22; DSUMF ¶ 6. In accordance with the provisions of the Dawes Act, trust patents dated June 13, 1892, were issued to Oneida allottees, to remain in trust for twenty-five years. PSUMF ¶ 21; DSUMF ¶ 8., After the individual tribal members, including members of the Oneida Tribe, received their allotments, but before the twenty-five-year trust period expired, they repeatedly petitioned the federal government for legislation granting the individual members fee simple title to their land. In response to such requests, Congress amended the Dawes Act through the Burke Act, 34 Stat. 182, 25 U.S.C. § 349, on May 8, 1906. The Burke Act gave the Secretary of the Interior the discretion to immediately issue fee patents to competent Indian allottees before the expiration of the twenty-five-year trust period required under the Dawes Act. Section 6 of the Burke Act provided that, upon issuance of the patent conveying the allotment in fee simple, \"all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or taxation of said land [would] be removed.\" 25 U.S.C. § 349. During the same year, Congress passed an act making \"appropriations for the current and contingent expenses of the Indian Department, for fulfilling treaty stipulations with various Indian tribes, and for other purposes.\" Act of June 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 325 ch. 3504. The June 21, 1906 Act included a provision authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to issue fee patents to fifty-six named Oneida allottees and, in the Secretary's discretion, \"to issue a patent in fee to any Indian of the Oneida Reservation in Wisconsin for the lands heretofore allotted him.\" Id. The issuance of the patents would operate as a \"removal of all restrictions as to the sale, taxation, and alienation of the lands so patented.\" Id., Over the years that followed, Congress authorized the sale of trust patents held by non-competent allottees for their benefit, 34 Stat. 1015, at 1018, and authorized the issuance of fee patents to allotment purchasers, 35 Stat. 444, resulting in the issuance of fee patents for much of the allotted land. The twenty-five-year trust period for those allotments that remained in trust was set to expire on June 12, 1917. DSUMF ¶ 33. On March 24, 1917, a three-person competency commission recommended that fee patents be issued immediately to ten named Oneida allottees, that fee patents be issued to an additional twenty-two named Oneida allottees upon the expiration of the trust period on June 12, 1917, and that the trust period for all other allottees still holding allotments in trust on the area set aside in the Treaty of 1838 be extended. PSUMF ¶ 29; DSUMF ¶ 32. By 1917, over 50,000 acres of the 65,400-acre reservation fell out of Indian ownership. DSUMF ¶ 30. On May 4, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson signed an executive order extending the trust period by nine years for thirty-five named Oneida *508allottees. PSUMF ¶ 34; DSUMF ¶ 35. President Calvin Coolidge signed an executive order on March 1, 1927, extending the trust period for twenty-one named Oneida allottees. PSUMF ¶ 38; DSUMF ¶ 36. By the early 1930s, the Oneida Tribe owned less than 90 acres of the approximately 65,400 acres within the original boundaries of the area set aside in the 1838 treaty. DSUMF ¶ 98. Several hundred additional acres of individual allotments continued to be held in trust. Id. At least 95% of the land was no longer owned by Indians. Id. ¶ 95., In 1934, Congress once again changed federal policy toward tribes through the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 450, et seq. The IRA put an end to the allotment process, 25 U.S.C. § 461 ; continued periods of trust upon Indian lands and restrictions on alienation indefinitely, 25 U.S.C. § 462 ; authorized the Secretary of the Interior to restore to tribal ownership the remaining surplus lands of any Indian reservation previously opened for public sale, acquire through purchase or otherwise any lands within or without existing reservations, and place them in trust for the purpose of providing land for Indians, 25 U.S.C. §§ 463, 465 ; and authorized tribes to adopt constitutions and by-laws, and organize their own governments under the supervision of the Secretary, 25 U.S.C. § 476. In 1936, less than two years after the enactment of the IRA, the Nation adopted its Constitution and Bylaws. PSUMF ¶ 49., Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The fact that the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not alter this standard. In evaluating each party's motion, the court must \"construe all inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration is made.\" Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson , 297 F.3d 558, 561-62 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp. , 154 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 1998) ). The party opposing the motion for summary judgment must \"submit evidentiary materials that set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.\" Siegel v. Shell Oil Co. , 612 F.3d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). \"The nonmoving party must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.\" Id. Summary judgment is properly entered against a party \"who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.\" Austin v. Walgreen Co. , 885 F.3d 1085, 1087-88 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) )., The court begins with the parties' dispute regarding the origin and creation of the Oneida Reservation. In 1831, the United States entered into a treaty with the Menominee Tribe to acquire a 500,000-acre tract of land to be set apart as a home to several New York tribes, including the Oneida Tribe of Indians. This tract of land was to be apportioned among the emigrating New York tribes \"so as not to assign any tribe a greater number of acres than may be equal to one hundred for each soul actually settled upon the lands.\" ECF No. 92-10 at 4. The treaty indicated further that the ceded lands were to be held by the New York Indian tribes \"under such *509tenure as the Menomonee [sic] Indians now hold their lands, subject to such regulations and alteration of tenure as Congress and the President of the United States shall, from time to time, think proper to adopt.\" Id. Although the treaty was amended twice to extend the three-year deadline by which the New York tribes were to relocate to the ceded lands and to alter the boundaries of the ceded tract of land, the original terms of the 1831 treaty were otherwise confirmed., The United States entered into a treaty with the Oneida on February 3, 1838. The Oneida ceded to the United States its interest in the 1831 Menominee land set apart for them in return for reserving \"to the said Indians to be held as other Indian lands are held a tract of land containing one hundred (100) acres, for each individual.\" ECF No. 92-13 at 3. The land was subsequently surveyed by the United States. The survey, labeled \"Oneida Reservation,\" consisted of 65,400 acres of land. The Nation asserts that this treaty created a reservation held in common by the Tribe. The Village maintains that the Treaty provides for the reservation of individual 100-acre tracts for each member, rather than one reservation held in common by the Tribe., In determining whether a reservation has been created, courts \"ask whether the area has been validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the Government.\" Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe , 498 U.S. 505, 511, 111 S.Ct. 905, 112 L.Ed.2d 1112 (1991) (citation omitted). When a party asserts that a treaty created a reservation, the \"treaty is to be construed as the Indians would have understood it, as disclosed by the practices and customs of the Indians at the time the treaty was negotiated, and by the history of the treaty, the negotiations that preceded it, and the practical construction given the treaty by the parties.\" United States v. Top Sky , 547 F.2d 486, 487 (9th Cir. 1976) (internal citations omitted); see also Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians , 526 U.S. 172, 196, 119 S.Ct. 1187, 143 L.Ed.2d 270 (1999) (noting that courts must look \"beyond the written words to the larger context that frames the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties\")., Here, the history leading up to the Treaty of 1838 demonstrates that the United States, the Menominee, and the Oneida engaged in negotiations regarding the relocation of the Oneida from New York to the ceded Menominee territory. The Treaty of 1838 provides that \"there shall be reserved to the said Indians to be held as other Indian lands are held a tract of land containing one hundred (100) acres, for each individual.\" ECF No. 92-13 at 3. The Village argues that the reference in the Treaty of 1838 to \"a tract of land containing one hundred (100) acres for each individual\" means that the Treaty allotted land to individual members of the tribe rather than creating a reservation held in common. Yet, a reading of the Treaty in its entirety and consideration of the surrounding circumstances indicates that the language simply conveys how the United States would calculate the amount of land that would be apportioned to the Oneida Tribe from the 500,000 acres of ceded Menominee land set apart for the New York tribes. Indeed, the 1831 Menominee Treaty stated that the ceded land was to be apportioned among the tribes \"so as not to assign any tribe a greater number of acres than may be equal to one hundred for each soul actually settled upon the lands\" and that those tracts would be held \"as the Menomonee [sic] Indians hold their lands,\" which the 1831 Menominee treaty described *510as a \"reservation.\" ECF No. 92-10 at 4. Although it is true that certain individual members of the Oneida Tribe sought to trade their participation in the Oneida Reservation in favor of more land elsewhere, the principal tribal leaders intended to establish a permanent home for the Tribe in Wisconsin and ultimately entered into a treaty with the United States to do so. The United States' December 1838 survey labels a single tract of land, totaling 65,400 acres, as the Oneida Reservation. Both the United States and the Tribe agreed that the survey satisfactorily reflected the parties' understanding of the Treaty. In short, the language of the 1838 Treaty, the history of the Treaty, the negotiations that preceded it, and the practical construction given the Treaty by the parties compel the conclusion that the lands were ceded to the Oneida Tribe as a reservation and not as individual allotments to its members. For these reasons, the court holds that the Treaty of 1838 created the Oneida Reservation., Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitigation of issues resolved in an earlier lawsuit. \"Issue preclusion ... bars successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment, even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.\" Taylor v. Sturgell , 553 U.S. 880, 892, 128 S.Ct. 2161, 171 L.Ed.2d 155 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The doctrine \"has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.\" Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore , 439 U.S. 322, 326, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979) (citation omitted). The prerequisites for applying the doctrine are satisfied when \"(1) the issue sought to be precluded is the same as an issue in the prior litigation; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the prior litigation; (3) the determination of the issue must have been essential to the final judgment; and (4) the party against whom estoppel is invoked must have been fully represented in the prior action.\" Adams v. City of Indianapolis , 742 F.3d 720, 736 (7th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted)., The Village asserts that, even though the Tribe was not a named party in the litigation, the complaint in that action indicates that the plaintiffs were duly authorized and empowered to act for and on behalf of the Oneida Tribe. But the fact that the lawsuit was brought by members of the Tribe, rather than the Tribe itself, suggests that the Tribe was not fully represented in Stevens and did not itself participate in the proceedings. Indeed, there is no evidence that the Tribe exercised a sufficient degree of control in Stevens . See 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4451 (2017) (\"Lesser measures of participation without control do not suffice.\")., In addition, issue preclusion does not apply here because this case raises different factual and legal questions than those raised in Stevens . \"Identity of the issue is established by showing that the same general legal rules govern both cases and that the facts of both cases are indistinguishable as measured by those rules.\" WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4425. Again, the question raised in Stevens was whether individual members of the Tribe were required to pay local property taxes upon the issuance of fee patents for their allotments. The underlying issue in this case is whether the Nation is subject to the regulations of a local municipality in the conduct of its special events. Although similar issues regarding the reservation's status were raised in Stevens , that action was not a comprehensive adjudication of the true status of the reservation. In addition, the issue of whether the Nation itself is immune from local regulatory authority was not litigated in Stevens to any extent. See Bernstein v. Bankert , 733 F.3d 190 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding issue preclusion did not apply because the issues involved facts that were not \"identical in all material aspects\"). Because this case presents different facts and legal foundation, issue preclusion does not apply. The court will therefore turn to the Village's alternative argument that, even apart from the 1933 decision in Stevens , the Oneida Reservation was disestablished or diminished., 18 U.S.C. § 1151. Although located within the federal criminal code, \"the Court has recognized that it generally applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction.\" DeCoteau v. Dist. Cty. Court for Tenth Judicial Dist. , 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2, 95 S.Ct. 1082, 43 L.Ed.2d 300 (1975)., Prior to the enactment of § 1151, land within a reservation's boundaries was held to be no longer Indian country when Indian title was extinguished. See, e.g., Clairmont v. United States , 225 U.S. 551, 32 S.Ct. 787, 56 L.Ed. 1201 (1912) (vacating conviction for selling or giving intoxicating liquor to Indian on ground that railroad right-of-way, where offense occurred, had been conveyed in fee to railroad and thus was no longer Indian country). But § 1151\"abrogated this understanding of Indian country and, with respect to reservation lands, preserves federal and tribal jurisdiction even if such lands pass out of Indian ownership.\" Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Podhradsky , 606 F.3d 994, 1007 (8th Cir. 2010) (citing Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary , 368 U.S. 351, 357-58, 82 S.Ct. 424, 7 L.Ed.2d 346 (1962) ); see also Solem v. Bartlett , 465 U.S. 463, 468, 104 S.Ct. 1161, 79 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984) (\"Only in 1948 did Congress uncouple reservation status from Indian ownership, and statutorily define Indian country to include lands held in fee by non-Indians within reservation boundaries.\"). Thus, the question before the court is whether the Oneida Reservation was disestablished or diminished before § 1151 became effective., \"Although the terms 'diminished' and 'disestablished' have at times been used interchangeably,\" as the court explained in Yankton Sioux Tribe v. Gaffey , 188 F.3d 1010, 1017 (8th Cir. 1999), \"disestablishment generally refers to the relatively rare elimination of a reservation while diminishment commonly refers to the reduction in size of a reservation.\" The Nation correctly observes that \"[b]ecause the Reservation was created by a treaty, only Congress can diminish or disestablish it.\" Pl.'s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 96, at 36. This follows from the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, under which the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States are the supreme law of the land and control over the enactments of states and local governments. U.S. Const. art. VI., *513Solem , 465 U.S. at 470, 104 S.Ct. 1161 (\"Diminishment, moreover, will not be lightly inferred.\"). The congressional intent to disestablish or diminish a reservation must be clear. This is because of the general rule that doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the Indian tribes \"who are the wards of the nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith.\" McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm'n , 411 U.S. 164, 174, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973) (quoting Carpenter v. Shaw , 280 U.S. 363, 367, 50 S.Ct. 121, 74 L.Ed. 478 (1930) ). Accordingly, \"[o]nce a block of land is set aside for an Indian Reservation and no matter what happens to the title of individual plots within the area, the entire block retains its reservation status until Congress explicitly indicates otherwise.\" Solem , 465 U.S. at 470, 104 S.Ct. 1161., To determine whether an Indian reservation has been disestablished or diminished, the court must look first to the statutory text of the relevant statute, reasoning that it is \"[t]he most probative evidence of congressional intent.\" Id. at 469, 104 S.Ct. 1161 ; see also Nebraska v. Parker , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 1072, 1079, 194 L.Ed.2d 152 (2016) (\"[W]e start with the statutory text, for '[t]he most probative evidence of diminishment is, of course, the statutory language used to open Indian lands.' \" (citation omitted) (second alteration in original) ). Courts next examine the circumstances surrounding the passage of the act, \"particularly the manner in which the transaction was negotiated with the tribes involved and the tenor of legislative reports presented to Congress.\" Solem , 465 U.S. at 471, 104 S.Ct. 1161 ; Parker , 136 S.Ct. at 1079. Finally, courts \"look to the subsequent treatment of the area in question and the pattern of settlement there.\" South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe , 522 U.S. 329, 351-52, 118 S.Ct. 789, 139 L.Ed.2d 773 (1998) ; see also Parker , 136 S.Ct. at 1079. \"When both an act and its legislative history fail to provide substantial and compelling evidence of a congressional intention to diminish Indian lands, we are bound by our traditional solicitude for the Indian tribes to rule that diminishment did not take place and that the old reservation boundaries survived the opening.\" Solem , 465 U.S. at 472, 104 S.Ct. 1161., In cases where disestablishment or diminishment is alleged to have resulted from surplus land acts, such as Solem and Parker , the Court has observed that common \"hallmarks of diminishment\" include \" '[e]xplicit reference to cession or other language evidencing the present and total surrender of all tribal interests' or 'an unconditional commitment from Congress to compensate the Indian tribe for its opened land.' \" Parker , 136 S.Ct. at 1079 (quoting Solem , 465 U.S. at 470-71, 104 S.Ct. 1161 ) (alteration in original). Examples of termination language contained in surplus land acts found to show congressional intent to diminish or disestablish include: \"the Smith River reservation is hereby discontinued,\" Mattz v. Arnett , 412 U.S. 481, 505 n.22, 93 S.Ct. 2245, 37 L.Ed.2d 92 (1973) ; \"the reservation lines of the said Ponca and Otoe and Missouria Indian reservations ... are hereby, abolished,\" Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip , 430 U.S. 584, 618, 97 S.Ct. 1361, 51 L.Ed.2d 660 (1977) ; \"the ... Indians hereby cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the United States all their claim, right, title, and interest,\" DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 455-56, 95 S.Ct. 1082 ; and \"[t]he said Indians belonging to the Shoshone or Wind River Reservation, Wyoming, for the consideration hereinafter named, do hereby cede, grant, and relinquish to the United States, all right, title, and interest which they may have to all the lands embraced within the said reservation, except the lands within *514and bounded by the following lines,\" Wyoming v. United States Envt'l Prot. Agency , 875 F.3d 505, 518 (10th Cir. 2017)., But this case does not arise under a surplus land act. There was no surplus land act passed in connection with the Oneida Reservation because it was not contemplated that there would be surplus land remaining after the land within the Reservation was allotted to individual tribal members and fee patents finally issued. It would make no sense for an allotment act to contain the type of cession language that is found in surplus land acts or terms like \"surrender, grant, or convey.\" Those terms have no place in the context of allotment. In the process of allotment, the tribes were not conveying surplus lands to the United States; instead, the United States was conveying its interest in the lands it had held in trust for the benefit of the tribes to the individual tribal members and terminating the restrictions that had previously applied to it. For the same reason, allotment acts would not contain language indicating that the Indian tribes would be compensated for the allotted lands. The land was not being conveyed to outsiders by the tribe, but instead divided among the tribal members free of all federal restrictions., The Nation argues that the Dawes Act and the Burke Act have never been construed to alter reservation boundaries. Indeed, the mere act of dividing the Reservation into individual allotments for each member, by itself, is insufficient to divest the land of its reservation status. See United States v. Celestine , 215 U.S. 278, 287, 30 S.Ct. 93, 54 L.Ed. 195 (1909) (\"It is clear that the allotment alone could not [revoke the reservation].\"). After all, the lands allotted to a tribe's members were set apart for the tribe and remained under the federal government's care and control. United States v. Pelican , 232 U.S. 442, 449, 34 S.Ct. 396, 58 L.Ed. 676 (1914) (\"[W]e are unable to find ground for the conclusion that [Indian lands] became other than Indian country through the distribution into separate holdings, the Government retaining control.\"). But we are not talking here about allotment, by itself. Once the allotment trust period had run its course or was otherwise terminated, the Secretary, acting under the authority granted him by Congress, issued patents conveying the land in fee, free of all restrictions, to the individual tribal members. Once the fee patents were issued, the federal government no longer retained control of the land, as the land was converted into fee simple and owned by the individual tribal member. At that point, the intent unequivocally expressed by Congress in its enactment of the allotment acts was realized and either then or with the further conveyance of the land to non-Indians, the original reservation was diminished., These facts distinguish this case from both Celestine and Pelican . In Celestine , the Indian defendant challenged his federal murder conviction on the ground that the United States district court lacked jurisdiction because the crime occurred on land within the exterior boundaries of the reservation, but which had been allotted to him and for which he had been granted a patent. 215 U.S. at 280, 30 S.Ct. 93. Notwithstanding the issuance of a patent, the Court held that the land remained part of the reservation because Congress had taken no steps to exclude the allotted land from the reservation. Id. at 284, 30 S.Ct. 93. Unlike this case, the patent issued to the defendant in Celestine contained \"conditions against alienation or leasing, exemption from levy, sale, or forfeiture, not to be disturbed by the state without the consent of Congress ....\" Id. at 286, 30 S.Ct. 93. And unlike this case, the defendant Indian had remained in possession of the property., Similarly, in Pelican , the Indian defendant challenged his federal indictment for murder on the same ground, claiming that the crime occurred on another Indian's allotment and was therefore not within Indian country. 232 U.S. at 444, 34 S.Ct. 396. The district court agreed and sustained the defendant's demurrer. However, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that \"[a]lthough the lands were allotted in severalty, they were to be held in trust by the United States for twenty-five years for the sole use and benefit of the allottee, or his *516heirs, and during this period were to be inalienable.\" Id. at 447, 34 S.Ct. 396. Explaining further, the Court stated, \"[t]hat the lands, being so held, continued to be under the jurisdiction and control of Congress for all governmental purposes relating to the guardianship and protection of the Indians, is not open to controversy.\" Id. Again, unlike this case, no fee patent had been issued and the original tribal member remained in possession., The conclusion that the issuance of fee patents and sale of the land following allotment diminished the reservation is also consistent with, if not compelled by, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Wisconsin v. Stockbridge-Munsee Community , 554 F.3d 657 (7th Cir. 2009). In that case, the State of Wisconsin sued the Sockbridge-Munsee Tribe seeking an injunction enjoining the Tribe's gambling operation and a declaration of the current boundaries of the Tribe's reservation. The Tribe counterclaimed for a declaration that the golf course and supper club complex it had purchased was within the boundaries of the reservation created by its 1856 treaty with the United States such that it could operate slot machines at that location under a contract with the State of Wisconsin entered into pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701, et seq . The golf course and supper club complex were located within the boundaries of the Tribe's original reservation, but it was in a section that had been sold to timber companies in 1871. 554 F.3d at 661. The unsold land within the reservation boundaries was later allotted to tribal members pursuant to a 1906 act of Congress, and eventually sold off. After passage of the IRA, the Department of the Interior had worked with the Tribe in the 1930s to reacquire parts of the land described in the 1856 treaty, rededicating the property as the Tribe's reservation. Id. Based on the previous history, however, the State argued that the 1856 reservation was diminished by the 1871 Act's sale of reservation land to timber companies, and then extinguished by the 1906 Act. The district court agreed, granting the State's motion for summary judgment, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Notwithstanding the absence of \"the hallmark language\" suggesting that Congress intended to disestablish or diminish the reservation in the 1906 Act, the court concluded that the circumstances surrounding it and the manner in which the reservation was treated in the aftermath of the Act made clear Congress's intent to extinguish the reservation:, Id. at 664-65. As for the manner in which the reservation was treated after the Act, the court noted that \"the land became subject to state taxes, and the Department *517of the Interior refused to intervene in alcohol-related problems within the original reservation.\" Id. at 665. And when in the 1930s, the Department of Interior worked with the Tribe to reacquire parts of its 1856 reservation, it declared the newly reacquired land to be the Tribe's reservation. Id. Though \"there were exceptions to this understanding,\" the court held, \"the aberrational statements are not enough to overcome the clear record showing Congress's intent to extinguish the reservation and the otherwise consistent treatment of the reservation as disestablished.\" Id., Strong support for the conclusion that the sale of fee patented land to non-Indians resulted in a diminishment of the reservation can also be found in the series of cases involving the Yankton Sioux Tribe of South Dakota. The dispute there initially arose out of an effort by the Yankton Sioux Tribe to regulate a landfill within the boundaries of its original reservation, over which the State of South Dakota claimed jurisdiction. The original boundaries of the Yankton Sioux Reservation were defined in an 1858 treaty between the United States and the Yankton Sioux Tribe to include approximately 430,000 acres of land in what is now Charles Mix County, South Dakota. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe , 522 U.S. at 334, 118 S.Ct. 789. Under the Dawes Act, about 167,325 acres of the reservation were allotted and patented, and then an additional 95,000 acres were allotted after the passage of an Act of February 28, 1891. The allotments, which totaled approximately 262,300 acres, were not contiguous parcels and were interspersed with approximately 168,000 acres of unallotted surplus land. The 168,000 acres of unallotted lands were then ceded to the United States through an Act of August 15, 1894. Id. at 336-38, 118 S.Ct. 789. The landfill at the center of the dispute was located on non-Indian fee land within the ceded portion of the original reservation boundaries. Id. at 333, 118 S.Ct. 789. The Tribe and the federal government claimed that, because the site was located within the reservation's original 1858 boundaries, it remained part of the reservation and was therefore subject to federal environmental regulations. The State of South Dakota, on the other hand, argued that the 1894 divestiture of Indian property resulted in the disestablishment, or at least the diminishment, of the Tribe's reservation, such that the ceded lands no longer constituted \"Indian country\" under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) and thus the State had primary jurisdiction over the facility. Id. at 340-41, 118 S.Ct. 789., Although the Tribe prevailed in the lower courts, the Supreme Court reversed. Finding that the plain language of the 1894 Act of Congress ratifying the agreement between the Tribe and the Yankton Indian Commission for the ceding of unallotted lands to the United States evinced a congressional intent to diminish the reservation, the Court concluded that the site for the facility was not within the reservation boundaries and thus the State had jurisdiction over it. Id. at 351, 118 S.Ct. 789. The Court limited the scope of its decision to the status of the ceded lands, however, and remanded the case for further proceedings. It explicitly avoided deciding whether Congress had disestablished the reservation altogether. Id. at 358, 118 S.Ct. 789., \"The Act could not foresee all that would happen in the future with population movement, state development, and changing Indian policy,\" the court explained, \"but it contained provisions showing concern for future interests of the Indians in common, as well as provisions recognizing that conditions were sure to change as white settlers moved in to the opened reservation with the expectation of state support.\" Id. at 1028. And \"as more white settlers came on to the opened lands,\" the court explained, \"increased state involvement on their behalf was expected, and the jurisdiction of the State was expected to increase over time.\" Id. In addition, \"some *519articles of the Act reflect the parties' assumption that an allottee who received full title at the end of the trust period would become subject to the civil and criminal laws of the State or territory in which he resided.\" Id. The court found that \"nothing in its text or the circumstances surrounding its passage suggests that any party anticipated that the Tribe would exercise jurisdiction over non Indians who purchased land after it lost its trust status.\" Id. Though the court determined that the 1894 Act intended to diminish the reservation, it concluded that it could not define the precise limits of the remaining reservation and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to further develop the record and to determine what categories of land comprised the diminished reservation. Id. at 1030., On this last appeal, the Eighth Circuit vacated the district court's holding that fee lands that had continuously remained in Indian ownership were still part of the reservation. In all other respects, the district court's decision was affirmed. 606 F.3d at 1015. In upholding the district court's determination that allotted lands that retained their trust status were still part of the Yankton Sioux Reservation, the Eighth Circuit observed that the \"simple act of dividing the Yankton Sioux Reservation into individual allotments was insufficient to divest the allotted lands of their reservation status\" and that there was \"no indication in the historical record that either Congress or the Tribe expressly intended to eliminate the reservation status of the Yankton allotted lands immediately upon allotment or upon the sale of the Tribe's surplus holdings.\" Id. at 1008. \"It thus follows,\" the court concluded, that \"the allotted lands held in trust retained the same reservation status they had enjoyed since the original 1858 Treaty.\" Id. at 1008-09. As for lands within the original boundaries of the reservation that were taken back into trust by the United States after the enactment of the IRA, the court noted that \"[b]y taking former Yankton Sioux Reservation lands back into trust under the IRA, the Secretary effectively exercised his authority to consolidate the Tribe's land base by restoring reservation status to former pieces of a reservation in existence since 1858.\" Id. at 1012. With respect to fee lands continuously owned in fee by Indians, the court found no evidence in the record that any such land existed and therefore vacated the district court's conclusion that such lands would remain part of the reservation. Id. at 1015. That fee lands lawfully sold to non-Indians were no longer part of the reservation was virtually unquestioned., I find this line of cases instructive for the issues before me here. Just as the Eighth Circuit concluded in Gaffey and Podhradsky that fee lands conveyed to non-Indians were no longer part of the Yankton Sioux Reservation, so also I conclude that the fee lands within the original boundaries of the Oneida Reservation that *520were sold to non-Indians, unless reacquired and placed into trust by the federal government, are no longer a part of that Reservation. The loss of that land has necessarily resulted in the diminishment of the Reservation from its original boundaries. Nothing in the text of the Dawes Act or the Act of 1906 suggest that Congress anticipated that the Nation would exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians who purchased land after it lost its trust status. Congress knew based on the Burke Act, which was enacted less than one month before the Act of 1906, that allottees who were issued fee patents would become subject to the civil and criminal laws of the State or territory in which they resided. See 25 U.S.C. § 349 (\"[A]t the expiration of the trust period and when the lands have been conveyed to the Indians by patent in fee ... then each and every allottee shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may reside.\"). It thus follows that as more non-Indian settlers purchased lands held in fee from Oneida members, increased involvement by the state on the settlers' behalf was expected, thereby increasing the State's jurisdiction over time. See Montana v. United States , 450 U.S. 544, 559 n.9, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981) (\"It defies common sense to suppose that Congress would intend that non-Indians purchasing allotted lands would become subject to tribal jurisdiction when an avowed purpose of the allotment policy was the ultimate destruction of tribal government.\"); see also Solem , 465 U.S. at 471 n.12, 104 S.Ct. 1161 (\"When an area is predominately populated by non-Indians with only a few surviving pockets of Indian allotments, finding that the land remains Indian country seriously burdens the administration of State and local governments.\"). By distributing reservation land through allotment and taking a definitive and considered step in allowing the Secretary to expedite the issuance of fee patents to Oneida members, Congress understood that the Nation would be divested of its authority once the allotment process was complete. In short, a reading of the Dawes Act and the Act of 1906 and an examination of the historical context in which they were enacted establish that Congress intended to diminish the Oneida Reservation by the land which it foresaw would become fee simple patents and would subsequently pass out of Indian ownership into the hands of white settlers. The issuance of fee patents and the subsequent transfer of fee title to those lands effectuated that intent., The remaining evidence regarding the subsequent treatment of the land after the enactment of the Act of 1906 supports this conclusion. The parties have presented volumes of material evidencing the subsequent treatment of the land after the passage of the Act of 1906. As noted above, to a lesser extent, courts should consider \"Congress's own treatment of the affected areas, particularly in the years immediately following the opening,\" as well as \"the manner in which the Bureau of Indian Affairs and local jurisdictional authorities dealt with unallotted open lands.\" Solem , 465 U.S. at 471, 104 S.Ct. 1161. \"[A]s one additional clue as to what Congress expected would happen,\" courts also \"look to the subsequent demographic history of opened lands.\" Id. at 471-72, 104 S.Ct. 1161. At the same time, it is not uncommon for the subsequent treatment evidence to be \"so rife with contradictions and inconsistencies as to be of no help to either side.\" Id. at 478, 104 S.Ct. 1161., That appears to be the case here on the issue of disestablishment. For instance, the Village, on the one hand, asserts that certain federal officials in the Office of Indian Affairs as well as superintendents of the Keshena Agency repeatedly referred *521to the area as a former reservation and note that the Oneida lost almost all of their land. The Nation, on the other, asserts that these views did not represent a consensus among federal officials on the status of the Oneida Reservation and that the remaining documents are ambiguous on disestablishment. References to the \"former reservation,\" for example, could simply mean the \"original reservation,\" as opposed to the substantially diminished reservation that resulted from the sale of their allotments by tribal members and that continued to exist up until the passage of the IRA. Such language could also reflect the common assumption during the allotment era that reservations were in the process of becoming extinct. But as noted above, before that process was complete, Congress enacted the IRA and ended it. The Village's evidence of the aftermath of the 1906 Act does not overcome this undisputed fact, especially considering that subsequent treatment is the \"least compelling evidence\" in the court's diminishment analysis. Parker , 136 S.Ct. at 1082.","caseName":"Oneida Nation v. Village of Hobart, Wisconsin","caseNameFull":"ONEIDA NATION v. VILLAGE OF HOBART, WISCONSIN","citation":["371 F. Supp. 3d 500"],"citeCount":2,"cluster_id":7335190,"court":"District Court, E.D. Wisconsin","court_citation_string":"E.D. Wis.","court_id":"wied","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2019-03-28","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Case No. 16-C-1217","docket_id":64323676,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T13:40:34.139875Z","date_created":"2022-07-25T06:19:35.051395Z","score":{"bm25":17.4238}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":7253110,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T11:29:48.732974Z","date_created":"2022-07-25T06:19:35.059486Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nThe subsequent treatment of the land in question does support the conclusion that the Oneida reservation was diminished, however. The numerous statements of federal officials referring to the \"former reservation,\" even if ambiguous as to disestablishment, at least manifest the view that the original boundaries were no longer intact. Just as in Stockbridge-Munsee , \"the land became subject to state taxes, and the Department of the Interior refused t","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[7253110],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4343180/constitutionality-of-civil-damages-provisions-of-fair-housing-bill/","attorney":"","caseName":"Constitutionality of Civil Damages Provisions of Fair Housing Bill","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4343180,"court":"Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel","court_citation_string":"OLC","court_id":"olc","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"1978-01-25","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":null,"docket_id":4575963,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-09-03T16:24:17.278809Z","date_created":"2017-01-27T22:47:36.777007Z","score":{"bm25":16.62608}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[87010,101435,102804,103304,108968,109625,9418738],"download_url":"https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1978/01/31/op-olc-v002-p0016_0.pdf","id":4120441,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/1978/01/25/constitutionality_of_civil_damages_provisions_of_fair_housing_bill.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T14:12:35.881691Z","date_created":"2017-01-27T22:47:36.783257Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"9ba5100c48b843c20e84a1f569ffb87d66152a7d","snippet":"                                                                   January 25, 1978\n\n\n78-4       MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE\n           GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF\n           HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT\n\n           Fair Housing— Civil Rights Act— Civil\n           Penalties— Application of Seventh\n           Amendment—Jury Trial\n\n\n   This is in response to your request for our opinion concerning the constitu­\ntionality of the civil damages provisions of the Edwards-Drinan bill (H.R.\n3504). Sp","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4120441],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4506017/illuminating-co-v-wiser/","attorney":"\n  Amanda R. Yurechko, Weltman, Weinberg & Reis Co., L.P.A., 323 West Lakeside Avenue, Suite 200, Cleveland, OH 44113 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).\n , \n  Mitchell M. Tallan and Lori Elaine Thomson, Gallagher Gams Pryor Tallan & Littrell, 471 East Broad Street, 19th Floor, Columbus, OH 43215 (For Defendants-Appellants).\n ","caseName":"Illuminating Co. v. Wiser","caseNameFull":"ILLUMINATING COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James J. WISER, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants.","citation":["2018 Ohio 2248","114 N.E.3d 240"],"citeCount":1,"cluster_id":4506017,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2018-06-11","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"NOS. 2017–A–0082; 2017–A–0083; 2017–A–0084","docket_id":7114275,"judge":"Rice","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:04:03.244645Z","date_created":"2018-06-11T15:45:16.519938Z","score":{"bm25":16.493736}},"neutralCite":"2018 Ohio 2248","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8128,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/11/2018/2018-Ohio-2248.pdf","id":4283270,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2018/06/11/illum_co._v._wiser.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T16:04:47.483875Z","date_created":"2018-06-11T15:45:16.528845Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"1cbd2f85eb9cb08d25e83ed235cc4ba2d77dad3c","snippet":"\n\n\n  CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.\n \n\n  {¶ 1} Appellants, James J. Wiser, et al., appeal the summary judgment entered by the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas in favor of appellee, the Illuminating Company (\"CEI\"), and against appellants on CEI's complaint for negligence. At issue is whether the trial court erred in its determination of CEI's damages. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\n ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4283270],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"ENERGY & UTILITIES LAW - measure of damages for negligent destruction of utility pole is cost of pole and facilities attached thereto based on reproduction cost less accrued depreciation of damaged pole and facilities attached thereto indirect costs of repairs (overhead) are a proper element of damage for which recovery may be had in case involving damage to utility pole where such costs can be proved with reasonable certainty and have been correctly made in accord with sound accounting principles."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4714625/benjamin-zanni-v-town-of-johnston/","attorney":"","caseName":"Benjamin Zanni v. Town of Johnston","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4714625,"court":"Supreme Court of Rhode Island","court_citation_string":"R.I.","court_id":"ri","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-01-23","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"19-51","docket_id":16744251,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T02:04:05.849729Z","date_created":"2020-01-23T16:09:59.262145Z","score":{"bm25":15.643331}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1538737,1998638,2263104,2274434,2299454,2344947],"download_url":"http://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SupremeCourt/SupremeOpinions/19-51.pdf","id":4494402,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/01/23/benjamin_zanni_v._town_of_johnston.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T18:31:31.194343Z","date_created":"2020-01-23T16:09:59.266723Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"cec5c2c67d9474307f74eddb7e30c3ac1fc1ab61","snippet":"January 23, 2020\n                        January 23, 2020\n\n\n\n\n                                                                    Supreme Court\n\n                                                                    No. 2019-51-Appeal.\n                                                                    (PC 15-4245)\n\n\n                   Benjamin Zanni                :\n\n                                           v.    :\n\n               Town of Johnston.                 :\n\n\n\n\n                   NOTICE","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4494402],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiff, Benjamin Zanni, appealed from the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the Town of Johnston, in the Superior Court following his claim for benefits based on his time as an elected official in the town. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the trial justice should have considered the language of the repealing ordinance to determine the legislative intent behind the repealed ordinance that he alleged entitled him to the benefits. The plaintiff also argued that the trial justice erred in finding that the benefits ordinance applied prospectively rather than retroactively. The Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on different grounds from those relied on by the trial justice, and held that the clear and unambiguous language of the benefits ordinance indicated that the plaintiff was not eligible to receive benefits. The Court also addressed the plaintiff's argument that the ordinance was intended to be applied retroactively rather than prospectively. The Court found that the ordinance sought to create a substantive legal right that did not previously exist and did not provide any type of remedy, and therefore the ordinance applied prospectively. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4247626/rangeview-llc-v-city-of-aurora/","attorney":"Foster Graham Milstein & Calisher, LLP, David Wm. Foster, Chip G. Sehoneberger, Melanie MacWilliams-Brooks, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP, Martha L. Fitzgerald, Carrie E. Johnson, Denver, Colorado; Wood, Ris & Hames, P.C., Todd E; Mackintosh, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees","caseName":"Rangeview, LLC v. City of Aurora","caseNameFull":"RANGEVIEW, LLC, a Colorado Limited Liability Company; Pamela Eades; And John Sellery, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF AURORA, a Municipal Corporation; City Council of the City of Aurora, a Governing Body; And Mitrah Investment and Holdings, LLC, a Colorado Limited Liability Company, Defendants-Appellees","citation":["2016 COA 108","381 P.3d 445","2016 Colo. App. LEXIS 952","2016 WL 3885212"],"citeCount":6,"cluster_id":4247626,"court":"Colorado Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Colo. Ct. App.","court_id":"coloctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2016-07-14","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Court of Appeals 15CA0239","docket_id":4120160,"judge":"Fox, Miller, Taubman","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-21T23:49:28.502551Z","date_created":"2016-08-15T22:05:11.062375Z","score":{"bm25":15.576764}},"neutralCite":"2016 COA 108","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1194616,1205537,1209380,1271297,1277057,2509377,2538428,2566263,2600425,2623989,2633353,2823847],"download_url":"http://www.cobar.org/Portals/COBAR/Repository/Sections/Opinions/7-14-16/15CA0239-PD.pdf?ver=2016-07-18-161202-143","id":4024887,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2016/07/14/rangeview_llc_v._city_of_aurora.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T13:07:55.878755Z","date_created":"2016-08-15T22:05:11.068187Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"90423a4790e650fef7718c7cd33c9c256639be1e","snippet":"COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS                                          2016COA108\n\nCourt of Appeals No. 15CA0239\nArapahoe County District Court No. 13CV722\nHonorable Frederick T. Martinez, Judge\n\n\nRangeview, LLC, a Colorado limited liability company; Pamela Eades; and John\nSellery,\n\nPlaintiffs-Appellants,\n\nv.\n\nCity of Aurora, a municipal corporation; City Council of the City of Aurora, a\ngoverning body; and Mitrah Investment and Holdings, LLC, a Colorado limited\nliability company.\n\nDefendants-Appell","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4024887,9835498,9835499],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"Rezoning of Property—Site Plan—Standards—Abuse of Discretion","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4423057/in-re-becker-v-wells-fargo-bank-na/","attorney":"No Appearance for Petitioner-Appellee, Brown Dunning Walker P.C., David C. Walker, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant","caseName":"In re Becker v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A","caseNameFull":"In the INTEREST OF Kylee BECKER, Protected Person, and and Aaron Becker, Conservator for Kylee Becker, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Appellant","citation":["2017 COA 114","405 P.3d 499","2017 WL 3667337","2017 Colo. App. LEXIS 1078"],"citeCount":2,"cluster_id":4423057,"court":"Colorado Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Colo. Ct. App.","court_id":"coloctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2017-08-24","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Court of Appeals 16CA1598","docket_id":6146019,"judge":"Taubman, Román, Lichtenstein","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T00:41:07.548451Z","date_created":"2017-08-31T06:06:24.262747Z","score":{"bm25":15.517376}},"neutralCite":"2017 COA 114","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1194576,1205857,1208227,1249614,2345990,2366096,2589845,4024902,4024947],"download_url":"http://www.cobar.org/Portals/COBAR/Repository/Sections/Opinions/8-24-17/16CA1598-PD.pdf?ver=2017-08-24-101645-230","id":4200310,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2017/08/24/in_re_becker_v._wells_fargo_bank_n.a.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T15:07:11.453476Z","date_created":"2017-08-31T06:06:24.269585Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"c6c8c81acbcc5cebb9f4eee736c08b85b6172eb1","snippet":"\n\n\n  Opinion by\n \n\n  JUDGE TAUBMAN\n \n\n  ¶ 1 In this conservatorship case, appellant, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion for reconsideration of the order to restore funds to a conservatorship account. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further factual findings.\n \n\n  I. ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4200310],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"Conservatorship—Restricted Account—Breach of Fiduciary Duty—Joint and Several Liability—Mismanagement—Beneficiary","syllabus":"The trial court ordered Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) to establish a conservatorship account for the benefit of Kylee Becker (the beneficiary) to be maintained by her father, Aaron Becker (Becker). It was intended to be a restricted account for the beneficiary's settlement funds obtained as a result of a personal injury claim. In its order, the court stated that no funds could be withdrawn from the account except by \"separate certified order of this court.\" Wells Fargo complied with the order and deposited funds into the account, but allowed Becker to make unauthorized transfers from the account until it had a negative balance. The trial court issued a show cause order to Wells Fargo and Becker related to the removal of funds without a court order. After a hearing, the trial court found Becker and Wells Fargo jointly and severally liable for breach of fiduciary duty, and ordered Wells Fargo to restore the funds to the account. Wells Fargo moved to reconsider the order to restore funds, arguing that the trial court should have considered the percentage of fault attributable to it and Becker as required by CRS § 13-21-111.5. Wells Fargo requested that the trial court determine the relative degrees of liability between it and Becker regarding mismanagement of the account, and determine the amount of the depleted funds actually spent for the beneficiary's benefit, to not afford her a double recovery. The trial court denied the motion based on its power to supervise fiduciary administration of estates under CRS §§ 15-10-501 to -505. On appeal, Wells Fargo contended that the trial court erred when, in denying the motion for reconsideration, it did not apportion liability between Wells Fargo and Becker. Based on a plain reading of the statutes and their interpretation in appellate decisions, the trial court correctly determined that CRS § 13-21-111.5 does not apply in this case. Title 13 was intended to contemplate limitations on damages only for actions brought as a result of negligence or another tort. Wells Fargo also contended that the trial court erred by ordering it to restore the full amount to the restricted account because, based on the evidence produced at trial, Becker withdrew some of those funds to pay for food, schooling, and other necessities for the beneficiary. The trial court was required to make findings regarding the amount of funds actually used for the beneficiary and failed to do so. The order was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case was remanded to the trial court for further factual findings, and based on those findings, entry of an order regarding the amount of Wells Fargo's liability, if any."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9490815/marzan-v-univ-of-cincinnati/","attorney":"","caseName":"Marzan v. Univ. of Cincinnati","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2024 Ohio 857"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9490815,"court":"Ohio Court of Claims","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. Cl.","court_id":"ohioctcl","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-02-23","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"2023-00533JD","docket_id":68407613,"judge":"Sadler","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-23T01:29:09.854825Z","date_created":"2024-04-04T15:11:15.604719Z","score":{"bm25":14.900096}},"neutralCite":"2024 Ohio 857","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2707137,3211693,3701787,3722750,3761839,3769592,3779140,3781795,4881061,6220783,6773631,6786148],"download_url":"https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/13/2024/2024-Ohio-857.pdf","id":9957428,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/02/23/marzan_v._univ._of_cincinnati.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T23:25:43.838708Z","date_created":"2024-04-04T15:11:15.622633Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"e21f94fe1d6596e7ce57091a9b110bb1eedf8a42","snippet":"[Cite as Marzan v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 2024-Ohio-857.]\n\n\n\n\n                              IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO\n\n\n\n ANGEL MARZAN                                             Case No. 2023-00533JD\n\n         Plaintiff                                        Judge Lisa L. Sadler\n                                                          Magistrate Robert Van Schoyck\n         v.\n                                                          ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT’S\n UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI      ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9957428],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Civ.R. 56 summary judgment premises liability negligence attendant circumstances open and obvious workers' compensation. Workers' compensation was plaintiff's sole remedy for damages after an injury on an uneven sidewalk. Additionally, defendant owed no duty to plaintiff because the sidewalk's defective condition was open and obvious, and no attendant circumstances were present at the time of the injury. Judgment rendered for defendant."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/8245168/levine-v-kellogg/","attorney":"","caseName":"Levine v. Kellogg","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2022 Ohio 3440"],"citeCount":4,"cluster_id":8245168,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2022-09-29","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"21AP-338","docket_id":65387273,"judge":"Mentel","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T17:51:32.593653Z","date_created":"2022-09-29T20:08:17.047271Z","score":{"bm25":14.517918}},"neutralCite":"2022 Ohio 3440","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2690817,3217634,3688079,3694283,3695860,3709747,3710429,3723793,3724933,3725711,3768810,4030698,4035379,4272178,4318156,4325458,4442222,4521137,4703237,5124733,5140255,6753834,6756298,6758337,6758368,6758758,6762996,6767296,6770922,6775376,6783086,6793440,9427476,11148682,11152278],"download_url":"https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/10/2022/2022-Ohio-3440.pdf","id":8210431,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2022/09/29/levine_v._kellogg.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-28T03:10:42.055558Z","date_created":"2022-09-29T20:08:17.051835Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"056fd172909e7e8fdbd2dc2c783032f789a22ae5","snippet":"[Cite as Levine v. Kellogg, 2022-Ohio-3440.]\n\n\n                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO\n\n                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT\n\n\nSteve Levine et al.,                             :\n\n                 Plaintiffs-Appellees,           :\n\nv.                                               :             No. 21AP-338\n                                                           (M.C. No. 2016CVF-27321)\nKen Kellogg,                                     :\n             ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[8210431],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The trial court applied the correct test regarding the measure of damages in a landlord-tenant dispute as the lesser of the cost of repair and the difference in market value caused by the damage. As there is some competent, credible evidence going to the essential elements of the case, we cannot say that any part of the trial court's judgment regarding the award of $0 for alleged damage to the property was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The award of attorney fees was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. We do, however, find that the award was sufficiently disproportionate to the damages obtained to raise the issue of reasonableness under R.C. 5321.16(C). The trial court failed to provide any reasoning as to the disproportionality between the damages and the attorney fees. We remand this matter for the trial court to provide further findings as to the attorney fees award regarding the Prof.Cond.R. 1.5 factors and the disproportionality between the damages and lodestar amount. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9380630/vays-v-county-of-orange/","attorney":"","caseName":"Vays v. County of Orange","caseNameFull":"","citation":["185 N.Y.S.3d 209","214 A.D.3d 689","2023 NY Slip Op 01112"],"citeCount":1,"cluster_id":9380630,"court":"Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York","court_citation_string":"N.Y. App. Div.","court_id":"nyappdiv","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2023-03-01","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Index No. 8221/16","docket_id":66919389,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-26T17:57:53.782111Z","date_created":"2023-03-01T20:06:07.156072Z","score":{"bm25":14.490693}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2234516,2590473,3155871,3163323,4090941,4510611,4641163,5518167,5534050,5806433,5814012,5942119],"download_url":"http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2023/2023_01112.htm","id":9376106,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"html/2023/03/01/vays_v._county_of_orange.html","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-28T10:45:06.356528Z","date_created":"2023-03-01T20:06:07.180833Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"e129289ec41de6b07888a843ebaf44ee2b0c0488","snippet":"\n\nVays v County of Orange (2023 NY Slip Op 01112)\n\n\n\n\n\nVays v County of Orange\n\n\n2023 NY Slip Op 01112\n\n\nDecided on March 1, 2023\n\n\nAppellate Division, Second Department\n\n\n\nPublished by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.</","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9376106],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/3008826/bedee-v-american-medical-response-of-colorado/","attorney":"Melat, Pressman & Higbie, LLP, Alanson Highie, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant., DAGNER %CO SCHLUTER %CO MITZNER %CO WERBER, LLC, Leslie L. Schluter, Greenwood Village, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee.","caseName":"Bedee v. American Medical Response of Colorado","caseNameFull":"Karen BEDEE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN MEDICAL RESPONSE OF COLORADO, Defendant-Appellee","citation":["2015 COA 128","361 P.3d 1083","2015 Colo. App. LEXIS 1403","2015 WL 5259823"],"citeCount":326,"cluster_id":3008826,"court":"Colorado Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Colo. Ct. 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Bedee conte","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[3008826],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4866095/benevolent-protective-order-of-elks-of-united-states-of-am-n/","attorney":"","caseName":"Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks of United States of Am. & N. Tonawanda Lodge No. 860 of Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks of United States of Am. v. Creative Comfort Sys., Inc.","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2021 NY Slip Op 01672"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4866095,"court":"Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York","court_citation_string":"N.Y. App. Div.","court_id":"nyappdiv","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2021-03-19","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"1121 CA 19-02055","docket_id":59748873,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T02:45:19.663997Z","date_created":"2021-03-19T20:12:46.105175Z","score":{"bm25":14.237331}},"neutralCite":"2021 NY Slip Op 01672","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2049436,2053866,2587596,5539046,5540341,5812113,5812886,5820292,5873095,5905615,6010181],"download_url":"http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2021/2021_01672.htm","id":4669874,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"html/2021/03/19/benevolent__protective_order_of_elks_of_united_states_of_am.__n._1.html","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-22T19:50:37.992867Z","date_created":"2021-03-19T20:12:46.108756Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"85be07a0bc3473d4f09d60522eb33d1477e4a45f","snippet":"\r\n\r\nBenevolent & Protective Order of Elks of United States of Am. & N. Tonawanda Lodge No. 860 of Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks of United States of Am. v Creative Comfort Sys., Inc. (2021 NY Slip Op 01672)\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nBenevolent & Protective Order of Elks of United States of Am. & N. Tonawanda Lodge No. 860 of Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks of United S","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4669874],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/3173166/denver-health-hospital-authority-v-city-of-arvada-ex-rel-arvada-police/","attorney":"Ruegsegger Simons Smith & Stern, LLC, Jeff C. Staudenmayer, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee. •, Christopher K. Daly, City Attorney, Roberto Ramirez, Senior Assistant City Attorney, Arvada, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant., Senter Goldfarb & Rice, LLC,- Eric M. Ziporin, Jennifer F. Kemp, Denver, Colorado,' for Amicus Curiae Colorado Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency., Polsinelli PC, Gerald A. Niederman, Ann McCullough, Bennett L. Cohen, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Colorado . Hospital Association., D. Scott Martinez, City Attorney, Tracy A. Davis, Assistant City Attorney, Joshua L. Roberts, Assistant City Attorney, T. Shaun Sullivan, Assistant City Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae City and County of Denver.","caseName":"Denver Health & Hospital Authority v. City of Arvada Ex Rel. Arvada Police Department","caseNameFull":"DENVER HEALTH AND HOSPITAL AUTHORITY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF ARVADA EX REL. ARVADA POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant-Appellant","citation":["2016 COA 12","405 P.3d 308","2016 Colo. App. LEXIS 85"],"citeCount":7,"cluster_id":3173166,"court":"Colorado Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Colo. Ct. 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Specifically, Arvada contends that section 16-3^401(2), C.R.S.2015, is void for vagueness; that the district court misin*311terpreted Poudre","type":"lead-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[109561,110661,110998,1134773,1196196,1302746,1391596,1408095,1430168,1448425,1695055,1844569,2022619,2451789,2457336,2517887,2538204,2584094,2584875,2607755,2621823],"download_url":"http://www.cobar.org/opinions/opinion.cfm?opinionid=10075&courtid=1","id":3173166,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"html/2016/01/28/denver_health_and_hospital_authority_v._city_of_arvada.html","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T03:49:25.728177Z","date_created":"2016-01-28T19:02:43.972108Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"76e759300a7bc07fbc6d90333c16d815f2a18983","snippet":"\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\nColorado Court of Appeals Opinions || January 28, 2016\r\n\r\n\r\nColorado Court of Appeals -- January 28, 2016\r\n2016 COA 12. No. 15CA0164. Denver Health and Hospital Authority v. City of Arvada.\n\r\n\n\r\n\t \r\n\r\n\t\r\n\t\t\r\n\t\t\t\r\n\t\t\t\tCOLORADO COURT OF APPEALS\n\r\n\t\t\t\r\n\t\t\t\t2016 COA 12\n\r\n\t\t\r\n\t\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[3173166,9821343,9821344],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9440884/sarah-bryant-v-state-of-tennessee/","attorney":"","caseName":"Sarah Bryant v. State of Tennessee","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9440884,"court":"Court of Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Ct. App.","court_id":"tennctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2023-11-14","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"W2022-00968-COA-R3-CV","docket_id":68006322,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-23T01:17:13.072785Z","date_created":"2023-11-14T22:10:07.200004Z","score":{"bm25":14.114139}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1058755,1074529,1081321,2438545],"download_url":"https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/BryantSarahOPN.pdf","id":9898709,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/11/14/sarah_bryant_v._state_of_tennessee.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T23:04:38.958540Z","date_created":"2023-11-14T22:10:07.201511Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"3f5a9b0c9755ef8a379aef2723c6656a0a4df5d8","snippet":"                                                                                        11/14/2023\n               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                            AT JACKSON\n                             September 12, 2023 Session\n\n                 SARAH BRYANT v. STATE OF TENNESSEE\n\n                   Appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission\n                No. T20181874     James A. Hamilton, Commissioner\n                      ___________________________________\n\n            ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9898709],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"This appeal follows the dismissal of the appellant's claim for damages in the Tennessee Claims Commission. The appellant, who was injured during a class she participated in while enrolled as a student in the occupational therapy program at the University of Tennessee Health Science Center, submits that the Commission's failure to find her professor negligent was in error. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10266106/davila-v-city-of-new-york/","attorney":"","caseName":"Davila v. 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App. Div.","court_id":"nyappdiv","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-11-06","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Index No. 517326/17","docket_id":69348895,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-21T18:14:46.476084Z","date_created":"2024-11-06T20:10:36.853435Z","score":{"bm25":14.084558}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2115524,2560467,4220734,5487086,5532809,5537121,5539885,5809367,5844734,6084485,6498237,9374389,9398659],"download_url":"http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2024/2024_05433.htm","id":10732696,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"html/2024/11/06/davila_v._city_of_new_york.html","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-06T10:43:52.371340Z","date_created":"2024-11-06T20:10:36.861306Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"52da885f5f3c912ee7298229650d8f762b02fd08","snippet":"\n\nDavila v City of New York (2024 NY Slip Op 05433)\n\n\n\n\n\nDavila v City of New York\n\n\n2024 NY Slip Op 05433\n\n\nDecided on November 6, 2024\n\n\nAppellate Division, Second Department\n\n\n\nPublished by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law §","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10732696],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""}]}