{"count":425878,"next":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/search/?cursor=cz0yMS40NTkxMTQmcz05NDc5MDQ4JnQ9byZkPTIwMjYtMDgtMTgmcD0y&q=INTERPRETATION+OF+STATUTORY+REFERENCES&type=o","previous":null,"results":[{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4342040/interpretation-of-article-17-bis-of-the-us-eu-air-transport-agreement/","attorney":"","caseName":"Interpretation of Article 17 Bis of the US-EU Air Transport Agreement","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4342040,"court":"Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel","court_citation_string":"OLC","court_id":"olc","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2016-04-14","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":null,"docket_id":4574823,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-09-03T16:23:38.393928Z","date_created":"2017-01-27T22:38:55.027805Z","score":{"bm25":36.733276}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[106228,110740,111984,112574,504364,698714,9431651,9434047,9435475],"download_url":"https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/attachments/2016/04/21/2016-04-14-ata-article-17.pdf","id":4119301,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2016/04/14/interpretation_of_article_17_bis_of_the_us-eu_air_transport_agreement.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T14:11:50.279092Z","date_created":"2017-01-27T22:38:55.035883Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"71b2caee1d761c2d36193b804da835488be5f846","snippet":"                     Interpretation of Article 17 Bis of the\n                       US-EU Air Transport Agreement\nArticle 17 bis of the Air Transport Agreement Between the United States of America and the European\n  Community and Its Member States does not provide an independent basis upon which the United\n  States may deny a permit to an air carrier of a Party to the Agreement if that carrier is otherwise\n  qualified to receive such a permit.\n\n                                                   ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4119301],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4563116/green-gas-del-statutory-trust-v-commr/","attorney":"Robert J. Kovacev ,  Lisa M. Zarlenga , and Dianna Muth Mullis, for petitioners. Stephen A. Haller, Karen O. Myrick,  David L. Zoss , Michael T. Shelton, and  John Schmittdiel , for respondent.","caseName":"Green Gas Del. Statutory Trust v. Comm'r","caseNameFull":"GREEN GAS DELAWARE STATUTORY TRUST, METHANE BIO, LLC, TAX MATTERS PARTNER v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent<sup id=\"fnr_fnote1\"><a href=\"fn_fnote1\" id=\"\">1</a></sup>","citation":["147 T.C. No. 1","147 T.C. 1","2016 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 17"],"citeCount":12,"cluster_id":4563116,"court":"United States Tax Court","court_citation_string":"Tax Ct.","court_id":"tax","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2016-07-14","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Docket Nos. 26965-09, 13698-10, 14409-10","docket_id":8184555,"judge":"LARO","lexisCite":"2016 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 17","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:20:31.092721Z","date_created":"2018-11-14T08:27:32.788410Z","score":{"bm25":35.632767}},"neutralCite":"147 T.C. No. 1","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[6961,66441,101937,102139,102283,103369,104867,105107,108372,110062,111296,112697,157713,242547,268142,292186,297970,386838,401045,413214,478603,590231,778649,788889,1252512,1350744,1500655,1543179,1548178,1548256,4340041,4472259,4474181,4482174,4482229,4483948,4485166,4485571,4485804,4595285,4597123,4597704,4597955,4605437,4605825,4607230,4610814,4616521,4623148,4632163,4632439],"download_url":"https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/UstcInOp/OpinionViewer.aspx?ID=10860","id":4340369,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2016/07/14/green_gas_delaware_statutory_trust_methane_bio_llc_tax_matters_partner.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T16:44:47.098738Z","date_created":"2018-11-14T08:27:32.795373Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"43cdc638fcc428675b7a8f20af60509e8f785f45","snippet":"GREEN GAS DELAWARE STATUTORY TRUST, METHANE BIO, LLC, TAX MATTERS PARTNER, Petitioner v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent1Green Gas Del. Statutory Trust v. Comm'rDocket Nos. 26965-09, 13698-10, 14","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4340369],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4677112/in-the-matter-of-the-application-of-coe-college-for-interpretation-of/","attorney":"","caseName":"In the Matter of the Application of Coe College for Interpretation of Purported Gift Restrictions v. Coe College","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4677112,"court":"Supreme Court of Iowa","court_citation_string":"Iowa","court_id":"iowa","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2019-11-08","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"19-0155","docket_id":16445163,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:53:15.555068Z","date_created":"2019-11-08T15:03:52.017443Z","score":{"bm25":33.85464}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1246101,1281726,1749422,1792682,1842323,1910005,1971120,2075673,2087782,2197495,3434479],"download_url":"https://www.iowacourts.gov/courtcases/7947/embed/SupremeCourtOpinion","id":4454365,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2019/11/08/in_the_matter_of_the_application_of_coe_college_for_interpretation_of.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T18:03:47.404341Z","date_created":"2019-11-08T15:03:52.021828Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"417d570512bc61bc350a29e5bf3542a6e09b6c01","snippet":"                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA\n                                  No. 19–0155\n\n                         Filed November 8, 2019\n\n\nIN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF COE COLLEGE FOR\nINTERPRETATION OF PURPORTED GIFT RESTRICTION,\n\nCOE COLLEGE,\n\n      Appellant.\n\n\n      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Fae Hoover-\n\nGrinde, Judge.\n\n\n\n      A college appeals a district court judgment denying its request for\n\ndeclaratory relief as to the terms of a 1976 charitable gift","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4454365],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4788803/abortion-statutory-interpretation-whether-section-20-208-of-the/","attorney":"","caseName":"Abortion Statutory Interpretation –Whether Section 20-208 of the Health-General Article Prohibits Nurse Practitioners, Certified Nurse Midwives, and Physician Assistants from Providing Medication Abortions – Whether the Same Statute Prohibits Physician Assistants from Performing Surgical Abortions","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4788803,"court":"Maryland Attorney General Reports","court_citation_string":"Md. Att'y Gen.","court_id":"mdag","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-09-23","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"105 OAG 003","docket_id":18469166,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T02:24:19.602890Z","date_created":"2020-09-24T05:06:37.186013Z","score":{"bm25":32.11289}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[104631,108713,112786,308641,884911,1088006,1469221,1482054,1486982,1529850,1547891,1941939,1990492,2074797,2090215,2166385,2185972,2319670,2320321,2334674,2361281,2402252,2403285],"download_url":"http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/Opinions Documents/2020/105oag003 .pdf","id":4569150,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/09/23/abortion_statutory_interpretation_whether_section_20-208_of_the.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T19:22:06.485782Z","date_created":"2020-09-24T05:06:37.189745Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"2560c434240c689e908795c14da5805707e16bb3","snippet":"                           ABORTION\nSTATUTORY INTERPRETATION – WHETHER SECTION 20-208 OF\n    THE HEALTH-GENERAL ARTICLE PROHIBITS NURSE\n    PRACTITIONERS, CERTIFIED NURSE MIDWIVES, AND\n    PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS FROM PROVIDING MEDICATION\n    ABORTIONS – WHETHER THE SAME STATUTE PROHIBITS\n    PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS FROM PERFORMING SURGICAL\n    ABORTIONS\n                         January 10, 2020\nThe Honorable Ariana Kelly\nMaryland House of Delegates\n      You have requested our opinion on two question","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4569150],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9448492/application-of-the-statutory-pay-cap-on-administratively-determined-pay-in/","attorney":"","caseName":"Application of the Statutory Pay Cap on Administratively Determined Pay in 5 U.S.C. § 5373 to the National Science Foundation","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9448492,"court":"Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel","court_citation_string":"OLC","court_id":"olc","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2023-11-29","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"","docket_id":68054731,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-09-03T16:24:14.015688Z","date_created":"2023-12-01T18:00:21.516566Z","score":{"bm25":31.852978}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[102824,110266,112852,214901,413383,3202510,9419845,9421194,9429969,9432059,9434163,9489154,9889184],"download_url":"https://www.justice.gov/d9/2023-12/2023-11-29-nsf-statutory_cap.pdf","id":9906317,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/11/29/application_of_the_statutory_pay_cap_on_administratively_determined_pay_in.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T23:07:46.462382Z","date_created":"2023-12-01T18:00:21.527087Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"ff9ec8d6234b27fb643a9209bb8d396fd7a54c36","snippet":"(Slip Opinion)\n\n    Application of the Statutory Pay Cap on Administratively\n      Determined Pay in 5 U.S.C. § 5373 to the National\n                       Science Foundation\nThe statutory pay cap on administratively determined pay in 5 U.S.C. § 5373 applies to\n  the salaries that the National Science Foundation Director fixes under 42 U.S.C.\n  § 1873(a)(1). Because some NSF employees are currently receiving salaries above\n  section 5373’s cap, NSF must promptly take steps to come into complianc","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9906317],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The statutory pay cap on administratively determined pay in 5 U.S.C. § 5373 applies to the salaries that the National Science Foundation Director fixes under 42 U.S.C. § 1873(a)(1). Because some NSF employees are currently receiving salaries above section 5373's cap, NSF must promptly take steps to come into compliance with the pay cap. NSF lacks the authority to continue to pay salaries above the cap for the purpose of mitigating the effect that implementing the cap will have on its employees."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4342351/interpretation-of-inspector-general-act/","attorney":"","caseName":"Interpretation of Inspector General Act","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4342351,"court":"Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel","court_citation_string":"OLC","court_id":"olc","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"1998-03-20","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":null,"docket_id":4575134,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-09-03T16:23:46.313273Z","date_created":"2017-01-27T22:41:18.495347Z","score":{"bm25":30.642378}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[102311,112560,9429794],"download_url":"https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1998/03/31/op-olc-v022-p0050_0.pdf","id":4119612,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/1998/03/20/interpretation_of_inspector_general_act.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T14:12:04.269004Z","date_created":"2017-01-27T22:41:18.502889Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"dd093322360aef5ce6e903a5a33e1300243f33f4","snippet":"                     Interpretation of Inspector General Act\n\nA lthough it is a clo se q uestion, the better interpretation o f the Inspector G eneral Act is that Congress\n    did not in tend to lim it the phrase “ recom m endation that funds be put to better u se” to only those\n    au d it reco m m en d atio ns that achieve identifiable m onetary savings.\n\n                                                                                                          M arch 20, 1998\n\n\n M   em orandum ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4119612],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4694283/abortion-statutory-interpretation-whether-section-20-208-of-the/","attorney":"","caseName":"Abortion Statutory Interpretation –Whether Section 20-208 of the Health-General Article Prohibits Nurse Practitioners, Certified Nurse Midwives, and Physician Assistants from Providing Medication Abortions – Whether the Same Statute Prohibits Physician Assistants from Performing Surgical Abortions","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4694283,"court":"Maryland Attorney General Reports","court_citation_string":"Md. Att'y Gen.","court_id":"mdag","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-01-10","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"105 OAG 003","docket_id":16680468,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:57:47.336448Z","date_created":"2020-01-10T21:05:43.091208Z","score":{"bm25":30.528345}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[104631,108713,112786,308641,884911,1088006,1469221,1482054,1529850,1547891,1941939,1990492,2074797,2090215,2166385,2185972,2319670,2320321,2334674,2361281,2402252,2403285],"download_url":"http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/Opinions Documents/2020/105oag003 .pdf","id":4471614,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/01/10/abortion_statutory_interpretation_whether_section_20-208_of_the.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T18:15:47.386876Z","date_created":"2020-01-10T21:05:43.094811Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"3c3388098bb045f3e1b71095f2e05941063a2778","snippet":"                           ABORTION\nSTATUTORY INTERPRETATION – WHETHER SECTION 20-208 OF\n    THE HEALTH-GENERAL ARTICLE PROHIBITS NURSE\n    PRACTITIONERS, CERTIFIED NURSE MIDWIVES, AND\n    PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS FROM PROVIDING MEDICATION\n    ABORTIONS – WHETHER THE SAME STATUTE PROHIBITS\n    PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS FROM PERFORMING SURGICAL\n    ABORTIONS\n                         January 10, 2020\nThe Honorable Ariana Kelly\nMaryland House of Delegates\n      You have requested our opinion on two question","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4471614],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10811802/robert-schmidt-v-rhode-island-division-of-taxation/","attorney":"","caseName":"Robert Schmidt v. Rhode Island Division of Taxation","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10811802,"court":"Supreme Court of Rhode Island","court_citation_string":"R.I.","court_id":"ri","court_jurisdiction":"S","dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2026-03-19","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"2024-0134-M.P.","docket_id":72521888,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-03-20T16:24:31.843885Z","date_created":"2026-03-20T16:24:31.758402Z","score":{"bm25":30.206556}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1039056,1039104,1479202,1511395,1893264,1926520,1936868,1950178,1990388,2064493,2074420,2081910,2268472,2299454,2335365,2349535,2361973,2378686,2384845,2422729,2549596,2716946,2750486,3197753,3869177,4151099,4271843,4356501,4385350,4947181,8283517,9521098,9629863,9645410,9695491,9754144,9809940,9862547,9943860],"download_url":"https://www.courts.ri.gov/Opinions/Supreme-24-134.pdf","id":11278554,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2026/03/19/robert_schmidt_v._rhode_island_division_of_taxation.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-03-20T16:26:04.169809Z","date_created":"2026-03-20T16:24:31.768873Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"c7aa75fcd3fc1b33de0cf98b38495494be1630e2","snippet":"                                                Supreme Court\n\n                                                No. 2024-134-M.P.\n                                                (A.A. 22-213)\n\n                                                (Dissent begins on Page 22)\n\n\n      Robert Schmidt et al.          :\n\n                v.                   :\n\nRhode Island Division of Taxation.   :\n\n\n\n\n        NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision\n        before publication in the Rhode Island R","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11278554],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari filed by the Rhode Island Division of Taxation, seeking review of a District Court judgment in favor of the respondents, Robert and Mary Schmidt. The sole issue was one of statutory interpretation—namely, whether the three-year refund period prescribed in G.L. 1956 § 44-30-87(a), which limits the amount that a taxpayer can recover for an overpayment of income taxes, refers to the three years following a taxpayer's filing of a tax return or the three years prior to a taxpayer's claim for a refund. This Court held that the three-year period in question refers to the three years after a return is filed. Accordingly, the Court quashed the judgment of the District Court."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/6236863/statutory-mandate-to-propose-legislation-in-response-to-medicare-funding/","attorney":"","caseName":"Statutory Mandate to Propose Legislation in Response to Medicare Funding Warning","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":6236863,"court":"Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel","court_citation_string":"OLC","court_id":"olc","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2016-08-25","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"","docket_id":62601166,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-09-03T16:24:14.217966Z","date_created":"2022-01-14T20:11:34.039794Z","score":{"bm25":30.00568}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[90042,92942,93413,118009,9416435,9420759,9425881,9426752,9426961,9431772,9433692,9808243],"download_url":"https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/2016-08-25-medicare-warning/download","id":6103745,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2016/08/25/statutory_mandate_to_propose_legislation_in_response_to_medicare_funding.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-26T18:29:52.940815Z","date_created":"2022-01-14T20:11:34.041830Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"a1fc7b7dc764b334dbecde2052530b69c62d1259","snippet":"            Statutory Mandate to Propose Legislation in\n              Response to Medicare Funding Warning\nThe Recommendations Clause bars Congress from enacting laws that purport to prevent\n  the President from recommending legislation that he judges “necessary and expedi-\n  ent.”\nThe Recommendations Clause bars Congress from enacting laws that purport to require\n  the President to recommend legislation even if he does not judge it “necessary and\n  expedient.”\nSection 802 of the Medicare Prescr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[6103745],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The Recommendations Clause bars Congress from enacting laws that purport to prevent the President from recommending legislation that he judges \"necessary and expedient.\" The Recommendations Clause bars Congress from enacting laws that purport to require the President to recommend legislation even if he does not judge it \"necessary and expedient.\" Section 802 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, which requires the President to submit \"proposed legislation\" in response to a Medicare funding warning under section 801(a)(2), contravenes the Recommendations Clause and may be treated as advisory and non-binding."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/7179112/city-of-new-albany-v-bd-of-commissioners-of-the-cnty-of-floyd/","attorney":"[1] Between 1991 and 1992 the New Albany Floyd County Indiana Building Authority (\"the Building Authority\") issued bonds in order to finance a Criminal Justice Center (\"the Center\"). In 1992, Floyd County (\"the County\"), through its Board of Commissioners, entered into a fifteen-year lease (\"the 1992 Lease\") with the Building Authority, in which the County would lease the Center and the City of New Albany (\"the City\") would sublease from the County. In 2018, approximately ten years after the 1992 Lease ended, the County demanded that the Building Authority deed over the title of the Center pursuant to a provision in the 1992 Lease. After the Building Authority refused, the County filed suit seeking declaratory judgment and specific performance. The City intervened in the suit. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the County. The City contends that pursuant to Indiana Code chapter 36-9-13, the Building Authority lacked the authority to agree to such a provision that voluntarily divested itself of the Center's title. Because we agree that the Building Authority lacked the statutory authority to agree to such a provision but also conclude that the County can still exercise a purchase option in the 1992 Lease, we reverse and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.1, [3] On September 3, 1992, the County and the Building Authority executed the 1992 Lease. The 1992 Lease was for a term of fifteen years, beginning in September of 1993 when the Center was ready for partial occupancy by the City police and County sheriff's departments. The 1992 Lease terms included a turn-over provision (\"the Turn-Over Provision\") which provided that, [5] After the Building Authority declined to transfer title, the County filed suit on April 27, 2018, seeking, inter alia , declaratory judgment and specific performance.2 The County also moved to expedite the proceedings, which motion was granted. On May 18, 2018, the trial court granted the City's motion to intervene. On June 15, 2018, a bench trial was held to resolve all claims, counterclaims, and defenses regarding the County's request for declaratory judgment and specific performance. On June 19, 2018, the trial court entered declaratory judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the Turn-Over Provision in the 1992 Lease was valid pursuant to Indiana Code section 36-9-13-22(a)(6), making the Center the property of the County. The trial court also ordered that title of the Center be divested from the Building Authority and vested in the County pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 70., [7] The City contends that the trial court erroneously interpreted Indiana Code section 36-9-13-22(a)(6) to permit the *640Building Authority to agree to the Turn-Over Provision. Our goal in construing a statute is to determine and give effect to legislative intent. AlliedSignal, Inc. v. Ott , 785 N.E.2d 1068, 1078 (Ind. 2003). \"To give effect to the legislature's intent, we do not consider a statutory provision in isolation but rather consider the statute as a whole and interpret an individual provision so as to harmonize it with other sections of the enactment.\" Id. \"Where statutory provisions are in conflict, no part of a statute should be rendered meaningless but should be reconciled with the rest of the statute.\" Id. at 1079 (quoting Robinson v. Wroblewski , 704 N.E.2d 467, 474 (Ind. 1998) ). \"We generally presume that all statutory language is used intentionally, so that, [e]ach word should be given effect and meaning where possible and not treated as mere surplusage.\" In re Howell , 27 N.E.3d 723, 726 (Ind. 2015) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Indiana Code section 36-9-13-22(a)(6) dictates that \"the board of directors of a building authority, acting in the name of the authority, may acquire real or personal property by gift, devise, or bequest and hold, use, or dispose of that property for the purposes authorized by this chapter[.]\" (emphasis added)., [9] The County argues that the General Assembly's use of \"that\" should be interpreted to refer to any real or personal property that is acquired by a building authority regardless of how it was acquired. This argument fails for multiple reasons. First, the County's interpretation would make the use of the words \"gift, devise, or bequest\" mere surplusage, which we presume was not the General Assembly's intent. See In re Howell , 27 N.E.3d at 726. Moreover, if Indiana Code section 36-9-13-22(a)(6) permitted building authorities to dispose of any real or personal property regardless of the way in which it was acquired, as the County suggests, it would render the other dispositional powers granted to building authorities in Indiana Code chapter 36-9-13 irrelevant. See Ind. Code § 36-9-13-25 (disposition through options to purchase); see also Ind. Code § 36-9-13-41 (disposition through dissolution). Therefore, because it is undisputed that the Center was not acquired by gift, devise, or bequest, the Building Authority lacked the statutory authority to agree to the Turn-Over Provision., Ind. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n v. Osco Drug, Inc. , 431 N.E.2d 823, 833 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). Because a building authority is also a governmental entity, the County points to Indiana Code section 36-1-11-8 as authorization for the Building Authority to agree to the Turn-Over Provision. Indiana Code section 36-1-11-8 dictates that, [11] We conclude that Indiana Code chapter 36-9-13 and Indiana Code chapter 36-1-11 are in irreconcilable conflict in regards to the dispositional powers of building authorities; thus, the more specific chapter, Indiana Code chapter 36-9-13, must prevail. Indiana Code chapter 36-9-13 specifically details the authority of building authorities whereas Indiana Code chapter 36-1-11 deals more generally with governmental entities. If the general dispositional authority outlined in Indiana Code chapter 36-1-11 is held to be controlling, it would leave the dispositional powers outlined specifically for building authorities in Indiana Code chapter 36-9-13 superfluous, which would be contrary to precedent. See Althaus v. Evansville Courier Co. , 615 N.E.2d 441, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (finding where two statutes dealing with the same subject matter are irreconcilably conflicting, the more detailed statute prevails over the general statute). Moreover, both the Building Authority and the County agreed to the Statutory Application Provision in the 1992 Lease which mandated that Indiana Code chapter 36-9-13 would govern the terms of said lease. We construe the 1992 Lease as any other contract, which by its clear and unambiguous terms binds the County to the Statutory Application Provision for which it bargained. See Whiteco Indus., Inc. v. Nickolick , 571 N.E.2d 1337, 1339 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (\"A lease is to be construed as any other contract... Where no defect is claimed to have occurred during formation of the contract, its terms, if unambiguous, are conclusive on the question of the intentions of the parties.\"). In summary, we conclude that the County has failed to establish that the Building Authority had any statutory authority to agree to the Turn-Over Provision., [13] The 1992 Lease expired in September of 2008, and thereafter the status quo was maintained. Neither party claims that at any time since the expiration of the 1992 Lease has the Building Authority attempted to evict the County. Rather, the County *642has continued to occupy its share of the Center and pay its share of the operational costs for approximately a decade. Because the County held over beyond the expiration of the 1992 Lease, both the Building Authority and the County have continued the tenancy under the terms of the 1992 Lease, which includes the purchase option. The purchase option states that, [15] The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded with instructions for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.","caseName":"City of New Albany v. Bd. of Commissioners of the Cnty. of Floyd","caseNameFull":"CITY OF NEW ALBANY, Appellant-Intervenor/Counterclaimant v. BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF FLOYD, Appellee-Plaintiff/Counterclaim New Albany Floyd County Indiana Building Authority, Appellee-Defendant/Cross-Claim","citation":["125 N.E.3d 636"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":7179112,"court":"Indiana Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ind. Ct. App.","court_id":"indctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2019-05-22","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-MI-1627","docket_id":64167480,"judge":"Bailey, Brown","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T12:58:58.507304Z","date_created":"2022-07-24T11:58:53.947944Z","score":{"bm25":29.72346}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":7089534,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-26T22:10:04.370986Z","date_created":"2022-07-24T11:58:53.956637Z"},"ordering_key":2,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nBrown, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.\n[16] I concur with the majority's conclusion in Part II that the County may still exercise its option to purchase the Center pursuant to the 1992 Lease. However, I respectfully disagree with Part I of the opinion, do not find Ind. C","type":"in-part-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":7089533,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-02-26T05:37:59.359597Z","date_created":"2022-07-24T11:58:53.954550Z"},"ordering_key":1,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nBailey, J., concurs.\nBrown, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.\n","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[7089533,7089534],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10596606/marilyn-l-wilson-v-the-city-of-providence-by-and-through-its-treasurer/","attorney":"","caseName":"Marilyn L. Wilson v. The City of Providence, by and through its Treasurer, James J. Lombardi","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10596606,"court":"Supreme Court of Rhode Island","court_citation_string":"R.I.","court_id":"ri","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2025-06-02","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"2023-0340-Appeal.","docket_id":70437288,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-06-02T16:14:04.272294Z","date_created":"2025-06-02T16:14:04.219255Z","score":{"bm25":29.098688}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2823199,4402823,9705385],"download_url":"https://www.courts.ri.gov/Opinions/Supreme-23-340.pdf","id":11063194,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2025/06/02/marilyn_l._wilson_v._the_city_of_providence_by_and_through_its_treasurer.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T04:06:56.113631Z","date_created":"2025-06-02T16:14:04.223116Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"447176276212317b5c49f2c7c8d6eb3bb32467cc","snippet":"                                                      Supreme Court\n\n                                                      No. 2023-340-Appeal.\n                                                      (PC 22-1362)\n\n          Marilyn L. Wilson            :\n\n                  v.                   :\n\nThe City of Providence, by and through :\nits Treasurer, James J. Lombardi, et al.\n\n\n\n\n           NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision\n           before publication in the Rhode Island Report","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11063194],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiff, Marilyn Wilson, appealed from a partial final judgment entered in accordance with Rule 54(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure following a Superior Court order granting summary judgment in favor of Diane Wilson as to count one and count three of Marilyn's complaint and count one of Diane's cross-claim. Before the Supreme Court, Marilyn argued that the hearing justice erred in interpreting G.L. 1956 § 45-21.3-1 and Section 17-189(m)(6) of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Providence, thereby holding that Diane, and not Marilyn, is the surviving spouse of Milton Wilson and is entitled to receive the surviving spouse benefits set forth in the statute and ordinance. Upon reviewing the record, the Supreme Court held that under their plain and ordinary meanings, the terms \"surviving spouse\" and \"dependent spouse\" both refer to the person to whom a decedent was married at the time of his or her death. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the surviving spouse benefit in question is a distinct statutory benefit, separate from any other pensions, which must be paid to the decedent retiree's surviving spouse, as defined supra. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the partial final judgment of the Superior Court, thereby declaring that Diane, and not Marilyn, is entitled to receive the surviving spouse benefit from the city."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/8713362/travelers-indemnity-co-v-statutory-hawaii-direct-action-settlement/","attorney":"Andrew Tyler Frankel, Barry Robert Ostrager, Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, New York, NY, for Appellants., Kent Andrew Bronson, Matthew Gluck, Milberg LLP, New York, NY, Danielle Wildern Juhle, Ronald Barliant, Goldberg, Kohn, Bell, Black, Rosenbloom & Moritz, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Appellees.","caseName":"Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Statutory & Hawaii Direct Action Settlement Counsel","caseNameFull":"In re JOHNS-MANVILLE CORPORATION, Debtors. The Travelers Indemnity Company and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company (f/k/a Aetna Casualty and Surety Company) v. Statutory and Hawaii Direct Action Settlement Counsel and Common Law Settlement Counsel","citation":["845 F. Supp. 2d 584","2012 WL 667084","2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27266"],"citeCount":2,"cluster_id":8713362,"court":"District Court, S.D. New York","court_citation_string":"S.D.N.Y.","court_id":"nysd","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2012-03-01","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Nos. 11 Civ. 1312(JGK), 11 Civ. 1329(JGK)","docket_id":65979274,"judge":"Koeltl","lexisCite":"2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27266","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T21:05:55.632369Z","date_created":"2022-11-26T04:59:56.305089Z","score":{"bm25":27.339834}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":8696553,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-27T03:53:40.059946Z","date_created":"2022-11-26T04:59:56.321040Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\n\nOPINION AND ORDER\n\nJOHN G. KOELTL, District Judge.\nThe appellants, Travelers Indemnity Company and Travelers Casualty and Surety Company (“Travelers”), appeal from a final judgment of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Lifland, J.), dated January 20, 2011, requiring Travelers to pay over $500 million to certain asbestos plaintiffs that had filed direct actio","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[8696553],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/6236940/statutory-rollback-of-salary-to-permit-appointment-of-member-of-congress-to/","attorney":"","caseName":"Statutory Rollback of Salary to Permit Appointment of Member of Congress to Executive Office","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":6236940,"court":"Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel","court_citation_string":"OLC","court_id":"olc","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2009-05-20","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"","docket_id":62601243,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-09-03T16:24:13.159837Z","date_created":"2022-01-14T20:12:17.824385Z","score":{"bm25":27.070446}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1612799,3997267,9029032,9424889],"download_url":"https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/2009-05-20-rollback/download","id":6103822,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2009/05/20/statutory_rollback_of_salary_to_permit_appointment_of_member_of_congress_to.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T05:16:46.344639Z","date_created":"2022-01-14T20:12:17.826297Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"616ce743b8a54d99d638d99028c4c1821a80b59c","snippet":"       Statutory Rollback of Salary to Permit Appointment of\n              Member of Congress to Executive Office\nWhere a salary increase for an office would otherwise create a bar to appointment of a\n  member of Congress under the Ineligibility Clause, compliance with the Clause can be\n  achieved by legislation rolling back the salary of the executive office before the ap-\n  pointment.\n\n                                                                         May 20, 2009\n\n          MEMORANDUM O","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[6103822],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Where a salary increase for an office would otherwise create a bar to appointment of a member of Congress under the Ineligibility Clause, compliance with the Clause can be achieved by legislation rolling back the salary of the executive office before the appointment."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4342099/validity-of-statutory-rollbacks-as-a-means-of-complying-with-the/","attorney":"","caseName":"Validity of Statutory Rollbacks as a Means of Complying With the Ineligibility Clause","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4342099,"court":"Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel","court_citation_string":"OLC","court_id":"olc","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2009-05-20","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":null,"docket_id":4574882,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-09-03T16:23:47.196345Z","date_created":"2017-01-27T22:39:17.221494Z","score":{"bm25":26.957024}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[85412,1612799,3997267,9029032,9424889],"download_url":"https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2009/05/31/ineligibility-clause_0.pdf","id":4119360,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2009/05/20/validity_of_statutory_rollbacks_as_a_means_of_complying_with_the.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T14:11:49.161088Z","date_created":"2017-01-27T22:39:17.227381Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"8a43814350a7a4e88764a557c4a6420c05d0a9bf","snippet":"                VALIDITY OF STATUTORY ROLLBACKS\n      AS A MEANS OF COMPLYING WITH THE INELIGIBILITY CLAUSE\n\n         Where a salary increase for an executive office would otherwise create a bar to appointment of a\nmember of Congress under the Ineligibility Clause, compliance with the Clause can be achieved by\nlegislation rolling back the salary of the office before the appointment.\n\n                                                               May 20, 2009\n\n                 MEMORANDUM OPINION ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4119360],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9470332/felder-v-commissioner-of-correction/","attorney":"","caseName":"Felder v. Commissioner of Correction","caseNameFull":"","citation":["348 Conn. 396"],"citeCount":3,"cluster_id":9470332,"court":"Supreme Court of Connecticut","court_citation_string":"Conn.","court_id":"conn","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-01-23","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"SC20576","docket_id":68207336,"judge":"Robinson; McDonald; D’Auria; Mullins; Ecker","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-04-01T03:00:23.314063Z","date_created":"2024-01-30T22:02:24.079364Z","score":{"bm25":25.871256}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":11297890,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/01/23/felder_v._commissioner_of_correction_1.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-04-01T03:58:03.851111Z","date_created":"2026-04-01T02:52:28.145118Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"f80920a1bc02caf189101d08b03e7a1b89cd762d","snippet":"         BRUCE M. FELDER v. COMMISSIONER\n                  OF CORRECTION\n                     (SC 20576)\n     Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins and Ecker, Js.\n\n                                  Syllabus\n\nPursuant to statute (§ 52-470 (d)), when a petitioner files a petition for a\n   writ of habeas corpus ‘‘subsequent to a judgment on a prior petition\n   challenging the same conviction, there shall be a rebuttable presumption\n   that the filing of the subsequent petition has been de","type":"combined-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROcr/CR348/348CR6.pdf","id":9928170,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/01/23/felder_v._commissioner_of_correction.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-14T05:50:04.494495Z","date_created":"2024-01-30T22:02:24.083247Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"97af314b7ef2b462824a2a3b8d337d89513c749e","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where the court, Newson, J., rendered judgment dismissing the petition, from which the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to the Appellate Court, Alvord, Cradle and Alexander, Js., which affirmed the habeas court's judgment, and the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed. Laila M. G. Haswell, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (petitioner). Laurie N. Feldman, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state's attorney, and Helen J. McLellan, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11297890,9928170],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Pursuant to statute (§ 52-470 (d)), when a petitioner files a petition for a writ of habeas corpus ''subsequent to a judgment on a prior petition challenging the same conviction, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the filing of the subsequent petition has been delayed without good cause if such petition is filed after the later of . . . [t]wo years after the date on which the judgment in the prior petition is deemed to be a final judgment . . . [or] October 1, 2014 . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 52-470 (e)), if the petitioner fails to demon- strate good cause for the delay, the habeas court shall dismiss the petition. The petitioner, who had been convicted of various larceny offenses, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after he had exhausted his direct appeals. The habeas court denied the petition, the Appellate Court dis- missed the petitioner's appeal, and the habeas court's judgment became final on May 9, 2012. Approximately nine days before the judgment in that habeas action became final, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. The federal habeas matter became final in June, 2015, when the federal court denied the petition and declined to issue a certificate of appealability. On May 18, 2017, the petitioner filed a second habeas petition in the Superior Court challeng- ing the conviction that was the subject of his first state habeas petition. The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, requested that the habeas court issue an order directing the petitioner to show good cause why his second state habeas petition should not be dismissed pursuant to § 52-470 (e), claiming that it was filed after the applicable deadline view of ''the necessity of an order directed to the [s]ecretary given her office's long established policy of not accepting a minor party's nomination for an office when there is a conflicting nomination under the same party des- ignation''). 348 Conn. 396 JANUARY, 2024 397 Felder v. Commissioner of Correction in § 52-470 (d) of October 1, 2014. The habeas court issued an order to show cause for the delay. At an evidentiary hearing on the order to show cause, the petitioner's counsel argued that the term ''prior petition'' in § 52-470 (d) was not limited to habeas petitions filed in state court and, therefore, that the second state habeas petition was timely because it was filed within two years of the final judgment rendered in connection with the petitioner's federal habeas petition. Alternatively, the petition- er's counsel argued that, even if the second state habeas petition had been untimely, the petitioner had established good cause for the delay, insofar as the petitioner was not aware of § 52-470 (d) or its deadlines, and insofar as the petitioner's former counsel could not have informed the petitioner of those deadlines because counsel had terminated their representation of the petitioner before the enactment of § 52-470 (d). The habeas court rendered judgment dismissing the petition, concluding that it was untimely filed and that the petitioner had not established good cause to excuse the delay. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the habeas court's judgment, concluding that the phrase ''prior petition'' does not include federal habeas petitions and that the petitioner's alleged lack of knowledge of the deadlines prescribed by § 52-470 (d), without more, was insufficient to establish good cause for the delay in filing his second state habeas petition. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court correctly concluded that the phrase ''prior petition'' in § 52-470 (d) unambiguously refers solely to prior state habeas petitions and does not also include prior federal habeas petitions, and, accord- ingly, the petitioner's second state habeas petition was untimely: Although § 52-470 does not explicitly indicate that the term ''prior peti- tion'' refers solely to state habeas petitions, and although the other provisions in chapter 915 of the General Statutes do not make it explicit that they are referring solely to state habeas applications, proceedings, or petitions, the provision (§ 52-466 (a)) in chapter 915 that contains the requirements for where a habeas petition must be filed specifies that the application must be made to the Connecticut Superior Court, and the Superior Court has jurisdiction over only state habeas petitions. Moreover, the entire statutory scheme in which § 52-470 is situated deals exclusively with state habeas petitions, if the legislature had intended any portion of that statute to address federal habeas petitions, it would have explicitly stated so, or the context would necessarily imply it, and, accordingly, the statute's silence as to whether a ''prior petition'' includes a federal petition indicates that it does not include a federal petition within its scope. Furthermore, subsections (b) and (c) of § 52-470 dictate the procedures for, and treatment of, a ''petition,'' and, insofar as the legislature is 398 JANUARY, 2024 348 Conn. 396 Felder v. Commissioner of Correction empowered to dictate neither the procedures for federal habeas petitions nor when a federal court must dismiss a petition, it could not credibly be maintained that these other references to ''petition'' encompass federal habeas petitions. In addition, the petitioner's claim that interpreting ''prior petition'' as limited to state habeas petitions would lead to absurd and unworkable results because it would require a petitioner to file simultaneous state and federal habeas petitions, resulting in an unnecessary state petition should he succeed on his federal habeas petition, was unavailing, as it is not uncommon for a petitioner to pursue simultaneous federal and state habeas petitions, and this court's construction of § 52-470, which encourages petitioners to consolidate all their claims in their first state habeas petition or to bring any additional claims forward promptly once they become apparent, rather than waiting to complete litigation on a federal habeas claim, was consistent with the legislative intent of ensur- ing the expedient resolution of state habeas cases. 2. The habeas court properly exercised its discretion in determining that the petitioner had failed to establish good cause for the untimely filing of his second state habeas petition and properly dismissed that petition pursuant to § 52-470 (d) and (e): The petitioner's claim that good cause existed because he was unaware of § 52-470 and its statutory deadlines when he filed the second state habeas petition was unavailing, as the petitioner's lack of knowledge of the law, standing alone, was insufficient to excuse his late filing, and the petitioner did not present any testimony or argument to establish that his lack of knowledge was beyond his control. Moreover, the petitioner could not prevail on his claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that good cause existed because, even if he had known about § 52-470 and its deadlines, he could not have understood that the term ''prior petition'' in that statute encompassed only prior state habeas petitions, as this court could not conclude that the habeas court abused its discretion on the basis of evidence and arguments that were not presented to it. Furthermore, any interpretation contrary to this court's interpretation that § 52-470 unambiguously refers solely to state habeas petitions would have been unreasonable, and, even if the statutory language was pre- viously unclear, the petitioner could not establish that any ambiguity in the statutory language established good cause for his late filing, as the petitioner testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was unaware of the statute prior to filing his second state habeas petition, which necessarily meant that he could not establish the necessary nexus between the 348 Conn. 396 JANUARY, 2024 399 Felder v. Commissioner of Correction purportedly unclear statutory language and his failure to timely file his second state habeas petition. Argued September 7, 2023—officially released January 23, 2024"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/5095342/meriden-v-freedom-of-information-commission/","attorney":"","caseName":"Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission","caseNameFull":"","citation":["338 Conn. 310"],"citeCount":11,"cluster_id":5095342,"court":"Supreme Court of Connecticut","court_citation_string":"Conn.","court_id":"conn","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2021-03-12","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"SC20378","docket_id":60401061,"judge":"Robinson; McDonald; D’Auria; Mullins; Kahn; Ecker","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-08T15:08:57.131389Z","date_created":"2021-09-21T20:06:16.198795Z","score":{"bm25":25.098919}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1978734,3324765,3330077,3335696,3370755,6358109,7840393,7843855,7846146,7850525,7853445,7857976,7857977],"download_url":null,"id":11297667,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2021/03/12/meriden_v._freedom_of_information_commission.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-08T15:43:08.744918Z","date_created":"2026-04-01T02:44:18.964367Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"a4409d4445f003f8cbc8d2084ec240ff0549c222","snippet":"      CITY OF MERIDEN ET AL. v. FREEDOM OF\n         INFORMATION COMMISSION ET AL.\n                   (SC 20378)\n                 Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria,\n                      Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.\n\n                                  Syllabus\n\nPursuant to a provision of the Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 (2)),\n   the term ‘‘meeting’’ means ‘‘any hearing or other proceeding of a public\n   agency, any convening or assembly of a quorum of a multimember public\n   agency, an","type":"combined-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROcr/CR338/338CR11.pdf","id":4912727,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2021/09/28/meriden_v._freedom_of_information_commission.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-10T17:50:35.093477Z","date_created":"2021-09-21T20:06:16.201104Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"8252abc67c99ccfe84ac0ef54efa11462ca501a2","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Appeal from the decision of the named defendant, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain, where the court, Hon. Henry S. Cohn, judge trial referee, exercising the powers of the Supe- rior Court, rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' appeal, from which the plaintiffs appealed to the Appel- late Court, Prescott, Moll and Bishop, Js., which reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to that court with direction to render judgment sustaining the plaintiffs' appeal; thereafter, the named defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed. Valicia Dee Harmon, commission counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Colleen M. Murphy, general counsel, for the appellant (named defendant). Stephanie Dellolio, city attorney, for the appellees (plaintiffs). Proloy K. Das, Kari L. Olson and Matthew A. Ciarleg- lio filed a brief for the Connecticut Conference of Municipalities as amicus curiae.","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11297667,4912727],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Pursuant to a provision of the Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-200 (2)), the term ''meeting'' means ''any hearing or other proceeding of a public agency, any convening or assembly of a quorum of a multimember public agency, and any communication by or to a quorum of a multimember public agency . . . to discuss or act upon a matter over which the public agency has supervision, control, jurisdiction or advisory power.'' The defendant Freedom of Information Commission appealed to this court from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which reversed the trial court's judgment dismissing the administrative appeal of the plaintiffs, the city of Meriden and its city council. Four leaders of the twelve member city council had gathered at city hall with the mayor and the retiring city manager to discuss the upcoming search for a new city manager. The four member leadership group agreed to submit a resolu- tion to create a city manager search committee to the full city council for its consideration at an upcoming meeting and thereafter drafted a proposed resolution listing the names of people to be considered for appointment to the committee and detailing the committee's duties. Thereafter, a complaint was filed with the commission, alleging that the leadership group gathering was an unnoticed and private meeting, in violation of the open meetings provision of the Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-225 (a)). The commission concluded that the gathering was a ''proceeding'' within the meaning of § 1-200 (2), such a proceeding constituted a ''meeting'' within the meaning of that subdivision, and the plaintiffs violated § 1-225 (a) by failing to properly notice the gathering and to conduct it in public view. Subsequently, the plaintiffs appealed from the commission's decision to the trial court. In dismissing the plaintiffs' appeal, the trial court concluded that the commissioner's factual findings and conclusions were supported by substantial evidence and that the gathering constituted a meeting within the meaning of § 1- 200 (2). In reversing the trial court's judgment, the Appellate Court 338 Conn. 310 SEPTEMBER, 2021 311 Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission concluded that the gathering did not constitute a meeting under § 1-200 (2) and, thus, did not trigger the open meeting requirements of § 1-225 (a). Specifically, the Appellate Court disagreed with the trial court's interpretation of the phrase ''hearing or other proceeding'' in § 1-200 (2) as meaning a gathering among agency members that constituted a step in the process of agency-member activity. The Appellate Court explained that, consistent with the legal dictionary definitions of ''pro- ceeding'' and ''hearing,'' ''hearing or other proceeding'' in § 1-200 (2) refers to a process of adjudication, which falls outside the scope of activities conducted during the gathering at issue. On the granting of certification, the commission appealed to this court. Held that, because the gathering of the city council's four member leadership group with the mayor and the retiring city manager was not a ''hearing or other proceeding'' of a public agency under § 1-200 (2), it was not subject to the open meeting requirements of § 1-225 (a), and, accordingly, the judgment of the Appellate Court was affirmed: the phrase ''hearing or other proceeding,'' as a whole, connoted a formal process by which official business was authorized to be conducted, and, when the phrase ''hearing or other proceeding'' in § 1-200 (2) was considered in the context of the entire statutory framework, it was apparent that a group comprising less than a quorum of a public agency, such as the four member leadership group, may conduct a hearing or other proceeding within the meaning of § 1-200 (2) only when it has express authority to take action; accordingly, because the mayor and the retiring city manager had no authority to create the city manager search committee, there was no evidence in the record that the leadership group was formed pursuant to any official resolution of the city council, and the leadership group had no independent, express authority to take any action regarding the formation of the search committee that could legally bind the city council, the gathering was not a hearing or other proceeding for purposes of § 1-200 (2); moreover, this court disagreed with the Appellate Court's restrictive reading of ''hearing or other proceeding,'' which would have circumscribed the applicability of the open meeting requirements to adjudicative activities, insofar as public agencies conduct hearings or proceedings that do not have adjudicative functions associated with them; furthermore, this court declined to adopt the commission's pro- posed definition of ''hearing or other proceeding'' as including all com- munications between government officials that constitute ''a step in the process of agency-member activity,'' regardless of whether such group has authority to act, because that interpretation would yield absurd results and render meaningless the quorum requirement in the second and third definitions of ''meeting'' under § 1-200 (2). Argued September 8, 2020—officially released March 12, 2021 March 12, 2021, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes. 312 SEPTEMBER, 2021 338 Conn. 310 Meriden v. Freedom of Information Commission"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9439125/commissioner-of-mental-health-addiction-services-v-freedom-of/","attorney":"","caseName":"Commissioner of Mental Health & Addiction Services v. Freedom of Information Commission","caseNameFull":"","citation":["347 Conn. 675"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9439125,"court":"Supreme Court of Connecticut","court_citation_string":"Conn.","court_id":"conn","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2023-08-29","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"SC20686","docket_id":68003575,"judge":"Robinson; McDonald; D’Auria; Mullins; Ecker; Keller; Cradle","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-04-02T02:18:16.116900Z","date_created":"2023-11-14T19:04:32.667945Z","score":{"bm25":24.410212}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROcr/CR347/347CR48A.pdf","id":9896949,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/08/29/commissioner_of_mental_health__addiction_services_v._freedom_of_1.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-14T05:20:00.073351Z","date_created":"2023-11-14T19:04:31.575058Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"614a3139d3e40ffd35c8f3354f39532d3bab8ebd","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"in-part-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROcr/CR347/347CR48E.pdf","id":9896948,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/08/29/commissioner_of_mental_health__addiction_services_v._freedom_of.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-14T05:19:59.997928Z","date_created":"2023-11-14T19:04:30.533894Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"3c811f43955f10cbc97d503e8c7c69d50c7fa74a","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"dissent"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROcr/CR347/347CR48.pdf","id":9896950,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/08/29/commissioner_of_mental_health__addiction_services_v._freedom_of_2.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-14T05:20:00.372856Z","date_created":"2023-11-14T19:04:32.669312Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"0ae85532bdafce62e1ca7f766ea2114fa58c4491","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"lead-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":11298883,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/08/29/commissioner_of_mental_health__addiction_services_v._freedom_of_3.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-04-02T02:18:16.224310Z","date_created":"2026-04-02T02:17:14.723570Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"2a84401760856e640b496557c7573503ad303057","snippet":"     COMMISSIONER OF MENTAL HEALTH AND\n         ADDICTION SERVICES ET AL. v.\n          FREEDOM OF INFORMATION\n              COMMISSION ET AL.\n                  (SC 20686)\n            Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,\n                    Ecker, Keller and Cradle, Js.*\n                                 Syllabus\nPursuant to statute (§ 52-146e (a)), ‘‘communications and records as defined\n   in section 52-146d shall be confidential’’ and ‘‘no person may disclose\n\n  * This case original","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Appeal from the decision of the named defendant determining that the plaintiffs had violated the require- ments of the Freedom of Information Act and ordering that they comply with those requirements by disclosing certain records to the defendant The Hartford Courant et al., brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain and tried to the court, Cordani, J.; judgment sustaining the appeal in part, from which the named defendant appealed and the plaintiffs cross appealed. Reversed in part; judgment directed. Valicia Dee Harmon, commission counsel, for the appellant-cross appellee (named defendant). Alma Rose Nunley, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were William Tong, attorney gen- eral, Clare Kindall, former solicitor general, and Emily V. Melendez, assistant attorney general, for the appel- lees-cross appellants (plaintiffs).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9896949,11298883,9896950,9896948],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Pursuant to statute (§ 52-146e (a)), ''communications and records as defined in section 52-146d shall be confidential'' and ''no person may disclose This case originally was scheduled to be argued before a panel of this court consisting of Chief Justice Robinson and Justices D'Auria, Mullins, Ecker and Keller. Thereafter, Justice McDonald and Judge Cradle were added to the panel and have read the briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of the oral argument prior to participating in this decision. 676 AUGUST, 2023 347 Conn. 675 Commissioner of Mental Health & Addiction Services v. Freedom of Information Commission or transmit any communications and records or the substance or any part or any resume thereof which identify a patient . . . without the consent of the patient or his authorized representative.'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 52-146d (2)), the phrase ''communications and records'' is defined as ''all oral and written communications and records thereof relating to diagnosis or treatment of a patient's mental condition between the patient and a psychiatric mental health provider, or between a member of the patient's family and a psychiatric mental health pro- vider, or between any of such persons and a person participating under the supervision of a psychiatric mental health provider in the accomplish- ment of the objectives of diagnosis and treatment, wherever made, including communications and records which occur in or are prepared at a mental health facility . . . .'' The plaintiffs, the Commissioner of Mental Health and Addiction Services and the Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services (DMHAS), appealed to the trial court from the decision of the named defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission (commission), which ordered the disclosure, without redaction, of a police report to the defendant newspaper and its reporter, which the reporter had requested pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The police report concerned the death of a patient, P, after a medical event at the Whiting Forensic Division of Connecticut Valley Hospital (Whiting), which is a maximum security, mental health treatment facility operated by DMHAS. DMHAS has its own police department, which is stationed at Whiting. The police report consisted of a collection of investigative reports, authored by DMHAS police officers, documenting the police department's investiga- tion into P's death. In ordering disclosure, the commission concluded that the police report was not exempt from disclosure under the provi- sion (§ 1-210 (b) (10)) of FOIA that exempts from disclosure communica- tions privileged by the doctor-patient or therapist-patient relationship or any other common-law or statutory privilege. The commission rea- soned that the police report did not relate to the diagnosis or treatment of P's mental health condition within the meaning of those terms, as set forth in § 52-146d (2), insofar as the officers who prepared the report had not participated in the diagnosis or treatment of P's mental health condition. The commission also concluded that disclosure of the police report did not violate the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) (42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq.), as implemented by the Privacy Rule (45 C.F.R. § 160.101 et seq.), which generally prohibits a ''covered entity'' from disclosing protected ''health information'' without a valid authorization. The trial court sustained in part the plaintiffs' appeal from the commission's decision. The court concluded that the police report fell within the definition of ''communications and records'' in § 52-146d (2) because the report was prepared at a mental health facility and related to the treatment of a patient's mental health condi- 347 Conn. 675 AUGUST, 2023 677 Commissioner of Mental Health & Addiction Services v. Freedom of Information Commission tion, but it nonetheless determined that the report could be disclosed so long as anything therein that identified a patient was redacted in accordance with § 52-146e (a). The court also concluded that, although the police report was prepared by a ''covered entity'' and contained ''health information'' within the meaning of HIPAA and the Privacy Rule, it could be released, pursuant to those provisions, only after references to any patient's identity and personally identifying health information were redacted. Thereafter, the commission appealed and the plaintiffs cross appealed from the trial court's judgment, seeking a determination as to whether the police report at issue was exempt from disclosure under FOIA, either because it was protected by the psychiatrist-patient privilege set forth in §§ 52-146d (2) and 52-146e (a), or by HIPAA and the Privacy Rule. Held: 1. Although the police report itself was not exempt from disclosure under § 1-210 (b) (10) of FOIA, as it was not a privileged psychiatrist-patient communication under §§ 52-146d (2) and 52-146e (a), this court ordered the redaction of certain information contained therein prior to dis- closure: a. This court concluded that the police report was not a communication or record thereof under § 52-146d (2): It was clear from the plain language of §§ 52-146d (2) and 52-146e (a) that the psychiatrist-patient privilege applies only to communications or records thereof that relate to the diagnosis or treatment of a patient's mental health condition and that are between individuals who fall within the three categories of communicants delineated in § 52-146d (2), namely, the patient and a psychiatric mental health provider, a member of the patient's family and a psychiatric mental health provider, or one of those individuals and a person participating under the supervision of a psychiatric mental health provider in the accomplishment of the objec- tives of the patient's diagnosis and treatment. Moreover, this court clarified that not every communication involving or concerning a psychiatric patient necessarily relates to the diagnosis or treatment of that patient's mental health condition and rejected the notion that its case law stood for the broad proposition that the psychia- trist-patient privilege prohibits the disclosure of all communications and records that are made or prepared at a mental health facility and that identify a patient, regardless of the identities of the individuals between whom the communication is made. In the present case, the police report, which was prepared after P stopped receiving treatment at Whiting, was not a part of P's clinical file, and, in view of the nature and timing of the postmortem investigation con- ducted by the DMHAS police officers, it was clear that the officers who prepared the report were not participating in the accomplishment of the objectives of diagnosis and treatment when they prepared the report 678 AUGUST, 2023 347 Conn. 675 Commissioner of Mental Health & Addiction Services v. Freedom of Information Commission but, instead, were performing the traditional law enforcement function of investigating an untimely death. Furthermore, there was no merit to the plaintiffs' claim that the phrase ''wherever made, including communications and records which occur in or are prepared at a mental health facility'' in § 52-146d (2) expanded the definition of ''communications and records'' to encompass all commu- nications and records that are made or prepared in a mental health treatment facility and that relate to the diagnosis or treatment of a patient's mental condition, regardless of the identity of the individuals between whom the communications are made, as the legislative history and purpose of § 52-146d demonstrated that that phrase was not intended to create a freestanding category of confidential communications and records unique to mental health facilities but, instead, to clarify that the psychiatrist-patient privilege was not limited to communications between patients and private psychiatrists but also extended to communications relating to psychiatric treatment provided at publicly funded institutions that offer inpatient treatment. In addition, in enacting FOIA, the legislature balanced competing princi- ples concerning governmental transparency and patient confidentiality and provided, as it deemed appropriate, for certain exemptions from disclosure to protect patient confidentiality, and the decision as to whether the public policy of this state would best be served by creating a blanket exemption from disclosure of all records and documents relat- ing to patients at Whiting rested with the legislature rather than this court. b. There was substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the commission's finding that the police report was not a communication or record thereof, as those terms are defined in § 52-146d (2): The police report, which related to and was generated after the death of a patient at Whiting, was not a communication between any of the individuals who are included in the three categories of communicants delineated in § 52-146d (2), as the report did not constitute a communica- tion between a patient or a member of a patient's family and a psychiatric mental health provider, or between any such person and a person partici- pating under the supervision of a psychiatric mental health provider in the accomplishment of the objectives of the patient's diagnosis and treatment. Rather, the police report was a communication between DMHAS police officers tasked with investigating P's death and an unknown recipient or recipients. Moreover, regardless of who the intended recipient of the police report was, in view of the death of P, who was the subject of the report, it was clear that the officers were not participating in the accomplishment of the objectives of P's diagnosis and treatment when they prepared the 347 Conn. 675 AUGUST, 2023 679 Commissioner of Mental Health & Addiction Services v. Freedom of Information Commission report but, rather, were performing the traditional law enforcement func- tion of investigating an untimely death and reporting the results of their investigation, and this court could not conclude that the commission acted arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion in determining that the police report was not a communication or record within the meaning of the statutory scheme. Furthermore, although some DMHAS police officers responded to the emergency medical event involving P, it was unclear whether they were participating in their capacity as a member of the mental health treatment team or, alternatively, performing the traditional law enforcement func- tion of responding to an emergency, and, in light of that ambiguity, this court could not substitute its own judgment for that of the commission. Nevertheless, because the police report contained sensitive information regarding the identity of two patients, namely, the names, dates of birth, and home phone numbers of P and a second patient who witnessed the medical event that led to P's death, and because the newspaper reporter explicitly stated in his FOIA request that all references to a patient's identity could be redacted, the commission improperly ordered the dis- closure of that identifying information over the plaintiffs' objection, and, accordingly, this court ordered that all references to patient names, dates of birth, and home phone numbers be redacted from the report prior to disclosure. 2. The police report was not exempt from disclosure under HIPAA and the Privacy Rule: The commission's interpretation of the Privacy Rule was not entitled to deference, as the Privacy Rule was promulgated by the United States Department of Health and Human Services, and such deference was not warranted when, as in the present case, the agency interpreting the regulation, namely, the commission, was not responsible for its promul- gation. The Privacy Rule contains various exemptions, including one that permits a covered entity to use or disclose protected health information without a valid authorization to the extent that such use or disclosure is ''required by law,'' and that term is defined to expressly include statutes or regula- tions that compel an entity to use or disclose protected health infor- mation. Even if this court assumed that, under the Privacy Rule, the DMHAS Police Department was a ''covered entity'' and that the police report contained ''health information,'' the police report was not shielded from disclosure under HIPAA because its release was ''required by law'' under FOIA, which is a state statute that requires the disclosure of public records, and the police report, therefore, had to be disclosed, provided 680 AUGUST, 2023 347 Conn. 675 Commissioner of Mental Health & Addiction Services v. Freedom of Information Commission that the names, dates of birth, and home phone numbers of the patients mentioned therein were redacted. (One justice concurring in part and dissenting in part; two justices dissenting in one opinion) Argued September 8, 2022—officially released August 29, 2023"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4342199/interpretation-of-section-586-of-the-foreign-operations-export-financing/","attorney":"","caseName":"Interpretation of Section 586 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4342199,"court":"Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel","court_citation_string":"OLC","court_id":"olc","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2003-07-18","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":null,"docket_id":4574982,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-09-03T16:23:54.680283Z","date_created":"2017-01-27T22:40:13.879726Z","score":{"bm25":23.62625}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[87790,109067,111221,9426350,9434121],"download_url":"https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2003/07/31/op-olc-v027-p0130_0.pdf","id":4119460,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2003/07/18/interpretation_of_section_586_of_the_foreign_operations_export_financing.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T14:11:57.071127Z","date_created":"2017-01-27T22:40:13.886310Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"a6532064f58e23057aceaaf931e6f7c2142f40cb","snippet":"                Interpretation of Section 586 of the Foreign\n                Operations, Export Financing, and Related\n                      Programs Appropriations Act\nExisting statutory provisions that prohibit or impose mandatory restrictions on the public release of\n  information are not overridden by section 586 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and\n  Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2003, which requires the President to order federal agencies\n  “to expeditiously declassify a","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4119460],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/1325761/cashwell-v-department-of-state-treasurer/","attorney":"\n\nPoyner & Spruill, LLP, by Edwin M. Speas, Jr., for petitioner-appellant.\n, \nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Robert M. Curran, for respondent-appellee.\n","caseName":"Cashwell v. Department of State Treasurer","caseNameFull":"Narley Cashwell v. Department of State Treasurer, Retirement Systems Division, and Michael Williamson, Director, Retirement Systems Division.","citation":["675 S.E.2d 73","196 N.C. App. 81","2009 N.C. App. LEXIS 452"],"citeCount":4,"cluster_id":1325761,"court":"Court of Appeals of North Carolina","court_citation_string":"N.C. Ct. App.","court_id":"ncctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2009-04-07","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"COA08-432","docket_id":1581677,"judge":"Calabria, Steelman, Stroud","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-21T03:12:11.264849Z","date_created":"2014-10-30T17:51:16.438783Z","score":{"bm25":23.353874}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":7993,"cites":[1214293,1236547,1338734,1370635,1386983,1418346],"download_url":null,"id":1325761,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"north_carolina/court_opinions/documents/74089918136bdaee.xml","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T07:09:43.471649Z","date_created":"2013-10-30T05:29:57.540288Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"839146edd0a8904e2ba5597384ecca71330a2019","snippet":"\nNarley Cashwell (\"petitioner\") appeals an order denying petitioner a tax free pension1 under the Consolidated Judicial Retirement System (\"CJRS\") and the Teachers' and State Employees Retirement System (\"TSERS\"). We find no error.\n I. TSERS and CJRS\nThe TSERS and CJRS are retirement systems created by the General Assembly for North Carolina state employees. Both systems are similarly structured, administered by","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"Appeal by petitioner from order entered 18 February 2008 by Judge R. Allen Baddour, Jr. in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 October 2008.","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[1325761],"source":"ZLU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"<bold>Pensions and Retirement — Consolidated Judicial Retirement System —</bold> <bold>Teachers' and State Employees Retirement System — entitlement to tax</bold> <bold>free pension</bold>\n<block_quote>      The trial court did not err by denying petitioner a state tax free pension under the Consolidated Judicial Retirement System and the Teachers' and State Employees Retirement System because: (1) N.C.G.S. §§ <cross_reference>135-5</cross_reference> and <cross_reference>135-4</cross_reference> read in conjunction provide that a member of a state retirement system who leaves state service and withdraws contributions in the retirement system has no rights to any benefits within the retirement system except for the right to repay previously withdrawn contributions as provided in N.C.G.S. § <cross_reference>135-4</cross_reference>; (2) petitioner acquired the right to repay his previously withdrawn contributions since he vested in the retirement system in 1995, and it would be a strained statutory interpretation to allow his vesting date to shift depending on the amount of previously withdrawn contributions the employee<page_number>Page 82</page_number>\nchooses to repay; and (3) petitioner's repayment of contributions withdrawn prior to 12 August 1989 does not entitle petitioner to a tax-free pension, and the repayment of previously withdrawn contributions serves only to increase the years of service creditable to an employee.</block_quote>\n"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9479048/drumm-v-freedom-of-information-commission/","attorney":"","caseName":"Drumm v. Freedom of Information Commission","caseNameFull":"","citation":["348 Conn. 565"],"citeCount":3,"cluster_id":9479048,"court":"Supreme Court of Connecticut","court_citation_string":"Conn.","court_id":"conn","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-02-27","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"SC20656","docket_id":68290041,"judge":"Robinson; McDonald; D’Auria; Mullins; Ecker; Dannehy; Elgo","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-04-01T03:02:55.535784Z","date_created":"2024-02-28T14:01:57.309141Z","score":{"bm25":21.459114}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":11297896,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/02/27/drumm_v._freedom_of_information_commission_1.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-04-01T03:26:06.322996Z","date_created":"2026-04-01T02:52:37.607993Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"dadbf4094b79b5226ff8fbef2a211e08ee2a2580","snippet":"February 27, 2024             CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     Page 35\n\n\n\n\n         348 Conn. 565             FEBRUARY, 2024                                 565\n                      Drumm v. Freedom of Information Commission\n\n\n              JOHN DRUMM, CHIEF OF POLICE, ET AL. v.\n              FREEDOM OF INFORMATION COMMISSION\n                           (SC 20656)\n                      Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,\n                              Ecker","type":"combined-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROcr/CR348/348CR43.pdf","id":9945661,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/02/27/drumm_v._freedom_of_information_commission.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-14T06:06:28.108660Z","date_created":"2024-02-28T14:01:57.345325Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"574c85bf06003b2b0e5862943b428c208d96a7e9","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Appeal from the decision of the defendant ordering the disclosure of certain records, brought to the Supe- rior Court in the judicial district of New Britain, where the court, Klau, J., granted the motion to intervene as a defendant filed by Anike Niemeyer; thereafter, the case was tried to the court, Klau, J.; judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiffs appealed. Reversed; further proceedings. Floyd J. Dugas, for the appellants (plaintiffs). Valicia Dee Harmon, commission counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Colleen M. Murphy, general counsel, for the appellee (defendant). Stephanie Rice, law student intern, with whom were David A. Schulz and, on the brief, Emile Shehada, law student intern, for the appellee (intervenor Anike Niemeyer). Matthew A. Weiner, former assistant state's attorney, and Sarah Hanna, former senior assistant state's attor- ney, filed a brief for the Division of Criminal Justice as amicus curiae. Dan Barrett and Elana Spungen Bildner filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Connecticut as amicus curiae. 348 Conn. 565 FEBRUARY, 2024 571 Drumm v. Freedom of Information Commission","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11297896,9945661],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Pursuant to a provision of the Freedom of Information Act (§ 1-210 (b) (3) (D)), records of law enforcement agencies not otherwise available to the public that were compiled in connection with the detection or investi- gation of a crime are exempt from disclosure if the disclosure of such records would result in the disclosure of ''information to be used in a prospective law enforcement action if prejudicial to such action . . . .'' The plaintiffs, the town of Madison, its police department, and its chief of police, D, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant, the Freedom of Information Commission, ordering the disclosure, pursu- ant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), of certain documents contained in the police department's homicide investigation files to the intervening defendant, N, a filmmaker who was the complainant before the commission. The requested documents related to the 2010 homicide of B. Immediately after the homicide, DNA evidence was recovered, but the case went unsolved. In 2013, N and B's son, H, began working on a documentary about B's unsolved homicide. Between 2013 and 2019, H met with members of the police department, including S, three times in an attempt to obtain information about the investigation. During those meetings, H was left with the impression that the police department had classified B's homicide as a cold case. S indicated to H that, although the DNA evidence was sufficient to identify potential suspects, it was inadequate to prosecute any particular individual, and that the police department had had the same prime suspect since one week after the homicide. Nevertheless, D, citing the ongoing investigation, would not permit the police department to cooperate with the documentary project. As a result, N filed an FOIA request with the police department, which denied the request and declined to produce any of the requested docu- ments on the ground that they were not subject to public disclosure pursuant to § 1-210 (b) (3) (D). N then filed a complaint with the commis- sion. The only evidence the plaintiffs offered at the hearing before the commission was S's testimony. S acknowledged that the case had gone This case originally was argued before a panel consisting of Chief Justice Robinson, Justices D'Auria, Mullins and Ecker, and Judge Elgo. Thereafter, Justices McDonald and Dannehy were added to the panel and have read the briefs and appendices, and listened to a recording of the oral argument prior to participating in this decision. 566 FEBRUARY, 2024 348 Conn. 565 Drumm v. Freedom of Information Commission cold by 2016 and that, with the technology available at that time, the DNA evidence could not lead to an arrest. S also testified, however, that the investigation remained open and active, that he was working on the case periodically throughout the year, and that the police periodically received new leads, which he then would investigate. S further testified that he monitored changes in forensic technology and suggested that new DNA technologies might help the police make an identification in the future. The commission ruled in favor of N with respect to most of the requested documents, ordering that the plaintiffs provide N with copies of those documents. The commission found that, although B's death continued to be investigated, the requested documents did not fall within the exception from disclosure of law enforcement records because the plaintiffs had failed to establish either prong of § 1-210 (b) (3) (D), namely, that the requested records would ''be used in a prospec- tive law enforcement action'' and that their release would be prejudicial. The trial court upheld the commission's decision and dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal. In so doing, the trial court concluded that the law enforcement exception to the FOIA is governed by a reasonable possibil- ity standard, articulated a list of seven, nonexclusive factors that the commission should use to determine whether a prospective law enforce- ment action is a reasonable possibility, and determined that the plaintiffs were unable to satisfy that standard. On the plaintiffs' appeal from the trial court's judgment, held: 1. The plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that the commission arbi- trarily and capriciously had failed to articulate and apply the correct legal standard that governs claims of exemption under § 1-210 (b) (3) (D): a. The trial court correctly concluded that, under the first prong of § 1-210 (b) (3) (D), a ''prospective law enforcement action'' is a law enforcement action that is at least a reasonable possibility: Insofar as the FOIA does not define the term ''prospective,'' this court consulted dictionary definitions of the term and concluded that the statute was facially ambiguous, as plausible arguments could be made that the legislature, in enacting § 1-210 (b) (3) (D), may have intended ''prospective'' to have a probabilistic meaning, such as potential, antici- pated, expected, likely or possible, or to mean in prospect or pertaining to a prospect, as in prospective buyers. In resolving that ambiguity, this court adopted the probabilistic definition of ''prospective'' and agreed with the trial court's conclusion that a ''prospective law enforcement action'' refers to a future law enforcement action that has at least a reasonable possibility of occurring, meaning that the occurrence is more than theoretically possible but not necessar- ily likely or probable. Moreover, although the law enforcement exception plausibly could be read to impose either a more exacting standard, such as by requiring 348 Conn. 565 FEBRUARY, 2024 567 Drumm v. Freedom of Information Commission that the police show that an arrest or prosecution is pending or likely, or a less demanding standard, such as by requiring that the police demon- strate only a speculative or theoretical possibility of some future law enforcement action, the reasonable possibility standard was the most reasonable reading of the law enforcement exception insofar as it struck a proper balance between the competing public interests underlying the FOIA, namely, fostering openness and transparency while protecting important governmental functions that demand a degree of confiden- tiality. Furthermore, application of the rules of statutory interpretation to a related FOIA provision (§ 1-215 (b) (3)), which exempts from disclosure information relating to records of arrest that may ''prejudice a pending prosecution or a prospective law enforcement action,'' and the legislative history of § 1-210 (b) (3) (D) provided further support for the reasonable possibility standard and ruled out the most extreme readings of the term ''prospective.'' b. This court clarified that, under the first prong of § 1-210 (b) (3) (D), a respondent before the commission must establish only that it is at least reasonably possible that the information contained in a requested document will ''be used in'' support of an arrest or prosecution: In Dept. of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission (51 Conn. App. 100), the Appellate Court stated in dictum that the law enforcement exception is satisfied when there is an evidentiary showing that the requested records are going to be used in a law enforcement action, and Superior Court judges and the commission have relied on that language to require a showing that it is at least probable, if not certain, that the subject records would be used for an arrest or prose- cution. Construing the statute to create a coherent and cohesive scheme, this court presumed that the same standard must govern both the ''to be used'' and the ''prospective law enforcement action'' elements of the first prong of the statutory law enforcement exception, and, accordingly, it overruled the Appellate Court's dictum in Dept. of Public Safety to the extent that it imposed a standard in connection with the ''to be used'' element that was different from the reasonable possibility standard that applied to the ''prospective law enforcement action'' element. c. This court rejected the policy arguments advanced by the plaintiffs and the amicus curiae, the Division of Criminal Justice: The division's claim that the reasonable possibility standard should be deemed satisfied when a law enforcement investigation is open, a suspect has been identified, and no insurmountable obstacles exist to a future arrest or prosecution was not supported by the language or legislative history of the statute, and that proposed rule followed a categorical 568 FEBRUARY, 2024 348 Conn. 565 Drumm v. Freedom of Information Commission approach that failed to account for the specific facts and context of each individual case, placed too much weight on the law enforcement side of the scale, precluded the public from exercising any effective oversight in all cases in which any applicable statute of limitations has not run, and did not account for the fact that, with the passage of time, it becomes increasingly likely that openness, rather than secrecy, is what will unearth the elusive lead that will help the police solve the case. Moreover, the claim that, as a matter of public policy, courts and the commission should defer to the expertise of law enforcement agencies or officials when construing or applying the law enforcement exception was not supported by the statutory scheme or the legislative history, especially in view of the fact that the legislature, which has been clear in the context of exceptions to the disclosure of records when it intends to give the agency possessing the subject records increased deference, did not do so when it drafted § 1-210 (b) (3). d. This court articulated various factors for determining, in the context of the crime of murder and other crimes that involve lengthy or no statutes of limitations, whether a future law enforcement action is reason- ably possible: This court agreed that the following seven, nonexclusive factors identi- fied by the trial court were relevant to a determination of whether a future law enforcement action is reasonably possible: the length of time that has passed since the crime; the length of time that has elapsed since the law enforcement agency last obtained significant new evidence or leads; whether the investigation, even if officially open, is classified as a cold case; the number of investigators presently assigned to the investigation; the amount of time investigators are committing to the case; whether the agency has a suspect and, if so, whether the agency's suspicion is supported by more than speculation; and whether advances in science or technology, such as improvements in DNA analysis, may help solve the crime. This court also noted that those individual factors may vary in importance from case to case and are not intended to serve as a complete or mecha- nistic checklist, and sight should not be lost of the two fundamental issues that underlie the factors, namely, whether the law enforcement agency continues to investigate the crime actively and earnestly, and, if the investigation has gone cold, whether there remains a reasonable possibility that the investigation ultimately will culminate in some law enforcement action. 2. The existing administrative record was not sufficient to permit this court to apply the newly adopted reasonable possibility standard as a matter of law, and, accordingly, this court remanded the case for further pro- ceedings before the commission: 348 Conn. 565 FEBRUARY, 2024 569 Drumm v. Freedom of Information Commission The commission's finding that the police had not identified a suspect was without support in the record and was contradicted by S's and H's testimony that the police department had enough DNA to develop suspects and that it had a prime suspect, the erroneous finding was apparently important to the commission's law enforcement exception analysis insofar as the commission had relied on that finding to distin- guish the present case from previous cases in which it had found that release of requested records would be prejudicial to a prospective law enforcement action, and, accordingly, this court concluded that the com- mission must be afforded an opportunity on remand to consider what weight and importance, if any, to give to the testimony that the police department identified a prime suspect early in the investigation. Moreover, the commission's final decision could be understood to require a probability, even a certainty, that the requested records will be used for an arrest or prosecution, a stringent standard that is not consistent with the plain language of the statute, and, because the commission's factual findings, such as that the plaintiffs' claims were wholly specula- tive, were conclusory and may be tied up with the legal standard that it applied, this court could not apply the new reasonable possibility standard to the existing record without running the risk of substituting its judgment for that of the commission as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact, and, accordingly, the commission must be provided with the opportunity on remand to assess whether some law enforcement action still remains a reasonable possibility. Furthermore, in concluding that a law enforcement action was not rea- sonably possible, the trial court relied on certain statistical evidence regarding the probability of a prosecution in cold murder investigations and the extent to which public disclosure of information in such cases would improve the likelihood of an arrest and prosecution rather than prejudice that outcome, but the commission was the fact finder, and it should have the opportunity on remand to review any available statistical data in the first instance, with the input from the parties and any expert testimony they wish to offer, before making relevant findings. 3. Although the trial court did not address the commission's determination that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that disclosure of the requested records would be prejudicial to a prospective law enforcement action, this court declined to give the trial court the opportunity on remand to consider the prejudice prong of § 1-210 (b) (3) (D) because, under the circumstances of the present case, further review by the trial court was unnecessary: The two prongs of the law enforcement exception, although distinct, are not wholly unrelated, several of the factors that the trial court identified as relevant to the prospective law enforcement action prong of § 1-210 (b) (3) (D), such as the existence of a suspect and the availability of DNA 570 FEBRUARY, 2024 348 Conn. 565 Drumm v. Freedom of Information Commission evidence for future testing, also are relevant to the issue of prejudice, and the commission's reconsideration of these matters will necessarily bear on prejudice, as well. Moreover, it seemed likely that the commission also applied the wrong legal standard to the prejudice prong insofar as it improperly conflated the two prongs of the statutory exception and improperly relied on S's offhand statement that he could ''go on with speculating'' as to how the requested information might be used, and, on remand, any documents that the plaintiffs submit for in camera review as containing potentially prejudicial information should be reviewed by the commission under its established standards. Argued October 19, 2022—officially released February 27, 2024"}]}