{"count":594180,"next":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/search/?cursor=cz0xNS40ODM4OCZzPTEwMDE0MzAzJnQ9byZkPTIwMjYtMTAtMDMmcD0y&q=DECLARATIONS+OF+INTENTION&type=o","previous":null,"results":[{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10291982/state-of-tennessee-v-bobby-daniel-pettie/","attorney":"","caseName":"State of Tennessee v. Bobby Daniel Pettie","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10291982,"court":"Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Crim. App.","court_id":"tenncrimapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-12-11","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"M2024-00558-CCA-R3-CD","docket_id":69457312,"judge":"Judge Tom Greenholtz","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-12-11T20:15:16.974371Z","date_created":"2024-12-11T20:15:16.925664Z","score":{"bm25":28.066374}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/E-SIGNED-M2024-0558-CCA-PETTIE.pdf","id":10758570,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/12/11/state_of_tennessee_v._bobby_daniel_pettie.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-07-03T19:34:37.526974Z","date_created":"2024-12-11T20:15:16.933571Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"b2d786c978a7df551ba99e49d60d458702960bcb","snippet":"                                                                                         12/11/2024\n\n        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                         AT NASHVILLE\n                        Assigned on Briefs December 10, 2024\n\n             STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BOBBY DANIEL PETTIE\n\n                  Appeal from the Circuit Court for Bedford County\n                      No. 17678 Forest A. Durard, Jr., Judge\n                      ___________________________________\n\n  ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10758570],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"A Bedford County jury found the Defendant, Bobby Daniel Pettie, guilty of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, among other offenses. The court then imposed a six-year sentence for this conviction after implicitly finding that the Defendant had a qualifying prior felony conviction. Thereafter, the Defendant sought to have his sentence declared illegal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, arguing that the jury did not find that he had a qualifying prior felony conviction. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the Defendant waived the jury's determination of the issue. The Defendant appealed to this court. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10292224/state-of-tennessee-v-bobby-daniel-pettie/","attorney":"","caseName":"State of Tennessee v. Bobby Daniel Pettie","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10292224,"court":"Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Crim. App.","court_id":"tenncrimapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-12-11","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"M2024-00558-CCA-R3-CD","docket_id":69457312,"judge":"Judge Tom Greenholtz","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-12-12T16:39:40.863859Z","date_created":"2024-12-12T16:14:04.918103Z","score":{"bm25":27.717579}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/E-SIGNED-M2024-0558-CCA-PETTIE%20%282%29.pdf","id":10758812,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/12/11/state_of_tennessee_v._bobby_daniel_pettie_1.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T02:32:15.132977Z","date_created":"2024-12-12T16:14:04.924642Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"9406b108a1e5973296fb912af3f38d524d3de9ca","snippet":"                                                                                         12/11/2024\n\n        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                         AT NASHVILLE\n                        Assigned on Briefs December 10, 2024\n\n             STATE OF TENNESSEE v. BOBBY DANIEL PETTIE\n\n                  Appeal from the Circuit Court for Bedford County\n                      No. 17678 Forest A. Durard, Jr., Judge\n                      ___________________________________\n\n  ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10758812],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"A Bedford County jury found the Defendant, Bobby Daniel Pettie, guilty of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, among other offenses. The court then imposed a six-year sentence for this conviction after implicitly finding that the Defendant had a qualifying prior felony conviction. Thereafter, the Defendant sought to have his sentence declared illegal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, arguing that the jury did not find that he had a qualifying prior felony conviction. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the Defendant waived the jury's determination of the issue. The Defendant appealed to this court. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4603859/susan-knight-as-of-the-estate-of-elton-m-johnson-v-horse-creek-rock-inc/","attorney":"","caseName":"Susan Knight as of the Estate of Elton M. Johnson v. Horse Creek Rock, Inc.","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4603859,"court":"Court of Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Ct. App.","court_id":"tennctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2019-03-26","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"W2018-01014-COA-R3-CV","docket_id":14805071,"judge":"Judge Andy D. Bennett","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:31:45.849007Z","date_created":"2019-03-26T21:37:27.063161Z","score":{"bm25":24.458302}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1050452,1050576,1058755,1491372,1662390,2279802,2362982,2388306,2390273,2441758,3893230],"download_url":"http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/knightsusanopn.pdf","id":4381112,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2019/03/26/susan_knight_as_of_the_estate_of_elton_m._johnson_v._horse_creek_rock_inc..pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T17:12:57.484539Z","date_created":"2019-03-26T21:37:27.071850Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"cf45987e0027f8b2a77cbc57d74bbed3d7742f3a","snippet":"                                                                                       03/26/2019\n               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                            AT JACKSON\n                              February 12, 2019 Session\n\n    SUSAN KNIGHT AS EXECUTRIX OF THE ESTATE OF ELTON M.\n             JOHNSON V. HORSE CREEK ROCK INC.\n\n                Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hardin County\n                 No. CH-273     Carma Dennis McGee, Chancellor\n\n\n                     ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4381112],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"This is a dispute over a lease agreement for property upon which the lessor permitted the lessee to mine limestone. After the original lessor died, his estate demanded that the lessee provide weight tickets as provided in the lease agreement. When the lessee failed to comply, the estate filed suit and the lessee counterclaimed. The trial court granted summary judgment to the estate on its claim for declaratory judgment and declared that the lease agreement was terminated. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the estate on the lessee's counterclaim for intentional interference with a business relationship. We affirm the decision of the trial court in all respects."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9456091/state-of-tennessee-v-robert-l-cody-iii/","attorney":"","caseName":"State of Tennessee v. Robert L. Cody, III","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9456091,"court":"Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Crim. App.","court_id":"tenncrimapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2023-12-28","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"E2022-00947-CCA-R3-CD","docket_id":68122659,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-23T01:20:55.304224Z","date_created":"2023-12-28T22:09:11.441674Z","score":{"bm25":23.355898}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[108114,110138,660188,1043928,1043968,1043997,1045517,1057558,1057566,1057584,1057596,1057682,1057734,1057821,1058090,1058264,1058506,1060459,1060565,1060830,1060898,1060945,1060978,1073270,1073388,1074326,1076495,1080076,1208681,1397653,1490576,1528630,1564422,1668553,1747577,1781135,1789328,2276935,2408953,2409995,2431765,2442291,2462368,2750181,4089191,4089802,4089803,4098980,4108644,4235395,4348976,9524418,9680593,9775475],"download_url":"https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/OpinionsPDFVersion/Robert%20L.%20Cody%2C%20III%20Opinion.pdf","id":9913916,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/12/28/state_of_tennessee_v._robert_l._cody_iii.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T23:11:04.291707Z","date_created":"2023-12-28T22:09:11.443477Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"9ced2a9fc162f62098a24046f7e19dfc4cb84ac8","snippet":"                                                                                                     12/28/2023\n           IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                            AT KNOXVILLE\n                                 September 26, 2023 Session1\n\n                STATE OF TENNESSEE v. ROBERT L. CODY, III\n\n                    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Knox County\n                    No. 114935 Kyle A. Hixson, Criminal Court Judge\n                         _________","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9913916],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Defendant, Robert L. Cody, III, was convicted of conspiracy to possess 26 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell within 1,000 feet of a drug-free zone (count one) possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony (count two) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (count three) and the jury found that Defendant committed a criminal gang offense (count ten) enhancing count one to a Class A felony. The trial court imposed an effective thirty-three year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss counts two and three for failure to charge an offense, and count ten of the presentment for failure to give proper notice of the gang enhancement (2) that the trial court erred by failing to declare a mistrial after the State read the presentment to the jury (3) that the trial court erred by excluding Investigator Jinks from the Rule of Sequestration (4) that the trial court erred by admitting text messages that were not properly authenticated (5) that the evidence was insufficient to support Defendant's drug conspiracy conviction in count one (6) that the criminal gang enhancement violated double jeopardy and the doctrine of collateral estoppel (7) that the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant under the prior version of the Drug-Free Zone Act and (8) that this court should resentence Defendant under the 2022 amendments to the Drug-Free Zone Act. Following our review of the entire record, oral arguments, and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4868317/state-of-tennessee-v-terrell-lamont-reid/","attorney":"","caseName":"State of Tennessee v. Terrell Lamont Reid","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4868317,"court":"Tennessee Supreme Court","court_citation_string":"Tenn.","court_id":"tenn","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2021-03-26","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"W2019-00636-SC-R11-CD","docket_id":59770329,"judge":"Justice Cornelia A. Clark","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T02:45:54.856076Z","date_created":"2021-03-26T21:13:49.725219Z","score":{"bm25":22.042288}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":5715,"cites":[1057919,1060316,1060712,2386233],"download_url":"https://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/reid.terrell.opn_.pdf","id":4672096,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2021/03/26/state_of_tennessee_v._terrell_lamont_reid.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-28T21:27:19.786737Z","date_created":"2021-03-26T21:13:49.733653Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"25782ddf46e8d3cfd69e89daa5af308349230630","snippet":"                                                                                          03/26/2021\n                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE\n                        Assigned on Briefs November 5, 2020\n\n\n            STATE OF TENNESSEE v. TERRELL LAMONT REID\n\n\n              Appeal by Permission from the Court of Criminal Appeals\n                         Circuit Court for Madison County\n                         No. 15-60   Kyle C. Atkins, Judge\n\n                       ___________________","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4672096],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"On June 24, 2015, Terrell Lamont Reid (\"the Petitioner\") pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Pursuant to the criminal gang enhancement statute, the firearm offense was enhanced from a Class C to a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-121(b) (2014). On April 7, 2016, the Court of Criminal Appeals declared the criminal gang enhancement statute unconstitutional as a violation of substantive due process. See State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118, 158-60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Aug. 18, 2016). The Petitioner did not file a post-conviction petition challenging his guilty plea. Instead, the Petitioner filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 (\"Rule 36.1\"), arguing that the intermediate appellate court's decision declaring the criminal gang enhancement statute unconstitutional rendered his sentence illegal. The trial court denied his motion, concluding it did not state a claim for relief, but the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the Bonds decision rendered the Petitioner's sentence for the firearm conviction void and, thus, illegal under Rule 36.1. In accordance with this Court's holding in Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83-85 (Tenn. 1999), we hold that the Petitioner's sentence was voidable, not void and illegal. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals's decision and reinstate the trial court's order denying the Petitioner's motion."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4499053/in-re-estate-of-john-tyler-mckelvey/","attorney":"","caseName":"In re Estate of John Tyler McKelvey","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4499053,"court":"Court of Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Ct. App.","court_id":"tennctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2018-05-17","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"M2017-01298-COA-R3-CV","docket_id":6765398,"judge":"Judge Frank G. Clement, Jr., P.J., M.S.","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:01:54.050080Z","date_created":"2018-05-17T22:06:44.725341Z","score":{"bm25":21.862398}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8266,"cites":[1053182,3889970],"download_url":"http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/in_re_estate_of_john_tyler_mckelveyopn.pdf","id":4276306,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2018/05/17/in_re_estate_of_john_tyler_mckelvey.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T16:00:00.700395Z","date_created":"2018-05-17T22:06:44.742039Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"580c54f0e56ecd96c4c0c905e9908d9dd1e52705","snippet":"                                                                                         05/17/2018\n               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                           AT NASHVILLE\n                                March 14, 2018 Session\n\n                IN RE ESTATE OF JOHN TYLER McKELVEY\n\n                Appeal from the Chancery Court for Franklin County\n                   No. 2016-PR-133 Don R. Ash, Senior Judge\n                     ___________________________________\n\n              ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4276306],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"This appeal arises from a declaratory judgment action seeking to determine whether the decedent died intestate. The decedent executed a will in 2005 and executed another will in 2011, which expressly revoked all prior wills and codicils. Following the decedent's death in 2016, the original of the 2011 will could not be located however, the original of the 2005 will was found in the decedent's personal filing cabinet. The decedent's children then filed a Petition to Open Estate and [for] Declaratory Relief, seeking a declaration that the decedent died intestate. The decedent's live-in companion of approximately 30 years, and a beneficiary under both wills, filed an answer, contending that the decedent died testate under either the 2005 or the 2011 will. At the trial, the decedent's companion conceded that she did not have evidence to overcome the presumption that the decedent revoked the 2011 will thus, the trial focused on whether the decedent intended to revive his 2005 will upon revoking the 2011 will. The trial court found \"there is no proof Decedent revoked the 2011 Will with the intent to execute a later will,\" and \"[g]iven the preservation and nearby-safekeeping of the 2005 Will following revocation of the 2011 Will and the lack of evidence indicating a contrary intent, the Court concludes Decedent intended to revive his 2005 Will.\" We affirm."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9383782/derblom-v-archdiocese-of-hartford/","attorney":"","caseName":"Derblom v. Archdiocese of Hartford","caseNameFull":"","citation":["346 Conn. 333"],"citeCount":7,"cluster_id":9383782,"court":"Supreme Court of Connecticut","court_citation_string":"Conn.","court_id":"conn","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2023-03-14","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"SC20584","docket_id":67011641,"judge":"Robinson; McDonald; D’Auria; Mullins; Ecker","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-04-01T02:58:56.601672Z","date_created":"2023-03-15T13:02:42.987033Z","score":{"bm25":21.576942}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROcr/CR346/346CR18.pdf","id":9379258,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/03/14/derblom_v._archdiocese_of_hartford.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-13T21:01:39.563410Z","date_created":"2023-03-15T13:02:43.050791Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"0489d23a12dcb59dbc608ee3a95863bf6954ad1f","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[1112919,1332021,1390583,1410947,1973090,1997832,2150131,2248852,2284440,2285952,3275608,3320143,3331570,4029562,4665586,5574358,5585879,6068462,6181159,6588799,6607974,7815014,7841638,7843964,7845124,7851325,7858695,7859943,9586491,9609048],"download_url":null,"id":11297844,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/03/14/derblom_v._archdiocese_of_hartford_1.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-04-01T03:16:38.677205Z","date_created":"2026-04-01T02:51:04.916693Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"49be6fad52bb905068242e799727968553a9c6d7","snippet":"March 14, 2023                  CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                  Page 3\n\n\n\n\n         346 Conn. 333                MARCH, 2023                                 333\n                              Derblom v. Archdiocese of Hartford\n\n\n                 MARIA J. DERBLOM, EXECUTRIX (ESTATE\n                     OF FRED H. RETTICH), ET AL. v.\n                      ARCHDIOCESE OF HARTFORD\n                               (SC 20584)\n                 Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auri","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Action to establish a constructive trust, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial dis- trict of New Haven, where the court, Pierson, J., granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and rendered judg- ment thereon, from which the plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, Lavine, Prescott and Alexander, Js., which affirmed the judgment of the trial court, and the plaintiffs, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed. Drzislav Coric, with whom were Brandon Marley and, on the brief, Cody A. Layton, for the appellants (plaintiffs). Lorinda S. Coon, with whom were John W. Sitarz and, on the brief, Kay A. Williams, for the appellee (defendant).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9379258,11297844],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiffs, who were the putative beneficiaries of a testamentary bequest that R had made to a defunct archdiocesan school (OLM) under the auspices of the defendant archdiocese, sought, inter alia, to establish and enforce the terms of a constructive trust. The plaintiffs are the executrix of R's estate, eleven former students of OLM and their parents, and M Co., which operates a private Catholic school that purports to be OLM's successor. Before his death, R donated a large sum of money to OLM, as it was important to him that parents be able to send their children to a Catholic school in the town of Madison, where OLM was located. After R died, his residual estate was distributed to OLM pursuant to his will, which contained a residuary clause in favor of OLM ''or its successor, for its general uses and purposes.'' The defendant thereafter announced that it would close OLM and another archdiocesan school and open a new school in the town of Branford. Some parents of students attending OLM, including some of the plaintiff parents, subsequently formed M Co., intending to establish a new Catholic school in Madison that would retain OLM's mission. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that R's bequest to OLM should be viewed as an endowment that resulted in a constructive trust benefiting the plaintiff students, with the defendant acting as trustee, and that the defendant had an equitable duty to convey the unspent portion of the bequest to M Co., as OLM's ''successor,'' or back to R's estate. The executrix of R's estate also sought a judgment declaring whether the endowment should be conveyed to M Co., or some other appropriate entity, for the benefit of the plaintiffs or if the endowment to OLM had lapsed with no clear successor, such that the funds should be returned to R's estate. The defendant moved to dismiss the action, contending that none of the plaintiffs had standing to enforce the terms of a completed charitable gift to a school. The defendant relied on the common-law rule, codified by statute (§ 3-125), that the state attorney general has the exclusive authority to bring an action to enforce the terms of a charitable gift. The plaintiffs objected on the ground that they had standing under the exception to that rule for persons who have a special interest in the enforcement of a charitable trust. The trial court, however, granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, and the Appellate Court affirmed, agreeing with the trial court that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The Appellate Court concluded that R's bequest to OLM was an outright or 334 MARCH, 2023 346 Conn. 333 Derblom v. Archdiocese of Hartford absolute gift to OLM, rather than an endowment that resulted in a charitable trust, and that the special interest exception did not apply when, as in the present case, the charitable gift is unencumbered by specific restrictions on its use. On the granting of certification, the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Held that the Appellate Court properly upheld the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' action for lack of standing: 1. The Appellate Court correctly determined that R's bequest to OLM was an outright, unrestricted gift: When a donor specifies that a gift must be used for the donee's ''general uses and purposes,'' the only limitation on the donee's use of the gift is that the donee must use it in furtherance of the duties imposed by the donee's charter or articles of incorporation, and, because this limitation applies to all charitable gifts, regardless of whether it is expressly included in the instrument conferring the gift, the ''general uses and purposes'' language in R's bequest to OLM evinced an intent that it was unrestricted rather than restricted. Moreover, the plaintiffs could not prevail on their claim that R's gift to OLM was restricted on the ground that R specified in his will that, if OLM became incapable of possessing or using the gift, the unspent portion should go to OLM's ''successor,'' as that claim was based on allegations that R's will evinced an intent that M Co., as the entity with the mission that most closely approximates the mission of OLM, should be the cy pres beneficiary of the gift to OLM, rather than on any allegation that M Co. was OLM's successor corporation in the legal sense, and the plaintiffs' claim was inadequately briefed insofar as the plaintiffs did not refer to the cy pres doctrine in their briefs or cite to any authority for the proposition that proof of such intent means that there is an implied restriction on the trust or gift such that a potential cy pres beneficiary has standing to initiate proceedings to enforce the donor's intent. 2. The Appellate Court correctly determined that, under the specific facts and circumstances of the present case, the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring an action to enforce R's unrestricted bequest to OLM under the special interest exception to the rule that the state attorney general has exclusive authority to enforce the terms of a charitable gift: When a donor has made a gift to a charitable organization that is unrestricted by any contractual terms or qualifications, the donee organi- zation is the sole beneficiary of the gift, and the only limitation on its use is that the organization must use it in furtherance of the duties imposed on it by its charter or articles of incorporation, and this court was not aware of any case in which a court had held that the potential beneficiaries of a charitable organization have standing to bring an action to compel the organization to use an unrestricted gift in a specific manner. Moreover, even if there were rare instances in which the beneficiary of a charitable organization could be found to have a special interest suffi- 346 Conn. 333 MARCH, 2023 335 Derblom v. Archdiocese of Hartford cient to confer standing to bring an action to force the organization to use an unrestricted gift in a specific manner, this was not such an instance, as students enrolled in educational institutions constitute a constantly fluctuating group, and concluding that a particular student or group of students has standing to bring an action to enforce the terms of a trust created to benefit the institution would undermine the primary purpose behind the rule that the state attorney general has exclusive standing to bring such an action, which is to limit the number of persons who have standing to initiate litigation. Argued November 21, 2022—officially released March 14, 2023"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4371076/in-re-estate-of-sandra-kay-christian/","attorney":"","caseName":"In Re: Estate of Sandra Kay Christian","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4371076,"court":"Court of Appeals of Tennessee","court_citation_string":"Tenn. Ct. App.","court_id":"tennctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2017-02-24","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"E2015-02276-COA-R3-CV","docket_id":4610000,"judge":"Judge Charles D. Susano, Jr.","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T00:25:58.070868Z","date_created":"2017-02-24T20:16:36.686197Z","score":{"bm25":21.192142}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8280,"cites":[1054227,1054484,1058249,1503410,1636553,1657265,1717482,1795294,2101034,2405441,2459753,3892389],"download_url":"http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/in_re_estate_of_sandra_christian_opn.pdf","id":4148336,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2017/02/24/in_re_estate_of_sandra_kay_christian.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T14:31:17.485321Z","date_created":"2017-02-24T20:16:36.695700Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"5ff28403d9e9b26296ed4a45fd2efe9660a8637a","snippet":"                IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE\n                           AT KNOXVILLE\n                                October 18, 2016 Session\n\n                  IN RE ESTATE OF SANDRA KAY CHRISTIAN\n\n                Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hawkins County\n                   No. 2012-PR-182 Douglas T. Jenkins, Judge\n\n\n             No. E2015-02276-COA-R3-CV-FILED-FEBRUARY 24, 2017\n\n\n\n\nIn this case involving the Last Will and Testament of Sandra Kay Christian, we construe\na provisi","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4148336],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"In this case involving the Last Will and Testament of Sandra Kay Christian, we construe a provision in her will in order to determine the interests of the parties with respect to real property owned by her. The deceased passed away on November 15, 2012. Her will contains a residuary clause. That clause devises two-fifths of the residue of her estate to Phyllis Midgett, Ms. Christian's sister. The will contains a separate provision that permits the deceased's nephews, John Reuben Christian, III and Ashley Paul Christian (the Nephews), to purchase her residence. The will provides that, in the event the Nephews elect to purchase the property, they will pay the deceased's niece, Regina Christian Dykes (the Niece), an amount that would make her share of the estate equal to theirs. The Nephews expressed their intent to purchase the residence. Ms. Midgett brought this action seeking a declaration that she has a two-fifths interest in the residence property. The trial court found the will provision at issue to be unambiguous. Consequently, the court held that Midgett has no interest in the residence property. The court directed Nephews to pay one-third of the value of the property to the Niece. Midgett appeals. We affirm"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4640639/in-interest-of-tb/","attorney":"","caseName":"in Interest of T.B","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2019 COA 89"],"citeCount":5,"cluster_id":4640639,"court":"Colorado Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Colo. Ct. App.","court_id":"coloctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2019-06-20","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"16CA1289, People","docket_id":15934572,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:43:10.164906Z","date_created":"2019-07-18T15:02:44.375408Z","score":{"bm25":21.067684}},"neutralCite":"2019 COA 89","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1799,76998,97242,105993,106534,108341,108497,108608,108810,109514,109670,110020,110331,110380,112870,118027,118136,118155,121146,127899,137749,577187,621506,852361,1125372,1135792,1143621,1165533,1166690,1196243,1203200,1213807,1237015,1282743,1297252,1369225,1383236,1420198,2007417,2145873,2161725,2254721,2269009,2280989,2509325,2512230,2526547,2570416,2583651,2584299,2585341,2590081,2592845,2592851,2598315,2599882,2604304,2613209,2625822,2628160,2633365,2637519,2823803,3185988,4148590,4171048,4171049,4171051,4200309,4350397,4350398,4400128],"download_url":"https://www.cobar.org/Portals/COBAR/Repository/opinions/6-20-19/2019COA89.pdf","id":4417892,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2019/06/20/in_interest_of_t.b.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T17:38:21.498570Z","date_created":"2019-07-18T15:02:44.385419Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"2a8eb91efc0c21b38d16b10800d8278432316728","snippet":"     The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions\n  constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by\n  the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be\n    cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.\n  Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion\n           should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.\n\n\n                                                  ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4417892],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez","syllabus":"In 2001, when T.B. was 12 years old, he was adjudicated for unlawful sexual contact, a class 1 misdemeanor if committed by an adult. In 2005, he pleaded guilty to sexual assault. Following the 2005 adjudication, T.B. successfully completed probation and offense-specific treatment. He has no other criminal record. In 2010, T.B. filed a pro se petition to discontinue sex offender registration in both cases, which the trial court granted as to the 2005 case and denied as to the 2001 case. About five years, later T.B. filed another petition to discontinue registration, arguing that lifetime registration violated due process and constituted cruel and unusual punishment. After a hearing, the juvenile court denied the petition. On appeal, the People asserted that T.B.'s constitutional arguments were procedurally barred. T.B.'s claims are not barred as successive because he did not seek relief under Crim. P. 35(c), and the legal landscape involving juvenile sentencing generally, and lifetime registration in particular, has evolved substantially since his 2010 petition. Further, the law of the case doctrine does not bar review because no other Court of Appeals division has addressed T.B.'s first petition. T.B. contended that when applied to juveniles, automatic lifetime registration under the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (CSORA) for repeat offenders violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. CSORA requires that juveniles who have more than one adjudication for unlawful sexual behavior must register as sex offenders for life, unless a court entered an order discontinuing the registration requirement. The Court of Appeals analyzed the factors in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), for determining whether a statute's punitive effect overrides its declared civil intent, and concluded that requiring a juvenile, even one who has been twice adjudicated for offenses involving unlawful sexual behavior, to register as a sex offender for life without regard to whether he or she poses a risk to public safety is an overly inclusive, and therefore excessive, means of protecting public safety. Therefore, CSORA operates as a punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Here, the juvenile court specifically found that T.B. \"successfully addressed all issues related to his sexual offending behavior\" and that he was \"not likely to reoffend.\" However, the juvenile court did not reach the issue of whether the lifetime registration requirement is cruel and unusual on its face or as applied to T.B. The order denying T.B.'s petition to discontinue the requirement that he register as a sex offender was reversed and the case was remanded for the juvenile court to determine whether the lifetime registration requirement is cruel and unusual on its face or as applied to T.B."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10278661/ct-freedom-alliance-llc-v-dept-of-education/","attorney":"","caseName":"CT Freedom Alliance, LLC v. Dept. of Education","caseNameFull":"","citation":["346 Conn. 1"],"citeCount":3,"cluster_id":10278661,"court":"Supreme Court of Connecticut","court_citation_string":"Conn.","court_id":"conn","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2023-01-12","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"SC20627","docket_id":66761055,"judge":"Robinson; D’Auria; Ecker; Alexander; Keller","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-04-02T02:17:58.958050Z","date_created":"2024-11-21T00:38:04.802026Z","score":{"bm25":20.450483}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":11298873,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/01/12/ct_freedom_alliance_llc_v._dept._of_education.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-04-02T02:30:38.275108Z","date_created":"2026-04-02T02:17:00.728618Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"be1979ab34e255deb93094a3e62ad7c9ea2aea6d","snippet":"January 31, 2023              CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                  Page 3\n\n\n\n\n                         CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED\n\n\n                                           IN THE\n\n\n\n\n                         SUPREME COURT\n                                           OF THE\n\n\n\n\n               STATE OF CONNECTICUT\n\n\n                   CT FREEDOM ALLIANCE, LLC, ET AL.\n                     v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION\n                                ET AL.\n                       ","type":"combined-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROcr/CR346/346CR7.pdf","id":9366283,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/01/31/ct_freedom_alliance_llc_v._dept._of_education.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-13T20:45:50.823109Z","date_created":"2023-01-26T16:03:21.127379Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"20bae90bffd4f3fd449fa5353d33339f776fd8b7","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROcr/CR346/346CR7.pdf","id":10745249,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2023/01/31/ct_freedom_alliance_llc_v._dept._of_education_1.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-14T18:30:31.948154Z","date_created":"2024-11-21T00:38:04.805769Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"6379072388d71bb548c35d4c670da312708800b0","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Action for, inter alia, a judgment declaring the legality of certain school mask requirements that the defen- dants promulgated and issued during their response to the COVID-19 pandemic, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where Governor Ned Lamont was added as a defendant; thereafter, the court, Moukawsher, J., granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiffs appealed. Appeal dismissed. Norman A. Pattis, with whom, on the brief, was Cameron L. Atkinson, for the appellants (plaintiffs). Timothy J. Holzman, assistant attorney general, with whom were Darren P. Cunningham, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, William Tong, attorney gen- eral, and Clare Kindall, former solicitor general, for the appellees (defendants).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9366283,11298873,10745249],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiffs sought relief in connection with a mandate issued by the defendants, the governor of the state of Connecticut, the Department of Education, and the education commissioner, that required children to wear face masks in school during the COVID-19 pandemic. In response to the pandemic, the governor declared a public health and civil pre- paredness emergency in March, 2020, and, pursuant to statute (§§ 19a- 131a and 28-9), thereafter issued certain executive orders to protect public health and safety, including an order cancelling all in-person public school classes for the remainder of the school year. The depart- ment later issued guidance to school districts on how to safely reopen schools the following school year, which directed school districts to adopt policies requiring that students and staff wear masks or other forms of face coverings when at school. The governor then issued an executive order authorizing the commissioner to issue ''binding guid- ance'' for the operation of schools, deemed necessary to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. That order, which was extended several times, applied retroactively and provided that the commissioner's binding guid- ance, including the previously issued guidance regarding face masks, was not a regulation for purposes of the Uniform Administrative Proce- dure Act (UAPA) (§ 4-166 et seq.). The defendants thus were permitted to issue and enforce the binding guidance without first providing notice to the public and an opportunity to be heard. The plaintiffs challenged the legality of the mask mandate and sought declaratory and injunctive 1 2 JANUARY, 2023 346 Conn. 1 CT Freedom Alliance, LLC v. Dept. of Education relief, claiming, inter alia, that the mandate was improperly issued and extended, and that it violated the rights of schoolchildren to a free public education under article eighth of the Connecticut constitution. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiffs appealed. While the appeal was pending, the department repealed the school mask mandate, and the defendants thereafter moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. Although the plaintiffs did not contend that a live controversy existed, they opposed the motion to dismiss on the ground that their claims were reviewable under either the capable of repetition, yet evad- ing review exception or the voluntary cessation exception to the moot- ness doctrine. Held that neither the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception nor the voluntary cessation exception to the mootness doctrine applied in the present case, and, because this court agreed that it could no longer provide the plaintiffs with any practical relief, it dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction: 1. The plaintiffs failed to establish that their claims were capable of repeti- tion, yet evading review, as there was no reasonable likelihood that the questions presented in this appeal would arise again in the future: In determining whether the questions presented in this appeal would recur, the appropriate inquiry was not whether the mask mandate itself was likely to be reinstated, which was relevant only to the plaintiffs' final substantive claim that the mask mandate violates the rights of schoolchildren to a free public education, but whether there was a reason- able likelihood that the particular governmental actions the plaintiffs challenged would arise in a similar manner in the future, and that likeli- hood did not exist with respect to the plaintiff's three procedural claims relating to the issuance and extension of the school mask mandate. With respect to the plaintiffs' claim that the department violated the UAPA by issuing the mask mandate through its guidance, given the unique nature of the COVID-19 pandemic and the defendants' newly acquired knowledge from dealing with it, it was unlikely that, and purely speculative whether, the defendants would address future civil prepared- ness emergencies in the same way, that is, by issuing guidance that is retroactively deemed to be binding and exempt from the definition of ''regulation'' in the UAPA via an executive order. With respect to the plaintiff's claim that the governor unlawfully extended the executive order multiple times, it was speculative whether there would be another pandemic of the same extended nature or that a governor would employ the same procedure in a future emergency, especially when the legislature had taken steps to validate the governor's issuance and extension of executive orders under § 28-9 and had gained 346 Conn. 1 JANUARY, 2023 3 CT Freedom Alliance, LLC v. Dept. of Education the knowledge and experience to determine whether to validate or nullify such orders if similar circumstances were to arise in the future. The plaintiffs' claim that the legislature unconstitutionally delegated its legislative power in violation of the separation of powers provision of the Connecticut constitution by passing multiple special acts that ratified and allowed the governor to extend his emergency declarations was also based on speculation that a pandemic of the same magnitude and duration would occur in the future, and it was reasonable to assume that, because the majority of civil preparedness emergencies previously declared in Connecticut had lasted only a few weeks or months, the legislature would not likely be confronted with a similar emergency in which the governor would seek to extend his emergency powers in a manner beyond what this court deemed permissible in Casey v. Lamont (338 Conn. 479). With respect to the plaintiffs' claim that the mask mandate violated the rights of schoolchildren to a free public education, because the mask mandate was repealed during the pendency of the plaintiffs' appeal and the defendants have not indicated that they intend to reinstate the mandate, it was speculative whether the defendants would issue another school mask mandate, and concluding that they would do so would require this court to engage in scientific and political speculation as to how the current pandemic would proceed and how the legislative and executive branches would respond. 2. The voluntary cessation exception did not apply to overcome the mootness of the controversy in the present case: Although the voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a court of the power to determine the legality of the practice, it is appropriate to afford some deference to governmental actors who have voluntarily ceased the allegedly unlawful conduct and to their representations that certain conduct has been discontinued. This court had no reason not to believe the defendants' representations that they had repealed the mask mandate because the circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic had changed and that they had no intention to reinstate the mandate, the plaintiffs did not suggest that the defendants' motivation in repealing the mask mandate was to avoid an adverse ruling, and there was no evidence that the defendants repealed the mandate in response to litigation or with the intent to reinstate the mandate after a dismissal of the plaintiffs' appeal. Argued September 7, 2022—officially released January 12, 2023 January 12, 2023, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes. 4 JANUARY, 2023 346 Conn. 1 CT Freedom Alliance, LLC v. Dept. of Education"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4499521/georgetown-of-the-highlands-condominium-owners-assn-v-nsong/","attorney":"","caseName":"Georgetown of the Highlands Condominium Owners' Assn. v. Nsong","caseNameFull":"GEORGETOWN OF THE HIGHLANDS CONDOMINIUM OWNERS' ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Stella NSONG, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants","citation":["2018 Ohio 1966","113 N.E.3d 192"],"citeCount":4,"cluster_id":4499521,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. App.","court_id":"ohioctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2018-05-17","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"106025","docket_id":6789784,"judge":"Jones","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T01:02:03.217429Z","date_created":"2018-05-18T20:43:39.094366Z","score":{"bm25":20.431282}},"neutralCite":"2018 Ohio 1966","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":8107,"cites":[3697640,3731535],"download_url":"http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/8/2018/2018-Ohio-1966.pdf","id":4276774,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2018/05/17/georgetown_of_the_highlands_condominium_owners_assn._v._nsong.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T16:00:21.451402Z","date_created":"2018-05-18T20:43:39.105995Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"a47bc433ab30065bca100b6976d03ae8b0cf5401","snippet":"\n\n\n  Michael A. Heller, Mike Heller Law, L.L.C., 333 Babbit Road, Suite 233, Euclid, Ohio 44123, ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT\n \n\n  Jared S. Klebanow, Klebanow Law, L.L.C., 850 Euclid Avenue, Suite 701, Cleveland, Ohio 44114, Steven B. Potter, Dinn, Hochman & Potter, L.L.C., 5910 Landerbrook Drive, Suite 200, Cleveland, Ohio 44124, For Georgetown of the Highlands Condominium Association\n \n\n  K","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4276774],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Civ.R. 56(C)/summary judgment dispositive motion R.C. 5311.18(C)/discharge of condominium liens Evid.R. 702/expert witness/attorney fees relief from judgment. Where appellee filed its motion for summary judgment and appellant did not oppose the motion disputing the alleged amount owed or file any dispositive motion to demonstrate that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to appellant's counterclaims, the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in granting appellee's motion. Appellant failed to establish that her property was trespassed against by an unauthorized intentional act neither was appellee negligent in the manner in which it responded to the emergency situation going on in appellant's unit. Appellant's argument disputing the amount owed to appellee failed where appellant did not oppose appellee's summary judgment motion. Appellant's invasion of privacy claim fails where appellant failed to show that appellee made any type of public disclosure about appellant that would have put appellant in a false light. Based on the terms of the association's declaration and bylaws, appellee was permitted to enter appellant's unit where an emergency existed. Appellant's breach of contract claim fails. The expert witness established that the attorney's hourly rate charged was reasonable and appellant failed to present any evidence that the fees charged were unreasonable. The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for relief from judgment. It was established that appellant was indebted to the United States and appellant failed to present evidence demonstrating otherwise."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4789857/diaz-v-commissioner-of-correction/","attorney":"","caseName":"Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction","caseNameFull":"","citation":["200 Conn. App. 524"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4789857,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-09-29","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC41159","docket_id":18479079,"judge":"DiPentima; Alvord; Keller","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:46:18.059500Z","date_created":"2020-09-28T12:02:47.701041Z","score":{"bm25":19.942945}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[595185,610573,610574,748634,1525683,1912727,2051593,2356011,2554019,4503939,7547724,7841937,7843275,7843446,7843854,7845040,7847967,7849144,7854774,9268932,9422583,9428773,9429592,9429872,9636670,9706334],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP200/200AP368.pdf","id":4570204,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/09/29/diaz_v._commissioner_of_correction.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T22:23:17.227341Z","date_created":"2020-09-28T12:02:47.703710Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"aad4c83fbece985e28a6824ce0ea67644b616a6d","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland and transferred to the judicial district of Fairfield, where the matter was tried to the court, Dev- lin, J.; judgment denying the petition; thereafter, the court denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed. Robert L. O'Brien, assigned counsel, with whom, on the brief, was Christopher Y. Duby, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner). Mitchell S. Brody, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Brian Preleski, state's attorney, and Angela R. Macchiarulo, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4570204],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The petitioner, who had been convicted of various drug and weapons charges, appealed to this court following the denial of his petition for certification to appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying his second petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner had been convicted at a second trial after our Supreme Court had reversed the judgment of conviction at his first trial. At the petitioner's first habeas trial, the court reporter alleged that the habeas judge, C, a police detec- tive, and P, the prosecutor at both of the petitioner's criminal trials, were involved in a scheme in which C gave hand signals to P during her testimony that prompted the judge to interrupt or to allow P to finish her answer before offering a different answer and an opportunity to amend her response. The Office of the Chief State's Attorney there- after conducted an investigation and prepared a written report, and the habeas judge declared a mistrial after more than six months passed since the judge had last heard evidence. At the petitioner's second habeas trial, the petitioner alleged, inter alia, that P, at his first criminal trial, had intentionally failed to disclose certain exculpatory evidence in viola- tion of Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S. 83) and elicited perjured testimony from L, who, in exchange for leniency in connection with a drug offense he had been charged with, cooperated with the police in arranging to purchase drugs from the petitioner. The petitioner further alleged that P's Brady violations constituted prosecutorial impropriety that rendered his prosecution at his second criminal trial a violation of his right against double jeopardy. Finally, the petitioner alleged that F, his defense coun- sel at the second criminal trial, had rendered ineffective assistance and had a conflict of interest that resulted from F's employment as a police officer while representing the petitioner. The habeas court denied each of the petitioner's claims, and rendered judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus and his petition for certification to appeal. Held: 1. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the petition- er's petition for certification to appeal on the ground that it improperly denied his motion for an evidentiary hearing to preclude the testimony of P and C: the court's prohibition of P's testimony would have frustrated its ability to adjudicate the petitioner's claims, the need for an evidentiary hearing was outweighed by the time and resources that would have been expended to conduct such a proceeding, and, although the court invited the petitioner to make whatever record he wanted as to the hand-signaling scheme that might support his Brady and double jeopardy claims, the petitioner did not make an offer of proof, call P, C or the court reporter as witnesses or bring to the court's attention the report by the chief state's attorney's office; moreover, contrary to the petitioner's assertion, the court was not required to conduct a collateral evidentiary hearing to explore the hand-signaling incident, as the second habeas trial was a collateral hearing that was dedicated in part to the adjudication of his Brady and double jeopardy claims, the court's denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing was harmless, as any evidence developed at such a hearing as to P's intent to commit Brady violations or that damaged her credibility would not have meaningfully enhanced the merits of his double jeopardy claim, and, even if the petitioner had proven that P's nondisclosures constituted a Brady violation, the relief was a new trial, which he received when the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction at his first trial; furthermore, the petitioner could not prove his double jeopardy claim, as the evidence overwhelm- ingly supported the petitioner's convictions, and, thus, it was unlikely that P would have believed during the petitioner's first criminal trial that he was likely to be acquitted in the absence of her allegedly inten- tional Brady violations, and, although L falsely testified during the first criminal trial that he had been arrested for possession of narcotics he purchased from the petitioner, the source of the drugs that led to L's arrest was of minimal relevance to the charges against the petitioner, as the police officers who testified never stated that those drugs were connected to L's cooperation with the police. 2. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the petitioner certification to appeal on the ground that it improperly denied his claim that F rendered ineffective assistance; the petitioner did not present this court with any law that held that F's simultaneous representation of the petitioner and his employment as a police officer established a conflict of interest, the petitioner did not point out any specific instances that suggested that F's interests were compromised for the benefit of a third party or any errors by F that were so serious that he did not function as the counsel guaranteed by the sixth amendment, and, although the petitioner asserted that F had a conflict of interest because he was required by statute (§ 54-1f) to arrest the petitioner if F had reasonable grounds to suspect that the petitioner had committed a felony crime, the petitioner did not direct this court to any specific instance in which § 54-1f or any other legal obligation F had as a police officer impaired his ability to provide the petitioner with adequate and uncom- promised defense representation. Argued June 17—officially released September 29, 2020"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/7331207/young-v-dist-of-columbia/","attorney":"*30Ferris Ridgely Bond, Sr., Jane Carol Norman, Bond & Norman Law P.C., Miguel Angel Serrano, Law Office of Miguel Serrano, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff., James Anthony Towns, Sr., Robert A. DeBerardinis, Jr., William J. Chang, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants., BERYL A. HOWELL, Chief Judge *31Lamont Andre Young, who was injured after being shot in the back during a confrontation with officers of the District of Columbia's Metropolitan Police Department (\"MPD\"), filed suit against one of those officers, Thurman Powell, and the District of Columbia, raising Fourth Amendment Excessive Force and Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment claims, under 42 U.S.C § 1983, as well as various claims under District of Columbia law. The Court previously dismissed several of the plaintiff's claims, including the Fourth Amendment claim against the District of Columbia, and the Eighth Amendment and common law excessive force claims against both defendants. See Young v. District of Columbia , 107 F.Supp.3d 69, 82-83 (D.D.C. 2015) (dismissing Count I against District of Columbia and Counts II and IV entirely). After over two years of discovery, the defendants have now filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (\"Defs.' MSJ\"), ECF No. 36, on the plaintiff's remaining claims in Count I (Fourth Amendment Excessive Force) against defendant Powell, and, against both defendants, Counts III (assault and battery), VI (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress), and VII (Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress). For the reasons given below, the defendants' motion is denied., The material facts leading up to the moment of the shooting largely are undisputed. On December 26, 2013, MPD officers responded to a disturbance at 1728 W. Street SE, Washington, DC, where the plaintiff had had a verbal altercation with his friend, Crystal Perry. Incident Report at 1, 3, ECF No. 36-2; Dep. of Lamont Young (\"Young Dep.\") at 9:17-19, ECF No. 36-2. Ms. Perry informed the officers that the plaintiff had secured a black semi-automatic handgun in his waistband prior to leaving Ms. Perry's apartment. Incident Report at 3. Ms. Perry also informed the officers that the plaintiff had made threatening remarks toward law enforcement. Id. One of the responding officers radioed a lookout for the plaintiff based on the information Ms. Perry had provided. Dep. of Thurman Powell (\"Powell Dep.\") at 44:4-18, ECF No. 36-2; Dep. of Anthony Allen (\"Allen Dep.\") at 9:10-20, ECF No. 36-2., The next day, the plaintiff visited his barbershop to get a haircut. Young Dep. at 23:2-5. There was a wait to be served, so the plaintiff borrowed the keys to his barber's car to drive to a nearby restaurant for breakfast. Id. at 23:5-9. The plaintiff encountered some acquaintances selling cigarettes outside before he could reach the car, however, and stopped to talk to them. Id. at 26:3-19. Allen observed the plaintiff, who was wearing the same clothing the radio dispatch had described him to have worn the day before. Allen Dep. at 14:1-7. Allen requested backup, advising dispatch that he had located the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was known to carry a *32weapon. Id. at 14:7-12, 15:4-5. Defendant Powell responded to Allen's request for backup and arrived in his cruiser shortly thereafter. Id. at 14:20-15:1; Powell Dep. at 68:20-69:5. Upon arriving at the scene, defendant Powell observed the plaintiff leaning up against a wall, wearing the clothing Meyers's dispatch had described. Powell Dep. at 59:1-22, 76:6-7., Defendant Powell testified that he and Allen ordered the plaintiff to remove his hands from his pockets. Powell Dep. at 46:1-8. The plaintiff initially ignored these orders and walked away from the officers toward a vehicle parked in the middle of the street. Id. at 47:18-22; 51:20-22; 76:15. The plaintiff removed his hands from his pockets as he walked away. Id. at 77:7-8. Allen and defendant Powell again ordered the plaintiff to stop, but the plaintiff disobeyed, putting his hands back into his pockets and continuing to walk away. Id. at 77:10-17. Both officers repeatedly commanded the plaintiff to show his hands. Id. at 77:20-21. The plaintiff \"then snatched his hand out of his pocket and put it inside his waistband.\" Id. at 77:22-78:1. The plaintiff suddenly \"jerked his arm out,\" \"as if he was pulling something out of his waistband,\" id. at 78:4-5, and \"twisted towards\" defendant Powell,\" id. at 125:4-6, 126:22-127:2. Defendant Powell fired his gun once at the plaintiff, id. at 78:5-6, and then radioed for an ambulance and for his supervisors, id. at 82:9-13. The plaintiff was unarmed. Id. at 101:7-10., Crime scene investigators secured evidence from the scene, recovering a \"glass bottle with a strong chemical odor\" as well as a Glock 21 handgun from the right rear floorboard of a Lexus parked along 22nd Street SE. See Crime Scene Evid. Rpt. at 2, Items 11 & 13, ECF No. 36-2. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration later determined the bottled substance to contain phencyclidine (\"PCP\"). See DEA Chemical Analysis Rpt., ECF No. 36-2. Investigators found no gun on the plaintiff. See Crime Scene Evid. Rpt. at 2. Defendant Powell gave a statement to the MPD's Internal Affairs Division (\"IAD\") later that day, asserting that he had been focusing on the plaintiff's forearm and the back of the plaintiff's hand before discharging his weapon. Pl.'s Opp'n Def.'s MSJ, Ex. 4a, Officer Powell Statement to IAD (\"Powell Statement\") at 7, ECF No. 39-5. Defendant Powell did not say that he had seen anything in the plaintiff's hands prior to shooting him. Id. at 3, 5, 7. Defendant Powell told the IAD that he shot the *33plaintiff because the plaintiff had made a \"motion\" while removing his hands from his jacket, causing defendant Powell to fear for his life. Id. at 5, 7.1, On June 23, 2014, a jury convicted the plaintiff of unlawful possession of a firearm and carrying a pistol without a license. DC Sup. Ct. Dkt., United States v. Lamont A. Young , 2013 CF2 0022729. On September 10, 2014, the plaintiff was sentenced to 42 months' imprisonment on the unlawful possession count and to 16 months' imprisonment on the carrying a pistol charge, to be served concurrently. Id. The plaintiff filed suit against defendant Thurman and the District of Columbia, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, raising claims of excessive force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment Compl. ¶¶ 24-34, ECF No. 1. The plaintiff also raised claims of common law assault and battery, excessive force, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Id. ¶¶ 35-64. The defendants filed motions to dismiss, Defs.' Mot. Dismiss Complaint, ECF No. 5; Def. Powell's Mot. Partial Dismissal, ECF No. 12, which the Court granted in part and denied in part, dismissing the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim *34against both defendants, the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim against the District of Columbia, the plaintiff's common law excessive force claim against both defendants, and all claims against defendant Powell \"in his official capacity.\" Order Granting in Part & Denying in Part Def. Powell's Mot. for Partial Dismissal, ECF No. 16; Mem. Op. at 18, ECF No. 15., Discovery in this case ultimately lasted over two years. See Minute Orders, dated June 19, 2015 and Sept. 27, 2017. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's remaining claims of Fourth Amendment excessive force, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress (\"IIED\"), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (\"NIED\"), Defs.' MSJ, which is now ripe for review.2, Summary judgment is appropriate \"if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\" FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). \"In making that determination, a court must view the evidence 'in the light most favorable to the opposing party.' \" Tolan v. Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ). In other words, \" 'the evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.' \" Id. at 1863 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (alterations omitted) ). \"[A] 'judge's function' at summary judgment is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.' \" Id. at 1866 (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). The Supreme Court has stressed, in the qualified immunity context, \"the importance of drawing inferences in favor of the nonmovant.\" Id., The defendants argue that defendant Powell is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment Excessive Force claim because defendant Powell did not violate the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights and, in the alternative, any rights violated were not clearly established at the time of the shooting. The defendants also argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's District of Columbia assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress (\"IIED\") claims, in Counts III and VI, respectively, for essentially identical reasons. Finally, the defendants argue that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress (\"NIED\") in Count VII, and that this claim therefore must be dismissed. Each of these arguments is addressed in turn., The defendants contend that defendant Powell's conduct was objectively reasonable and did not violate the plaintiff's clearly established Fourth Amendment rights, entitling defendant Powell to qualified immunity from the plaintiff's damages claim for use of excessive force in Count I. Defs.' MSJ at 1. Following a summary of the applicable legal framework, the factual record, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, is analyzed to determine whether qualified immunity bars this claim. The Court concludes that the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment Excessive Force claim may proceed to trial., Section 1983 of Title 42, U.S. Code, creates a cause of action against \"[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.\" 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defense of qualified immunity may be asserted by \"government officials performing discretionary functions\" to shield them from civil damages liability in such a suit \"as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.\" Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 635, 638, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). \"Qualified immunity attaches when an official's conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.\" Kisela v. Hughes , --- U.S. ----, 138 S.Ct. 1148, 1152, 200 L.Ed.2d 449 (2018) (per curiam) (quoting White v. Pauly, --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 548, 551, 196 L.Ed.2d 463 (2017) (per curiam) ); see also Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (\"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' \" (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) ) ). \" 'Because the focus is on whether the officer had fair notice that her conduct was unlawful, reasonableness is judged against the backdrop of the law at the time of the conduct.' \" Kisela , 138 S.Ct. at 1152 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen , 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (per curiam) )., *36Courts use \"a two-step sequence for resolving government officials' qualified immunity claims.\" Pearson , 555 U.S. at 232, 129 S.Ct. 808. \"First, a court must decide whether the facts ... shown make out a violation of a constitutional right.\" Id. (internal citation omitted). \"Second, if the plaintiff has satisfied this first step, the court must decide whether the right at issue was 'clearly established' at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct.\" Id. Courts may \"exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.\" Id. at 236, 129 S.Ct. 808., Although a case need not be \"directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.\" Kisela , 138 S.Ct. at 1152 (quoting White , 137 S.Ct. at 551 ). \"Specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context, where ... it is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the factual situation the officer confronts.\" Id. (quoting Mullenix v. Luna , --- U.S. ----, 136 S.Ct. 305, 308, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015) (per curiam) (alterations omitted) ). \"Use of excessive force is an area of the law 'in which the result depends very much on the facts of each case,' and thus police officers are entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent 'squarely governs' the specific facts at issue.\" Id. at 1153 (quoting Mullenix , 136 S.Ct. at 309 ). \"Precedent involving similar facts can help move a case beyond the otherwise 'hazy border between excessive and acceptable force' and thereby provide an officer notice that a specific use of force is unlawful.\" Id. (quoting Mullenix , 136 S.Ct. at 312 ). \"An officer 'cannot be said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right's contours were sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant's shoes would have understood that he was violating it.' \" Id. at 1153 (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard , 572 U.S. 765, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 2023, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) ). At the same time, a court \"need not identify cases with 'materially similar' facts, but have only to show that 'the state of the law at the time of the incident gave the officer fair warning that his alleged misconduct was unconstitutional.' \" Johnson v. District of Columbia , 528 F.3d 969, 976 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer , 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (alterations omitted) )., \"The 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.\" Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)\"The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.\" Id. at 396-97, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Moreover, \"the 'reasonableness' inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.\" Id. at 397, 109 S.Ct. 1865. An officer's use of force is unreasonable where the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, offer \"no indication that [the plaintiff] posed any threat to\" anyone or \"had committed a serious crime.\" Hall , 867 F.3d at 157. \"[I]f an excessive force claim turns on which of two conflicting stories best captures what happened on the street, Graham will not permit summary judgment in favor of the defendant official.\" Saucier v. Katz , 533 U.S. 194, 216, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment (quoted with approval in Johnson , 528 F.3d at 977 ) )., Nor does \"the severity of the crime at issue,\" Hall , 867 F.3d at 157, make defendant Powell's use of force reasonable. The defendants argue that \"[g]iven the information contained in the dispatches, Officer Powell reasonably believed that Plaintiff was potentially armed and dangerous.\" Defs.' Reply at 5. This is true, but only up to a point. The officers were entitled to rely on the dispatches throughout their interactions with the plaintiff, see United States v. Hensley , 469 U.S. 221, 231, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985) (\"[E]ffective law enforcement cannot be conducted unless police officers can act on directions and information transmitted by one officer to another.\" (quoting *38United States v. Robinson , 536 F.2d 1298, 1299 (9th Cir. 1976) ) ), but only until the time that the plaintiff clearly manifested, by raising his hands in the air above his head where the officers could see them, that he was not holding a weapon, and that he posed no threat. At that point, any information communicated over the dispatch could not give the officers probable cause to believe a clearly unarmed, surrendering man posed a danger to them or others. See Flythe v. District of Columbia , 791 F.3d 13, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (\"That an individual at one point posed a threat does not grant officers an irrevocable license to kill. Justification for deadly force exists only for the life of the threat.\"); see also Hall , 867 F.3d at 157 (holding that force is excessive when \"no indication\" exists that a plaintiff \"posed any threat to\" anyone or \"had committed a serious crime\"); Johnson , 528 F.3d at 975 (holding that \"repeatedly kicking a surrendering suspect in the groin [ ] produces [no] law enforcement benefit that might outweigh the serious harm it causes\").3 As such, no \"importan[t] [ ] governmental interests\" existed \"to justify the intrusion\" upon the plaintiff's \"Fourth Amendment interests.\" Hall , 867 F.3d at 157 (quoting Tolan , 134 S.Ct. at 1865 )., The defendants rely on Sigman v. Town of Chapel Hill , 161 F.3d 782, 786, 788 (4th Cir. 1998), for the proposition that \"White's testimony does not create a triable issue of fact as to the threat that a reasonable officer in Officer Powell's position faced.\" Defs.' Reply at 10. Sigman , however, does not support the defendants' position. Sigman concluded that a police officer \"reasonably perceived a threat to his safety and the safety of others and that his response [shooting the decedent] therefore was objectively justified and reasonable\" despite affidavits from three witnesses declaring that the decedent was not holding a knife when he was shot. 161 F.3d at 786-88. Sigman reasoned that these affidavits \"cannot effectively impact the credibility of [the officer's] testimony (or that of all five other officers on the scene) as to his perceptions of what he saw from an entirely different-and closer-vantage point,\" given that \"[t]he three witnesses in this case were located across the street amidst a crowd cheering Sigman on, as if the confrontation were a game or contest.\" Id. at 787-88. Here, in contrast, White observed the incident from a vantage point sufficiently similar to that of defendant Powell to enable a jury reasonable to conclude that White's perception of the plaintiff is probative of how a reasonable officer in defendant Powell's position would have perceived the plaintiff at the moment defendant Powell fired his weapon. White testified that he was approximately \"15, 20 feet\" from \"where everything happened at\" \"when everything went down,\" and had \"walked to the corner where Mr. Young was\" shortly before the shooting occurred. White Dep. at 125:24-25, 130:5-6. Defendant Powell, meanwhile, testified that he was approximately \"20 feet, if that,\" away from the plaintiff in at the time he fired his weapon. Powell Dep. at 78:19-20. The defendants offer nothing but conclusory assertions to explain how White perceived the incident from a vantage point too different from that of defendant Powell to testify reliably as to what a reasonable officer in defendant Powell's position would have perceived. That the officer in Sigman \"had special knowledge of Sigman's dangerousness and of the threats that Sigman had made on his life,\" 161 F.3d at 788, does not change this analysis. Nothing in Sigman suggests that such \"special knowledge,\" id. , by itself could allow an officer reasonably to believe a person whom the officer perceived to be holding no weapon posed a danger to the officer or others. To the contrary, Sigman discussed the significance of the officer's \"special knowledge\" only after discounting the testimony of the three witnesses who testified that the decedent was unarmed. Here, as explained above, White's testimony cannot be discounted., Johnson provided defendant Powell \"fair warning that his alleged misconduct was unconstitutional.\" Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). There, police mistook the plaintiff for a drug dealer's armed accomplice, aimed guns at the plaintiff, and commanded the plaintiff \"to put up [his] hands.\" Id. at 972. The plaintiff \"immediately complied,\" and then, \"[w]ith his hands still raised, ... turned away from the [lead officer's] gun and fell through the open doorway of his apartment, landing face-down on the floor.\" Id. \"While [the plaintiff] was prone on the floor with his arms and legs spread, [the officer] repeatedly kicked and stomped his groin and buttocks.\" Id. Johnson determined \"that a reasonable officer would not have repeatedly kicked the surrendering suspect in the groin.\" Id. at 974. While recognizing that the officer \"ha[d] a legitimate and substantial interest in apprehending an armed suspect and protecting himself and the public from possible harm,\" Johnson reasoned that \"it is not clear how kicking [the plaintiff] in the groin furthered either of the[se]\" interests.\" Id. at 975. Johnson concluded that \"[s]ummary judgment was premature because there exists a genuine issue of material fact, namely, whether [the plaintiff's] prone position was threatening or suggested escape.\" Id. at 977. \"That dispute,\" Johnson explained, \"can only be resolved by evaluating the conflicting testimony of [the plaintiff] and [the officer].\" Id.","caseName":"Young v. Dist. of Columbia","caseNameFull":"Lamont Andre YOUNG v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA","citation":["322 F. Supp. 3d 26"],"citeCount":2,"cluster_id":7331207,"court":"Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit","court_citation_string":"D.C. Cir.","court_id":"cadc","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2018-08-20","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Civil Action No. 14-2129 (BAH)","docket_id":64319691,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T13:39:36.100992Z","date_created":"2022-07-25T05:47:44.294151Z","score":{"bm25":16.773941}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":7249125,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T11:28:17.069584Z","date_created":"2022-07-25T05:47:44.300891Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nHere, as in Johnson , a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether a reasonable officer in defendant Powell's position could have believed that the plaintiff's \"position was threatening or suggested escape.\" Id. As in Johnson , the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff suggest that ","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[7249125],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10880439/harrison-v-state-of-oklahoma/","attorney":"","caseName":"HARRISON v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2026 OK CR 18"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10880439,"court":"Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma","court_citation_string":"Okla. Crim. App.","court_id":"oklacrimapp","court_jurisdiction":"SA","dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2026-06-25","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"PC-2025-708","docket_id":73533950,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-06-25T19:02:10.232585Z","date_created":"2026-06-25T19:02:09.857734Z","score":{"bm25":16.753551}},"neutralCite":"2026 OK CR 18","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[11157978,11177189],"download_url":"https://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?citeid=552535","id":11347958,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"html/2026/06/25/harrison_v._state_of_oklahoma.html","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-06-25T19:02:25.275293Z","date_created":"2026-06-25T19:02:10.010290Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"4fed2b7fb7c9aea1bfbb09c4b03cb78ff40a8f25","snippet":"\n\t\tOSCN Found Document:HARRISON v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA\n\n\t\t\t\t\t\n\n\t\t\t\t\n\t\t\t\tHARRISON v. STATE OF OKLAHOMA2026 OK CR 18Case Number: PC-2025-708Decided: 06/25/2026Mandate Issued: 06/25/2026COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA\nCite as: 2026 OK CR 18, __ P.3d __\n\n\t\t\t\t\n\n\nERICA LASHON HARRISON, Petitioner,<","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11347958],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"¶1 On September 8, 2025, Petitioner, through counsel, filed with the Clerk of this Court a copy of her Notice of Intent to Appeal; Preparation of Appeal Record Court; and Reporter's Acknowledgement; and in the Alternative, Notice of Post-Conviction Appeal From Final Order of the District Court which was filed with the clerk of the trial court on the same day, in Tulsa County District Court Case No. CF-2013-1446. 1 This notice declared Petitioner's intent to appeal a trial court order, pronounced in open court on August 29, 2025, that denied Petitioner's application for resentencing pursuant to the Oklahoma Survivors' Act. See 22 O.S.Supp.2024, §§ 1090.4 -1090.5. The trial court's written findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed in the trial court on October 30, 2025. The Clerk of this Court assigned this appeal this Court's Case No. F-2025-7408. On March 20, 2026, the State filed its State of Oklahoma's Motion to Dismiss Appeal or, Alternatively, to Convert it into a Postconviction Appeal. On April 9, 2026, Petitioner filed Appellant's Response to State of Oklahoma's Motion to Dismiss Appeal or, Alternatively, to Convert it into a Postconviction. In its motion, the State maintains that the appeal to this Court of an order denying resentencing to individuals eligible pursuant to Section 1090.4 of the Survivors' Act must be taken in accordance with 22 O.S.2021, § 1087 and the provisions governing an appeal to this Court under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. We agree."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/7334564/ollie-v-univ-of-conn/","attorney":"*145Todd D. Steigman, William G. Madsen, Madsen, Prestley & Parenteau, LLC, Hartford, CT, Jacques J. Parenteau, Madsen, Prestley & Parenteau, LLC, New London, CT, for Plaintiff., Christopher Edward Engler, Gabriel Joseph Jiran, Shipman & Goodwin LLP, Hartford, CT, for Defendant., Kari A. Dooley, United States District Judge *146This action arises out of the events that unfolded following the termination of plaintiff Kevin Ollie (\"Ollie\") as the head coach of the men's basketball team at the defendant University of Connecticut (\"UConn\"). Ollie brings discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (\"Title VII\") as well as the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (\"CFEPA\"). He seeks preliminary injunctive relief and other equitable relief. By a motion dated December 27, 2018, UConn seeks dismissal of this action pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, failure to State a claim for which relief may be granted, and failure to join a necessary party. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants UConn's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.1, While the Union and UConn moved forward with the arbitration, Ollie sought to preserve his ability to pursue discrimination claims under the CFEPA and Title VII in an administrative or judicial forum. Because the CFEPA and Title VII have relatively short limitations periods - 180 days and 300 days, respectively - Ollie was concerned that the deadline for filing his discrimination claims would pass before the arbitration concluded. (Id. at ¶ 32.); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-82(f) (\"one hundred and eighty days after the alleged act of discrimination\"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (\"three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred\"). Ollie was also concerned, however, that UConn would terminate the arbitration pursuant to the *147election-of-remedies provision in the CBA if he filed a discrimination claim with either the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (\"CHRO\") or the United States Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (\"EEOC\") prior to the conclusion of the arbitration. (Compl. at ¶ 34.) The election-of-remedies provision, set forth in Section 10.3 of the CBA, states:, With the Complaint, Ollie filed an ex parte request for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction prohibiting UConn from invoking Section 10.3 if he files a claim with the CHRO or EEOC. He also sought (and still seeks) an order prospectively equitably tolling the applicable statute of limitations for his discrimination claims under the CFEPA and Title VII and equitably estopping UConn from asserting a statute of limitations defense to those claims. (See id. , Prayer for Relief, at ¶¶ 1-2.) The Court denied the request for a temporary restraining order under Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but convened a hearing on the request for a preliminary injunction on December 28, 2018. Prior to the hearing, UConn filed the instant motion to dismiss challenging, inter alia , this Court's subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the claims asserted herein are not ripe for adjudication., Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Therefore, this Court *148must assure itself that it has subject matter jurisdiction as a threshold matter before proceeding to the merits of any case. Wynn v. AC Rochester , 273 F.3d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 2001). \"A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it.\" Makarova v. United States , 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000). Ripeness, the issue raised by UConn, is a component of Article III standing; Nat'l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. Walsh , 714 F.3d 682, 688 (2d Cir. 2013) ; which in turn is an essential component of subject matter jurisdiction; Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. , 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (\"If plaintiffs lack Article III standing, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear their claim.\" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). A plaintiff who seeks to invoke the authority of the court bears the burden of establishing the court's subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Makarova , 201 F.3d at 113., When a defendant raises a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction based on the allegations in the complaint, as UConn has, \"the plaintiff has no evidentiary burden\" and the court must ordinarily decide the issue based solely on the allegations in the complaint and the exhibits attached thereto. Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC , 822 F.3d 47, 56 (2d Cir. 2016). The complaint in this case, however, references and relies upon a series of e-mails between counsel for both parties. The e-mails were not attached to the complaint but were appended to Ollie's subsequent pleadings, including his memorandum in opposition to the instant motion to dismiss. The e-mails include Ollie's request that UConn either waive Section 10.3 if he files a claim with the EEOC or CHRO, or, alternatively, enter into a tolling agreement with respect to his discrimination claims. The e-mails also include UConn's response to these inquiries. Neither party has raised any challenge to the authenticity of the e-mails or objected to the Court's consideration of them. Indeed, both parties have relied upon the e-mails in their arguments regarding the motion to dismiss. In addition, the Court concludes that the communications reflected in the e-mails are \"integral\" to the complaint and may be fairly considered on a motion to dismiss even though they are not attached to the complaint. See Goel v. Bunge, Ltd. , 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016) (discussing standard for consideration of documents that are \"integral\" to the complaint at the motion to dismiss stage)., \"To be justiciable, a cause of action must be ripe-it must present a real, substantial controversy, not a mere hypothetical question. Ripeness is peculiarly a question of timing. A claim is not ripe if it depends upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The doctrine's major purpose is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements. The ripeness doctrine is drawn both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.\" Nat'l Org. for Marriage, Inc. , 714 F.3d at 687 (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). The ripeness requirement \"prevents courts from declaring the meaning of the law in a vacuum and from constructing generalized legal rules unless the resolution of an actual dispute requires it.\" Id. at 688 (quoting Simmonds v. INS , 326 F.3d 351, 357 (2d Cir. 2003) )., Here, UConn argues that Ollie's claims are unripe under Article III of the United States Constitution. \"Often, the *149best way to think of constitutional ripeness is as a specific application of the actual injury aspect of Article III standing. The irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements: (1) 'the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact,' i.e., 'an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical'; (2) 'there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of'; and (3) 'it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.' Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (quotation marks, citations, alterations, and footnotes omitted). Constitutional ripeness, in other words, turns on the first Lujan factor-to say a plaintiff's claim is constitutionally unripe is to say the plaintiff's claimed injury, if any, is not actual or imminent, but instead conjectural or hypothetical.\" Nat'l Org. for Marriage, Inc. , 714 F.3d at 688 (citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted)., In response, Ollie articulates three distinct bases under which his Title VII claim3 is ripe for adjudication. Ollie first asserts that UConn's refusal to agree not to invoke Section 10.3 has deterred, or \"chilled,\" him from filing a claim with the EEOC and that chilling effect constitutes a sufficiently concrete and particularized injury to confer standing. Second, Ollie argues that there is a \"credible threat\" that UConn will invoke Section 10.3 if he files a claim with the EEOC. This \"credible threat,\" he argues, has resulted in \"coerced self-censorship\" (i.e. , not filing a claim with the EEOC) sufficient to confer standing. Finally, Ollie asserted in his Complaint that he has suffered an actual or imminent injury under the first Lujan factor due to (a) the lapse of the limitations period for his Title VII claim as a result of UConn's refusal to waive its rights under Section 10.3 or (b) his risk of losing his contractual right to arbitrate his grievance if he files a claim with the EEOC. (Compl. at ¶¶ 60-61.) Ollie's arguments are addressed seriatum., Ollie first argues that UConn's conduct has \"chilled\" his exercise of his Title VII rights and that chilling is a sufficient injury to confer standing. His argument derives from a series of cases involving *150pre-enforcement challenges to statutes or regulations based on the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In these cases, plaintiffs have been held to have standing to bring First Amendment challenges to laws prior to their actual or threatened enforcement based on the chilling effect the law has on their protected speech. E.g., Nat'l Org. for Marriage, Inc. , 714 F.3d at 687, 690 (holding plaintiff had constitutional standing to challenge statute where plaintiff \"plausibly contends\" it was regulated by that statute even though plaintiff had not attempted to ascertain its status vis-à-vis the statute nor had it been subject to any enforcement action); Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell , 221 F.3d 376, 381-84 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding non-profit had constitutional standing to seek declaratory judgment and injunction concerning state statute regulating political advertisements based on reasonable belief that some of its advertisements fell within the challenged provisions even though it had not yet been charged with a violation). Courts have found standing in these cases because \"without the possibility of pre-enforcement challenges, plaintiffs contesting statutes or regulations on First Amendment grounds face an unattractive set of options ...: refraining from activity they believe the First Amendment protects, or risk civil or criminal penalties for violating the challenged law.\" Nat'l Org. for Marriage, Inc. , 714 F.3d at 689 (quoting Fla. League of Prof'l Lobbyists, Inc. v. Meggs , 87 F.3d 457, 459 (11th Cir. 1996) ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union , 442 U.S. 289, 298, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979) (\"When the plaintiff has alleged an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by a statute, and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereunder, he 'should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.' \"). As a result, pre-enforcement claims brought under the First Amendment are viewed \"under somewhat relaxed standing and ripeness rules.\" Nat'l Org. for Marriage, Inc. , 714 F.3d at 689., The Court disagrees. The chilling doctrine arose as a specific solution to a problem presented in the First Amendment context. The freedoms afforded by the First Amendment have long been regarded not only \"as supremely precious in our society\" but also \"delicate and vulnerable.\" N.A.A.C.P. v. Button , 371 U.S. 415, 433, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963). As a result, it is now well established that \"constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or 'chilling,' effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights.\" Laird v. Tatum , 408 U.S. 1, 11, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972) (collecting cases); see also Nat'l Org. for Marriage, Inc. , 714 F.3d at 689. This rule comes from the Supreme Court's recognition that \"[t]he threat of sanctions may deter [the] exercise [of First Amendment rights] almost as potently as the *151actual application of sanctions.\" Button , 371 U.S. at 433, 83 S.Ct. 328., Ollie has not cited, and this Court has not located, any case in which a court has applied the chilling doctrine of standing outside of the context of the First Amendment. In fact, courts have repeatedly declined to apply the chilling doctrine outside of the limited context of free speech and free expression claims under the First Amendment. United States v. Chester , 628 F.3d 673, 688 (4th Cir. 2010) (concluding importing this \" 'extraordinary' exception ... into the Second Amendment context would be inappropriate\" because the overbreadth, or \"chilling effect,\" doctrine \"is the Court's solution to [a] speech-specific problem\"); Coleman v. DeWitt , 282 F.3d 908, 914 (6th Cir. 2002) (declining to apply overbreadth and related chilling of rights doctrine in context of substantive due process claim); Grendell v. Ohio Supreme Court , 252 F.3d 828, 834 (6th Cir. 2001) (\"It is well-settled that facial constitutional challenges relying on the overbreadth doctrine, and the resultant chilling effect such overbreadth has on speech, are limited to the First Amendment sphere.\"); Firearm Owners Against Crime v. City of Harrisburg , No. 1:15-cv-0322, 2016 WL 1162283, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2016) (declining to apply chilling doctrine to Second Amendment claim where \"[p]laintiffs offer no legal support for application of the concept of 'chilling effect' from First Amendment jurisprudence to the instant case\"); Nat'l Conf. of Catholic Bishops v. Bell , 490 F.Supp. 734, 741 (D.D.C. 1980) (declining to apply chilling doctrine in context of free exercise claim under the First Amendment), aff'd 653 F.2d 535 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam)., In addition, in the First Amendment cases, \"the challenged exercise of governmental power was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the complainant was either presently or prospectively subject to the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that he was challenging.\" Laird , 408 U.S. at 11, 92 S.Ct. 2318. That is, the plaintiffs had a real and imminent fear of being subjected to civil or criminal penalties if they engaged in the speech that they believed to be protected. This is not the kind of dilemma Ollie faces. Unlike the plaintiffs in the First Amendment cases, Ollie does not have to break the law (or even the CBA) in order to pursue his Title VII claims. Indeed, he still has all of the rights and remedies he needs for his discrimination claims available to him under Title VII. As such, the concerns identified in the First Amendment cases are simply not implicated in this case and the Court declines to apply the chilling doctrine of standing to the circumstances presented here., Ollie next argues that his claim is ripe for adjudication based on what he terms the coercive nature of UConn's conduct. This argument is based primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. , 549 U.S. 118, 127 S.Ct. 764, 166 L.Ed.2d 604 (2007). Although similar to the chilling doctrine jurisprudence, MedImmune provides a distinct analysis of Article III ripeness in the context of the Declaratory Judgment Act., There, MedImmune, a drug manufacturer, disputed whether it was required to pay certain patent-related fees to the defendant, Genentech, under the parties' licensing agreement. Id. at 121-22, 127 S.Ct. 764. When Genentech sent a letter threatening to enforce its patent, terminate the licensing agreement and bring suit, MedImmune started paying the disputed fees and instituted a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity and enforceability of Genentech's patent. Id. Importantly, had MedImmune not paid the disputed fees and Genentech prevailed *152in its threatened patent suit, MedImmune could have been liable for treble damages and attorney fees and enjoined from selling a product that made up eighty percent of its sales revenue. Id. at 122, 127 S.Ct. 764. During litigation of the declaratory judgment action, an issue arose as to whether there was an actual controversy in light MedImmune's payment of the disputed fees. The lower courts concluded that there was no case or controversy because MedImmune's payment of the disputed fees eliminated any threat of imminent harm. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. , 427 F.3d 958, 962-63 (Fed. Cir. 2005). That is, because the payments were being made, MedImmune was not at risk of being sued, being found liable for treble damages, or enjoined from making sales of the product at issue., On appeal, the Supreme Court began by observing that \"where threatened action by government is concerned, we do not require a plaintiff to expose himself to liability before bringing suit to challenge the basis for the threat - for example, the constitutionality of a law threatened to be enforced.\" MedImmune, Inc. , 549 U.S. at 128-29, 127 S.Ct. 764 ; e.g., Terrace v. Thompson , 263 U.S. 197, 211-212, 216, 44 S.Ct. 15, 68 L.Ed. 255 (1923) (holding plaintiff was not required to bet the proverbial farm to challenge constitutionality of Anti-Alien Land Law where State threatened forfeiture of plaintiff's farm, fines, and penalties if he entered into a lease with an alien); Steffel v. Thompson , 415 U.S. 452, 455-56, 459, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974) (holding there was an actual controversy for declaratory judgment action challenging constitutionality of criminal trespass statute where plaintiff \"has been twice warned to stop\" distributing handbills challenging Vietnam War \"and has been told by the police that if he again distributes handbills at the shopping center and disobeys a warning to stop he will likely be prosecuted.\"). \"In each of these cases, the plaintiff had eliminated the imminent threat of harm by simply not doing what he claimed the right to do,\" but the Supreme Court nonetheless concluded that the court had jurisdiction \"because the threat-eliminating behavior was effectively coerced.\" MedImmune, Inc. , 549 U.S. at 129, 127 S.Ct. 764. The Supreme Court further observed: \"The dilemma posed by that coercion-putting the challenger to the choice between abandoning his rights or risking prosecution-is a dilemma that it was the very purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to ameliorate.\" Id., The question, therefore, was whether this coercion theory of standing had applicability in private disputes. The Supreme Court concluded that it did, reasoning that actual or threatened injury to a business by a private actor can be as coercive as actual or threatened injury by a governmental actor. Id. at 131, 134, 127 S.Ct. 764 ; see also id. at 132, 127 S.Ct. 764 (reiterating its observation in an earlier case that \" '[t]o imperil a man's livelihood, his business enterprises, or his solvency, [was] ordinarily quite as coercive' as, for example, 'detaining his property.' \"). Harkening back to the cases previously discussed in the opinion, the Supreme Court held: \"The rule that a plaintiff must destroy a large building,4 bet the farm, or (as here) risk *153treble damages and the loss of 80 percent of its business before seeking a declaration of its actively contested legal rights finds no support in Article III.\" Id. at 134, 127 S.Ct. 764., Moreover, the \"worst case scenario\" faced by Ollie is that he loses the ability to arbitrate his termination, a forum he prefers insofar as UConn bears the burden of proof there. This is ultimately the basis for his argument that he is being asked to \"bet the farm.\" However, even if this worst-case scenario was to come to pass, Ollie is not without recourse because he still has the ability to challenge his termination in another forum. In a forum other than the arbitration, Ollie would bear the burden of proof, but this situation does not approach the dire Hobson's Choice faced by the plaintiff in MedImmune ., Lastly, the Court looks to whether Ollie has standing under the traditional standing analysis set forth in the first Lujan factor. Ollie contends in his complaint that he has suffered real or imminent harm because UConn's conduct, which he claims violates Title VII, has caused the limitations period for some of his discrimination claims to lapse. (Compl. at ¶ 60.) He also asserts as a real or imminent harm based on the potential loss of his arbitration rights under the CBA if UConn invokes Section 10.3 after he files a discrimination claim with the EEOC. (Id. at 61.) These harms are both conjectural and hypothetical at this stage and cannot therefore provide a basis upon which Ollie has standing or this Court has subject matter jurisdiction., The passage of a limitations period does not in and of itself bar Ollie's claims because the limitations period under Title VII is not jurisdictional. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. , 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). Instead, \"[t]he statute of limitations is normally an affirmative defense on which the defendant has the burden of proof.\" Bano v. Union Carbide Corp. , 361 F.3d 696, 710 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); accord McGullam v. Cedar Graphics, Inc. , 609 F.3d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 2010) ; Nghiem v. U.S. Dep't of Veterans Affairs , 451 F.Supp.2d 599, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd , 323 Fed. Appx. 16 (2d Cir. 2009). Consequently, for Ollie to suffer an actual injury based on the passage of the limitations period, he must first file a claim with the EEOC, UConn must then assert the limitations period as an affirmative defense, and UConn must prevail in that defense. A statute of limitations defense, of course, is \"subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.\" Zipes , 455 U.S. at 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127. Accordingly, Ollie can challenge this defense by, for example, requesting that the limitations period be equitably tolled or that UConn equitably estopped from asserting this defense (as he has requested in this proceeding). Because any harm related to the passage of the limitations period is contingent on future events that might never come to pass, it is conjectural, hypothetical, and inadequate to establish standing., Similarly, any injury based on the termination of the arbitration by UConn is hypothetical at this stage. UConn has only asserted that it is \"not willing to waive [Section] 10.3.\" If Ollie files a claim with the EEOC, it is unknown and speculative whether UConn will actually invoke Section 10.3. Accordingly, UConn's refusal to waive its rights under the CBA does not cause a real or imminent injury to Ollie and therefore it does not create an issue that is ripe for adjudication., In concluding that Ollie's claims are not ripe for adjudication at this stage, the Court makes no determination as to the merits of his claims. The Court is deciding *155only that it is premature to decide the issues presented in Ollie's complaint because the injury or harm he identifies might never come to pass. If the events portended by Ollie come to pass, Ollie will have the opportunity to raise all of his claims and defenses in due course and in whichever forum he finds himself. His effort to litigate those claims and defenses on a pre-emptive basis through this action, however, fails for the reasons set forth above.","caseName":"Ollie v. Univ. of Conn.","caseNameFull":"Kevin OLLIE v. UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT","citation":["364 F. Supp. 3d 143"],"citeCount":2,"cluster_id":7334564,"court":"District Court, D. Connecticut","court_citation_string":"D. Conn.","court_id":"ctd","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2019-02-04","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"CIVIL NO. 3:18-CV-02070 (KAD)","docket_id":64323050,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T13:40:25.635354Z","date_created":"2022-07-25T06:13:54.396620Z","score":{"bm25":15.935639}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":7252484,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-25T00:18:59.792718Z","date_created":"2022-07-25T06:13:54.402407Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nConclusion\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.\nSO ORDERED at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 4th day of February 2019.\n","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[7252484],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/7330482/jones-v-dist-of-columbia/","attorney":"*41Michael J. Kator, Cathy Ann Harris, Juliette Markham Niehuss, Kator, Parks, Weiser & Harris, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs., Taylor Cross Morosco, Jonathan Hale Pittman, Steven J. Anderson, Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendant., Tonia Jones and Kenniss Weeks were police officers and squad car partners in the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) in the summer of 2006. Ms. Jones, who was known to her colleagues as a lesbian woman, began an intimate relationship with Ms. Weeks, who at the time was known to her colleagues as a heterosexual woman who had previously been married to a man. The unexpected relationship between the two women created a wave at MPD, and Ms. Jones and Ms. Weeks now allege that the ripples from that wave created a hostile work environment for them, in violation of Title VII and the D.C. Human Rights Act (DCHRA), for which they sue the District of Columbia (the District or D.C.) Both Plaintiffs allege that they were subjected to harassment and hostility on the basis of sexual orientation and sex, as well as retaliation for complaining. Because the claims all emanate from allegations related to Plaintiffs' lesbian relationship, and they have not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to harassment based on sex, the Court will grant D.C.'s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiffs' sex discrimination claims under Title VII and DCHRA. However, because there are disputes of material fact concerning Plaintiffs' claims of a hostile work environment due to their sexual orientation and retaliation for protected activities under DCHRA, the Court will deny summary judgment on those claims., Ms. Jones and Ms. Weeks are police officers of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department. Ms. Weeks has worked for MPD since 2000; she was assigned to the Seventh District (7D), first as an officer, and later as an investigator and a detective, from September 2000 until December *422009. See Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts [Dkt. 90-1] ¶¶ 74-75, 153 (Def.'s Undisputed); Pl. Weeks's Statement of Material Facts in Dispute [Dkt. 93-1] ¶¶ W002-03 (Weeks Disputed).1 Ms. Jones began working for MPD in 2001 and was assigned to 7D at all relevant times except for a brief assignment in July 2010. See Def.'s Undisputed ¶¶ 2-3; Pl. Jones's Statement of Material Facts in Dispute [Dkt. 96-1] ¶¶ J002-03 (Jones Disputed)., Prior to the fall of 2006, both Ms. Weeks and Ms. Jones were friends with Sergeant Jonathan Podorski, the day-shift supervisor of Police Service Area (PSA) 703. See Def.'s Undisputed ¶¶ 6, 78; Weeks Disputed ¶ W006; Jones Disputed ¶ J006.2 Ms. Weeks considered Sgt. Podorski a close friend; she had socialized at his home, he taught her how to play the guitar, and they had gone on group vacations together, along with other coworkers. See Def.'s Undisputed ¶ 79; Weeks Dep. [Dkt. 93-11] at 13, 22. During this time, Ms. Weeks also believed that Sgt. Podorski had romantic feelings for her. See Weeks Disputed ¶ W007. Ms. Jones and Sgt. Podorski also had a friendly relationship; they had socialized on several occasions and Ms. Jones considered Sgt. Podorski to be a \"good guy, a friend.\" See Def.'s Undisputed ¶ 6; Jones Dep. [Dkt. 93-7] at 21. Prior to September 2006, people at MPD knew that Ms. Jones identified as a lesbian, but Ms. Weeks was known to her colleagues as a heterosexual woman. See Def.'s Undisputed ¶ 13. Ms. Weeks and Ms. Jones were assigned to ride together beginning in early 2006. See 3d Am. Compl. [Dkt. 26] ¶ 8., On September 24, 2006, Plaintiffs arrived at a domestic violence call where two family members were suspected of hitting and threatening a teenage family member with a knife. See Podorski IAD File Narrative Report [Dkt. 94-7] at 2 (Podorski IAD); Jones Dep. 120.3 Plaintiffs talked with the teenager and determined that she had been attacked for telling her family that she was a lesbian. See Podorski IAD at 5. Sgt. Podorski ordered Plaintiffs not to arrest the two family members and to bring the teenager to a mental health facility for evaluation. Id. at 4-5. Sgt. Podorski stated that he had prior experience with the teenager and knew she had mental health issues and was a runaway. See Podorski Dep. at 53, 122-24. Plaintiffs disagreed with his order, and called the MPD Gay and Lesbian Unit (GLU) to complain about it. See Podorski IAD at 5. Sgt. Brett Parsons of the GLU, along with another MPD officer, came to the scene, interviewed witnesses, and arrested the two family members. Id. Sgt. Podorski was subsequently referred to the U.S. Attorney's Office for \"Failure to Make a Lawful Arrest,\" and cited by MPD's Internal Affairs Division (IAD) for Neglect of Duty. See Podorski IAD Final Report [Dkt. 94-11] at 3. Ms. Jones alleges that after these events on September 24, 2006, Sgt. Podorski prevented the Plaintiffs from riding together on a daily basis, even during periods when they were assigned to the same PSA. See Jones Disputed ¶¶ J028-29., In November 2006, Plaintiffs participated in the annual \"open season\" bidding process, in which MPD officers bid on different PSA assignments. See Jones OHR Complaint (Apr. 20, 2009), Jones OHR File [Dkt. 94-3] at 3. Both Plaintiffs had planned to bid for PSA 703, but Sgt. Podorski assigned Ms. Jones to be out on duty during bidding, and when she returned to the 7D office, PSA 703 was full. See id. As a result, Ms. Weeks bid on and was assigned to PSA 703, Ms. Jones was assigned to PSA 701, and Plaintiffs were unable to ride together as squad-car partners. See id. Ms. Jones alleges that Sgt. Podorski intentionally assigned her to be out on patrol during bidding in order to keep her and Ms. Weeks apart. See id. ; see also Weeks OHR Rebuttal Affidavit (Nov. 10, 2008) [Dkt. 94-8] at 1., After the notice on excessive UFIRs was posted, Ms. Weeks told Sgts. Eric Levenberry and Buddy Smallwood that she believed Sgt. Podorski was being unfair. See Weeks Dep. at 63. According to Ms. Weeks, Sgt. Levenberry told her she could file a complaint with the District's Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Office, but warned her that if she did, Sgt. Podorski might tell people that Ms. Weeks had slept with him. Id. Sgt. Levenberry recalled the conversation but not how he advised Ms. Weeks. See Levenberry Dep. [Dkt. 94-12] at 19. Ms. Jones testified that, also in January 2007, she and Ms. Weeks together complained to Lt. Derek Larsen about Sgt. Podorski, telling Lt. Larsen that they did not want to work with Sgt. Podorski anymore because of the way he had been treating them. See Jones Dep. at 69, 72-79. There was apparently no immediate response; Lt. Larsen testified that he advised Plaintiffs several months later, in October 2007, that if they were having a problem with Sgt. Podorski they could file an EEO complaint. See Larsen Dep. [Dkt. 94-1] at 42-43. In February 2007, Plaintiffs also talked with Lt. Ashley Rosenthal, a former EEO counselor for 7D and trainer at the Police Academy, about Sgt. Podorski's allegedly harassing behavior; Plaintiffs allege that Lt. Rosenthal advised them to document their complaints but did not take further steps to address their concerns. See Weeks Dep. at 333; Rosenthal Dep. [Dkt. 97-9] at 59-62., In March 2007, Ms. Jones began her new assignment in PSA 701. During this time, Sgt. Podorski was responsible for Roll Call assignments to scout cars, and Ms. Jones alleges that Sgt. Podorski routinely refused to assign her and Ms. Weeks to the same scout car, even though he would routinely assign other officers in heterosexual relationships to ride together. See Statement of Officer Tonia L. Jones, Jones OHR File at 68-74.5 Also during March 2007, Plaintiffs met with Joel Maupin, Commander of 7D, to complain about Sgt. Podorski and to request that they both be transferred to the midnight shift to avoid his supervision. See Weeks Dep. at 137. CDR Maupin informed Plaintiffs that they could file an EEO complaint, but that he had a policy between open bids of agreeing to reassignments only with a \"body-for-body\" replacement; that is, a transferring officer had to find another officer to take her place. See id. at 136-37, 142; Jones Dep. at 127-28. CDR Maupin testified that the \"body-for-body\" requirement *45is standard procedure because of staffing limitations, see Maupin Dep. [Dkt. 93-12] at 31, while Plaintiffs contend that the \"body-for-body\" policy was not an official policy and was selectively enforced in a discriminatory way. See Weeks Dep. at 130-32 (Ms. Weeks describing her understanding that one other officer had been permitted to change her shift without a \"body-for-body\" replacement). Both Ms. Weeks and Ms. Jones were reassigned to the midnight shift later in 2007, in August and September, respectively, when each had found a replacement with whom to switch. See Weeks Dep. at 125-26., Sgt. Yurell Washington was the supervisor in 7D on the midnight shift to whose supervision each Plaintiff voluntarily transferred in late summer 2007. See Weeks Disputed ¶ W010; Def.'s Undisputed ¶ 80. Before those transfers, in May 2007, Plaintiffs had traveled with Sgt. Washington and his girlfriend to Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, for an annual motorcycle rally (Bike Week). See Def.'s Undisputed ¶ 82; Weeks Disputed ¶ W012. During the several-hours-long drive, during which the travelers talked and, at various times, Plaintiffs openly kissed in the back seat, Sgt. Washington asked Ms. Weeks why she \"switched to being with women,\" which Ms. Weeks alleges was invasive and harassing. Weeks Opp'n at 14; see Washington Dep. [Dkt. 94-15] at 77-79, 116-17. Sgt. Washington contends that the question came up naturally in conversation and that he had no hidden motive in asking it. See Washington Dep. at 77-78., A number of MPD officers traveled to Myrtle Beach for \"Bike Week\" and during the vacation Plaintiffs stayed at a rental house with other officers including Sgts. Podorski and Washington. Jones Dep. at 102; see also Washington Dep. at 113. During a party one night at a different house, a clearly drunk Sgt. Podorski walked out onto the porch and yelled, \"Do you want to f-k?\" in front of a large group that included Plaintiffs. Jones Dep. at 46. That Sgt. Podorski asked this question is undisputed; there is a dispute as to whether he was seriously propositioning Ms. Weeks or both Plaintiffs, see, e.g. , Weeks Dep. at 118 (\"I took it as him being serious.\"), or if the outburst was directed at no one in particular, see Def.'s Undisputed ¶ 118; Podorski Dep. at 66 (\"I don't know if I was yelling at them or someone else in the house.\"). Ms. Jones testified that other officers at the party expressed their indignation to her about the Sergeant's conduct, although apparently none presented evidence in discovery. See Jones Dep. at 106. Ms. Jones also testified that she helped to restrain other officers from attacking Sgt. Podorski. See id. (\"I was trying to stop other people from assaulting [Sgt. Podorski].\"). Plaintiffs argue that their recollections of other officers' reactions after Sgt. Podorski's outburst corroborates Ms. Jones's testimony that the outburst was directed at either Ms. Weeks or both women., Sgt. Washington separated Plaintiffs by assigning Ms. Weeks to the so-called \"Marjorie Court detail,\" a temporary fixed-post assignment to provide protection to a fellow officer at his home, on September 19, 2007. See Def.'s Undisputed ¶ 124; Washington Dep. at 55, 80-81. During such a stint on October 5, 2007, Ms. Weeks arrested a suspect on an unrelated matter, but Sgt. Washington ordered her to return to her detail and assigned the arrest to another officer to process at the lock-up. Ms. Weeks charges that in doing so Sgt. Washington was treating her unfairly. See Weeks Internal Affairs Division Interview at 9-11 (Oct. 7, 2007) [Dkt. 94-18] (Weeks IAD Interview). Plaintiffs believe that Sgt. Washington assigned Ms. Weeks to the detail in order to separate Plaintiffs, and that his intent was punitive. Ms. Weeks alleges that another officer asked for the detail but Sgt. Washington refused because he was \"saving\" it for Ms. Weeks. Weeks OHR Complaint (Apr. 20, 2009), Weeks OHR File at 3 [Dkt. 94-4]; Weeks Dep. at 128; see also Washington Dep. at 60 (testifying that he did not recall telling anyone that he was \"saving\" the detail for Ms. Weeks)., 5. Investigations of Ms. Weeks for Neglect of Duty and Absence, In September and October of 2007, Ms. Weeks was investigated, on Sgt. Washington's orders, for two separate incidents involving MPD's absence and leave policies. First, on September 26, 2007, Ms. Weeks was investigated for \"neglect of duty\" after allegedly leaving a squad car partner (not Ms. Jones) behind and neglecting to follow MPD procedures after doing so. See Def.'s Undisputed ¶¶ 126-28; Washington Dep. at 626-3. Ms. Weeks disputes that she ever left a partner behind and contends that the charge was baseless. See Weeks Dep. at 176-78. She was never formally reprimanded for the alleged violation, and she does not know if anything came of it, but she argues that being written up contributed to a hostile work environment. She also states that the investigation remains in her 7D employment file as an \"adverse action.\" See id. ; Weeks Disputed ¶¶ W087-88., Second, on October 3, 2007, Ms. Weeks called in sick but failed to check in with MPD's medical clinic upon returning to work as required by official policy; as a result, Sgt. Washington initiated an investigation into Ms. Weeks for being absent without leave (AWOL). See Weeks AWOL Investigation Memorandum (Feb. 27, 2008) [Dkt. 90-9]. Ms. Weeks admits that she failed to comply with existing policy (and was officially AWOL) but complains that Sgt. Washington checked in repeatedly with medical staff to ask if Ms. Weeks had reported to them, which Ms. Weeks contends was atypical and harassing. See, e.g. , Weeks Dep. at 192-93, 195. Ms. Weeks also contends that the AWOL investigation was untimely as it was not commenced until four days after the incident, and that she herself was not told about the AWOL charge for a year. See Weeks Disputed ¶ W091., On October 7, 2007, Ms. Weeks and Ms. Jones attended the wedding of two fellow officers. See Def.'s Undisputed ¶ 139; Weeks Disputed ¶ W102. Plaintiffs each requested one hour of leave, although MPD policy provided for short periods of personal leave in the form of two- or four-hour blocks. See Def.'s Undisputed ¶ 140; Weeks Disputed ¶ W102. Upon arriving at work, Plaintiffs saw Sgt. Washington just leaving 7D.7 They then found that he had marked them out for two hours. They allege that he had not marked other officers out for two hours, even though others may have been gone for as long as or longer than Plaintiffs. See Def.'s Undisputed ¶ 141; Weeks Disputed ¶ W105. The record *48is not clear as to whether Plaintiffs were late arriving on duty by an hour or slightly more, but Plaintiffs contend that clarity is unimportant because Sgt. Washington had already marked them out for two hours before he knew when they actually reported. See Weeks Dep. at 176; Jones Dep. at 144. Neither Plaintiff brought the mistake to the attention of Sgt. Washington or requested a correction to her leave records through typical channels, although each described the matter when they filed EEO charges with MPD's Internal Affairs Division later that month. See Def.'s Undisputed ¶ 142; Weeks Disputed ¶ W106., Plaintiffs say that they became too stressed to work after Sgt. Washington marked them out for two hours for the wedding and decided to take stress leave. On October 8, 2007, both Plaintiffs filed formal stress complaints with MPD, alleging that their work environment was stressful because Sgt. Washington was discriminating against them based on \"sexual preference.\" See Jones and Weeks PD-42 Documents (Oct. 7, 2007) [Dkt. 94-19] (PD-42 Documents). Both also reported physiological symptoms such as headaches and nausea due to ongoing harassment. Id. Plaintiffs immediately took time off due to stress and did not return to work until November 26, 2007. See Def.'s Undisputed ¶ 147; Weeks Dep. at 201-02. While on stress leave, both Plaintiffs filed EEO complaints with the Internal Affairs Division (IAD), alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and retaliation. Ms. Jones complained of such treatment by Sgt. Podorski, but not Sgt. Washington, and Ms. Weeks complained of such treatment by Sgt. Washington, but not Sgt. Podorski. Each Plaintiff was interviewed by EEO Counselor Debbie Burt. See Weeks IAD Interview; Jones IAD Interview (Oct. 15, 2007) [Dkt. 94-10]., Additionally while on stress leave, Plaintiffs took a preplanned, prepaid, oneweek vacation to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico. See Def.'s Undisputed ¶¶ 145-46. The parties dispute whether Plaintiffs had remaining paid annual leave to cover their vacation or used paid stress leave. Plaintiffs admit that they had both exhausted their sick and annual leave at the time, see 3d Am. Compl. ¶ 70, but Ms. Weeks asserts that they both had received approval for the vacation prior to requesting stress leave, and that they used approximately 40 hours of annual leave and not stress leave for the vacation. See Weeks Disputed ¶ W113. In addition, Ms. Weeks alleges that MPD categorized her leave time incorrectly. See id. ¶ W115., In the spring of 2008, both Plaintiffs were eligible for, and participated in, MPD's Investigator Qualifications and Selection Process. See Def.'s Undisputed ¶ 150. A total of 228 officers, including both Plaintiffs, were found to be eligible for 63 open positions. Id. ¶ 151. The candidates were all ranked and the 63 highest-ranking officers were promoted to Investigator, a precursor to becoming a Detective; the other names remained on the list to be awarded promotions as vacancies occurred in the order of the list. See Investigator Candidate Ranking List [Dkt. 90-15]. The ranking took into account multiple factors in determining each candidate's overall ranking. These included a written examination (20 percent), an interview with a panel (50 percent), and past performance evaluations (10 percent). See Jones Testing Results [Dkt. 90-17]; Weeks Testing Results [Dkt. 90-16]; Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. [Dkt. 90] at 22 (Mot.). At the end of the application process in October 2008, Ms. Weeks was ranked 16th and was selected to become an Investigator. Ms. Jones, however, was ranked 193rd and was not selected, as there were only 63 openings. See Investigator Candidate Ranking List. Although Ms. Jones contends that Sgt. Podorski's \"meets expectations\" performance evaluation in 2006 was the major factor in her ranking, the District maintains that Ms. Jones's overall low score-including her examination results and poor interview-was the determinative factor. See Jones Disputed ¶ J099; Def.'s Undisputed ¶ 63. Ms. Jones has withdrawn her allegations that MPD discriminated against her by failing to promote her to Investigator. See Jones Opp'n at 22 n.6 [Dkt. 96]., When Ms. Weeks was promoted to Investigator in October 2008, she ceased to work as a patrol officer. Instead, Ms. Weeks began to work in the 7D Detectives' Office as an Investigator. See MPD Investigator Selection for Criminal Investigations Division (Oct. 23, 2008) [Dkt. 95-2]., *50Ms. Weeks alleges that she continued to suffer a hostile work environment despite the change in work location and supervisors. She alleges that she was given less desirable assignments than those assigned to male colleagues, arrest warrants she initiated were given to male colleagues for closure, and her cases were reassigned to male detectives. See Weeks Handwritten Notes [Dkt. 95-3] at 1-2. She complains that a superior asked her if she was \"timid\" and that she was \"ridiculed\" once when she requested training. Weeks Dep. at 259, 227. Ms. Weeks also complains that her supervisor, Sgt. Avis King, verbally counseled her for contacting a friend working in MPD's Homicide unit for help on a case and that Sgt. King then sent an email to all 7D detectives to condemn the practice of \"going outside of this unit crying about not receiving assistance with cases\" without following proper protocol, a practice Sgt. King called \"cancerous.\" Avis King Email (Dec. 9, 2008) [Dkt. 95-4]. Later in December 2008, Ms. Weeks requested an hour of leave to attend a funeral service for a fallen police officer, but was denied leave by Sgt. King because there was a mandatory meeting. See Weeks Handwritten Notes at 2. Ms. Weeks complains that another sergeant counseled her for requesting leave. Id., Under D.C. regulations, an employee is entitled to a final interview with her EEO counselor, at which the employee must be given an \"Exit Letter\" informing her of the disposition of her EEO charge and of her right to file a complaint with the Director of the D.C. Office of Human Rights (OHR) within 15 days. See D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 4 § 105.5-105.6. At her request, Ms. Weeks received such an Exit Letter on December 14, 2007; the document warned her that she had 15 days to file a complaint with OHR if she wished to pursue her charges. See Weeks Exit Letter [Dkt. 64-19]; see also Def.'s Undisputed ¶ 158. Despite the warning in the Exit Letter, Ms. Weeks waited until March 31, 2008, to file a complaint of discrimination with OHR alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation. Weeks OHR Complaint (Mar. 31, 2008). Ms. Jones did not ask for an Exit Letter and did not receive one until March 31, 2008. Jones Exit Letter [Dkt. 64-20]. Unlike Ms. Weeks, Ms. Jones promptly filed a sexual orientation-based complaint with OHR on the same day. See Jones OHR Complaint (Mar. 31, 2008), Jones OHR File at 1-2., On December 23, 2008, Plaintiffs' counsel sent letters to MPD stating that both Plaintiffs wanted to amend their initial OHR Complaints to include gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and reprisal, but the letters did not include any sworn statements or charges from Plaintiffs themselves, and were, therefore, ineffective for the purpose. See Jones OHR File at 20; Weeks OHR, *51File at 20. On April 1, 2009, Plaintiffs' counsel sent an email to OHR, attaching statements from Ms. Jones and Ms. Weeks in which they alleged discrimination on the basis of gender in addition to their earlier claims. See Juliette Niehuss Email (Apr. 1, 2009) [Dkt. 90-22]. The date on the signature line of each of Plaintiffs' amended OHR complaints is April 20, 2009, see Weeks OHR Complaint (Apr. 20, 2009), Weeks OHR File at 4; Jones OHR Complaint (Apr. 20, 2009), Jones OHR File at 12, and the District concedes that April 1, 2009, the date of the email with Plaintiffs' statements attached, is the formal filing date of the amendments. See, e.g. , Mot. at 27 (\"Plaintiff [Jones] did not file her EEOC complaint until April 1, 2009.\"); see also id. (citing the April 1, 2009 email as the record citation for Ms. Jones's filing of her amended OHR complaint). The complaints were cross-filed with the Washington Field Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as charges of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., Ms. Jones alleges that, several months later, Sgt. Levenberry emailed OHR investigators to tell them that Ms. Jones threatened EEO complaints whenever she did not get her way; Ms. Jones argues that Sgt. Levenberry sent these emails in retaliation for Ms. Jones having mentioned him in her OHR complaint. See Levenberry OHR Emails [Dkt. 95-7]. Sgt. Levenberry has testified that he was merely answering questions from OHR investigators concerning an EEO charge filed by Ms. Jones against him. See Levenberry Dep. at 52., Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on January 25, 2011. Complaint [Dkt. 1]. Their Third Amended Complaint, filed December 28, 2012, included thirteen counts. See 3d Am. Compl. [Dkt. 26]. This Court dismissed Plaintiffs' constitutional claims, Counts XI, XII, and XIII, on July 25, 2012. See 7/25/2012 Order [Dkt. 16].9 The Court dismissed Counts VIII and X, alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII, on June 30, 2016. 6/30/2016 Order [Dkt. 89]. In her Opposition to Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Ms. Jones withdrew her claims based upon discriminatory non-promotion, Counts II, IV, VI, IX, and X. See Jones Opp'n at 22 n.6.10 Both Plaintiffs now advance a case of an alleged hostile work environment due to their sexual preference and a retaliatory hostile work environment due to their protected activities. They also allege a hostile work environment due to their sex. Remaining for decision are: Count I, which alleges a hostile work environment in violation of DCHRA due to Plaintiffs' sexual orientation; Count III, which alleges a hostile work environment in violation of DCHRA on the basis of Plaintiffs' sex; Count V, which alleges a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII on the basis of Plaintiffs' sex; and Count VII, which alleges a retaliatory hostile work environment in violation of DCHRA due to *52Plaintiffs' protected activities. See 3d Am. Compl. at 25-31.11, The Court advised the parties at a status conference on June 30, 2016, that supplemental briefing was required due to internal inconsistencies, lack of clarity, and the lack of record citations in Plantiffs' briefs. See 6/30/2016 Minute Entry; Tr. of Status Conference (June 30, 2016) [Dkt. 91]; 6/30/2016 Order (ordering supplemental briefing). The parties subsequently filed supplemental briefs, which are ripe for decision. The District filed a renewed motion for summary judgment. See Mot. Ms. Weeks and Ms. Jones filed separate briefs in opposition. See Weeks Opp'n to Def.'s 2d Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. 93] (Weeks Opp'n); Jones Opp'n to Def.'s 2d Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. 96] (Jones Opp'n). The District replied. Reply to Opp'n to 2d Mot. for Summ. J. [Dkt. 99] (Reply)., A. Motion for Summary Judgment, Summary judgment shall be granted \"if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is \"material\" if it is capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the litigation. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute is \"genuine\" if there is sufficient admissible evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Scott v. Harris , 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007)., The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of identifying portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (providing that the movant may cite to \"depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations ..., admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials\")., *53In response, the non-moving party must similarly designate specific facts in the record that reveal a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548. On a motion for summary judgment, a court must analyze all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, to the extent the non-moving party relies on conclusory assertions offered without evidentiary support, such assertions do not establish a genuine issue for trial. See Greene v. Dalton , 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C. Cir. 1999)., Durant v. D.C. Gov't , 875 F.3d 685, 700 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. , 510 U.S. 17, 21, 23, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993), and Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson , 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) ) (internal citations omitted). There is no bright-line test for a hostile work environment, and a plaintiff need not show psychological harm or any specific adverse employment outcome. See Harris , 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367. To make a prima facie Title VII hostile work environment claim based on sex, the plaintiff employee must show:, Almost all of the legal tenets developed under Title VII are applied by D.C. courts when applying the D.C. Human Rights Act. See Attakora v. D.C. , 943 F.Supp.2d 152, 157 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Am. Univ. v. D.C. Comm'n on Human Rights , 598 A.2d 416, 422 (D.C. 1991) (\"In deciding cases brought under [DCHRA], we follow the allocations of burdens and *54order of proof prescribed for cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.\") ). In addition to sex, DCHRA establishes sexual orientation as a protected class. See D.C. CODE § 2-1401.01 (stating the intent of DCHRA is to end \"discrimination for any reason other than that of individual merit, including, but not limited to ... sexual orientation [or] gender identity or expression\")., DCHRA specifies that it is an \"unlawful discriminatory practice\" to retaliate against an employee for having \"exercised or enjoyed, or ... aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of any right granted or protected under [DCHRA],\" or \"because that person has opposed any [discriminatory] practice ... or because that person has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing authorized under [DCHRA].\" D.C. CODE § 2-1402.61(a) - (b)., To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under DCHRA, a plaintiff *55must demonstrate that: (1) she was engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer took a materially adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the materially adverse action. See Taylor v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth. , 957 A.2d 45, 54 (D.C. 2008) ; see also Bryant v. D.C. , 102 A.3d 264, 268 (D.C. 2014) (noting that the analysis for DCHRA retaliation is the same as for Title VII). In order for a factfinder to infer a causal connection between an employee's protected activity and an adverse action, there must be evidence that the employer was aware of the employee's protected activity. See McFarland v. George Washington Univ. , 935 A.2d 337, 357-58 (D.C. 2007)., To bring an EEO lawsuit under DCHRA, a District employee must file \"within one year of the unlawful discriminatory act, or the discovery thereof,\" which deadline is tolled for as long as a timely complaint is pending with OHR. See D.C. CODE § 2-1403.16(a) (\"The timely filing of a complaint with the Office, or under the administrative procedures established by the Mayor pursuant to § 2-1403.03, shall toll the running of the statute of limitations while the complaint is pending.\").","caseName":"Jones v. Dist. of Columbia","caseNameFull":"Tonia L. JONES v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA","citation":["314 F. Supp. 3d 36"],"citeCount":1,"cluster_id":7330482,"court":"Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit","court_citation_string":"D.C. Cir.","court_id":"cadc","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2018-06-04","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Civil Action No. 11–215 (RMC)","docket_id":64318966,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T13:39:25.295951Z","date_created":"2022-07-25T05:37:11.566571Z","score":{"bm25":15.920017}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":7248399,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T11:28:05.351661Z","date_created":"2022-07-25T05:37:11.577632Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Hostile Work Environment Based on Sexual Orientation\nAt the heart of this case are Plaintiffs' allegations that they were subjected to a hostile work environment on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of DCHRA.13 To the detriment of their allegations, Plaintiffs have adopted an \"everything but the kitchen sink\" litigation strategy, by wh","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[7248399],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9430777/state-v-ashford/","attorney":"","caseName":"State v. Ashford","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2023 Ohio 3139"],"citeCount":1,"cluster_id":9430777,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. 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Ashford, 2023-Ohio-3139.]\n\n\n\n\n                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO\n                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT\n                                      LUCAS COUNTY\n\nState of Ohio                                           Court of Appeals No. L-22-1296\n                                                                             L-22-1299\n        Appellee\n                                                        Trial Court No. CR0202101808\n     ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9882634],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Zmuda. Judgment denying dismissal after mistrial affirmed where defendants consented by stating they had no objection to mistrial and selecting new trial date, and the record demonstrated no prosecutorial intent to provoke a mistrial based on consent, manifest necessity to declare a mistrial not a consideration."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4791670/cain-ridge-beef-farm-llc-v-fisher/","attorney":"","caseName":"Cain Ridge Beef Farm, L.L.C. v. Fisher","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2020 Ohio 4727"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4791670,"court":"Ohio Court of Appeals","court_citation_string":"Ohio Ct. 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Fisher, 2020-Ohio-4727.]\n\n\n\n\n             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO\n                             SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT\n                                  MONROE COUNTY\n\n                         CAIN RIDGE BEEF FARM, LLC ET AL.,\n\n                                        Plaintiffs-Appellees,\n\n                                                     v.\n\n                                EDNA LYDIA FISHER ET AL.,\n\n                                     Defe","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4572017],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"dormant mineral act notice of intent to declare abandoned affidavit of abandonment notice of failure to file wrong party listed as surface owner standing summary judgment de novo."},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10155157/the-people-of-the-state-of-colorado-v-rodney-dewayne-mcdonald/","attorney":"","caseName":"The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado v. 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