{"count":61784,"next":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/search/?cursor=cz0yMy42NjY1MTUmcz0yMzYwMjg4JnQ9byZkPTIwMjYtMDgtMjEmcD0y&q=ALTERNATIVES+TO+RECOVERING+EXPECTATION+DAMAGES+EXPECTATION+DAMAGES&type=o","previous":null,"results":[{"absolute_url":"/opinion/7101364/baker-ex-rel-mandatory-punitive-damages-class-v-hazelwood/","attorney":"John F. Daum, O’Melveny & Myers, LLP, Los Angeles, California, for appellant Exxon Corporation., David M. Heilbron (briefed), McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen, LLP, San Francisco, California, for appellant Exxon Shipping Company., Thomas M. Russo (briefed), Chalos & Brown, P.C., New York, New York, for appellant Joseph Hazelwood., David C. Tarshes (briefed), David W. Oesting, Stephen M. Rummage, Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP, Anchorage, Alaska, for the appellees., Brian B. O’Neill (argued), Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis, Minnesota, James vanR. Springer, Dickstein Shapiro Morin & Oshinsky LLP, Washington, DC, for the appellees.","caseName":"Baker ex rel. Mandatory Punitive Damages Class v. Hazelwood","caseNameFull":"In re: the EXXON VALDEZ, Grant Baker, as representatives of the Mandatory Punitive Damages Class v. Joseph Hazelwood, and Exxon Corporation Exxon Shipping Company, In re: the Exxon Valdez, Grant Baker, as representatives of the Mandatory Punitive Damages Class v. Exxon Corporation Exxon Shipping Company, and Joseph Hazelwood, Daniel R. Calhoun Bradford J. Chisholm David P. Clarke Thomas S. McAllister Phillip G. McCrudden Michael J. McClenaghan Guy Piercey Hugh Wisner Grant C. Baker Larry L. Dooley Kim J. Ewers John W. Herschleb Kent Herschleb David B. Horne Michael J. Owecke Gerald E. Thorne George A. Gordaoff Old Harbor Native Corporation Timberline, Inc. Barbara Brown John Foges Jamie L. Halladay Charles McMahon Jennifer Briggs Terri Mast Mark T. Coles Fred Galicano Mike Hollerbeke Kathy Bryan Vincent Libed Art Huddleston Robert Love Roxane Villaueva Marcelo Rombaoa Scott Hulbert Brian Gillis Frank Michael Carlson Elenor McMullen Native Village of Larsen Bay Native Village of Chenega Bay v. Exxon Corporation Exxon Shipping Company Joseph Hazelwood","citation":["270 F.3d 1215","2001 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9528","154 Oil & Gas Rep. 1","2001 Daily Journal DAR 11915","32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20320","2002 A.M.C. 1","2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 24029"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":7101364,"court":"Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit","court_citation_string":"9th Cir.","court_id":"ca9","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2001-11-07","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"Nos. 97-35191 to 97-35193 and 97-35235","docket_id":64089714,"judge":"Browning, Kleinfeld, Schroeder","lexisCite":"2001 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9528","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T12:37:47.277611Z","date_created":"2022-07-24T03:53:44.280014Z","score":{"bm25":51.583424}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[6679,72143,86749,93475,98958,101179,106041,106209,106390,107317,108764,109091,110067,110468,110546,110676,110825,111000,111719,112393,112503,112557,112900,112930,117862,117989,118026,118313,118424,199180,233058,283787,292031,393055,393268,406712,411240,433397,451952,455820,484901,525664,554941,585271,660274,665976,670796,675204,676444,677122,677429,699276,708161,726585,729816,732382,744679,744857,766186,766294,767799,769127,772038,1124484,1166828,1379743,1402640,1403012,1406103,1432170,1432372,1446417,1520437,2262240,2491608,2552631,2609795,3608329,5463621,6928676,6937406,6943698,6944370,6945092,6952460,6982796,6985267,6985579,8373751,8757170,8933907,8950084,8999204,9033784,9418331,9428452,9433294,9434070,9460911,9483546],"download_url":null,"id":7007101,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T09:55:51.720721Z","date_created":"2022-07-24T03:53:44.314113Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nKLEINFELD, Circuit Judge:\nThis is an appeal of a $5 billion punitive damages award arising out of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. This is not a case about befouling the environment. This is a case about commercial fishing. The jury was specifically instructed that it could not award damages for environmental harm. The reason is that under a stipulation with the United States and Alaska, Exxon had already been punished f","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[7007101],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4732261/victoria-druding-v-care-alternatives/","attorney":"","caseName":"Victoria Druding v. Care Alternatives","caseNameFull":"","citation":["952 F.3d 89"],"citeCount":36,"cluster_id":4732261,"court":"Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit","court_citation_string":"3rd Cir.","court_id":"ca3","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-03-04","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"18-3298","docket_id":16926660,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-17T21:57:30.648490Z","date_created":"2020-03-04T18:00:14.167922Z","score":{"bm25":43.406147}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[33767,77158,107624,220093,221854,463485,511776,762065,787607],"download_url":"https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/183298p.pdf","id":4512608,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/03/04/victoria_druding_v._care_alternatives.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-11-17T21:57:30.645778Z","date_created":"2020-03-04T18:00:14.172661Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"dfeac899e3401ad3cb77da3597d3710716fe1f76","snippet":"                                       PRECEDENTIAL\n\n       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS\n            FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT\n                 _____________\n\n                     No. 18-3298\n                    _____________\n\n  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and STATE OF NEW\nJERSEY ex rel. VICTORIA DRUDING; BARBARA BAIN;\n        LINDA COLEMAN; RONNI O’BRIEN\n\n                           v.\n\n               CARE ALTERNATIVES\n\nVictoria Druding, Barbara Bain, Linda Coleman, and Ronni\n                        ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4512608],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4342452/waiver-of-claims-for-damages-arising-out-of-cooperativespace-activity/","attorney":"","caseName":"Waiver of Claims for Damages Arising Out of CooperativeSpace Activity","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4342452,"court":"Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel","court_citation_string":"OLC","court_id":"olc","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"1995-06-07","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":null,"docket_id":4575235,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-09-03T16:23:50.465468Z","date_created":"2017-01-27T22:42:09.791337Z","score":{"bm25":37.702694}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[92666,99561,101753,102726,102804,105269,226890,231802,358556,5536322,9418565,9418915,9419200,9421456,9423566,9428506,9429969,9430736,9432491,9432994],"download_url":"https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1995/06/31/op-olc-v019-p0140_0.pdf","id":4119713,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/1995/06/07/waiver_of_claims_for_damages_arising_out_of_cooperativespace_activity.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T14:12:05.826046Z","date_created":"2017-01-27T22:42:09.800793Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"1f9a068b74d9be471fce7551f2dc24320a715462","snippet":"    Waiver of Claims for Damages Arising Out of Cooperative\n                         Space Activity\nCongress has not authorized the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to waive subrogated\n   claims on behalf of federal agencies against foreign States for damages arising out of cooperative\n   space activity. An amendm ent to the Space Act would be necessary to grant NASA such authority.\n\nThe President m ay waive claims, including subrogated claims, against foreign governments, in\n   exc","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4119713],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/2280832/californians-for-alternatives-to-toxics-v-california-department-of/","attorney":"Counsel, Law Offices of Thomas N. Lippe, Thomas N. Lippe; and Michael W. Graf for Plaintiff and Appellant., Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Mary E. Hackenbracht, Assistant Attorney General, and Matthew J. Goldman, Deputy Attorney General, for Defendants and Respondents., McKenna Long & Aldridge, Stanley W. Landfair, Ann G. Grimaldi and Eric S. C. Lindstrom for Real Parties in Interest and Respondents Dow AgroSciences, Gowan Company, Platte Chemical Company, and Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc., Howrey Simon Arnold & White, Buckmaster de Wolf, Lisa S. Buccino and David B. Weinberg for Real Parties in Interest and Respondents FMC Corporation and Makhteshim Agan of North America, Inc.","caseName":"Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. California Department of Pesticide Regulation","caseNameFull":"CALIFORNIANS FOR ALTERNATIVES TO TOXICS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF PESTICIDE REGULATION Et Al., Defendants and Respondents; DOW AGROSCIENCES Et Al., Real Parties in Interest and Respondents","citation":["39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 393","136 Cal. App. 4th 1049"],"citeCount":30,"cluster_id":2280832,"court":"California Court of Appeal","court_citation_string":"Cal. Ct. App.","court_id":"calctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2006-02-16","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"C046813","docket_id":354227,"judge":"Raye","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-21T10:18:58.659938Z","date_created":"2015-06-16T23:46:32.314729Z","score":{"bm25":37.348145}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":6554,"cites":[1259255,2261901,2268335,2525487],"download_url":null,"id":2280832,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T18:40:47.021871Z","date_created":"2013-10-30T08:58:18.537263Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"c0f1695610e78f540319a0ac05603160d290b89a","snippet":"\n39 Cal.Rptr.3d 393 (2006)\n136 Cal.App.4th 1049\nCALIFORNIANS FOR ALTERNATIVES TO TOXICS, Plaintiff and Appellant,\nv.\nCALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF PESTICIDE REGULATION et al., Defendants and Respondents;\nDow Agrosciences et al., Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.\nNo. C046813.\nCourt of Appeal, Third District.\nFebruary 15, 2006.\nAs Mo","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[2280832],"source":"LU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4342657/damages-and-arbitration-provisions-in-proposed-amendments-to-the-fair/","attorney":"","caseName":"Damages and Arbitration Provisions in Proposed Amendments to the Fair Housing Act","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4342657,"court":"Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel","court_citation_string":"OLC","court_id":"olc","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"1987-06-08","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":null,"docket_id":4575440,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-09-03T16:23:53.987033Z","date_created":"2017-01-27T22:43:46.514091Z","score":{"bm25":34.768524}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[87010,97062,101389,101435,102804,103304,104545,108968,109014,109625,9418456,9418738,9421696,9424206,9425255,9427142,9427331,9428883,9430184,9430716,9430943,9442447],"download_url":"https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/1987/06/31/op-olc-v011-p0050_0.pdf","id":4119918,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/1987/06/08/damages_and_arbitration_provisions_in_proposed_amendments_to_the_fair.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T14:12:11.510480Z","date_created":"2017-01-27T22:43:46.519794Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"0d7f4a9c73b9e486b9149c367f28dd9ec6107ef8","snippet":"           Damages and Arbitration Provisions in Proposed\n               Amendments to the Fair Housing Act\n\nC ertain proposed am endm ents to the Fair Housing Act would provide that parties may voluntar­\n   ily subm it their dispute to an arbitrator empowered to im pose compensatory and punitive\n   dam ages (as opposed to equitable relief or restitution). These amendments would be permis­\n   sible under the Seventh Amendment because they amount to a waiver o f a right, that would\n   otherw ise ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4119918],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/9507322/rent-to-own-llc-v-cr-fed-leasing-llc/","attorney":"","caseName":"Rent to Own, LLC v. CR-FED Leasing, LLC","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":9507322,"court":"Texas Court of Appeals, 13th District","court_citation_string":"Tex. App.-Edinburg-Corpus Christi","court_id":"txctapp13","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2024-05-23","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"13-23-00563-CV","docket_id":68581823,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-02-24T13:15:00.509445Z","date_created":"2024-05-25T17:12:14.543965Z","score":{"bm25":30.183645}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1382358,1383422,1615396,1745343,1879004,2807283,2828414,5109271,5282674,5287748,5288036,6107915],"download_url":"https://search.txcourts.gov/RetrieveDocument.aspx?DocId=65007&Index=%5c%5c10%2e20%2e4%2e7%5cTamesIndexes%5ccoa13%5cOpinion","id":9973935,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2024/05/23/rent_to_own_llc_v._cr-fed_leasing_llc.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-02-24T13:15:00.505908Z","date_created":"2024-05-25T17:12:14.546359Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"47e7f679657fe8a447245d6bc39f70fe5013c572","snippet":"                         NUMBER 13-23-00563-CV\n\n                           COURT OF APPEALS\n\n                  THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS\n\n                    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG\n\n\nRENT TO OWN, LLC,                                                       Appellant,\n\n                                             v.\n\nCR-FED LEASING, LLC,                                                      Appellee.\n\n\n             ON APPEAL FROM THE 131ST DISRTICT COURT\n                    OF BEXAR COUNTY, TE","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9973935],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10675382/doe-v-lamb/","attorney":"","caseName":"Doe v. Lamb","caseNameFull":"","citation":["235 Conn. App. 295"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10675382,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2025-09-23","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC46466","docket_id":71415533,"judge":"Elgo; Clark; Westbrook","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:46:50.760789Z","date_created":"2025-09-22T12:03:38.880981Z","score":{"bm25":29.532957}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[618831,1844436,1897031,1908691,2308307,2680439,2717514,3321923,3584293,4079223,4123739,4320835,4405014,4416647,5665435,7841453,7844168,7844892,7845745,7846881,7847323,7847953,7847972,7848046,7848156,7848294,7848531,7859035,7859201,7863995,8915697,9434240,9678436,9804059,9889061],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP235/AP235.344.pdf","id":11141969,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2025/09/23/doe_v._lamb.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:46:50.709497Z","date_created":"2025-09-22T12:03:38.884070Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"4104da17e9e72d72eba972f0039d8ab6d57299e8","snippet":"************************************************\n   The “officially released” date that appears near the\nbeginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be\npublished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it\nis released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the\nbeginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-\nion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-\ncially released” date appearing in the opinion.\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncor","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Action to recover damages for, inter alia, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Windham at Putnam, where the court, Lynch, J., granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant Matthew Lohbush; thereafter, the court, Lohr, J., granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant JoAnn Lohbush as to the plaintiff Jane Doe 2; subsequently, the court, Lohr, J., granted the motion for summary judgment filed by the defen- dant JoAnn Lohbush as to the plaintiff Jane Doe 1 et al. and rendered judgment for the defendant JoAnn Lohbush, from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Affirmed. James J. Healy, with whom was Christopher P. Anderson, for the appellants (plaintiffs). Stephanie M. Javarauckas, with whom, on the brief, was Edward W. Gasser, for the appellee (defendant JoAnn Lohbush).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11141969],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiffs, victims of criminal computer hacking by the defendant L, appealed from the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in favor of L's parent, the defendant J. The plaintiffs claimed that the court improperly granted summary judgment because J had voluntarily assumed a duty of care to them to monitor and supervise L's Internet usage at J's home or, in the alternative, J owed a general duty of care arising from her affirmative conduct, and J failed to prevent L, an adult, from hacking into the plaintiffs' social media accounts to obtain and post on the Internet photographs of them in the nude. Held: The trial court properly rendered summary judgment for J on the plaintiffs' claims sounding in negligence, in which they alleged that J had voluntarily assumed a duty of care to them, as this court could not conclude that a reasonable person in J's position could foresee that the mere act of providing a computer or Internet service to an adult child would result in the kind of harm the plaintiffs alleged, and, although J had made gratuitous, unsolicited email statements to the police representing what she had done and was intending to do to prevent future hacking attempts by L, there was no genuine issue of material fact that J did not learn that L had stolen the plaintiffs' photographs and posted them online until after that conduct had ceased. Furthermore, contrary to the plaintiffs' claim, public policy considerations, under the circumstances at issue, did not compel the conclusion that J's actions gave rise to a duty of care to the plaintiffs, as the parties' normal expectations weighed against establishing such a duty, any benefit that might accrue from recognizing a public policy of encouraging parents to monitor their adult children's Internet use could not be counterbalanced by the practical difficulties inherent in taking on such a task, the recognition of such a legal duty would increase litigation, and the decisions of courts in other jurisdictions informed this court's determination that it could not conclude that J had taken on a policy of supervising L that was analogous to that of employers who undertake to supervise their employees. The plaintiffs' claim that J owed them and other similarly situated victims a general duty of care on the basis of her assurances to the police that she would supervise L's computer related activities was unavailing, as this court was not convinced that J, in voluntarily undertaking to monitor L's activities, increased the risk of harm to the plaintiffs, who provided no evidentiary basis for their assertion that, subsequent to her statements to the police, J knew that L would be tempted to engage in further misconduct or that no one else would assume the responsibility for preventing his misconduct, and the fact that the General Assembly has not expressed, by way of statute, a public policy interest supporting the imposition of third-party liability against those who provide Internet access to others weighed against creating a common-law duty of care in such circumstances. Argued January 13—officially released September 23, 2025"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/2526187/akalwadi-v-risk-management-alternatives-inc/","attorney":"Devashis A. Kayal, Dev A. Kayal LLC, Silver Spring, MD, for Plaintiff., Jeffrey L. Friedman, Friedman and Associates LLP, Reisterstown, MD, for Defendant.","caseName":"Akalwadi v. Risk Management Alternatives, Inc.","caseNameFull":"Kiran AKALWADI, Plaintiff, v. RISK MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES, INC., Defendant","citation":["336 F. Supp. 2d 492","2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19066","2004 WL 2115593"],"citeCount":69,"cluster_id":2526187,"court":"District Court, D. Maryland","court_citation_string":"D. Maryland","court_id":"mdd","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2004-09-22","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"CIV. RDB-02-3604","docket_id":2389706,"judge":"Bennett","lexisCite":"2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19066","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-21T12:31:46.686737Z","date_created":"2014-10-30T23:48:10.766254Z","score":{"bm25":28.51286}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":253,"cites":[111620,111719,111722,117919,118465,602804,673883,676076,728011,741752,757236,776848,785003,1505589,1529805,1808218,1970800],"download_url":null,"id":2526187,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T20:29:27.099328Z","date_created":"2013-10-30T10:11:31.789737Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"216c5c0b08e429ee512cedebc2ce372759aa5240","snippet":"\n336 F.Supp.2d 492 (2004)\nKiran AKALWADI, Plaintiff,\nv.\nRISK MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES, INC., Defendant.\nNo. CIV. RDB-02-3604.\nUnited States District Court, D. Maryland, Northern Division.\nSeptember 22, 2004.\n*493 *494 *495 *496</","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[2526187],"source":"LU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4508440/the-comm-to-elect-dan-forest-v-emps-political-action-comm/","attorney":"Walker Law Firm, PLLC, by David \"Steven\" Walker, for the Plaintiff-Appellant., Stevens Martin Vaughn & Tadych, PLLC, by C. Amanda Martin, Raleigh, for the Defendant-Appellee.","caseName":"The Comm. To Elect Dan Forest v. Emps. Political Action Comm.","caseNameFull":"The COMMITTEE TO ELECT DAN FOREST, a Political Committee, Plaintiff, v. EMPLOYEES POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (EMPAC), Defendant.","citation":["817 S.E.2d 738","260 N.C. App. 1"],"citeCount":2,"cluster_id":4508440,"court":"Court of Appeals of North Carolina","court_citation_string":"N.C. Ct. App.","court_id":"ncctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2018-06-19","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"COA17-569","docket_id":7205389,"judge":"Dillon, McGee","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-12-13T14:29:02.691570Z","date_created":"2018-06-19T12:11:05.406529Z","score":{"bm25":28.044254}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1741,99472,109380,112315,131149,145776,1156881,1217192,1223313,1227268,1284312,1298711,1314597,1320160,1320291,1324018,1327689,1329211,1335634,1337377,1339458,1339684,1340738,1360447,1364527,1366616,1390751,1392263,1395984,1411472,1419621,3203656,3652753,3656152,3672103,3676257,3678194],"download_url":"http://appellate.nccourts.org/opinions/?c=2&pdf=36054","id":4285693,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2018/06/19/the_comm._to_elect_dan_forest_v._emps._political_action_comm.â.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T16:06:29.358070Z","date_created":"2018-06-19T12:11:05.416406Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"d03e3f9e1093075e3d7cb0148add76f7f92dc92c","snippet":"               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA\n\n                                   No. COA17-569\n\n                                 Filed: 19 June 2018\n\nWake County, No. 16-CV-003099\n\nTHE COMMITTEE TO ELECT DAN FOREST, a political committee, Plaintiff,\n\n              v.\n\nEMPLOYEES POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE (EMPAC), Defendant.\n\n\n        Appeal by Plaintiff from order entered 15 February 2017 by Judge Allen\n\nBaddour in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 October\n","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[9886607,9886608,4285693],"source":"CU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"Standing, Injury in fact, political advertisement, Stand by your ad law, statutory damages"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/8749036/schaake-v-risk-management-alternatives-inc/","attorney":"Jerome Noll, Lax & Noll, New York City, for Plaintiff., Jonathan M. Borg, Lisa Martinez Wolmart, Pitney, Hardin, Kipp & Szuch, LLP, New York City, for Defendant.","caseName":"Schaake v. Risk Management Alternatives, Inc.","caseNameFull":"Gerda SCHAAKE, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated v. RISK MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES, INC.","citation":["203 F.R.D. 108","2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15933","2001 WL 1181015"],"citeCount":27,"cluster_id":8749036,"court":"District Court, S.D. New York","court_citation_string":"S.D.N.Y.","court_id":"nysd","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2001-09-14","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"No. 01 CIV. 4441(CM)","docket_id":66015028,"judge":"McMahon","lexisCite":"2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15933","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T21:18:58.554224Z","date_created":"2022-11-26T09:51:57.905713Z","score":{"bm25":27.950382}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[110225,425978,556477,674629,718739,764095,1461837,2491462,8729559,8730508,8731719,8731749,8795507,9039109],"download_url":null,"id":8732305,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-27T04:06:08.417695Z","date_created":"2022-11-26T09:51:57.915888Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nMEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS\nMCMAHON, District Judge.\nPlaintiff filed a class action complaint on May 23, 2001, alleging violations of the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., seeking statutory damages as well as injunctive and declaratory relief for the plaintiff and the class. On June 26, 2001, prior to filing any res","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[8732305],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/8750357/in-re-risk-management-alternatives-inc/","attorney":"Robert I. Lax, New York City, for consolidated plaintiffs., Lisa Martinez Wolmart, Pitney, Hardin, Kipp & Szuch, LLP, Morristown, NJ, for defendants.","caseName":"In re Risk Management Alternatives, Inc.","caseNameFull":"In re RISK MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES, INC., FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT LITIGATION","citation":["208 F.R.D. 493","2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11055","2002 WL 1363286"],"citeCount":12,"cluster_id":8750357,"court":"District Court, S.D. New York","court_citation_string":"S.D.N.Y.","court_id":"nysd","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2002-06-14","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"No. 01 Civ. 4441(CM)","docket_id":66016355,"judge":"McMahon","lexisCite":"2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11055","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T21:19:24.567953Z","date_created":"2022-11-26T10:00:05.846405Z","score":{"bm25":26.720789}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[106395,109050,110737,111722,498051,572670,602804,700478,711066,759119,775320,1462936,1492763,1620125,1965354,2421041,6933712,8731702,8731719,8796804,8796932,8981411,9025064,9026088,9034156,9040166,9041383,9043491,9430607],"download_url":null,"id":8733627,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T18:37:01.290056Z","date_created":"2022-11-26T10:00:05.857655Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nMEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS, GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT\nMCMAHON, District Judge.\nPlaintiff brings this action under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, et seq. (“FDCPA”), alleging that defendant’s attempts","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[8733627],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10607919/in-re-recommendations-to-revise-discovery-rules/","attorney":"","caseName":"In Re Recommendations to Revise Discovery Rules","caseNameFull":"","citation":["2019 Ark. 399"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10607919,"court":"Supreme Court of Arkansas","court_citation_string":"Ark.","court_id":"ark","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2019-12-12","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"","docket_id":70567517,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-06-18T02:27:42.801537Z","date_created":"2025-06-18T02:27:42.742917Z","score":{"bm25":25.594662}},"neutralCite":"2019 Ark. 399","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"https://opinions.arcourts.gov/ark/supremecourt/en/454373/1/document.do","id":11074507,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2019/12/12/in_re_recommendations_to_revise_discovery_rules.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T04:09:23.725936Z","date_created":"2025-06-18T02:27:42.752881Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":true,"sha1":"db1222a9c9d85489ddfd2cdcad350dc0dfa2b63e","snippet":"                                   Cite as 2019 Ark. 399\n\n                SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS\n                                                 Opinion Delivered: December 12, 2019\n\nIN RE ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT\nCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL PRACTICE –\nRECOMMENDATIONS TO REVISE\nDISCOVERY RULES\n\n\n\n\n                                      PER CURIAM\n\n       We publish for public comment              our   Committee on Civil       Practice’s\n\nrecommendations for amendments to Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedu","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11074507],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/10357013/zurich-american-insurance-company-as-successor-by-merger-to-maryland/","attorney":"","caseName":"Zurich American Insurance Company, as Successor by Merger to Maryland Casualty Company v. the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company, as Successor to Burlington Northern Railroad Company, and as Successor in Interests to Great Northern Railway Company","caseNameFull":"","citation":[],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":10357013,"court":"Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth)","court_citation_string":"Tex. App.-Fort Worth","court_id":"txctapp2","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2025-03-13","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"02-23-00245-CV","docket_id":68141651,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-02-24T13:22:51.552328Z","date_created":"2025-03-17T08:18:08.849942Z","score":{"bm25":25.559586}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[15352,341347,402530,887364,894766,894788,895047,895084,895295,1215466,1380604,1402310,1438841,1441444,1488007,1499274,1499436,1515317,1574006,1588498,1633998,1637415,1651858,1662491,1676438,1742633,1742741,1757229,1763799,1773107,1783236,1783842,1947466,1985256,2107557,2125975,2273986,2427972,2428635,2432038,2448540,2513927,2831275,2831500,3008274,3076464,3100448,4154729,4342983,5108247,5287160,6108821,6111244,7237789,9858442],"download_url":"https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaID=7ba93ec0-78b3-4725-a840-a163f01b146e","id":10823601,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2025/03/13/zurich_american_insurance_company_as_successor_by_merger_to_maryland.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-02-24T13:22:51.581713Z","date_created":"2025-03-17T08:18:08.855493Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"9da1415510df245950603b599e08d66e4274f711","snippet":"                         In the\n                    Court of Appeals\n            Second Appellate District of Texas\n                     at Fort Worth\n                 ___________________________\n                      No. 02-23-00245-CV\n                 ___________________________\n\nZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, AS SUCCESSOR BY MERGER\n         TO MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellant\n\n                                V.\n\nTHE BURLINGTON NORTHERN AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, AS\nSUCCESSOR TO BUR","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[10823601],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/5301224/gallagher-v-fairfield/","attorney":"","caseName":"Gallagher v. Fairfield","caseNameFull":"","citation":["339 Conn. 801"],"citeCount":2,"cluster_id":5301224,"court":"Supreme Court of Connecticut","court_citation_string":"Conn.","court_id":"conn","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2021-07-28","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"SC20533","docket_id":61578476,"judge":"Robinson; McDonald; D’Auria; Mullins; Kahn; Ecker; Keller","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-04-01T02:48:14.104868Z","date_created":"2021-11-29T17:02:54.294306Z","score":{"bm25":25.4718}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[2298521,4029562,5975945],"download_url":null,"id":11297705,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2021/07/28/gallagher_v._fairfield.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-04-01T02:59:50.195687Z","date_created":"2026-04-01T02:45:14.774089Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"b623da9643190bc619c822ddfef25d09f7ae132f","snippet":"              JAMES G. GALLAGHER v. TOWN\n                  OF FAIRFIELD ET AL.\n                       (SC 20533)\n             Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins,\n                       Kahn, Ecker and Keller, Js.\n\n                                   Syllabus\n\nThe plaintiff sought damages from the defendant town for, inter alia, breach\n   of contract. The plaintiff worked as a police officer for the town and\n   retired on disability in 1986 after sustaining an injury in the course of ","type":"combined-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROcr/CR339/339CR43.pdf","id":5129786,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2021/11/30/gallagher_v._fairfield.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-10T21:23:20.618222Z","date_created":"2021-11-29T17:02:54.300388Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"a6c916365b9d97c325ebbb1c84d90427abe18051","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Fairfield and tried to the court, Radcliffe, J.; judgment in part for the plaintiff, from which the defendants appealed and the plaintiff cross appealed. Reversed in part; judgment directed. Catherine L. Creager, with whom was James T. Bald- win, for the appellants-cross appellees (defendants). William J. Ward, for the appellee-cross appellant (plaintiff).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11297705,5129786],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiff sought damages from the defendant town for, inter alia, breach of contract. The plaintiff worked as a police officer for the town and retired on disability in 1986 after sustaining an injury in the course of his employment. In 1985, the town had entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union in which the plaintiff was member. At that time, federal law did not permit municipal employees to enroll in Medicare, but the law was amended thereafter to permit or require municipal employees to participate in Medicare. The 1985 collective bargaining agreement provided that union members who retired due to disability would be entitled to town paid private health insurance. In 2016, the year after the plaintiff reached the age of sixty-five, the town informed him that he would be required to enroll in Medicare and to pay the cost of his Medicare Part B premiums. The plaintiff claimed that the town was bound to provide him with town paid private health insurance under the collective bargaining agreement or, alternatively, that it was obligated to subsidize the costs of his Medicare Part B premiums. Follow- ing a trial, the court concluded that the collective bargaining agreement 802 NOVEMBER, 2021 339 Conn. 801 Gallagher v. Fairfield did not bar the town from requiring that the plaintiff transition to Medi- care, so long as the Medicare plan did not substantially reduce the benefits provided. The court also concluded, however, that the town was bound to subsidize the costs of his Medicare Part B premiums. Thereafter, the town appealed and the plaintiff cross appealed from the trial court's judgment. Held: 1. The trial court correctly concluded that the collective bargaining agree- ment did not preclude the town from terminating the private health insurance in which the plaintiff was enrolled and requiring him to transi- tion to Medicare coverage: the collective bargaining agreement did not specifically require that the plaintiff be placed, and that he remain, on the same health insurance plan as the town's ''active employees,'' as that term did not appear in the agreement, and the agreement did not address what rights retirees would have following the expiration of that agreement in 1987; moreover, the agreement did not specify whether Medicare qualifies as an insurance carrier or whether retirees who become eligible for Medicare can be treated differently from active employees, and, although a 2010 collective bargaining agreement between the town and the union required eligible union retirees to participate in Medicare, that did not necessarily mean that the silence in the 1985 collective bargaining agreement with respect to that issue was purposeful, as federal Medicare law changed after the 1985 collective bargaining agreement went into effect, and testimony at trial suggested that, when the town agreed, in 1985, to subsidize retirees' health insur- ance costs for life, it was with the expectation that the retirees would not be eligible to enroll in Medicare and that private insurance would be their only available coverage option; furthermore, the town's course of performance in allowing the plaintiff to remain enrolled in private health insurance since his retirement in 1986 did not demonstrate that the plaintiff was entitled to continue on that path, as he was not eligible to enroll in Medicare until he turned sixty-five, the only reason why the town did not immediately terminate the plaintiff's private insurance coverage when he did turn sixty-five was that there was confusion over whether that transition needed to be delayed pending the resolution of a workers' compensation claim, and other union members who retired along with the plaintiff under the 1985 collective bargaining agreement also had been transitioned to Medicare. 2. This court declined to address the plaintiff's claim that the town illegally transferred him from private health insurance to Medicare without his consent, as the record was inadequate for review of that claim and the claim was inadequately briefed. 3. The trial court incorrectly concluded that the town was required to reim- burse the plaintiff for the cost of his Medicare premiums; the plaintiff conceded that the town was required to provide him only with benefits that are afforded to active employees, rather than benefits comparable to those that he received under the 1985 collective bargaining agreement, 339 Conn. 801 NOVEMBER, 2021 803 Gallagher v. Fairfield the 2010 collective bargaining agreement required that active employees share the costs of their private health insurance, active employees were required to contribute toward the town's premium equivalent costs, and the evidence adduced by the plaintiff suggested that he was paying no more for his health insurance than the town's active employees. Argued January 14—officially released July 28, 2021"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4381796/new-york-connecticut-development-corp-v-blinds-to-go/","attorney":"","caseName":"New York-Connecticut Development Corp. v. Blinds-To-Go","caseNameFull":"","citation":["449 N.J. Super. 542","159 A.3d 892"],"citeCount":16,"cluster_id":4381796,"court":"New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division","court_citation_string":"N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.","court_id":"njsuperctappdiv","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2017-04-10","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"A-5660-14T4","docket_id":4670618,"judge":"","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T00:29:01.965415Z","date_created":"2017-04-10T14:11:56.044136Z","score":{"bm25":24.964289}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[1439995,1466268,1525098,1894406,1897561,1902214,1910017,1920915,1935115,1938448,1972135,2302605,2361197,2365370,2371297],"download_url":"http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/opinions/a5660-14Redacted.pdf","id":4159049,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2017/04/10/new_york-connecticut_development_corp._v._blinds-to-go.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-25T14:38:43.464375Z","date_created":"2017-04-10T14:11:56.053157Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"cac27b118cac34a5779df762b7736c8e66c23d63","snippet":"                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE\n               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION\n\n                                     SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY\n                                     APPELLATE DIVISION\n                                     DOCKET NO. A-5660-14T4\n\nNEW YORK-CONNECTICUT\nDEVELOPMENT CORP.,\n                                        APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION\n     Plaintiff-Respondent/                     AS REDACTED\n     Cross-Appellant,                        April 10,","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4159049],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/8787248/torres-v-air-to-ground-services-inc/","attorney":"Brad S. Kane, John M. Morris, Kane Law Firm, Brett S. Markson, Timothy A Pico, Markson Pico LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Vicente Torres., Nina Huerta, Stephen A. Tuggy, Locke Lord LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Megan E. Hodapp, Locke Lord LLP, Houston, TX, Emily Christin Pera, Jane M. Flynn, Federal Express Corporation, Irvine, CA, Terrence O’Neal Reed, Federal Express Corporation, Memphis, TN, for Ar to Ground Services, Inc., et al.","caseName":"Torres v. Air to Ground Services, Inc.","caseNameFull":"Vicente TORRES v. AIR TO GROUND SERVICES, INC.","citation":["300 F.R.D. 386","2014 WL 2757471","2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85942"],"citeCount":4,"cluster_id":8787248,"court":"District Court, C.D. California","court_citation_string":"C.D. Cal.","court_id":"cacd","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2014-05-09","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"No. CV 13-03164 SJO (RZx)","docket_id":66053363,"judge":"Otero","lexisCite":"2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85942","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T21:34:12.227873Z","date_created":"2022-11-26T12:44:11.062464Z","score":{"bm25":24.841284}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[105132,107250,107969,108906,110737,110963,111222,112747,118142,118319,145730,173489,218178,219618,358955,399152,457916,591453,781808,784326,784946,821432,873042,1231885,1232180,1301891,1592866,2265791,2374442,2620886,2630272,3034080,3066095,5665326,5665619,5666526,6942524,6945786,6972197,8705885,8745337,8764041,8766324,8767153,8769465,8771340,8924306,8943550,8980600,9042108,9046186,9432577],"download_url":null,"id":8771139,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-23T18:50:35.108973Z","date_created":"2022-11-26T12:44:11.069573Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nPROCEEDINGS (in chambers): ORDER GRANTING IN PART DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION [Docket No. 68]\nS. JAMES OTERO, District Judge.\nThis matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs Vicente Torres (“Torres”) and Randy Vivar Carino’s (“Carino”) (together, “Plaintiffs”) Motion for Class Certification (the “Motion”), filed February 21, 2014. On March 31, 2014, Defendants Ar to Ground Ser","type":"lead-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[8771139],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4956964/in-re-the-parental-rights-to-bp/","attorney":"Kristina M. Nichols (of Nichols Law Firm PLLC), for appellant., Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General, and Amy S. Soth, Managing Assistant, for respondent.","caseName":"In re the Parental Rights to B.P.","caseNameFull":"In the Matter of the Parental Rights to B.P.","citation":["188 Wash. App. 113"],"citeCount":0,"cluster_id":4956964,"court":"Court of Appeals of Washington","court_citation_string":"Wash. Ct. App.","court_id":"washctapp","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2015-06-04","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"No. 32437-1-III","docket_id":60177524,"judge":"Brown, Fearing, Siddoway","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-22T03:09:21.623798Z","date_created":"2021-08-12T18:03:43.531621Z","score":{"bm25":24.050241}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":null,"id":4765147,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-22T20:37:29.835556Z","date_created":"2021-08-12T18:03:43.580376Z"},"ordering_key":2,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"","snippet":"\nFearing, J.\n¶46 (dissenting) — In parental termination cases, the State of Washington inevitably advances the proposition that the best interest of the child is the court’s primary concern. The State also routinely repeats a corollary mantra that, when the interest of the parent and the child conflict, the child’s interests prevail. Unfortunately, the State’s dogma ignores the principle that the paramount goal of child welfare leg","type":"dissent"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4765146,4765147],"source":"U","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4800537/karagozian-v-usv-optical-inc/","attorney":"","caseName":"Karagozian v. USV Optical, Inc.","caseNameFull":"","citation":["335 Conn. 426"],"citeCount":9,"cluster_id":4800537,"court":"Supreme Court of Connecticut","court_citation_string":"Conn.","court_id":"conn","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-04-15","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"SC20257","docket_id":18575935,"judge":"Robinson; Palmer; McDonald; D’Auria; Mullins; Kahn; Ecker","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-04-01T02:44:04.546774Z","date_created":"2020-10-27T15:04:42.324470Z","score":{"bm25":23.788445}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[723924,787947,1526298,2410379,2563407,4021761,4227353,4370919,4370933,7845788,8234080,8234083,9434641,9698528,9823483],"download_url":null,"id":11297605,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/04/15/karagozian_v._usv_optical_inc..pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-04-01T02:48:34.388639Z","date_created":"2026-04-01T02:43:15.838327Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"882f7618e431fddab9c642ed8044889b3e6cb196","snippet":"       OHAN KARAGOZIAN v. USV OPTICAL, INC.\n                   (SC 20257)\n             Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D’Auria,\n                      Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.\n\n                                  Syllabus\n\nThe plaintiff employee sought to recover damages from the defendant\n   employer, alleging that he was constructively discharged in violation of\n   public policy. The plaintiff had been employed as a licensed optician\n   manager in the defendant’s optical department in ","type":"combined-opinion"},{"author_id":null,"cites":[],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROcr/CR335/335CR24.pdf","id":4580884,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/10/27/karagozian_v._usv_optical_inc..pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2026-05-10T12:17:35.788416Z","date_created":"2020-10-27T15:04:42.326500Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"0f3b4eb88ec5d6946b28fb3e44c209b2d3a00d7e","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Action to recover damages for the plaintiff's alleged constructive discharge from employment, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, where the court, Hon. John F. Cronan, judge trial referee, granted the defendant's motion to strike the revised complaint; thereafter, the court, Har- mon, J., granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment and rendered judgment for the defendant, from which the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, DiPentima, C. J., and Lavine and Moll, Js., which affirmed the judg- April 15, 2020, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes. 335 Conn. 426 OCTOBER, 2020 429 Karagozian v. USV Optical, Inc. ment of the trial court, and the plaintiff, on the grant- ing of certification, appealed to this court. Affirmed. John R. Williams, for the appellant (plaintiff). Robert M. Palumbos, pro hac vice, with whom was Elizabeth M. Lacombe, for the appellee (defendant). Scott Madeo and Brian Festa filed a brief for the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities as amicus curiae.","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[11297605,4580884],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiff employee sought to recover damages from the defendant employer, alleging that he was constructively discharged in violation of public policy. The plaintiff had been employed as a licensed optician manager in the defendant's optical department in a JCPenney store and alleged that the defendant improperly required him to provide optomet- ric assistance services to the doctor of optometry in the store. The 19 Although our case law does not expressly preclude damages for personal injuries arising from innocent misrepresentations, we observe that such liability would be inappropriate in the present case. ''The defendant may be subjected to liability for innocent misrepresentation causing stand-alone economic harm when the defendant undertakes to guarantee the truth of the matter represented, that is, when his representation is a warranty. Where a warranty is breached, the plaintiff may recover the contract or loss of bargain measure of damages.'' (Emphasis added.) 3 D. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts (2d Ed. 2011) § 669, p. 661; see 3 Restatement (Second), supra, §552C, comment (f), p. 145 (noting that innocent misrepresentation damages ''are restitutionary in nature'' and ''in effect [restore the plaintiff] to the pecuniary position in which he stood before the transaction,'' and that, because ''the defendant's misrepresentation is an innocent one, he is not held liable for other damages; specifically, he is not liable for benefit of the bargain or for consequential damages'' (emphasis added)); see also Johnson v. Healy, supra, 176 Conn. 106 (''[t]he proper test for damages was the difference in value between the property had it been as represented and the property as it actually was''). Thus, it appears that this damages calculation would not provide the plaintiffs with any significant relief because the damages for personal injuries stemming from the mesh would be limited to the difference between what the plaintiffs paid for the mesh product and the value of the mesh retained. 335 Conn. 426 OCTOBER, 2020 427 Karagozian v. USV Optical, Inc. plaintiff claimed that, under a declaratory ruling issued by the Board of Examiners for Optometrists and a cease and desist consent order issued by the Board of Examiners for Opticians, employees, including opticians, under the control of unlicensed third parties were prohibited from performing services for licensed optometrists. The plaintiff also alleged that his duties violated the public policy embodied in the statute (§ 31-130 (i)) requiring JCPenney and the defendant to have a staffing permit before providing staffing services to the optometrist. The plaintiff further alleged that he was forced to resign when the defendant refused his requests to be excused from these duties. The defendant moved to strike the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that its allegations could not satisfy the requirements of a constructive discharge claim. The defendant asserted that the declaratory ruling and the cease and desist order were not binding and did not create a private right of action for optometric assistants. The defendant also alleged that the plaintiff's reliance on § 31-130 (i) was misplaced because the plaintiff did not allege that optometrists employed by the defendant charged the defendant for hiring opticians. The trial court, relying on Brittell v. Dept. of Correction (247 Conn. 148), determined that, to prevail on his constructive discharge claim, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate that the defendant intended to force him to resign. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint and rendered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the trial court's judgment. The Appellate Court, interpreting and applying Brittell in the same manner as the trial court, concluded, inter alia, that there was no allegation in the plaintiff's complaint that reasonably could be construed to claim that the defendant intended to create conditions so intolerable that a reasonable person in the plaintiff's shoes would be compelled to resign. On the granting of certification, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The Appellate Court incorrectly interpreted the standard set forth in Brittell to require the plaintiff to assert facts demonstrating that the defendant intended to force him to resign, Brittell having required the plaintiff to establish only that the defendant intended to create an intoler- able work atmosphere; the Brittell standard for constructive discharge requires a subjective inquiry into whether the employer intended to create the complained of employment atmosphere or condition and an objective inquiry into whether that atmosphere or condition would have led a reasonable person in the employee's shoes to feel compelled to resign, and that standard does not require the employee to allege facts showing that the employer intended to force the employee to resign. 2. Although the Appellate Court incorrectly applied the standard for con- structive discharge in Brittell, that court correctly upheld the trial court's granting of the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint on the alternative ground that the plaintiff had failed to allege facts establishing that his work atmosphere was so difficult or unpleasant 428 OCTOBER, 2020 335 Conn. 426 Karagozian v. USV Optical, Inc. that a reasonable person in his shoes would have felt compelled to resign, and, accordingly, this court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court: nothing in the plaintiff's complaint established that the defendant required him to violate the law, as the declaratory ruling evaluated the circumstances under which an optometrist would be considered an employee of an unlicensed person or entity, and the plaintiff was employed as an optician rather than an optometrist, the declaratory rul- ing was binding only on those, unlike the plaintiff, who participated in the hearing that led to the ruling, and the ruling, which was intended to provide guidance to optometrists, did not establish criminal liability or inflict repercussions for specific conduct that would compel a reason- able optician in the plaintiff's shoes to resign; moreover, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the cease and desist order either applied to him or bound the defendant, as the order required that a store different from the one in which the plaintiff worked not permit a licensed optician to act in the capacity of an optometric assistant to an independent optometrist leasing space in the store, and also failed to demonstrate how the consent order functionally created a work condition so intolera- ble that a person in the plaintiff's shoes would have been justified in walking off the job as if he had been fired; furthermore, contrary to the plaintiff's claim, § 31-130 (i) was inapplicable, as it requires only that a person who procures or offers to procure employees for employers register with the Commissioner of Labor, and the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint did not suggest that the defendant intended to create conditions different from what the plaintiff would have expected when he agreed to work as a licensed optician manager for the defendant. Argued December 12, 2019—officially released April 15, 2020"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/4694425/streifel-v-bulkley/","attorney":"","caseName":"Streifel v. Bulkley","caseNameFull":"","citation":["195 Conn. App. 294"],"citeCount":9,"cluster_id":4694425,"court":"Connecticut Appellate Court","court_citation_string":"Conn. App. Ct.","court_id":"connappct","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2020-01-14","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"AC41239","docket_id":16683528,"judge":"Lavine; Prescott; Harper","lexisCite":"","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:47:50.392642Z","date_created":"2020-01-13T13:03:11.174591Z","score":{"bm25":23.740757}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":null,"cites":[853579,1734057,1790154,1890674,1925093,1931268,1931413,1947462,1954044,2193346,2293979,2374511],"download_url":"http://www.jud.ct.gov/external/supapp/Cases/AROap/AP195/195AP92.pdf","id":4471756,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":"pdf/2020/01/14/streifel_v._bulkley.pdf","meta":{"timestamp":"2025-12-04T16:47:50.427601Z","date_created":"2020-01-13T13:03:11.178460Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"685c9c80c48552f13f9365b7b825f9d8ab348f28","snippet":"***********************************************\n    The “officially released” date that appears near the be-\nginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub-\nlished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was\nreleased as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be-\nginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions\nand petitions for certification is the “officially released”\ndate appearing in the opinion.\n\n   All opinions are subject to modification and technical\ncorr","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"Action to recover damages for the defendant's alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, where the court, Brazzel-Massaro, J., granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed. David V. DeRosa, with whom was Peter Rotatori III, for the appellant (plaintiff). Janis K. Malec, with whom was Mary B. Ryan, for the appellee (defendant).","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[4471756],"source":"C","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":"The plaintiff registered nurse sought to recover damages from the defendant for negligence in connection with injuries she sustained while providing medical care to the defendant, who was a patient in the radiation oncol- ogy department at the hospital where she worked. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that as she was assisting the defendant during the diagnostic procedure or medical treatment he was undergoing, he grabbed hold of her while he attempted to transition from a supine to a seated position on the examining table, and, as a result, she suffered several physical injuries. She claimed that her injuries were proximately caused by the defendant's negligence. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff's action was not viable because allowing a medical care provider to recover damages from her patient was contrary to public policy. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of material fact that the defendant, as a patient at the hospital, owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, who was providing him medical care as a registered nurse. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment because the defendant's motion for sum- mary judgment effectively challenged the legal sufficiency of her cause of action, and, therefore, that court should have treated the motion as a motion to strike to provide her with the opportunity to replead; because the plaintiff failed to object to the trial court's deciding the case through summary judgment or, in the alternative, to offer to amend her complaint if the court determined that the allegations were legally insufficient, she waived any claim that the trial court improperly failed to treat the motion for summary judgement as a motion to strike. 2. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court improperly granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the question of whether the defendant owed her a duty of care involved a question of fact reserved for the jury, which was based on her assertion that the court was obligated to first address, but failed to do so, whether the harm that she suffered was foreseeable before concluding whether a duty existed; the determination of whether a duty of care existed under the circumstances of this case was a question of law that the court was permitted to make at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, and, in making that determination, the court was permitted to decide that no duty existed solely on public policy grounds. 3. The plaintiff's claim that applying the test articulated in Murillo v. Seymour Ambulance Assn., Inc. (264 Conn. 474) to determine whether recognizing a duty of care is inconsistent with public policy conflicts with this state's abolition of the doctrine of assumption of risk as a complete bar to recovery was unavailing; because our Supreme Court has continued to consider in cases involving medical treatment the normal expectation of the participants in analyzing the activity under review, including the statuses of the parties, even after the state's abolition of the doctrine of assumption of risk, this court was not prohibited by the abolition of that doctrine from applying the test articulated in Murillo to determine whether recognizing a duty of care was inconsistent with public policy, and the plaintiff reliance on Sepega v. DeLaura (326 Conn. 788) was misplaced, as there was no language in that case that even implied that our Supreme Court intended to abolish or retreat from the test in Murillo. 4. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court incorrectly determined that imposing a duty of care on the defendant while the plaintiff was furnishing medical care him was inconsistent with public policy, this court having declined to recognize, as a matter of law, that a patient owes a duty of care to avoid negligent conduct that causes harm to a medical care provider while the patient is receiving medical care from that provider: this court's application of the relevant public policy considerations articulated in the test in Murillo indicated that all four factors weighed against recognizing a duty of care, specifically, the normal expectations of registered nurses and patients under the circumstances, balancing the unlikely enhancement to medical care provider and patient safety by recognizing a duty of care against the potential for higher medical care costs for patients caused by increased litigation, jeopardizing the confidentiality of medical information and the availability of a workers' compensation remedy for medical care providers, and the fact that no other jurisdiction has imposed a duty of care on a patient while receiving medical care from a medical care provider all weighed against recognizing a duty of care; moreover, this court's decision not to recognize a duty of care was predicated on the conclusion that uninhibited access to medical care for all prospective patients, the goal of encouraging patients to share sensitive information with their medical care providers without fearing the loss of confidential- ity, and the safety of patients and medical care providers alike are vitally important to the integrity of the health care system in Connecticut. Argued September 17, 2019—officially released January 14, 2020"},{"absolute_url":"/opinion/2360288/transportation-alternatives-inc-v-city-of-new-york/","attorney":"Christopher Dunn, Arthur Eisenberg, Donna Lieberman, New York Civil Liberties Union, New York City, for Plaintiff., Dana Biberman, New York City Law Department, New York City, for Defendants.","caseName":"Transportation Alternatives, Inc. v. City of New York","caseNameFull":"TRANSPORTATION ALTERNATIVES, INC., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK and Henry J. Stern, Commissioner of the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation, Defendants","citation":["218 F. Supp. 2d 423","2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15035","2002 WL 1880392"],"citeCount":4,"cluster_id":2360288,"court":"District Court, S.D. New York","court_citation_string":"S.D.N.Y.","court_id":"nysd","court_jurisdiction":null,"dateArgued":null,"dateFiled":"2002-08-15","dateReargued":null,"dateReargumentDenied":null,"docketNumber":"01 Civ. 6465(SAS)","docket_id":2260967,"judge":"Scheindlin","lexisCite":"2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15035","meta":{"timestamp":"2024-06-21T10:59:00.035845Z","date_created":"2015-10-14T00:55:55.077160Z","score":{"bm25":23.666515}},"neutralCite":"","non_participating_judge_ids":[],"opinions":[{"author_id":2857,"cites":[71683,74453,106761,109450,109517,109836,109871,110015,110188,110312,110561,110992,111175,111256,111719,111866,111950,112027,112664,112767,112850,112899,117967,118303,118455,118458,118496,118499,121170,450566,696232,762645,763296,765228,774514,776219,778083,2346946,6954190,8978688,9427999],"download_url":null,"id":2360288,"joined_by_ids":[],"local_path":null,"meta":{"timestamp":"2025-10-24T19:05:54.660676Z","date_created":"2013-10-30T09:14:38.085266Z"},"ordering_key":null,"per_curiam":false,"sha1":"4c7aadfb1bf44877a425c68acdd85967a330366e","snippet":"\n218 F.Supp.2d 423 (2002)\nTRANSPORTATION ALTERNATIVES, INC., Plaintiff,\nv.\nCITY OF NEW YORK and Henry J. Stern, Commissioner of the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation, Defendants.\nNo. 01 Civ. 6465(SAS).\nUnited States District Court, S.D. New York.\nAugust 15, 2002.\n*424 *425 ","type":"combined-opinion"}],"panel_ids":[],"panel_names":[],"posture":"","procedural_history":"","scdb_id":"","sibling_ids":[2360288],"source":"LU","status":"Published","suitNature":"","syllabus":""}]}