{"resource_uri":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/audio/106500/?format=json","id":106500,"absolute_url":"/audio/106500/moreno-salinas-v-stephan-clark/","panel":[],"docket":"https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v4/dockets/74834643/?format=json","date_created":"2026-09-22T14:38:19.130117-07:00","date_modified":"2026-09-22T14:46:08.124527-07:00","source":"C","case_name_short":"","case_name":"Moreno Salinas v. Stephan Clark","case_name_full":"","judges":"","sha1":"428dcf68ca55285f0c544d2dfc658a6e34443863","download_url":"https://media-oa.ca8.uscourts.gov/OAaudio/2026/9/253324.MP3","local_path_mp3":"mp3/2026/09/22/moreno_salinas_v._stephan_clark_cl.mp3","local_path_original_file":"mp3/2026/09/22/moreno_salinas_v._stephan_clark.mp3","filepath_ia":"","ia_upload_failure_count":null,"duration":2195,"processing_complete":true,"date_blocked":null,"blocked":false,"stt_status":1,"stt_source":1,"stt_transcript":"Mr. Tobin, you may proceed when you're ready. And you have, let's see, you've divided your time? That's correct. Ten minutes and five minutes. Okay. Please pay attention to your time as you go through your argument. I will. May it please the Court. Rule 37e permits an adverse inference to be imposed for the spoliation of evidence only upon the finding that the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information to use in the litigation. And this Court's precedent only affirms and strengthens that required finding. However, the Court below here did not properly find intent according to this Court's precedent and instead imputed MDOC's failure to follow its retention policy to the individual officer defendants. But it's also clear that no such intent finding could be made because the Court did not at first properly establish that the officer defendants had any authority or ability to access or tamper the footage at issue or any authority over the retention policy or the ability to retain footage. This case is a little weird in the sense that you don't have any Monell claims or anything against the Department of Corrections. And so I just wonder if the case is different. Like, I understand that these particular defendants, how do you draw an adverse inference if they had no control over it? That makes sense to me. But what happens if there's the usual Monell claims and supervisory claims where some of them did have the ability to preserve the evidence? Well, I suppose I don't necessarily know how it would operate under Monell. But certainly there was no particular defendant here who was regarded as a supervisor who might have ability to, even a supervisor over the use of force, someone who might have the ability to preserve the footage. Really, they're beholden to the policy at issue. I believe the Court misread the policy in determining that these defendants had the ability to obtain and retain the footage. She determined. Counsel, I'm not familiar with the Eighth Circuit precedent. Are you familiar with Comas v. Schaeffer from the Western District of Missouri? The case rings a bell. The court said the federal courts have consistently held that documents are deemed to be within the possession, custody, or control for purposes of Rule 34 if the party has the legal right to obtain the documents on demand. These are all employees of the same entity. Why wouldn't they have had authority to demand those documents? Well, I don't think there was anything in the record to suggest that they could demand the documents, actually. I think the record only supported that there was a shift commander. The use of force policy supports that there's a shift commander who, I suppose, oversees the process for the footage to be preserved. But it doesn't support that these officer defendants – there's no one who is a shift commander, at least in the record, among these defendants. So there was no one there. In fact, the use of force policy, and it's found at Appendix 145 to 147, at least the relevant portions, supported that the shift commander would then deliver it to the investigator. So it would be presumed that the investigator would have custody of the footage here. What happens if there was – and I kind of want to go back to the earlier question. But what happens if there was a supervisor here? We had a supervisor that controlled the film or the video, and then we had a bunch of normal employees like we do here.  I think that you would need testimony adduced to support that this supervisor actually was involved, actually had that respective role in the use of force policy. Could you do an adverse inference against some of the defendants but not others? Like the supervisory defendants but not – I'm just trying to figure out how this works under your view. Right. It's sort of skipping ahead in the argument, but if you could make some sort of imputation argument, I think the Southern District of New York case, Stanborough, did this sort of case-by-case adverse inference looking at the relative responsibilities of the officer defendants. So in that case, the court determined that even on a case-by-case basis, it could not impute an adverse inference to all the officer defendants, none of whom had any responsibility to preserve the footage. But it could impute it to the sergeant supervisor who signed off on the use of force policy. Could they have – back to Judge Grouse's question. Could they have requested it? And if they could have requested it, does that support the adverse inference enough by itself? So I don't believe there's anything in the record that suggests that they could have actually requested it. In fact, the affidavit that we provided, which is Appendix 61 through Appendix 63, supported that essentially none of the officers or similarly situated individuals within their duties would have the ability to or authorization to access these tapes or these footage. There was no – certainly nothing in the record to suggest that they could actually request it. Doesn't that just create a perverse incentive for institutions to create procedures separating the officers from the management so that they can hide evidence? I think there's certainly an issue where you have to pick your poison. In Burris, this court determined that it would frustrate Rule 37 to impose it on any party or any individual who did not have a role in the actual spoliation. In Burris, there was no employer-employee relationship, and that's a very different situation. Right. And Burris did rely upon Adkins v. Wolever from the Sixth Circuit, which is a much more analogous case where we're dealing with officer defendants and a prospective Department of Corrections. In that case, the court determined that there had to be a culpable state of mind to actually destroy the evidence. And in that case, that's the only way in which you could have an adverse inference on that basis. And, in fact, if you were to rule otherwise, that you would then be incentivizing and essentially all officer defendants to constantly be checking with their employing facility that they're following the retention policy that they would presumably – well, that they would presume was in operation anyway. So when you have a situation where you have officers who are dealing with situations that may arise with inmates just to speculate every day or multiple times a week, you'd be asking them to essentially request their employing facility to make sure that this footage is preserved in every single case. Would it be different? So you raise an interesting point. Why should employees have to request something that should already be kept? But suppose we had a different policy, right? Suppose the policy said that employees had to request it. It's not done as a matter of course, even if there's been a use of force or some other incident, that the employees have to affirmatively request it, and these employees did not. Would that create a different answer then? I think it might create a different answer. It would be kind of a difficult and probably slightly unadministerable policy, but I think that might change the responsibility on that basis if they have a duty to request it and then they just did not perform that duty. But that, of course, was not the case here. In fact, the court had imputed the exfoliation from MDOC. In fact, it was imputed MDOC's failure to follow its retention policy to MDOC, which presumably kicks in precedent such as Morris v. Union Pacific or Auer v. City of Minot here where there has to be circumstantial evidence to support a conscious permitting of failure to follow retention policy. Here, circumstantial evidence is simply not there. In fact, almost the entire incident was preserved. Just 45 seconds in the middle of the incident was gone. There was 30 minutes after, 30 minutes before that were also gone. That was the— Was there any explanation? There was no explanation provided, and the court brings that up multiple times within the record. In fact, there was a factual finding that there was no sufficient explanation, I believe. There was no sufficient explanation. That's right. Exhibit B to plaintiff's trial brief adverse inference was our RFPs on search of Stephen Clark where basically he said, although surveillance footage of incidents involving uses of force are automatically retained, other footage is generally not retained as institutions do not have infinite amounts of storage space. So this was the furnished explanation. What about the fact that the state is providing or funding the defense and will pay any judgment? Should those bear on this issue? No, I don't believe that actually speaks to culpability in this context. So we're talking about either a conscious permitting of a failure to follow a retention policy or actually tampering or, in any number of ways, you might be able to destroy evidence. But the mere fact that there is this connection that created by virtue of 105.711, I don't think establishes the requisite culpability here. Suppose, though, that just a crazy case, but Minnesota or, excuse me, I don't know, Missouri DOC keeps calling. This is a Missouri case, correct? It is. So Missouri DOC calls and says, hey, get rid of that, 30 minutes. I don't want to have to pay this huge judgment. If you get rid of it, we're all good. And they get rid of it. And then would you have an adverse inference? I could see where who's paying could play a big role in the motivation for destroying the evidence. Yeah, absolutely. I think you would have an adverse inference in that context if they're specifically requesting it and someone is following through. I think you could show a culpable state of mind under that rule. So why not impute it here? So if you can impute it there to the individual guards, why not impute it here? Right. Well, I don't think that you can make such an imputation under the court's precedent that stands currently where we've talked about if you're not involved in it, it makes no sense to impute it. And there was just no evidence of involvement with the actual saving of footage. So that looks like it's all my time. I appreciate it. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Sedlak? Yes. Thank you, Judge. You may proceed. May it please the court. Affirming the district court's fees decision would make this court the extreme outlier among the federal circuits and would require ignoring the plain text of the PLRA. First, the district court awarded fees as if this were a generic civil rights case under Section 1983. Indeed, the district court stated explicitly that the same prevailing party standard applies, but the PLRA has its own standard for closing fees for unsuccessful claims. Second, every other court of appeals that has confronted this question has recognized and applied the statute's distinct standard. This court should not create a split in derogation of statutory text. Instead, within the context of this record with intertwined claims against multiple defendants, the court should follow the approach of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits and order a percentage reduction based on the plaintiff's average success against all the defendants. The court should therefore vacate and remand the fees decision. The district court ignored the governing standard. The court below expressly believed that the, quote, same standard applies under the PLRA, end quote, as Section 1983 claims. That's plainly incorrect. The statute itself provides that unless, quote, the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights, end quote, then the fee shall not be awarded. And the Supreme Court recently recognized in Murphy v. Smith that if the PLRA had simply, Congress had simply meant for prisoner litigation claims to be governed by Section 1983, then it wouldn't have bothered to write a new statute. Counsel, if we were to remand on this issue, would the district court have adequate guidance from other circuits or would we need to, is there differences between the circuits on this, how they would reduce fees? Yes, I would recommend that this court go ahead and enter the 45.1% reduction based on how other circuits have treated similar circumstances. I'd refer your honor both to the Ninth Circuit's case as well as the Fourth Circuit's case that we cite in our brief where the court did either implement the percentage reduction or bless the district courts doing so. As the Ninth Circuit explained, the PLRA excludes unsuccessful claims even if they are based on related legal theories or share a common core of facts with the successful claim. And that's the Ninth Circuit's Edmo case. The Fourth Circuit case that I mentioned too is Montcalm Publishing Corp. v. Commonwealth of Virginia. As was the case here, the Ninth Circuit in Edmo held that the PLRA plainly bars recovery of fees for litigating claims brought against several individual defendants who were dismissed from the action. Plaintiff, real quick, plaintiff is wrong in saying that there can be no fee reduction because it's impossible to parse out the work done on unsuccessful versus successful claims. But again, as the Ninth Circuit said in Edmo, the PLRA excludes unsuccessful claims even if they're based on related legal theories. Unless the court has any further questions, then we would ask for the court to vacate. Is this the first time our court has been called upon to weigh in on this issue? In this specific context and certainly in the context of a published decision, the plaintiff does cite to an unpublished judgment from this court previously. But as this court has explained, in circumstances like this where the other circuits have, in this court's word, had the better of the issue, then the advisable thing to do is to follow the other circuits. The unpublished case went the other way, right? It simply affirmed a judgment, an unpublished judgment of the District Court of Iowa, which made the same mistake as the District Court below here in assuming that the same standard under Section 1988 applies to the PLRA. So is the idea here, as you advocate, that if you have three defendants and you prevail, only prevail against one? Then yes, you would get one third. You get one third, no matter how intertwined the evidentiary case against the three may have been. And the same amount of work would have been required to pursue one as opposed to the three. Right, yes, yes. So just a mathematical, just a straight mathematical analysis here. At least in a context like this where the District Court explicitly did make the finding that all of the claims against the defendants were intertwined, then yes, doing the mathematical reduction based on the intertwined nature is when you would do that. Obviously, if there's another, if it's a different case where you can parse out the fees based on claims, then you wouldn't just do the percentage reduction. Unless the court has any further questions, I thank the court for its time. Thank you. Mr. Hormuth. Good morning. May it please the court. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in giving an adverse inference instruction. First, the District Court applied the proper adverse inference instruction standard of whether, one, there was intent indicating a desire to suppress the truth, and two, prejudice. As this court recognized in Morris v. Union Pacific, intent is rarely proved by direct evidence, and a District Court has substantial leeway to determine intent through consideration of circumstantial evidence, witness credibility, motives, and other factors. Defendants wholly failed to address this intent standard in their briefs, and they asked this court to simply accept that the missing video must have been the product of mere negligence. This was a remarkable position to take on appeal when defendants offered to the District Court no credible explanation for the missing video, and every excuse they offered was either demonstrably false or recanted by the defendants. Well, maybe they didn't know. I mean, that's one of the challenges, and maybe that's not this case. But one of the challenges, if you hold it against, say, an employee and the employer or supervisor is the one that controls it, well, you may not know what the reason for why the supervisor or the employer deleted the videotape. And so maybe they didn't know. They tried to proffer an affidavit, which isn't evidence trying to explain it. They tried to say what it was, and then they attributed it to a timestamp. So they did look into this, but they ended up conceding it wasn't a technological timestamp issue. And at the end of the day, after they went through their litany of excuses, ultimately they did not know. There was no answer to that question. But you see the concern here, the concern being the adverse inference instruction is based on the person who actually controls the evidence or has some element of control. And so if you don't have that element of control, and it's a very powerful tool, you're actually punishing people who had no idea. Now, I'm not saying this is this case. Maybe there's some indication that they knew what was going on here, but that's the danger, is that you're essentially creating a situation where they're being blamed for something they did not do. The other side of that danger is the policy behind why we impute this to individual corrections officers. And you touched on it earlier in your question. It leads to, in all the cases that discuss imputation in this context, say that if we didn't do it this way, it would lead to the absurd result where states could destroy evidence with zero risk when they are identifying the individual as employees. So it would create, you know, there is that opposite and I think much stronger policy consideration that is universally applied in these imputation cases. Although that is somewhat lessened by the fact that if you bring a Monell claim, if you bring a supervisory claim, if you bring a direct claim or an official capacity claim, all of those different things are actually claims against the Missouri Department of Corrections. And presumably you could get the adverse inference if the party who lost the evidence is right in front of you. Correct, that just wasn't the case here and it doesn't diminish the significant amount of authority we cited on the policy reasons behind imputation in these just cases against individual corrections officers in 1983 cases. So, but turning back to having really no explanation for the missing video, the district court then applied Stevenson, which said that bad faith can be inferred where a party preserves some but not all evidence and where bad faith can be inferred if the defendants knew of the importance of the evidence. And that's the case here. Some but not all the evidence was preserved. The defendants clearly knew about the importance of this video. There was a policy to preserve, not destroy the evidence in all cases of use of force. And I will remind the court if you look at the use of force policy, it is directed to all of the officers, not just certain people in the institution. And it goes through the whole policy of what has to be done in a use of force case. The defendants knew this video was important. In fact, they reviewed the video in connection with preparing the use of force reports. They relied on it in preparing the use of force reports. So it's not like they didn't have access to this video. The warden also testified the importance of the video because he testified that he reviewed the entire video to determine discrepancies between the video and the defendants' use of force reports and making his own finding that use of force was not warranted in this case. We didn't have that same opportunity. Did they have the ability – did the policy say whether they had the ability to request it and say you must preserve it? I mean is there any – or did the district court make findings that the individual defendants had some ability to do that? Yes, Your Honor. Before we get to the imputation, I think separate and apart from the imputation, the district court did find that the video was within the defendants' possession, custody, and control because it was conceded that they had access to and reviewed the video in connection with preparing their use of force reports, which is standard practice. It was conceded that they had the ability to request the video upon demand. And the possession, custody, and control was further evidenced by the fact that defendants produced all other documents and video in this case without asserting an objection to lack of possession, custody, and control. It didn't come up. That objection didn't come up until the adverse inference was raised. Everything else these defendants produced didn't object to lack of possession, custody, and control. They had access to the video to review it for the use of force reports. And as you recognize, Judge Grass, under Comas, and this is what the district court said to the defendants in arguing this issue, you're reading the rule too narrowly because if you have the ability to request upon demand, it is within your possession, custody, and control under Comas. So I hope that answers your question on the record with possession, custody, and control. Just one last question. I hate to do this to you, but is this a situation where they – because sometimes we have that where we have to view it under particular circumstances because it's politically sensitive or it's something we're not supposed to be viewing and we can't take it, for example, on a USB drive with us. Was there any sort of evidence as to whether or not they actually had it physically in their possession or on their computer devices? There was no evidence of that, Your Honor. There were questions of the defendants on cross because there were inconsistencies among their use of force reports about, did you guys do this together? Did you view it together? Some said yes, then they recanted that and said no. And one person testified no, and his use of force report was verbatim to somebody else's use of force report. And I asked them, I said, did you guys get together on this stuff? And they said no, they separately did their use of force report. So there is that evidence, but it's not like they went and retrieved it and you guys have a half hour in this room with a video to do your report, to do it and give it back. There's no evidence of that. Back to Stevenson for a moment on the importance of the video and the credibility and the motives here. The record here is replete with credibility and motive concerns. The record shows that the gap in video just so happened to coincide with a critical segment of this prolonged excessive use of force event. It was not mere coincidence that the gap in video related to a specific location Mr. Salinas identified in his pro se complaint before I was ever appointed by the court to represent him and before knowing that the missing video would become an issue in this case. We also know that the video here was used to impeach defendants who attempted to testify that plaintiff was throwing his elbows, swinging his arms, attempting to headbutt officers and had to be put in leg restraints. None of that was true and it was proven not to be true because we had the video that was produced and we didn't have the benefit of the missing gap for this critical segment. We also didn't have the 30 minutes prior and the 30 minutes after to both support plaintiff's testimony and to impeach the defendants in the manner we did with the video that we did have. Stevenson found that as the only contemporaneous recording of the incident, standing alone, that's prejudicial. I'd submit in this case there are many other facts and circumstances that show the credibility, the motives and the prejudice. I've already touched on the possession, custody and control and it's our position that this video was in the custody and control of the defendants. There's sufficient facts to support that. If that's the case, the imputation analysis is not necessary but the defendants also failed on the imputation. The district court here carefully analyzed other district court opinions within the circuit, Taylor v. Null and Vote v. Correctional Care, where the missing video footage was imputed to the corrections officers under far less extreme circumstances. And as I mentioned earlier, the policy underlying all of these cases and other cases that we cited in our brief is that if you didn't impute this evidence, it would lead to the absurd result that a state-run correctional facility could wrongly destroy any piece of evidence in its control with near zero risk of consequences in prisoner suits. The only case that defendants cite to counter all of our imputation authority that we've presented is the Sixth Circuit case of Atkins v. Woliver. In that case, however, the Sixth Circuit did not reject the concept of imputation. Rather, in applying the abuse of discretion standard to a decision not to impute, the court made it a point to state that the district court could have gone either way because that culpability is within the sound discretion of the district court. Before turning to the next issue, I'd also like to address the Stanborough case that was mentioned in connection with this notion that an individualized analysis on imputation had to be done for each defendant. Such an individualized assessment was not required here because all defendants were similarly situated in terms of the applicable policies and procedures, employment at the Southeast Correction Center, possession, custody, and control, culpability, their motives, and credibility related to their involvement in a single prolonged use of force event. The Stanborough case, which is just a district court case out of New York, is the only case cited by defendants for the proposition that an individualized assessment had to be made. Stanborough is completely distinguishable from the facts of this case. Stanborough was a consolidated action involving different events, different locations, different facilities, and different corrections officers employed by different facilities, necessitating some analysis of whether the missing video from one of the events at one of the locations could be imputed to certain of the individual officers. Stanborough has no resemblance to the similarly situated defendants in this case, and in Stanborough it happened to be that there was imputation against a sergeant, but it wasn't for the reason that he held the title sergeant. He was the one that was responsible at that location for that particular event in terms of the video evidence. I'd also note that the defendants did not object to any of the jury instructions, didn't raise this issue with the district court, didn't object to the instructions that were directed to all of the similarly situated defendants. Next, quickly, I want to turn to the issue of the stipulation of the medical bills. In U.S. v. Hawkins, this court held that a stipulation is an agreement between the parties as to a fact of the case, and as such, it's evidence introduced by both parties. Federal courts recognize that a stipulation by its very nature signals the intentional relinquishment of any and all rights to challenge the admissibility of the stipulated evidence, and federal courts have noted that the vital feature of a stipulation is universally conceded to be its conclusiveness upon the party making it, i.e., the prohibition of any further dispute of the fact by him and of any use of evidence to disprove or contradict it. In U.S. v. Robinson, this court concluded that where a defendant is aware of a stipulation and does not object to the stipulation in court, the defendant is acquiesced and waived its rights. And this court held in Reiner that such waiver applies if the objecting party becomes the proponent of the evidence, even after filing a motion to eliminate, and even if the trial court definitively previously ruled on that objection. Counsel, in the absence of waiver, would Overton require a different result? Yes, because Overton, as the district court properly recognized, is not a 1983 action. Defendants rely on three cases for their position that the collateral source rule should not apply. None of them analyzed the federal common law collateral source rule into Section 1983, including Overton. It wasn't a 1983 case. They also cite Williams, which applied South Dakota state law in a diversity case, and they cited the state court case of Fisher, which is a Delaware state court case that applied the Delaware collateral source rule. The defendants here have not cited a single case where the federal common law collateral source rule did not apply to a Section 1983 action, and that makes sense. This circuit in Gill v. Massachusetts directly held that the collateral source rule applies to Section 1983 actions, and the district court here noted other cases it found applying the collateral source rule in Section 1983 cases, including cases where the state routinely identifies the individual defendants. We've cited those in our brief. We have cited other cases, district court cases, mind you, where Section 1983, the collateral source rule, is applied to prisoner Section 1983 cases, and that all makes sense because the individual correction officers are persons under Section 1983. A state, this decades-old law, is not a person. Officials sued in their individual capacities are persons. They come to court as individuals, whereas states are not persons and enjoy sovereign immunity. Moreover, this court has found state statutes that identify individuals from consequences of carrying out their duties does not make the state the real party in interest. In my little bit of time, I do want to hit on the attorney's fees. It's not correct that the court did not apply the PLRA, look to the fee award. She goes to the PLRA. She goes to every one of the limitations in the PLRA. The Edmo case, defendants just, I see I'm out of time. If I could finish my thought. You may. Okay, thank you. The Edmo case, they cite to say that the district court has to reduce the fee if there's not success against all defendants, and you're right. There's nothing in the Eighth Circuit about this, except CPX v. Garcia, which you were on that panel, Judge Strauss, where you affirmed where the district court, even under the PLRA, did have the ability and the common sense to say, you can have theories and defendants that are so inextricably intertwined that the work performed on the unsuccessful claims was the same as the successful claims. And here the district court made that exact finding. She says, even if some officers were ultimately dismissed by stipulation or found not liable, discovery against all in their capacity as fact witnesses was necessary in proving the successful claims. Johnson v. Breeden, an Eleventh Circuit case that they curiously cite, said that there's nothing in the record about that inquiry about unsuccessful fees, but the Eleventh Circuit, unlike the Ninth Circuit, in remanding the case back to the district court, said, hey, we specifically said, we don't foreclose the possibility that some of the same time spent and incurred in connection with defendants and claims on which Johnson was not successful also may have been directly and reasonably spent and incurred in proving the claims against defendants for which he was successful. The district court did not abuse her. All right, counsel. Thank you. That's enough. Thank you. Thank you. All right. Rebuttal. Yeah, so opposing counsel went over, so take two minutes to wrap up if you'd like to. I'd first like to just address the issue of the indicia that would be required to assume a conscious permitting of a failure to follow a retention policy. Plaintiff contends that there was such evidence in the record of this. The court said that because the defendants had the ability to put the video on a disc and take it somewhere else, that they then had the ability to preserve this footage. The policy itself reads, the contents of the incident video will be retrieved from the digital monitoring equipment and copied onto a blank CD slash DVD and put somewhere else. It does not ascribe this responsibility to the particular individual defendants here. As to the ability to produce it in discovery, they could only produce this video upon entry of counsel who are then able to request it from MDOC. But before such point, before litigation has even begun, they wouldn't actually have that ability and the policy doesn't support that they have the ability. Counsel, with regard to the collateral source rule, did the stipulation constitute a waiver of your ability to raise that argument? No, absolutely not. On that particular issue, the court had already determined that the medical bills were coming in and asked that we stipulate to an amount at that point. In fact, earlier on, basically the attorney said, it would be over my objection, I would prefer that we just enter the bills. We ended up going for an amount, but it was over an objection. She said they were going to come in upon her own evaluation. But no, it does not support that it was actually waived on that basis. The actual rule for the collateral source rule, as cited under Gill v. Mashevsky, is that essentially the liability will not be reduced from the payment of others. Here, I think there's a brief support. It's the Missouri coffers that will be taxed twice from both the paying of the medical bills and from indemnifying the judgment here. Those sources are not collateral to each other, and you could not say that these are payments coming from another. Can I ask one more question? On the video, the fact that they could be put on CD and the policy says that, that makes it a little different than the case we were talking about earlier where you just really don't have access to it or anything. Why do you think that that alone doesn't at least support the district court's findings as to the failure to retain and having the intent? I don't think it supports the district court's finding because we have two essentially named individuals in this use of force policy. It's the shift commander and the investigator. It says the investigator will take custody of that CD or take custody of the footage. If the investigator is not available, it will go to the investigator's office. One would assume they are the ones who have the custody of that. So an individual can't have it, just to be clear. You cannot walk out with a CD of your own. The use of force policy does not support that. It supports that it's in the custody of the investigator's office. Got it. Thank you again for your time. All right. Thank you, counsel. Appreciate your arguments today. The case is submitted and the court will issue a decision as soon as possible."}