
81 U.S. 170 (1871)
14 Wall. 170
THE SCOTIA.
Supreme Court of United States.

*177 Mr. J.C. Carter, for the appellants.
Messrs. D.D. Lord and E.C. Benedict, contra.
*180 Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion of the court.
It is plain that had the ship continued on her course after she first saw the steamer's bright light, there could have been no collision. And, still more, had she not afterwards and when near the steamer put her helm to starboard she would have been out of all danger. Even when she first sighted the Scotia she had passed the point at which her course and that of the steamer intersected. This is a necessary sequence from the facts that the angle between the courses of the two vessels was exactly one point, and that the light of the steamer, when first seen, bore from a point to a point and a half off her port bow. Besides, when the *181 ship was first seen from the steamer, her bearing, it is clearly proved, was from a point to two points off the steamer's port bow. Such a bearing was impossible unless the ship had already crossed the line of the Scotia's course, and passed the point at which the vessels could have come together unless one or the other had taken a new direction. They must have passed with a wide berth between had the ship made no change of her helm, or had she kept her luff in obedience to the mate's order. But by putting her helm hard a-starboard she was made to change her course constantly till the collision occurred. Even before she bore away the red light of the steamer was seen by her wheelsman, and probably by her lookout, if not indeed by her master, doubtless in time even then to escape harm. Had it not been then for the unfortunate order of the master to starboard her helm, and bear away before the wind, this case could not have arisen.
It must, however, be conceded that this, of itself, is not sufficient to excuse the Scotia, if she failed to adopt such precautions as were in her power, and were necessary to avoid a collision. Meeting a sailing vessel proceeding in such a direction as to involve risk, it was her duty to keep out of the way, and nothing but inevitable accident, or the conduct and movements of the ship, can repel the presumption that she was negligent, arising from the fact of collision. But this duty of the steamer implies a correlative obligation of the ship to keep her course, and to do nothing to mislead. Nor is a steamer called to act, except when she is approaching a vessel in such a direction as to involve risk of collision. She is required to take no precautions when there is no apparent danger.
Was, then, the Scotia in fault? If she was, the fault must have been either that she did not change her helm sooner, or that she ported, or that she was unjustifiably late in slackening her speed and reversing her engines. No other fault is imputed to her. We have already said that she was not bound to take any steps to avoid a collision until danger of collision should have been apprehended, and we think *182 there was no reason for apprehension until the ship's light was seen closing in upon her. Assuming for the present that she had no right to conclude that the light was on a steamer and to manuvre accordingly, and, therefore, that it was her duty to keep out of the way, it is still true that all her duty at first was to watch the light in order to discover certainly what it was, and to observe its course and notice whether it crossed her own course. It is not the law that a steamer must change her course, or must slacken her speed the instant she comes in sight of another vessel's light, no matter in what direction it may be. With such a rule navigation cannot be conducted. Nor is such a rule necessary to safety. It is, therefore, no fault that, seeing the ship's light off her port bow, apparently at a distance of several miles, the Scotia continued on her course without slackening her speed, until that light began to close in upon her. Then she ported her helm, the obvious effect of which was to take her farther away from the approaching vessel. Then she slowed her engines, stopped and backed, until, at the time when the collision took place, she had almost, if not entirely, ceased to move through the water. Had she starboarded, instead of porting, the movement would have turned her toward the Berkshire, and apparently would have rendered collision more probable. Of the propriety of her slowing her engines, stopping, and backing, there can be no doubt. If, now, it be considered that she had been misled by the nature and location of the light on the Berkshire, which indicated that the ship was at a much greater distance than she was in fact; that consequently the peril came upon her suddenly, leaving short time for deliberation, and if it be considered that she had been brought into this extremity, first, by the ill-judged and causeless change of the ship's course, and, second, by the persistent effort of the ship's master to cross her bow after he had seen her red light, and discovered certainly that she was a steamer, it would be unjust to impute to her as a fault that she did what she ought to have done, had the approaching vessel been in fact a steamer, and that which at all events seemed *183 most likely to avoid a collision. Certainly it was not her fault that she did not know the Berkshire to be a sailing vessel. And in all human probability the measures taken by her to avoid a collision would have been successful if they had not been counteracted by the constant veering of the Berkshire, with her helm kept hard a-starboard.
Independently, therefore, of any statutory regulations, and looking to the facts with reference to the old maritime law alone, as it was before any modern legislation, we think the Scotia was not chargeable with fault.
But we think the Scotia had a right to conclude that the Berkshire was a steamer rather than a sailing vessel, and that, when first seen, she was at the distance of four or five miles, instead of being near at hand. Such was the information given her by the ship's white light, fastened as it was to the anchor-stock on deck, and no watchfulness could have enabled her to detect the misrepresentation until it was too late. Both vessels were moving under similar regulations. The Berkshire was an American ship, belonging to the mercantile marine, and she was required by the act of Congress of April 29th, 1864, to carry green and red lights, which she did not carry, and she was forbidden to carry the white light, which she did carry. By exhibiting a white light, she, therefore, held herself forth as a steamer, and by exhibiting it from her deck, instead of from her masthead, she misrepresented her distance from approaching vessels. It is clear the Scotia would have been justified in taking her for a steamer had she been known to be an American ship. But it is insisted on behalf of the appellants that, inasmuch as the act of Congress is a mere municipal regulation, obligatory as a statute only upon American vessels, the Scotia, a British steamer, cannot avail herself of it to fault an American ship, or to justify her own conduct. Waiving for the moment consideration of the question whether this position is well taken, it is yet true that the Berkshire was under the statute, though on the high seas, and that the Scotia was subject to and sailing under similar regulations (the British orders in council of January 9th, 1863); that the collision *184 happened in the known path of vessels navigating between the United States and Great Britain, and that there was a reasonable probability that vessels in that path would be either American or British, and would, therefore, carry the lights prescribed by the laws of those countries. The steamer might well, therefore, in the absence of knowledge, act upon that probability, and in the emergency into which she had been brought, might, without fault, apply the rule of navigation common to the ships of both countries.
But, to return to the question, we think that independently of the act of Congress, considered as a mere municipal regulation, the Berkshire was bound to show a green light on her starboard, and a red light on her port side, without exhibiting any white light; and that the Scotia may set up in defence her failure to carry such green and red lights, as also the fact that she did improperly show a white light. And we think that her breach of duty in these respects misled the officers of the steamer, and caused them to act on the assumption that she was a steamer, and therefore under obligation to pass on the port side. If so, the collision was solely due to the fault of the ship. We rest this conclusion not solely, or mainly, upon the ground that the navigation laws of the United States control the conduct of foreign vessels, or that they have, as such, any extra-territorial authority, except over American shipping. Doubtless they are municipal regulations, yet binding upon American vessels, either in American waters or on the high seas. Nor can the British orders in council control our vessels, though they may their own. We concede also that whether an act is tortious or not must generally be determined by the laws of the place where the act was committed. But every American vessel, outside of the jurisdiction of a foreign power, is, for some purposes at least, a part of the American territory, and our laws are the rules for its guidance. Equally true is it that a British vessel is controlled by British rules of navigation. If it were that the rules of the two nations conflicted, which would the British vessel, and which would the American, be bound to obey? Undoubtedly the rule *185 prescribed by the government to which it belonged. And if, in consequence, collision should ensue between an American and a British vessel, shall the latter be condemned in an American court of admiralty? If so, then our law is given an extra-territorial effect, and is held obligatory upon British ships not within our jurisdiction. Or might an American vessel be faulted in a British court of admiralty for having done what our statute required? Then Britain is truly not only mistress of the seas, but of all who traverse the great waters. It is difficult to see how a ship can be condemned for doing that which by the laws of its origin, or ownership, it was required to do, or how, on the other hand, it can secure an advantage by violation of those laws, unless it is beyond their domain when upon the high seas. But our navigation laws were intended to secure the safety of life and property, as well as the convenience of commerce. They are not in terms confined to the regulation of shipping in our own waters. They attempt to govern a business that is conducted on every sea. If they do not reach the conduct of mariners in its relation to the ships and people of other nations, they are at least designed for the security of the lives and property of our own people. For that purpose they are as useful and as necessary on the ocean as they are upon inland waters. How, then, can our courts ignore them in any case? Why should it ever be held that what is a wrong when done to an American citizen, is right if the injured party be an Englishman?
But we need not affirm that the Berkshire was under obligation to show colored lights, or to refrain from showing a white light, merely because of an act of Congress, nor need we affirm that the Scotia can protect herself by setting up the ship's violation of that act. Nor is it necessary to our conclusions that the British rules in regard to lights are the same as ours, though that is an important consideration. We are not unmindful that the English courts of admiralty have ruled that a foreigner cannot set up against a British vessel, with which his ship has collided, that the British vessel violated the British mercantile marine act, on the *186 high seas, for the reason, as given, that the foreigner was not bound by it, inasmuch as it is beyond the power of Parliament to make rules applicable to foreign vessels outside of British waters. This decision was made in 1856, in the case of The Zollverein.[*] A similar rule was asserted also in The Dumfries,[] decided the same year; in The Saxonia,[] decided in the High Court of Admiralty in 1858, and by the Privy Council in 1862. The same doctrine was laid down in 1858, in the case of Cope v. Doherty,[§] and in The Chancellor,[] decided in 1861. All these decisions were made before the passage of the Merchant Shipping Amendment Act, which took effect on the 1st day of June, 1863. By that act the same rules in regard to lights and movements of steamers and sailing vessels on the high seas were adopted as those which were prescribed by the act of Congress of 1864, and by the same act it was provided that the government of any foreign state might assent to the regulations, and consent to their application to the ships of such state, and that thereupon the Queen, by order in council, might direct that such regulations should apply to ships of such foreign state when within or without British jurisdiction. The act further provided that whenever an order in council should be issued applying any regulation made under it to the ships of any foreign country, such ships should in all cases arising in British courts be deemed to be subject to such regulations, and for the purpose thereof be treated as British ships. Historically, we know that before the close of the year 1864, nearly all the commercial nations of the world had adopted the same regulations respecting lights, and that they were recognized as having adopted them. These nations were the following: Austria, the Argentine Republic, Belgium, Brazil, Bremen, Chili, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hamburg, Hanover, Hawaii, Hayti, Italy, Lubeck, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Morocco, *187 Netherlands, Norway, Oldenburg, Peru, Portugal, Prussia, Roman States, Russia, Schleswig, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United States, and Uruguay  almost every commercial nation in existence.[*] Had this libel then been filed in a British court, the Berkshire must have been found solely in fault, because her white light and her neglect to exhibit colored lights signalled to the Scotia that she was a steamer, and directed the Scotia to do exactly what she did.
It must be conceded, however, that the rights and merits of a case may be governed by a different law from that which controls a court in which a remedy may be sought. The question still remains, what was the law of the place where the collision occurred, and at the time when it occurred. Conceding that it was not the law of the United States, nor that of Great Britain, nor the concurrent regulations of the two governments, but that it was the law of the sea, was it the ancient maritime law, that which existed before the commercial nations of the world adopted the regulations of 1863 and 1864, or the law changed after those regulations were adopted? Undoubtedly, no single nation can change the law of the sea. That law is of universal obligation, and no statute of one or two nations can create obligations for the world. Like all the laws of nations, it rests upon the common consent of civilized communities. It is of force, not because it was prescribed by any superior power, but because it has been generally accepted as a rule of conduct. Whatever may have been its origin, whether in the usages of navigation or in the ordinances of maritime states, or in both, it has become the law of the sea only by the concurrent sanction of those nations who may be said to constitute the commercial world. Many of the usages which prevail, and which have the force of law, doubtless originated in the positive prescriptions of some single state, which were at first of limited effect, but which when generally accepted became of universal obligation. The Rhodian law is supposed to have been the earliest system of marine rules. *188 It was a code for Rhodians only, but it soon became of general authority because accepted and assented to as a wise and desirable system by other maritime nations. The same may be said of the Amalphitan table, of the ordinances of the Hanseatic League, and of parts of the marine ordinances of Louis XIV. They all became the law of the sea, not on account of their origin, but by reason of their acceptance as such. And it is evident that unless general assent is efficacious to give sanction to international law, there never can be that growth and development of maritime rules which the constant changes in the instruments and necessities of navigation require. Changes in nautical rules have taken place. How have they been accomplished, if not by the concurrent assent, express or understood, of maritime nations? When, therefore, we find such rules of navigation as are mentioned in the British orders in council of January 9th, 1863, and in our act of Congress of 1864, accepted as obligatory rules by more than thirty of the principal commercial states of the world, including almost all which have any shipping on the Atlantic Ocean, we are constrained to regard them as in part at least, and so far as relates to these vessels, the laws of the sea, and as having been the law at the time when the collision of which the libellants complain took place.
This is not giving to the statutes of any nation extra-territorial effect. It is not treating them as general maritime laws, but it is recognition of the historical fact that by common consent of mankind, these rules have been acquiesced in as of general obligation. Of that fact we think we may take judicial notice. Foreign municipal laws must indeed be proved as facts, but it is not so with the law of nations.
The consequences of this ruling are decisive of the case before us. The violation of maritime law by the Berkshire in carrying a white light (to say nothing of her neglect to carry colored lights), and her carrying it on deck instead of at her masthead, were false representations to the Scotia. They proclaimed that the Berkshire was a steamer, and *189 such she was manifestly taken to be. The movements of the Scotia were therefore entirely proper, and she was without fault.
DECREE AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
NOTES
[*]  1 Swabey, 96.
[]  Ib. 63.
[]  1 Lushington, 410.
[§]  4 Kay & Johnson, 367; 2 De Gex & Jones, 626.
[]  4 Law Times, 627.
[*]  See Holt's Rule of the Road, page 2.
