                         NUMBERS 13-12-00281-CR

                             COURT OF APPEALS

                   THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                      CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

JUSTIN MERCHANT
A/K/A JUSTIN KEITH MERCHANT,                                              Appellant,

                                            v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                       Appellee.


                    On appeal from the 252nd District Court
                         of Jefferson County, Texas.


                          MEMORANDUM OPINION
             Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes
                 Memorandum Opinion by Justice Perkes

      Pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement, appellant, Justin Merchant a/k/a Justin Keith

Merchant, pleaded guilty to felony theft, a state-jail felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §

31.03 (West 2011). The Court accepted the plea agreement and placed appellant on

deferred-adjudication community supervision for a period of five years.
       Appellant thereafter failed to comply with at least one of his community-supervision

conditions, by being found in unlawful possession of a firearm. The State filed a motion to

revoke appellant’s community supervision and adjudicate guilt. Appellant pleaded true to

the first alleged violation of his community supervision (possession of a firearm by a felon),

and the remaining alleged violations were abandoned. Based on appellant’s “true” plea,

the trial court revoked appellant’s community supervision, adjudicated appellant guilty of

felony theft, and sentenced him to two years of confinement in the Texas Department of

Criminal Justice, State Jail Division. The trial court ordered appellant to pay $1,051.00 in

administrative fees and $619.00 in court costs.

       Appellant timely perfected appeal and, as discussed below, his court-appointed

counsel filed an Anders brief. We affirm.1

                                           I. ANDERS BRIEF

       Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), appellant’s court-

appointed appellate counsel filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating

that his review of the record yielded no grounds of error upon which an appeal can be

predicated. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional

evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See

In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders

brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it

must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent



       1
          Pursuant to a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas, this case is before
us on transfer from the Ninth Court of Appeals in Beaumont, Texas. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 73.001
(West 2005).

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legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343–44 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

       In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]

1978), appellant’s counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there

are no reversible errors in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has informed this Court that

he has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal;

(2) served a copy of the brief and counsel’s motion to withdraw on appellant; and (3)

informed appellant of his right to review the record and to file a pro se response.2 See

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252

S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than an adequate period of time has passed, and appellant has

not filed a pro se response. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409.

                                     II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

       Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief, and have found

nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,

827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the

opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for

reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of




       2
          The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not comply with the
rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court
those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case
presents any meritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696–97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).

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Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. There is no reversible error in

the record. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                     III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

        In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney asked this Court for permission to

withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman,

252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779–80 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw

from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney

must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the

appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within

five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this

opinion and this Court’s judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file a

petition for discretionary review.3 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252

S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).




                                                             Gregory T. Perkes
                                                             Justice

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the
16th day of August, 2012.

        3
            No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case
by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary
review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed
within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion
for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Effective September
1, 2011, any petition for discretionary review must be filed with the clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.3. Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4.
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