UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 95-5957

JOSEPH A. BOONE,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Alexander Harvey II, Senior District Judge.
(CR-95-227-H)

Submitted: August 30, 1996

Decided: September 20, 1996

Before HALL, MURNAGHAN, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Daniel E. Ellenbogen, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Jamie M.
Bennett, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

In June 1995 Appellant Joseph Boone pled guilty to illegally pos-
sessing a firearm as a convicted felon.* Boone contends the district
court erred in determining his sentence under the federal sentencing
guidelines. Specifically, Boone claims that the district court consid-
ered a conviction that was too old to be used in determining his crimi-
nal history points and his base offense level. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.

The only issue in this appeal is whether Boone's armed robbery
conviction in 1971 should be used in determining Boone's base
offense level and criminal history category under the federal sentenc-
ing guidelines. Boone's conviction in 1971 resulted in a sentence of
twenty years. In August 1976 Boone was paroled after serving five
years and two months of his twenty-year sentence. Boone's parole
ceased to be actively monitored in May 1980.

However, Boone was arrested for theft in December 1980. After a
period of delay, Boone's parole was revoked and he was sentenced
to serve the remainder of his twenty-year sentence. On the theft
charge, Boone received four years imprisonment to be served concur-
rently with his armed robbery conviction. In October 1985, Boone
was paroled both on the 1971 armed robbery conviction and the 1982
theft conviction.

Boone argues that he was not "incarcerated" as a result of his 1971
armed robbery conviction within fifteen years from his current
offense and thus the district court should not have considered it in
determining his criminal history category or base offense level under
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual,
§§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), 4A1.2 (Nov. 1995). Specifically, Boone argues
that his incarceration in 1982 was not the result of his parole revoca-
tion, but was the result of his theft conviction. According to Boone,
his parole revocation was a mere accounting procedure as he could
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*18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g) (West Supp. 1996).

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not be incarcerated on the theft charge and on parole for armed rob-
bery at the same time. Thus, Boone asserts that his period of incarcer-
ation for his 1971 conviction falls outside the fifteen-year period from
his current offense. We find Boone's argument to be without merit.

Boone was indeed incarcerated on the armed robbery sentence
within fifteen years of November 1, 1994, the date he committed his
current offense. Whether he served his sentences concurrently is
immaterial. Because Boone was incarcerated on the 1971 robbery
conviction within fifteen years of his current offense, the district court
properly found Boone's 1971 conviction eligible for inclusion in cal-
culating his criminal history and base offense level.

Accordingly, we affirm Boone's conviction and sentence. We dis-
pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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