UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

JANE DOE, a minor by her parents
and next friends; JOHN DOE; JUNE
DOE, Parents of Jane Doe,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ARLINGTON COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,
                                                               No. 99-1426
Defendant-Appellee,

and

ALVIN CRAWLEY, Director, Student
Services Arlington County Public
Schools,
Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Claude M. Hilton, Chief District Judge.
(CA-98-371-A)

Argued: March 1, 2000

Decided: March 20, 2000

Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Jodi Therese Tuer, MCDONALD & KARL, Washington,
D.C., for Appellants. John Francis Cafferky, HUNTON & WIL-
LIAMS, McLean, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: John F. Karl,
Jr., MCDONALD & KARL, Washington, D.C., for Appellants.
Arthur E. Schmalz, HUNTON & WILLIAMS, McLean, Virginia;
Barbara S. Drake, County Attorney, Carol McCoskrie, Assistant
County Attorney, Arlington, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

After administrative hearings, Jane Doe, by her parents, John and
June Doe, brought this action against the Arlington County School
Board, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (1998) and 42
U.S.C.A § 1983 (1998 & Supp. 1999). The district court granted sum-
mary judgment to the Board; we affirm.

Doe contends that her "1996-97 and 1997-98 placements were
inconsistent with the IDEA's requirement that disabled students be
educated to the maximum extent appropriate in the regular classroom
with non-disabled children." The administrative hearing officers,
however, found that in both years the Board provided Jane Doe with
the least restrictive appropriate placements under the IDEA. "Admin-
istrative findings in an IDEA case `are entitled to be considered prima
facie correct.'" Hartmann v. Loudoun County Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d
996, 1000-01 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1046 (1988) (quoting
Doyle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 953 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir.
1991)). In this case, as the district court found,"[t]he evidence firmly
supports both hearing officers' determination that the `full inclusion'
program promoted by the plaintiffs would not meet[Jane's] educa-
tional needs for core academic subjects, given her significant cogni-
tive limitations and distractibility."

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Perhaps recognizing this, Doe maintains that the district court erred
in refusing to permit "meaningful discovery" or admission into evi-
dence of certain documents. We review a district court's discovery
rulings for abuse of discretion, and find no abuse here.

Doe also asserts that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment on her § 504 and § 1983 claims. The § 504 claim was, as
the district court held, both derivative of the IDEA claim (and so must
fail because the IDEA claim fails) and waived (because Doe did not
argue it in the state review hearing). The § 1983 claim was based
entirely on the IDEA and § 504 claims. Since Doe cannot prevail on
her IDEA and § 504 claims, she cannot prevail on her § 1983 claim.
Moreover, notwithstanding Doe's assertions to the contrary, she has
also failed to demonstrate that any statutory violation constituted a
"policy or custom" of the Board, a prerequisite for § 1983 recovery
against the Board. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 690-91, 694 (1978).

We have fully considered all of Doe's remaining arguments. After
careful review of the extensive record, the briefs and arguments of
counsel, and the relevant legal authorities, we reject them and affirm
the grant of summary judgment to the Board for the reasons stated by
the district court. See Jane Doe v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 41 F.
Supp.2d 599 (E.D. Va. 1999).

AFFIRMED

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