
57 U.S. 610 (____)
16 How. 610
WILLIAM EARLY, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
JOHN DOE, ON THE DEMISE OF RHODA E. HOMANS.
Supreme Court of United States.

*612 Upon this exception the case came up to this court and was argued by Mr. Lawrence, for the plaintiff in error, and by Mr. Redin and Mr. Woodward, for the defendant in error.
*615 Mr. Justice WAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an ejectment suit for part of lot No. 4, in square, No. 730, in the city of Washington.
The only question raised by counsel in the argument of the case here, is, whether, where property has been assessed for taxes, it can be considered as having been regularly advertised *616 and regularly sold, if it shall be sold before twelve full weeks (or eighty-four days) have passed from the date of the first advertisement. Eighty-four days advertisement were not given when the property in dispute in this case was sold. Upon the trial in the Circuit Court, the plaintiff in that court prayed its instruction to the jury in these words: "That the said sale was invalid and of no effect, and passed no title to the defendant in the premises in question; because a period of twelve full weeks had not intervened between the 26th of August, the time of the first advertised notice of sale, and the 15th of November, 1848, the day or time of sale, but a period of eleven weeks and four days only." The court gave the instruction accordingly. The defendant's counsel excepted to the same. The court, upon his prayer, allowed it, and the case is regularly here by writ of error.
It appears that the notice for sale of the property in dispute was inserted in the National Intelligencer twelve times in successive weeks, the first insertion being on Saturday, the 26th of August, and the last on the 15th of November, the day of sale. Including the 26th of August as one of the days of the notice, and the 15th of November necessarily as another, we find that the notice was given only for eighty-two days. The language of the statute regulating the notice to be given is in these words: "That public notice of the time and place of the sale of all real property for taxes due the corporation of the city of Washington, shall be given hereafter, by advertisement, inserted in some newspaper published in said city, once in each week, for at least twelve successive weeks." Now, the first week following the date of the advertisement expired with the next Friday, the tenth of November, and, if the computation is carried out, it will be found that the twelfth week expired on the 17th of November. But the sale was made two days before, on the 15th of November, the last insertion of the notice being on the day of sale.
So there were eleven insertions of the notice in the newspaper in different weeks (making, with the first, twelve) after the expiration of the week from the first insertion, and the point to be settled is, whether the statute means that twelve insertions in successive weeks is sufficient notice, without respect to the number of days in twelve weeks. We do not doubt if the statute had been "once in each week for twelve successive weeks," a previous notice of the particular day of sale having been given to the owner of the property, that it might very well be concluded, that twelve notices in different successive weeks, though the last insertion of the notice for sale was on the day of sale, was sufficient. But when the legislator has used the words, for at least twelve successive weeks, we cannot doubt that the *617 words, at least as they would do in common parlance, mean a duration of the time that there is in twelve successive weeks or eighty-four days. Every statute must be construed from the words in it, and that construction is to be preferred which gives to all of them an operative meaning. Our construction of the statute under review gives to every word its meaning. The other leaves out of consideration the words "for at least," which mean a space of time comprehended within twelve successive weeks or eighty-four days. The preposition, for, means of itself duration when it is put in connection with time, and as all of us use it in that way, in our every-day conversation, it cannot be presumed that the legislator, in making this statute, did not mean to use it in the same way. Twelve successive weeks is as definite a designation of time, according to our division of it, as can be made. When we say that any thing may be done in twelve weeks, or that it shall not be done for twelve weeks, after the happening of a fact which is to precede it, we mean that it may be done in twelve weeks or eighty-four days, or, as the case may be, that it shall not be done before. The notice for sale, in this instance, was the fact which was to precede the time for sale, and that is neither qualified nor in any way lessened by the words "once a week," which precede in this statute those which follow them, "for at least twelve successive weeks." We think that the court did not err in refusing to give to the jury the instruction which was asked by the defendant upon the trial of this case.
The construction of the statute will be recognized to be in harmony with that policy of the law which experience has established to protect the ownerships of property from divestiture by statutory sales, where there has not been a substantial compliance with the law, by which a public officer is empowered to sell it.
Property is liable to be sold on account of an undischarged obligation of the owner of it to the public or to his creditors. But it can only be done in either case where there has been a substantial compliance with the prerequisites of the sale, as those are fixed by law. Any assumption by the officer appointed to make the sale, or disregard of them, the law discountenances. He may not do any thing of himself, and must do all as he is directed by the law under which he acts. He may not, by any misconstruction of it, anticipate the time for sale within which the owner of the property may prevent a sale of it, by paying the demand against him, and the expenses which may have been incurred from his not having done so before. This the law always presumes that the owner may do, until a sale has been made. He may arrest the uplifted hammer of *618 the auctioneer when the cry for sale is made, if it be done before a bonâ fide bid has been made. The authority of the officer to sell is, as it was in this case, "unless the taxes be previously paid to the collector, with such expenses as may have accrued at the time of payment." There is a difference, it is true, in the strictness required in a tax sale, and that of a sale made under judgment and execution, but in both, the same rule applies as to the full notice of time which the law requires to be given for the sale. "In deciding upon tax land titles great strictness has always been observed. The collector's proceedings are closely scanned. The purchaser is bound to inquire whether he has done so or not. He buys at his peril, and cannot sustain his title without showing the authority of the collector and the regularity of his proceedings."
This court said, in Williams v. Peyton, 4 Wheat. 77, that the authority given to a collector to sell land for the non-payment of the direct tax, "is a naked power not coupled with an interest." In all such cases the law requires that every prerequisite to the exercise of that power must precede its exercise, that the agent must pursue the power or his act will not be sustained by it. Again, in Ronkendorff's Case, 4 Peters, 349, this court repeated that in an ex parte proceeding, as a sale of lands for taxes, under a special authority, great strictness is required. An individual cannot be divested of his property against his consent, until every substantial requisite of the law has been complied with. The proof of the regularity of the collector's proceedings devolves upon the person who claims under the collector's sale. At an earlier day, the court decided, in Stead's Executors v. Course, 4 Cranch, 403: A collector selling lands for taxes, must act in conformity with the law from which his power is derived; and the purchaser is bound to inquire whether he has so acted. It is incumbent upon the vendee to prove the authority to sell. See also McClung v. Ross, 5 Wheaton, 116; Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheaton, 119. The decisions made by this court are full as to the circumstances under which tax titles may be set aside. We recommend also the perusal of the case of Lyon et al. v. Burt et al., in 11 Alabama Reports, cited by the counsel for the defendant in error; and to all of the cases cited in the opinion of Chief Justice Collier. It is not necessary for us to extend this opinion farther in citing cases upon tax sales. So far as we know, the law upon the subject is the same throughout the United States, and where differences exist they have occurred from a different phraseology in statutes, and not from any discordance in the views of judges in respect to the common law to be applied in tax sales.
See 4 Cranch, 403; 9 Cranch, 64; 1 Scam. 335; 1 Bibb, 295; *619 5 Mass. Rep. 403; 4 Dec. & Bal. 363; 3 Ohio Reports, 232; 2 Ohio, 378; 3 Yeates, 284; 2 Yeates, 100; 13 Sergeant & Rawle, 208; 4 Dec. & Bal. 386; 5 Wheat. 116; 6 Wheat. 119; 1 Yeates, 300; 3 Monroe, 271; 1 Tyler's Rep. 295; 14 Mass. 177; 8 Wheaton, 681; 15 Mass. 144; Greenleaf's Rep. 339; Taylor's North Carolina Rep. 480; 3 Hawks's Rep. 283; 1 Gilm. 26; 10 Wend. 346; 18 Johns. Rep. 441; 5 Alabama, 433. I have not the reports of the Supreme Court of Georgia at hand to cite from them any cases of tax sales, if any have been decided by it, but I know that the decisions of the courts in that State are the same as those stated in this opinion and in the cases cited.
We affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.

Order.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the county of Washington, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.
