                        T.C. Memo. 2008-28



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                  LISA H. GREEN, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 11678-06.              Filed February 12, 2008.



     Mitchell S. Fuerst, for petitioner.

     Brian A. Pfeifer, for respondent.



                        MEMORANDUM OPINION


     MARVEL, Judge:   This matter is before the Court on

respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, as

supplemented.   After concessions,1 the issue for decision is



     1
      Respondent concedes that the Court has jurisdiction under
sec. 6015(e), I.R.C., to review the determination denying relief
under sec. 6015(f), I.R.C., for 1999 and 2000.
                               - 2 -

whether we have jurisdiction under section 6015(e)2 over

petitioner’s stand-alone case asserting a claim for equitable

relief under section 6015(f) for 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998.

                            Background

     Petitioner resided in Florida when the petition in this case

was filed.

     Petitioner filed joint Federal income tax returns for the

years at issue with her former husband, Jonathan H. Green.

Petitioner paid the Federal income tax liabilities reported on

the 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 joint returns but did not pay the

tax liabilities reported on the 1999 and 2000 joint returns.

Respondent has not asserted a deficiency against petitioner for

any year at issue.

     On February 3, 2003, respondent received petitioner’s Form

8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief, with a Statement

Regarding Request for Equitable Relief (statement) for 1995

through 2000 attached.   In the statement, petitioner requested a

refund of tax paid for 1995 through 2000 under section 6015(f).

     On March 24, 2006, respondent issued to petitioner a Notice

of Determination Concerning Relief from Joint and Several

Liability Under Section 6015 for 1999 and 2000, in which he

denied petitioner’s request for relief.   Respondent, however, did


     2
      Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code.
                               - 3 -

not issue a notice of determination for 1995, 1996, 1997, or

1998.   Petitioner timely petitioned this Court, asserting that

respondent erred by denying her relief under section 6015 for

1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000.

     On November 28, 2006, respondent’s motion to dismiss for

lack of jurisdiction was filed.   Respondent argues that we lack

jurisdiction under section 6015(e) over petitioner’s section

6015(f) claim for relief because respondent has not determined a

deficiency for any of the years at issue.   Petitioner filed a

notice of objection to respondent’s motion.

     In the Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-

432, div. C, sec. 408(a), (c), 120 Stat. 3061, 3062 (TRHCA

section 408), Congress amended section 6015(e) to confer

jurisdiction on this Court over stand-alone requests for

equitable relief under section 6015(f), effective for tax

liabilities arising or remaining unpaid on or after December 20,

2006.   On April 19, 2007, respondent filed a supplement to his

motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.   Respondent concedes

that TRHCA section 408 grants us jurisdiction to review

respondent’s determination denying relief under section 6015(f)

for 1999 and 2000.   Respondent argues, however, that we lack

jurisdiction to determine petitioner’s eligibility for relief

under section 6015(f) for 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 because the
                                 - 4 -

tax liabilities for those years were fully paid before

December 20, 2006.

     On May 14, 2007, the Court held a hearing on respondent’s

motion at its trial session in Miami, Florida.    Petitioner’s and

respondent’s counsel appeared and were heard.    At the hearing, we

directed petitioner to submit a response to respondent’s

supplement and offered respondent the opportunity to reply to

petitioner’s response.

     On June 15, 2007, petitioner’s response to respondent’s

supplement was filed.    On July 12, 2007, respondent replied.

                             Discussion

I.   Section 6015(e)

     Section 6015(e) generally allows a spouse who has requested

relief from joint and several liability to contest the

Commissioner’s denial of relief under section 6015 by filing a

timely petition in this Court.    Before the enactment of TRHCA

section 408, the Court had jurisdiction over such cases only if

the Commissioner had asserted a deficiency against the taxpayer.

See Billings v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 7 (2006).    TRHCA section

408 amended section 6015(e) to confer jurisdiction on the Court

over stand-alone requests for equitable relief under section

6015(f), but only with respect to tax liabilities arising or

remaining unpaid on or after December 20, 2006.
                                - 5 -

     Petitioner asserts that she is entitled to equitable relief

under section 6015(f) in the form of a tax refund for each of the

years 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998.    Her argument reflects the fact

that she paid the tax liabilities for those years before December

20, 2006.    Because petitioner’s 1995-98 tax liabilities did not

arise or remain unpaid on or after December 20, 2006, the Court

does not have jurisdiction under section 6015(e), as amended by

TRHCA section 408, over petitioner’s stand-alone claim for

equitable relief under section 6015(f) for 1995-98.    See, e.g.,

Smith v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2007-117; Bock v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2007-41.

     Petitioner argues, however, that TRHCA section 408 violates

her equal protection and due process rights under the United

States Constitution because it treats taxpayers who have paid

their tax liabilities before December 20, 2006, differently from

taxpayers who have not.   Petitioner’s argument is unavailing.     It

is well established that “Legislatures have especially broad

latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax

statutes.”    Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540,

547 (1983).    A taxpayer challenging the constitutionality of a

tax classification on equal protection grounds must bear the very

heavy burden of negating “every conceivable basis which might

support it.”    Id. at 547-548; see also Durham v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2004-125.
                                - 6 -

     Petitioner has not argued, and she has failed to

demonstrate, that she is a member of any suspect classification

or that TRHCA section 408 interferes with a fundamental right.

Consequently, we must uphold TRHCA section 408 if it bears a

rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.      See

Regan v. Taxation With Representation, supra at 547.     We have

held that it is especially difficult to demonstrate that no

rational basis exists for a classification in a revenue act for

which the presumption that an act of Congress is constitutional

is particularly strong.    See Black v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 505,

507-508 (1977); Cansino v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-134.

Moreover, under the rational basis standard, a statute does not

violate the equal protection mandate “if any state of facts

rationally justifying * * * [the statute] is demonstrated to or

perceived by the courts.”    United States v. Md. Savings-Share

Ins. Corp., 400 U.S. 4, 6 (1970).

     One obvious rational basis for Congress’s choice of an

effective date is administrative convenience.    Administrative

convenience has been recognized as a sufficient reason for

legislative line drawing.    See, e.g., N.Y. Rapid Transit Corp. v.

City of New York, 303 U.S. 573, 580 (1938).     In enacting TRHCA

section 408, Congress had to draw a line that would enable the

Internal Revenue Service and the courts to ascertain when TRHCA

section 408 would apply.    Congress reasonably decided to use
                                 - 7 -

TRHCA’s enactment date, December 20, 2006, and limited the

application of TRHCA section 408 to those taxpayers whose

liability arose or remained unpaid on or after that date.       We

perceive this to be a rational basis for the line drawn by

Congress, and we reject petitioner’s argument to the contrary.

     Petitioner has also failed to demonstrate that TRHCA section

408 violates her right to due process.      Petitioner appears to

argue that TRHCA section 408 offends due process because it was

not made retroactive to a date that would have enabled her to

have her day in court with respect to the fully paid 1995-98

liabilities.    Petitioner, however, has provided no support for

her argument.    Moreover, a taxpayer who pays a tax in full and

complies with other jurisdictional prerequisites can pursue a

refund action in a U.S. District Court or in the U.S. Court of

Federal Claims.    See sec. 7422(a).     If petitioner believed that

she should not have been liable for the taxes for 1995-98 that

were reported and fully paid, she could have filed a refund claim

and related litigation.    It does not follow from the fact that

petitioner is foreclosed from litigating in this Court because of

a rational decision on Congress’s part to establish an effective

date for TRHCA section 408 that petitioner’s constitutional right

to due process has been violated.      We reject petitioner’s due

process argument as meritless.
                                 - 8 -

II.   Equitable Jurisdiction

      Petitioner argues that the Court should retain jurisdiction

to determine whether petitioner was a signatory to the joint

returns for 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998.     Petitioner asserts that

because she signed the joint returns under duress and coercion,

she did not have the requisite intent to file a joint return.      In

effect, petitioner is asking this Court to exercise jurisdiction

over petitioner’s claims under general equitable principles.

      Petitioner has cited no statute or case that supports her

argument that we can or should exercise jurisdiction independent

of any conferred by section 6015(e).     The only cases that she

cites in support of her argument that we have equitable

jurisdiction to decide whether she signed her 1995-98 joint

returns under duress are deficiency cases in which the

Commissioner issued notices of deficiency and the taxpayers

timely petitioned this Court.    See Stanley v. Commissioner, 81

T.C. 634 (1983); Brown v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 116 (1968).

      Petitioner never received a notice of deficiency for 1995-

98.   Consequently, we do not have jurisdiction to redetermine a

deficiency under section 6213(a).     In addition, for reasons

described earlier in this opinion, we do not have jurisdiction

over petitioner’s section 6015(f) claims for 1995-98 under

section 6015(e) as amended.     Petitioner has not asserted any

basis for us to exercise jurisdiction over her claims.
                              - 9 -

     In the light of the foregoing, we shall grant respondent’s

motion to dismiss petitioner’s 1995-98 section 6015(f) claims for

lack of jurisdiction, as supplemented.



                                           An appropriate order

                                      of dismissal for lack of

                                      jurisdiction will be entered.
