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BYRNE v. AVERY CENTER FOR OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, P.C.—
                       CONCURRENCE

   ZARELLA, J., with whom ROGERS, C. J., joins, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with parts
I and II A of the majority opinion. I respectfully disagree,
however, with the majority’s decision in part II B of
the opinion not to reach and decide the defendant’s
statutory claim. The majority concludes that the plain-
tiff did not assert an independent claim under General
Statutes § 52-146o because that claim is contained in
counts two and four of the amended complaint alleging
negligence and negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress, respectively, instead of in a separate count. In
my view, however, the majority indulges in an overly
technical reading of counts two and four that is incon-
sistent with the modern view of pleading, which rejects
a narrow, formalistic reading of the pleadings in favor
of construing pleadings broadly and applying common
sense. See, e.g., Fuessenich v. DiNardo, 195 Conn. 144,
150–51, 487 A.2d 514 (1985); Bombero v. Marchionne,
11 Conn. App. 485, 496, 528 A.2d 396 (Borden, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 205 Conn. 801, 529 A.2d 719
(1987); DeMartin v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 4 Conn.
App. 387, 390, 494 A.2d 1222, cert. denied, 197 Conn.
813, 499 A.2d 62 (1985). I thus believe that counts two
and four, in which one of the plaintiff’s assertions is
that the defendant ‘‘disclosed the medical file, without
authority, in violation of . . . § 52-146o,’’ directly
allege a violation of the statute, and the fact that the
allegation is not contained in a separate count is imma-
terial because the trial court and the parties have treated
counts two and four throughout the proceedings as
asserting a statutory violation. Accordingly, I believe
that the statutory claim was properly raised and should
have been decided by this court.
   I finally emphasize that, because this court has deter-
mined that the issue of whether Connecticut’s common
law provides a remedy for a health care provider’s
breach of its duty of confidentiality in the course of
complying with a subpoena has not been raised, the
issue remains unresolved, which leaves the parties and
the trial court to determine the most appropriate course
of action as the litigation proceeds.
