UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                      No. 97-4308

MARCUS BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.
Dennis W. Shedd, District Judge.
(CR-96-450-DWS)

Submitted: October 20, 1997

Decided: December 11, 1997

Before NIEMEYER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Henry Dargan McMaster, TOMPKINS & MCMASTER, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. J. Rene Josey, United States Attorney,
Jane B. Taylor, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee.

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Marcus Brown appeals from his convictions on seven counts of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute crack
cocaine, distribution of crack cocaine, and possession with intent to
distribute crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1997), for which he was sentenced to 151 months imprison-
ment. Brown's only claim on appeal is that the district court erred by
admitting evidence of Brown's guilty plea to state charges based on
the same conduct underlying Count 2 of the federal charges. We
affirm.

At Brown's trial, the government called Sumter County narcotics
officer Mark Rosensteel to testify. Rosensteel stated, over Brown's
objection, that Brown had pled guilty in South Carolina state court to
a drug charge (Possession with Intent to Distribute Crack Cocaine)
which was based on the same facts as Count 2 of the federal indict-
ment (Possession with Intent to Distribute crack cocaine on December
1, 1994). Rosensteel's testimony was based on his involvement with
Brown's arrest and his in-court identification of Brown's signature on
the guilty plea document.1 Brown claims that Rosensteel's testimony
constituted inadmissible hearsay entitling him to a new trial.

This court reviews the district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 731 (4th Cir.
1993). We find no abuse of discretion. First, Brown's guilty plea was
not hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2), which provides that a
statement is not hearsay if it "is offered against a party and is (A) the
party's own statement, in either an individual or representative capac-
ity or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption
or belief in its truth." Second, the document itself could have been
admitted as a self-authenticating document under Fed. R. Evid. 901(a).2
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1 The document itself was not introduced into evidence.
2 Rule 901(a) provides that "[t]he requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evi-
dence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what
its proponent claims." Rule 901(b)(1) further provides that the testimony
of a witness with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be con-
forms with the requirements of the Rule.

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Accordingly, we affirm Brown's conviction. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pres-
ented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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