UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                     No. 98-4135

WALTER O. CRAWFORD, III,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Newport News.
Jerome B. Friedman, District Judge.
(CR-97-60)

Submitted: July 7, 1998

Decided: July 31, 1998

Before WILKINS, HAMILTON, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

J. Brian Donnelly, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F.
Fahey, United States Attorney, Damon A. King, Special Assistant
United States Attorney, Fort Eustis, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Walter O. Crawford, III, was convicted of driving under
the influence of alcohol, in violation of 18 U.S.C.§ 13 (1994), assimi-
lating Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-266 (Michie 1997), and refusing to sub-
mit to a breath, blood, or urine test, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3118
(1994). On appeal, Crawford alleges that the district court erroneously
admitted evidence of his refusal to take a post-arrest breathalyzer test
in violation of state law and that his sentence is in violation of state
and federal law. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

A military policeman ("MP") stopped Crawford after he observed
Crawford driving erratically within the limits of Fort Eustis, a federal
military reservation. The MP noticed a strong smell of alcohol on
Crawford's breath and administered three field sobriety tests, all of
which Crawford failed. The MP offered Crawford a preliminary
breath test, which he refused. Crawford was then transported to the
military police station where he was advised of the implied consent
statute and offered a breath or blood test. Crawford refused both. At
a bench trial before a federal magistrate, the Government introduced,
over defense objection, evidence of Crawford's refusal to submit to
chemical tests. Crawford was convicted and sentenced to a $500 fine
and three years of supervised probation. As a special condition of pro-
bation, Crawford was prohibited from operating a motor vehicle on
a public highway for a period of three years.

Decisions regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence are
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be
reversed absent an abuse of that discretion, and we find no such abuse
here. See United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 731 (4th Cir. 1993).
Crawford alleges that the Assimilative Crimes Act ("ACA"), 18
U.S.C. § 13 (1994), also assimilates the Virginia statute that prohibits
a prosecutor from introducing evidence that the defendant refused a
breath test during a prosecution for driving under the influence.1 We
disagree.
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1 See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-268.10 (Michie 1997).

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It is well-settled that the ACA assimilates for federal prosecutions
a state's substantive law, but generally does not use state procedural
law or its rules of evidence. See United States v. Price, 812 F.2d 174,
175 (4th Cir. 1987); Kay v. United States, 255 F.2d 476, 479 (4th Cir.
1958). We find that the statute upon which Crawford relies is clearly
an evidentiary rule. Moreover, there is no need to look to state law
in the present case because 18 U.S.C. § 3118(b) (1994) expressly
allows for the admission of the challenged evidence.

Contrary to Crawford's assertions, we find nothing in federal or
state law which prohibited the magistrate judge from restricting his
driving privileges as a special condition of probation. Federal courts
may impose any condition on probation so long as it is reasonably
related to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1994). See 18
U.S.C. § 3563(b). In the present case, we find that the magistrate
judge properly considered the factors required under§ 3553(a), and
the restriction imposed does not last longer than the probationary
period.2 Moreover, the restriction was not imposed as a fine, but
rather as a condition of probation.

We therefore affirm Crawford's convictions and sentence. We dis-
pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
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2 We note that while the restriction seems harsh on the surface, the
magistrate court was faced with an individual who had had four convic-
tions for driving under the influence in the last six years and was on pro-
bation for one of those convictions at the time of the instant offense.

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