                         T.C. Memo. 2000-224



                       UNITED STATES TAX COURT



             JOSEPH P. MCGIVNEY, JR., Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No.     10329-99.                    Filed July 28, 2000.


     Thomas J. Handler, for petitioner.

     Patricia Pierce Davis, for respondent.



                          MEMORANDUM OPINION


     LARO, Judge:    Respondent moves the Court to enter a decision

in accordance with the parties' stipulation of settled issues

(stipulation) filed on March 20, 2000.    Petitioner objects

thereto, asserting that he has recently learned of possible

evidence of documents which will disprove certain terms of the

stipulation.   We must decide whether, as requested, we shall

defer entry of decision until after petitioner obtains the
                                   - 2 -

documents and shares them with respondent.       We hold that we shall

not.       Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code for the

year in issue.

                                Background

       Respondent determined a $59,114 deficiency in petitioner's

1995 Federal income tax and additions thereto of $2,662.95 and

$3,205.33 under sections 6651(a)(1) and 6654, respectively.

While residing in Illinois petitioner petitioned the Court to

redetermine these amounts.      The Court set this case for trial in

Chicago, Illinois, on March 20, 2000.        On the date set for trial

the parties filed the stipulation, and the Court ordered that the

stipulated decision document be submitted to the Court by April

19, 2000.       Petitioner now refuses to sign the decision document,

asserting that he has recently become aware that documents may

exist which support the allegations set out in his petition.

Petitioner asserts:

       petitioner believes that the financial records and
       information [alleged to be newly discovered but not in
       petitioner’s possession] will indicate that the taxable
       income amounts, related tax liability, and interest and
       penalty previously conceded in the stipulation of
       settled issues, are inaccurate and petitioner is harmed
       by conceding to such amounts.

Petitioner does not move the Court to vacate the stipulation1 but



       1
      Even assuming arguendo, that petitioner is making such a
motion through his response to respondent's motion for entry of
decision, we would deny the motion under the rationale of Stamm
Intl. Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 315, 321 (1988)
                                - 3 -

requests that we deny respondent's motion and that in view of the

aforementioned information, which is not supported by affidavit,

petitioner be granted additional "time to present such new

information to District Counsel."

                            Discussion

     The compromise and settlement of tax cases is governed by

general principles of contract law.     See Dorchester Indus., Inc.

v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 320, 330 (1997), affd. without

published opinion 208 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2000).    A settlement

stipulation is in essence a contract.    Each party agrees to

concede some rights which he or she may assert against his or her

adversary as consideration for those secured in the settlement

agreement.   See Saigh v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 171, 177 (1956).

Like contracts, stipulations of settlement bind the parties

thereto to the terms thereof.   See Stamos v. Commissioner, 87

T.C. 1451, 1455 (1986).   In determining the proper meaning of the

terms, we look to the language of the stipulation and the

circumstances surrounding its execution.    See Robbins Tire &

Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 420, 435-436 (1969); see also

Brink v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 602, 606 (1962), affd. 328 F.2d

662 (6th Cir. 1964).   We will enforce a stipulation of

settlement, whether filed or orally stipulated into the record,

unless justice requires that we do otherwise.    See Dorchester

Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 335; Saigh v.
                                 - 4 -

Commissioner, supra at 177 (1956); cf. Adams v. Commissioner, 85

T.C. 359, 375 (1985) (less stringent standard to modify or set

aside settlement stipulation when a trial is not canceled as a

result of the stipulation).

     Petitioner makes no allegations that the decision proffered

by respondent is not in accordance with the stipulation.     The

stipulation, which is clear on its face, speaks for itself and

shows that the parties agreed to resolve this case in the manner

therein set out.   The stipulation, voluntarily entered into, must

be given binding effect.   The parties struck a bargain in the

stipulation, and petitioner must live with the benefits and

burdens of it.   See Summers v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-17.

We hold that on the material before us, there is no reason to

delay entry of a decision, reflecting the stipulation.

     To reflect the foregoing,



                                         An appropriate order will be

                                   issued granting respondent's

                                   motion for entry of decision and

                                   decision will be entered in

                                   accordance therewith.
