UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT OWENS, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                                     No. 98-2470
KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Orangeburg.
William B. Traxler, Jr., District Judge;
E. S. Swearingen, Magistrate Judge.
(CA-97-1922-5-21JI)

Submitted: April 30, 1999

Decided: May 25, 1999

Before HAMILTON, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

William T. Toal, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Frank W.
Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, J. Rene Josey, United States
Attorney, John Berkley Grimball, Assistant United States Attorney,
Deana R. Ertl-Lombardi, Chief Counsel, Rebion VIII, Thomas H.
Kraus, Assistant Regional Counsel, Office of the General Counsel,
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Denver, Colorado, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Robert Owens appeals the magistrate judge's orders upholding the
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Owens'
applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental secur-
ity income and denying his motion for reconsideration. We affirm.

Owens was born on September 1, 1942, has a high school educa-
tion, and has past relevant work experience as a truck driver, wrecker
operator, and van driver. He applied for benefits in 1992, alleging that
he became disabled in June 1989 because of back, neck, and leg prob-
lems, diabetes, and hypertension. Following the denial of his applica-
tions initially and on reconsideration, an ALJ conducted a hearing on
Owens' claims. The ALJ found that Owens' impairments were not as
severe as claimed, that he remained capable of performing medium
work, and that he could perform his past relevant work. The Appeals
Council affirmed this decision, which became the final decision of the
Commissioner. Acting pursuant to the parties' consent, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) (1994), the magistrate judge upheld the Commissioner's
final decision. Owens timely appealed.

We must determine whether the Commissioner's findings are sup-
ported by substantial evidence, see Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971), and whether the correct law was applied. See Hays
v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence
is that evidence which a "reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion." Perales, 402 U.S. at 401 (internal quotations
and citation omitted). Owens contends that substantial evidence does
not support the Commissioner's decision. Specifically, Owens argues
that the ALJ erred when he found that Owens' pain was not as severe
as claimed and when he discredited the opinion of Owens' treating
physician that Owens was totally disabled from performing any work.

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We have reviewed the record, briefs, and pertinent case law in this
matter. Our review persuades us that the magistrate judge correctly
found that the Commissioner's decision denying benefits is based on
substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the
magistrate judge. See Owens v. Apfel, No. CA-97-1922-5-21JI
(D.S.C. July 17 and Sept. 4, 1998).*

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
_________________________________________________________________
*Although the district court's judgment or order is marked as "filed"
on July 17, 1998, the district court's records show that it was entered on
the docket sheet on July 20, 1998. Pursuant to Rules 58 and 79(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the date that the judgment or order
was entered on the docket sheet that we take as the effective date of the
district court's decision. See Wilson v. Murray , 806 F.2d 1232, 1234-35
(4th Cir. 1986).

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