                                                                                          ACCEPTED
                                                                                      03-14-00531-CR
                                                                                            11673895
                                                                           THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                      AUSTIN, TEXAS
October 4, 2016                                                                  7/18/2016 9:09:29 AM
                               No. 03-14-0531-CR                                    JEFFREY D. KYLE
                                                                                               CLERK



                                IN THE
                           COURT OF APPEALS                         RECEIVED IN
                                                               3rd COURT OF APPEALS
                    FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT                AUSTIN, TEXAS
                                                               7/18/2016 9:09:29 AM
                          OF TEXAS, AT AUSTIN
                                                                 JEFFREY D. KYLE
                                                                       Clerk
                          DERRICK KUYKENDALL
                                 Appellant
                                     v.
                             The State of Texas
                                 Appellee

                  On Appeal In Case Number D1DC-13-300701
                  From the 147ST District Court of Travis County
                    The Hon. Bert Richardson, Judge Presiding


           MOTION FOR RE-CONSIDERATION

                               EN BANC

                                  Submitted by:

                         The Law Offices of Ariel Payan
                               1012 Rio Grande
                             Austin, Texas 78701
                              Tel. 512/478-3900
                              Fax: 512/472-4102

                                   Ariel Payan
                             State Bar No. 00794430

                     Court-Appointed Attorney for Appellant
                                                             Table of Contents


Index of Authorities .........................................................................................................................ii

Point of Error.................................................................................................................................... v

Facts Relevant to this Motion .......................................................................................................... 1

Prayer .............................................................................................................................................. 14

Certificate of Delivery ................................................................................................................... 15




                                                                           i
                                                          Index of Authorities


Federal Cases:

Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S.Ct. 189 (1932) ................................................... 6


United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 68B69, 105 S.Ct. 471 (1984) ............................................ 6




Texas Cases:

Bell v. State, 148 Tex.Cr.R. 573, 189 S.W.2d 1022 (1945) .......................................................... 4


Dockery v. State, 542 S.W.2d 644 (Tex.Cr.App. 1976) ............................................................ 12


Giles v. State, 617 S.W.2d 691 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981) .................................................................... 12


Guthrie-Nail v. State B S.W.3d B, 2015 WL 5449642, PD-0125-14 (Tex.Cr.App. September
16, 2015) .......................................................................................................................................5, 6


Guzman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Tex.Cr.App. 2006) ....................................................8, 9


Howard v. State, 420 S.W.2d 706 (Tex.Cr.App. 1967) ................................................................. 4


Lafleur v. State, 106 S.W.3d 91, 92 (Tex.Cr.App. 2003) ..................................................... 3, 5, 7


                                                                         ii
Lewis v. State, 529 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975) ......................................................9, 11


London v. State, 547 S.W.2d 27 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977).................................................................. 12


Lugo v. State, 667 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984) .........................................................8, 9


Mendieta v. State, 706 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986)....................................................... 9


Moore v. State, 574 S.W.2d 122 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978) ................................................................. 11


Ormsby v. State, 600 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980) ............................................................... 11

Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985) .......................................................6, 7


Roberts v. State, 122 S.W. 388 (Tex.Cr.App. 1909)...................................................................... 4


Saunders v. State, 840 S.W.2d 390, 391 (Tex.Cr.App. 1992) ....................................................... 8


Schoelman v. State, 644 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983) ....................................................12, 13


Thomas v. State, 638 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983) .......................................... 4, 5, 12


Trujillo v. State, 227 S.W.3d 164, 168 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref'd) ............. 9


                                                           iii
Weatherford v. State, 21 S.W. 251 (Tex.Cr.App. 1893) ................................................................ 4




Texas Statutes / Codes:

Tex. Gov't.Code Ann. ' 508.145(d). ............................................................................................... 3


Tex. Pen.Code Ann. ' 19.05(a) ....................................................................................................... 9


Tex. Penal Code sec. 6.03(d) ................................................................................................... 11-13


Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.13 ............................................................................................ 4


Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04. ......................................................................................... 4


Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12 ............................................................................................ 3


Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12 ' 3g (a)(2) ......................................................................... 3




                                                                  iv
                                 Point of Error

The following are the points upon which this motion is predicated:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT
THE JURY REGARDING THE SPECIAL ISSUE OF A DEADLY WEAPON
AND SUCH WAS HARMFUL TO APPELLANT

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT
THE JURY REGARDING THE LESSOR INCLUDED CHARGE OF
CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE AND SUCH WAS HARMFUL TO
APPELLANT




                                       v
                                    No. 03-14-0531-CR

                                     IN THE
                                COURT OF APPEALS
                         FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
                               OF TEXAS, AT AUSTIN

                                DERRICK KUYKENDALL
                                      Appellant

                                             v.

                                    The State of Texas
                                        Appellee

                       On Appeal In Case Number D1DC-13-300701
                       From the 147ST District Court of Travis County
                         The Hon. Bert Richardson, Judge Presiding



            MOTION FOR RE-CONSIDERATION

                                     EN BANC

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS:

      COMES NOW, Appellant in the above styled and numbered cause, by and through

counsel Ariel Payan, and respectfully files this AMotion for Re-Consideration En Banc,@ filed

pursuant to Tex.R.App.Pro. 49.7, and would show the Court as follows:



                                             1
                                  Facts Relevant to this Motion

       This Court handed down an opinion in this cause on April 28, 2016.




                                   Summary of the Argument

       The following is a brief summary of the argument presented in this motion:

       The defense requested a lawful and timely charge. The trial judge erred in failing to

include it. Giving a written instruction to the jury on the issue of a deadly weapon is the

preferred method of presenting this issue. When a party makes a timely request for a lawful

and necessary instruction, the trial court commits error in failing to give it.

       The testimony presented at trial was sufficient to raise the issue of criminally negligent

homicide, and the trial judge erred in not giving the requested instruction. The Court=s

opinion ignores that the evidence can be viewed in two ways. The instruction should have

been given so that the jury had the option to decide.




                                                 2
                                    Point of Error Restated




       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT
       THE JURY REGARDING THE SPECIAL ISSUE OF A DEADLY WEAPON
       AND SUCH WAS HARMFUL TO APPELLANT


       This Court=s opinion held that the jury had to make an >express= finding of a deadly

weapon in this case. ATherefore, by finding Kuykendall guilty of manslaughter, the jury

expressly found that he had used or exhibited a deadly weapon.@      Citing Lafleur v. State, 106

S.W.3d 91, 92 (Tex.Cr.App. 2003). Slip op at 3. This Court=s opinion, therefore, relies

upon the precept that there could be no other possible finding, due to the jury=s verdict.

       The entry of a deadly weapon in a judgment not only curtails a trial court's ability to

order community supervision, it also affects a defendant's eligibility for parole. Section

508.145(d) of the Texas Government Code states that an inmate serving a sentence ... for an

offense for which the judgment contains an affirmative finding under Section 3g(a)(2) of

[Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure] must serve a longer period, without

consideration of good conduct time, before he may be released on parole. Tex. Gov't.Code

Ann. ' 508.145(d). For a trial court to enter a deadly-weapon finding in the judgment, the

trier of fact must first make an affirmative finding to that effect. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann.



                                                3
art. 42.12 ' 3g (a)(2). A defendant convicted of manslaughter is not automatically subjected to

parole or probation limitations. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12. Therefore, a

deadly weapon finding has a substantial impact on the sentence a defendant serves.

       The law in Texas has always been that once a jury has been selected as the fact finder,

the law relies upon them >exclusively= as a body to make all the necessary findings in a case.

 Article 36.13, V.A.C.C.P., provides:

       Unless otherwise provided in this Code, the jury is the exclusive judge of the
       facts, but it is bound to receive the law from the court and be governed thereby.

Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.13. Further, Article 38.04, V.A.C.C.P., provides:

       The jury, in all cases, is the exclusive judge of the facts proved, and of the
       weight to be given the testimony, except where it is provided by law that proof
       of any particular fact is to be taken as either conclusive or presumptive proof of
       the existence of another fact, or where the law directs that a certain degree of
       weight is to be attached to a certain species of evidence.

Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04. It has long been said that the jurors are the exclusive

judges of the facts proved, Weatherford v. State, 21 S.W. 251 (Tex.Cr.App. 1893), or the

issues of facts, Roberts v. State, 122 S.W. 388 (Tex.Cr.App. 1909). It is frequently said that

the jury is the exclusive judge of the facts, credibility of the witnesses, and weight to be given

to the testimony. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 420 S.W.2d 706 (Tex.Cr.App. 1967). Texas




                                                4
courts have long held that fact issues must be submitted to the jury.           Bell v. State, 148

Tex.Cr.R. 573, 189 S.W.2d 1022 (1945).

       Whether a firearm was used in the commission of an offense, is a fact issue to be

decided by the trier of the facts.     Thomas v. State, 638 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tex.Cr.App.

1983). When the jury is the trier of the facts an Aaffirmative finding@ as to whether a firearm

was used or exhibited during the commission of the offense, said finding must be made by the

jury, not by the trial judge. Id. The Thomas Court stated:

              If the Legislature had intended for the trial court to make such an
       Aaffirmative finding,@ a determination of a fact issue, in a case where the jury
       was the trier of the facts, it could have easily provided for such determination to
       be made by the trial court. It did not do so, and we cannot say the Legislature
       intended to overrule the provisions of Articles 36.13 and 38.04, V.A.C.C.P.

Thomas, 638 S.W.2d at 907. It is the fact finders duty to make the finding, when a fact

finder is not given that option there are other methods for the court=s to make a determination

post trial, (see Lafleur v. State, 106 S.W.3d 91 (Tex.Cr.App. 2003)), but when a party

requests the finding the trial judge should give it.         This Court=s finding relies on the

assumption that no other possible conclusion could have been reached by a jury in this case,

and therefore the trial judge=s actions were justified in refusing the requested instruction.

       In Guthrie-Nail v. State B S.W.3d B, 2015 WL 5449642, PD-0125-14 (Tex.Cr.App.

September 16, 2015), the Court of Criminal Appeals was faced with an issue of whether or not


                                                 5
a fact finding could refuse to make a finding of a deadly weapon in a case of murder. The

Court held that the fact finder could make this >inconsistent finding,= and that the law does not

bar inconsistent verdicts. The Court stated:

      If a deadly-weapon special issue is submitted to a jury, the jury may answer that
      issue Ano@ even in a case in which use of a deadly weapon is a necessary element
      of the offense. Such a result in a jury trial would be internally inconsistent, but
      the law does not bar inconsistent verdicts.

Guthrie-Nail, BS.W.3d at B, (citing United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 68B69, 105 S.Ct. 471

(1984); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S.Ct. 189 (1932)). A fact finder can

make a finding that is inconsistent with a verdict. This jury could have done so, and was

denied that ability by the trial judge=s failure to instruct when properly requested by the

defense.

      In Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex.Cr.App. 1985), the Court of Criminal

Appeals addressed the >express= versus >implied= findings of a deadly weapon. The Court

held that the trial court's entry of a deadly-weapon finding was not express even though the

jury could have determined that the defendant had used a deadly weapon by committing an

attempted murder. The State argued that the finding of guilt meant the jury necessarily made

an affirmative finding of use or exhibition of a deadly weapon or firearm, but the Court

rejected those arguments because they amounted to implied findings. The Court held that a



                                               6
trial judge could not properly enter an affirmative finding concerning the defendant's use or

exhibition of a deadly weapon or firearm during the commission of the offense unless the case

fit into one of the listed scenarios. The focus of Polk is to remove these >implied= findings,

when a party properly requests a deadly weapon special finding, it should be given to the jury.

      The Polk Court reached this conclusion by first defining >affirmative finding=.

             Affirmative is defined as ... that which avers a fact to be true; that
      which establishes. Black's Law Dictionary 55 (5th ed. 1979). Finding is
      defined as: [t]he result of the deliberations of a jury or a court. A decision upon
      a question of fact reached as the result of a judicial examination or investigation
      by a court [or] jury.... Black's Law Dictionary 569 (5th ed. 1979). We have
      searched the legislative history of Article 42.12, supra, and have determined that,
      given the previous definitions, these words taken together were intended to mean
      the trier of fact's express determination that a deadly weapon or firearm was
      actually used or exhibited during the commission of the offense.

Polk, 693 S.W.2d at 393. [Emphasis in original]. The impetus of the Polk decision was to

remove the ambiguity and inconsistency of an >implied= finding, where the appellate courts

have to go back and fix and or clarify what was done at trial. Appellate courts have come

full circle. Lafleur makes it permissible for reviewing courts to make a deadly weapon

finding when the litigants fail to request an instruction. The Lafleur Court recognized that

this was not the >preferred method.= An instruction for a special finding of a deadly weapon

in a murder case is not an unlawful instruction, indeed it is the preferred method. See Lafleur




                                               7
v. State, 106 S.W.3d 91, 92 n.6 (Tex.Cr.App. 2003)1. Here the defense requested an

instruction and was denied.

       This Court=s opinion noted: AMoreover, Kuykendall has not cited any authority, and we

are not aware of any, holding that a defendant is entitled to have the trial court submit the

deadly-weapon question to the jury as a special issue.@             Slip op., at 3. Indeed, appellate

counsel has been unable to find anything that says you have to in this instance, how simple life

would be. Appellant believes that it would certainly make the law easier and cleaner to

follow and understand if there was a bright line rule that so required, but this is not the Court

for such sweeping directives, nor is it likely that the political will exists to >clarify= things so.

But, when a litigant makes a request for a lawful, appropriate, timely instruction, that complies

with the law and does not confuse the issues before it, a trial judge should give the instruction,

and failure to do so is error.




       1
           The Court stated:
       We do not suggest that reference to the application paragraph is the sole method, or even a
       preferred method, for making a deadly weapon finding when a person is convicted of a
       lesser-included offense. There is much merit in Judge Price's preference for a special deadly
       weapon issue. That is a commendable practice. We hold only that a trial judge has the
       authority to enter a deadly weapon finding based upon express deadly weapon language in
       the application paragraph of a lesser-included offense.



                                                     8
       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT
       THE JURY REGARDING THE LESSOR INCLUDED CHARGE OF
       CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE AND SUCH WAS HARMFUL TO
       APPELLANT


       A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser-included offense if (1) the lesser

offense is a lesser-included offense of the charged offense and (2) there is some evidence in

the record that would permit a jury rationally to find that if the defendant is guilty, he is guilty

only of the lesser offense.   Guzman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 185, 188 (Tex.Cr.App. 2006). A

reviewing court should look at all the evidence presented at trial to make this determination.

Lugo v. State, 667 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984).

       Criminally negligent homicide is a lesser included offense of murder. See Saunders v.

State, 840 S.W.2d 390, 391 (Tex.Cr.App. 1992); Lugo, 667 S.W.2d at 147. The issue then is

whether there is some evidence from which the jury rationally could have found that, if

Appellant was guilty, he was guilty only of the lesser offense of criminally negligent

homicide. See Guzman, 188 S.W.3d at 188.

       Criminally negligent homicide involves causing the death of another by criminal

negligence. Tex. Pen.Code Ann. ' 19.05(a). Criminal negligence involves inattentive risk

creation. Lugo, 667 S.W.2d at 147B48; Lewis v. State, 529 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex.Cr.App.

1975). The focus of criminal negligence is the failure of the actor to perceive the risk created


                                                 9
by his conduct. Trujillo v. State, 227 S.W.3d 164, 168 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006,

pet. ref'd)[Emphasis added]. Before a charge on criminally negligent homicide is          required,

the record must contain evidence showing an unawareness of the risk. Mendieta v. State, 706

S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986).         This is determined by looking at the evidence

presented to find if the defendant was unaware of the risk of death based on the risk created by

his conduct. Id.

      Appellant testified that he was trying to scare away his attacker by firing a warning shot

into the air. He described the shooting initially as:


      A.     I'm trying to back up, and I just tried to give a warning shot, but when I
             gave a warning shot --

      Q.     You got a warning shot?

      A.     I tried to give a warning shot. He just kept coming. I don't even remember
             shooting the second time. I don't -- I don't remember shooting two times. I
             just remember trying to give a warning shot. Get away.

R.R. Vol. 8, pg. 62. Appellant testified that he had never shot a gun before that night.

      Q. Had you ever shot a gun before that night?

      A. No, ma'am.

R.R. Vol. 8, pg. 64. When asked to describe the event in more detail Appellant testified:




                                               10
       Q.      You said you fired off what you were intending to be a warning shot, and
               you don't even remember that second shot. Did it seem like one shot to
               you?

       A.      That's what I thought. I didn't even know it was two shots.

       Q.      Did you aim that weapon, [Appellant]?

       A.      No, ma'am. I barely -- I barely got -- I didn't even have time to aim. I just
               took it out of my pocket and shot. I probably could have shot myself. I
               didn't have time to aim.

R.R. Vol. 8, pg. 66. When asked about his intent during the shooting Appellant stated:

       Q.      [Appellant], did you want [the victim] to die that night?

       A.      No, ma'am. No, ma'am.

       Q.      When you fired that warning shot, what did you want to happen?

       A.      I just wanted to get away from him. I didn't know. I didn't want nobody to
               get hurt. I just wanted to get away.

R.R. Vol. 8, pg. 66. Appellant=s testimony establishes, that he has not handled firearms in the

past, he is scared and trying to get the victim away from him. His stated actions are to fire a

warning shot into the air, to get the attackers to back away from him. His intent is not to

harm anyone and fire a single shot. He does not realize that he has fired more than one shot

at the time.




                                                 11
      In reviewing a defendant=s contention that his requested charge on criminally negligent

homicide should have been given, a reviewing court should be governed by the rule that as

long as evidence from any source raises a defensive issue or raises an issue that a lesser

included offense may have been committed, and a jury charge on the issue is properly

requested, the issue must be submitted to the jury. Ormsby v. State, 600 S.W.2d 782

(Tex.Cr.App. 1980); Moore v. State, 574 S.W.2d 122 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978). The credibility of

the evidence and whether it is controverted or conflicts with other evidence may not be

considered in determining whether such a charge should be given. Moore, supra.

      V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 6.03(d) defines criminal negligence as:

      A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with respect to
      circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he
      ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
      exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that
      the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care
      that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed
      from the actor's standpoint.

Tex. Penal Code sec. 6.03(d)[Emphasis added]. The difference between criminally negligent

homicide and involuntary manslaughter is the culpable mental state required to establish each

offenseCcriminal negligence for the former and recklessness for the latter.    Lewis v. State,

529 S.W.2d 550 (Tex.Cr.App. 1975).




                                               12
      This Court noted all of these factors and discounted them as insufficient to raise the

issue of criminal negligence >on its own=. The Court goes on to cite Thomas v. State and

Jackson v. State to further this belief that accidental discharge and pointing a weapon don=t

raise criminal negligence.

      Two factors that have often been relied upon, either singly or together, as the sole basis

for requiring a charge on criminally negligent homicide are whether a defendant pointed a

loaded gun at another and whether the weapon accidentally discharged.      Schoelman v. State,

644 S.W.2d 727 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983); Giles v. State, 617 S.W.2d 691 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981);

London v. State, 547 S.W.2d 27 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977); Dockery v. State, 542 S.W.2d 644

(Tex.Cr.App. 1976) (opinion on rehearing). For many years these two facts were held to be

virtually dispositive of whether sufficient facts existed to warrant a charge on the issue. But

every case in which someone points a loaded gun at another does not require that a charge on

criminally negligent homicide be given. Thomas v. State 699 S.W.2d 845, 850 (Tex.Cr.App.

1985). Nor does the allegation of accidental discharge necessarily raise the issue. The

attendant circumstances from which the defendant's mental state can be inferred must be

collectively examined in light of the definition of criminally negligent conduct. See Tex. Penal

Code, Sec. 6.03(d).




                                               13
       A defendant may be shown to be guilty only of the lesser offense if the evidence

presented is subject to different interpretations. In Thomas, 699 S.W.2d at 851, the Court

held that if the evidence raises two inferences regarding the defendant's awareness of the risk,

then the jury should be instructed on both inferences, citing Schoelman v. State, 644 S.W.2d

727 (Tex.Cr.App. 1983).

       Here Appellant testified that he had no intent to kill or injure anyone, no one asked him

if he knew or was aware of the risk inherent in firing a weapon in >a crowded parking lot= even

if the intent was to fire in the air.2 His stated intent was to fire into the air, and not into a

crowd. This intent is sufficient to show that his actions could be interpreted as criminally

negligent in that he should have been aware of the substantial risk of firing a weapon, but

since his stated intent was to fire into the air and not at anyone, he disregarded this risk. The

reviewing court is to look from the perspective of the actor, versus the result of the conduct.

Tex. Penal Code 6.03(d). Discharging a firearm is an inherently dangerous act, yet it is done


           AFurthermore, undisputed evidence established that Kuykendall was aware that
       2



firearms are dangerous because he had known victims of gun violence and had himself been
seriously injured by a firearm.@ Slip op., at 6. In this era of rampant gun violence and
expansive media coverage, knowledge of the dangers of a firearm can be imputed to anyone,
and should not be used as a dispositive factor. It is knowledge of the particular firearm that
the Thomas Court and others have looked to. Had he ever fired that weapon, was he familiar
with it, and its idiosyncracies, did he know it was loaded? Those are the issues that have
merit in determining an actor=s knowledge.


                                                 14
thousands of times a day throughout this country. Firing a weapon into the air is not safe,

but it does not carry the intent of firing it at someone. There is no direct evidence that shows

that he was aware of the risk of firing the weapon into the air, the circumstantial evidence the

Court cites can be interpreted in more than one way, and as such the requested instruction was

required.




                                             Prayer

       WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant in the above styled and

numbered cause respectfully prays that this Court sitting En Banc reconsiders the original

opinion handed down by the panel in this cause and grant him any and all relief to which he is

entitled.

                                         Respectfully submitted,

                                         ARIEL PAYAN
                                         Attorney at Law
                                         1012 Rio Grande
                                         Austin, Texas 78701
                                         Tel. 512/478-3900
                                         Fax: 512/472-4102
                                         Arielpayan@hotmail.com

                                        by:           /s/ Ariel Payan
                                         Ariel Payan
                                         State Bar No. 00794430


                                               15
                                         Attorney for Appellant




                                  Certificate of Compliance

      I hereby certify pursuant to T.R.A.P. 9.4(i)(3), the word count for this document, as
determined by the word processing program is         3283                                     .
                                                   /s/ Ariel Payan
                                        Ariel Payan




                                              16
                                      Certificate of Delivery
      This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing AMotion for
Re-Consideration En Banc@ was electronically delivered to the office of the District Attorney
of Travis County, Texas at appellateTCDA@traviscountytx.gov; and to Appellant on July 17,
2016.

                                                  /s/ Ariel Payan
                                       Ariel Payan




                                             17
