                        T.C. Memo. 1998-444



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



        IRENE E. JONES, a.k.a. IRENE E. PERRY-JONES, a.k.a.
                  IRENE E. PERRY, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 26719-96.            Filed December 21, 1998.



     Irene E. Jones, pro se.

     Carol-Lynn E. Moran, for respondent.



                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

     WRIGHT, Judge:   This case was assigned to Special Trial

Judge Norman H. Wolfe pursuant to the provisions of section

7443A(b)(4) and Rules 180, 181, and 183.     All section references

are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the tax years in

issue, unless otherwise indicated.   All Rule references are to
                              - 2 -


the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.   The Court agrees

with and adopts the opinion of the Special Trial Judge, which is

set forth below.

               OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE

     WOLFE, Special Trial Judge:    Respondent determined

deficiencies in petitioner's Federal income taxes for the taxable

years 1993 and 1994, additions to tax for failure to file timely

Federal income tax returns pursuant to section 6651(a)(1), and

accuracy-related penalties for negligence as follows:

                             Additions to Tax          Penalty
     Year      Deficiency     Sec. 6651(a)(1)       Sec. 6662(a)

     1993          $6,333          $1,165             $1,267
     1994           7,550           1,338              1,510

     After concessions by both parties,1 the issues for decision

with respect to petitioner's taxes for 1993 and 1994 are:      (1)

Whether petitioner is entitled to claim her daughter, Melanie

Roberts, also known as Melanie Stroman, and Nicole Roberts,

Melanie Roberts' daughter and petitioner's granddaughter, as

dependents; (2) whether petitioner is entitled to head of

household filing status; (3) whether petitioner overstated her

itemized deductions by $28,565 and $19,061 on Schedule A of her


1
     The parties stipulated that petitioner is not entitled to a
dependency exemption for Latoya Roberts for the taxable years
1993 and 1994. During the trial, respondent conceded that
petitioner was entitled to deductions for union dues for the
taxable years 1993 and 1994 in the amounts of $971.76 and $1,163,
respectively.
                               - 3 -


Federal income tax returns for the taxable years 1993 and 1994,

respectively; (4) whether petitioner is liable for additions to

tax under section 6651(a)(1) for 1993 and 1994 for failure to

file returns timely; and (5) whether petitioner is liable for the

accuracy-related penalties under section 6662(a) for 1993 and

1994.

     The evidence in this case consists of a stipulation of facts

with attached exhibits (incorporated herein by reference) and

oral testimony and exhibits admitted during the trial.   When the

petition was filed, petitioner resided in Blue Bell,

Pennsylvania.2

                            Background

     On July 29, 1994, petitioner filed her 1993 Federal income

tax return on which she identified her filing status as head of

household and claimed dependency exemptions for the following

three individuals:   Latoya Roberts (hereinafter Latoya), Nicole

Roberts (hereinafter Nicole), and Melanie Roberts (hereinafter

Melanie).   On July 17, 1995, petitioner filed her 1994 Federal

income tax return on which she again identified her filing status

as head of household and claimed dependency exemptions for the

same three individuals.   Melanie, also known as Melanie Stroman,


2
     In her petition, petitioner also requested a redetermination
of deficiencies relating to the 1991 taxable year. The petition
with respect to the 1991 year subsequently was dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction by an order of this Court dated July 17, 1997.
                                - 4 -


is petitioner's daughter and was 34 years old in 1994.    Nicole

and Latoya are Melanie's daughters and petitioner's

granddaughters.    In 1994, Latoya was 18 and Nicole was 13 years

of age.    Petitioner conceded prior to trial that she is not

entitled to a dependency exemption for Latoya for 1993 and 1994.

Petitioner claims that she provided over one-half of the support

for Melanie and Nicole during the years in issue.    Petitioner

claimed head of household status for 1993 and 1994 based upon her

contention that she provided the principal place of abode for

Melanie, Nicole, and Latoya during those years.

     In 1966, petitioner married Lee Perry.    She became legally

separated from Lee Perry in 1970 and divorced him in July 1994.

Petitioner married James Jones in August 1994.    During the trial,

petitioner introduced into evidence numerous checks from a joint

checking account she maintained with James Jones.    Many of the

checks were written prior to the time petitioner remarried.     Mr.

Jones did not testify during the trial of this case.

     At trial, petitioner produced 30 canceled checks from the

joint checking account payable to various clothing and department

stores.3   Petitioner claimed that the checks represented payments

for items purchased on behalf of Melanie and Nicole during 1993


3
     Most of petitioner's checks were payable to the following
stores: Strawbridge and Clothier, J.C. Penney, Lane Bryant,
Dress Barn, Clover, Macys, and Wanamakers, and many of the checks
were for payments on store charge cards.
                                - 5 -


and 1994.   In her testimony, petitioner implied that she had

incurred additional expenses on behalf of Melanie and Nicole, but

these were the only canceled checks she was able to find the

night before the trial.    Of petitioner's 30 canceled checks, only

1 check bore a date in 1993.    Petitioner submitted no other

evidence of any financial support she provided to her daughter

and granddaughter.    Petitioner explained at trial:   "we don't

think that everything we do for our children we must write down.

We don't do that.    We don't keep receipts."

     From 1993 through 1995, the Philadelphia Housing Authority

(hereinafter PHA) provided subsidized housing for Melanie,

Nicole, and Latoya.    PHA paid rent of approximately $600 monthly

for housing for these individuals during 1993 and 1994.

     Melanie, Nicole, and Latoya stayed at petitioner's residence

off and on for as much as 1 or 2 months at a time during 1993 and

1994.   Petitioner was not able to provide the exact dates that

they lived with her.    Petitioner estimated that her daughter and

two granddaughters lived with her approximately half of the time

during 1993 and 1994.    Neither Melanie, Nicole, nor Latoya

testified on behalf of petitioner during the trial.

     Petitioner does not dispute that Melanie received public

housing assistance during the years in issue.    However, she

claims that Melanie was involved in an abusive relationship that

caused her and her daughters to flee their home for the security
                                - 6 -


of petitioner's residence.   According to petitioner, during those

periods, Melanie's boyfriend would remain in residence at the

property provided for Melanie by the PHA.    Such occupation by an

unauthorized person was contrary to Melanie's lease on the

property and also contrary to Federal laws concerning PHA

operations.

     During the years in issue, petitioner was employed as a

staff representative in the District Council 88 Office of the

American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees

(hereinafter AFSCME).   AFSCME is a union that represents public

employees.    Petitioner's job as a staff representative required

her to travel to various work sites and speak with the union

members at each location.

     The testimony of Jesse M. Evans (Evans), who is employed by

AFSCME as the business manager of Council 13 for the State of

Pennsylvania, establishes that AFSCME had two different methods

of paying for petitioner's job-related travel.    The first method

was through the provision of an automatic travel allowance that

was included in petitioner's paycheck.    The travel allowance is a

taxable allowance for which petitioner was not required to

provide any receipts to receive payment.    The travel allowance

consisted of a car allowance, an in-town per diem, and an

allowance for car insurance.    Petitioner received travel

allowances of $10,249.96 and $10,489.96 for 1993 and 1994,
                                - 7 -


respectively.   Petitioner's travel allowances for 1993 and 1994

included annual payments of $1,150 for car insurance.

     The second method of travel expense reimbursement was a

direct travel subsidy.    AFSCME directly reimbursed petitioner for

actual travel expenses she incurred.    At the beginning of every

month, petitioner was reimbursed for any gasoline, oil, public

transportation, tolls, air fare, meals, car leasing, and

entertainment expenses she had incurred the previous month, as

long as she had the necessary receipts.   When petitioner was

required to travel out of town, she received an additional $32

per day travel allowance.   Petitioner was reimbursed for

substantial expenses during 1993 and 1994.   Furthermore, Evans'

testimony establishes that if petitioner had provided additional

receipts, at a later date, for expenses that qualified for

reimbursement, she would have been reimbursed for those

expenditures.

     To receive reimbursement for her travel expenses, petitioner

was required by her employer to maintain a daily travel log that

included the travel location and the departure and arrival

locations.   The daily travel log included sick days, vacation

days, and holidays.   Among the items employees were required to

document on the daily travel log were beginning and ending

odometer readings, gas, oil, parking, public transportation, and

entertainment expenses.   During the trial, petitioner submitted
                                - 8 -


additional receipts for alleged unreimbursed travel expenses from

1993 and 1994.    Petitioner testified that she had not presented

these receipts to her employer for reimbursement at the

appropriate time because her director required all receipts to be

submitted at one time, and she found these additional receipts at

a later date.    The additional receipts submitted by petitioner

include receipts for gasoline, parking, tickets to various social

functions, meals, a visit to a doctor's office, and prescription

drugs.

     Petitioner claimed the following employee expenses on

Schedule A of her 1993 Federal income tax return:

     Union dues                                     $1,194
     Professional dues                                  67
     Equipment and supplies                          1,050

     Form 2106 expenses:
       Parking fees, tolls, etc.                    13,779
       Travel expenses while away from home          2,181
       Other business expenses                       6,350
       Meals and entertainment                       2,490
                                                    27,111

Petitioner claimed a charitable contribution deduction in the

amount of $2,054 on Schedule A of her 1993 Federal income tax

return.   She also claimed the following other expenses on

Schedule A of her 1993 Federal income tax return:

     Tax consultation                                 $250
     Publications                                       65
     Safe deposit box                                   30
                                                       345
                               - 9 -


     Respondent disallowed all of the above-listed expenses.    The

only items respondent allowed from Schedule A of petitioner's

1993 Federal income tax return were State taxes in the amount of

$1,395.   Since the amount of itemized deductions allowed by

respondent was less than the standard deduction amount of $3,100,

petitioner was allowed the standard deduction in the deficiency

notice for 1993.

     Petitioner claimed the following employee expenses on

Schedule A of her 1994 Federal income tax return:

     Union dues                                     $1,194
     Professional dues                                 320
     Equipment and supplies                            687
     Form 2106 expenses:
       Parking fees, tolls, etc.                     4,167
       Travel expenses while away from home          3,213
       Other                                         3,104
       Meals and entertainment                         501
                                                    13,186

Petitioner claimed a charitable contribution deduction in the

amount of $6,467 on Schedule A of her 1994 Federal income tax

return.   She also claimed the following other expenses on

Schedule A of her 1994 Federal income tax return:

     Tax consultation                                 $245
     Safe deposit box                                   35
                                                       280

     Again, respondent disallowed all of the above-listed

expenses.   During the trial, petitioner introduced into evidence

a canceled check for $100, payable to Melanie Taylor, and a

receipt for $35 for the rental of a safety deposit box during
                               - 10 -


1994.   According to petitioner, Melanie Taylor and her partner,

Byron Fersner, prepared petitioner's Federal income taxes.      The

only items respondent allowed from Schedule A of petitioner's

1994 Federal income tax return were State taxes in the amount of

$1,580.   Since the amount of itemized deductions allowed by

respondent was less than the standard deduction amount of $3,100,

petitioner was allowed the standard deduction in the deficiency

notice for 1994.

     According to petitioner, on November 29, 1991, she was

involved in an automobile accident while driving her own car.

Because a car is required for her job, petitioner rented a car

from Enterprise-Rent-A-Car (hereinafter Enterprise).    For reasons

unexplained in the record, petitioner rented a car from

Enterprise from December 1991 through September 1996, rather than

leasing or purchasing a car.    According to petitioner, the 1991

automobile accident resulted in litigation that was still pending

at the time of this trial.     At trial, petitioner submitted

canceled checks from her joint checking account with Mr. Jones

for 1993 and 1994 payable to Enterprise in the amounts of $263.79

and $5,275.19, respectively.    Petitioner's expense report for

March 1993 indicates that petitioner was reimbursed $1,350 by her

employer for the rental car.    Petitioner admits that she was

reimbursed to the extent of $1,350, but contends that the
                              - 11 -


reimbursement relates back to expenses she incurred for a rental

car prior to March 1993.

     Petitioner admits that she utilized the rental car for

personal as well as business uses.     Petitioner conceded using the

rental car for shopping trips, transportation to Masonic

conventions, trips to church, and other trips of a personal

nature.   The record also indicates petitioner authorized other

individuals to drive the rental car.

     According to IRS records, petitioner did not file a request

for extension of time in which to file her 1993 or 1994 Federal

income tax returns.   Petitioner claims that one of her tax return

preparers informed her that she had filed the required extension

requests for both 1993 and 1994.   Petitioner further alleges that

she never received copies of these extensions from her preparers

and therefore is unable to provide the Court with copies of these

extensions.   Petitioner was unable to locate her tax return

preparers prior to trial.   On petitioner's 1993 and 1994 Federal

income tax returns, the tax return preparer identified his

business address as a post office box in Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania.
                               - 12 -


                             Discussion

1.   Dependency Exemptions

      Section 151(c) allows a taxpayer, subject to certain

requirements, a deduction for a personal exemption for each of

the taxpayer's dependents as defined in section 152.   A daughter

or a granddaughter of a taxpayer over half of whose support, for

the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer

begins, is provided by the taxpayer qualifies as a dependent.

Sec. 152(a)(1).

      Section 1.152-1(a)(2)(i), Income Tax Regs., provides that in

determining whether an individual received over half of his or

her support from the taxpayer, "there shall be taken into account

the amount of support received from the taxpayer as compared to

the entire amount of support which the individual received from

all sources, including support which the individual himself

supplied."   In Blanco v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 512, 514-515

(1971), this Court held that, in establishing that more than one-

half of a dependent's support has been provided, a prerequisite

to such a showing is the demonstration by competent evidence of

the total amount of the dependent's support from all sources for

that year.   If the amount of total support is not established and

cannot be reasonably inferred from competent evidence available

to the Court, it is not possible to conclude that the taxpayer
                              - 13 -


claiming the exemption provided more than one-half of the support

of the claimed dependent.

     Petitioner claimed her daughter, Melanie, and her

granddaughters, Nicole and Latoya, as dependents on her tax

returns for the 1993 and 1994 tax years.   Petitioner has

stipulated that she is not entitled to a dependency exemption for

her granddaughter Latoya for 1993 and 1994.   Respondent

determined that petitioner did not provide more than one-half of

the support for Melanie and Nicole during 1993 and 1994 as

required by section 152.

     Petitioner has testified that Melanie and Nicole lived with

her off and on during 1993 and 1994.   She has failed to provide

any substantiation of her testimony and also has failed to

provide any means for us to decide how many weeks or months

during 1993 and 1994 Melanie and Nicole actually lived with

petitioner.   We have no reliable information concerning any costs

incurred by petitioner in connection with these visits of

indeterminate length.   Even petitioner's own testimony concerning

the extent of the visits is approximate and uncertain.

     Both Melanie and Nicole received housing assistance from PHA

in the form of rent payments during the years in issue.     PHA paid

$600 per month in rent for housing occupied by Melanie and Nicole

during the time period petitioner claimed them as dependents.    In

addition, on March 24, 1993, Melanie signed a release authorizing
                                - 14 -


the PHA to verify that she was receiving a public assistance

grant from the Philadelphia County Board of Assistance to help

with her other living expenses.    There is no evidence in the

record that Melanie ceased receiving public assistance grants

during 1993 or 1994.

     At trial petitioner submitted into evidence numerous

canceled checks from petitioner's joint checking account payable

to stores for items she claims were purchased on behalf of her

daughter and granddaughters.    Other than the canceled checks,

petitioner could not provide any specifics about items allegedly

purchased for Melanie, Nicole, and Latoya.     The checks do not

indicate what items were purchased or for whom those items were

purchased.   Furthermore, the checking account used by petitioner

is a joint account, so it is unclear whether the purchases were

financed by petitioner or Mr. Jones.     We do not doubt that

petitioner bought clothing and other items for her daughter and

granddaughters, but she has failed to show the amount of such

purchases.   Petitioner has not established the total amount

expended from all sources for the support of Melanie and Nicole

during 1993 and 1994.   She has failed to substantiate her claim

that she provided over half of the support for Melanie and Nicole

during those years.    Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is not

entitled to deductions for personal exemptions for those

individuals in 1993 and 1994.
                              - 15 -


2.   Head of Household Filing Status

      Section 2(b) provides that a taxpayer may qualify for head

of household filing status if that taxpayer is not married at the

close of the taxable year and maintains as his or her home a

household which constitutes the principal place of abode for more

than half of the taxable year for a child of the taxpayer or a

descendant of a son or daughter of the taxpayer.      Sec.

2(b)(1)(A)(i).   A taxpayer is considered not married if he or she

is legally separated or divorced.      Sec. 2(b)(2)(B).

      Respondent's position is that petitioner is not entitled to

head of household filing status for either 1993 or 1994 because

she did not meet the requirements set forth in section 2(b).

Petitioner argues that she is entitled to head of household

filing status because she provided the principal place of abode

for her daughter and two granddaughters during 1993 and 1994.

      Based on the evidence before us, we agree with respondent

that petitioner has not established that she has met the

requirements for head of household status under section 2(b).

The record shows that from 1993 through 1995, the PHA provided

the principal place of abode for Melanie, Latoya, and Nicole.

Petitioner has conceded that she is not entitled to claim her

granddaughter Latoya as a dependent for 1993 or 1994 and

apparently has abandoned the claim that Latoya lived with her

more than half of either year.   When petitioner was asked to
                              - 16 -


estimate the amount of time that her daughter Melanie and her

granddaughter Nicole lived with her, her response was that they

lived with her only about one-half of the time during 1993 and

1994.   The record shows that petitioner's daughter Melanie lived

in an apartment provided by PHA throughout 1993 and 1994.

Petitioner has testified that Melanie was involved in an abusive

relationship during those years and sometimes sought refuge at

petitioner's home for a month or more at a time.   But the

apartment always was provided for Melanie and Nicole by PHA

during the years in issue and was available to them.   Although

Melanie and Nicole may have lived with petitioner on and off

during the years in issue, we hold on this record that petitioner

has failed to prove that she provided their principal place of

abode for more than half of the taxable years 1993 and 1994.

Accordingly, petitioner has not qualified for head of household

status under section 2(b) for 1993 and 1994.

     Additionally, section 2(b) requires that a taxpayer not be

married at the close of the taxable year to qualify for head of

household filing status.   Petitioner married Mr. Jones in August

1994, and there is no indication in the record that she and Mr.

Jones were separated at the end of 1994, or that they lived apart

during the last 6 months of that year.   See secs. 2(b)(2),

7703(b).   According to the plain language of the statute, in

order to be eligible for head of household filing status, a
                                - 17 -


taxpayer may not be considered as married at the close of the

taxable year.   Sec. 2(b)(1).   Therefore, for this reason and the

other reasons set forth above, we hold that petitioner is not

entitled to head of household filing status for 1994.

3.   Itemized Deductions

      Exclusions and deductions from income are a matter of

legislative grace and are narrowly construed.       INDOPCO, Inc. v.

Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v.

Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).      Taxpayers are required to

substantiate claimed deductions and credits by maintaining the

records needed to establish the amounts of such items.      Sec.

6001; Meneguzzo v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831-832 (1965);

sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs.

      A.   Unreimbursed Employee Expenses

      Section 162(a) permits the deduction of "ordinary and

necessary" expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in

carrying on any trade or business.       The performance of services

as an employee constitutes a trade or business.       O'Malley v.

Commissioner, 91 T.C. 352, 363-364 (1988).       An ordinary expense

is one that is common and acceptable in the particular business.

Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113-114 (1933).       A necessary

expense is an expense that is appropriate and helpful in carrying

on a trade or business.    Heineman v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 538,

543 (1984).
                              - 18 -


     When an employee has a right to reimbursement for

expenditures related to her status as an employee, but fails to

claim such reimbursement, the employee's expenses are not

deductible because such expenditures are not "necessary"; i.e.,

it is not necessary for an employee to remain unreimbursed for

expenses to the extent he or she could have been reimbursed.

Orvis v. Commissioner, 788 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1986), affg. T.C.

Memo. 1984-533; Lucas v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1, 7 (1982).

     Generally, when evidence shows that a taxpayer incurred a

deductible expense, but the exact amount cannot be determined,

the Court may approximate the amount.    Cohan v. Commissioner, 39

F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930).    The Court, however, must have

some basis upon which an estimate can be made.    Vanicek v.

Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985).    Section 274(d)

provides that no deduction under section 162 or 212 for travel

and meals and entertainment is allowed unless the taxpayer

substantiates by adequate records or by sufficient evidence

(A) the amount of the expense, (B) the time and place of the

travel or entertainment, (C) the business purpose of the expense,

and (D) the business relationship to the taxpayer of persons

entertained.   The Cohan doctrine does not apply to such expenses.

     Petitioner claimed employee expenses on Schedule A of her

1993 and 1994 Federal income tax returns in the total amounts of

$27,111 and $13,186, respectively.
                                - 19 -


     Petitioner has produced evidence from her employer that she

paid union dues in the amounts of $971.76 for 1993 and $1,163 for

1994, and respondent has conceded that these amounts are

deductible.    With regard to the remaining claimed expenses,

petitioner failed to establish that she is entitled to the

deductions.

        Petitioner offered no explanation concerning the

professional dues in the amounts of $67 and $320 that she

claimed, respectively, on Schedule A of her 1993 and 1994 Federal

income tax returns.    There is no evidence in the record that

these dues were ordinary and necessary expenses related to her

employment.

     Petitioner also claimed deductions for "Equipment and

Supplies" on Schedule A of her 1993 and 1994 Federal income tax

returns in the amounts of $1,050 and $687, respectively.

According to petitioner, her professional equipment and supplies

consisted of her "three fezzes, two hats, rituals, constitution *

* * .    The books, the boxes that the fezzes and hats go in, the

equipment to keep them a certain way" and other Masonic supplies

that she was required to purchase as part of her membership in

four fraternal organizations:    (1) The Eastern Star; (2) the

Cyrenes; (3) the Ladies of the Circle of Perfection; and (4) the

Daughters of Isis.    Although petitioner undoubtedly purchased

certain items related to her membership in these fraternal
                               - 20 -


organizations, those supplies are not deductible expenses.

Petitioner's membership in these fraternal organizations was for

her own personal benefit.   There is no evidence in the record

that, as a staff representative for AFSCME, petitioner was

required to belong to any fraternal organization.

     The bulk of petitioner's itemized expenses, $24,800 for 1993

and $10,985 for 1994, was included on Form 2106, Employee

Business Expenses.   Among the expenses petitioner deducted on

Form 2106 were parking fees, tolls, travel expenses while away,

and meals and entertainment.   According to Evans, the business

manager of AFSCME, if petitioner had provided receipts for these

types of expenses she would have been reimbursed.   It is well

established in this Court that an employee may not deduct

expenses that are subject to reimbursement by the employer.

Orvis v. Commissioner, supra; Lucas v. Commissioner, supra at 7.

     For the reasons set forth above, except for conceded items,

we sustain respondent's disallowance of claimed deductions for

unreimbursed business expenses.

     B.   Charitable Contribution Deductions

     Petitioner claimed deductions for cash contributions in the

amounts of $2,054 for 1993 and $6,467 for 1994.   During the

trial, petitioner claimed that many of the unreimbursed employee

expenses she had claimed on her 1993 and 1994 Federal income tax

returns were actually charitable contributions.   She claimed that
                              - 21 -


the equipment and supplies and some of the travel expenses that

she had claimed were on behalf of fraternal organizations.       To

support her claim, petitioner presented various checks, receipts,

and raffle tickets.

     Section 170 allows a deduction for charitable contributions

subject to certain limitations.   A charitable contribution is the

voluntary transfer of property without adequate consideration.

United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105 (1986);

Murphy v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 249, 252 (1970); Urbauer v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-170.     Payments to a qualified

charitable organization are deductible as charitable

contributions to the extent that they exceed the fair market

value of any material benefit received in return.     United States

v. American Bar Endowment, supra at 118; Murphy v. Commissioner,

supra at 253; Urbauer v. Commissioner, supra.

     The checks submitted by petitioner were payment for

admission to various conventions and luncheons held by the

Eastern Star, Cyrenes, Ladies of the Circle of Perfection, and

the Daughters of Isis.   Petitioner described these organizations

as "the female side of the Masons" and as fraternal

organizations.   A contribution to a domestic fraternal society,

order, or association, operating under the lodge system, is only

deductible if the contribution or gift is to be used exclusively

for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational
                               - 22 -


purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to animals.    Sec.

170(c)(4).   Petitioner has failed to establish that these

donations were used exclusively for the purposes specified in

section 170(c)(4).    Additionally, she has failed to establish

that the amounts she paid for these events exceed the fair market

value she received.   Furthermore, payments for raffle tickets

generally do not qualify as charitable contributions.    Goldman v.

Commissioner, 46 T.C. 136 (1966), affd. 388 F.2d 476 (6th Cir.

1967).

     If a taxpayer makes a charitable contribution of money, the

taxpayer must maintain for each contribution either (1) a

canceled check, (2) a receipt from the donee organization, or (3)

other reliable written records.    Sec. 1.170A-13(a)(1), Income Tax

Regs.    Although petitioner did provide the Court with many checks

and receipts, these items do not support her claims.    The

receipts and checks provided by petitioner show amounts paid to

fraternal organizations.    Some receipts lack the payee's name.

As discussed above, petitioner has failed to establish that these

amounts were donated for a charitable purpose.    Petitioner has

not provided us with sufficient documentation to substantiate the

charitable contribution deductions she claimed on her 1993 and

1994 Federal income tax returns.
                               - 23 -


     For the foregoing reasons, we hold that petitioner is not

entitled to the deductions for charitable contributions she

claimed for 1993 and 1994.

     C.    Other Expenses on Schedule A

     Petitioner claimed the following other expenses on Schedule

A of her 1993 Federal income tax return:

     Tax consultation                                   $250
     Publications                                         65
     Safe deposit box                                     30
                                                         345

Petitioner claimed the following other expenses on Schedule A of

her 1994 Federal income tax return:

     Tax consultation                                   $245
     Safe deposit box                                     35
                                                         280

     Petitioner provided a $35 receipt from Corestates Bank

indicating payment of the 1994 safe deposit box rental fee; and

we accept her claim that a $30 payment was made for the same

purpose in 1993.    Petitioner also provided a canceled check for

$100, payable to Melanie Taylor, one of petitioner's tax

preparers.    Petitioner's tax returns were not signed by Melanie

Taylor, but only by Byron Fersner.      Nevertheless, we accept

petitioner's testimony that the payment was for tax preparation

fees for 1994, and we also allow her claim for a similar payment

in 1993.    Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is entitled to

deduct the safe deposit box rental fees of $30 for 1993 and $35

for 1994 and $100 in tax preparation fees for each of the years
                               - 24 -


1993 and 1994.   We sustain the disallowance of the balance of the

above-listed deductions for lack of substantiation.

4.   Section 6651(a)(1) Additions to Tax

      Section 6651(a)(1) imposes an addition to tax for a

taxpayer's failure to file a required return on or before the

specified filing date, including extensions.    The addition to tax

is inapplicable if the taxpayer shows that the failure to file

the return was due to reasonable cause and not due to willful

neglect.   Sec. 6651(a)(1).   Generally, individuals are required

to file on or before the 15th day of April following the close of

the calendar year.    Sec. 6072(a).

      Petitioner filed her 1993 and 1994 Federal income tax

returns on July 29, 1994, and July 17, 1995, respectively.

According to respondent's records, petitioner did not file an

extension of time in which to file her 1993 or 1994 Federal

income tax returns.    Petitioner contends that she relied upon

statements made by her tax preparer, who informed her that

extensions for 1993 and 1994 years were filed on her behalf.      At

trial, petitioner was unable to furnish any evidence showing that

extensions for 1993 and 1994 had been filed or any correspondence

with a tax return preparer on the subject.    Petitioner's failure

to make timely filing of her tax returns is not excused by her

alleged reliance on an agent, and such reliance is not reasonable

cause for a late filing under section 6651(a)(1).     United States
                                 - 25 -


v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985); Radabaugh v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 1992-572.    Therefore, we hold that petitioner is liable for

additions to tax under section 6651(a)(1) for the years 1993 and

1994.

5.   Section 6662(a) Penalties

      Section 6662(a) imposes a penalty of 20 percent of the

portion of the underpayment which is attributable to negligence

or disregard of rules or regulations.     Sec. 6662(b)(1).

Negligence is the lack of due care or failure to do what a

reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under the

circumstances.     Neely v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 934, 947 (1985).

The term "disregard" includes any careless, reckless, or

intentional disregard.    Sec. 6662(c).   Based on this record, we

hold that petitioner was negligent and disregarded rules or

regulations.   Accordingly, she is liable for the accuracy-related

penalties under section 6662(a) for 1993 and 1994.

      To reflect the concessions and our conclusions on the

disputed issues,

                                           Decision will be entered

                                      under Rule 155.
