

Genova v Chiovaro (2015 NY Slip Op 08143)





Genova v Chiovaro


2015 NY Slip Op 08143


Decided on November 12, 2015


Appellate Division, Second Department


Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.


This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.



Decided on November 12, 2015
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P.
L. PRISCILLA HALL
SANDRA L. SGROI
COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.


2014-10779
 (Index No. 8450/13)

[*1]Laura J. Genova, appellant,
v Lisa A. Chiovaro, respondent.


Elana Sharara, Great Neck, N.Y., for appellant.
DeSena & Sweeney, LLP, Bohemia, N.Y. (Shawn P. O'Shaughnessy of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Palmieri, J.), entered September 22, 2014, which granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
The defendant met her prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the cervical region of the plaintiff's spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614), and that, in any event, the alleged injury was not caused by the subject accident (see generally Jilani v Palmer, 83 AD3d 786, 787).
In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained a serious injury to the cervical region of her spine under the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d), and as to whether the alleged injury was caused by the accident (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219; Estrella v GEICO Ins. Co., 102 AD3d 730, 731-732). Thus, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
MASTRO, J.P., HALL, SGROI and DUFFY, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Aprilanne Agostino
Clerk of the Court


