                        T.C. Memo. 2006-38



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



               ROBERT WILLIAM WOODS, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 21419-03L.             Filed March 9, 2006.



     Robert William Woods, pro se.

     Marshall R. Jones, for respondent.



                        MEMORANDUM OPINION


     WELLS, Judge:   Petitioner seeks review, pursuant to section

6330,1 of respondent’s determination to proceed with the

collection of petitioner’s tax liabilities for the 1988, 1989,




     1
       Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code, as amended.
                               - 2 -

1990, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996, and 1997 taxable years.   The issue

we must decide is whether petitioner’s tax liabilities were

discharged by an order of the U.S. bankruptcy court.    At trial,

petitioner raised the bankruptcy issue for the first time and did

not address the issues raised in respondent’s notice of

determination.

                            Background

     Some of the facts and certain exhibits have been stipulated.

The parties’ stipulations of fact are incorporated in this

opinion by reference and are found as facts in the instant case.

At the time he filed his petition, petitioner resided in Remlap,

Alabama.

     Petitioner filed Forms 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax

Return, for the taxable years 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, and

1995 but failed to pay the balances reported as due.    Petitioner

did not file Forms 1040 for the taxable years 1996 and 1997.

Instead, petitioner filed IRS Form 4852, Substitute for Form W-2,

Wage and Tax Statement, or Form 1099-R, Distributions from

Pensions, Annuities, Retirement or Profit-Sharing Plans, IRAs,

Insurance Contracts, Etc.   Along with Form 4852, petitioner filed

an “Asseveration of Claimed Gross Income”, (asseveration) in

which he claimed, among other things, as follows:

     The Asseveror hereby further states that, despite the
     claims of Long Lewis Ford [his employer] on the copy of
     the W-2's or 1099's, attached to this Asseveration, he
     did not have any gross income, as he did not have any
                              - 3 -

     items of gross income (26 CFR §1.861-8(a)(3)), from any
     taxable sources listed by the Secretary (26 CFR §1.861-
     8(f)(1)), to have then any ‘gross income’, pursuant to
     the rules promulgated by the Secretary.

     *        *        *        *        *           *     *

     Furthermore, since the remuneration paid to the
     Asseveror by Long Lewis Ford on the Copy of the W-2's
     or 1099's, attached to this Asseveration, is not from a
     taxable source listed in 1.861-8(f)(1), nor listed in
     1.861-8T(d)(2)(iii), the remuneration paid to the
     Asseveror is excluded from the law, and thus excluded
     from the definition of “gross income”. This definition
     of gross income from a source, related to U.S.
     Citizens, directly leads to §911 of Title 26 USC, which
     has to do with U.S. Citizens living abroad.


Petitioner states in his asseveration that, because he was not

living abroad, he did not have “wages”, and the remuneration he

received from his employer was therefore exempt.

     In a letter attached to his asseveration, petitioner further

stated as follows:

     As you have probably already noted, the instructions on
     the 4852 Form states plainly that it is to be attached
     to the Form 1040, yet these Forms are presented without
     the 1040. I am concerned and almost certain that the
     IRS will not take these 4852 documents into
     consideration should I file the 1040 Form with
     corresponding numbers, which would be zero.

Petitioner concluded the letter stating that, because he did not

have any gross income, he could not have any taxable income, and

therefore he was not required to file a Form 1040.

     Respondent sent petitioner separate notices of deficiency

for each taxable year in issue, but petitioner failed to petition
                                 - 4 -

this Court.2    Respondent timely assessed petitioner for the tax,

additions to tax, penalties, and interest for the years in issue.

     On November 28, 2002, respondent sent petitioner a Letter

1058, Final Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to

a Hearing.     Petitioner timely filed Form 12153, Request for a

Collection Due Process Hearing, on December 19, 2002.

Respondent’s Appeals Officer Gayla L. Owens conducted

petitioner’s hearing on November 12, 2003.    Petitioner raised

only frivolous tax protester type arguments at the hearing,

arguing that he did not have gross income as defined by sections

861, 911, and section 1.861-8(a)(4), Income Tax Regs.     Petitioner

also stated at the hearing that his First Amendment, Fifth

Amendment, and Sixth Amendment individual rights had been

violated; that he was denied meaningful due process of law; and

that decisions by lower courts, such as this Court and the

Federal District Courts, are binding on the Internal Revenue

Service only for the particular taxpayer and years litigated.

     On November 19, 2003, respondent sent petitioner a Notice of

Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320

and/or 6330 sustaining the proposed levy to collect petitioner’s

unpaid tax liabilities for the years in issue.     On December 16,

2003, petitioner timely filed his petition with this Court, again



     2
       Petitioner does not dispute that he received the notices
of deficiency.
                               - 5 -

arguing that he did not have taxable income because “26 CFR

Section 1.863-1(c) clearly states what sections to use to

determine one’s taxable income.”    Petitioner also stated in his

petition that Appeals Officer Owens, as an employee of the IRS,

cannot be a fair and impartial representative, and that the

period of limitations on collection had expired according to

section 6501.

     On April 23, 2004, petitioner filed a petition under chapter

7 of title 11 of the United States Code (the Bankruptcy Code)

with the United States Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of

Alabama (the bankruptcy court).    Respondent was listed on

Schedule F, Creditors Holding Unsecured Non-Priority Claims.3

Ms. Kenya Bufford, respondent’s Insolvency Specialist from

Birmingham, Alabama, was notified through the bankruptcy court of

petitioner’s chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.    Respondent did not

attend the creditors’ meeting held on May 27, 2004.    Petitioner

received a discharge by order of the bankruptcy court dated

July 27, 2004, stating:   “IT IS ORDERED:   The debtor is granted

a discharge under section 727 of title 11, United States Code.”




     3
       Schedule F listed: “Ms. Kenya Bufford, Insolvency
Specialist, IRS/Special Procedure Function, 801 Tom Martin Drive,
Room 126, Birmingham, AL 35211". Schedule F did not list the
total tax owed.
                               - 6 -

     At trial, petitioner’s only argument, raised for the first

time, was that the bankruptcy court’s July 27, 2004, order

discharged his tax liabilities.

                            Discussion

     The issue we must decide is whether the bankruptcy court’s

July 27, 2004, order forecloses respondent from collecting

petitioner’s tax liabilities for the 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991,

1993, 1995, 1996, and 1997 taxable years.   Petitioner did not

raise the issue of his bankruptcy discharge during the section

6330 Appeals hearing (Appeals hearing) because he did not file

for bankruptcy until after filing his petition to this Court for

review of respondent’s determination to proceed with collection.

     Before we address the issue of the bankruptcy discharge, we

briefly address petitioner’s position at the Appeals hearing, in

his petition to this Court, and throughout the administrative

process before the Internal Revenue Service.    Section 6330

provides that no levy may be made on any property or right to

property of a person unless the Secretary first notifies the

person in writing of the right to a hearing before the Appeals

Office.   Section 6330(c)(1) provides that the Appeals officer

must verify at the hearing that the applicable laws and

administrative procedures have been followed.    At the hearing,

the person may raise any relevant issues relating to the unpaid

tax or the proposed levy, including appropriate spousal defenses,
                                - 7 -

challenges to the appropriateness of collection actions, and

collection alternatives.    Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A).   The person may

challenge the existence or amount of the underlying tax if the

person did not receive any statutory notice of deficiency for the

tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute

the tax liability.   Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B).

     Where the validity of the underlying tax liability is

properly in issue, the Court will review the matter de novo.

Where the validity of the underlying tax is not properly in

issue, however, the Court will review the Commissioner’s

administrative determination for abuse of discretion.     Sego v.

Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114

T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000).

     Petitioner did not dispute at his Appeals hearing that he

received the notices of deficiency.     Petitioner argued, during

the Appeals hearing and throughout the administrative process

with the IRS, that he did not have taxable income under sections

861, 911, and section 1.861-8(a)(4), Income Tax Regs.     That

argument has been rejected by every court that has addressed the

issue and is the type of frivolous argument that wastes the

Court’s time and resources.4   We do not address petitioner’s


     4
       In two letters to respondent dated July 31 and Sept. 16,
2002, petitioner claims that he is not a tax protester and that
he has never made a ridiculous claim regarding the law.
Petitioner informed respondent that he was a member of N.I.T.E.
                                                   (continued...)
                              - 8 -

section 861 argument with somber reasoning and copious citations

of precedent, as to do so might suggest that petitioner’s

arguments possess some degree of colorable merit.5   See Crain v.

Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417, 1417 (5th Cir. 1984).   During the

Appeals hearing petitioner raised only his frivolous section 861

argument and did not provide any collection alternatives.

Accordingly, Appeals Officer Owens determined to proceed with

collection of petitioner’s tax liabilities for the years in

issue.



     4
      (...continued)
(National Institute for Taxation Education) and a follower of
Thurston Paul Bell, a well-known advocate of the frivolous
section 861 argument. Petitioner also warned respondent that
respondent needed to “be informed of the present circumstances
the government is facing” in its case against Mr. Bell in the
Federal District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to
enjoin him from promoting his sec. 861 argument and other tax
avoidance services. The remainder of those letters contain
nonsensical and almost incomprehensible “free speech” arguments
and numerous cites to caselaw and statutes taken completely out
of context.

     We note that Thurston Paul Bell was enjoined from promoting
his frivolous sec. 861 argument and other tax avoidance services.
See United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474 (3d Cir. 2005), affg. 238
F. Supp. 2d 696 (M.D. Pa., 2003). We also note that another
well-known tax protester, Larken Rose, was recently sentenced to
15 months in prison for not filing returns and advancing the
frivolous sec. 861 argument. See United States v. Rose, 2005 WL
3216739 (E.D. Pa., May 25, 2005).
     5
       While we do not address petitioner’s frivolous section 861
argument, we note that respondent provided petitioner three cases
from this Court rejecting the argument: Williams v.
Commissioner, 114 T.C. 136, 138 (2000); Madge v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2000-370; and Aiello v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-
40.
                                 - 9 -

I.   The Parties’ Contentions.

     Petitioner contends, for the first time in his brief, that

his tax liabilities for the years in issue have been discharged

under section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code.   Petitioner contends as

follows:

     The issues addressed in 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii)
     clearly state that if the tax was “assessed within 240
     days, plus any time plus 30 days [sic] during which an
     offer in compromise with respect to such tax that was
     made within the 240 days after such assessment was
     pending, before the date of the filing of the petition”
     the taxes in question are not dischargeable.

     In the instant case, NONE of the things addressed in
     the above referenced code sections apply. The taxes
     were, by the IRS’s own admission, assessed more than
     240 days prior to the bankruptcy petition being filed
     and there was no recent offer in compromise to take
     into consideration.

     Further, 11 U.S.C. §§ 507 & 523 address the issue of
     when returns, if required, are filed. Those sections
     clearly state that an income tax debt is dischargeable
     under [11] U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) if the tax
     return was last due, including extensions, more than 3
     years prior to the bankruptcy filing date. * * *
     Obviously, since the latest year at issue is 1997 the 3
     year time limit has run.

Petitioner also contends that respondent has no claim because

respondent failed to attend the creditors’ meeting on May 27,

2004, to claim the tax debt was not discharged.

     Respondent contends that, under Magana v. Commissioner, 118

T.C. 488 (2002), we need not consider petitioner’s bankruptcy

discharge in our review for an abuse of discretion under section

6330(d)(1) because petitioner failed to raise the issue during
                               - 10 -

the Appeals Office’s consideration of the case.   See id. at 493-

494 (holding that issues not raised by a taxpayer during the

Appeals Office’s consideration of a case under section 6330

generally will not be considered by the Court upon a review for

abuse of discretion).   Respondent further contends that, even if

we consider the bankruptcy court’s July 27, 2004, order granting

petitioner a discharge, respondent may still proceed with

collection for the 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, and 1995 taxable

years6 because respondent had prior liens pursuant to section

6321.    Relying on Chase Auto. Fin., Inc. v. Kinion, 207 F.3d 751

(5th Cir. 2000), respondent contends that creditors are not

prevented from postdischarge enforcement of a valid lien that

existed at the time of the entry of a bankruptcy order for

relief, if the lien was not avoided in the bankruptcy

proceeding.7   Because petitioner did not file a Form 1040 for the

1996 and 1997 taxable years, respondent further contends that

respondent is not foreclosed from collecting the taxes for 1996

and 1997 because 11 U.S.C. sec. 523(a)(1)(B)(2000) excepts them

from discharge.   Swanson v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 111, 120-121

(2003).


     6
       Petitioner filed tax returns for these years but failed to
pay the balances due.
     7
       Respondent contends that, since the record in the instant
case does not contain any indication that the sec. 6321 liens
were avoided, respondent may proceed with collection of
petitioner’s tax liabilities for the years in issue.
                                - 11 -

      We do not need to decide whether Magana v. Commissioner,

supra, precludes our consideration of petitioner’s bankruptcy

discharge.    Even if we were to assume arguendo that the effect of

the discharge may be considered, petitioner could not prevail in

the instant case because, for reasons explained below, we

conclude that petitioner’s tax debts remain collectible by levy.

Moreover, because we do not believe that it will be either

necessary or productive, we shall not remand this case to

respondent’s Appeals Office to consider petitioner’s arguments.

See Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 189 (2001).

II.   Jurisdiction Over the Bankruptcy Discharge Issue.

      This Court has jurisdiction in a levy proceeding instituted

under section 6330(d)(1) to decide whether a taxpayer’s unpaid

tax liabilities were discharged in bankruptcy.    Swanson v.

Commissioner, supra at 117; see also Washington v. Commissioner,

120 T.C. 114, 120-121 (2003).

      Title 11 section 523 provides exceptions to discharge from

bankruptcy.   Bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction for

debts listed in 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(2), (4), (6), and (15).

Title 11 section 523(c)(1); Swanson v. Commissioner, supra at 126

(citing In re McKendry, 40 F.3d 331, 335 (10th Cir. 1994); In re

Galbreath, 83 Bankr. 549, 550 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1988); Fed. R.

Bankr. P. 4007 Advisory Committee’s Note (1983); 4 Collier on

Bankruptcy, par. 523.03, at 523-17 (15th ed. rev. 1996)).      “With
                              - 12 -

respect to determining whether other debts, including tax debts,

are dischargeable, bankruptcy courts have concurrent jurisdiction

with other courts.”   Swanson v. Commissioner, supra at 126-127

(citing Whitehouse v. LaRoche, 277 F.3d 568, 576 (1st Cir. 2002);

In re McKendry, supra at 335 n.3; In re Galbreath; supra at 551;

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007 Advisory Committee’s Note (1983)

(“Jurisdiction over this issue on these debts [debts listed under

11 U.S.C. sec. 523(a)(1), (3), (5), (7), (8), and (9)] is held

concurrently by the Bankruptcy Court and any appropriate

nonbankruptcy forum.”); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy, par. 523.03, at

523-19).   Such concurrent jurisdiction allows dischargeability

issues relating to certain debts to be decided by the

nonbankruptcy court if the issues have not been addressed by the

bankruptcy court in a prior chapter 7 proceeding.   Swanson v.

Commissioner, supra at 127.

     The record in the instant case contains no evidence that the

bankruptcy court addressed the issue of whether petitioner’s tax

liabilities were dischargeable.   The bankruptcy court’s order

merely states:   “The debtor is granted a discharge under section

727 of title 11, United States Code, (the Bankruptcy Code)”.

While respondent’s insolvency specialist was listed on an

attachment to the Schedule F of the bankruptcy court’s order, a

dollar amount for the claim was not listed.
                               - 13 -

     In Washington and Swanson we decided that the bankruptcy

court had not addressed whether the taxpayers’ tax debts were

discharged because the records in both cases lacked any evidence

to the contrary.    The bankruptcy court orders in both Washington

and Swanson released the taxpayers from all “dischargeable

debts.”   See Washington v. Commissioner, supra at 116; Swanson v.

Commissioner, supra at 120.    In the instant case, however, the

bankruptcy court’s order makes no reference to dischargeable

debts.    That lack of reference, however, is of no consequence.

Section 727 of title 11 does not release a debtor from a debt

that is nondischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code.    Thus, an

order discharging a debtor from all “dischargeable debts” is no

different, for present purposes, from an order granting the

debtor “a discharge under section 727 of title 11, United States

Code”.

     Accordingly, based upon our holdings in Washington and

Swanson, we hold that, in the instant levy proceeding commenced

under section 6330(d)(1), the Court has jurisdiction to decide

whether the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of

Alabama discharged petitioner’s tax liabilities for the 1988,

1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996, and 1997 taxable years.

III. Sections 507 and 523 of the Bankruptcy Code.

     As noted above, petitioner contends that his tax liabilities

for the years in issue were discharged because they were not
                              - 14 -

filed within the time prescribed under 11 U.S.C. 507(a)(8).

Section 507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code establishes a priority for

claims; section 507(a)(8) provides, in pertinent part, as

follows:

     (8) Eighth, allowed unsecured claims of governmental
     units, only to the extent that such claims are for--
           (A) a tax on or measured by income or gross
           receipts--
                (i) for a taxable year ending on or before
                the date of the filing of the petition for
                which a return, if required, is last due,
                including extensions, after three years
                before the date of the filing of the
                petition;
                (ii) assessed within 240 days, plus any time
                plus 30 days during which an offer in
                compromise with respect to such tax that was
                made within 240 days after such assessment
                was pending, before the date of filing the
                petition; or
                (iii) other than a tax of a kind specified
                under section 523(a)(1)(B) or 523(a)(1)(C) of
                this title, not assessed before, but
                assessable, under applicable law or by
                agreement, after, the commencement of the
                case;

Thus, according to petitioner, respondent’s claims for

petitioner’s income taxes are valid only if a tax return was due

within 3 years of the filing of the petition with the bankruptcy

court, or the tax was assessed within 240 days before the filing

of the petition with the bankruptcy court.
                               - 15 -

We disagree.   Title 11 U.S.C. section 523(a) provides as follows:

       (a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a),
       1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge an
       individual debtor from any debt–

           (1) for a tax or a customs duty–

                (A) of the kind and for the periods specified
                in section 507(a)(2) or 507(a)(8) of this
                title, whether or not a claim for such tax
                was filed or allowed;

                (B) with respect to which a return, if
                required–

                       (i) was not filed; or

                       (ii) was filed after the date on which
                       such return was last due, under
                       applicable law or under any extension,
                       and after two years before the date of
                       the filing of the petition; or

                (C) with respect to which the debtor made
                a fraudulent return or willfully attempted in
                any manner to evade or defeat such tax;
                [Emphasis added.]

Accordingly, an individual debtor is not discharged under 11

U.S.C. section 727 from a tax liability specified under 11 U.S.C.

section 507(a)(8), whether or not a claim was filed, or from a

tax liability with respect to which the debtor failed to file a

required return or willfully attempted in any manner to evade or

defeat such tax.   Title 11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(A), (B), and

(C).    See generally Brumbaugh v. United States, 267 Bankr. 800

(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2001)(tax protester’s debts not discharged,

despite being assessed more than 240 days prior to petitioning
                              - 16 -

the bankruptcy court, because the debts were nondischargeable

under 11 U.S.C. sec. 523(a)(1)(B) and (C)).

      Petitioner also fails to appreciate the effect of lien under

SEC. 6321.   LIEN FOR TAXES.-- which provides:

           If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or
      refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount
      (including any interest, additional amount, addition to
      tax, or assessable penalty, together with any costs
      that may accrue in addition thereto) shall be a lien in
      favor of the United States upon all property and rights
      to property, whether real or personal, belonging to
      such person.


The lien arises at assessment and continues until the liability

is satisfied or becomes unenforceable because of lapse of time.

Section 6322.

IV.   Dischargeability Under Section 523(a)(1)(B) of the
      Bankruptcy Code.

      A Chapter 7 debtor generally is discharged from all debts

that arose before the filing of the bankruptcy petition under 11

U.S.C. sec. 727(b).   Certain debts, however, are excepted from

discharge under 11 U.S.C. sec. 523.    11 U.S.C. section

523(a)(1)(B)(i) excepts a tax debt from discharge in bankruptcy

if a debtor was required to file a tax return with respect to

such tax but failed to file one.   A purpose of the return

requirement in section 523(a)(1)(B) is to “prevent a debtor who

has ignored the filing requirements from escaping liability for

unpaid taxes through the debtor’s own misconduct.”    Swanson v.

Commissioner, 121 T.C. at 122 (citing In re Hindenlang, 164 F.3d
                                  - 17 -

1029, 1032 (6th Cir. 1999); In re Bergstrom, 949 F.2d 341, 342

(10th Cir. 1991)).

       The Bankruptcy Code does not define the term “return”.       In

defining return for purposes of 11 U.S.C. sec. 523(a)(1)(B),

other courts have looked to the Internal Revenue Code and cases

decided by this Court.       Swanson v. Commissioner, supra at 122.

In Beard v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766 (1984), affd. 793 F.2d 139

(6th Cir. 1986), we developed a test for whether a document

qualifies as a return.      We held that, in order to qualify as a

return, a document must meet the following requirements:         (1)

Purport to be a return; (2) be executed under penalty of perjury;

(3) contain sufficient data to allow a calculation of tax; and

(4) represent an honest and reasonable attempt to satisfy the

requirements of the tax law.       Id. at 777.

       Petitioner filed Forms 1040, for the taxable years 1988,

1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, and 1995 but failed to pay the balances

due.       Petitioner did not file Forms 1040 for the taxable years

1996 and 1997.       Instead, for taxable years 1996 and 1997,

petitioner filed IRS Form 4852, Substitute for Form W-2, or

Form 1099-R, and his asseveration denying that he earned any

wages.8      At trial, petitioner argued that, although he did not


       8
       Petitioner informed respondent’s Appeals Officer that his
speech included in the Form 4852 was protected under the First
Amendment because it was his redress against the Government as
well as his defense against the Government’s “illgitimate
                                                   (continued...)
                               - 18 -

file a Form 1040, he did file IRS Form 4852, which he claimed was

apparently good enough for the IRS to make its assessment.

     Petitioner signed the Form 4852 under penalty of perjury.

However, that document does not satisfy the other prongs of the

Beard test and therefore does not qualify as a return.   Because

the Form 4852 does not “convey, imply, or profess outwardly” to

be a return, it does not purport to be a return.    Beard v.

Commissioner, supra at 778.    In fact, in a letter to respondent

dated September 5, 1999, contesting penalties under section 6702

for filing a frivolous income tax return, petitioner stated:    “I

did not file a Form 1040 or anything that purported to be a

return for the year 1996 or 1997 to be considered a Frivolous

Return”.   (Emphasis added.)




     8
      (...continued)
assumptions” that all income is gross income. Petitioner may
disagree with and dislike the tax laws, but such “Noncompliance
with the tax law is not protected by the First Amendment.”
Butler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-263 (citing Sloan v.
Commissioner, 53 F.3d 799, 800 (7th Cir. 1995), affg. 102 T.C.
137 (1994); Hettig v. United States, 845 F.2d 794, 795-796 (8th
Cir. 1988); Bradley v. United States, 817 F.2d 1400, 1404-1405
(9th Cir. 1987); McKee v. United States, 781 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th
Cir. 1986); Collett v. United States, 781 F.2d 53, 55 (6th Cir.
1985); Eicher v. United States, 774 F.2d 27, 29-30 (1st Cir.
1985); Hudson v. United States, 766 F.2d 1288, 1291-1292 (9th
Cir. 1985); Kahn v. United States, 753 F.2d 1208, 1214-1217,
1222-1223 n.8 (3d Cir. 1985); Mosher v. IRS, 775 F.2d 1292, 1295
(5th Cir. 1985); Welch v. United States, 750 F.2d 1101, 1108-1110
(1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850, 857-
858 (3d Cir. 1973)).
                               - 19 -

     The Form 4852 also does not represent an honest and

reasonable attempt to satisfy the tax laws, id. at 777, which is

a critical requirement; see id. at 779 (stating that the critical

requirement is that there must be an honest and reasonable

attempt to satisfy the requirements of the Federal income tax

laws).   Petitioner filed the Form 4852, and deliberately omitted

the Form 1040, in protest of the tax laws claiming that he did

not have wages, gross income, or taxable income as defined in the

Internal Revenue Code.   The Form 4852 and accompanying

asseveration filed by petitioner were merely vehicles to assert

his frivolous arguments to respondent and to avoid payment of his

tax liabilities.   As we noted in Beard:

     “In tax protester cases, it is obvious that there is no
     ‘honest and genuine’ attempt to meet the requirements
     of the code. In our self-reporting tax system the
     government should not be forced to accept as a return a
     document which plainly is not intended to give the
     required information.” [Id. at 779 (quoting United
     States v. Moore, 627 F.2d 830, 835 (7th Cir. 1980)).]

     Accordingly, we hold that petitioner did not file returns

for the 1996 and 1997 taxable years, and, therefore, his tax

liabilities for those two years are excepted from discharge under

11 U.S.C. section 523(a)(1)(B)(i).      Swanson v. Commissioner, 121

T.C. at 125; Howard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-100.

V.   Sections 6321 and 6322.

     We need not decide whether the bankruptcy court discharged

petitioner from personal liability for his tax liabilities for
                               - 20 -

1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, and 1995.9   Even if we were to

assume arguendo that those liabilities were discharged in

personam, any property that belonged to petitioner when he filed

his bankruptcy petition is still encumbered in rem by a Federal

tax lien and remains subject to levy.   The U.S. Government

obtains a lien against all property and rights to property,

whether real or personal, if a person liable for any tax neglects

or refuses to pay such tax after demand has been made.   Sec.

6321.    The lien arises automatically and continues until the tax

liability is satisfied or becomes unenforceable by lapse of time.



     9
       Although not necessary to our decision in the instant
case, we take notice that bankruptcy courts that have faced the
issue have held that frivolous tax protester behavior may
constitute a willful attempt in any manner to evade or defeat tax
under 11. U.S.C. sec. 523(a)(1)(C) (2000). See, e.g., Myers v.
IRS, 216 Bankr. 402, 404-405 (6th Cir. BAP Ohio 1998); Brumbaugh
v. United States, 267 Bankr. 800, 811 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2001);
Wilbert v. IRS, 262 Bankr. 571, 576-577 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2001);
Berning v. IRS, 244 Bankr. 96, 99 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1999);
Spirito v. United States, 198 Bankr. 624, 629 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1996); Laurin v. United States, 161 Bankr. 73, 75 (Bankr. D. Wyo.
1993).

     We also take notice that based on petitioner’s long history
of not paying his taxes, his frivolous arguments, and his
creation of roadblocks to prevent collection of his tax
liabilities, a court could conclude that petitioner did not file
his bankruptcy petition in good faith. Such bad faith filing by
tax protesters is an attempted abuse of the bankruptcy process
which frequently results in the dismissal of the petition by the
bankruptcy court. See, e.g., United States v. Mathews, 209
Bankr. 218, 221 (BAP 6th Cir. 1997); Morimoto v. United States,
171 Bankr. 85, 86 (BAP 9th Cir. 1994); In re Johnston, 207 Bankr.
142, 145-146 (S.D. Tex. 1996); In re Hovind, 197 Bankr. 157, 161
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1996); In re Burrell, 186 Bankr. 230, 234-235
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995).
                                - 21 -

Sec. 6322; see also Iannone v. Commissioner, 122 T.C. 287,

292-293 (2004).

       Federal tax liens of which notice has been filed are not

extinguished by personal discharge in bankruptcy.     11 U.S.C. sec.

522(c)(2)(B) (2004); see also Iannone v. Commissioner, supra at

293.    “A discharge of personal liability in bankruptcy

‘extinguishes only one mode of enforcing a claim--namely, an

action against the debtor in personam--while leaving intact

another--namely, an action against the debtor in rem.’”      Iannone

v. Commissioner, supra at 293. (quoting Johnson v. Home State

Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991).    Any pre-existing Federal tax liens

remain in effect and attach to assets owned prior to the date of

the filing the bankruptcy petition.      11 U.S.C. sec. 522(c)(2)(B);

Iannone v. Commissioner, supra at 293.

       The record in the instant case shows that, before petitioner

commenced his case in bankruptcy, respondent properly assessed

and demanded payment of the tax liabilities owed for the 1988,

1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, and 1995 taxable years.     Petitioner has

presented no evidence that the Federal tax liens arising from

those liabilities were defective.    Petitioner simply insists that

his tax debts were discharged by the bankruptcy court’s July 27,

2004, order.    However, when petitioner filed for bankruptcy,

there were valid Federal tax liens on his property.
                               - 22 -

     Section 6331(a) provides, in pertinent part:

     If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses
     to pay the same * * *, it shall be lawful for the
     Secretary to collect such tax * * * by levy upon all
     property and rights to property(except such property as
     is exempt under section 6334) belonging to such person
     or on which there is a lien provided in this chapter
     for the payment of such tax. * * *


Section 6334(a) exempts the following from levy:    (1) Wearing

apparel and school books; (2) fuel, provisions, furniture, and

personal effects; (3) books and tools of a trade, business, or

profession; (4) unemployment benefits; (5) undelivered mail; (6)

certain annuity and pension payments; (7) workmen’s compensation;

(8) judgment for support of minor children; (9) certain amounts

of wages, salary and other income; (10) certain service-connected

disability payments; (11) certain public assistance payments;

(12) assistance under the job training partnership act (since

repealed); (13) certain residences.     See also Iannone v.

Commissioner, supra at 293-294.

     Section 6334(c) provides:    “Notwithstanding any other law of

the United States * * *, no property or rights to property shall

be exempt from levy other than the property specifically made

exempt by subsection (a).”    Section 301.6334-1(c), Proced. &

Admin. Regs., provides that “No provision of a State law may

exempt property or rights to property from levy for the

collection of any Federal tax.”    See also Iannone v.

Commissioner, supra at 294.
                              - 23 -

      Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented any evidence

that any of the property to which the Federal tax lien attached

or upon which respondent intends to levy is exempt under section

6334(a).   Accordingly, we hold that respondent may proceed with

the proposed levy in satisfaction of petitioner’s tax liabilities

for the 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996 and 1997 taxable

years.

VI.   Petitioner’s Other Contentions.

      Petitioner contends, in his brief, that respondent does not

have a claim because respondent failed to attend the creditors’

meeting on May 27, 2004, to object to petitioner’s discharge.

Petitioner’s argument has no merit.     Because the tax debts for

1996 and 1997 in the instant case are of the type specified in 11

U.S.C. sec. 523(a)(1), respondent was not required to object or

even file a claim to protect against discharge because the

liabilities were nondischargeable.      Swanson v. Commissioner, 121

T.C. at 128.   Furthermore, the Federal tax liens are not

extinguished by bankruptcy.   11 U.S.C. sec. 522(c)(2)(B).    A

discharge in bankruptcy extinguishes only the ability to proceed

against the debtor personally; it leaves intact the lien on the

debtor’s property.   Iannone v. Commissioner, supra at 293.

Accordingly, because there were valid Federal tax liens on

petitioner’s property for the 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, and

1995 taxable years, it was not necessary for respondent to attend
                              - 24 -

the creditors’ meeting in order to levy upon the property to

which those liens attached.

     We have considered all of petitioner’s contentions.   To the

extent not addressed herein, those contentions are without merit

or unnecessary to reach.

VII. Section 6673.

     The record in the instant case shows that respondent warned

petitioner in November 2003, and again in the notice of

determination, that this Court could impose a penalty under

section 6673, and further warned petitioner that his section 861

argument was frivolous and groundless.   Section 6673(a)(1)

provides that this Court may require the taxpayer to pay a

penalty not in excess of $25,000 whenever it appears to this

Court that:   (a) The proceedings were instituted or maintained by

the taxpayer primarily for delay; (b) the taxpayer’s position is

frivolous or groundless; (c) or the taxpayer unreasonably failed

to pursue available administrative remedies.

     Petitioner’s 1996 and 1997 tax returns were nothing but

vehicles to assert his frivolous section 861 argument that he did

not owe taxes.   The record also contains several letters from

petitioner to respondent which contain nothing but his frivolous

861 argument and assorted frivolous free speech arguments.

     Petitioner was well aware that respondent intended to

collect petitioner’s tax liabilities long before he filed his
                             - 25 -

petition with the bankruptcy court on April 23, 2004.   Petitioner

had been receiving correspondence from respondent for many years

regarding his growing tax liabilities and was sent respondent’s

Final Notice of Intent to Levy on November 28, 2002,

approximately 1 year and 5 months before petitioner filed his

petition with the bankruptcy court.   Between November 28, 2002,

and his Appeals hearing almost a year later on November 12, 2003,

petitioner repeatedly raised his frivolous section 861 argument

instead of cooperating with respondent.    After receiving a notice

of determination on November 19, 2003, notifying him that

collection was imminent, petitioner instituted proceedings with

this Court on December 16, 2003, in an attempt to delay

collection, stating that he did not have taxable income because

“26 CFR Section 1.863-1(c) clearly states what sections to use to

determine one’s taxable income.”   Four months after filing his

petition with this Court, but before trial, petitioner filed his

petition with the bankruptcy court on April 23, 2004.   Petitioner

now argues that his tax liabilities, which he previously argued

he did not owe under section 861, were discharged by the

bankruptcy court’s July 27, 2004, order.

     On the basis of the record in the instant case, we are

convinced that petitioner instituted proceedings with this Court

to delay collection, repeatedly advanced his frivolous section

861 argument, despite being warned it was frivolous, and failed
                              - 26 -

to cooperate with respondent during the administrative process

and appeals hearing.   Petitioner’s timing of his bankruptcy

petition was clearly yet another attempt to delay or avoid

collection.   Accordingly, we shall impose a penalty of $10,000

pursuant to section 6673.

VIII. Conclusion.

     We hold that respondent may proceed with the proposed levy

to collect the tax liabilities for the years in issue.

     To reflect the foregoing,


                                         An appropriate decision

                                   will be entered.
