UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                        No. 99-4131

JERMONZA LEVON SPENCER,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville.
James C. Turk, District Judge.
(CR-97-82)

Submitted: September 28, 1999

Decided: November 22, 1999

Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Deborah C. Wyatt, WYATT & CARTER, Charlottesville, Virginia,
for Appellant. Robert P. Crouch, Jr., United States Attorney, Bruce A.
Pagel, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for
Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Jermonza Levon Spencer appeals his conviction and sentence for
conspiring to distribute and distributing cocaine base in violation of
21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841, 846 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999). Because our
review of the briefs and joint appendix discloses no reversible error,
we affirm.

Spencer argues first that the district court erred by allowing into
evidence a redacted summary of a confession made by Spencer's non-
testifying co-defendant. Spencer did not object to the use of the
redacted confession. Furthermore, Spencer's pre-trial motion to sup-
press makes no mention of the issue of which he now complains.
Matters raised for the first time on appeal will generally not be con-
sidered absent circumstances indicative of plain error. See United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993). Because those portions of
the appendix used at trial were redacted and were connected to Spen-
cer only through the use of evidence introduced later in trial, we find
no plain error. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 208, 211
(1987). Accordingly, this claim warrants no relief.

Spencer next argues that the district court's adoption of the pre-
sentence report was clearly erroneous and denied him his Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation. The testimony at trial and the pre-
sentence report support the district court's computation of relevant
conduct and the sentence imposed. Furthermore, we have previously
held that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to the probation
officer's interviews conducted for the purpose of preparing the pre-
sentence report. See United States v. Johnson , 935 F.2d 47, 50-51 (4th
Cir. 1991).

Finally, Spencer claims that the Government violated the tenets of
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (1994), by offering leniency to cooperating wit-
nesses in exchange for their truthful testimony. Although a widely
discussed panel decision of the Tenth Circuit supported this proposi-
tion, that opinion has since been overruled. See United States v.
Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th
Cir. 1999) (en banc). Furthermore, we recently rejected an identical

                    2
challenge. United States v. Richardson, ___ F.3d ___, 1999 WL
686892 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 1999) (No. 98-4139).

Accordingly, we affirm Spencer's conviction and sentence. We dis-
pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

                    3
