                                                   PANAGIOTA PAM SOTIROPOULOS, PETITIONER v.
                                                      COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
                                                                 RESPONDENT
                                                    Docket No. 19884–12.                              Filed May 5, 2014.

                                                  I.R.C. sec. 901(a) permits a U.S. citizen or resident to claim
                                               a credit against her Federal income tax liability for income
                                               taxes paid to a foreign country. If such taxes are ‘‘refunded in
                                               whole or in part,’’ the taxpayer is required to notify the Sec-
                                               retary, who is authorized to redetermine the U.S. tax. I.R.C.
                                               sec. 905(c)(1). Any tax due as a result of the Secretary’s
                                               redetermination is due on notice and demand. I.R.C. sec.
                                               905(c)(3). P is a U.S. citizen who lived and worked in the U.K.
                                               during 2003–05. On her U.S. returns for these years P
                                               claimed foreign tax credits in amounts corresponding to the
                                               U.K. tax withheld by her employer. P subsequently filed U.K.
                                               income tax returns showing overpayments and applied for
                                               refunds of U.K. tax. P received payments from U.K. taxing
                                               authorities but contends that the payments were not
                                               ‘‘refunds’’ within the meaning of I.R.C. sec. 905(c)(1)(C)
                                               because her entitlement to refunds remains under investiga-
                                               tion in the U.K. P did not notify the Secretary of these pay-
                                               ments pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 905(c)(1). Following examination
                                               of P’s returns, R mailed P a notice of deficiency for 2003–05
                                               determining that the U.K. taxes had been ‘‘refunded’’ and dis-
                                               allowing the claimed foreign tax credits. P petitioned the
                                               Court. Approximately a year after filing his answer, R moved
                                               to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. R contends that he
                                               erred in issuing the notice of deficiency and that I.R.C. sec.
                                               905(c) authorizes him to redetermine P’s 2003–05 tax and col-
                                               lect it upon notice and demand. Held: This Court has jurisdic-
                                               tion to determine, at a minimum, whether the statutory provi-
                                               sion alleged to divest it of jurisdiction applies, that is,
                                               whether the U.K. taxes paid by petitioner have been
                                               ‘‘refunded in whole or in part’’ within the meaning of I.R.C.
                                               sec. 905(c)(1)(C).

                                           Jeffrey L. Gould, for petitioner.
                                           Scott A. Hovey, for respondent.

                                                                                  OPINION

                                        LAUBER, Judge: Currently before this Court is respondent’s
                                     motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Internal Rev-
                                     enue Service (IRS or respondent) issued petitioner a notice of
                                     deficiency for tax years 2003–05, and petitioner timely peti-
                                     tioned the Court for redetermination of the deficiencies.
                                                                                                                                  269




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                                     270                  142 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                                     (269)


                                     Respondent now argues that he erred in issuing the notice
                                     and that the Court, by virtue of sections 905 and 6213, 1
                                     lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the substantive tax
                                     issue presented by the petition.

                                                                                Background
                                        Petitioner is a U.S. citizen who lived and worked in
                                     London, England, during 2003–05 and at the time she peti-
                                     tioned this Court. She was employed by the London office of
                                     Goldman Sachs during 2003–05. She received employee com-
                                     pensation from Goldman Sachs, which withheld United
                                     Kingdom (U.K.) income tax from her wages. She filed U.S.
                                     and U.K. income tax returns for each year at issue. On a
                                     timely filed U.S. return for each year, she claimed a foreign
                                     tax credit in a dollar amount equivalent to the U.K. tax with-
                                     held by Goldman Sachs.
                                        On her U.K. tax return for each year, petitioner claimed
                                     substantial deductions attributable to investments in U.K.
                                     film partnerships. She claimed these deductions under U.K.
                                     tax provisions that allowed investors in film partnerships to
                                     deduct highly leveraged investment costs against their
                                     earned income. In reliance on these deductions, petitioner
                                     applied for refunds on her U.K. returns of the tax that her
                                     employer had withheld and paid over to U.K. taxing authori-
                                     ties.
                                        Section 905(c)(1) provides that, if a taxpayer has claimed
                                     a credit for a foreign tax that is later ‘‘refunded in whole or
                                     in part,’’ the taxpayer ‘‘shall notify the Secretary.’’ The IRS
                                     is then authorized to redetermine the tax for that year and
                                     collect, upon notice and demand, any additional tax due. See
                                     sec. 905(c)(3).
                                        Petitioner received payments from the U.K. taxing authori-
                                     ties resulting from the submission of her 2003–05 U.K.
                                     returns. However, she contends that these payments were
                                     not ‘‘refunds’’ within the meaning of section 905(c)(1)(C) both
                                     because her entitlement to refunds remains under investiga-
                                     tion by U.K. taxing authorities and because the application
                                           1 All
                                             statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for
                                     the tax years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules
                                     of Practice and Procedure. All dollar amounts are rounded to the nearest
                                     dollar.




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                                     (269)                    SOTIROPOULOS v. COMMISSIONER                                        271


                                     of section 905(c) is allegedly affected by provisions of the
                                     U.S./U.K. income tax treaty. As a result, petitioner did not
                                     file amended U.S. returns for 2003–05 reporting reduced for-
                                     eign tax credits, nor did she otherwise notify the IRS pursu-
                                     ant to section 905(c)(1).
                                        The IRS commenced an examination of petitioner’s 2003–
                                     05 returns. Before or during the audit, the IRS was informed
                                     by U.K. taxing authorities that petitioner had invested in
                                     film partnerships; had claimed substantial deductions attrib-
                                     utable thereto; and had filed U.K. returns requesting
                                     refunds. The IRS determined that petitioner had received
                                     U.K. income tax refunds of $413,126 in 2003, $292,663 in
                                     2004, and $239,202 in 2005. It therefore disallowed cor-
                                     responding amounts of foreign tax credits that petitioner
                                     claimed on her U.S. returns.
                                        Rather than invoking section 905(c)(3) as authority for col-
                                     lecting the redetermined tax upon notice and demand, the
                                     IRS sent petitioner a notice of deficiency for 2003–05. This
                                     notice showed tax increases flowing from the credit adjust-
                                     ments and determined section 6662(a) accuracy-related pen-
                                     alties. The reductions to petitioner’s foreign tax credits were
                                     the only adjustments the IRS made to her returns for these
                                     years.
                                        Petitioner timely petitioned this Court challenging
                                     respondent’s determinations. Approximately a year after
                                     filing his answer, respondent moved to dismiss the case for
                                     lack of jurisdiction insofar as it concerns the adjustments to
                                     petitioner’s foreign tax credits. Respondent contends that he
                                     erred in issuing the notice of deficiency; that section 905(c)
                                     authorizes him to redetermine petitioner’s 2003–05 tax and
                                     collect it upon notice and demand; and that foreign tax credit
                                     adjustments of the sort involved here ‘‘are expressly removed
                                     from deficiency procedures’’ by a cross-reference from section
                                     6213(h)(2)(A) to section 905(c). Respondent acknowledges
                                     that the accuracy-related penalties determined in the notice
                                     of deficiency ‘‘properly fall under the jurisdiction of this
                                     Court.’’ However, respondent expresses his intention to con-
                                     cede these penalties if the Court grants his motion to dismiss
                                     as to the foreign tax credit adjustments.




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                                     272                 142 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                                     (269)


                                                                                Discussion
                                        This Court always has jurisdiction to determine whether it
                                     has jurisdiction. Cooper v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 70, 73
                                     (2010). The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and
                                     we must ascertain whether the case before us is one that
                                     Congress has authorized us to consider. See sec. 7442; Estate
                                     of Young v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 879, 881 (1983). In deter-
                                     mining whether we have jurisdiction over a given matter,
                                     this Court and the Courts of Appeals have given our jurisdic-
                                     tional provisions a broad, practical construction rather than
                                     a narrow, technical one. Lewy v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 779,
                                     781 (1977). When a statutory provision is capable of two
                                     interpretations, ‘‘we are inclined to adopt a construction
                                     which will permit us to retain jurisdiction without doing
                                     violence to the statutory language.’’ Traxler v. Commissioner,
                                     61 T.C. 97, 100 (1973).
                                     I. Statutory Framework
                                           A. The Tax Court as a Prepayment Forum
                                        The primary function of this Court is to act as a convenient
                                     prepayment forum in which taxpayers can challenge IRS
                                     deficiency determinations without paying the tax first. See
                                     sec. 6213(a); Lewy v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. at 781; Boris I.
                                     Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income,
                                     Estates, and Gifts, para. 115.2.2, at 115–13 (2d ed. 2012).
                                     Section 6211 defines a ‘‘deficiency,’’ and section 6212 author-
                                     izes the IRS to send a ‘‘notice of deficiency’’ if it determines
                                     a deficiency with respect to a taxpayer’s tax. Upon receipt of
                                     a notice of deficiency, the taxpayer may petition this Court
                                     for redetermination of the deficiency. Sec. 6213(a). The peti-
                                     tion must be filed within 90 days if the notice is mailed to
                                     a U.S. address or within 150 days if, as was true here, ‘‘the
                                     notice is addressed to a [taxpayer] outside the United
                                     States.’’ Ibid.
                                        Section 6213 also places important restrictions on the IRS’
                                     ability to assess a deficiency and begin collecting the tax. As
                                     a rule, the IRS may not assess an income tax deficiency until
                                     it has mailed a notice of deficiency and the relevant period
                                     (90 or 150 days, as applicable) has elapsed. Sec. 6213(a). If
                                     the applicable time window closes and the taxpayer does not




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                                     (269)                     SOTIROPOULOS v. COMMISSIONER                                        273


                                     petition this Court, the IRS may proceed with assessment
                                     and collection. If a taxpayer timely petitions this Court, the
                                     IRS may not assess the tax or proceed to collect it ‘‘until the
                                     decision of the Tax Court has become final.’’ Ibid.
                                        In certain circumstances, the restrictions on assessment
                                     found in section 6213 do not apply. For example, section
                                     6201(a)(1) authorizes the IRS to assess (and begin collection
                                     of ) taxes determined by a taxpayer and shown on his or her
                                     return. Section 6213(b)(1) authorizes the IRS to assess (and
                                     begin collection of ) additional tax arising from a mathe-
                                     matical or clerical error apparent on the face of a return. The
                                     usual restrictions on assessment likewise do not apply to
                                     assessable penalties, see secs. 6671–6725, or in emergency
                                     situations, such as termination and jeopardy assessments,
                                     see secs. 6851, 6852, 6861.
                                           B. Section 905(c)
                                        Section 905(c) includes another, quite specialized, excep-
                                     tion to the restrictions on assessment set forth in section
                                     6213. Subject to certain limitations, a U.S. citizen may elect
                                     to take a foreign tax credit against her U.S. income tax
                                     liability for income taxes paid or accrued to a foreign country
                                     or U.S. possession. Sec. 901(a). Congress anticipated the dif-
                                     ficulty of ascertaining, at the time the U.S. return is filed,
                                     the exact amount of foreign tax that will ultimately be allow-
                                     able as a credit. It accordingly provided, in what is now sec-
                                     tion 905(c), a special procedure for adjusting the credit when
                                     the taxpayer’s ultimate liability varies from the amount
                                     claimed. Section 905(c)(1) specifies three situations in which
                                     a U.S. taxpayer’s foreign tax credit must be adjusted:
                                              (A) accrued taxes when paid differ from the amounts claimed as
                                           credits by the taxpayer,
                                              (B) accrued taxes are not paid before the date 2 years after the close
                                           of the taxable year to which such taxes relate, or
                                              (C) any tax paid is refunded in whole or in part.

                                       The regulations describe these three situations as
                                     involving a ‘‘foreign tax redetermination.’’ Sec. 1.905–3T(c),
                                     Temporary Income Tax Regs., 53 Fed. Reg. 23614 (June 23,
                                     1988). 2 If a ‘‘foreign tax redetermination’’ as thus defined
                                           2 The   provisions of the temporary regulations discussed in the text, secs.
                                                                                                       Continued




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                                     274                 142 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                                     (269)


                                     occurs, section 905(c)(1) provides that ‘‘the taxpayer shall
                                     notify the Secretary, who shall redetermine the amount of
                                     the tax for the year or years affected.’’ Because the IRS,
                                     absent notice from the taxpayer, generally will not know of
                                     revisions to the taxpayer’s foreign tax liabilities, the Internal
                                     Revenue Code has long required self-reporting of such
                                     changes. See generally Pac. Metals Corp. v. Commissioner, 1
                                     T.C. 1028, 1029 (1943) (discussing section 131(c) of the Rev-
                                     enue Act of 1936, a predecessor of section 905(c)). Section
                                     6689 provides a strong incentive for taxpayers to comply with
                                     their self-reporting obligations under section 905(c)(1),
                                     imposing a penalty up to 25% of the deficiency for failure to
                                     provide the notice required by section 905(c)(1) unless it is
                                     shown that such failure is due to reasonable cause and not
                                     due to willful neglect.
                                        With exceptions not relevant here, the taxpayer is sup-
                                     posed to notify the Secretary by filing an amended return.
                                     Sec. 1.905–4T(b)(1), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 53 Fed.
                                     Reg. 23617 (June 23, 1988). An individual taxpayer is
                                     instructed to include with her amended return a revised
                                     Form 1116, Foreign Tax Credit, and information sufficient to
                                     enable the IRS to redetermine her U.S. tax liability. See sec.
                                     1.905–4T(b)(1), (3), Temporary Income Tax Regs.
                                        Once the IRS redetermines the taxpayer’s liability in
                                     accordance with section 905(c)(1), ‘‘[t]he amount of tax (if
                                     any) due * * * shall be paid by the taxpayer on notice and
                                     demand by the Secretary, and the amount of tax overpaid (if
                                     any) shall be credited or refunded to the taxpayer.’’ Sec.
                                     905(c)(3). A cross-reference from section 6213 confirms that
                                     the usual restrictions on assessment do not apply to section
                                     905(c) adjustments made by the IRS. See sec. 6213(h)(2)
                                     (‘‘For assessments without regard to restrictions imposed by
                                     this section in the case of—(A) Recovery of foreign income

                                     1.905–3T and 1.905–4T, Temporary Income Tax Regs., 53 Fed. Reg. 23613,
                                     23617 (June 23, 1988), were promulgated in 1988, T.D. 8210, 1988–2 C.B.
                                     248, and were in effect through November 6, 2007. They were amended by
                                     T.D. 9362, 2007–48 I.R.B. 1050, in November 2007, but the provisions dis-
                                     cussed herein remained substantially the same after that amendment. The
                                     applicability of these provisions was set to expire on November 5, 2010.
                                     See secs. 1.905–3T(f ), 1.905–4T(f )(3), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 72
                                     Fed. Reg. 62784, 62787 (Nov. 7, 2007). The provisions discussed in the text
                                     were in effect at all times relevant to this case.




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                                     (269)                    SOTIROPOULOS v. COMMISSIONER                                        275


                                     taxes, see section 905(c).’’); sec. 1.905–4T(b)(1), Temporary
                                     Income Tax Regs. (‘‘Subchapter B of chapter 63 of the Code
                                     (relating to deficiency procedures) shall not apply with
                                     respect to the assessment of the amount due upon such
                                     redetermination.’’).
                                     II. Analysis
                                        The IRS determined deficiencies in petitioner’s income tax
                                     for 2003–05 based on its contention that she had received
                                     refunds of U.K. taxes claimed as credits on her U.S. returns
                                     for those years. The IRS issued her a notice of deficiency and
                                     she timely petitioned this Court. Respondent contends that
                                     we nevertheless lack jurisdiction because the increased tax
                                     determined in the notice of deficiency constitutes a ‘‘section
                                     905(c) adjustment.’’
                                        Respondent contends that petitioner received U.K. tax
                                     refunds, which triggered his duty to redetermine her U.S. tax
                                     under section 905(c)(1). This duty arises, respondent con-
                                     tends, regardless whether the Commissioner has received
                                     notification from the taxpayer and regardless whether the
                                     taxpayer disputes the predicate for that section’s application.
                                     Because the IRS has allegedly adjusted petitioner’s foreign
                                     tax credits under section 905(c)(1), respondent argues that
                                     the redetermined tax is due on notice and demand under sec-
                                     tion 905(c)(3) and hence that this Court lacks deficiency
                                     jurisdiction by virtue of the cross-reference to section 905(c)
                                     from section 6213(h)(2)(A). The fact that the IRS sent peti-
                                     tioner a notice of deficiency is irrelevant, according to
                                     respondent, since the mailing and receipt of a notice do not
                                     automatically confer jurisdiction.
                                        As a preliminary matter, we agree with respondent that
                                     the Internal Revenue Code, not merely the issuance of a
                                     notice of deficiency, confers jurisdiction on this Court. See
                                     Thompson v. Commissioner, 137 T.C. 220, 225–226 (2011),
                                     rev’d on other grounds, 729 F.3d 869 (8th Cir. 2013). While
                                     the Thompson decision was reversed and remanded on other
                                     grounds, the Court of Appeals did not disturb this portion of
                                     the holding, and we see no reason to do so now. However, we
                                     do not agree with the other steps of respondent’s argument.
                                        In urging that we lack jurisdiction, respondent cites no
                                     caselaw but rather relies on what he regards as the plain




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                                     276                 142 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                                     (269)


                                     language of the statute. The problem with respondent’s posi-
                                     tion is that a plain reading of section 905(c) describes a cir-
                                     cumstance that did not necessarily occur here. Section
                                     905(c)(3) empowers the Commissioner to collect on notice and
                                     demand only in the case of a ‘‘redetermination under para-
                                     graph (1).’’ Paragraph 1 is structured as a conditional state-
                                     ment. As relevant here, it provides that if a foreign tax paid
                                     is refunded, then the taxpayer is required to notify the Sec-
                                     retary, who shall then redetermine the tax. Here, petitioner
                                     disputes that she received a ‘‘refund’’ of U.K. tax. She con-
                                     tends that the payments she received from U.K. taxing
                                     authorities were not ‘‘refunds’’ within the meaning of section
                                     905(c)(1)(C), both because her entitlement to refunds remains
                                     under investigation in the U.K. and because the application
                                     of section 905(c) is allegedly affected by provisions of the
                                     U.S./U.K. income tax treaty. 3 And because she allegedly
                                     received no ‘‘refunds,’’ she did not notify—and she contends
                                     that she had no obligation to notify—the Secretary under
                                     section 905(c)(1).
                                        In short, this is not a case where the taxpayer has con-
                                     ceded receipt of a foreign tax refund by notifying the Sec-
                                     retary, filing an amended return, and self-reporting an
                                     increased tax liability. Section 905(c)(1)(C) applies only ‘‘[i]f
                                     * * * any tax paid is refunded in whole or in part,’’ and peti-
                                     tioner contends that this condition has not been satisfied. We
                                     necessarily have jurisdiction to determine whether section
                                     905(c)(1)(C)—the statutory provision alleged to divest us of
                                     jurisdiction—applies.
                                        The Court confronted analogous facts in Comprehensive
                                     Designers Int’l, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 348 (1976). The
                                     taxpayer there claimed on its U.S. return a foreign tax credit
                                     for an accrued U.K. tax. The taxpayer determined this credit
                                     by translating its accrued liability in British pounds into dol-
                                     lars at the exchange rate prevailing at the end of its fiscal
                                     year, namely, £1.00 = $2.80. The taxpayer’s U.K. tax liability,
                                     when subsequently paid, was the same as its accrued
                                     liability in terms of British pounds. In dollar terms, however,
                                       3 We make no findings at this stage of the case concerning the merits

                                     of petitioner’s arguments. The only issue before us is the legal question
                                     whether we have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate her claims. See
                                     Tigers Eye Trading, LLC v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 67, 75 (2012) (citing
                                     Taylor v. Voss, 271 U.S. 176, 186 (1926)).




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                                     (269)                     SOTIROPOULOS v. COMMISSIONER                                        277


                                     its U.K. tax liability when paid was significantly lower than
                                     when accrued, because the pound had depreciated and was
                                     then convertible into dollars at a rate of £1.00 = $2.40. Id.
                                     at 350.
                                        On audit, the taxpayer contended that no adjustment to its
                                     foreign tax credit was required because its U.K. tax liability,
                                     in British pounds, was the same when paid as when accrued.
                                     The IRS disagreed, contending that, because of the exchange
                                     rate differential, the ‘‘accrued taxes when paid differ[ed] from
                                     the amounts claimed as credits by the taxpayer’’ within the
                                     meaning of section 905(c) of the 1954 Code. 4 The IRS sent
                                     the taxpayer a notice of deficiency based on a redetermina-
                                     tion of its foreign tax credit, and the taxpayer timely sought
                                     review in this Court.
                                        The Court in Comprehensive Designers did not address the
                                     jurisdictional issue currently before us, evidently because the
                                     parties had not raised it. Rather, the Court proceeded to the
                                     merits and ruled in favor of the IRS. See 66 T.C. at 354–356.
                                     As Judge Tannenwald framed the question, ‘‘We must decide
                                     whether the amount of [petitioner’s foreign tax] credit should
                                     be adjusted pursuant to section 905(c).’’ Id. at 354.
                                        Like the taxpayer in Comprehensive Designers, petitioner
                                     disputes that a foreign tax redetermination has occurred.
                                     Just as the taxpayer in Comprehensive Designers disagreed
                                     that its ‘‘accrued taxes when paid differ[ed] from the
                                     amounts claimed as credits,’’ petitioner disagrees that her
                                     U.K. tax ‘‘has been refunded in whole or in part.’’ In each
                                     case, the taxpayer did not file an amended return or other-
                                     wise notify the Secretary pursuant to section 905(c)(1); the
                                     IRS determined a deficiency stemming from partial disallow-
                                     ance of the foreign tax credit; the IRS sent the taxpayer a
                                           4 Section
                                                   905(c) of the 1954 Code, which was similar in substance to the
                                     current statute, provided: ‘‘If accrued taxes when paid differ from the
                                     amounts claimed as credits by the taxpayer, or if any tax paid is refunded
                                     in whole or in part, the taxpayer shall notify the Secretary [or his dele-
                                     gate], who shall redetermine the amount of the tax for the year or years
                                     affected.’’ The original version of the statute, enacted in 1918, read simi-
                                     larly: ‘‘If accrued taxes when paid differ from the amounts claimed as cred-
                                     its by the taxpayer, or if any tax paid is refunded in whole or in part, the
                                     taxpayer shall notify the Commissioner who shall redetermine the amount
                                     of the tax due * * * and the amount of tax due upon such redetermina-
                                     tion, if any, shall be paid by the taxpayer upon notice and demand.’’ Rev-
                                     enue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65–254, sec. 222(b), 40 Stat. at 1073.




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                                     278                  142 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                                     (269)


                                     notice of deficiency; and the taxpayer timely sought redeter-
                                     mination of that deficiency in our Court. In Comprehensive
                                     Designers and on other occasions, we decided the merits of
                                     questions concerning foreign tax credit adjustments described
                                     in section 905(c) and its predecessors, in each case without
                                     addressing the jurisdictional issue that respondent raises
                                     now. 5
                                       The statutory scheme that Congress has created generally
                                     affords taxpayers a prepayment forum to contest disputed
                                     taxes. The Code provides limited exceptions to this rule,
                                     allowing the Commissioner to assess the tax summarily (for
                                     example) where the taxpayer has reported a tax on her
                                     return or made obvious mathematical errors in computing
                                     her tax. See secs. 6201(a)(1), 6213(b). The common thread in
                                     these non-emergency situations is that the assessment is
                                     uncontroverted and does not need independent review, since
                                     the taxpayer does not dispute that the tax is owing. This
                                     statutory scheme supports the outcome in Comprehensive
                                     Designers and the other precedents we have cited, which
                                     afforded taxpayers a prepayment forum for contesting the
                                     application of section 905(c)(1), and its predecessors. 6
                                       At this point, we need not decide whether we have subject
                                     matter jurisdiction over all aspects of this controversy. At the
                                           5 See
                                              Steel Improvement & Forge Co. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 265, 280–
                                     282 (1961) (discussing sec. 131(c) of 1939 Code), rev’d on another issue, 314
                                     F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1963); H.H. Robertson Co. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1333,
                                     1340 (1947) (rejecting contention that amounts received from U.K. taxing
                                     authorities ‘‘were not ‘refunded’ within the meaning of that word as used
                                     in’’ sec. 131(c) of the 1939 Code), aff ’d, 176 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1949); Pac.
                                     Metals Corp. v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 1028, 1030 (1943) (determining for-
                                     eign tax credit adjustment when IRS issued notice of deficiency after tax-
                                     payer ‘‘failed to comply with the mandate of section 131(c) by failing to no-
                                     tify the Commissioner in 1939 that it had received a refund of part of the
                                     1936 foreign tax’’).
                                        6 Even in the case of mathematical errors, Congress has determined to

                                     afford taxpayers a prepayment forum by providing that ‘‘the deficiency pro-
                                     cedures prescribed by this subchapter’’ shall apply if the IRS reassesses
                                     the tax after the taxpayer timely requests that the assessment be abated.
                                     See sec. 6213(b)(2)(A). The ability to cure before assessment of some as-
                                     sessable penalties is additional evidence of a system intended to provide
                                     taxpayers meaningful opportunities to remedy the problem before assess-
                                     ment. See, e.g., sec. 6702 (frivolous return penalty does not apply if tax-
                                     payer withdraws frivolous submission within 30 days of receiving notice
                                     from the IRS).




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                                     (269)                    SOTIROPOULOS v. COMMISSIONER                                        279


                                     very least, we have jurisdiction to determine our jurisdiction.
                                     We thus have jurisdiction to decide whether the statutory
                                     provision alleged to divest us of jurisdiction applies, i.e.,
                                     whether the U.K. taxes paid by petitioner have been
                                     ‘‘refunded in whole or in part’’ within the meaning of section
                                     905(c)(1)(C). This will afford petitioner a prepayment forum
                                     for resolving the central issue that she raises on the merits,
                                     namely, that the amounts she received from U.K. taxing
                                     authorities during 2003–05 were not ‘‘refunds.’’
                                        To reflect the foregoing,
                                                                      An order will be issued denying respond-
                                                                   ent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdic-
                                                                   tion.

                                                                               f




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