UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

KARL G. BYRD, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                                  No. 99-2653
THE BALTIMORE SUN COMPANY;
BALTIMORE GRAPHIC COMMUNICATIONS
UNION #31,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge.
(CA-99-508-JFM)

Submitted: September 21, 2000

Decided: September 29, 2000

Before WILKINS, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Ralph T. Byrd, Laytonsville, Maryland, for Appellant. Howard K.
Kurman, OFFIT, KURMAN & ALMS, P.A., Owings Mills, Mary-
land; Charles Lamasa, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Karl G. Byrd, Sr., appeals the district court's order dismissing his
civil rights action alleging employment discrimination and retaliation
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1994). On appeal, Byrd suggests that the district court erred in find-
ing that Byrd failed to allege a continuing violation of his civil rights
through the Defendants' actions. Byrd also contends that the district
court should not have struck his second amended complaint and
should have allowed him to file a third amended complaint. Finding
no reversible error, we affirm the district court's order.

This court reviews the district court's order granting judgment in
the Defendants' favor in employment discrimination cases de novo.
See Henson v. Liggett Group, Inc., 61 F.3d 270, 274 (4th Cir. 1995).
Here, the district court correctly found that Byrd had failed to advance
more than "conclusory allegations of discrimination and harassment
[which] do not state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Simp-
son v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 35 (4th Cir. 1990). Byrd simply failed to
allege that any adverse job action taken against him was motivated by
racial animosity. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S.
792, 802 (1973). Neither did Byrd state a claim of a racially hostile
work environment. See Hartsell v. Duplex Products, Inc., 123 F.3d
766, 772 (4th Cir. 1997). Byrd's claim of retaliatory discharge is simi-
larly flawed in that Byrd failed to allege a causal connection between
his protected activity and any adverse employment action. See Beall
v. Abbott Lab., 130 F.3d 614, 618 (4th Cir. 1997). Finally, we note
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to allow
Byrd to amend his complaint a second and a third time. See Burns v.
AAF-McQuay, Inc., 166 F.3d 292, 294 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting district
court may deny a motion to amend where amendment would be
futile).

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Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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