
75 U.S. 276 (____)
8 Wall. 276
HUDSON CANAL CO.
v.
PENNSYLVANIA COAL CO.
Supreme Court of United States.

*278 Mr. Nash, for the plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Evarts and Southmayd, contra.
*284 Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Covenant broken is the foundation of the claim of the plaintiffs, as set forth in the declaration. Reduced to a concise statement, the alleged cause of action is that the defendants covenanted and agreed with the plaintiffs, in the articles of agreement mentioned in the declaration, that all the coal mined by them on their coal lands and transported over their railroad to the place where the railroad connects with the canal of the plaintiffs, should be transported from that place to tide waters upon the plaintiffs' canal, and that they would pay to the plaintiffs the toll prescribed in the agreements for the use of their canal in such transportation; and the alleged breach is that the defendants have not kept those covenants and agreements.
Service of the writ having been made, the defendants appeared and pleaded twelve special pleas in addition to the plea of non est factum. Issues were tendered by the defendants in the first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth pleas, which were duly joined, and the plaintiffs having demurred to the second, seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth pleas, the defendants joined in the several demurrers.
Particular description of the objections taken by the plaintiffs to the several special pleas demurred to is unnecessary, as the defendants concede that they are bad if the declaration sets forth a good cause of action, but they insist that the declaration is also bad and insufficient, and that they, the defendants, are entitled to judgment because the first fault in pleading was committed by the plaintiffs in the *285 declaration. Judgment in the Circuit Court was for the defendants, and the plaintiffs sued out a writ of error and removed the cause into this court.
Articles of agreement were concluded on the 31st day of August, 1847, between the plaintiffs and a certain unincorporated association, called the Wyoming Coal Association, and on the 29th of July, 1851, the parties to this suit entered into certain other articles of agreement, in which it is recited, among other things, that the corporation defendants, prior to that date, had, at the request of the coal association, made and constructed the railroad described in the first-mentioned agreement, and that all the business and interests of the coal association had been assigned and transferred, and become fully vested in the said defendants, and the parties therein covenanted and agreed with each other that the former agreement between the coal association and the plaintiffs shall stand, and be deemed and taken to be "the contract of the parties to these presents in the same manner" as if the defendant corporation had originally been the party of the second part to the same, instead of the coal association.
Both of these agreements are incorporated into the declaration, and in determining the rights of the parties in this case, they may both be regarded as they would be if both had been executed by the defendants as well as by the plaintiffs, as all the obligations contracted by the coal association have been assumed by the defendant corporation. All covenants upon the merits of the controversy contained in the first agreement, as well as those contained in the last, must be considered as covenants between the parties to this suit; and viewed in that light the plaintiffs covenanted and agreed with the defendants in the first agreement to furnish, at all times thereafter, to the boats of the defendants navigating the canal of the plaintiffs, all the facilities afforded by the canal company to boats used by other parties or by the plaintiffs themselves, charging and collecting only a certain toll per ton gross weight, to be adjusted each year and regulated in a prescribed manner by the market value of coal, but subject, nevertheless, to the proviso that the plaintiffs *286 should not be bound to allow the quantity of coal to be transported in pursuance of the articles of agreement to exceed in any one season four hundred thousand tons, unless they should enlarge their canal; nor in that event, to exceed one-half of the whole capacity of the canal for transportation, exclusive of the tonnage employed in the transportation of other articles than coal. Other covenants on the part of the plaintiffs are contained in the original agreement, but none of them are of a character to afford any aid in the solution of the questions involved in the pleadings.
Following the covenants of the plaintiffs are certain unimportant covenants made by the defendants, but in conclusion the defendants also promise and agree, "in consideration of the mutual undertakings herein contained," that they will use all their influence to cause the speedy construction of a railroad from the coal lands which they own to the canal of the plaintiffs, to connect with the same at the point or place therein described; and they also agree that if the construction of such railroad shall not be commenced within one year and be completed within three years, the plaintiffs may declare the agreement null and void.
Based upon these two agreements the declaration alleges that the defendants constructed the railroad therein described and put the same in operation as therein required; that the canal of the plaintiffs at that date did not permit the transit of boats of a tonnage exceeding fifty tons; that relying upon the covenants and undertakings of the defendants they immediately entered upon the work of enlarging their canal, and that they continued to prosecute the work with diligence and at great expense until the same was completed; that the canal as so enlarged permits the transit of boats of the tonnage of one hundred and twenty-five tons, making the capacity of the canal for transportation, in each season of navigation, as enlarged, eighteen hundred thousand tons; that the defendants, claiming the benefits and privileges of the covenants and agreements, did, after the completion of their railroad, construct and procure a large number of boats to be used upon the said canal in the transportation of coal *287 brought over their railroad, and did thereafter for the period therein mentioned transport all the coal which they brought over their railroad upon the canal of the plaintiffs to its eastern terminus at tide-water, as contemplated by the agreements; that they, the plaintiffs, have at all times been ready and willing to furnish to the boats owned and used by the defendants for the purpose of such transportation, all the facilities of navigation the canal ever afforded to their own boats, or to the boats owned or used by any other person or company.
Such facilities were sufficient, as the plaintiffs allege, for the transportation of all the coal mined by the defendants and transported by them over their said railroad during the period laid in the declaration, but the plaintiffs allege that the defendants, not regarding their covenants and undertakings to transport all their coal, to the extent aforesaid, over the canal of the plaintiffs, and to pay to them the prescribed rate of toll for such transportation, did not nor would they perform that covenant and agreement, but induced another railroad company to construct a branch road and connect the same with their railroad at the place where the latter road connects with the canal of the plaintiffs, and that they thereafter, during the period alleged in the declaration, diverted a large quantity of their coal transported over their railroad from the plaintiffs' canal, and transported the same from the place of such connection to tide-waters over the railroad of such other company, to the damage of the plaintiffs, as they say, in the sum of nine hundred thousand dollars.
Defects of form in the declaration or in the several pleas filed by the defendants are waived, as it is well settled that defects of substance only are open to a party who has pleaded to the merits or to one who has replied to an antecedent pleading.[*]
Particular examination of the several special pleas to which demurrers were filed need not be made, as it is conceded that they were framed upon the theory that the declaration *288 is insufficient. Judgment, therefore, must be for the plaintiffs if it be held that the declaration alleges a good cause of action, but if not, then the judgment of the Circuit Court must be affirmed, because if that conclusion be adopted the first fault in pleading was committed by the plaintiffs.[*]
Obviously the decision of the question must depend upon the construction to be given to the first agreement therein set forth, as it is quite clear that the declaration is well drawn if that agreement, when properly construed, will support the allegations that the defendants covenanted and agreed that all the coal mined on their coal land, and transported over their railroad to the place where the railroad connects with the canal of the plaintiffs, should be sent forward from that place to tide-waters upon their canal, and that the defendants also covenanted and agreed that they would pay to the plaintiffs the rate of toll therein prescribed for the use of the canal in such transportation.
Provision is made by the agreement, it is admitted, that the rates of toll to be charged by the plaintiffs shall be permanently reduced, and the plaintiffs contend that the defendants, in consideration of that stipulation, assumed a correlative obligation to send all their coal brought over their railroad to market upon the plaintiffs' canal. Express covenant to that effect, it is conceded, is not to be found in the articles of agreement, but the plaintiffs contend that the obligation in that respect is so plainly contemplated by the agreement that the law will enforce it as an implied covenant as fully as if it were expressed in appropriate words.[]
Undoubtedly necessary implication is as much a part of an instrument as if that which is so implied was plainly expressed, but omissions or defects in written instruments cannot be supplied by virtue of that rule unless the implication results from the language employed in the instrument, or is indispensable to carry the intention of the parties into effect; as where the act to be done by one of the contracting *289 parties can only be done upon something of a corresponding character being done by the opposite party, the law in such a case, if the contract is so framed that it binds the party contracting to do the act, will imply a correlative obligation on the part of the other party to do what is necessary on his part to enable the party so contracting to accomplish his undertaking and fulfil his contract.[*]
Three other examples are put in the case cited which it may be well to notice as illustrating the general principle, and as showing its true boundary when properly limited and applied. They were first adduced at the bar, but were subsequently adopted and confirmed by the court in substance and effect as follows:
1. If one person covenants or engages by contract to buy an estate of another at a given price, the law will imply a corresponding obligation on the part of such other person to sell, although the contract is silent as to any such obligation, as the person contracting to purchase cannot fulfil his contract unless the other party will consent to sell.[]
2. So if one person engages to work and render services which require great outlay of money, time, and trouble, and he is only to be paid according to the work he performs, the contract necessarily implies an obligation on the part of the employer to supply the work.
3. Persons often contract to manufacture some particular article, and in such cases the law implies a corresponding obligation on the part of the other party to take it when it is completed according to the contract, because if it were not so the party rendering the services and incurring the expense in fulfilling his contract could not claim any remuneration.[]
*290 4. Instruments inartificially drafted, or where the language employed is obscure, imperfect, or ambiguous, are always open to construction, and the primary rule in all such cases, whether the contract is or is not under seal, is the intention of the parties; but the power of a court of common law extends no further than to collect such intention from the language employed as applied to the subject-matter, in view of the surrounding circumstances.[*]
5. Courts of law cannot incorporate into a sealed instrument what the parties left out of it, even though the omission was occasioned by the clearest mistake; nor can they reject what the parties inserted, unless it be repugnant to some other part of the instrument, and none of the authorities cited by the parties in this case, when properly applied, are inconsistent with the views here expressed.[]
Examined in the light of the rules here suggested, the court is of the opinion that the articles of agreement set forth in the declaration contain no such covenants as those alleged by the plaintiffs as the foundation of their claim; that the terms of the agreement do not support the allegation that the defendants ever made any such covenants, nor that they ever agreed to pay toll except for coal actually transported under the agreement. Language to express any such contract is entirely wanting in the instrument, nor is there any covenant on the part of the plaintiffs from which any such implication can legally arise.
Reference is made by the plaintiffs to the provision of the agreement extending certain facilities to the boats of the defendants and covenanting for a permanent reduction in the rates of toll upon the plaintiffs' canal, as calling for a different construction of the articles of agreement, but it is quite obvious that those concessions were made as inducements to the defendants to locate and construct the contemplated railroad from their coal lands to the plaintiffs' canal, *291 so as to form a continuous line of transportation from the coal mines, over the canal, to tide-waters. Great advantages were expected to result from the completion of that railroad, and it is quite evident that the plaintiffs were willing to accept the prospect of increased freight for transportation upon their canal as affording full compensation for the concession which they made in the articles of agreement.
Principal covenant of the defendants was that they would use all their influence to cause the speedy construction of the railroad, and the plaintiffs proffered the concessions described in the agreement to encourage the enterprise and secure its early completion.[*]
Support to these views might be drawn from the recitals in the first agreement and from the proceedings of the plaintiff corporation, but it does not seem to be necessary to pursue the subject, as the only covenant of any importance made by the defendants was the one before mentioned, that they would use all their influence to cause the speedy construction of the railroad; and the second agreement contains the recital that the covenant in that behalf had been fully performed as agreed, before the second articles of agreement were executed between the parties.
Unsupported as the declaration is by anything else contained in the record, it is clear that it must be adjudged insufficient, and as the first fault in pleading was committed by the plaintiffs, it follows that the judgment of the Circuit Court was correct.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED WITH COSTS.
NOTES
[*]  Aurora v. West, 7 Wallace, 93; Clearwater v. Meredith, 1 Wallace, 38.
[*]  Aurora v. West, 7 Wallace, 94.
[]  United States v. Babbit, 1 Black, 61.
[*]  Churchward v. The Queen, Law Reports, 1 Q.B. 195.
[]  McIntyre v. Belcher, 14 Common Bench, New Series, 664; Pordage v. Cole, 1 Williams's Saunders, 319, 1.; Whidden v. Belmore, 50 Maine, 360; Barton v. McLean, 5 Hill, 258.
[]  St. Albans v. Ellis, 16 East, 352; Randall v. Lynch, 12 East, 179; Shrewsbury v. Gould, 2 Barnewall & Alderson, 489; Gerrard v. Clifton, 7 Term, 676; Aspdin v. Austin, 5 Q.B. 671; Great Northern Railway Co. v. Harrison, 12 C.B. 576.
[*]  Tipton v. Feitner, 20 New York, 425.
[]  Bealey v. Stuart, 7 Hurlstone & Norman, 753; Whittle v. Frankland, 2 Best & Smith, 49; Pilkington v. Scott, 15 Meeson & Welsby. 657; Rigby v. Great Western Railway Co., 14 Id. 811; Seddon v. Senate, 13 East, 74.
[*]  Commonwealth v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 43 Pennsylvania State, 302.
