                            UNPUBLISHED

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                       FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT


                            No. 03-7905



RONALD TATE,

                                            Petitioner - Appellant,

          versus


RICHARD SMITH; HENRY DARGAN MCMASTER, Attorney
General for the State of South Carolina,

                                           Respondents - Appellees.


Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(ca-03-952-6-25AK)


Submitted: February 12, 2004              Decided:   February 23, 2004


Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.


Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.


Ronald Tate, Appellant Pro Se. Derrick K. McFarland, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellees.


Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:

           Ronald Tate seeks to appeal the district court’s order

accepting the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge and

granting summary judgment against his petition for writ of habeas

corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000).    We dismiss the

appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was

not timely filed.

           Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of the

district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, Fed. R.

App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends the appeal

period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period

under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).    This appeal period is “mandatory

and jurisdictional.” Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S.

257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220,

229 (1960)).

           The district court’s order was entered on the docket on

October 22, 2003.   The notice of appeal was filed on November 27,

2003.*   Because Tate failed to file a timely notice of appeal or to

obtain an extension or reopening of the appeal period, we dismiss

the appeal.    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and




     *
      For the purpose of this appeal, we assume that the date
appearing on the notice of appeal is the earliest date it could
have been properly delivered to prison officials for mailing to the
court. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266
(1988).

                                - 2 -
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.



                                                        DISMISSED




                              - 3 -
