SUPER|OR COURT
oF THE

STATE OF DELAWARE

VlleN L. MED!N!LLA LEoNARD L. WlLuAl\/\S JuSTsCE CENTER
JUDGE 500 NoRTH KrNG STREET, sumz 10400

W\LM;NGTON, DE 19801-3733

TELEPHONE (302) 255~0626

October 18, 2017

Eugene J. Maurer, Jr., Esq. Phillip M. Casale, Esq.
Eugene J. Maurer, Jr., P.A. Department of Justice
lZOl-A King Street Carvel State Building
Wilmington, DE 19801 820 North French Street

Wilrnington, DE 19801

Re: State of Delaware v. Isal`ah Lecompte
Case ID No.: 1701012883

Dear Counsel:

This is the Court’s decision on Isaiah Lecompte (“Defendant”)’S Motion to
Transfer the Case to Family Court (“Motion”), filed on May 24, 2()17.l For the
reasons stated below, Defendant’S Motion is GRANTED.

On January Zl, 2017, Defendant Was fifteen years and two months ole When
he allegedly committed the crimes of Robbery First Degree and Conspiracy Second
Degree for Which he is charged in this Conrt.3 Neither charge falls Within this

 

l Slale v_ Lec()mpte, Crim. I.D. No. 1701()12883, D.I. #5 (Del. Super. May 24, 2017) [hereinafter
Motion].

2 Defendant’s date of birth is November 29, 20()1. l\/Iotion at il 3.

3 Former charges of Possession of a Firearrn During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”),
Possession, Purchase, Ownership, or Control of a Firearm by a Prohibited Juvenile, Possession,
Purchase, Ownership, or Control of Ammunition by a Person Prohibited, and Carrying a
Concealed Deadly Weapon Were nolle prossed after the Delaware State Police analyzed the
Weapon and determined that it did not fit the definition of a firearm under ll Del. C. § 222(12).
l\/lotion at 1] n. l.

Court’s exclusive jurisdiction and both can be considered for transfer to Family
Court under 10 Del. C. § 1011. Defendant has been detained since his arrest on
January 21, 2017 at the NeW Castle County Detention Center With the Division of
Youth Rehabilitative Services (“YRS”) for the Department of Services for Children,
Youth and their Families (“DSCYF”).

F actual and Procedural Background

At the reverse amenability hearing on October 9, 2017, the Court considered
the following evidence: a jointly submitted Stipulation regarding Defendant’s
alleged conduct that gave rise to the charges, and the report and testimony of the
only Witness, Jennifer Skinner, l\/[aster Family Service Specialist on behalf of YRS.
The State called no Witnesses.

Standard of Review

The reverse amenability process is meant to identify those juveniles charged
as adults Who are amenable to the rehabilitative processes of the Family Court.4 If
the juvenile files a motion to transfer the adult charges, this Court must hold a reverse
amenability hearing and Weigh the four factors set forth in 10 Del. C. § 101 1(b).5

Under § 1011(b), the Court may consider evidence of: (1) “[t]he nature of the
present offense and the extent and nature of the defendant’s prior record, if any;” (2)
“[t]he nature of past treatment and rehabilitative efforts and the nature of the
defendant’s response thereto, if any;” (3) “[W]hether the interests of society and the
defendant Would be best served by trial in the Family Court or in the Superior Court;”
and (4) any “other factors Which, in the judgment of the Court are deemed relevant.”(’

The Court need not make a preliminary determination of Whether the State
has made out a prima facie case against the Defendant because the defense conceded,
for these purposes, that there is a fair likelihood of Defendant’s conviction if he
proceeded to trial. The Court turns to an analysis of the four statutory factors

 

4 See generally 10 Del. C. §§ 1010-11 (2013 & Supp. 2016). See Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241,
249 (Del. 1994) (quoting Marine v. State, 624 A.2d 1181, 1184 (Del. 1993); Marl`ne v. State, 607
A.2d 1185, 1209 (Del. 1992)).

5 See, e.g., State v. Harper, 2014 WL 1303012, at *5-7 (Del. Super. Mar. 31, 2014).

6101)€1€_§1011(1>).

outlined in § 101 1(b).
Discussion

I. Nature of Present Offense and the Extent and Nature of Defendant’s
Prior Record

The first § 1011(b) factor is two-pronged. As to the nature of the present
offense, the charges are both serious and violent and weigh in favor of remaining in
this Court. The second prong of this factor looks to Defendant’s prior record. The
State argues that Defendant is tainted with a lengthy and violent juvenile record,
with four adjudications that include two prior felonies ln fact, it was while he was
on a Level lV Home Pass that Defendant allegedly committed these offenses

Defendant was twelve years and eleven months old when he first entered the
juvenile justice system. Therefore, his record spans two to three years within a
relatively volatile and short timeframe while an adolescent l\/Is. Skinner testified
that his prior criminal behavior and his inability to first adapt to his placement
settings were attributable to Defendant’s immaturity, and that while at Level lV and
in detention, his responses have also demonstrated signs of growth Defendant’s
behavior aligns with what the Supreme Court of the United States has identified, in
other contexts, as the “mitigating qualities of youth.”7 Our Country’S highest Court
has increasingly recognized the juvenile’s proclivity to act impulsively and
irresponsibly due to innumerable intrinsic and extrinsic factors.8

 

7 Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2467 (2012) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367
(1993)).

8 R()per v. Sz'rnmons and its progeny reflect the greater attention that has been placed on the
peculiarities inherent in juvenile conduct See Roper v. Sin/nn()ns, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). See also
Mr)nlgo)nery v. Louz'.s'l`ana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016); Miller, 132 S.Ct. 2455; Graham v. Fl()rz'da, 560
U.S. 48 (2010). This Eight Amendment jurisprudence recognizes that juveniles possess a “lack of
maturity and . . . underdeveloped sense of responsibility” that leads to reckless, impulsive, and
heedless risk-taking Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (quoting Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367). They “are more
vulnerable . . . to negative influences and outside pressures,” including from their family and peers.
Id. (citing Ecldz`ngs v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)). Juveniles have limited “control . . .
over their own environment” and lack the ability to extricate themselves from horrific, crime~
producing settings. Ia’. (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilly by Reason of
Adolescenee.' Develc)pmenlal Imn'zalurily, Dirnz`nished Responsl'bz'lily, and lhe Juvenile Death
Penally, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOG!ST 1009, 1014 (2003)). And because a child’s character is not as
“well formed” as an adult’s, his traits are “less fixed” and his actions are less likely to be “evidence
of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” Id. at 570 (citing ERIK H. ERu<soN, IDENTITY: YouTH AND CRlsls
(1968)).

l\/Is. Skinner, who nevertheless considered his criminal record in detail, opined
that Defendant is amenable to the rehabilitative processes of the Family Court.9 This
Court finds that as to the first factor, it splits in favor of both sides in that the first
prong weighs in favor of keeping the charges in this Court and the second weighs in
favor of transfer.

II. Nature of Past Treatment and Defendant’s Response

Defendant’s family has been investigated by the Division of Family Services
(“DFS”) on three occasions, but only once involving Defendant. ln that case, DFS
concluded that Defendant’s mother was not in need of any services and DFS closed
the case as “unfounded for abuse.”10 As such, there is no history of past treatment
until Defendant entered the juvenile justice system. Specifically, Defendant was
unsuccessfully discharged from Wraparound Delaware following his first offense
when he was just under thirteen.ll Defendant subsequently responded positively to
IOP services and additional support through VisionQuest, wherein he successfully
completed Accountability and Community Service through them.12 Although he
was discharged unsuccessfully from other programs, including some at VisionQuest,
it appeared he was making fair progress. His mother reported improved behavior
both at school and home during various times of services, although Defendant
exhibited negative behavior including school fights, suspensions and continued
conflict in his home. Notably, both parents, l\/ls. Lewis and l\/Ir. Palmer were present
at the hearing.

The record reflects that between thirteen and fifteen years of age, although
Defendant demonstrated poor judgment that often lead to criminal behavior, he has
responded favorably to structured settings and behavioral programing. When placed
at Standing Timbers (located 2 hours and 45 minutes from his home) at age fourteen
years and nine months, although initially slow to adapt, the record shows that his
behavior steadily improved After his arrest over ten months ago, once placed at the

 

9 Report of Jennifer Skinner, Master Family Service Specialist, YRS at 11 (submitted August 4,
2017).

m ]a’. at 1-2 (describing DFS involvement).
ll la'. at 9.

12 ]cl. at 9-10.

New Castle County Detention Center, he has also done well behaviorally and
educationally, achieving the highest behavioral ranking in the center. Thus, Ms.
Skinner maintained that Defendant is amenable to the Family Court.

No witnesses challenged Ms. Skinner’s report or opinion. The Court finds that
this factor weighs in favor of transfer.

III. Interests of Society and Defendant

l\/Is. Skinner’s report also states that the interests of society are best served by
transferring the charges to Family Court, in part, because of Defendant’s increasing
maturity and positive response to services She identified several targeted
rehabilitative programs available to Defendant through the Ferris School as well as
a list of community-based services. Her testimony also detailed the services
available to Defendant through the Family Court and the efforts that could be made
to provide him with the resources through age nineteen.13

The State argues that Defendant would likely recidivate and would not be
deterred from re-offending in light of his criminal history, and that the interest of
society is best served by keeping the case in this Court. This Court disagrees

Even if adjudicated in the Family Court, Defendant is not spared prison time
for his actions. He will face minimum mandatory imprisonment, but with the benefit
of rehabilitative services to age nineteen through YRS.14 Placing Defendant in adult
prison without the benefit of targeted age-appropriate rehabilitative services runs
against the interests of society. Therefore, this Court finds that this factor also
weighs in favor of transfer.

Conclusion
Defendant’s young age and prior, albeit limited, positive responses to

treatment suggest that transfer to the Family Court is appropriate Though the nature
of the charges is serious, all other § 1011(b) factors weigh in favor of allowing the

 

13 lar

14 Additionally, the Family Court may extend jurisdiction over Defendant until age twenty-one
see 10 Dez. C. §§ 928-29 (2013 & supp. 2016).

Family Court to address Defendant’s charges15 For the reasons stated above,
Defendant’s l\/Iotion is GRANTED.

IT IS S() ()RDERED.

viGan L. Mediniiia
Judge

oc: Prothonotary
cc: lnvestigative Service Office
lennifer Skinner, NCCDC

 

'5 For purposes of this analysis, the Court finds it unnecessary to analyze the miscellaneous fourth
factor under of § 1011(b).

