UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

TIMOTHY A. PLEDGER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.                                                                    No. 95-2295

CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.
Tommy E. Miller, Magistrate Judge.
(CA-94-1012-2)

Submitted: October 29, 1996

Decided: November 21, 1996

Before WIDENER, HALL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Timothy A. Pledger, Appellant Pro Se. Kenneth Michael Golski,
CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appel-
lee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Timothy Pledger appeals the district court's grant of judgment as
a matter of law to the City of Virginia Beach (the City) in Pledger's
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
(1994). The district court found Pledger's action barred by the appli-
cable statutes of limitation. Finding no error, we affirm.

Pledger alleged that the City exposed him to a racially hostile envi-
ronment, disparate treatment, and retaliation. He conceded that the
last overt act of alleged discrimination occurred in May 1992. Yet, he
failed to file his § 1983 claim until October 20, 1994--more than two
years after the last overt act of discrimination.See VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-243(A) (Michie 1992); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180
(1976). Further, he failed to file a claim with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission until July 7, 1993--more than 180 days
after the last overt act of alleged discrimination. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e). Thus, Pledger's claims are time-barred unless he estab-
lished a continuing violation. See Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 590
n.4 (4th Cir. 1992).

Pledger claimed the City's continual failure to promote him until
the time of trial constituted a continuing violation. However, he con-
ceded that the last overt act of discrimination occurred in May 1992,
and failed to cite any specific instance of discrimination within the
statute of limitations period. Id. The continuing violation theory
applies only when an actual violation occurred within the limitations
period. Woodard v. Lehman, 717 F.2d 909, 915 (4th Cir. 1983). A
"mere allegation of continuing discrimination without any identifica-
tion of a discriminatory event within the statute of limitations period
is insufficient to prove a continuing violation." Nealon, 958 F.2d at
592 (citing Woodard, 717 F.2d at 914-16). Thus, Pledger's claims are
time-barred.

Accordingly, we affirm the court's decision. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pres-
ented in the material before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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