
USCA1 Opinion

	




                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT                                 ____________________        No. 96-1853                                   JAMES MACFARLANE,                                Plaintiff, Appellant,                                          v.                        EDGAR D. MCKEAN, III, ESQUIRE, ET AL.,                                Defendants, Appellees.                                 ____________________                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE                   [Hon. Shane Devine, Senior U.S. District Judge]                                       __________________________                                 ____________________                                        Before                               Selya, Boudin and Stahl,                                   Circuit Judges.                                   ______________                                 ____________________            James MacFarlane on brief pro se.            ________________            Jeffrey  H.  Karlin,  Jennifer  L.  Murphy,  and  Wadleigh, Starr,            ___________________   ____________________        ________________        Peters, Dunn & Chiesa on brief for appellee.        _____________________                                 ____________________                                   August 19, 1997                                 ____________________                      Per  Curiam.   James  MacFarlane appeals  from  the                      ___________            district court's grant  of the motion by  appellees, Edgar D.            McKean, III, Esq.,  Julia M.  Nye, Esq. and  the law firm  of            McKean, Mattson and Latici, P.A., for judgment as a matter of            law under Fed.  R. Civ. P. 50(a).  We agree with the district            court  that appellant failed to introduce evidence from which            a   reasonable  jury  could  find  causation  in  this  legal            malpractice case.  We also find no abuse of discretion in the            district  court's exclusion  of  one  of  appellant's  expert            witnesses.  Finally, we decline appellant's request to vacate            a sanction imposed jointly  on him and his attorney  pursuant            to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.                 1. Rule 50(a) Dismissal                     ____________________                 We  have   carefully  reviewed  the   evidence  and  the            inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom in the light most            favorable to MacFarlane.  See Gibson v. City  of Cranston, 37                                      ___ ______    _________________            F.3d 731,  735 (1st  Cir. 1994).   As the  governing standard            requires,  we   have  not   considered  the   credibility  of            witnesses, resolved conflicts in testimony,  or evaluated the            weight of evidence.  See id.  Applying plenary  review to the                                 ___ ___            district court's judgment,  we conclude that the  evidence of            causation  "is such that reasonable minds could not differ as            to  the outcome." Rolon-Alvorado v. Municipality of San Juan,                              ______________    ________________________            1 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 1993).                 No reasonable  jury could have  found that, but  for the            breaches   of  duty   identified   by  MacFarlane's   expert,            MacFarlane  should have obtained  a more favorable  result in            his divorce trial.  Specifically, in the  absence of evidence                                         -3-            regarding  the contents  of the  mortgage application,  Beryl            Rich's financial circumstances  or her own representation  of            those circumstances,  the jury  would have  been required  to            speculate as to the probable  result if the alleged errors at            the trial and appellate level had not occurred.  "Speculation            about  what  might have  occurred  fails  to  create  a  jury            question  as to the  alleged damage sustained  by plaintiff."            Tanner  v. Caplin  & Drysdale,  24  F.3d 874,  878 (6th  Cir.            ______     __________________            1994).                 B. Exclusion of Expert Witness                    ___________________________                 "[T]he   court  has   broad   discretionary  powers   in            determining whether or  not the proposed expert  is qualified            by  'knowledge, skill,  experience,  training or  education.'            Fed.  R. Evil.  702."  Bogosian  v.  Mercedes-Benz  of  North                                   ________      ________________________            America,  Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 476 (1st Cir. 1997).  The trial            ______________            court  did not  abuse that  discretion  in excluding  Roberta            Harding, Esq., as an expert witness.                 C. Award of Attorneys' Fees                    ________________________                 In accordance with this court's order of March 18, 1997,            that part  of MacFarlane's  appeal that  seeks to  vacate the            sanction award is dismissed.                              _________                 The   judgment  of     the   district  court,   granting            defendants' motion  for  judgment  as  a matter  of  law,  is            affirmed.            ________                                         -4-
