

Parker v MTA Bus Co. (2016 NY Slip Op 04188)





Parker v MTA Bus Co.


2016 NY Slip Op 04188


Decided on June 1, 2016


Appellate Division, Second Department


Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.


This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.



Decided on June 1, 2016
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P.
JOSEPH J. MALTESE
COLLEEN D. DUFFY
VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.


2015-05254
 (Index No. 5262/13)

[*1]Allison Parker, appellant, 
vMTA Bus Company, et al., respondents.


Sim & Record, LLP, Bayside, NY (Sang J. Sim of counsel), for appellant.
Morris Duffy Alonso & Faley, New York, NY (Arjay G. Yao, Andrea M. Alonso, and Manuel R. Reynoso of counsel), for respondents.

DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lane, J.), dated March 20, 2015, which granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
The defendants failed to meet their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 955-956). The papers submitted by the defendants failed to adequately address the plaintiff's claim, set forth in the bill of particulars, that she sustained a medically determined injury or impairment of a nonpermanent nature which prevented her from performing substantially all of the material acts which constituted her usual and customary daily activities for not less than 90 days during the 180 days immediately following the accident (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969; Rouach v Betts, 71 AD3d 977).
In light of the defendants' failure to meet their prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853; Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
MASTRO, J.P., MALTESE, DUFFY and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Aprilanne Agostino
Clerk of the Court


