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          NATION-BAILEY v. BAILEY—CONCURRENCE

   PALMER, J., concurring. I agree with the majority
that the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the
trial court improperly had construed § 3 (B) of the par-
ties’ separation agreement as vesting discretion in the
trial court to modify rather than to terminate the ali-
mony payments of the defendant, Adrian Peter Bailey,
following that court’s finding that the plaintiff, Rebecca
Nation-Bailey, had cohabited within the meaning of
General Statutes § 46b-86 (b). In contrast to the major-
ity, however, I am not persuaded that the separation
agreement is ‘‘plain and unambiguous’’ on that point
because, in my view, a plausible argument can be made
that the agreement does give the trial court such discre-
tion. See Nation-Bailey v. Bailey, 144 Conn. App. 319,
330–37, 74 A.3d 433 (2013) (Borden, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing reasons why parties’ separation agreement
should be read to incorporate ‘‘the full panoply of reme-
dies provided by § 46b-86 [b], including the power to
modify . . . and suspend . . . the payment of peri-
odic alimony’’ [internal quotation marks omitted]). Nev-
ertheless, I do believe that the better reading of the
parties’ agreement is that it limits the trial court’s
authority to terminating alimony upon a finding of
cohabitation. I therefore concur in the result.
