                                       In The

                                 Court of Appeals

                     Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

                                __________________

                                NO. 09-19-00266-CV
                                __________________


                           IN THE INTEREST OF A.N.

__________________________________________________________________

               On Appeal from the 253rd District Court
                       Liberty County, Texas
                     Trial Cause No. CV1812859
__________________________________________________________________

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

       B.N. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her son, A.N. 1, 2

The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds exist

for termination of B.N.’s parental rights, and termination of her rights would be in

A.N.’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Appellant’s


   1
      We identify minors in appeals in parental-rights termination cases by using an
alias to protect the minor’s identity and all members of the child’s family. See Tex.
R. App. P. 9.8(a), (b).
    2
      R.N., A.N.’s father, did not appear at trial and does not appeal the termination
of his parental rights.
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court-appointed counsel submitted a brief in which counsel contends there are no

meritorious grounds to be advanced on appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S.

738, 744 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005,

no pet.). The brief provides counsel’s professional evaluation of the record. Counsel

certified Appellant was served with a copy of the Anders brief filed on her behalf.

This Court notified Appellant of her right to file a pro se response, as well as the

deadline for filing the response. B.N. filed a pro se letter in response to counsel’s

Anders brief but failed to raise any issues challenging the trial court’s termination.

We have independently reviewed the appellate record, counsel’s brief, and B.N.’s

pro se response, and we agree any appeal would be frivolous. We find no arguable

error requiring us to appoint new counsel to re-brief this appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State,

813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

      Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating B.N.’s parental

rights. We deny the motion to withdraw filed by B.N.’s court-appointed appellate

counsel, because an attorney’s duty extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all

appeals. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(B); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27

(Tex. 2016). In the event B.N. decides to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court of

Texas, counsel’s obligations to B.N. can be met “by filing a petition for review that

satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28.

                                           2
      AFFIRMED.



                                                 _________________________
                                                      CHARLES KREGER
                                                           Justice

Submitted on October 22, 2019
Opinion Delivered November 7, 2019

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.




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