                        T.C. Memo. 1995-472



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                 MICHAEL K. JONES, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 9295-94.          Filed October 3, 1995.



     Patrick J. O'Brien, for petitioner.

     Aretha Jones, for respondent.



                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

     DAWSON, Judge:   This case was assigned to Special Trial

Judge Carleton D. Powell pursuant to the provisions of section

7443A(b)(4) and Rules 180, 181, and 183.1     The Court agrees with

     1
         Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue. Rule
                                                   (continued...)
and adopts the opinion of the Special Trial Judge that is set

forth below.

                OPINION OF THE SPECIAL TRIAL JUDGE

     POWELL, Special Trial Judge:   Respondent determined a

deficiency in petitioner's 1990 Federal income tax in the amount

of $8,677 and additions to tax pursuant to sections 6651(a) and

6654(a) in the amounts of $1,786 and $458.78, respectively.

Petitioner resided in Ridgefield, Connecticut, at the time the

petition was filed.

     The issues are (1) whether petitioner had unreported income

from The Brownson Institute, (2) whether petitioner had itemized

deductions exceeding the standard deduction amount, and (3)

whether the additions to tax are applicable.

     The facts may be summarized as follows.   Prior to 1989

petitioner had been a seminary student in Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania.   In 1989 petitioner left the seminary and moved to

Washington, D.C., to seek employment as a professional writer.

By the end of 1989, petitioner had accepted a job as a speech

writer with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE).     This

appointment was subject to obtaining a security clearance;

however, petitioner began working as an employee in either late

1989 or very early in 1990, and the security clearance was

obtained in February or March of 1990.   During this time



     1
      (...continued)
references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
                                 - 3 -

petitioner continued to interview with other prospective

employers.

     Dinesh D'Souza (D'Souza) is an officer with The Brownson

Institute (the Institute) and a long-time friend of petitioner.

At times during their friendship, D'Souza lent funds to

petitioner that he had repaid.    D'Souza also served as a

guarantor on a loan petitioner received from a financial

institution.   At the time of the trial petitioner was repaying

that loan.

     The Institute publishes "Crisis", a magazine dealing with

religious issues; however, the Institute does not engage in any

other type of publishing activity.       Petitioner had previously

submitted, and been paid for, articles published in "Crisis".

D'Souza also was aware of petitioner's aspiration to write a

book, tentatively titled The Questioning Catholic, while pursuing

his seminary studies.

     In 1990 D'Souza agreed to help petitioner finance the

continuation of his theology studies.       Rather than directly

lending money to petitioner, D'Souza had the Institute transfer

$10,000 to petitioner from its account.       There were no notes or

other documents executed to show that a bona fide debt was

created between petitioner and the Institute, no security was

given, and no interest was required from petitioner.       D'Souza did

not discuss the transfer with other officers of the Institute.

Apparently D'Souza expected repayment to come from royalties that
                               - 4 -

might be generated by The Questioning Catholic.    Petitioner

returned to the seminary in September of 1990, and completed his

studies.   As of the date of trial petitioner has not written the

book, nor has he repaid the loan.

     Respondent received a Form W-2 from DOE showing wage income

of $30,907 and a Form 1099-MISC from the Institute reflecting the

payment of $10,000 to petitioner.    Respondent also received a

Form 1099-INT from Perpetual Savings Bank indicating an interest

payment in the amount of $64 and a Form 1099-G from the

Commonwealth of Virginia indicating payment of a State tax refund

in the amount of $279.   Petitioner does not recall receiving the

Form 1099-MISC from the Institute.

     While petitioner filed returns in the past, he does not

recall whether he prepared or filed a return for 1990.

Respondent did not receive a return for petitioner's 1990 taxable

year, and prepared a substitute return for him.    Respondent

determined that the wages, interest, and State tax refund were

includable in gross income.   Respondent also determined that the

$10,000 payment received from the Institute was includable in

gross income.   In determining petitioner's tax liability,

respondent allowed one personal exemption and the standard

deduction of a single filer in the amount of $3,250.    Respondent

also determined that petitioner was liable for the tax on self-

employment income on the $10,000 payment received from the

Institute.
                                - 5 -

     Petitioner has the burden of proof on each of the issues in

dispute.   Rule 142(a).   Petitioner's records have been lost;

this, however, does not relieve him of his burden.      Cady v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-260.      Petitioner concedes that he

received the wages from DOE.    Petitioner did not offer any

evidence with regard to the interest income or the State tax

refund, and we sustain respondent on these issues.     Furthermore,

while petitioner testified that he incurred some job search

expenses and that he made some charitable contributions, he did

not show that the deductions for these expenses exceeded the

standard deduction amount.2

     Regarding the funds received from the Institute, it is well

established that funds received as a loan do not constitute

taxable income to the recipient.     Woodsam Associates, Inc. v.

Commissioner, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952), affg. 16 T.C. 649

(1951).    For tax purposes, a bona fide debt is one arising from a

"debtor-creditor relationship based upon a valid and enforceable

obligation to pay a fixed or determinable sum of money."     Sec.

1.166-1(c), Income Tax Regs.    Further, under section 102(a),

gross income does not include amounts received "'out of

     2
         Petitioner testified that he made charitable
contributions of approximately $30 each week, or $1,560 for the
year. He also testified that he had job search expenses of
approximately $100 each month for the first 2 or 3 months of
1990. Petitioner also contends that his monthly living expenses
of $850 were deductible as job search expenses; however, he was
employed from at least very early in 1990, and these expenses
were nondeductible living expenses. Sec. 262.
                                - 6 -

affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses'", or

from a "'detached and disinterested generosity'," as a gift.

Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting

Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952) and

Commissioner v. Lo Bue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956)); Osborne v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-71.

     We agree with respondent that no bona fide debt existed

between petitioner and the Institute.   There was no agreement of

any type between them regarding repayment of the funds,

petitioner offered no security, and no interest was required or

paid.   However, this does not dispose of the issue.   As the

testimony made clear, the Institute served merely as a conduit to

effectuate a transfer of funds from D'Souza to petitioner.      The

Institute provided the funds solely upon D'Souza's request; it

did not receive any services by petitioner, and it did not

acquire any publishing or royalty rights held by petitioner.     It

is also clear that D'Souza intended the transfer to be either a

gift or a loan to petitioner.   Under either scenario, however,

the $10,000 is not taxable income to petitioner, and we need not

explore the issue further.   It also follows that petitioner would

not be liable for any tax on self-employment income.

     Respondent determined that petitioner was liable for an

addition to tax under section 6651(a) for failure to file a

return.   Section 6651(a) provides for an addition to tax in the

case of a failure to file a return unless it is established that
                                 - 7 -

the failure was "due to reasonable cause and not due to willful

neglect".   Petitioner has not established that he filed a return

or that the failure to file was due to reasonable cause.

Respondent's records indicate that petitioner did not file a

return for the year at issue.    Petitioner acknowledges that some

additional tax in excess of withholding would have been due, and

he has not shown that any additional amount was paid.    Indeed,

petitioner cannot recall preparing or mailing the return.

Petitioner had timely filed his Federal income tax returns for

other years and knew that he was required to file a return.     It

may be that petitioner was at the seminary during this time, and

his mail service may not have been reliable.    Petitioner may not

have actually received his Forms W-2 and 1099; however, the lack

of records does not relieve a taxpayer from the obligation to

file a return.     Electric & Neon, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.

1324, 1343 (1971), affd. without published opinion 496 F.2d 876

(5th Cir. 1974).    We sustain respondent's determination on this

issue.

     Respondent also determined that petitioner was liable for an

addition to tax pursuant to section 6654(a) for failure to pay

estimated tax.   Under section 6654(d)(1)(B), individuals are

generally required to pay in four equal installments during the

year a "required annual payment" that equals the lesser of (i) 90

percent of the tax shown or required to be shown on the return,

or (ii) 100 percent of the tax shown on the individual's return
                                - 8 -

for the previous year.   Where an individual is subject to wage

withholding, the total amount of tax withheld during the year is

deemed to have been paid in equal amounts on the due date of each

installment.   Sec. 6654(g).   Petitioner reported and paid tax in

the amount of $671 for 1989, and DOE withheld Federal income tax

in the amount of $1,534 during the 1990 year.      Thus, petitioner

made the "required annual payment" in the installments mandated

by section 6654; accordingly, there is no underpayment of

estimated taxes for the year at issue.

     Based on the foregoing,

                                        Decision will be entered

                                under Rule 155.
