                                                                           ACCEPTED
                                                                       01-15-00612-CR
                                                            FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                    HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                                                 10/27/2015 7:01:07 PM
                                                                 CHRISTOPHER PRINE
                                                                                CLERK

                  NO. 01-15-00612-CR

          IN THE FIRST COURT OF APPEALS       FILED IN
                                        1st COURT OF APPEALS
                  HOUSTON, TEXAS            HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                               10/27/2015 7:01:07 PM
                                               CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
                                                        Clerk
               STUART ADAM LATHAM,

                                           Appellant,

                           V.

                  STATE OF TEXAS,

                                          Appellee.


APPEAL FROM THE 180TH DISTRICT COURT, HARRIS COUNTY,
         TEXAS TRIAL COURT CAUSE NO. 1356904



                APPELLANT’S BRIEF


              THE CLOUD LAW FIRM P.C.
                      Carvana Cloud
                 Texas Bar No. 24048544
               850 W. Little York Rd. Ste. B
                  Houston, Texas 77091
                 Telephone: 832-230-4210
                    Fax: 832-230-4684
             Email: carvana@cloudlawfirm.net

                  Counsel for Appellant
                       IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Appellant

      Stuart Adam Latham


Counsel for Appellant

      Carvana Cloud
      THE CLOUD LAW FIRM
      850 W. Little York, Suite B
      Houston, TX 77091

Appellee

      The State of Texas

Counsel for Appellee

      Alan Curry
      Harris County District Attorney’s Office
      1201 Franklin Ste. 600
      Houston, TX 77002-1923

Trial Counsel for Appellant

      Joseph S. Owmby
      708 Main Street, Suite 790
      Houston, Texas 77002

Trial Counsel for the State

      Ryan Trask
      Assistant District Attorney
      Harris County District’s Attorney’s Office
      1201 Franklin, Suite 400
      Houston, Texas 77002




                                        i	  
                                              TABLE OF CONTENTS

Identity of Parties and Counsel ............................................................................... i

Index of Authorities ............................................................................................. iii

Statement of the Case ............................................................................................. 1

Waiver of Oral Argument ....................................................................................... 1

Statement of Jurisdiction ........................................................................................ 1

Issues Presented ...................................................................................................... 1

  I.     THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADJUDICATED THE
         APPELLANT BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS FACTUALLY
         INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT APPELLANT’S ADJUDICATION
         BECAUSE THE STATE’S PRIMARY WITNESS LACKED
         CREDIBILITY AND HER TESTIMONY WAS UNCORROBORATED.

 II.     THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY SENTENCING
         APPELLANT TO FIVE YEARS CONFINEMENT IN THE TEXAS
         DEPARTMENT OF CORECTIONS AS SUCH SENTENCE AMOUNTS
         TO “CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT” GIVEN THE FACTS OF
         THIS CASE.

Statement of Facts .................................................................................................. 2

Summary of the Argument ..................................................................................... 4

Argument ................................................................................................................ 5

  I.     THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ADJUDICATED THE
         APPELLANT BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS FACTUALLY
         INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT APPELLANT’S ADJUDICATION
         BECAUSE THE STATE’S PRIMARY WITNESS LACKED
         CREDIBILITY    AND     HER    TESTIMONY     WAS
         UNCORROBORATED……………………………………………………..7




                                                             ii	  
 II.     THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY SENTENCING
         APPELLANT TO FIVE YEARS CONFINEMENT IN THE TEXAS
         DEPARTMENT OF CORECTIONS AS SUCH SENTENCE AMOUNTS
         TO “CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT” GIVEN THE FACTS OF
         THIS CASE .................................................................................................. 11

Conclusion and Prayer ............................................................................................ 13




                                                           ii	  
                                             INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Amado v. State, 983 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet.
ref'd). ....................................................................................................................... 7
Anderson v. State, 621 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981). ...................................... 6
Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). ........................ 6
Greathouse v. State, 33 S.W.3d 455, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000,
pet ref'd). ................................................................................................................. 6
Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). ........................... 6-7
Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). .......................... 6-7
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417 (1962). ................................ 11
Scamardo v. State, 517 S.W.2d 293, 298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). ....................... 6
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3009, 77 L.Ed2d 637 (1983).11
Swinney v. State, 828 S.W.2d 254, 259 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st. Dist.] 1992). . 11
Walkovak v. State, 576 S.W. 2d 643 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979). .................................... 6

Statutes
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (Vernon 2015). ................................................... 1

Rules
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (Vernon 2015) ............................ 5
TEX. R. APP. PROC. 39.7 ......................................................................................... 1

Constitutional Provisions
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13 .......................................................................................... 11
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII ........................................................................................ 11
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ........................................................................................ 11




                                                               iii	  
                             STATEMENT OF THE CASE

      Pursuant to Texas Penal Code § 22.01, Appellant was indicted for the

offense of Assault of a Family Member. (1 C.R. 16). Appellant entered a plea of

guilty on December 10, 2012. (1 C.R. 20-21). Appellant was placed on Deferred

Adjudication for a period of two years community supervision with a fine of five

hundred dollars. (1 C.R. 26). On December 2, 2014, the State filed a Motion to

Adjudicate Appellant’s guilt alleging that he had violated the terms of his

community supervision when he committed an offense against the laws of the State

of Texas. (1 C.R. 33-34). Appellant entered a plea of “not true.” (1 C.R. 41). On

June 26, 2015 the Court held a hearing on the Motion to Adjudicate Guilt and

Appellant was found guilty of Assault of a Family Member – Second Offender.

Appellant was sentenced to five years confinement in the Texas Department of

Corrections (“TDC”). (1 C.R. 41).

                          WAIVER OF ORAL ARGUMENT

Pursuant to Tex. R. App. Proc. 39.7, Appellant waives oral argument.

                           STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

      The judgment of the Harris County 180th District Court was entered on June

26, 2015. Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal on June 26, 2015. This Court

has requested briefs on the merits.




                                        1	  
                               ISSUES PRESENTED

 I.   THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADJUDICATING
      APPELLANT BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS FACTUALLY
      INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT APPELLANT’S ADJUDICATION
      BECAUSE THE STATE’S PRIMARY WITNESS LACKED
      CREDIBILITY AND HER TESTIMONY WAS UNCORROBORATED.

II.   THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY SENTENCING
      APPELLANT TO FIVE YEARS CONFINEMENT IN THE TEXAS
      DEPARTMENT OF CORECTIONS AS SUCH SENTENCE AMOUNTS
      TO “CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT” GIVEN THE FACTS OF
      THIS CASE.

                                STATEMENT OF FACTS

      Stuart Latham, Appellant, was indicted for Assault of a Family Member -

Second Offender on October 26, 2012. (1 C.R. 16). On December 10, 2012,

Appellant pleaded guilty to Assault of a Family Member – Second Offender as

alleged in the indictment. (1 C.R. 20-21). The Court placed Appellant on deferred

adjudication for two years, ending December 9, 2014 and assessed a fine of five

hundred dollars. (1 C.R. 26). On December 2, 2014, the State filed a Motion to

Adjudicate Appellant’s guilt alleging that Appellant violated the terms and

conditions of the Community Supervision by: (1) Committing an offense against

the State of Texas. (1 C.R. 33-34). The Motion alleged that on or about November

8, 2014, in Harris County, Texas, the Appellant did then and there unlawfully,

intentionally, and knowingly cause bodily injury to Jessica Wingerter, a person

with whom the appellant had a dating relationship. (1 C.R. 33-34).



                                        2	  
      On June 26, 2015, the Appellant pleaded “not true” to the allegations at the

hearing on the motion to adjudicate. (1 R.R. 91). At the hearing, the State’s

primary witness was the complainant, Jessica Wingerter. (1 R.R. 12). During Ms.

Wingerter’s testimony, she testified that she had been in a dating relationship with

Appellant for “four, five years” but they had broken up.        (1 R.R. 16).    Ms.

Wingerter alleged that on November 8, 2014 Appellant went to her home and put

his arm around her neck, which prevented her from breathing for a few seconds. (1

R.R. 18). The witness testified that she did not call the police until November 11,

2014, three days later, to report this incident. (1 R.R. 22).

      Ms. Wingerter testified that she was unable to recall parts of the incident

because at the time of the hearing it had been seven months since the alleged

incident. (1 R.R. 15). She testified she could not recall whether her cousin, Corina

Ventura, was present at her home when the incident occurred. (1 R.R. 15). She

testified that she could not remember if Ms. Ventura was present when she was

interviewed by the Harris County Constable’s Office. (1 R.R. 21). She could

recall, however, that Ms. Ventura was interviewed by the Harris County

Constable’s Office but she could not recall how she was interviewed. (1 R.R. 22).

      Appellant took the stand and testified on his behalf. His testimony was that

on November 8, 2014, he and Ms. Wingerter were involved in an argument but

denied ever placing his forearm or his hands around her neck or choking her. (1



                                           3	  
R.R. 72, 74). Appellant also stated that he voluntarily went to their shared home in

Tomball only after she sent him a text message inviting him over for dinner. (1

R.R. 66). Appellant introduced a series of text messages sent from Ms. Wingerter

to Appellant, Defendant’s Exhibits 1 through 12, which were sent between the

dates of November 8, 2014 to November 11, 2014, proving that Ms. Wingerter

invited him over for dinner. (1 R.R. 61). When Ms. Wingerter was questioned

about whether she sent the text messages, she stated she could not remember and

also denied making them. (1 R.R. 29-34, 44). She further speculated that the text

messages presented in the hearing were created by Appellant’s cousin who worked

in the Information Technology (IT) field, as a result of him hacking into her Gmail

account (1 R.R. 29-34, 36). There is no substantiation or corroboration of this

allegation in the record.

      The Court found that Appellant did violate the terms and conditions of the

community supervision and found him guilty of Assault of a Family Member –

Second Offender. (1 R.R. 89). The Court sentenced Appellant to five years

confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections (“TDC”). (1 R.R. 89).

      On June 26, 2015, Appellant timely filed his Notice of Appeal.

                             SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

      Appellant raises two points of error. First, Appellant contends that the trial

court erred when it adjudicated Appellant because the evidence was factually



                                         4	  
insufficient to support an adjudication of guilt because the state’s primary witness

lacked credibility. This claim is based on the fact that the State failed to meet its

burden when it presented only one witness, Ms. Wingerter, the complainant, as

proof that the Appellant violated a term of his community supervision.           Ms.

Wingerter’s testimony was factually insufficient and uncorroborated and is thus

unable to support Appellant’s adjudication of guilt and sentence of five (5) years

confinement in TDC.

      Next, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

sentencing Appellant to five (5) years confinement in TDC as such sentence

amounts to cruel and unusual punishment given the facts of this case. The record

is clear that Appellant’s term of community supervision was set to expire on

December 10, 2014 and this new assault case was filed against him by Ms.

Wingerter on November 8, 2014, one month before his probation was set to end.

Because Appellant had no prior felony convictions and had completed ALL other

conditions and term of his community supervision, a sentence of five (5) years

TDC is considered cruel and unusual punishment.

                                       ARGUMENT

I.    BURDEN OF PROOF AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL

      An appellant may appeal from a revocation of community supervision. Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(b). In community supervision revocation



                                         5	  
cases, the State has the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that

the terms and conditions of community supervision have been violated. Cardona

v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (citing Anderson v. State,

621 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.Cr.App. 1981). This standard is met when the greater weight

of the credible evidence before the trial court supports a reasonable belief that a

condition or term of community supervision has been violated. Rickels v. State,

202 S.W.3d 759, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Scamardo v. State, 517 S.W.2d 293,

298 (Tex.Cr.App. 1974).

      The Court of Appeals of Texas reviews a trial court’s order revoking

community supervision under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 763. If the

State fails to meet its burden, the Court abuses its discretion in issuing a motion to

revoke probation. Greathouse v. State, 33 S.W.3d 455, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2000, pet ref'd); Walkovak v. State, 576 S.W. 2d 643 (Tex.Cr.App.

1979). In conducting its review, the appellate court considers all the evidence in

the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding to determine whether the trial

court could have reasonably found that appellant violated the terms and conditions

of his probation by a preponderance of the evidence. Greathouse v. State, 33

S.W.3d 455, 458 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet ref'd). The trial judge

is the sole trier of the facts and determines the credibility of the witnesses and the

weight to be given to their testimony. Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Tex.



                                          6	  
Crim. App. 1980); Amado v. State, 983 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd).

II.    THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
       ADJUDICATING APPELLANT BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS
       FACTUALLY INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT APPELLANT’S
       ADJUDICATION OF GUILT BECAUSE THE STATE’S PRIMARY
       WITNESS LACKED CREDIBILITY AND HER TESTIMONY WAS
       UNCORROBORATED.

       In assessing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, the court considers all

the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding to determine

whether the trial court could have reasonably found that appellant violated the

terms and conditions of his probation by a preponderance of the evidence. See

Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The trial judge

is the sole trier of the facts and determines the credibility of the witnesses and the

weight to be given to their testimony. Taylor v. State, 604 S.W.2d 175, 179 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1980); Amado v. State, 983 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st

Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd).

       Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s decision to adjudicate

guilt, there was insufficient evidence that appellant violated the terms of his

community supervision. The State failed to meet its burden when it presented

solely one witness, the complainant, Ms. Wingerter, to testify to what occurred on

November 8, 2014. Her testimony, alone, was insufficient to support a sentence of

five (5) years because she lacked credibility and her testimony was uncorroborated.

                                          7	  
      This case depended entirely upon the credibility of the complainant versus

the credibility of the Appellant. Both Appellant and complainant told opposing

accounts about what occurred on November 8, 2014. Ms. Wingerter stated that

Appellant put his arm around her neck and Appellant testified that this never

occurred. The trial court, being the sole trier of the facts, should have determined

that Ms. Wingerter lacked credibility when she gave conflicting testimony. Ms.

Wingerter described this alleged attack as being horrible, yet she maintained

communication with Appellant for three days after this incident allegedly occurred.

When confronted about her constant communication via text message with

Appellant, Ms. Wingerter responded that she did not recall sending any text

messages. She further responded that the text messages were somehow obtained

because someone hacked into her personal accounts.

      Ms. Wingerter lacked credibility when she testified at the adjudication

hearing. She repeatedly stated that she could not recall parts of what occurred on

November 8, 2014 and could not remember whether she drafted the text messages

that were sent to Appellant’s phone. Ms. Wingerter stated that she thought her

cousin, Corina Ventura, was present at her home on November 8, 2014. (1 R.R.

15). Then she stated that she could not remember if her cousin was sleeping when

the incident occurred. (1 R.R. 17). Later, she testified that she could not recall

whether her cousin was present at the home because it had been seven months



                                         8	  
since the alleged incident had occurred. (1 R.R. 20). She further testified that she,

Ms. Wingerter, had been interviewed three days later in front of her home by the

Harris County Constable’s Office but she could not recall whether Ms. Ventura

was interviewed with her. (1 R.R. 22, 51). She did recall however that Ms.

Ventura was interviewed by the Harris County Constable’s Office. (1 R.R. 22).

She also testified that she could not remember whether her cousin, Ms. Ventura

knocked on her door during the time of the incident. (1 R.R. 23-24).

      Ms. Wingerter also lacked credibility because she could not recall the

existence of a series of text messages that were sent from her to Appellant from

November 8, 2014 to November 11, 2014. She could neither recall what her

cellular phone number was nor what her cellular phone looked like. (1 R.R. 25).

Ms. Wingerter also could not recall what the Appellant’s cellular phone looked

like. (1 R.R. 26). She testified that she could not recall or remember when she

first communicated, either by text or voicemail, with Appellant on or after

November 8, 2014. (1 R.R. 28). When Ms. Wingerter was shown pictures of the

text messages, Defendant’s Exhibits 1-12, she denied drafting and sending the text

messages and stated that her computer had been hacked. (1 RR. 29-34, 36). She

did testify, however, that some of the text messages did look familiar, like she

would have written them. (1 RR. 34). Later, she testified that she did not send any

text messages to Appellant between the dates of November 8, 2014 through



                                         9	  
November 11, 2014. (1 R.R. 44). Ms. Wingerter could not remember other details

surrounding the alleged incident. For example, she could not remember whether

she went to her parent’s home that day or whether she stayed home. (1 R.R. 49).

      Ms. Wingerter’s recount of the alleged incident was completely

uncorroborated. Her cousin, Ms. Ventura, who may have been present during the

alleged incident and who was interviewed by the Harris County Constable’s Office

after the incident, was not present at the adjudication hearing and did not testify to

what occurred that night. (1 R.R. 52). Yet, Ms. Wingerter stated she still had

contact with her cousin and knew where she lived. (1 R.R. 52). The State did not

introduce any other testimony or evidence to corroborate Ms. Wingerter’s recount

of what occurred on November 8, 2014.

      The trial court erred by adjudicating Appellant based on the aforementioned

testimony of Ms. Wingerter, a witness who lacks credibility and provided

inconsistent testimony throughout the hearing. The trial court also erred when it

ignored the tangible text messages provided by Appellant which clearly

demonstrate that Ms. Wingerter invited him to their home for dinner on November

8, 2014. The testimony of Ms. Wingerter, alone, is factually insufficient to support

Appellant’s adjudication of guilt because she lacks credibility and because her

testimony was uncorroborated. Accordingly, because the State failed to meet its

burden that the Appellant violated a term of his community supervision, the trial



                                         10	  
court abused its discretion when adjudicating Appellant and sentencing him to five

(5) years confinement in TDC.

III.   THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY SENTENCING
       APPELLANT TO FIVE (5) YEARS CONFINEMENT IN THE TEXAS
       DEPARTMENT OF CORECTIONS AS SUCH SENTENCE
       AMOUNTS TO “CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT” GIVEN
       THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.

       The 8th and 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits the

imposition of sentences that are cruel and unusual. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, XIV.

Similarly, the Texas Constitution forbids the infliction of cruel and unusual

punishment.     TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.       Generally, a sentence between the

punishment range does not violate the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition.

Swinney v. State, 828 S.W.2d 254, 259 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st. Dist.] 1992).

However, the Supreme Court has held that “as a matter of principle a criminal

sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the defendant has been

convicted.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3009, 77 L.Ed2d

637 (1983). A sentence that is greatly disproportionate to the crime or shocks the

conscious may be deemed cruel and unusual. Id. “As the court noted in Robinson

v. California, a single day in prison may be unconstitutional in some

circumstances.” Id. (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667, 82 S.Ct.

1417 (1962)).




                                       11	  
      Under the facts of this case, a sentence of five years is cruel and unusual

punishment; thus the trial Court abused its discretion. When the alleged new law

violation occurred, Appellant was one month away from completing the two year

community supervision term, which he was granted (1 R.R. 52). The community

supervision term would have ended on December 9, 2014 and the alleged incident

occurred on November 8, 2014. (1 R.R. 52). The State filed the Motion to

Adjudicate Guilt on December 2, 2014, only seven days away from the end of his

community supervision term. (1 C.R. 33-34). The Court could have reinstated

community supervision for a longer term and/or mandated him to rehabilitation or

treatment. Instead, the Court sentenced Appellant to five (5) years confinement in

TDC. Although the punishment range for Assault of a Family Member - Second

Offender is two to ten years confinement in TDC, the Court sentenced Appellant to

an amount in the middle of the range of punishment even though Appellant had no

prior felony convictions and had successfully completed ALL other conditions of

community supervision. Because the Supreme Court has held that even sentences

that are within the legal range of punishment could be deemed cruel and unusual,

Appellant’s sentence violated this prohibition.     Furthermore, as stated above,

because the evidence was factually insufficient to support an adjudication of guilt,

Appellant’s sentence of five (5) years confinement in TDC can be considered cruel

and unusual give the facts of this case.



                                           12	  
                            CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

      For the reasons stated above, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court

reverse his conviction for Assault of a Family Member - Second Offender and

sentence of five (5) years confinement in TDC and remand this case to the trial

court for a new adjudication hearing.



                                                  THE CLOUD LAW FIRM, P.C.

                                                  /S/ CARVANA CLOUD

                                                  Carvana Cloud
                                                  State Bar No.: 240485544
                                                  THE CLOUD LAW FIRM
                                                  850 W. Little York, Suite B
                                                  Houston, TX 77091
                                                  832-230-4210 (office)
                                                  832-230-4684 (facsimile)
                                                  carvana@cloudlawfirm.net

                                                  ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT




                                        13	  
                       CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

      Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), I hereby certify that

this brief contains 2,931 words (excluding the caption, table of contents, table of

authorities, signature, proof of service, and certificate of compliance). This is a

computer-generated document created in Microsoft Word, using 14-point typeface

for all text, except for footnotes, which are in 12-point typeface. In making this

certificate of compliance, I am relying on the word count provided by the software

used to prepare the document.



                                                     THE CLOUD LAW FIRM, P.C.

                                                     /S/ CARVANA CLOUD

                                                     Carvana Cloud
                                                     State Bar No.: 240485544
                                                     THE CLOUD LAW FIRM
                                                     850 W. Little York, Suite B
                                                     Houston, TX 77091
                                                     832-230-4210 (office)
                                                     832-230-4684 (facsimile)
                                                     carvana@cloudlawfirm.net

                                                     ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT




                                          14	  
                        CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

      I certify that a true and correct copy of Appellant’s Brief was served by

electronic service and the electronic submission was reported as complete on this

26th day of October 2015 upon the following person: Alan Curry at

curry_alan@dao.hctx.net.


                                                 THE CLOUD LAW FIRM, P.C.

                                                 /S/ CARVANA CLOUD

                                                 Carvana Cloud
                                                 State Bar No.: 240485544
                                                 THE CLOUD LAW FIRM
                                                 850 W. Little York, Suite B
                                                 Houston, TX 77091
                                                 832-230-4210 (office)
                                                 832-230-4684 (facsimile)
                                                 carvana@cloudlawfirm.net

                                                 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT




                                       15	  
