
109 U.S. 75 (1883)
OLIVER & Others
v.
RUMFORD CHEMICAL WORKS.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued October 10th and 11th, 1883.
Decided October 29th, 1883.
IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE.
*80 Mr. Estes and Mr. Ellett for the plaintiffs in error.
Mr. George Gantt and Mr. Isham G. Harris for the defendants in error.
*81 MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court. After reciting the facts in the above language, he continued.
Various questions are presented by the record and have been discussed in argument, but there is one which goes to the foundation of the suit, and upon which our views are such as to make it unnecessary to consider any other. The court charged the jury that the interest of Morgan in the patent did not terminate at his death, but passed to his administratrix. The defendants excepted to this charge. The evidence was that Morgan died on the 19th of April, 1869, and the defendants asked the court to instruct the jury that the privilege conferred on Morgan by the instrument of February 1st, 1869, from the Rumford Chemical Works to him, terminated at his death, and did not pass to his administratrix, and that they should find for the defendants, if they believed that Morgan died on the 19th of April, 1869. The court refused to give such instruction, and the defendants excepted.
It is apparent that what was granted to Morgan was only the exclusive right to use, within the territory specified, the patented acid in making self-raising flour, and to use and sell in said territory the flour so made. The acid used in making the self-raising flour was all of it to be purchased from the Rumford Chemical Works, or its agents. No right was granted to made the acid, or to use it or sell it otherwise than as an ingredient in the self-raising flour. The effect of the grant made by the two instruments of February 1st, 1869, is subject to the provisions of § 11 of the act of July 4th, 1836, 5 Stat. 121, which was the statute in force at the time, and provided as follows:
"Every patent shall be assignable at law, either as to the *82 whole interest or any undivided part thereof, by any instrument in writing; which assignment, and also every grant and conveyance of the exclusive right under any patent, to make and use, and to grant to others to make and use, the thing patented within and throughout any specified part or portion of the United States, shall be recorded in the Patent Office within three months from the execution thereof."
By § 14 of the same act it was provided that damages for making, using or selling the thing whereof the exclusive right is secured by a patent:
"May be recovered by action on the case, in any court of competent jurisdiction, to be brought in the name or names of the person or persons interested, whether as patentees, assignees or as grantees of the exclusive right within and throughout a specified part of the United States."
Morgan was not an assignee of the entire right secured by the patent, nor of any undivided part of such entire right, nor of the exclusive interest in such entire right for the territory specified. He did not acquire the whole of the exclusive right or legal estate vested in the Rumford Chemical Works by the patent for the said territory, leaving no interest in his grantor for that territory, as to anything granted by the patent. It is well settled that a transfer of a right such as Morgan acquired is not an assignment, nor such a grant of exclusive right as the statute speaks of, but is a mere license. Curtis on Patents, 3d ed. § 179; Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477, 494. This being so, the instrument of license is not one which will carry the right conferred to any one but the licensee personally, unless there are express words to show an intent to extend the right to an executor, administrator or assignee, voluntary or involuntary.
In Troy Iron and Nail Factory v. Corning, 14 How. 193, 216, this court said:
"A mere license to a party, without having his assigns or equivalent words to them, showing that it was meant to be assignable, is only the grant of a personal power to the licensee, and is not transferable by him to another."
*83 In the present case there are no words of assignability in either instrument. The right is granted to Morgan alone, to him personally, with an agreement by him that he will enter on the manufacture of the self-raising flour, and that he will use all his business tact and skill to introduce and sell the flour. It is apparent that licenses of this character must have been granted to such individuals as the grantor chose to select because of their personal ability or qualifications to make or furnish a market for the self-raising flour, and thus for the acid, all of which was to be purchased from the grantor. The license was made revocable by the grantor on the failure of Morgan to perform his covenants and agreements.
We have not overlooked the fact that the privilege granted to Morgan was to continue for five years. This means no more than that he was to have it for five years, if he should live so long, and if the patent should not have expired. But it cannot have the effect to impart assignability to the privilege, or to prolong its duration beyond that of his life.
Respect for the Supreme Court of Tennessee induces us to say that we have carefully examined the opinion of that court in Oliver v. Morgan, 10 Heiskell, 322. That was a suit brought by the widow and administratrix of Morgan against Oliver, Finnie & Co., in a court of the State, to recover compensation under an agreement made between him and them February 15th, 1869, and which was to continue till April 1st, 1870, whereby he was to prepare self-raising flour for them under the license to him from the Rumford Chemical Works, and they were to pay him so much a barrel. In that suit it was held that Mrs. Morgan could recover not only for the time prior to Morgan's death, but for the subsequent time, and that the license to Morgan vested in him an interest which passed, at his death, to his personal representative. The proceedings in that suit are made a part of the record on this writ of error. But the suit in the circuit court was tried wholly on the view that the question as to the construction of the instruments of February 1st, 1869, was an open one, and was a question of general law, and not one as to a rule of property, and that there was nothing in the former suit which, as res judicata, could be *84 binding between the parties in this suit, as an estoppel. There is nothing in the pleadings which raises the question of such an estoppel. The lower State court having, in the prior suit, rendered a judgment for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of the State, while giving the interpretation before mentioned of the rights of Morgan, reversed the judgment for errors in other respects, and awarded a new trial. Afterwards there was, in the lower court, a verdict by consent, followed by a judgment for the plaintiff, for a less sum than the amount of the first verdict and judgment. Moreover, the present suit is one in a court of the United States, brought under the provisions of an act of Congress, for the infringement of letters patent. The former suit arose out of a contract between Morgan and Oliver, Finnie & Co., and was brought to recover damages for the breach of that contract. Under these circumstances, the question as to the rights of Morgan under the patent must be regarded as one to be passed upon in this suit as an original question, as if there had been no former suit. Giving to the opinion of the Supreme Court of Tennessee that consideration which is due to the force of reasoning in the views which it announces, we are unable to concur in the construction it gave to the license to Morgan. Accordingly:
The judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, with direction to award a new trial.
