UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                             No. 98-4051

TERRENCE LEMON CRAWFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                             No. 98-4059

ANTRON DEWAYNE EVANS,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
N. Carlton Tilley, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-97-164)

Submitted: July 28, 1998

Decided: September 1, 1998

Before WILLIAMS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL

Darwin Littlejohn, LITTLEJOHN & DRAPER, P.C., Winston-Salem,
North Carolina; Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, Eric D.
Placke, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Caro-
lina, for Appellants. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney,
Timika Shafeek, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Terrence Lemon Crawford and Antron Dewayne Evans each
entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to possess crack cocaine with
intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994). The district court sen-
tenced Crawford to a term of 140 months imprisonment and Evans to
a term of 157 months imprisonment. Both appeal their sentences, con-
testing the court's decision to enhance their sentences for possession
of a firearm during the offense. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (1997). Evans also argues that the district court
clearly erred in finding that he had more than a minor role in the
offense. See USSG § 3B1.2. We affirm.

A confidential informant made five controlled purchases of crack
from Crawford between March and July 1997. The first three transac-
tions took place at the apartment Crawford had shared with Evans for
three years.* During the second transaction, Evans retrieved the crack
from a bedroom. The last three transactions occurred away from the
_________________________________________________________________
*In February 1997, Crawford began staying at his mother's house but
continued to maintain a presence in the apartment and share the
expenses.

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apartment. Evans delivered the crack twice and Crawford once. When
the apartment was searched, twenty-six grams of crack were found in
the freezer section of the refrigerator. A stolen pistol was on a shelf
in Evans' room behind a VCR; the pistol proved to be inoperable.

At sentencing, Evans argued that he was a minor participant in the
offense. He claimed that Crawford obtained the crack and that Craw-
ford paid him only minimally to make deliveries. However, Evans
testified that, besides delivering to customers, he also collected
money owed to Crawford and cut crack into smaller amounts to suit
customers when necessary. A minor participant is one who is less cul-
pable than most other participants. See USSG§ 3B1.2, comment.
(n.4). In determining whether a defendant had a minor or minimal
role in the offense, "[t]he critical inquiry is . . . not just whether the
defendant has done fewer `bad acts' than his codefendants, but
whether the defendant's conduct is material or essential to committing
the offense." United States v. Palinkas, 938 F.2d 456, 460 (4th Cir.
1991), vacated, 503 U.S. 931 (1992), reinstated, 977 F.2d 905 (4th
Cir. 1992). Because Evans played an active role which contributed to
the success of the conspiracy, his conduct was material to the offense,
if not essential. Consequently, the district court's decision to refuse
the adjustment was not clearly erroneous. See United States v.
Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 213, 218 (4th Cir. 1989) (standard of review).

Crawford and Evans both contest, but on different grounds, the
two-level enhancement they received for the pistol found in Evans'
bedroom. Evans contends that the enhancement was not warranted
because the pistol had a broken firing pin, was not carried by him in
making deliveries, and thus was not connected to the offense. The
enhancement should be made "if the weapon was present during the
offense, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected
to the offense." USSG § 2D1.1, comment. (n.3). When the weapon is
discovered in a place where the conspiracy is carried on, a connection
to the offense is sufficiently established. See United States v. Apple,
962 F.2d 335, 338 (4th Cir. 1992). Moreover, an object that appears
to be a dangerous weapon, i.e., an instrument capable of inflicting
death or serious bodily injury, should be treated as a dangerous
weapon. See USSG §§ 1B1.1, comment. (n.1(d), 2D1.1, comment.
(n.3)). Therefore, the enhancement was not clearly erroneous in
Evans' case. In Crawford's case, the district court found that it was

                     3
reasonably foreseeable to him that Evans would have a firearm in the
apartment where crack was stored and sold. This finding was not
clearly erroneous. See United States v. Nelson , 6 F.3d 1049, 1056 (4th
Cir. 1993); United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427, 433 (4th Cir. 1989).

We therefore affirm the sentence. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.

AFFIRMED

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