           ANONYMOUS, PETITIONER v. COMMISSIONER
             OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT

          Docket No. 8256–12D.           Filed October 26, 2015.

        R issued P a final adverse determination letter (First Rev-
      ocation Letter), accompanied by an examination report, that
      revoked P’s tax-exempt status under I.R.C. sec. 501(c)(3)
      retroactively to Date 1. Litigation ensued and was settled by
      a closing agreement. Pursuant to the closing agreement, P
      agreed not to contest revocation of its tax-exempt status for
      prior years and to make a lump-sum payment to satisfy its
      tax obligations for those years. R agreed to withdraw the First
      Revocation Letter, to consider P’s new application for exempt
      status, and, after acting on that application, to issue a new

246
(246)                  ANONYMOUS v. COMMISSIONER                               247


          revocation letter. R granted P’s new application for exempt
          status and issued a new revocation letter (Second Revocation
          Letter). This letter likewise revoked P’s exempt status retro-
          actively to Date 1 but did not include the examination report.
          I.R.C. sec. 6110(a) provides that ‘‘[e]xcept as otherwise pro-
          vided in this section, * * * any written determination * * *
          shall be open to public inspection.’’ The Second Revocation
          Letter, as properly redacted, has been made available for
          public inspection. P initiated this action under I.R.C. sec.
          6110(f)(3) to restrain disclosure of the First Revocation Letter
          and accompanying examination report. P contends that R’s
          withdrawal of that letter before it was disclosed had the effect
          of rendering it ‘‘un-issued’’ or ‘‘a legal nullity.’’ Because the
          disclosure obligation is triggered ‘‘upon issuance of any writ-
          ten determination,’’ see I.R.C. sec. 6110(f)(1), acceptance of P’s
          argument would prevent the First Revocation Letter and
          accompanying examination report from being open to public
          inspection at all. Alternatively, P asks that we restrain R
          from disclosing the portion of the examination report that dis-
          cusses private inurement. R contends that the First Revoca-
          tion Letter and accompanying examination report, as properly
          redacted, must be disclosed.
             1. Held: The First Revocation Letter and accompanying
          examination report constitute a ‘‘written determination’’ that
          was properly ‘‘issued’’ to P. These documents must therefore
          be made available for public inspection under I.R.C. sec.
          6110(a), subject to the deletions required by I.R.C. sec.
          6110(c).
             2. Held, further, neither I.R.C. sec. 6110(c) nor any other
          provision of I.R.C. sec. 6110 authorizes the deletion, in its
          entirety, of the portion of the examination report discussing
          private inurement.

  Sealed, for petitioner.
  Sealed, for respondent.

                                     OPINION

  LAUBER, Judge: This is an action under section 6110(f)(3)
to restrain disclosure of a written determination issued by
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS or respondent). 1 Peti-
  1 All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at
all relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure. The record in this case is sealed pursuant to Rules
227 and 228; we accordingly state the facts in a manner intended to avoid
any inadvertent disclosures. The appellate venue is in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See sec. 7482(b)(1) (‘‘If for any
                                                     Continued
248          145 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                    (246)


tioner seeks to restrain the IRS from opening for public
inspection, subject to appropriate redactions, a final adverse
determination letter issued to petitioner on Date 4 (First
Revocation Letter). By this letter the IRS revoked petitioner’s
tax-exempt status retroactively to Date 1.
   Litigation concerning this determination ensued and was
settled by a closing agreement on Date 5. Pursuant to the
closing agreement, petitioner agreed not to contest revocation
of its tax-exempt status for prior years and to make a lump-
sum payment in fulfillment of its tax obligations for those
years. The IRS agreed to withdraw the First Revocation
Letter and to process a new application for tax-exempt status
that petitioner had filed on Date 3.
   On Date 6, the IRS granted petitioner’s new application
and recognized it, effective Date 3, as an organization
described in section 501(c)(3). The IRS concurrently issued
petitioner a revised final adverse determination letter
(Second Revocation Letter). The Second Revocation Letter
revoked petitioner’s exempt status for the period beginning
Date 1 and ending Date 2, the day before Date 3. The Second
Revocation Letter, as properly redacted, has been made
available for public inspection pursuant to section 6110(a).
   In light of these circumstances, petitioner contends that
the First Revocation Letter should be deemed never to have
been ‘‘issued.’’ Because the disclosure obligation is triggered
‘‘upon issuance of any written determination,’’ see sec.
6110(f)(1), acceptance of petitioner’s argument would prevent
that letter from being open to public inspection at all. Alter-
natively, petitioner asks us to restrain respondent from pub-
licly releasing—even as properly redacted—the portion of the
First Revocation Letter and accompanying examination
report that discusses respondent’s findings concerning pri-
vate inurement.
   We conclude that petitioner is not entitled to either form
of relief. The parties have agreed on the redactions to the
First Revocation Letter and accompanying examination
report that are required by section 6110(c). We hold that the

reason no subparagraph of the preceding sentence applies, then such deci-
sions may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia.’’). Petitioner’s principal place of business is thus irrelevant.
(246)              ANONYMOUS v. COMMISSIONER                           249


letter and report, as thus redacted, must be made available
for public inspection.

                              Background
   This case was submitted fully stipulated under Rule 122.
Petitioner is a nonprofit corporation that the IRS, prior to
Date 1, recognized as tax exempt under section 501(c)(3). Fol-
lowing an examination for certain tax years after Date 1 (the
audit period), the IRS notified petitioner that it was pro-
posing to revoke petitioner’s tax-exempt status. This notice
included an examination report (RAR) identifying four issues
that the IRS believed to warrant revocation, including a
finding that petitioner had allowed proceeds from its activi-
ties to inure to the benefit of private individuals.
   Petitioner filed a protest, and the case was considered by
the IRS Appeals Office (Appeals). In its rebuttal to the pro-
test, the examination team stated its view that the protest
advanced ‘‘unpersuasive arguments’’ that ‘‘do not change the
ultimate decision reached in the RAR.’’ The examination
team made a recommendation ‘‘not to pursue the private
inurement issues (issue number 4) of the RAR’’ but confirmed
its view that revocation was justified on the other three
grounds the report had advanced. Petitioner engaged in a
lengthy administrative process in an effort to resolve the case
with Appeals.
   That effort was ultimately unsuccessful. On Date 4, the
IRS National Office issued petitioner by certified mail a
letter styled a ‘‘final adverse determination regarding your
exempt status’’ (First Revocation Letter). This letter formally
concluded the IRS investigation and revoked petitioner’s tax-
exempt status retroactively to Date 1. The letter informed
petitioner:
  You have not demonstrated that you are operated exclusively for exempt
  purposes within the meaning of Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3)
  and Treasury Regulations section 1.501(c)(3)–1(d). You did not engage
  primarily in activities that accomplish one or more of the exempt pur-
  poses specified in section 501(c)(3). You are operated for a substantial
  non-exempt purpose. You are operated for the benefit of private rather
  than public interests and your activities resulted in substantial private
  benefit.
250        145 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS             (246)


   The letter included a lengthy report detailing the results
of the IRS investigation. This report stated the applicable
law and applied the law to the facts of petitioner’s case. The
report upheld the examination team’s initial determinations
as set forth in the RAR and concluded that revocation was
warranted on all four grounds the examination team had
identified, including private inurement.
   The First Revocation Letter was accompanied by a ‘‘Notice
of Intention to Disclose.’’ See sec. 6110(f)(1). This notice
informed petitioner that the IRS intended to make the First
Revocation Letter and accompanying report open for public
inspection under section 6110(a), subject to redaction of
identifying and other confidential information as required by
section 6110(c). The IRS also expressed its intention to
impose a tax liability for the audit period, reflecting defi-
ciencies in income tax flowing from petitioner’s taxable
status during those years.
   Litigation ensued. After extensive negotiations, petitioner
and respondent reached a settlement that resolved all issues
except those raised by the instant disclosure action. In a
closing agreement executed on Date 5, petitioner agreed not
to contest revocation of its tax-exempt status for prior years
and to make a lump-sum payment in fulfillment of its tax
obligations for those years. The IRS agreed to withdraw the
First Revocation Letter and to process a new Form 1023,
Application for Recognition of Exemption Under Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, that petitioner had
filed on Date 3. It was agreed that the IRS would issue a
new revocation letter after acting on the Form 1023.
   Consistently with the closing agreement, the IRS informed
petitioner, in a one-sentence letter also issued on Date 5: ‘‘We
have determined that it is in the best interests of the
Internal Revenue Service at this time to withdraw the Final
Adverse Determination Letter, dated [Date 4] which revoked
your tax-exempt status effective [Date 1].’’ Upon completing
its review of petitioner’s Form 1023, the IRS issued, on Date
6, a determination letter recognizing petitioner as an
organization described in section 501(c)(3). This determina-
tion as to petitioner’s tax-exempt status was effective Date 3,
the date the Form 1023 was filed. Consistently with that
action, the IRS issued petitioner a new final adverse deter-
mination letter, also issued on Date 6 (Second Revocation
(246)           ANONYMOUS v. COMMISSIONER                   251


Letter), revoking petitioner’s tax-exempt status for the period
beginning on Date 1 and ending on Date 2, the day before
Date 3.
  The reasoning stated in the Second Revocation Letter was
substantially identical to that stated in the First Revocation
Letter, including the following sentence: ‘‘You are operated
for the benefit of private rather than public interests and
your activities resulted in substantial private benefit.’’ How-
ever, the Second Revocation Letter was not accompanied by
the lengthy report outlining the facts discovered during the
IRS investigation and applying the law to those facts. The
Second Revocation Letter, as properly redacted, has been
made available for public inspection under section 6110(a).
  The closing agreement executed on Date 5 resolved all
issues between the parties except those raised by the instant
disclosure action. In this action, petitioner seeks to restrain
respondent’s public disclosure of the First Revocation Letter
and accompanying examination report or (in the alternative)
to restrain disclosure of the section of that report discussing
private inurement. In the event we determine that these
documents must be made available for public inspection
under section 6110(a), the parties have reached agreement
on, and stipulated to, ‘‘the redactions necessary to protect
petitioner’s confidentiality’’ under section 6110(c).

                          Discussion
I. Legal Standard and Burden of Proof
   The submission of this case fully stipulated changes nei-
ther the burden of proof nor the effect of a failure of proof.
See Rule 122(b); Okerson v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 258, 263
(2004). ‘‘In an action to restrain disclosure, the burden of
proof as to the issue of whether disclosure should be made
shall be upon the petitioner.’’ Rule 229(b). Petitioner also
bears under Rule 229 the burden of proof ‘‘as to the jurisdic-
tional requirements described in Rule 220(c).’’ The Tax Court
is a court of limited jurisdiction, and we must ascertain
whether the case before us is one that Congress has author-
ized us to consider. See sec. 7442; Estate of Young v. Commis-
sioner, 81 T.C. 879, 881 (1983). However, we always have
jurisdiction to determine whether we have jurisdiction.
252          145 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                      (246)


Cooper v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 70, 73 (2010); Kluger v.
Commissioner, 83 T.C. 309, 314 (1984).
II. The Merits
  A. The Statutory Scheme for Disclosure Actions
   Congress mandated in section 6110(a) that ‘‘the text of any
written determination and any background file document
relating to such written determination shall be open to public
inspection’’ except as otherwise provided in section 6110. Sec-
tion 6110(c) provides that the Secretary, before disclosing
any written determination, ‘‘shall delete’’ seven specified
types of information. These include ‘‘the names, addresses,
and other identifying details of the person to whom the writ-
ten determination pertains’’ and ‘‘information the disclosure
of which would create a clearly unwarranted invasion of pri-
vacy.’’ Sec. 6110(c)(1), (5). 2
   Before disclosing a written determination, the IRS must
provide interested persons with a ‘‘notice of intention to dis-
close,’’ sec. 6110(f)(1), and must provide those persons with
‘‘administrative remedies’’ to challenge the proposed level of
disclosure, sec. 6110(f)(2). An interested person ‘‘who has
exhausted his administrative remedies’’ but remains
aggrieved may commence an ‘‘action to restrain disclosure.’’
Sec. 6110(f)(3)(A)(i), (iii). This judicial remedy is created in
favor of an interested person ‘‘who disagrees with any failure
to make a deletion with respect to that portion of any written
determination or any background file document which is to
be open * * * to public inspection.’’ Sec. 6110(f)(3)(A)(ii).
   The statute specifically circumscribes this Court’s jurisdic-
tion in an action to restrain disclosure. Section 6110(f)(3)(A)
provides that an aggrieved person:
  may, within 60 days after the mailing by the Secretary of a notice of
  intention to disclose any written determination or background file docu-
  ment * * * file a petition in the United States Tax Court (anonymously,
  if appropriate) for a determination with respect to that portion of such
   2 Section 6110(g)(5) provides that certain written determinations need

not be made publicly available but shall be made available only upon
‘‘written request.’’ These include documents created during criminal inves-
tigations and jeopardy assessments, sec. 6110(g)(5)(A), and written deter-
minations addressing changes in a taxpayer’s accounting method, annual
accounting period, and similar technical matters, see sec. 6110(g)(5)(B).
None of these exceptions is relevant here.
(246)             ANONYMOUS v. COMMISSIONER                        253


  written determination or background file document which is to be open
  to public inspection.

By limiting our role to the making of a determination ‘‘with
respect to that portion of such written determination,’’ that
shall be disclosed, the statute restricts our jurisdiction to
deciding the propriety of the Commissioner’s proposed dele-
tions. This limitation on our jurisdiction is confirmed by sec-
tion 6110(m), which provides that the Commissioner ‘‘shall
not be required by any Court * * * to refrain from disclo-
sure’’ of any written determination whose disclosure is man-
dated by section 6110(a).
    In Anonymous v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 13 (2010), a tax-
payer sought to restrain the IRS from disclosing a private
letter ruling (PLR) in its entirety. The taxpayer based this
demand on its submission that ‘‘the contents of the PLR are
contrary to law and thus respondent acted arbitrarily, capri-
ciously, and in bad faith in issuing it.’’ Id. at 18. We declined
to consider the taxpayer’s argument, concluding that
‘‘[s]ection 6110(f)(3)(A) limits this Court’s determination to
the Commissioner’s deletion decisions.’’ 134 T.C. at 19. As we
explained, that section ‘‘grants this Court jurisdiction to
make a determination with respect to the Commissioner’s
decision to delete or not delete information from a PLR
before public disclosure.’’ Id. at 18–19. Section 6110(f)(3)(A)
‘‘does not give this Court the authority to order the Commis-
sioner to restrain disclosure of a PLR in its entirety.’’ 134
T.C. at 19. Having concluded that the PLR at issue con-
stituted a ‘‘written determination’’ within the meaning of sec-
tion 6110(a), we held that we lacked jurisdiction to consider
the relief petitioner requested.
    We operate under the same jurisdictional constraint here.
If the First Revocation Letter and accompanying report con-
stituted a ‘‘written determination’’ that was ‘‘issued’’ to peti-
tioner, we have no authority to order respondent to withhold
it from public inspection altogether. Our jurisdiction is then
limited to deciding the propriety of the IRS’ proposed dele-
tions—a task that the parties, by their agreement, have
already discharged for us.
  B. ‘‘Written Determination’’
 ‘‘The term ‘written determination’ means a ruling, deter-
mination letter, technical advice memorandum, or Chief
254           145 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                        (246)


Counsel advice.’’ Sec. 6110(b)(1)(A). The regulations define a
‘‘ruling’’ as ‘‘a written statement issued by the National
Office to a taxpayer * * * that interprets and applies tax
laws to a specific set of facts.’’ Sec. 301.6110–2(d), Proced. &
Admin. Regs. ‘‘A ruling generally recites the relevant facts,
sets forth the applicable provisions of law, and shows the
application of the law to the facts.’’ Ibid. ‘‘ ‘Issuance’ of a writ-
ten determination occurs, with respect to rulings and deter-
mination letters, upon the mailing of the ruling or deter-
mination letter to the person to whom it pertains.’’ Id. para.
(h). The First Revocation Letter, with its explanatory report,
thus constitutes a ‘‘written determination’’ that must be
made available for public inspection if it was a ‘‘determina-
tion letter’’ or a ‘‘ruling’’ that was ‘‘issued’’ to petitioner. 3
   An organization seeking recognition of exemption under
section 501(c)(3) must file an application on Form 1023 dem-
onstrating its compliance with the statutory requirements. If
the IRS believed these requirements were satisfied, it would
issue, for the tax period at issue, ‘‘[a] favorable determination
letter or ruling’’ to the requesting organization. Rev. Proc.
2014–9, sec. 4.01, 2014–2 I.R.B. 281, 285. 4 If the IRS con-
cluded that these requirements were not satisfied, it would
communicate that proposed decision to the applicant. This
communication took the form of a ‘‘proposed adverse deter-
mination letter’’ if issued by EO Determinations and a ‘‘pro-
posed adverse ruling’’ if issued by EO Technical. Id. secs.
7.02 and 7.03, 2014–2 I.R.B. at 288. In either case, the
requesting organization was afforded protest, appeal, and
conference rights. If the IRS ultimately decided that the
application must be denied, it would issue, as appropriate, ‘‘a
  3 The  First Revocation Letter was not a ‘‘technical advice memorandum’’
(TAM) because it was not issued by the IRS National Office to an IRS dis-
trict director or field office. See sec. 301.6110–2(f), Proced. & Admin. Regs.
Respondent notes that the terminology of this regulation does not comport
with current practice because the IRS has not had ‘‘district directors’’ for
several years. However, TAMs are still issued by the National Office and,
if adopted by the relevant field office, are regarded as having been ‘‘issued’’
for purposes of section 6110.
   4 The revenue procedure governing applications for recognition of exemp-

tion under section 501(a) is usually updated annually. See Rev. Proc. 2015–
9, sec. 1.02, 2015–2 I.R.B. 249, 251. The 2014 provisions discussed in the
text are substantially similar to those in effect for the relevant tax period.
(246)               ANONYMOUS v. COMMISSIONER                             255


final adverse determination letter’’ or a ‘‘final adverse
ruling.’’ Id. secs. 7.06 and 7.07, 2014–2 I.R.B. at 288.
   If an organization initially received a favorable IRS deter-
mination but failed to operate as section 501(c)(3) requires,
the ‘‘determination letter or ruling recognizing [its] exemp-
tion * * * [might] be revoked or modified.’’ Rev. Proc. 2014–
9, sec. 12, 2014–2 I.R.B. at 291. This revocation might be
retroactive if the organization ‘‘omitted or misstated a mate-
rial fact’’ in its application materials, ‘‘operated in a manner
materially different from that originally represented,’’ or
engaged in improper transactions. Id. sec. 12.01, 2014–2
I.R.B. at 291–292. ‘‘In the case of a revocation or modification
of a determination letter or ruling, the appeal and conference
procedures * * * [were] generally the same’’ as when the
IRS proposed to deny an organization’s exemption application
ab initio. Id. sec. 12.02, 2014–2 I.R.B. at 292 (cross-ref-
erencing section 7).
   The First Revocation Letter represented a final decision by
the IRS to revoke petitioner’s tax-exempt status retroactively
to Date 1. That letter was a written statement issued by the
IRS National Office to a taxpayer; the letter and its accom-
panying examination report recite the relevant facts, set
forth the applicable provisions of law, and show the applica-
tion of the law to the facts. These documents thus manifest
all the features of a ‘‘ruling’’ as defined in the regulations.
See sec. 301.6110–2(d), Proced. & Admin. Regs.
   The applicable revenue procedure did not explicitly state
how the IRS document communicating a revocation of
exempt status was to be characterized. However, since the
Commissioner’s initial recognition of exempt status took the
form of ‘‘[a] favorable determination letter or ruling,’’ Rev.
Proc. 2014–9, sec. 4.01, 2014–2 I.R.B. at 285, the document
that modified or revoked that initial determination must logi-
cally be either a ‘‘ruling’’ or a ‘‘determination letter’’ as well. 5
   5 The parties have stipulated that the IRS initially recognized petitioner

as tax exempt ‘‘by a determination letter,’’ and the First Revocation Letter
is styled ‘‘a final adverse determination’’ regarding petitioner’s exempt sta-
tus. But respondent does not contend that the latter document was a ‘‘de-
termination letter’’ for purposes of section 6110(b)(1)(A). See sec. 301.6110–
2(e), Proced. & Admin. Regs. (defining a ‘‘determination letter’’ as ‘‘a writ-
ten statement issued by a district director in response to a written inquiry
                                                 Continued
256          145 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                      (246)


In either event, the First Revocation Letter and its accom-
panying report constitute a ‘‘written determination’’ as
defined in section 6110(b)(1)(A). See Tax Analysts v. IRS, 350
F.3d 100, 103–104 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that documents
revoking tax-exempt status are subject to disclosure under
section 6110(a)).
   It is equally clear that the First Revocation Letter and its
accompanying report were ‘‘issued’’ to petitioner. The regula-
tions unambiguously provide that ‘‘ ‘[i]ssuance’ of a written
determination occurs, with respect to rulings and determina-
tion letters, upon the mailing of the ruling or determination
letter to the person to whom it pertains.’’ Sec. 301.6110–2(h),
Proced. & Admin. Regs. It is undisputed that these docu-
ments were sent to petitioner by certified mail on Date 4.
They were thus ‘‘issued’’ to petitioner on that date. See Tax
Analysts v. IRS, 495 F.3d 676, 680 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (‘‘The
common meaning of ‘issue,’ as a transitive verb, is ‘[t]o give
exit to; to send forth, or allow to pass out; to let out; to emit;
to discharge.’ * * * [A]nd we see no reason this meaning
should not apply here.’’), aff ’g 416 F. Supp. 2d (D.D.C. 2006).
Because the First Revocation Letter and its accompanying
report constitute a ‘‘written determination’’ that was ‘‘issued’’
to petitioner, the statute requires that these documents, as
properly redacted under section 6110(c), be made available
for public inspection under section 6110(a).
  C. Petitioner’s Arguments
   Petitioner concedes that the First Revocation Letter ‘‘at
one point * * * constituted a written determination.’’ Peti-
tioner contends, however, that respondent’s withdrawal of
that letter prior to disclosing it had the effect of rendering
it ‘‘un-issued’’ or ‘‘a legal nullity.’’ According to petitioner,
respondent’s withdrawal amounted to an admission that the
letter was an ‘‘obvious error.’’ Petitioner cites a provision of
the Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) stating that an ‘‘erro-
neous’’ letter, before being disclosed, should be replaced with

by an individual or an organization that applies principles and precedents
previously announced by the National Office to the particular facts in-
volved’’). As noted earlier, the language in this regulation concerning the
role of ‘‘district directors’’ is outdated. See supra note 3.
(246)            ANONYMOUS v. COMMISSIONER                    257


a corrected copy, in effect converting the original letter into
an un-issued draft. See IRM pt. 32.3.1.12.1 (Aug. 11, 2004).
    This argument is unpersuasive for at least three reasons.
First, the Commissioner’s withdrawal of the First Revocation
Letter did not constitute an admission that the letter or its
attached examination report was erroneous in any respect.
Rather, the Commissioner agreed to withdraw the letter as
part of a settlement that reflected the parties’ mutual deci-
sion to avoid the perceived hazards of litigation.
    Second, the IRM procedures for correcting an error by sub-
stituting pages or reissuing a letter prior to disclosure have
no application here. The ‘‘obvious error’’ exception set forth
in the IRM applies to minor problems such as a ‘‘typo-
graphical error, incorrect citation, incorrect cross references,
or an inadvertent omission,’’ not to substantive changes in
legal reasoning or findings of fact. See IRM pt. 32.3.1.12(1)
and (2). Indeed, the IRM advises that ‘‘[a] request for
reconsideration of a ruling or a request for supplemental
rulings is not a request for correction of an obvious error.’’ Id.
pt. 32.3.1.12(2). The ‘‘obvious error’’ exception cannot be
invoked to demand the displacement of the First Revocation
Letter and the attached examination report in their entirety.
    Third, the IRM lacks the force of law and does not create
rights for taxpayers. Marks v. Commissioner, 947 F.2d 983,
986 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1991), aff ’g T.C. Memo. 1989–575; Tax
Analysts, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 127 (same). The regulations
unambiguously provide that a written determination is
‘‘issued’’ when it is mailed to the taxpayer. Sec. 301.6110–
2(h), Proced. & Admin. Regs. A provision of the Internal Rev-
enue Manual could not override this regulation, even if there
were some inconsistency between the two, which there is not.
    Neither the statute nor the regulations provide any sup-
port for petitioner’s submission that a written determination
that has been properly ‘‘issued’’ can be ‘‘un-issued.’’ Indeed,
the regulations create a strong inference to the contrary.
They provide that ‘‘background file documents,’’ which nor-
mally are disclosable under section 6110(a), do not include ‘‘a
request for a ruling or determination letter that is with-
drawn prior to issuance thereof.’’ Sec. 301.6110–2(g)(2)(v),
Proced. & Admin. Regs. This regulation shows that the
Department of the Treasury knew how to exclude a ‘‘with-
drawn’’ document from disclosure when it so intended, and it
258           145 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                       (246)


made this exclusion available only when the document is
withdrawn ‘‘prior to issuance’’ of the ruling or determination
letter. The regulations contain no provision that would
exclude from disclosure a ruling or determination letter, or
background document relating thereto, that is withdrawn
after the written determination has been issued.
   Section 6110(a) requires disclosure of ‘‘any written deter-
mination’’ except as otherwise provided ‘‘in this section.’’ The
word ‘‘any’’ demands a broad construction, see Tax Analysts,
495 F.3d at 680–681, and the courts have uniformly refused
to recognize exceptions from disclosure that are not distinctly
spelled out in the statute. 6 Section 6110 incorporates no
exception for a situation in which the Commissioner agrees
to withdraw a previously issued written determination as
part of a settlement based on the hazards of litigation. We
are not at liberty to craft such an exception where none
exists. See sec. 6110(m) (providing that ‘‘the Secretary shall
not be required by any court * * * to refrain from disclosure’’
of a written determination whose disclosure is mandated by
section 6110(a)); Anonymous, 134 T.C. at 19 (‘‘Section
6110(f)(3)(A) is a precise grant of jurisdiction and does not
allow for additional general remedies.’’).
   Petitioner alternatively contends that we should restrain
respondent from disclosing, if not the entire First Revocation
Letter and explanatory report, at least the section of the
report that discusses the IRS’ findings concerning private
inurement. Petitioner notes that the IRS examination team,
in its rebuttal to petitioner’s protest, made a recommendation
‘‘not to pursue the private inurement issue.’’ This rec-
ommendation was apparently based on the examination
team’s belief that private inurement could be difficult to
prove and that a court would find the other three grounds for
revocation sufficient.
  6 See generally Tax Analysts, 495 F.3d at 681 (advisory emails from IRS
Office of Chief Counsel to field office staff, however brief or informal, con-
stitute ‘‘Chief Counsel advice’’ to be disclosed under section 6110(a)); Tax
Analysts, 350 F.3d at 103 (section 6110 applies to determinations denying
or revoking tax-exempt status); Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 615–
616 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (determinations labeled ‘‘Field Service Advice’’ are
analogous to technical advice memoranda and thus subject to section 6110
disclosure).
(246)            ANONYMOUS v. COMMISSIONER                    259


   Appeals evidently disagreed with this recommendation,
since the report accompanying the First Revocation Letter
clearly advances private inurement as one of four grounds for
revoking petitioner’s exemption. Yet respondent has admitted
that, at some point during the ensuing negotiations, it ‘‘with-
drew the inurement grounds for revocation.’’ In light of this
admission, petitioner urges that respondent be restrained
from disclosing the section of the examination report dis-
cussing private inurement in order to prevent ‘‘public confu-
sion.’’
   There is no legal basis for this argument. Section 6110(c)
specifies seven categories of information that must be deleted
from documents made available for public inspection under
subsection (a). The parties have stipulated to the deletions
that section 6110(c) requires, including the deletions that are
required to the ‘‘private inurement’’ section of the examina-
tion report. The statute authorizes no further deletions. To
the extent petitioner is arguing that this portion of the report
has been ‘‘withdrawn’’ and should thus be deemed ‘‘un-
issued,’’ we reject that argument for the reasons stated
above. And to the extent petitioner is arguing for an equi-
table exception based on the supposed risk of public confu-
sion, ‘‘[s]ection 6110(f)(3)(A) is a precise grant of jurisdiction
and does not allow for additional general remedies.’’ Anony-
mous, 134 T.C. at 19.
   To reflect the foregoing,
                        Decision will be entered for respondent.

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