

Celestin v Shawy (2015 NY Slip Op 01773)





Celestin v Shawy


2015 NY Slip Op 01773


Decided on March 4, 2015


Appellate Division, Second Department


Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.


This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.



Decided on March 4, 2015
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P.
L. PRISCILLA HALL
SHERI S. ROMAN
JEFFREY A. COHEN
BETSY BARROS, JJ.


2014-06808
 (Index No. 10635/12)

[*1]Dickens Celestin, appellant,
v Anthony J. Shawy, et al., respondents.


Harmon, Linder, & Rogowsky (Mitchell Dranow, Sea Cliff, N.Y., of counsel), for appellant.
Martyn, Toher, Martyn & Rossi, Mineola, N.Y. (Anthony Orcel of counsel), for respondents.

DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Feinman, J.), entered June 4, 2014, which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion is denied.
The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the lumbar region of the plaintiff's spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614).
In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury to the lumbar region of his spine (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219). Therefore, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
RIVERA, J.P., HALL, ROMAN, COHEN and BARROS, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Aprilanne Agostino
Clerk of the Court


