UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
                                                                      No. 98-4617
WILLIAM GERARD PARSONS, formerly
known as William Leon Parsons,
a/k/a David J. Apple,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.
Patrick Michael Duffy, District Judge.
(CR-97-819)

Submitted: May 25, 1999

Decided: September 23, 1999

Before MURNAGHAN and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and
HALL,* Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Tara D. Anderson, BERRY, QUACKENBUSH & STUART, P.A.,
_________________________________________________________________
*Senior Judge Hall participated in the consideration of this case but
died prior to the time the decision was filed. The decision is filed by a
quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. J. Rene Josey, United States
Attorney, Brucie H. Hendricks, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

William Gerard Parsons was convicted of two counts of possession
with intent to distribute crack cocaine pursuant to his guilty plea. On
appeal, he alleges that the district court erred by increasing his base
offense level based on its finding that prior, uncharged drug transac-
tions constituted "relevant conduct" pursuant to USSG
§ 1B1.3(a)(2).* Finding no error, we affirm.

Parsons was a crack cocaine dealer operating in an area of North
Charleston, South Carolina, known for its high crime and drug distri-
bution. Parsons was apprehended after selling crack cocaine to an
informant. Prior to trial, Parsons entered into a plea agreement in
which he agreed to cooperate with law enforcement officials and to
give truthful answers concerning his drug activities. The parties also
stipulated that the total amount of drugs involved was 10.6 grams,
which was based on the amount of drugs Parsons sold to the infor-
mant. At sentencing, however, the court attributed 220.7 grams to
Parsons. This amount was based on historical information provided
by some of Parsons' "customers" who were cooperating with authori-
ties. The court further held that neither it, nor the Government, was
bound by the stipulated drug amount because Parsons breached the
plea agreement when he failed two polygraph examinations in which
he was asked questions concerning his drug activities.
_________________________________________________________________

*U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1997).

                    2
It is well settled that a sentencing court may consider drug amounts
which are not specified in the count of conviction when calculating
a defendant's base offense level. See USSG§ 1B1.3(a)(2), comment.
(n.3). The district court's determinations regarding the quantity of
drugs to be considered as relevant conduct are factual in nature and
will only be reversed if they are clearly erroneous. See United States
v. Williams, 977 F.2d 866, 870 (4th Cir. 1992). In the present case,
we find that the district court properly attributed the additional drug
amounts to Parsons. The evidence showed that Parsons engaged in a
regular pattern of drug dealing with the cooperating"customers," and
Parsons failed to show that this information was inaccurate. See
United States v. Terry, 916 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 1990) (defendant
bears the burden showing that the information in the presentence
report is inaccurate; mere objections are insufficient). Although Par-
sons' counsel attempted to impeach the credibility of this information
at sentencing, this issue was decided against him, and we find nothing
in the record which would justify overturning the district court's deci-
sion. Finally, even absent Parsons' deceptive answers during the poly-
graph examinations, the court was not bound by the drug amount
stipulated in the plea agreement. See USSG§ 6B1.4(d), p.s.

Accordingly, we affirm Parsons' sentence. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pre-
sented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

                    3
