
USCA1 Opinion

	




          May 23, 1996                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT                                 ____________________        No. 95-1526                                    ASTOR D. CHANCE,                                Plaintiff, Appellant,                                          v.                                       TAIWAN,                                 Defendant, Appellee.                                                                                      ____________________        No. 95-1573        No. 95-1629                                   ASTOR D. CHANCE,                                Plaintiff, Appellant,                                          v.                          UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.,                                Defendants, Appellees.                                 ____________________                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS                   [Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]                                              ___________________                                 ____________________                                        Before                                 Selya, Cyr and Lynch,                                   Circuit Judges.                                   ______________                                 ____________________            Astor D. Chance on brief pro se.            _______________                                 ____________________                                 ____________________                 Per  Curiam.     We   affirm  the  judgments   in  these                 ___________            consolidated appeals substantially for the reasons recited by            the district court.  We add only the following comments.                  1.  The Government of Taiwan  is amenable to suit in the            United  States only  in  accordance  with  the terms  of  the            Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C.               1602-11.   See,  e.g.,  Millen Indus.,  Inc. v.  Coordination                       ___   ____   ____________________     ____________            Council  for North American Affairs,  855 F.2d 879, 883 (D.C.            ___________________________________            Cir.  1988)  ("all  laws,  including  the  FSIA,  [that  are]            applicable to  nations also apply to  Taiwan"); see generally                                                            _____________            Argentine Republic  v. Amerada Hess Shipping  Corp., 488 U.S.            __________________     ____________________________            428,  443 (1989) (FSIA "provides the sole basis for obtaining            jurisdiction  over a  foreign  state in  the  courts of  this            country").  Plaintiff is mistaken in arguing that the  FSIA's            applicability  to Taiwan  is  affected by     4(b)(7) of  the            Taiwan Relations Act, 22  U.S.C.   3303(b)(7), which provides            simply that the  capacity of Taiwan "to  sue and be  sued" in            United  States  courts  is  not altered  "by  the  absence of            diplomatic relations or recognition."  His further suggestion            that Taiwan's amenability to suit is  affected by the Torture            Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat.            73  (set  forth  in note  following  28  U.S.C.    1350),  is            likewise misplaced.                  2.    For the  reasons  enumerated  in Saudi  Arabia  v.                                                        _____________            Nelson, 507  U.S. 349  (1993), plaintiff's attempt  to invoke            ______            the  "commercial  activity"  exception  to  the  FSIA  proves                                         -2-            unavailing.  In particular, because  the governmental conduct            of which  he complains  is "peculiarly sovereign  in nature,"            id. at 361,  his action cannot be regarded as  one "based ...            ___            upon an act  outside the  territory of the  United States  in            connection with  a commercial  activity of the  foreign state            elsewhere ...."  28 U.S.C.   1605(a)(2).                   3.   Finally, we reject the  procedural objection voiced            by  plaintiff in  Nos.  95-1573 &  95-1629.   Inasmuch  as  a            frivolous complaint can properly be dismissed under 28 U.S.C.               1915(d) on  a  sua sponte  basis,  see, e.g.,  Neitzke  v.                              __________          ___  ____   _______            Williams,  490 U.S. 319, 324,  330 (1989), the  court did not            ________            err in dismissing  these actions in advance  of its indicated            twenty-day deadline.  Plaintiff, we note, has made no  effort            to  buttress  his substantive  arguments  in  this regard  on            appeal.                 Affirmed.                 _________                                         -3-
