          FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                 STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                         No. 1D17-3165
                 _____________________________

SAMUEL BYRD,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                  ___________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
Linda F. McCallum, Judge.

                        February 28, 2018


PER CURIAM.

     Appellant challenges the denial of his Motion to Correct
Illegal Sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal
Procedure 3.800(a). The State concedes error. For the reasons
provided below, we reverse and remand for resentencing.

     Appellant was convicted of attempted second-degree murder
with a firearm (Count I), a first-degree felony punishable by up to
thirty years in prison. ∗ §§ 775.082(3)(b), 777.04(4)(c), 782.04(2),
775.087(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). He was sentenced to life in prison
with a twenty-five year mandatory minimum term pursuant to

    *  Appellant was also convicted of armed robbery and
sentenced to life in prison for that crime. That sentence is not
affected by this opinion.
section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (2011), commonly referred to
as the 10-20-Life statute. The jury made a specific finding that
Appellant discharged a firearm which caused great bodily harm.

     The trial court had the discretion, pursuant to section
775.087(2)(a)3., to impose a mandatory minimum sentence
anywhere within the range of twenty-five years to life for Count I,
even if the selected mandatory minimum exceeded the general
statutory maximum (thirty years for attempted second-degree
murder). Hatten v. State, 203 So. 3d 142, 145 (Fla. 2016).
However, “if the trial court chooses to impose a sentence beyond
the selected mandatory minimum pursuant to the 10-20-Life
statute, additional statutory authority is required.” Id. at 146.
Here, Appellant’s life sentence was not imposed pursuant to
section 775.087(2), and there does not appear to be any additional
statutory authority to support a sentence beyond the statutory
maximum of thirty years. § 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat.

    Accordingly, we reverse and remand for resentencing
consistent with the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling in Hatten.

    REVERSED AND REMANDED with directions.

ROBERTS, KELSEY, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.
              _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________

Samuel Byrd, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Bryan Jordan, Assistant
Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.




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