UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                      No. 98-4808

TYRONE CLINT HILL,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville.
James H. Michael, Jr., Senior District Judge.
(CR-96-54)

Submitted: May 11, 1999

Decided: May 25, 1999

Before WIDENER, LUTTIG, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

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Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Daniel J. Meador, Jr., MORIN & BARKLEY, Charlottesville, Vir-
ginia, for Appellant. Robert P. Crouch, Jr., United States Attorney,
Ray B. Fitzgerald, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville,
Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Tyrone Clint Hill was convicted of distributing crack cocaine and
was sentenced to three years probation. A year later, the district court
revoked Hill's probation and sentenced him to three years imprison-
ment. In an order entered before the hearing, the court gave notice
that it might impose a sentence in excess of the sentencing range rec-
ommended in U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4 (1997).
Both in the order and at the revocation hearing, however, the court
stated that the issue was whether supervised release should be
revoked and the court referred to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3) (West
Supp. 1999). Section 3583(e)(3) governs revocation of supervised
release, while probation revocation is governed by 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3565 (West Supp. 1999). Both parties used the terms probation and
supervised release interchangeably at the revocation hearing. On
appeal, Hill contests the length of the sentence. While arguing that the
sentence was not plainly unreasonable, the government concedes that
resentencing is necessary because of the apparent confusion over
which statute applied.

Because the parties agree that resentencing is necessary, we vacate
the sentence and remand for resentencing without reaching the merits
of Hill's claims. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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