
USCA1 Opinion

	




          December 8, 1994                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT                                 ____________________        No. 94-1719                              U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,                                 Plaintiff, Appellee,                                          v.                        TOTAL PROPERTY SERVICES, INC., ET AL.,                               Defendants, Appellants.                                 ____________________                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS                   [Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]                                              ___________________                                 ____________________                                        Before                                  Cyr, Circuit Judge,                                       _____________                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,                                    ____________________                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.                                         _____________                                 ____________________            James Lawson on brief pro se.            ____________            Thomas S. Williamson,  Jr., Solicitor of Labor, Monica  Gallagher,            __________________________                      _________________        Associate  Solicitor,   William  J.   Stone,  Counsel   for  Appellate                                ___________________        Litigation, and Joan  Brenner, Attorney, U.S. Department  of Labor, on                        _____________        brief for appellee.                                 ____________________                                 ____________________                      Per Curiam.  We have reviewed the record and briefs                      __________            and now  affirm  the default  judgment  entered below.    The            district court  implicitly authorized the  extension of  time            for  service  when  it  granted the  Secretary's  motion  for            appointment of a special process  server, vacated its July 6,            1993  judgment  of  dismissal, and  granted  the  Secretary's            motion  for  entry  of  a  default  judgment.      We  reject            appellant's hypertechnical  reading of  Fed. R. Civ.  P. 4(j)            and 6(b)(2), and we find no abuse of the court's considerable            discretion in extending the time for service.  Similarly, the            court  did not  abuse its  discretion in  denying appellant's            motion to vacate the default judgment.                      Affirmed.                      ________
