UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
                                                                        No. 99-4510
ANGELO DIAZ RODRIQUEZ, a/k/a
Chico,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.
Robert E. Payne, District Judge.
(CR-98-409)

Submitted: January 31, 2000

Decided: February 29, 2000

Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Douglas M. Atkins, BOURDOW & BOWEN, P.C., Midlothian, Vir-
ginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey, United States Attorney, Shannon
L. Taylor, Special Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Vir-
ginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Angelo Diaz Rodriquez entered guilty pleas to possession of a fire-
arm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 1994 &
Supp. 1999), and possession of a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(j)
(West 1994 & Supp. 1999). The plea agreement provided that
Rodriquez faced a maximum sentence of ten years on each charge. At
the Rule 11 plea colloquy, the district court confirmed that the maxi-
mum term of imprisonment faced by Rodriquez was ten years on each
of the two counts to which he pled guilty. Because Rodriquez had
more than three prior violent felonies, however, 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)
(West Supp. 1999) required the district court to impose a minimum
prison term of fifteen years on the § 922(g)(1) charge. Accordingly,
at sentencing, Rodriquez received a term of 210 months imprisonment
on the first count and 120 months on the second count, to be served
concurrently. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.4 (1998).

Rodriquez appeals, challenging the validity of his plea on the
ground that the district court violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure by failing to inform him of the fifteen-year man-
datory minimum sentence required by § 924(e). The Government con-
cedes the Rule 11 violation. The parties disagree, however, as to the
appropriate remedy. While Rodriquez requests that the case be
remanded for resentencing in accordance with the plea agreement, the
Government asserts that a remand is required so that Rodriquez may
be afforded the opportunity to withdraw his plea and plead anew.

Because the armed career criminal enhancement of§ 924(e) altered
Rodriquez's statutory mandatory minimum sentence, he was entitled
to notice of this fact during his plea colloquy. See United States v.
Codia, 41 F.3d 1473, 1476 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that the Rule 11
colloquy must notify the defendant of § 924(e)'s mandatory mini-
mum); see also United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 402 (4th Cir.

                    2
1995) (holding that Rule 11(c)(1) requires the district court to advise
a defendant of the statutorily mandated maximum and minimum pen-
alties). The parties agree that Rodriquez was not informed of the pos-
sible application of § 924(e) in either his plea agreement or during the
plea colloquy, and the record supports their position. While we are
required to evaluate Rule 11 violations under the harmless error stan-
dard, see Goins, 51 F.3d at 402, we find that this Rule 11 violation
was not harmless because Rodriquez's substantial rights were violated
when he was not informed of the applicable mandatory minimum sen-
tence. See id. at 405 (holding failure to inform defendant of manda-
tory minimum sentence to be reversible error). We also find that the
Government has suggested the appropriate remedy. See United States
v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 115 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that when Rule
11 error concerns the defendant's state of mind, the appropriate rem-
edy is to vacate and remand so that defendant can plead anew); Goins,
51 F.3d at 405 (holding that when defendant is not informed about
mandatory minimum sentence, the sentence must be vacated and the
case remanded for repleading).

Accordingly, we vacate the district court's judgment and remand
in order for Rodriquez to plead anew. We dispense with oral argu-
ment because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the deci-
sional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

                    3
