                                        In The

                                 Court of Appeals
                     Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
                            ____________________
                               NO. 09-14-00412-CV
                            ____________________

                     THE CITY OF BEAUMONT, Appellant

                                          V.

                           JUSTIN JACKSON, Appellee
_______________________________________________________               ______________

                     On Appeal from the 60th District Court
                           Jefferson County, Texas
                          Trial Cause No. B-192,252
________________________________________________________               _____________

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      The City of Beaumont filed a notice of accelerated appeal. The appellee,

Justin Jackson, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal because the trial court has not

signed a written order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. In its response,

the City argues that the trial court implicitly denied the City’s plea by not

dismissing the case and that the City is entitled to appeal the trial court’s refusal to

rule on the plea.



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      The time for filing an accelerated appeal runs from the date on which the

appealable order is signed. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(b). An appellate court lacks

jurisdiction over an appeal authorized by section 51.014(a) of the Texas Civil

Practice and Remedies Code unless the trial court signed a written order. See Reyes

v. Burrus, No. 08-14-00080-CV, 2014 WL 2013404, at *1 (Tex. App.—El Paso

May 14, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); State v. Nine Hundred Eighty-Two Thousand

One Hundred Ten Dollars, No. 08-11-00253-CV, 2011 WL 4068011, at *1 (Tex.

App.—El Paso Sept. 14, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re Nationwide Credit, Inc.,

No. 13-10-00007-CV, 2010 WL 596809, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb.

18, 2010, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); Hubbard-Jowers v. Starfire Enters., Ltd.,

No. 02-06-462-CV, 2007 WL 439052, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 8, 2007,

no pet.) (mem. op.); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8)

(West Supp. 2014). “The appellate timetable does not commence to run other than

by signed, written order, even when the signing of such order is purely

ministerial.” Farmer v. Ben E. Keith Co., 907 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tex. 1995).

      We lack jurisdiction because the trial court has not signed an appealable

order. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.




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      APPEAL DISMISSED.



                                           ________________________________
                                                   STEVE McKEITHEN
                                                      Chief Justice

Submitted on November 5, 2014
Opinion Delivered November 6, 2014

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.




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