UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

RAE-LEE M. LUNA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LORAL CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee,                                                 No. 95-3205

and

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES,
INCORPORATED (IBM),
Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Claude M. Hilton, District Judge.
(CA-95-478-A)

Submitted: May 14, 1996

Decided: May 31, 1996

Before NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

John M. DiJoseph, SATTLER & DIJOSEPH, Arlington, Virginia, for
Appellant. R. Mark Dare, George E. Kostel, HAZEL & THOMAS,
P.C., Falls Church, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Rae-Lee Luna appeals the district court's order granting summary
judgment to the Defendant, Loral Corporation, and dismissing her
employment retaliation action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 1994). Luna
alleged that Loral included her in a 1994 reduction in force in
response to a complaint she filed with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) in 1991.

Our review of the parties' briefs discloses this appeal is without
merit. Luna failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory
discharge.1 Luna's retaliation claim fails because she does not show
a causal connection between her filing a complaint with the EEOC
and her discharge. Not only are the events separated by over three
years, but Luna failed to present evidence specifically linking the
events.2

Moreover, even if Luna proved a prima facie case, her claim failed
because she did not show pretext. Loral contended that Luna was dis-
charged because of a general reduction in force necessitated by
Loral's reduced business contracts and that Luna was the bottom rated
employee in her work group. Luna did not dispute the truth of these
non-discriminatory reasons, but claimed that her low ranking was evi-
dence of Loral's retaliation against her. Such a response is insufficient
to establish pretext, as it does not show that Loral's proffered reasons
were false or that Loral intentionally discriminated against her. Con-
_________________________________________________________________
1 Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 460 (4th Cir. 1994); Williams v. Cer-
beronics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1989); Ross v. Communica-
tion Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985).
2 See Carter, 33 F.3d at 460 (temporal proximity between the protected
activity and the adverse employment decision is element of causality).

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sequently, we cannot say that the district court's finding of non-
discrimination was erroneous.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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