                         COURT OF APPEALS
                          SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                               FORT WORTH

                              NO. 02-10-00036-CR
                              NO. 02-10-00037-CR
                              NO. 02-10-00038-CR


DEMOND JOHNSON                                                      APPELLANT

                                        V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS                                                       STATE

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           FROM THE 367TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

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                        MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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       Appellant Demond Johnson waived his right to a jury and entered open

pleas of guilt to three charges of burglary of a habitation.2 Johnson appeals his

convictions and concurrently running sentences of ten years’ confinement. We

will affirm.


       1
        See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
       2
        See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02 (Vernon 2003).
      Johnson’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to

withdraw as counsel and a brief in support of that motion. In the brief, counsel

avers that, in his professional opinion, the appeal is frivolous. Counsel’s brief

and motion meet the requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a

professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable

grounds for relief. 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967). Johnson declined to file

a pro se brief. By letter, the State declined to submit a brief in response to the

Anders brief.

      Once an appellant’s court-appointed attorney files a motion to withdraw on

the ground that the appeal is frivolous and fulfills the requirements of Anders, this

court is obligated to undertake an independent examination of the record. See

Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v. State,

904 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may

we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–

83, 109 S. Ct. 346, 351 (1988).

      We have carefully reviewed the record and counsel’s brief. We agree with

counsel that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in

the record that might arguably support the appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178

S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Meza v. State, 206 S.W.3d

684, 685 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to

withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.



                                         2
                                   BILL MEIER
                                   JUSTICE


PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and MEIER, JJ.

DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: December 2, 2010




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