                         T.C. Memo. 2002-144



                       UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                SANDRUS L. COLLIER, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 1570-01.                 Filed June 10, 2002.



     Eric F. Horvitz and Elizabeth A. Keith, for petitioner.

     Michele A. Yates, for respondent.



             MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION


     CHIECHI, Judge:    This case arises from a request for equita-

ble relief (relief) under section 6015(f)1 with respect to peti-

tioner’s taxable years 1987 through 1991.


     1
      Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times. All
Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
                                  - 2 -

     The issues remaining for decision are:

     (1) Does the Court have jurisdiction over petitioner’s

request for relief under section 6015(f) for taxable years 1990

and 1991?   We hold that we do.

     (2) Did respondent abuse respondent’s discretion in denying

petitioner relief under section 6015(f) for taxable years 1988,

1989, 1990, and 1991 (years at issue)?2     We hold that respondent

did not.

                         FINDINGS OF FACT

     Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

     Sandrus L. Collier (Ms. Collier), resided in Herndon,

Virginia, at the time she filed the petition.

     Ms. Collier and Claiborne L. Collier IV (Mr. Collier)

married on April 1, 1978, separated in July 1992, and divorced in

January 1997.   During their marriage, Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier

had one son, Claiborne Lee Collier V, who at the time of the

trial in this case was 20 years old.

     At all relevant times, Ms. Collier knew that Mr. Collier was

the father of at least one other child who was living in Califor-

nia at all relevant times after 1987.     Ms. Collier also was aware

at all relevant times that, at least during and before 1987, Mr.

Collier had a support obligation with respect to that child and



     2
      On brief, petitioner concedes that she is not entitled to
relief under sec. 6015(f) for taxable year 1987.
                              - 3 -

that, during a period which is not disclosed by the record but

which included at least certain years prior to 1988, Mr. Collier

was in arrears with respect to that obligation.

     During the period 1987 through 1991, Ms. Collier worked as a

teacher with the Fairfax County Public School System, and Mr.

Collier worked for one or more banks, for which they received the

wages indicated:

  Year        Ms. Collier’s Wages             Mr. Collier’s Wages
  1987              $24,678                         $37,214
                                                       1
  1988               25,000
  1989               33,502                          41,130
  1990               32,689                          41,729
  1991               33,000                          41,793
     1
      The 1988 joint return is not part of the record, and the
record does not disclose the amount of Mr. Collier’s wages during
1988.

During the same period, the respective employers of Ms. Collier

and Mr. Collier withheld from their respective wages the amounts

of Federal income tax (tax) indicated:

                                                     Total Tax With-
                                                     held from Wages
         Tax Withheld from   Tax Withheld from        of Ms. Collier
           Ms. Collier’s       Mr. Collier’s             and Mr.
 Year          Wages                Wages                 Collier
 1987             0                $2,967                  $2,967
                   1                    1
 1988                                                       4,171
 1989         $3,237                  2,239                 5,476
 1990          2,859                  2,159                 5,018
                   1                    1
 1991                                                       4,628
     1
      The record does not disclose how much, if any, of the total
amount of tax withheld for taxable years 1988 and 1991 is attrib-
utable to tax withheld from Ms. Collier’s wages and how much, if
                               - 4 -

any, of such tax is attributable to tax withheld from Mr. Col-
lier’s wages.

     At the time of the trial in this case, Ms. Collier was

(1) earning approximately $60,000 a year, (2) enrolled in a

postgraduate program, (3) paying for her adult son’s college

education, and (4) caring for her sick mother.

     During periods throughout the years 1987-1991, Ms. Collier

and Mr. Collier maintained a joint checking account.    At all

relevant times, Ms. Collier was responsible for paying at least

some of the bills of Mr. Collier and herself.    However, Ms.

Collier did not always have enough money to pay certain of those

bills, and a friend (Christine Stotts) lent her undisclosed

amounts of money.

     At all relevant times, Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier kept

information relating to their financial and tax matters in one

place, and they both had access to that information.    At times

throughout the years 1987-1991, Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier

discussed their financial and tax matters.

     On April 18, 1989, Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier jointly filed

Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (Form 1040), for

1987 (1987 joint return), which they signed on September 20,

1988.   In that return, Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier reported total

tax of $6,893 and tax due of $3,926.   At the time Ms. Collier and

Mr. Collier filed the 1987 joint return, Ms. Collier did not

believe that payment was made of the $3,926 of tax due shown in
                              - 5 -

that return, and they did not pay any tax at that time.

     On June 12, 1989, respondent assessed $6,893 with respect to

the taxable year 1987 of Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier.   Respondent

applied $2,967 of tax withheld against that assessment, which

left $3,926 unpaid.

     Sometime after June 12, 1989, and before October 1991,

respondent placed a lien on a joint bank account of Ms. Collier

and Mr. Collier with respect to the unpaid assessment for their

taxable year 1987, and Ms. Collier was aware of that lien.    In

October 1991, Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier entered into an in-

stallment agreement (1991 installment agreement) with respect to

that unpaid assessment under which they made payments until June

22, 1992, that respondent applied to that assessment.   After June

22, 1992, Ms. Collier ceased making installment payments under

the 1991 installment agreement.   Mr. Collier continued to make

installment payments under the 1991 installment agreement until

December 1996, when all payments ceased.

     In separate notices dated March 25, 1996, May 12, 1997, May

11, 1998, and April 26, 1999 (April 26, 1999 notice) and ad-

dressed to Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier, respondent informed them

that respondent had applied Ms. Collier’s overpayments of tax for

1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998 in the amounts of $26, $946, $725, and

$107, respectively, against the unpaid assessment for 1987.    The

April 26, 1999 notice indicated that respondent’s application of
                                 - 6 -

Ms. Collier’s overpayment for 1998 had reduced the unpaid assess-

ment for 1987 to zero dollars.

     Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier jointly filed Form 1040 for 1988

(1988 joint return).    Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier did not pay any

tax at the time they filed the 1988 joint return.

     On August 28, 1989, respondent assessed $7,049 with respect

to the taxable year 1988 of Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier.   Respon-

dent applied $4,171 of tax withheld against that assessment,

which left $2,878 unpaid.   Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier did not

enter into an installment agreement or other arrangement to pay

the unpaid assessment for 1988.

     In a notice dated April 11, 2000, respondent informed Ms.

Collier that respondent had applied Ms. Collier’s $443 overpay-

ment for 1998 against the unpaid assessment for 1988. Sometime

thereafter, respondent applied a total of $1,165 of Ms. Collier’s

overpayments for certain other taxable years against the unpaid

assessment for 1988.3


     3
      The parties stipulated:

          27. Petitioner’s overpayment in the amount of
     $865.00 from the 2000 tax year was applied against the
     outstanding 1988 tax balance.

          28. Petitioner’s overpayment in the amount of
     $300.00 from the 2000 tax year was applied against the
     outstanding 1988 tax balance.

We believe that the foregoing stipulations are in error in
indicating that both of the overpayments to which they refer
                                                   (continued...)
                                - 7 -

     On September 3, 1991, Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier jointly

filed Form 1040 for 1989 (1989 joint return), which they signed

on August 29, 1991.    In that return, Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier

reported total tax of $10,952 and tax due of $5,554.4    At the

time Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier filed the 1989 joint return, Ms.

Collier did not believe that payment was made of the $5,554 of

tax due shown in that return, and they did not pay any tax at

that time.

     On February 3, 1992, respondent assessed $10,952 with

respect to the taxable year 1989 of Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier.

Respondent applied $5,476 of tax withheld against that assess-

ment, which left $5,476 unpaid.   Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier did

not enter into an installment agreement or other arrangement to

pay the unpaid assessment for 1989.

     Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier jointly filed Form 1040 for 1990

(1990 joint return).   Mr. Collier signed that return.   Although

Ms. Collier did not sign the 1990 joint return, she intended to

file that return jointly with Mr. Collier and did not file a

separate return for 1990.   In the 1990 joint return, Ms. Collier


     3
      (...continued)
pertain to taxable year 2000. The record does not otherwise
disclose the year to which each of those overpayments pertains.
     4
      There was a mathematical error in the computation of the
amount of tax due shown in the 1989 tax return. That return
reported total tax of $10,952 and total payments of $5,476. The
1989 joint return incorrectly reported the amount of tax due as
$5,554. The difference between $10,952 and $5,476 is $5,476.
                                - 8 -

and Mr. Collier reported total tax of $10,539 and tax due of

$5,521.   Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier did not pay any tax at the

time they filed the 1990 joint return.

     On May 20, 1991, respondent assessed $10,539 with respect to

the taxable year 1990 of Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier.    Respondent

applied $5,018 of tax withheld against that assessment, which

left $5,521 unpaid.    In November 1997, Mr. Collier entered into

an installment agreement (1997 installment agreement) with

respect to the unpaid assessment for 1990.5

     Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier jointly filed Form 1040 for 1991

(1991 joint return).   Mr. Collier signed that return.   A signa-

ture for “Sandrus Collier” appeared under the signature of Mr.

Collier in the 1991 joint return.   Ms. Collier intended to file

that return jointly with Mr. Collier and did not file a separate

return for 1991.   In the 1991 joint return, Ms. Collier and Mr.

Collier reported total tax of $12,778 and tax due of $8,528.6     At

the time Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier filed the 1991 joint return,

Ms. Collier did not believe that payment was made of the $8,528

of tax due shown in that return, and they did not pay any tax at



     5
      The record does not disclose whether Mr. Collier made any
payments under the 1997 installment agreement.
     6
      There was a mathematical error in the computation of the
amount of tax due shown in the 1991 joint return. That return
reported total tax of $12,778 and total payments of $4,628. The
1991 joint return incorrectly reported the amount of tax due as
$8,528. The difference between $12,778 and $4,628 is $8,150.
                                   - 9 -

that time.

     On May 25, 1992, respondent assessed $12,778 with respect to

the taxable year 1991 of Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier.       Respondent

applied $4,628 of tax withheld against that assessment, which

left $8,150 unpaid.   Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier did not enter

into an installment agreement or other arrangement to pay the

unpaid assessment for 1991.

     On March 16, 1996, Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier signed a

document entitled “PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AND SEPARATION AGREEMENT”

(separation agreement).       That agreement provided in pertinent

part:

             4.       WAIVER OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT

               The parties hereby waive and release any
     rights that they may have for the support and mainte-
     nance, spousal support, or alimony of themselves, and
     agree that they will at no time hereafter seek or ask,
     in any manner, any monies of any nature from one an-
     other except as set forth in this Agreement; and fur-
     ther, that if proceedings in divorce are taken by
     either of the parties, they will not in such proceed-
     ings make any such demand.

        *         *       *          *       *       *       *

            16.       DEBTS

               Except as otherwise provided herein, each
     party shall be solely responsible for any and all debts
     solely in his or her name, and shall indemnify and hold
     the other party harmless thereon.

               The Husband hereby assumes and agrees to pay
     the joint debt to the IRS in the approximate amount of
     $22,000.00 incurred by the parties prior to the execu-
     tion of this Agreement, and shall indemnify and hold
     the Wife harmless thereon.
                              - 10 -


               The Wife hereby assumes and agrees to pay the
     joint debt to Apple Federal Credit Union in the approx-
     imate amount of $10,000.00 incurred by the parties
     prior to the execution of this Agreement, and shall
     indemnify and hold the Husband harmless thereon.

     In a document entitled “JUDGMENT OF ABSOLUTE DIVORCE”

(judgment of divorce), the Circuit Court for Prince George’s

County, Maryland, ordered, inter alia, “that all the terms and

provisions of the Agreement of the parties dated the 16th day of

March, 1996 * * * be * * * incorporated, but not merged, into the

judgment by reference”.   On January 2, 1997, that court entered

that judgment of divorce.

     On April 8, 2000, Ms. Collier sent respondent the then

current version of Form 8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief

(And Separation of Liability and Equitable Relief) (Form 8857),

which respondent had instructed her to complete.7   In that form,

Ms. Collier requested relief under section 6015(b), (c), and (f).

Ms. Collier attached the following statement to Form 8857:

     Dear IRS: Request for Innocent Spouse Relief Division,

     I am requesting Innocent Spouse Relief for the FYE
     1988. I do not have a refund this year as in previous
     years. My employer has changed the month of our FYE
     from July to December. With doing this I managed to
     break even this year. I am asking for relief from
     previous years if possible. I know my ex-husband has
     applied for an offer in compromise. I do not know what
     the status of our taxes are as he seems to be very
     secretive about this. I thought he was in good stand-


     7
      On Oct. 2, 1998, Ms. Collier sent respondent a prior ver-
sion of Form 8857, in which she requested relief under sec. 6015.
                        - 11 -

ing and paying as scheduled. Only after receiving a
letter indicating a TAX LEVY, was I aware of what was
going on.

I am now legally divorced from Claiborne L. Collier,
IV, and have been separated from him since 1992. While
married to Claiborne he had increased his payroll
deductions from 3 to 12 without my knowledge during the
years 1988 through 1991. I was not aware of this
deduction until after we were divorced and I began
cleaning out old files and records. Yes, I am guilty
and I feel very foolish as not to have taken a more
responsible approach with the filing of our taxes. At
the time I had no reason not to trust him with our
financial matters, not even knowing what or how much we
might get back or owe, he did keep me in the dark. I
erred in my judgment with many aspects of our marriage
and especially with our finances. I do not have any
documentation from his place of employment during those
years, nor is his former employer, Equitable Bank of
Maryland, in business any longer. I have moved several
times as our records were either lost or thrown out.
All I have are my own tax records for the years 1992 to
the current. I have legal custody of our son and have
only claimed him and myself. I now know there are many
things I was lead to believe about the marriage and our
financial obligations that were now correct.

In 1997, I should have received a $900 federal refund
for tax FYE 96. I requested that my refunds not be
applied to any back taxes with my former husband. When
I did not hear a response, I wrote asking for it to be
applied to and accepted as paid-in-full for the Tax
period: 12-31-1987. The amount owed for the year 1988
was $818.03. However, it was not credited as paid in
full. In 1998, I should have received $725 for FYE 97
again it was applied to our 1987 and 1988 tax year.
Again I wrote asking for relief of my taxes and again
it was not.

Since 1992, I have lived up to all the IRS required
agreements of filing federal taxes on time. As a
matter of fact, I’ve tried in previous years, without
success, to not have any of my tax refunds applied to
these back taxes. I submitted legal documents and the
Form 433-F to the required departments. I think it was
either lost or misplaced in your office, because when I
called to check the status, after several months of not
                             - 12 -

     hearing a response, various employees didn’t quite know
     how to respond over the phone. The legal documents
     were copies of our divorce agreement, which includes a
     section with stipulation Clai would be responsible for
     paying our tax bills. I mailed copies of our divorce
     agreement in previous years. I was told by an attorney
     and by one of your employees, as well as by the judge
     who signed our divorce agreement, that our divorce
     settlement is a binding document. I felt it meant this
     is how the judge expected the agreement to be carried
     out, that it would be possible for me to be released
     from being directly responsible for any tax payments.
     All I’m asking is to be removed from being directly
     responsible - meaning I would not like to be a part of
     any Intent to Levy or collection. I have tried to do
     my part; I have filed on time and tried to do what is
     expected. I hope this year I will finally be able to
     be released from these taxes, or that he is able to
     finally have an off of compromise accepted. I would
     like to move on in my life without financial obliga-
     tions connected with him.

     I don’t have much, but what I do have, I’ve saved and
     struggled to acquire on my own. I am now paying for
     our son’s college education on my own. His father is
     responsible just as I am however; he is not living up
     to it. I hope you take under consideration the above
     information. Please advise in writing your decision
     and inform me on the direction to take to settle the
     above taxes.

     Again Thank you for trying to help settle a problem
     that has taken a long time to process. If you require
     additional information please feel free to contact me.
     If you have a FAX number for me to forward additional
     material please forward the number. I want to do
     whatever it takes to help the IRS help me help myself.
     I put my faith in God and you as an employee of the IRS
     to help me with a solution. [Reproduced literally.]

     On December 19, 2000, respondent sent Ms. Collier a determi-

nation letter with respect to the taxable years 1987 through 1991

of Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier.   In that letter, respondent

determined that Ms. Collier is not entitled for any of those
                                - 13 -

years to relief under section 6015(f)8 because:    (1) Ms. Collier

knew and had reason to know of the underpayment of tax for each

of the years 1987 through 1991, and (2) under all the facts and

circumstances, it would not be inequitable to hold Ms. Collier

liable for the tax for each of those years.

                                OPINION

     We first address Ms. Collier’s position that the Court lacks

jurisdiction over her request for relief under section 6015(f)

for taxable years 1990 and 1991.    In support of that position,

Ms. Collier contends that she did not jointly file tax returns

with Mr. Collier for those years.

     The Court’s jurisdiction in the instant case is dependent

upon section 6015(e)(1).9    See Ewing v. Commissioner, 118 T.C.


     8
      Respondent also denied, and Ms. Collier concedes that she
is not entitled to, relief under sec. 6015(b) and (c).
     9
      Sec. 6015(e) provides in pertinent part:

     SEC. 6015.    RELIEF FROM JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY ON
                   JOINT RETURN.

          (e) Petition for Review by Tax Court.--

               (1) In general.-–In the case of an individual
          against whom a deficiency has been asserted and
          who elects to have subsection (b) or (c) apply--

                       (A) In general.–-In addition to any
                  other remedy provided by law, the individual
                  may petition the Tax Court (and the Tax Court
                  shall have jurisdiction) to determine the
                  appropriate relief available to the individ-
                  ual under this section if such petition is
                                                      (continued...)
                             - 14 -

__, __ (2002); Fernandez v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 324, 330-331

(2000); Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 289-290 (2000).    We

conclude that the joint filing of a tax return is not a prerequi-

site to the Court’s jurisdiction under that section.10   We reject

Ms. Collier’s position that we do not have jurisdiction over

taxable years 1990 and 1991 because she did not jointly file tax

returns with Mr. Collier for those years.

     We next address Ms. Collier’s position that respondent

should not have denied her request for relief under section

6015(f) with respect to each of the taxable years 1988 through



     9
      (...continued)
               filed--

                    (i) at any time after the earlier of--

                         (I) the date the Secretary mails,
                    * * * notice of the Secretary’s final
                    determination of relief available to the
                    individual, or

                         (II) the date which is 6 months
                    after the date such election is filed
                    with the Secretary, and

                    (ii) not later than the close of the
               90th day after the date described in clause
               (i)(I).
     10
      Although our jurisdiction under sec. 6015(e)(1) is not
dependent on spouses’ jointly filing a tax return, a taxpayer is
not entitled to relief under sec. 6015 for a taxable year if such
taxpayer did not jointly file a tax return with such taxpayer’s
spouse for that year. See sec. 6015; Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1
C.B. 447, 448. We address below Ms. Collier’s contention that
she did not jointly file tax returns with Mr. Collier for 1990
and 1991.
                                   - 15 -

1991.     We review that denial of relief for abuse of discretion.

Butler v. Commissioner, supra at 291-292.     Ms. Collier bears the

burden of proving that respondent abused respondent’s discretion

in denying her relief under section 6015(f).     See Jonson v.

Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 125 (2002).

        As directed by section 6015(f),11 respondent has prescribed

procedures in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447 (Revenue

Procedure 2000-15), to be used in determining whether an individ-

ual qualifies for relief under that section.     Section 4.01 of

Revenue Procedure 2000-15 lists seven conditions (threshold

conditions) that must be satisfied before the Internal Revenue

Service (Service) will consider a request for relief under

section 6015(f).12     If a requesting spouse satisfies all of the


     11
          Sec. 6015(f) provides:

     SEC. 6015.     RELIEF FROM JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY ON
                    JOINT RETURN

          (f) Equitable relief.–-Under procedures prescribed
     by the Secretary, if--

                  (1) taking into account all the facts and
             circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the indi-
             vidual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency
             (or any portion of either); and

                  (2) relief is not available to such individ-
             ual under subsection (b) or (c),

     the Secretary may relieve such individual of such
     liability.
     12
          Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01, 2000-1 C.B. 448, provides:
                                                       (continued...)
                                - 16 -

applicable threshold conditions, section 4.01 of Revenue Proce-

dure 2000-15 provides that that spouse is entitled to relief

under section 6015(f) for all or part of the liability in ques-

tion if, taking into account all of the facts and circumstances,


     12
          (...continued)

          .01 Eligibility to be considered for equitable
     relief. All the following threshold conditions must be
     satisfied before the Service will consider a request
     for equitable relief under § 6015(f). * * *

               (1) The requesting spouse filed a joint
     return for the taxable year for which relief is sought;

               (2) Relief is not available to the requesting
     spouse under § 6015(b) or 6015(c);

               (3) The requesting spouse applies for relief
     no later than two years after the date of the Service’s
     first collection activity after July 22, 1998, with
     respect to the requesting spouse;

                  (4) * * * the liability remains unpaid. * * *

               (5) No assets were transferred between the
     spouses filing the joint return as part of a fraudulent
     scheme by such spouses;

               (6) There were no disqualified assets trans-
     ferred to the requesting spouse by the nonrequesting
     spouse. * * * For this purpose, the term “disqualified
     asset” has the meaning given such term by §
     6015(c)(4)(B); and

               (7) The requesting spouse did not file the
     return with fraudulent intent.

     A requesting spouse satisfying all the applicable
     threshold conditions set forth above may be relieved of
     all or part of the liability under § 6015(f) * * *, if,
     taking into account all the facts and circumstances,
     the Service determines that it would be inequitable to
     hold the requesting spouse liable for such liability.
                             - 17 -

the Service determines that it would be inequitable to hold the

requesting spouse liable for such liability.

     Turning to the threshold conditions of section 4.01 of

Revenue Procedure 2000-15, the parties agree or do not dispute

that Ms. Collier satisfies all of those conditions for each of

the taxable years 1988 through 1991 except Ms. Collier apparently

contends that she does not satisfy for taxable year 1990 or

taxable year 1991 the threshold condition set forth in section

4.01(1) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 (i.e., the requesting spouse

jointly filed with the nonrequesting spouse a tax return for the

taxable year for which the requesting spouse is seeking relief

under section 6015(f)).13


     13
      Ms. Collier assumes incorrectly that if the Court were to
conclude that it has jurisdiction over her claim for relief under
sec. 6015(f) for each of the taxable years 1990 and 1991, the
Court would have found that she jointly filed a tax return with
Mr. Collier for each of those years. Proceeding upon that
erroneous assumption, Ms. Collier presents her position as to
whether she is entitled for all of the taxable years at issue,
including 1990 and 1991, to relief under sec. 6015(f) pursuant to
the procedures set forth in Revenue Procedure 2000-15 by contend-
ing, in the alternative, that she jointly filed tax returns with
Mr. Collier for 1990 and 1991 and therefore satisfies the thresh-
old condition set forth in sec. 4.01(1) of Revenue Procedure
2000-15 for all of the taxable years at issue. We have held that
the joint filing of a tax return is not a prerequisite to our
jurisdiction under sec. 6015(e)(1). Consequently, in determining
whether we have jurisdiction over the taxable years 1990 and
1991, we did not address Ms. Collier’s contention that she did
not jointly file returns with Mr. Collier for those two years.
We shall now address that contention in the context of determin-
ing whether Ms. Collier satisfies the threshold condition set
forth in sec. 4.01(1) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 with respect
to each of the taxable years 1990 and 1991. Of course, if we
                                                   (continued...)
                                - 18 -

     With respect to Ms. Collier’s contention that she did not

jointly file a tax return with Mr. Collier for taxable year 1990

or taxable year 1991, the parties stipulated that Ms. Collier and

Mr. Collier filed their tax returns for those years on April 15,

1991, and April 15, 1992, respectively.    Ms. Collier argues that

we should disregard that stipulation.    In support of that argu-

ment, Ms. Collier asserts:

          A visual inspection of the 1990 and 1991 returns
     shows that petitioner did not sign the 1990 return and
     that the “Sandrus Collier” signature appearing on the
     1991 return is different from the signature on the 1987
     and 1989 returns. Both parties here must have made a
     mutual mistake when entering into the stipulation
     * * *.

     We shall not disregard the parties’ stipulations of fact

that Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier filed their tax return for each

of the taxable years 1990 and 1991 unless justice requires us to

do so.    Rule 91(e).   We conclude that justice does not require us

to disregard those stipulations.

     Assuming arguendo that Ms. Collier did not sign the 1990

joint return and the 1991 joint return, on the instant record, we

find that any such facts are not contrary to the parties’ stipu-

lations of fact that Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier filed their tax



     13
      (...continued)
were to find, contrary to the parties’ stipulation, that Ms.
Collier did not file tax returns for 1990 and 1991 jointly with
Mr. Collier, Ms. Collier would not be entitled for those years to
relief under sec. 6015(f). See sec. 6015; Rev. Proc. 2000-15,
sec. 4.01(1), 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448.
                                 - 19 -

return for each of the years 1990 and 1991.14     The determinative

factor as to whether spouses filed a joint tax return is whether

such spouses intended to file such a return.15     Where both

spouses intend that a tax return be filed as a joint return, the

absence of the signature of one spouse does not prevent their

intention from being realized.     Estate of Campbell v. Commis-

sioner, 56 T.C. 1, 12 (1971); Federbush v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.

740, 757 (1960), affd. per curiam 325 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1963); Heim

v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 270, 273 (1956), affd. 251 F.2d 44 (8th

Cir. 1958); Howell v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 859, 866 (1948),

affd. per curiam 175 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1949).

     We have found as a fact that Ms. Collier intended to, and

did, file tax returns for 1990 and 1991 jointly with Mr.

Collier.16     We have no valid basis for concluding that Ms. Col-


     14
      Moreover, we find it illogical to conclude, as Ms. Collier
would have us do, that, because she allegedly did not sign the
1990 joint return and the 1991 joint return, “Both parties * * *
[in the instant case] must have made a mutual mistake when
entering into the stipulation.”
     15
          Indeed, Ms. Collier admits on brief:

     The presence or absence of signatures on a joint return
     is not dispositive to filing status, * * * and the
     Court can find that petitioner filed joint returns even
     though she did not sign the returns at issue. * * * the
     Court will determine the non-signing spouse’s filing
     status by whether she intended to file a joint return.
     * * * [Citations omitted.]
     16
      Consistent with the parties’ stipulations of fact, Ms.
Collier testified that she filed tax returns for the years 1987
                                                   (continued...)
                             - 20 -

lier and respondent made a mutual mistake of fact in stipulating

that Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier jointly filed tax returns for

1990 and 1991.

     On the record before us, we find that Ms. Collier satisfies

for 1990 and 1991 the threshold condition set forth in section

4.01(1) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 (i.e., the requesting spouse


     16
      (...continued)
through 1991 jointly with Mr. Collier, although she inconsis-
tently testified that she did not know that a joint tax return
was being filed for taxable year 1991. Although Ms. Collier at
first testified that she did not know that a joint tax return for
1990 was being filed, she changed her testimony to state that “I
knew he [Mr. Collier] was filing jointly [for 1990], but I didn’t
know if he had filed”. We also note that Ms. Collier filed tax
returns jointly with Mr. Collier for 1987, 1988, and 1989, and
she does not contend that she did not file tax returns jointly
with him for taxable years 1979 through 1986 during which they
were married. That customary practice of filing tax returns for
years before 1990 and 1991 jointly with Mr. Collier strongly
indicates that Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier intended to file
jointly for 1990 and 1991. See Estate of Campbell v. Commis-
sioner, 56 T.C. 1, 12-13 (1971); Federbush v. Commissioner, 34
T.C. 740, 757-758 (1960), affd. per curiam 325 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1963); cf. Helfrich v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 404, 407-408 (1955)
(where there was no history of joint filing and nonsigning spouse
did not know that a joint return had been filed or prepared, the
Court was unable to conclude, without more, that the inclusion of
income attributable to nonsigning spouse was indicative of an
intent to file a joint return). We reject Ms. Collier’s claim on
brief that her practice of filing tax returns jointly with Mr.
Collier changed for taxable years 1990 and 1991. In this regard,
we note (1) that Ms. Collier did not file separate returns for
1990 and 1991, years for which she had wage income of $32,689 and
$33,000, respectively, see Howell v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 859,
866 (1948), affd. per curiam 175 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1949), and
(2) that the 1990 and 1991 joint returns reported Ms. Collier’s
respective wages for those years, and Ms. Collier’s Form W-2 was
attached to the 1990 joint return, see Federbush v. Commissioner,
supra at 756; Heim v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 270, 274 (1956),
affd. 251 F.2d 44 (8th Cir. 1958).
                              - 21 -

jointly filed a tax return for the taxable year for which the

requesting spouse is seeking relief under section 6015(f)).

     Where, as is the case here, the requesting spouse satisfies

the threshold conditions set forth in section 4.01 of Revenue

Procedure 2000-15, section 4.02 of that revenue procedure sets

forth the circumstances under which the Service ordinarily will

grant relief to that spouse under section 6015(f) in a case like

the instant case where a liability is reported in a joint return

but not paid.   As pertinent here, those circumstances, which

Revenue Procedure 2000-15 and we refer to as elements, are:

               (a) At the time relief is requested, the
     requesting spouse is no longer married to * * * the
     nonrequesting spouse    * * *

               (b) At the time the return was signed, the
     requesting spouse had no knowledge or reason to know
     that the tax would not be paid. The requesting spouse
     must establish that it was reasonable for the request-
     ing spouse to believe that the nonrequesting spouse
     would pay the reported liability. If a requesting
     spouse would otherwise qualify for relief under this
     section, except for the fact that the requesting spouse
     had no knowledge or reason to know of only a portion of
     the unpaid liability, then the requesting spouse may be
     granted relief only to the extent that the liability is
     attributable to such portion; and

               (c) The requesting spouse will suffer eco-
     nomic hardship if relief is not granted. For purposes
     of this section, the determination of whether a re-
     questing spouse will suffer economic hardship will be
     made by the Commissioner or the Commissioner’s dele-
     gate, and will be based on rules similar to those
     provided in § 301.6343-1(b)(4) of the Regulations on
     Procedure and Administration.

(We shall hereinafter refer to the elements set forth in section
                             - 22 -

4.02(1)(a), (b), and (c) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 as the

marital status element, the knowledge or reason to know element,

and the economic hardship element, respectively.)

     Section 4.02(2) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 provides that

relief granted under section 4.02(1) of that revenue procedure is

subject to the following limitations:

               (a) If the return is or has been adjusted to
     reflect an understatement of tax, relief will be avail-
     able only to the extent of the liability shown on the
     return prior to any such adjustment; and

               (b) Relief will only be available to the
     extent that the unpaid liability is allocable to the
     nonrequesting spouse.

     Turning to the three elements set forth in section 4.02(1)

of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, the presence of which will ordi-

narily result in a grant of relief under section 6015(f), respon-

dent concedes that with respect to each of the years at issue the

marital status element is present in the instant case.

     With respect to the knowledge or reason to know element set

forth in section 4.02(1)(b) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, Ms.

Collier contends that that element is present here.   In order for

the knowledge or reason to know element to be present in the

instant case, Ms. Collier must establish (1) that at the time the

joint return for each of the years at issue was signed she had no

knowledge or reason to know that the tax reported in each of

those returns would not be paid and (2) that it was reasonable

for her to believe that Mr. Collier would pay the reported tax
                              - 23 -

for each such year.

     In support of her position that the knowledge or reason to

know element is present in the instant case, Ms. Collier contends

on brief that Mr. Collier handled, and prevented her from partic-

ipating in, their financial and tax matters and never informed

her of any unpaid taxes.   In an attempt to establish those

contentions as facts, Ms. Collier relies on brief on her own

testimony and the unsworn statement of Christine Stotts (Ms.

Stotts) (Ms. Stotts’ statement), which the parties stipulated

“states her [Ms. Stotts’] personal knowledge of the relationship

between petitioner [Ms. Collier] and her ex-husband [Mr. Col-

lier].”17



     17
      Ms. Collier relies on the following portion of Ms. Stotts’
statement:

          After Sandrus and her former husband Clai, moved
     to northern Virginia, there were many occasions,
     Sandrus and her son would come stay with me for a
     couple of days, and other times I would have to loan
     her money. Clai did not always give her enough money
     to cover their bills. On one occasion while visiting
     her, Clai came in and started an argument about their
     finances. He was especially upset on receiving a certi-
     fied letter from the IRS. He blamed her because he was
     late with their taxes. Sandrus told him she had never
     been involved with the filing of their taxes before so
     why was he so upset now. When she asked to be a part
     of his decision making he told her she was too stupid
     to understand and he was not about to begin teaching
     her now. Their argument was a little too nerve rat-
     tling for me so I left. However, two or three hours
     later, she called to ask could she stay with me for a
     while. Sandrus was afraid of Clai, but stayed in the
     marriage as long as she did for their son.
                              - 24 -

     We do not find that the testimony on which Ms. Collier

relies establishes her contentions that Mr. Collier handled, and

prevented her from participating in, their financial and tax

matters and never informed her of any unpaid taxes.   Moreover, we

found Ms. Collier’s testimony to be self-serving, conclusory,

vague, inconsistent, and/or questionable in certain material

respects, and we shall not rely on it to establish her position

in this case.   Nor do we find that Ms. Stotts’ statement estab-

lishes as facts that Mr. Collier handled, and prevented Ms.

Collier from participating in, their financial and tax matters

and never informed her of any unpaid taxes.18

     We have found that (1) Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier jointly

filed a tax return for each of the years 1987 through 1991;

(2) at all relevant times Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier kept

information relating to their financial and tax matters in one

place and had access to that information; (3) at times throughout

1987-1991 Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier discussed their financial

and tax matters; (4) at all relevant times Ms. Collier was


     18
      Ms. Stotts’ statement establishes that at an undisclosed
time Mr. Collier informed Ms. Collier that they were having
problems with the Service and that Ms. Collier was involved with
financial matters of Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier at least in that
Ms. Collier was responsible for paying at least certain of their
bills, although she did not always have enough money to pay those
bills. The assertion in Ms. Stotts’ statement that “Sandrus [Ms.
Collier] told him [Mr. Collier] she had never been involved with
the filing of their taxes before so why was he so upset now” is
nothing but a recitation of what Ms. Collier stated at an undis-
closed time to Mr. Collier in the presence of Ms. Stotts.
                             - 25 -

responsible for paying at least some of the bills of Mr. Collier

and herself, although she did not always have enough money to pay

those bills; (5) during periods throughout 1987-1991 Ms. Collier

and Mr. Collier maintained a joint checking account; (6) at all

relevant times Ms. Collier knew that at least during and before

1987 Mr. Collier had a support obligation with respect to a child

of his that was not Ms. Collier’s child, and during a period

which included at least certain years prior to 1988 Mr. Collier

was in arrears with respect to that support obligation;

(7) sometime after June 12, 1989, and before October 1991,

respondent placed a lien on a joint bank account of Ms. Collier

and Mr. Collier with respect to the unpaid assessment for their

taxable year 1987, and Ms. Collier knew about that lien; (8) Ms.

Collier and Mr. Collier did not pay any tax at the respective

times they filed the joint returns for the taxable years 1987

through 1991; (9) at the time Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier filed

the 1987 joint return Ms. Collier did not believe that payment

was made of the $3,926 of tax due shown in that return; (10) at

the time Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier filed the 1989 joint return

Ms. Collier did not believe that payment was made of the $5,554

of tax due shown in that return; and (11) at the time Ms. Collier

and Mr. Collier filed the 1991 joint return Ms. Collier did not

believe that payment was made of the $8,528 of tax due shown in

that return.
                             - 26 -

     On the record before us, we find that Ms. Collier has failed

to carry her burden of establishing that with respect to each of

the years at issue the knowledge or reason to know element set

forth in section 4.02(1)(b) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 is

present here.

     With respect to the economic hardship element set forth in

section 4.02(1)(c) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, Ms. Collier

contends that that element is present here.   According to Ms.

Collier, if she were to pay the unpaid assessment for each of the

years at issue, she would suffer economic hardship.    That is

because she claims that she has significant financial obligations

consisting of paying for her adult son’s college education, her

own postgraduate work, and the care of her mother.19

     In determining whether a requesting spouse will suffer

economic hardship, section 4.02(1)(c) of Revenue Procedure 2000-

15 requires reliance on rules similar to those provided in

section 301.6343-1(b)(4), Proced. & Admin. Regs.   Section

301.6343-1(b)(4)(i), Proced. & Admin. Regs., generally provides

that an individual suffers an economic hardship if the individual

is unable to pay his or her reasonable basic living expenses.

Section 301.6343-1(b)(4), Proced. & Admin. Regs., provides:

          (ii) Information from taxpayer. In determining a
     reasonable amount for basic living expenses the direc-


     19
      Ms. Collier also points out that she is not receiving
spousal support or alimony from Mr. Collier.
                             - 27 -

     tor will consider any information provided by the
     taxpayer including–-

               (A) The taxpayer’s age, employment status and
     history, ability to earn, number of dependents, and
     status as a dependent of someone else;

               (B) The amount reasonably necessary for food,
     clothing, housing (including utilities, home-owner
     insurance, home-owner dues, and the like), medical
     expenses (including health insurance), transportation,
     current tax payments (including federal, state, and
     local), alimony, child support, or other court-ordered
     payments, and expenses necessary to the taxpayer’s
     production of income (such as dues for a trade union or
     professional organization, or child care payments which
     allow the taxpayer to be gainfully employed);

               (C) The cost of living in the geographic area
     in which the taxpayer resides;

               (D) The amount of property exempt from levy
     which is available to pay the taxpayer’s expenses;

               (E) Any extraordinary circumstances such as
     special education expenses, a medical catastrophe, or
     natural disaster; and

               (F) Any other factor that the taxpayer claims
     bears on economic hardship and brings to the attention
     of the director. [Sec. 301.6343-1(b)(4)(ii), Proced. &
     Admin. Regs.]

     Assuming arguendo that the expenses claimed by Ms. Collier

(i.e., expenses relating to her adult son’s college education,

her own postgraduate work, and the care of her mother) qualify as

basic living expenses within the meaning of section 301.6343-

1(b)(4), Proced. & Admin. Regs.,20 Ms. Collier presented no


     20
      We are persuaded on the record before us that the expenses
for the care by Ms. Collier of her mother qualify as basic living
expenses within the meaning of that regulation. However, as
                                                   (continued...)
                             - 28 -

evidence as to the amounts of such claimed expenses.   On the

instant record, we find that Ms. Collier has failed to carry her

burden of showing that the amounts of such expenses, when added

to the amounts of her other expenses that qualify as basic living

expenses within the meaning of that regulation, are reasonable.21

     On the record before us, we find that Ms. Collier has failed

to carry her burden of establishing that respondent’s determina-

tion to deny her relief, in whole or in part, for each of the

years at issue will cause her to be unable to pay a reasonable

amount for basic living expenses within the meaning of section

301.6343-1(b)(4), Proced. & Admin. Regs.   On that record, we find

that Ms. Collier has failed to carry her burden of establishing

that with respect to each of the years at issue the economic

hardship element set forth in section 4.02(1)(c) of Revenue

Procedure 2000-15 is present in the instant case.

     On the record before us, we find that Ms. Collier has failed

to carry her burden of establishing that with respect to each of


     20
      (...continued)
discussed below, Ms. Collier has failed to establish the amounts
that she spends for, inter alia, food, clothing, housing, and
medical care for her mother.
     21
      As for Ms. Collier’s contention that she does not receive
spousal support or alimony from Mr. Collier, the record estab-
lishes Ms. Collier’s ability to earn a living. At the time of
the trial in this case, Ms. Collier was earning approximately
$60,000 a year. We also note that Ms. Collier appears to have a
right of indemnification against Mr. Collier for the payment of
certain tax liabilities under their separation agreement and
judgment of divorce.
                               - 29 -

the years at issue all of the elements set forth in section

4.02(1) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 under which the Service will

ordinarily grant equitable relief under section 6015(f) are

present in the instant case.

     Although Ms. Collier has not shown that she qualifies for

relief under section 4.02(1) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, the

Service may nonetheless grant relief to her under section 4.03 of

that revenue procedure.   That section provides a partial list of

positive and negative factors which respondent is to take into

account in considering whether respondent will grant an individ-

ual full or partial equitable relief under section 6015(f).   No

single factor is to be determinative in any particular case; all

factors are to be considered and weighed appropriately; and the

list of factors is not intended to be exhaustive.   Rev. Proc.

2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448.

     Turning to the partial list of positive factors set forth in

section 4.03(1) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 that weigh in favor

of relief,22 Ms. Collier contends that each of those factors is


     22
      As pertinent here, sec. 4.03(1) of Revenue Procedure 2000-
15 provides:

          (1) Factors weighing in favor of relief. The
     factors weighing in favor of relief include, but are
     not limited to, the following:

               (a) Marital status. The requesting spouse is
     * * * divorced from the nonrequesting spouse.

                                                    (continued...)
                               - 30 -

present in the instant case.

     The parties do not dispute that the marital status positive

factor, the economic hardship positive factor, and the knowledge

or reason to know positive factor set forth in section

4.03(1)(a), (b), and (d), respectively, of Revenue Procedure



     22
      (...continued)
               (b) Economic hardship. The requesting spouse
     would suffer economic hardship (within the meaning of
     section 4.02(1)(c) of this revenue procedure) if relief
     from liability is not granted.

               (c) Abuse. The requesting spouse was abused
     by the nonrequesting spouse, but such abuse did not
     amount to duress.

               (d) No knowledge or reason to know. In the
     case of a liability that was properly reported but not
     paid, the requesting spouse did not know and had no
     reason to know that the liability would not be paid.
     * * *

               (e) Nonrequesting spouse’s legal obligation.
     The nonrequesting spouse has a legal obligation pursu-
     ant to a divorce decree or agreement to pay the out-
     standing liability. This will not be a factor weighing
     in favor of relief if the requesting spouse knew or had
     reason to know, at the time the divorce decree or
     agreement was entered into, that the nonrequesting
     spouse would not pay the liability.

               (f) Attributable to nonrequesting spouse.
     The liability for which relief is sought is solely
     attributable to the nonrequesting spouse.

(We shall hereinafter refer to the positive factors set forth in
sec. 4.03(1)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of Revenue Procedure
2000-15 as the marital status positive factor, the economic
hardship positive factor, the abuse positive factor, the knowl-
edge or reason to know positive factor, the legal obligation
positive factor, and the attribution positive factor, respec-
tively.)
                               - 31 -

2000-15 are the same as the marital status element, the economic

hardship element, and the knowledge or reason to know element set

forth in section 4.02(1)(a), (c), and (b), respectively, of that

revenue procedure.

     With respect to the marital status positive factor set forth

in section 4.03(1)(a) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, respondent

concedes that with respect to each of the years at issue that

factor is present in the instant case.

     With respect to the economic hardship positive factor and

the knowledge or reason to know positive factor set forth in

section 4.03(1)(b) and (d), respectively, of Revenue Procedure

2000-15, we have found that Ms. Collier has failed to carry her

burden of showing that with respect to each of the years at issue

the economic hardship element and the knowledge or reason to know

element set forth in section 4.02(1)(c) and (b), respectively, of

Revenue Procedure 2000-15 are present in the instant case.    On

the instant record, we further find that Ms. Collier has failed

to carry her burden of establishing that with respect to each of

the years at issue the economic hardship positive factor and the

knowledge or reason to know positive factor set forth in section

4.03(1)(b) and (d), respectively, of that revenue procedure are

present in the instant case.

     With respect to the abuse positive factor set forth in

section 4.03(1)(c) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, Ms. Collier
                                 - 32 -

maintains that she was abused by Mr. Collier in that she suffered

from constant verbal and mental abuse from Mr. Collier during her

marriage to him.     In support of that contention, Ms. Collier

relies on Ms. Stotts’ statement and the unsworn statement of a

psychiatrist, Ronald J. Garson, M.D. (Dr. Garson’s statement).

As for Ms. Stotts’ statement, Ms. Stotts provides her opinion in

that statement that Mr. Collier “caused mental and verbal abuse

to both Sandrus [Ms. Collier] and their son” (Ms. Stotts’ opin-

ion).23     We are unwilling to rely on Ms. Stotts’ opinion, which

we find to be conclusory and lacking in any specificity as to the

facts on which she bases her conclusion.        As for Dr. Garson’s

statement, all that statement contains is the following:

          Ms. Sandrus Collier has been under my [Dr.
     Garson’s] care for treatment of depression since Janu-
     ary, 1993. At that time, she was dealing with the
     stress of separation and divorce. Subsequently, she
     recovered from the depression and is now much improved.

Dr. Garson’s statement makes no reference to Ms. Collier’s having

been abused by Mr. Collier.     We do not find that Dr. Garson’s

statement establishes that Mr. Collier abused Ms. Collier during



     23
          According to Ms. Stotts’ statement,

     While Sandrus [Ms. Collier] and Clai [Mr. Collier] were
     married and even after their separation, Clai caused
     mental and verbal abuse to both Sandrus and their son,
     Rusty (Clai V). Sandrus began therapy soon after
     separating from Clai. She had become a co-dependent of
     Clai’s behavior and actions. He had so much control
     over her that it was very hard for her to “break away”.
     * * *
                               - 33 -

their marriage.   On the record before us, we find that Ms.

Collier has failed to carry her burden of showing that with

respect to each of the years at issue the abuse positive factor

set forth in section 4.03(1)(c) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 is

present in the instant case.

     With respect to the legal obligation positive factor set

forth in section 4.03(1)(e) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, respon-

dent concedes that with respect to each of the years at issue

that factor is present in the instant case.

     With respect to the attribution positive factor set forth in

section 4.03(1)(f) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, Ms. Collier

maintains on brief that the unpaid assessment for each of the

years at issue is solely attributable to Mr. Collier because he

“was claiming approximately 10-12 allowances, which resulted in

significant underpayments of tax.”      In support of her position on

brief, Ms. Collier relies on the following testimony that she

gave on cross-examination:    “I found out later that he had like

ten to 12 [sic] deductions.    After our separation, in going

through records I found this information.”     We believe that the

foregoing testimony of Ms. Collier pertains only to the taxable

year 1989.24   Even if Ms. Collier had intended her testimony


     24
      In this connection, Ms. Collier’s testimony that she
“found out later that he [Mr. Collier] had like ten to 12 [sic]
deductions” was elicited by respondent on cross-examination after
the following cross-examination with respect to taxable year
                                                   (continued...)
                                - 34 -

regarding the “ten to 12 [sic] deductions” that she claims Mr.

Collier was taking pertained to 1989 as well as to other years,

it is not clear to which other years her testimony relates.

Moreover, Ms. Collier’s testimony regarding Mr. Collier’s with-

holding is uncorroborated and conclusory, and we are unwilling to

rely on it to establish her contention that for each of the

taxable years at issue Mr. Collier “was claiming approximately

10-12 allowances, which resulted in significant underpayments of




     24
          (...continued)
1989:

          Q    However, when you compare the wages you
     earned to the withholding amounts percentage wise did
     you realize that for the 1989 year you had 30 percent
     of withholdings?

          A    I didn’t understand tax situations, so I
     didn’t know that I did not have enough taken out. I
     thought I had did what was correct until after filing
     and seeing these papers. Then I realized that it
     wasn’t enough taken out.

             Q    Did you take out enough for one person?

          A    I thought I was doing enough for myself, not
     doing it as a couple, because he was taking out his
     own, and I was taking out mine.

             Q    And about how many were you taking out at the
     time?

          A    Just for myself. He was doing our son. He
     was adding--I found out later he had like ten to 12
     deductions. After our separation, in going through
     records I found this information. [Reproduced liter-
     ally.]
                             - 35 -

tax.”25

     The record establishes the amount of tax withheld from the

respective wages of Ms. Collier and Mr. Collier for only two of

the taxable years at issue, i.e., 1989 and 1990.   The record does

not establish the tax withheld from either Ms. Collier’s wages or

Mr. Collier’s wages for taxable years 1988 and 1991.26   On the

instant record, we find that Ms. Collier has failed to carry her

burden of showing that the unpaid liability for each of the years

at issue is solely attributable to Mr. Collier’s allegedly having

claimed an excessive number of withholding allowances.

     On the record before us, we find that Ms. Collier has failed

to carry her burden of establishing that with respect to each of

the years at issue the attribution positive factor set forth in

section 4.03(1)(f) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 is present in the

instant case.

     Turning to the negative factors set forth in section 4.03(2)

of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 that weigh against relief,27 Ms.


     25
      Assuming arguendo that Mr. Collier had claimed 10 to 12
withholding allowances for each of the taxable years at issue,
the record does not disclose whether or not Mr. Collier would
have had a valid reason for claiming such number of allowances.
     26
      For taxable years 1988 and 1991, the record establishes
only the total tax withheld from the wages of Ms. Collier and Mr.
Collier.
     27
      As pertinent here, sec. 4.03(2) of Revenue Procedure 2000-
15 provides:

                                                    (continued...)
                             - 36 -

Collier contends that none of those factors is present in the

instant case.

     The parties agree or do not dispute that the knowledge or


     27
      (...continued)
          (2) Factors weighing against relief. The factors
     weighing against relief include, but are not limited
     to, the following:

               (a) Attributable to the requesting spouse.
     The unpaid liability * * * is attributable to the
     requesting spouse.

               (b) Knowledge, or reason to know. A request-
     ing spouse knew or had reason to know * * * that the
     reported liability would be unpaid at the time the
     return was signed. This is an extremely strong factor
     weighing against relief. * * *

               (c) Significant benefit. The requesting
     spouse has significantly benefitted (beyond normal
     support) from the unpaid liability * * *.

               (d) Lack of economic hardship. The request-
     ing spouse will not experience economic hardship (with-
     in the meaning of section 4.02(1)(c) of this revenue
     procedure) if relief from the liability is not granted.

               (e) Noncompliance with federal income tax
     laws. The requesting spouse has not made a good faith
     effort to comply with federal income tax laws in the
     tax years following the tax year or years to which the
     request for relief relates.

               (f) Requesting spouse’s legal obligation.
     The requesting spouse has a legal obligation pursuant
     to a divorce decree or agreement to pay the liability.

(We shall hereinafter refer to the negative factors set forth in
sec. 4.03(2)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) of Revenue Procedure
2000-15 as the attribution negative factor, the knowledge or
reason to know negative factor, the significant benefit negative
factor, the economic hardship negative factor, the noncompliance
negative factor, and the legal obligation negative factor,
respectively.)
                                - 37 -

reason to know negative factor, the economic hardship negative

factor, and the legal obligation negative factor set forth in

section 4.03(2)(b), (d), and (f), respectively, of Revenue

Procedure 2000-15 are the opposites of the knowledge or reason to

know positive factor, the economic hardship positive factor, and

the legal obligation positive factor set forth in section

4.03(1)(d), (b), and (e), respectively, of that revenue proce-

dure.     The attribution negative factor set forth in section

4.03(2)(a) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 is essentially the

opposite of the attribution positive factor set forth in section

4.03(1)(f) of that revenue procedure.28    We have found above that

Ms. Collier has failed to carry her burden of establishing that

with respect to each of the years at issue the economic hardship

positive factor and the knowledge or reason to know positive

factor set forth in section 4.03(1)(b) and (d), respectively, of

Revenue Procedure 2000-15 are present in the instant case.       On

the instant record, we further find that petitioner has failed to

carry her burden of establishing that with respect to each of the

years at issue the economic hardship negative factor and the



     28
      Although we do not believe that those two factors are
exactly opposite because the attribution negative factor does not
contain the word “solely” that appears in the attribution posi-
tive factor, we conclude that respondent’s use of the word
“solely” in describing the attribution positive factor but not in
describing the attribution negative factor does not affect our
findings and conclusions with respect to those factors in the
instant case.
                             - 38 -

knowledge or reason to know negative factor set forth in section

4.03(2)(d) and (b), respectively, of that revenue procedure are

not present in the instant case.

     With respect to the attribution negative factor set forth in

section 4.03(2)(a) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, we have found

above that Ms. Collier has failed to carry her burden of showing

that the unpaid liability for each of the years at issue is

solely attributable to Mr. Collier’s allegedly having claimed an

excessive number of withholding allowances.   Ms. Collier prof-

fered no reliable evidence to show that no portion of the unpaid

liability for each of the years at issue is attributable to her.

On the record before us, we find that Ms. Collier has failed to

carry her burden of establishing that with respect to each of the

years at issue the attribution negative factor set forth in

section 4.03(2)(a) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 is not present in

the instant case.

     With respect to the significant benefit negative factor set

forth in section 4.03(2)(c) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, Ms.

Collier contends on brief that she did not significantly benefit

from the unpaid assessment for each of the years at issue be-

cause, inter alia:

     [Mr. Collier] failed to support petitioner and their
     son adequately, resulting in her having to borrow money
     from friends on occasion. Moreover, there were times
     that petitioner could not even pay the household bills
     at times due to her husband’s controlling of the fam-
     ily’s money. [Internal references omitted.]
                              - 39 -

In support of her contention that she did not significantly

benefit from the unpaid assessment for each of the years at

issue, Ms. Collier relies on brief on Ms. Stotts’ statement

quoted supra note 17, in which Ms. Stotts states, inter alia,

that she lent Ms. Collier undisclosed amounts of money and that

“[Mr. Collier] did not always give her [Ms. Collier] enough money

to cover their bills” that Ms. Collier was responsible for

paying.   We are unwilling to rely on the foregoing vague state-

ments of Ms. Stotts to establish that Ms. Collier did not signif-

icantly benefit within the meaning of section 4.03(2)(c) of

Revenue Procedure 2000-15 from the unpaid assessment for each of

the years at issue.   We have rejected above Ms. Collier’s conten-

tion that Mr. Collier handled, and prevented her from participat-

ing in, their financial and tax matters.   We have found above

that (1) at all relevant times Ms. Collier was responsible for

paying at least some of the bills of Mr. Collier and herself,

although she did not always have enough money to pay those bills

and that (2) during periods throughout 1987-1991 Ms. Collier and

Mr. Collier maintained a joint checking account.   We find on the

instant record that the facts that Ms. Stotts lent Ms. Collier

undisclosed amounts of money and that Ms. Collier did not always

have enough money to pay the bills that she was responsible for

paying are not determinative of whether Ms. Collier significantly

benefited from the unpaid assessment for each of the years at
                               - 40 -

issue.    On the record before us, we find that Ms. Collier has

failed to carry her burden of establishing that with respect to

each of the years at issue the significant benefit negative

factor set forth in section 4.03(2)(c) of Revenue Procedure 2000-

15 is not present in the instant case.

     With respect to the noncompliance negative factor set forth

in section 4.03(2)(e) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, Ms. Collier

makes no argument addressing that factor.29   On the record before

us, we find that Ms. Collier has failed to carry her burden of

establishing that with respect to each of the years at issue the

noncompliance negative factor is not present in the instant case.

     With respect to the legal obligation negative factor set

forth in section 4.03(2)(f) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, respon-

dent concedes that Mr. Collier has a legal obligation pursuant to

a divorce decree or agreement to pay the outstanding liability

for each of the years at issue.   Consequently, respondent con-

cedes that with respect to each of the years at issue the legal

obligation negative factor set forth in section 4.03(2)(f) of

Revenue Procedure 2000-15 is not present in the instant case.


     29
      Although Ms. Collier makes no argument with respect to the
noncompliance negative factor set forth in sec. 4.03(2)(e) of
Revenue Procedure 2000-15, the record establishes that respondent
applied certain of Ms. Collier’s overpayments of tax for taxable
year 1995 and thereafter against the unpaid assessment for
taxable years 1987 and 1988. The record contains no evidence
with respect to the taxable years 1992 through 1994, although it
does establish that after June 22, 1992, Ms. Collier ceased
making installment payments under the 1991 installment agreement.
                             - 41 -

     On the record before us, we find that Ms. Collier has failed

to carry her burden of establishing any other factors with

respect to any of the years at issue that weigh in favor of

granting relief under section 6015(f) and that are not set forth

in sections 4.02(1) and 4.03(1) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15.

     Based upon our examination of the entire record before us,

we find that Ms. Collier has failed to carry her burden of

showing that respondent abused respondent’s discretion in denying

her relief under section 6015(f) with respect to the unpaid

assessment for each of the years at issue.

     We have considered all of the contentions and arguments of

Ms. Collier that are not discussed herein, and we find them to be

without merit and/or irrelevant.

     To reflect the foregoing and the concession of Ms. Collier

as to taxable year 1987,

                                        Decision will be entered

                                   for respondent.
