
77 U.S. 33 (1869)
10 Wall. 33
BATES
v.
EQUITABLE INSURANCE COMPANY
Supreme Court of United States.

*35 Mr. Goodrich, for the plaintiff in error.
Messrs. W.H. Potter and A.H. Brown, contra.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
One of the conditions of the policy was that if the property insured should be sold or conveyed, the risk assumed ceased, *36 and the policy became void; and there can be no doubt that, looking to both the provisions of a policy, such as this one contained, and which are cited in the statement of the case, it ceases to be binding when the assured parts with his interest in the property insured, unless the company be notified of the sale. When this is done before a loss happens, the company is bound to refund a part of the prepaid premium, to be apportioned in reference to the unexpired time for which the policy was given.
If, however, the purchaser and the assured ask it, and the company consent to it, the policy may continue for the benefit of the purchaser. This latter proposition is founded upon the knowledge of the sale, and upon the consent of the company to accept the purchaser as the party whose interest is insured, instead of the vendor who was originally insured.
As there is no evidence, outside of the two indorsements, already quoted from the policy,[*] that there was any consent to accept Bates, the purchaser, as the party whose interest was insured, and as the presumption, if there is one arising from those indorsements of a notice of sale, is not supported by anything else, it becomes important to determine what those indorsements imply on those two points.
If Philbrick could not, in law or in fact, have directed the payment of the loss, if one should occur to him, as owner of the property, to another party, with the consent of the company, then it would be a reasonable inference that the indorsement made by him implied a sale of his interest. But if he could make, with the consent of the company, a valid appointment that any loss, covered by the policy should be paid to a third person, though he remained the owner of the goods, and the loss was his loss, then the indorsement of Philbrick does not necessarily convey the idea of a sale, nor the consent of the company imply a consent to a sale.
Now, it is a well known and frequent thing in insurance business, for a person to insure his life, or his property, and either in the policy itself, or by indorsement at the time it *37 is made, or by subsequent indorsement, to which the consent of the company is generally required, to direct the loss to be paid to some third party. And this is done in language similar, if not identical with that used in this case. It is a mode of appointing that the loss of the party insured shall be paid by the company to such third person. This transaction is a very common mode of furnishing a species of security by a debtor to his creditor, who may be willing to trust to the debtor's honesty, his skill and success in trade, but who requires indemnity against such accidents as loss by fire, or the perils of navigation. The property of the debtor at risk being thus insured for the benefit of the creditor, gives him this indemnity.
In the face of this frequent use of the two indorsements on the policy, it cannot be held that they imply of themselves a knowledge of the sale or a consent to insure the purchaser.
If it could be shown that it had been the course of dealing, between these particular parties, to recognize the indorsement of the party first assured as evidence of a sale, and the indorsement of the company as a consent to the sale; or if it could be shown that by custom and usage, in any particular place, these indorsements were so treated, the case might be different; but, in the absence of such usage or custom, we can see in these indorsements nothing more than the direction of Philbrick, and the consent of the company, that any loss sustained by Philbrick, covered by that policy, should be paid to Bates. As Philbrick did not have any interest in the goods when the fire occurred, he sustained no loss, and the policy covered none.
The analogy of the effect of such indorsements on promissory notes, in assigning the notes to the indorser, is very imperfect. In such case the sum mentioned in the note is payable absolutely, and without regard to the interest of the original payee in any other matter. It is all contained in the note whose contents, to use the language of the Judiciary Act, are thus made payable to the indorsee, and the indorser necessarily parts with his interest in the subject-matter of the contract.
*38 These views are well supported by recently adjudged cases in this country.[*]
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[*]  Supra, p. 34, REP.
[*]  Fogg v. Middlesex Manufacturing Co., 10 Cushing, 346; Hale v. M. & F. Ins. Co., 6 Gray, 169; Young v. Eagle Ins. Co., 14 Id. 153; Grosvenor v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 17 New York, 391; State Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 31 Pennsylvania State, 438.
