                                                                                ACCEPTED
                                                                           07-14-00360-CR
                                                              SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                        AMARILLO, TEXAS
                                                                       7/9/2015 8:48:23 PM
                                                                          Vivian Long, Clerk


                     NO. 07-14-00360-CR

                          IN THE                          FILED IN
                    COURT OF APPEALS               7th COURT OF APPEALS
                                                     AMARILLO, TEXAS
                SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT          7/9/2015 8:48:23 PM
                     AMARILLO, TEXAS                    VIVIAN LONG
             _________________________________             CLERK


                       SHELLY BLAIR
                             V.
                   THE STATE OF TEXAS
             _________________________________

        ON APPEAL FROM THE 364TH DISTRICT COURT
               OF LUBBOCK COUNTY, TEXAS
                   CAUSE NO. 2014-401,146
             _________________________________

                   BRIEF FOR THE STATE
             _________________________________

                                MATTHEW D. POWELL
                                Criminal District Attorney
                                Lubbock County, Texas

                                K. SUNSHINE STANEK
                                AMANDA MCKINNEY SAY
                                CHRISTOPHER SCHULTE
                                Assistant Criminal District Attorneys

ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED            LAUREN MURPHREE
                                Assistant Criminal District Attorney
                                Lubbock County, Texas
                                State Bar No. 24085059
                                P.O. Box 10536, Lubbock, TX 79408
                                Phone (806)775-1100
                                FAX: (806)775-7930
                                E-mail: LMurphree@lubbockcda.com
                                (On Appeal)
                                ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE
                          Identity of Parties and Counsel

Appellant:

       Shelly Blair

Appellant’s trial attorneys:

       Mike Brown, 1601 Broadway, Lubbock, TX 79401; phone (806)763-9493; fax
       (806)744-5411.

       Audie Reese, 1616 Texas Avenue, Suite 4, Lubbock, TX 79401; (806)747-5676.

Appellant’s appellate counsel:

       Jesse Mendez, 2833 74th St., Lubbock, TX 79423; phone (806)748-5287; fax
       (806)748-5256.

State of Texas:

At trial:

       K. Sunshine Stanek, Amanda Say, Christopher Schulte, Assistant Criminal
       District Attorneys, Lubbock County Criminal District Attorney’s Office, P.O.
       Box 10536, Lubbock, Texas 79408; phone (806) 775-1100; fax (806)775-7930

On appeal:

       Lauren Murphree, Assistant Criminal District Attorney, Lubbock County
       Criminal District Attorney’s Office, P.O. Box 10536, Lubbock, Texas 79408;
       phone (806) 775-1100; fax (806)775-7930

Trial Judge:

       Honorable Cecil Puryear, Presiding Judge, sitting by assignment, 364th District
       Court of Lubbock County, Texas, Lubbock County Courthouse, 904
       Broadway, Lubbock, TX 79401
                                                     Table of Contents
                                                                                                                             PAGE

Identity of Parties and Counsel ................................................................................................ i

Table of Contents ...................................................................................................................... ii

Table of Authorities ................................................................................................................. iv

Statement of the Case ............................................................................................................... 1

Statement of the Facts .............................................................................................................. 1

Summary of the Argument ...................................................................................................... 5

Argument and Authorities........................................................................................................7

First Issue Presented: Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that she intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused
bodily injury to Officer Matsik. Where the jury heard testimony that Appellant
accelerated just before hitting Officer Matsik, and that after the offense Appellant told
people that she “did it” because she did not want to get caught, and that she killed a
cop, is the evidence sufficient to show that—at the very least—Appellant knew of the
risk of her conduct and consciously disregarded that risk when she struck Officer
Matsik? ……………………………………………………………………………...7
Standard of Review …………………….………………………………………………7
I. APPELLANT CANNOT PROVE THAT THE VERDICT IS SO CONTRARY TO
THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AS TO BE CLEARLY WRONG

AND UNJUST ………………………………………………………………………....8

          A. Appellant’s statements after the offense support a finding of knowing or
          intentional conduct .....................................................................................................10



                                                                    ii
           B. Appellant’s reckless driving at a high rate of speed, illegal passing, failure to
           maintain a single lane, and failure to stop and render aid when she struck
           Officer Matsik support—at the very least—a finding of recklessness................13
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................15
Conclusion and Prayer ...........................................................................................................15

Certificate of Service ..............................................................................................................16

Certificate of Compliance .....................................................................................................16




                                                                      iii
                                            Table of Authorities


SUPREME COURT CASE LAW                                                                                        PAGE
Jackson v. Virginia,
  443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ....................................................... 7


TEXAS CASE LAW
Brooks v. State,
  323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ............................................................................ 7
Brown v. State,
  91 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002, no pet.) .....................................................10
Dewberry v. State,
  4 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ................................................................................. 8
Dobbins v. State,
  228 S.W.3d 761(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. dism'd .........................11
Hart v. State,
  89 S.W.3d 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ................................................................................. 9
Hartsfield v. State,
  305 S.W.3d 859(Tex. App. Texarkana 2010), reh'g overruled (Mar. 9, 2010) ....... 9, 10
Henderson v. State,
  825 S.W.2d 746(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, pet. ref'd ..............................11
Herrero v. State,
  124 S.W.3d 827 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref'd) ............... 9, 10, 11
Lucio v. State,
  351 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) ............................................................................ 7



                                                           iv
Rodriguez v. State,
  129 S.W.3d 551 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref'd) ...............................11
Smith v. State,
  965 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) ............................................................................ 9
Williams v. State,
  235 S.W.3d 742 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ..........................................................................13


TEXAS RULES AND STATUTES
TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(a) ..................................................................................................10
TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(b) ..................................................................................................10
TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(c) ..................................................................................................13
TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.02(a)(2), (b)(2)(B) ............................................................................ 9
TEX. R. APP. P. 3.2....................................................................................................................vi
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(1) ..........................................................................................................16
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(3) ..........................................................................................................16




                                                                   v
                                   NO. 07-14-00360-CR

                                        IN THE
                                  COURT OF APPEALS
                              SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
                                   AMARILLO, TEXAS
                           _________________________________

                                     SHELLY BLAIR
                                           V.
                                 THE STATE OF TEXAS
                           _________________________________

                                 BRIEF FOR THE STATE
                           _________________________________



To the Honorable Court of Appeals:

          The State of Texas, the prosecuting authority in Cause No. 2014-401,146 in the

364th District Court of Lubbock County, and Appellee before the Seventh Court of

Appeals, respectfully submits this brief in reply to the brief filed by Appellant

appealing his conviction for the offense of Aggravated Assault on a Public Servant.

The parties will be referred to as “Appellant” and “State.”1




1
    TEX. R. APP. P. 3.2.


                                            vi
                                 Statement of the Case

                Appellant was indicted for the offense of Aggravated Assault on a Public

Servant on January 22, 2014. (Clerk’s Record (CR) p. 8). Following a four-day trial,

from September 29, 2014 to October 2, 2014, Appellant was found guilty of the

offense as indicted. (CR p. 87). The trial court assessed punishment at fifty years

imprisonment and certified that Appellant has the right of appeal. (CR pp. 79, 97).



                                 Statement of the Facts

        Narcotics officers with the Lubbock Police Department were conducting

surveillance on a warehouse on January 10, 2014, when they observed a gray vehicle

driven by a white male and a white female passenger approach the warehouse.2 After

pulling up next to the officer’s vehicle and attempting to look inside, the individuals in

the gray vehicle knocked on the warehouse door and went inside.3 Noting the officers

outside, the driver of the vehicle told his counterpart inside the warehouse—William

Trae Groessbeck—that he was going to leave and wasn’t going to stop.4 Eventually,

the male and female returned to the gray vehicle and left the parking lot.5 This




2
  (RR vol. 4, pp. 31-32).
3
  (RR vol. 4, pp. 32-33).
4
  (RR vol. 5, pp. 186-87).
5
  (RR vol. 4 p. 38).

                                            vii
information was relayed by surveilling officers to Officer Matsik, who began to follow

the gray vehicle.6

        Once behind the vehicle, Officer Matsik activated his emergency lights to

perform a traffic stop.7 The gray vehicle began to pick up speed, and a high-speed

chase ensued in central Lubbock.8 At approximately 52nd Street and Slide Road, the

high speed chase ended when the driver of the gray vehicle crashed his vehicle into

Officer Matsik’s, and the driver fled on foot.9 Officer Matsik followed.10 The driver,

who was running very quickly—even breaking through a fence at one point during the

pursuit—ran through backyards and wove through alleys as he attempted to evade

Officer Matsik.11 The female passenger remained with the vehicle and drove away.12

        As the male suspect turned onto Utica Avenue from the east via an alley,

Officer Matsik observed a mail truck driving north down Utica swerve to miss him.13




6
  (RR vol. 4, pp. 38-40).
7
  (RR vol. 5, p. 58).
8
  (RR vol. 5, pp. 58-62).
9
  (RR vol. 5, pp. 62, 79).
10
   (RR vol. 5, p. 62).
11
   (RR vol. 4, pp. 50-51).
12
   (RR vol. 4, p. 56).
13
   The exhibit, admitted at trial, is useful in visualizing the scene as it was described at trial.
                                                      2
14



        The driver of the mail truck, Gary Davis, drove very slowly as he saw the gray

vehicle approaching at a high rate of speed from behind.15 At the same time, Officer

Matsik emerged from the alley and once again saw the gray vehicle—this time coming

directly towards him.16 To Davis’s surprise, the gray vehicle passed the mail truck on


14
   (State’s Ex. 80).
15
   (RR vol. 4, 81).
16
   (RR vol. 4, p. 92).
                                           3
the right.17 After accelerating, the gray vehicle hit Officer Matsik—who attempted to

minimize the impact by pushing off of the vehicle.18 After throwing Officer Matsik

over the hood of the mail truck and onto the ground, the vehicle sped away.19

Accident reconstruction officers later found no signs of braking prior to impact.20

Davis rendered aid to Officer Matsik until EMS arrived, likely saving his life.21

        As law enforcement and medical assistance arrived, officers began to search for

both the suspect who had fled on foot and the driver of the gray vehicle.22 Civilians in

the area were instrumental in pointing law enforcement toward both of the fleeing

suspects.23 The male suspect (later identified as William Hill) was found hiding inside

of an elderly woman’s apartment.24 A separate search and witnesses led officers to

Natasha Sperling, who implicated Appellant as the driver of the vehicle when it hit

Officer Matsik. According to Sperling, Appellant fled to a nearby house where

Sperling was staying and told Sperling she “fucked off a cop” who was undercover.25

Sperling helped Appellant change clothes let Appellant use her phone to contact Hill

and Groesbeck, who Appellant told she might get out of town.26

17
   (RR vol. 4, p. 81).
18
   (RR vol. 5, p. 65).
19
   (RR vol. 4, p. 83).
20
   (RR vol. 5, p. 260).
21
   (RR vol. 4, pp. 84-85).
22
   (RR vol. 5, pp. 110-11).
23
   (See, e.g., RR vol. 5, pp. 114-15).
24
   (RR vol. 5, pp. 116-17).
25
   (RR vol. 5, p. 168).
26
   (RR vol. 5, p. 171).
                                            4
           Appellant ultimately gave Sperling more details: including that after Hill got out

and ran, she wanted to get away and ran over the “cop” because Hill was about to get

caught.27 Appellant was eventually apprehended at Sperling’s house wearing different

clothes than those described by Officer Matsik, and identified herself as “Sherry” to

officers upon arrest.

                                 Summary of the Argument

           The evidence presented at trial proved that Appellant intentionally hit Officer

Matsik with her vehicle to avoid her or her co-defendant, William Hill, from getting

caught. Before Hill even began to evade officers, he told his friends that he was going

to leave and not stop. As predicted, a high-speed chase ensued once Officer Matsik

began following the vehicle that resulted in Hill hitting Officer Matsik’s vehicle and

fleeing on foot. Officer Matsik followed, and Appellant took control of Hill’s vehicle

and drove in the direction of the individuals. When Appellant turned onto Utica

Avenue one can imagine she saw three things: a mail truck driving down the street,

Hill turning onto a street from an alley, and Officer Matsik close behind gaining

ground on Hill. At that time, Officer Matsik saw only one thing: Appellant driving

directly toward him. Crash.

           The crime scene alone supports a finding of intentional conduct by Appellant.

But at the very least, Appellant’s actions support recklessness. Appellant had been in

27
     (RR vol. 5, p. 68).
                                                5
the vehicle when it struck Officer Matsik’s vehicle and the mail truck, yet consciously

disregarded that risk when she continued to drive in a reckless manner down a

residential street.

       Appellant’s actions after the offense are also enlightening: telling her friend that

she “fucked off a cop,” saying that Hill was about to get caught and that she did not

want to get caught, and fleeing from the scene all point to a culpable mental state.

Deference to the fact finder’s deicions coupled with this Court’s ability to look to

circumstances before, during, and after the offense all lead to the conclusion that the

evidence was sufficient to support a culpable mental state of intentional, knowing, or

reckless behavior at trial.




                                             6
                                   Arguments and Authorities

                                       First Issue Presented

        Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find beyond a

reasonable doubt that she intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury

to Officer Matsik. Where the jury heard testimony that Appellant accelerated just

before hitting Officer Matsik, and that after the offense Appellant told people that she

“did it” because she did not want to get caught, and that she killed a cop, is the

evidence sufficient to show that—at the very least—Appellant knew of the risk of her

conduct and consciously disregarded that risk when she struck Officer Matsik?

                                        Standard of Review

        The only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether

the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense the State is

required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt is the standard set forth in Jackson v.

Virginia.28 In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, the

evidence must be examined in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine

whether, based on that evidence and reasonable inferences from it, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.29 The standard gives “full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to

28
   Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); see Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 912, 925 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plur. op.).
29
   Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902 n. 19.
                                                     7
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.”30 Each fact need not point directly and

independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the

incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.31 In a sufficiency

review, all of the evidence in the record must be reviewed, “both direct and

circumstantial, whether admissible or inadmissible.”32


     I. APPELLANT CANNOT PROVE THAT THE VERDICT IS SO CONTRARY TO THE
     OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AS TO BE CLEARLY WRONG AND

                                                UNJUST



        Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault of a public servant. At trial, the

State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: 1) Shelly Blair; 2) on or

about the 10th day of January, 2014; 3) did then and there intentionally, knowingly, or

recklessly; 4) cause bodily injury; 5) to Michael Matsik; 6) by striking him with a motor

vehicle; 7) and the defendant did then and there use or exhibit a deadly weapon, to

wit: a motor vehicle, during the commission of said assault; 8) and the defendant did

then and there know that Michael Matsik was then and there a public sevant, to wit: a

police officer; and 9) that Michael Matsik was then and there lawfully discharging an

30
   Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789; accord Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011).
31
   Lucio, 351 S.W.3d at 894.
32
   Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
                                                    8
official duty, to wit; pursuing a fleeing suspect while on foot.33 The offense of

aggravated assault against a public servant—as indicted—requires that a person

intentionally or knowingly threaten another with imminent bodily injury, and “use, or

exhibit, a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault” against a person the

actor knows is a public servant while the public servant is lawfully discharging an

official duty.34

         Appellant attacks only the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the mens rea

of the offense. A defendant’s culpable mental state is a question of fact to be

determined from the totality of the circumstances.35 In reviewing the sufficiency of

the evidence, the reviewing court should look at events occurring before, during, and

after the commission of the offense, and may rely on actions of the defendant which

show an understanding and common design to commit the offense.36 The jury may

infer the existence of a culpable mental state from any facts tending to prove its

existence—including the existence of a culpable mental state from any facts tending

to prove its existence—for example, the acts, words, and conduct of the accused.37

Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, so




33
     (CR p. 8).
34
     TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.       § 22.02(a)(2), (b)(2)(B).
35
   See Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
36
   Hartsfield v. State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App. Texarkana 2010), reh'g overruled, (Mar. 9, 2010).
37
   See Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
                                                   9
long as the cumulative force is sufficient to support the conviction.38 In a legal

sufficiency analysis, the question is not whether a rational jury could have entertained

a reasonable doubt of guilt, but whether it necessarily would have done so based on

the evidence presented.39

      A. Appellant’s statements after the offense support a finding of knowing or
                                     intentional conduct
            Intentionally, as defined in the Court’s Charge, means “a person acts

intentionally, or with intent, when it is his conscious objective or desire to cause the

result.”40 Knowingly, as defined in the court’s charge, means “a person acts

knowingly, or with knowledge, when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain

to cause the result.”41 Both can be shown by a defendant’s actions before, during, or

after an offense.42

            In Brown v. State, 91 S.W.3d 353, 356-58 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2002, no pet.),

the appellant, while fleeing from a police officer, jumped in a utility truck with a boom

and bucket holding a utility worker raised thirty feet in the air. He then drove off in a

reckless manner and at a high rate of speed, crashed the vehicle, and the utility worker

suffered serious bodily injury.43 In that case, the court of appeals held that evidence


38
   Hartsfield v. State, 305 S.W.3d at 863.
39
   Herrero v. State, 124 S.W.3d 827 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d).
40
   (CR p. 8); TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(a).
41
   (CR p. 8); TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(b).
42
     Hartsfield, at 863.
43
     Id.
                                                10
was sufficient to support the verdict in part because the jury heard Appellant’s

statements after the accident asking how the utility worker was and how badly he was

hurt.44 When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational

trier of fact could have found that the appellant used the utility truck in a manner in

which it would be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury because his

statements after the fact showed an awareness of the risk to the utility worker.45

          Similarly, flight after an offense can serve as indicia of guilt. In Dobbins v. State,

228 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. dism’d Dec. 5, 2007),

the appellant was convicted of aggravated assault on a public servant after running

over a deputy constable in his vehicle. After hitting the deputy constable, the appellant

fled.46 There, no evidence was presented that the appellant sped up to hit the officer,

but the appellant’s flight after hitting the officer supports a culpable mental state (in

that case, intentional or knowing conduct).47

          Appellant’s case presents both: communications after the fact that indicate a

culpable mental state, and flight after the offense as indicia of guilt. The jury was


44
   Id. at 357.
45
   Id.
46
   Id. at 763.
47
  See id. at 763-65, (holding that after the vehicle stopped and the victim got off of the hood of the
vehicle, the appellant fled the scene); see also Rodriguez v. State, 129 S.W.3d 551, 564 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (holding that defendant’s attempt to flee cast doubt on his claim
of ignorance of the offense); Henderson v. State, 825 S.W.2d 746, 749-50 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1992, pet. ref’d) (holding that in determining intent, the jury was entitled to consider events
occurring before, during, and after commission of the offense).

                                                  11
presented with the following facts that support finding a knowing or intentional

mental state:

          • Officer Matsik was readily identifiable as law enforcement,
            announced himself, and was wearing a LPD vest;
          • Appellant knew that Hill and Officer Matsik were engaged in a
            foot chase on the streets she was driving down;
          • Appellant illegally passed a stopped mail truck on a two-lane road
            on the right;
          • Davis testified that the impact was not instantaneous with
            Appellant turning onto the street and Officer Matsik exiting the
            alley;
          • Officer Matsik heard Appellant’s vehicle accelerate toward him;
          • Crime scene investigation revealed no signs of Appellant braking
            before impact;
          • Appellant fled the scene after hitting Officer Matsik;
          • Appellant told Sperling that Hill was about to get caught [by
            Officer Matsik] and that she did not want to get caught;
          • Appellant changed clothes after the offense to conceal her
            identitity; and
          • Appellant identified herself to police as “Sherry” when
            apprehended

      Individually and together, the facts support the verdict. Appellant’s statements

to others after the offense do not point to an “accident” or mere “failure to stop and

render aid” as she advocates for. Instead, her actions and conduct before, during, and

after the offense indicate a conscious objective or desire to cause the result.




                                            12
B. Appellant’s reckless driving at a high rate of speed, illegal passing, failure to
     maintain a single lane, and failure to stop and render aid when she struck
       Officer Matsik support—at the very least—a finding of recklessness


        Recklessly, as defined in the court’s charge, means “a person acts recklessly, or

is reckless, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his

conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial or unjustifiable

risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a

nature or degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of

care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed

from the actor’s standpoint.”48 Distinguishing recklessness from criminal negligence is

instructive:

        Criminal recklessness must not be confused with (or blended into)
        criminal negligence, a lesser culpable mental state. With criminal
        negligence, the defendant ought to have been aware of a substantial and
        unjustifiable risk that his conduct could result in the type of harm that
        did occur, and that his risk was of such a nature that the failure to
        perceive it was a gross deviation from the reasonable standard of care
        exercised by ordinary people.49

        While both require a gross failure to adhere to a reasonable-person standard of

care, recklessness means that the actor was aware of the risk he was creating and

consciously disregarded it.50 In analyzing conduct for recklessness, courts consider

48
   (CR pp. 7-8); TEX. PENAL CODE § 6.03(c).
49
   Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750-51 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
50
   Id. at 751.
                                                  13
whether 1) the alleged act or omission—viewed objectively at the time of its

commission—created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of the type of harm that

occurred; and 2) the risk was of such a magnitude that disregarding it constituted a

gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would have

exercised in the same situation.51 Even removing Hill and Officer Matsik from the

scene, Appellant’s manner of driving—maintaining a high speed in a residential area

and passing a stopped vehicle on the right shoulder—at the time of the offense

created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of the type of harm that occurred.

           In addition to facts supporting a knowing or intentional state of mind, the jury
also heard:
       • Hill was going to get away at any cost, and Appellant was along for the
         ride;
       • Appellant had just been involved with Hill in a motor vehicle accident
         following a high speed chase before Hill fled on foot;
       • Prior to hitting Officer Matsik, Appellant struck the mail truck.

           Each of the circumstances put before the jury demonstrate awareness of the

risk (accidents that had already occurred as a result of reckless driving) and a

conscious disregard of that risk. Perhaps most incriminating, however, is the fact that

Appellant drove at a high speed in the direction of the foot chase. Had Appellant

simply wanted to evade arrest herself and get away, she could have easily driven away

from the direction of the foot chase and avoided the situation entirely. Instead,


51
     Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d at 755.

                                              14
Appellant drove directly toward both Hill and Officer Matsik. If her conduct was not

intentional or knowing, then it was at the very least reckless because she wholly

disregarded the extreme degree of risk driving recklessly at a high rate of speed in a

residential area posed to those who lived there and those engaged in a foot chase on

those very streets. Evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s conduct.

                                     Conclusion

       When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational

trier of fact reasonably could have found that the appellant intentionally, knowingly,

or recklessly used her motor vehicle to cause bodily injury to Officer Matsik.

                               Conclusion and Prayer

       For the reasons stated above, no reversible error has been committed and the

State respectfully requests that the Court should affirm the judgment and sentence in

all things.

                                                Respectfully submitted,

                                                MATTHEW D. POWELL
                                                Criminal District Attorney
                                                State Bar No. 00784782


                                                By: /s/ Lauren Murphree
                                                Lauren Murphree
                                                Assistant Criminal District Attorney
                                                Lubbock County, Texas
                                                State Bar No. 24085059
                                                P.O. Box 10536
                                                Lubbock, Texas 79408
                                           15
                                                 (806)775-1100
                                                 FAX (806)775-7930
                                                 E-mail: LMurphree@lubbockcda.com

                                 Certificate of Service

       I certify that a true copy of the foregoing brief has been delivered to Jesse
Mendez, Attorney for Appellant, by e-mail delivery to jessemendez@suddenlink.net
on July 9, 2015.

                                                 MATTHEW D. POWELL
                                                 Criminal District Attorney
                                                 State Bar No. 00784782


                                                 By: /s/ Lauren Murphree
                                                 Lauren Murphree

                              Certificate of Compliance

        Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)(3), I further certify that, relying on the word
count of the computer program used to prepare the foregoing State’s Response, this
document contains 3,267 words, inclusive of all portions required by TEX. R. APP. P.
9.4(i)(1) to be included in calculation of length of the document.

                                                 MATTHEW D. POWELL
                                                 Criminal District Attorney
                                                 State Bar No. 00784782


                                                 By: /s/ Lauren Murphree
                                                 Lauren Murphree




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