                          T.C. Memo. 1997-398



                        UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                   DANIEL V. PRESNICK, Petitioner v.
             COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



        Docket No. 14198-96.               Filed September 2, 1997.



        Daniel V. Presnick, pro se.

        Robert E. Marum, for respondent.



                          MEMORANDUM OPINION


        DINAN, Special Trial Judge:   This case was heard pursuant

to the provisions of section 7443A(b)(3) and Rules 180, 181, and

182.1

        1
          Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are
to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the taxable years in
issue. All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure.
                                 - 2 -

     Respondent determined deficiencies in petitioner's Federal

income taxes and additions to tax for the years indicated:

                                         Additions to Tax
     Year       Deficiency       Sec. 6651(a)(1)     Sec. 6654

     1990         $2,699                 $674.75           -
     1991          1,420                  355.00         $82.00
     1992          1,822                  455.50          79.00
     1993          1,224                  288.25          47.99

     After concessions by the parties,2 the issues remaining for

decision are:   (1) Whether petitioner had unreported nonemployee

compensation in amounts determined by respondent; (2) whether

petitioner is liable for the section 6651(a)(1) additions to tax;

(3) whether petitioner is liable for the section 6654(a)

additions to tax.

     No stipulations of fact were filed in this case.       Petitioner

resided in Orange, Connecticut, on the date the petition was

filed in this case.

     Petitioner is a former member of the Connecticut State Bar,

having been disbarred in 1989.    He worked as a property manager

for Florida Realty and Reconstruction, Inc. (Florida Realty)

during the taxable years in issue.       He was responsible for

managing one rental property, located in Guilford, Connecticut,

which he described as a "giant house".       Florida Realty is

     2
          Respondent concedes that petitioner's nonemployee
compensation for taxable year 1990 is only $5,637, approximately
half of the amount determined in the statutory notice of
deficiency. Petitioner concedes that he received and failed to
report interest income and dividend income in the amounts
determined by respondent.
                               - 3 -

operated by petitioner's brother, who lives in Florida and did

not appear at trial.

     Petitioner did not file a return for any of the taxable

years in issue.

     On February 19, 1997, petitioner was served with a notice

setting his case for trial on May 12, 1997.   Attached to the

notice of trial was the Court's standing pretrial order which

states in part:

          ORDERED that all facts shall be stipulated to the
     maximum extent possible. All documentary and written
     evidence shall be marked and stipulated in accordance
     with Rule 91(b), unless the evidence is to be used to
     impeach the credibility of a witness. Objections may
     be preserved in the stipulation. If a complete
     stipulation of facts is not ready for submission at
     trial, and if the Court determines that this is the
     result of either party's failure to fully cooperate in
     the preparation thereof, the Court may order sanctions
     against the uncooperative party. Any documents or
     materials which a party expects to utilize in the event
     of trial (except for impeachment), but which are not
     stipulated, shall be identified in writing and
     exchanged by the parties at least 15 days before the
     first day of the trial session. The Court may refuse
     to receive in evidence any document or material not so
     stipulated or exchanged, unless otherwise agreed by the
     parties or allowed by the Court for good cause shown.

     Petitioner did not exchange any of his documents at least 15

days before the first day of the trial session.   Petitioner

appeared for trial with a box of unorganized documents which he

had first shared with respondent the morning of the trial.

     The first issue for decision is whether petitioner had

unreported nonemployee compensation in the amounts determined by

respondent.   Respondent's determinations in the statutory notice
                               - 4 -

of deficiency are presumed to be correct, and petitioner bears

the burden of proving otherwise.   Rule 142(a); Welch v.

Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).

     Section 61(a) defines gross income to mean all income from

whatever source derived including, but not limited to,

compensation for services, including fees, commissions, fringe

benefits, and similar items.   Sec. 61(a)(1).

     Petitioner contends that the amounts he received from

Florida Realty are not includable in his gross income because

such amounts were reimbursements for amounts that he paid to

maintain the Guilford rental property.   Alternatively, he argues

that, if such amounts are includable in income, he should be

entitled to business expense deductions for the amounts that he

advanced on behalf of Florida Realty.    Petitioner further claims

that he is entitled to business expense deductions for certain

amounts he paid to wind up his law practice, subsequent to his

disbarment.

     Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proof.    Rule

142(a).   He did not comply with the requirements of the standing

pretrial order.   He has not shown good cause for his failure to

exchange his documents with respondent as required by the

pretrial order, and the Court did not receive them in evidence.

His testimony was disjointed, contradictory, and, at times,

incomprehensible.
                                 - 5 -

     Petitioner did not call any witnesses, and relies solely

upon his own testimony in support of his position.   It is well

established that, in the absence of corroborating evidence, we

are not required to accept the self-serving and unverified

testimony of taxpayers.   Niedringhaus v. Commissioner, 99 T.C.

202, 212 (1992); Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986).

     Based on the limited record in this case, we find that

petitioner has not proved that he did not receive nonemployee

compensation in the amounts determined by respondent, apart from

the amount conceded by respondent for 1990.   Further, he has not

proved that he is entitled to any deductions for advances on

behalf of Florida Realty or windup expenses for his law practice,

or the amounts thereof.   Respondent's determinations on this

issue are therefore sustained.

     The second issue for decision is whether petitioner is

liable for the section 6651(a)(1) additions to tax for 1990,

1991, 1992, and 1993.

     Section 6651(a)(1) imposes an addition to tax for failure to

timely file a return, unless the taxpayer establishes:   (1) The

failure did not result from "willful neglect," and (2) the

failure was "due to a reasonable cause".   "Willful neglect" has

been interpreted to mean a conscious, intentional failure or

reckless indifference.    United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241,

245-246 (1985).   "Reasonable cause" requires the taxpayer to

demonstrate that he exercised ordinary business care and prudence
                               - 6 -

and was nonetheless unable to file a return within the prescribed

time.   United States v. Boyle, supra at 246.    The addition to tax

equals 5 percent of the tax required to be shown on the return

for the first month with an additional 5 percent for each

additional month or fraction of a month during which the failure

to file continues, not to exceed a maximum of 25 percent.    Sec.

6651(a)(1).

     Petitioner stated that he did not feel that he should be

called upon to pay a penalty because as far as he was concerned

his income was zero, aside from his interest and dividends.

Petitioner's belief that he did not owe any tax does not

constitute reasonable cause under section 6651(a)(1), especially

considering the fact that petitioner is a former attorney.

Krieger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-347, affd. without

published opinion 64 F.3d 657 (4th Cir. 1995).    We find that

petitioner has failed to show that his failure to timely file his

returns was not due to willful neglect or that such failure was

due to reasonable cause.   Therefore, we hold that petitioner is

liable for the section 6651(a)(1) additions to tax.

     The third issue for decision is whether petitioner is liable

for the section 6654(a) additions to tax for failure to make

estimated income tax payments for 1991, 1992, and 1993.

     Unless the taxpayer demonstrates that one of the statutory

exceptions applies, imposition of this addition to tax is

mandatory where prepayments of tax, either through withholding or
                                 - 7 -

by making estimated quarterly tax payments during the course of

the taxable year, do not equal the percentage of total liability

required under the statute.   Sec. 6654(a); Niedringhaus v.

Commissioner, supra at 222; Grosshandler v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.

1, 20-21 (1980).   Petitioner bears the burden of proving his

entitlement to any exception.     Habersham-Bey v. Commissioner, 78

T.C. 304, 319-320 (1982).

     Respondent's determination takes into account a small amount

of withholding for 1993.    Petitioner did not make any estimated

tax payments for 1991, 1992, or 1993, nor has he shown that any

of the statutory exceptions are applicable in this case.       We

therefore sustain respondent's determination on this issue.

     To reflect the foregoing,



                                              Decision will be entered

                                         under Rule 155.
