  USMAN BHUTTA, PETITIONER v. COMMISSIONER
     OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT

    Docket No. 26940–13.        Filed December 22, 2015.

  P, a citizen of Pakistan and a foreign medical school grad-
uate, entered the United States in 2009 to participate in an
internal medicine residency training program. During the
three-year residency training program, for which P received
an annual salary, P treated patients, with supervision; con-
ducted and presented research; and supervised and trained
third- and fourth-year medical students. P’s supervising and
training of medical students consisted of having the medical
students observe him during ‘‘rounds’’, preparing the students
for monthly examinations, and evaluating the students
monthly. For taxable year 2010 P reported his wages from the
residency training program as exempt from U.S. income tax
under the Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation
and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes
on Income, U.S.-Pak., art. XII, July 1, 1957, 10 U.S.T. 984

                                                                 351
352                145 UNITED STATES TAX COURT                           (351)

      (entered into force May 21, 1959) (hereinafter treaty). Treaty
      art. XII exempts from U.S. income tax remuneration that a
      professor or teacher receives for teaching if the professor or
      teacher is a Pakistani resident who temporarily visits the
      United States ‘‘for the purpose of teaching for a period not
      exceeding two years at a university, college, school or other
      educational institution’’ in the United States. R subsequently
      issued P a notice of deficiency disallowing the claimed treaty
      exemption. P asserts that he is entitled to an exemption
      under treaty art. XII or, alternatively, that he is entitled to
      an exemption under treaty art. XIII(3). Treaty art. XIII(3)
      exempts from income tax compensation up to $10,000 if a
      Pakistani resident, temporarily present in the United States
      under arrangements with the United States or any agency or
      instrumentality thereof solely for the purpose of training,
      study, or orientation, receives such compensation for the ren-
      dition of services directly related to such training, study, or
      orientation. Held: P was not in the United States for ‘‘the pur-
      pose of teaching’’ in 2010 and therefore is not entitled to the
      exemption under treaty art. XII. Held, further, P is not enti-
      tled to the exemption under treaty art. XIII(3) because P has
      not proven that he was in the United States under arrange-
      ments with the United States or an agency or instrumentality
      thereof. Held, further, R’s determination is sustained.

  H. Craig Pitts, for petitioner.
  William Franklin Castor and H. Elizabeth H. Downs, for
respondent.
  MARVEL, Judge: In a notice of deficiency, respondent deter-
mined a $4,415 deficiency in petitioner’s Federal income tax
for taxable year 2010. Petitioner timely petitioned this Court
for redetermination of the deficiency. After concessions, 1 the
sole issue for decision is whether petitioner’s wages earned
as a medical resident in 2010 are exempt from tax under
  1 Respondent  conceded his determination in the notice of deficiency that
petitioner had a taxable State tax refund of $762. This concession resulted
in a computational adjustment to petitioner’s itemized deductions, and in
a first supplemental stipulation of facts the parties stipulated respondent’s
computation of a reduced deficiency of $4,295. In addition to the explicit
concessions, we consider petitioner to have conceded his assertion in the
petition that he is entitled to a standard deduction for 2010. Petitioner
failed to advance any arguments as to this issue in his opening or answer-
ing brief. Accordingly, we deem the issue abandoned. See Wilcox v. Com-
missioner, 848 F.2d 1007, 1008 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988), aff ’g T.C. Memo. 1987–
225; Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 187 (2001); Nicklaus v. Com-
missioner, 117 T.C. 117, 120 n.4 (2001).
(351)                 BHUTTA v. COMMISSIONER                             353


article XII or article XIII(3) of the Convention for the Avoid-
ance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
With Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Pak., July 1, 1957, 10
U.S.T. 984 (entered into force May 21, 1959) (United States-
Pakistan Income Tax Convention or treaty).
                           FINDINGS OF FACT

   Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.
The stipulated facts are incorporated herein by this ref-
erence. Petitioner resided in Oklahoma when he petitioned
this Court. 2
   Petitioner was a citizen of Pakistan at all relevant times.
At the time of trial he lived with his wife, a Pakistani citizen
whom he married in 2010, and his daughter, who is a U.S.
citizen. He has been a practicing physician on the nephrology
faculty of OU Physicians, a physicians group within the
Oklahoma University Health Sciences Center (university),
since August 2014 after completing a three-year residency
training program and a fellowship there.
I. Petitioner’s Medical Background and Residency Training
   Program
  In 2005 petitioner graduated from Allama Iqbal Medical
College, University of Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan, with a med-
ical degree. To obtain the medical degree petitioner com-
pleted five to six years of coursework and spent one year
working in a hospital. 3
  Petitioner believed that the medical training in the United
States was ‘‘far superior’’ to the training he received in Paki-
  2 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Internal

Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references
are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
  3 It is not clear whether petitioner practiced medicine in Pakistan before

entering the United States in 2009. During cross-examination petitioner
answered ‘‘Yes. After I did the one year training’’ to respondent’s counsel’s
question ‘‘At the point you graduated from medical school, did you become
a medical doctor for purposes of Pakistan?’’ However, petitioner stated on
an unsigned Form 9250, Questionnaire—Tax Treaty Benefits, see infra p.
358, that his occupation before coming to the United States was ‘‘medical
student’’. The record does not show where petitioner was employed after
obtaining the medical degree in 2005 and before entering the United
States in 2009. However, we infer from the record that petitioner did not
teach at a medical school in Pakistan.
354             145 UNITED STATES TAX COURT                (351)


stan and decided to pursue a medical residency in the United
States. Before he could begin a residency training program in
the United States, however, petitioner had to pass the
United States Medical Licensing Examination (USMLE), a
three-step examination for medical licensure in the United
States. He completed the first step and the clinical knowl-
edge portion of the second step in Pakistan on December 20,
2006, and October 18, 2007, respectively. On December 4,
2007, petitioner was issued a B–1/B–2 visa, which allowed
him to enter the United States to take the clinical skills por-
tion of the second step of the USMLE. Petitioner completed
the clinical skills portion in the United States on January 30,
2008.
   After passing steps 1 and 2 of the USMLE, petitioner was
eligible for certification from the Educational Commission for
Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG). ECFMG is an
organization that certifies the qualifications of international
medical school graduates before they begin U.S. graduate
medical education. ECFMG certification is required before an
international medical school graduate may take step 3 of the
USMLE, begin a U.S. residency training program, and obtain
an unrestricted license to practice medicine in the United
States. Petitioner obtained ECFMG certification on March
27, 2008, and he completed the third step of the USMLE in
the United States in January 2009.
   While in the United States petitioner interviewed at var-
ious universities seeking acceptance into an internal medi-
cine residency training program. He interviewed with the
university and received by letter dated March 23, 2009, an
offer of appointment as a first-year internal medicine resi-
dent from the university’s department of internal medicine.
The offer letter indicated that petitioner’s start date would be
July 1, 2009, and that he would complete his ‘‘residency
training’’ on June 30, 2012. The letter also stated that peti-
tioner would have the opportunity to initiate training in a
subspeciality during his second year of residency. The resi-
dency position paid an annual salary of $45,666 for the first
year, which increased by approximately $1,000 ‘‘with each
year of training.’’ Petitioner accepted the offer by signing the
letter on March 28, 2009, and returning it to the university.
   Petitioner’s acceptance of the university’s offer was
memorialized in a contract entitled the University of Okla-
(351)                BHUTTA v. COMMISSIONER                          355


homa College of Medicine Residency Agreement, which peti-
tioner and a university representative signed on August 11,
2009 (2009 agreement). The 2009 agreement covers only peti-
tioner’s first year of residency and comprises four parts:
Appointment; University Responsibilities; Resident Respon-
sibilities; and Reappointment, Promotion, and Termination.
Among the university’s stated responsibilities is its obligation
to provide a ‘‘graduate medical education program’’ with ‘‘fac-
ulty oversight and supervision of all educational and clinical
activities’’. Resident responsibilities include ‘‘fulfill[ing] the
educational requirements of the training program’’ and using
‘‘his/her best efforts to provide safe, effective and compas-
sionate patient care’’. Teaching medical students is not a
stated resident responsibility.
   Under the 2009 agreement a resident could be suspended
without pay or dismissed for failing to obtain an Oklahoma
medical license within a prescribed time. The 2009 agree-
ment also states that continuation of the training program
requires annual renewals of appointment, which are not
automatically offered but rather are ‘‘offered yearly based
upon meeting the performance standards of the Program.’’
Failure to satisfactorily complete training program require-
ments or breaching institutional rules could result in ‘‘non-
promotion’’. A resident would not know for certain whether
he could continue in the program until the university gave
him a renewal contract. 4
   Before he could begin his residency training program, peti-
tioner needed to obtain a U.S. exchange visitor, or J–1, visa.
ECFMG, as petitioner’s sponsor, issued him a Form DS–
2019, Certificate of Eligibility for Exchange Visitor (J–1)
Status, which allowed him to go to a U.S. embassy to apply
for and receive the visa. See 22 C.F.R. sec. 62.2 (2010)
(defining Form DS–2019). The Form DS–2019 described peti-
tioner as a ‘‘university post grad medical trainee’’, an ‘‘alien
physician’’, and a ‘‘research scholar’’ and was valid from
August 10, 2009, to August 9, 2010, to reflect the dates of the
2009 agreement. 5
  4 Petitioner was aware of other residents at the university whose con-

tracts were not renewed.
  5 Originally the Form DS–2019 was valid beginning July 2009, but be-

cause there was a delay in the issuing of petitioner’s visa, which caused
                                             Continued
356               145 UNITED STATES TAX COURT                    (351)


  ECFMG had to renew the Form DS–2019 every year for
petitioner to continue in the residency training program.
ECFMG’s criteria for renewing a Form DS–2019 were listed
on its Web site and included a requirement that an applicant
provide proof of a renewed agreement with a university, a
letter of good standing from the director of the applicant’s
residency training program, and copies of the applicant’s visa
and insurance. ECFMG would not renew a Form DS–2019 if
the applicant’s residency training program or university
closed or if the applicant’s home country wanted him to
return.
  Petitioner obtained a J–1 visa on June 5, 2009. The J–1
visa allowed petitioner to remain in the United States for the
duration of the residency training program and any
postresidency fellowship but required him to return to Paki-
stan for two years after his training unless he obtained a
hardship waiver. See id. sec. 62.27(g)(1). Petitioner entered
the United States at the end of July 2009 and began his resi-
dency training program at the university on August 10, 2009.
The university renewed petitioner’s residency agreement
yearly, allowing him to obtain a new Form DS–2019 every
year and to complete his three-year residency training pro-
gram on August 10, 2012. He then began a two-year fellow-
ship in nephrology at the university, which he completed in
August 2014. He subsequently obtained a hardship waiver of
the J–1 visa two-year foreign residence requirement, which
allowed him to remain in the United States and work at the
university hospital as a licensed physician.
  Petitioner’s duties throughout his residency and fellowship
included treating patients on inpatient wards and in the out-
patient clinic under faculty supervision, conducting and pre-
senting clinical research, and supervising and training third-
and fourth-year medical students. All of these duties,
including the supervising and training of medical students,
were part of petitioner’s training in the residency training
program. Petitioner was able to treat patients and train the
medical students simultaneously because, at that point in the
medical students’ education, they spent most of their time in
the hospital on the ward teams with the residents.

a delay of his start date in the residency training program, ECFMG had
to issue him a new Form DS–2019.
(351)                 BHUTTA v. COMMISSIONER                            357


   Three to five medical students accompanied petitioner on
‘‘rounds’’ during which he treated patients, and he discussed
the patients’ physical examination findings and other rel-
evant information with the students. After rounds the med-
ical students accompanied petitioner while he treated
incoming patients or existing patients who needed additional
care. After petitioner had finished treating his patients, he
helped the students prepare for their monthly examinations.
At the end of the month petitioner evaluated each student on
certain criteria including medical knowledge, interpersonal
communication skills, and ability to gather information and
conduct physical examinations.
   As discussed further infra, petitioner came to the United
States in 2009 and remained in the United States in 2010 for
the purpose of participating in a training program for med-
ical residents. Although supervising and training medical
students was a component of the residency training program,
petitioner was not in the United States for the purpose of
teaching.
   The university also expected petitioner to conduct research
as part of his residency training program. Petitioner spent
one to two months per year on research, during which time
he took on lighter clinical responsibilities so that he could
conduct clinical research on selected patients. He conducted
research during 2009 through 2011, published abstracts and
articles, and presented his research at local and national
medical conferences, such as the American Society of Clinical
Oncology annual meeting and the national meeting of the
American College of Physicians. 6
II. Petitioner’s 2010 Federal Income Tax Return and Liability
  Petitioner hired a tax return preparer in New York to pre-
pare a Form 1040NR, U.S. Nonresident Alien Income Tax
Return, on his behalf for taxable year 2010. 7 The return
  6 Petitioner estimated at trial that during 2010 his ‘‘education-related’’

activities, including research and teaching students, constituted 70% of a
typical day. However, this percentage, even if accurate, is unconvincing as
most of the time he spent supervising and training medical students was
time spent treating patients as part of his residency training program.
  7 Although petitioner married in 2010, the return reflects a filing status

of ‘‘other single nonresident alien’’. Respondent does not challenge peti-
                                               Continued
358                 145 UNITED STATES TAX COURT                         (351)


states that petitioner’s occupation in the United States is
‘‘research physician’’. The Form 1040NR does not report peti-
tioner’s wages from the residency totaling $46,170 as taxable
income but rather claims the wages as ‘‘income exempt by a
treaty’’. A Schedule OI, Other Information, attached to the
return shows that petitioner claimed an exemption from
income tax on his wages under treaty art. XII. Petitioner did
not report or pay tax on his 2010 wages to Pakistan.
   On November 19, 2012, petitioner filed a Form 9210, Alien
Status Questionnaire, with respect to taxable years 2010–12.
In response to the question regarding his reason for coming
to the United States, petitioner checked the boxes for ‘‘Edu-
cation’’ and ‘‘Teaching’’. An unsigned Form 9250 was
attached to the Form 9210. On the Form 9250 petitioner
indicated that his primary purpose in visiting the United
States was ‘‘teaching/research/training in internal medicine’’.
On the Form 9250 petitioner also stated that he came to the
United States at the invitation of an educational institution
and spent 50% of his time teaching and 50% of his time
researching. Petitioner also stated that his occupation before
coming to the United States was ‘‘medical student’’ and his
occupation when he returned to Pakistan would be ‘‘consult-
ant physician in nephrology’’.
   Respondent mailed petitioner a notice of deficiency, dated
November 5, 2013, disallowing petitioner’s claimed exemp-
tion from U.S. income tax under treaty art. XII but allowing
a $5,000 student exemption under treaty art. XIII(1)(a). 8
tioner’s claimed filing status.
   8 The Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Preven-

tion of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Pak., art.
XIII(1), July 1, 1957, 10 U.S.T. 984 (entered into force May 21, 1959), pro-
vides:
      A resident of one of the contracting States, who is temporarily present
   in the other contracting State solely
      (a) as a student at a recognized university, college or school in such
   other State, or
      (b) as the recipient of a grant, allowance or award for the primary pur-
   pose of study or research from a religious, charitable, scientific or edu-
   cational organization of the former State
  shall be exempted from tax by such other State (i) on all remittances
  from abroad for the purposes of his maintenance, education or training,
  and (ii) with respect to an amount not in excess of 5,000 United States
  dollars for any taxable year, representing compensation for personal
(351)                  BHUTTA v. COMMISSIONER                               359


Petitioner filed a timely petition in this Court contesting
respondent’s determination. 9

                                  OPINION

I. Burden of Proof
   As a general rule, a notice of deficiency is entitled to a
presumption of correctness, and the taxpayer bears the bur-
den of proving the Commissioner’s deficiency determination
incorrect. Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115
(1933); Bronstein v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 382, 384 (2012).
However, under section 7491(a), if the taxpayer produces
credible evidence 10 with respect to any factual issue relevant
to ascertaining the taxpayer’s liability for tax and meets
other requirements, the burden of proof rests on the Commis-
sioner as to that factual issue. See Higbee v. Commissioner,
116 T.C. 438, 440–441 (2001). With the exception of part
III.B, infra, our findings of fact are based on a preponderance
of the evidence, and thus the allocation of the burden of proof
is immaterial. See Estate of Bongard v. Commissioner, 124
T.C. 95, 111 (2005). With respect to part III.B, infra, peti-
tioner does not argue, and the record does not permit us to
conclude, that the burden of proof should shift under section
7491(a), and the burden of proof remains with petitioner.
II. Governing Statutory Framework
  Under the general rule of section 871(b), a nonresident
alien individual such as petitioner 11 who is engaged in a
   services.
   9 Petitioner initially elected to have this case conducted under small tax

case procedures. See sec. 7463(a). Before trial petitioner’s counsel orally
moved that the ‘‘S’’ designation be removed, and we granted the oral mo-
tion.
   10 ‘‘Credible evidence is the quality of evidence which, after critical anal-

ysis, the court would find sufficient upon which to base a decision on the
issue if no contrary evidence were submitted (without regard to the judicial
presumption of IRS correctness).’’ Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438,
442 (2001) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rept. No. 105–599, at 240–241 (1998),
1998–3 C.B. 747, 994–995).
   11 A nonresident alien is a person who is neither a citizen nor a resident

of the United States as defined in sec. 7701(b)(1)(A). Id. subpara. (B). Re-
spondent conceded that petitioner was not a citizen or a resident of the
                                                  Continued
360                145 UNITED STATES TAX COURT             (351)


trade or business in the United States is subject to U.S.
income tax on the individual’s taxable income effectively con-
nected with the conduct of that trade or business. Ordinarily,
an individual who performs personal services within the
United States at any time during the taxable year conducts
a ‘‘trade or business within the United States’’. Sec. 864(b).
Consequently, a nonresident alien who receives compensation
for the performance of personal services in the United States
has income effectively connected with the conduct of a trade
or business in the United States and therefore has gross
income under the Code. See sec. 1.864–4(c)(6)(ii), Income Tax
Regs.; see also sec. 61(a)(1). However, under section 894(a),
the Code is applied to any taxpayer with due regard to any
treaty obligations of the United States that pertain to that
taxpayer. An applicable treaty obligation can therefore alter
an individual’s income tax liability under the Code.
III. The United States-Pakistan Income Tax Convention
   The United States-Pakistan Income Tax Convention was
signed on July 1, 1957, and was ratified by the President of
the United States on November 6, 1958. It entered into force
on May 21, 1959, and is effective for taxable years beginning
on or after January 1, 1959. This case raises interpretation
issues regarding treaty art. XII, which deals with the tax
ramifications of remuneration paid to professors and
teachers, and treaty art. XIII(3), which deals with the tax
ramifications of compensation paid for certain services
related to training, study, or orientation under arrangements
with a State or any agency or instrumentality thereof.
   When interpreting a treaty, we begin with the text of the
treaty and the context in which the written words are used.
E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534 (1991); Sumitomo
Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 179–180 (1982).
The plain meaning of the language of a treaty controls unless
its effect is contrary to the intent or expectations of the sig-
natories. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006)
(citing 1 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States sec. 325(1) (1986)); Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc.,
457 U.S. at 180; Amaral v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 802, 812
(1988). Because treaties are contracts between sovereigns, we
United States in 2010.
(351)             BHUTTA v. COMMISSIONER                    361


construe them more liberally than private agreements to give
effect to the signatories’ intent. See United States v. Stuart,
489 U.S. 353, 365–366 (1989); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S.
392, 396 (1985); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293
(1933); Estate of Silver v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 430, 434
(2003) (citing Nw. Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Commis-
sioner, 107 T.C. 363, 378–379 (1996)). Where appropriate, we
may ascertain the meaning of a treaty with an eye toward
the treaty’s legislative history and the parties’ negotiations,
diplomatic correspondence, and practical construction they
have adopted. See Air France, 470 U.S. at 396; Factor, 290
U.S. at 294–295; Estate of Silver v. Commissioner, 120 T.C.
at 434; Rust v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 284, 288–289 (1985).
We also give weight to how the departments of the respective
governments charged with negotiating and enforcing a treaty
interpret that treaty. See Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187,
194 (1961); Rust v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. at 288.
  A. Article XII of the United States-Pakistan Income Tax
     Convention
   Treaty art. XII provides: ‘‘A professor or teacher, resident
in one of the contracting States, who temporarily visits the
other contracting State for the purpose of teaching for a
period not exceeding two years at a university, college, school
or other educational institution in the other contracting
State, shall be exempted from tax by such other contracting
State in respect of remuneration for such teaching.’’ Peti-
tioner contends that the compensation he received in 2010
for his residency training program is exempt from U.S.
income tax under treaty art. XII because a purportedly large
component of the residency training program was teaching
third- and fourth-year medical students. Respondent
counters that petitioner (1) was not in the United States for
‘‘the purpose of teaching’’ and (2) was not temporarily vis-
iting the United States for ‘‘a period not exceeding two
years’’.
   The phrase ‘‘the purpose of teaching’’ is not defined in the
treaty. Our analysis focuses on the meaning of the word
‘‘purpose’’ and on whether petitioner had the requisite pur-
pose. Neither party has invited our attention to, and we have
not found, any legislative history or documentary evidence of
the negotiators’ or signatories’ intended meaning of the word
362                 145 UNITED STATES TAX COURT                          (351)


‘‘purpose’’. 12 See, e.g., S. Exec. Rept. No. 85–1 (1958), 1960–
2 C.B. 906 (Committee on Foreign Relations report on the
treaty); 104 Cong. Rec. 13238–13241 (1958) (Senate floor
debate and action on the treaty); Treasury Department Tech-
nical Explanation of the 1957 U.S.-Pakistan income tax
treaty (Technical Explanation), signed July 1, 1957, RIA Int’l
Tax Treaty 7033. In the instance of an undefined treaty
term, treaty art. II(2) provides: ‘‘[A]ny term not otherwise
defined shall, unless the context otherwise requires, have the
meaning which it has under the laws of that contracting
State relating to the taxes which are the subject of the
present Convention.’’ ‘‘[P]urpose’’ is not defined in the Code
in any way meaningful to this situation. We therefore ‘‘adopt
the ordinary, contemporary understanding of * * * [this]
word[] for purposes of our analysis.’’ See Eshel v. Commis-
sioner, 142 T.C. 197, 209 (2014).
   Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘‘purpose’’ as ‘‘[a]n objective,
goal, or end’’. Black’s Law Dictionary 1356 (9th ed. 2009).
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines ‘‘purpose’’ as
‘‘something set up as an object or end to be attained’’,
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 949 (10th ed. 1997),
and Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary defines it as ‘‘the
reason why something is done or used: the aim or intention
of something’’; ‘‘the feeling of being determined to do or
achieve something’’; and ‘‘the aim or goal of a person: what
a person is trying to do, become, etc.’’, Merriam-Webster’s
Online      Dictionary,     http://www.merriam-webster.com/dic-
tionary/purpose (last visited Nov. 16, 2015).
   12 To support his position, petitioner relies upon several revenue rulings

promulgated by the Commissioner which we address infra. But the Com-
missioner generally does not participate in the negotiation of tax treaties,
and we do not interpret the revenue rulings as evidence of the negotiators’
or signatories’ intent. See Crow v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 376, 389 (1985)
(‘‘A revenue ruling represents the view of the Commissioner, not the Treas-
ury Department, and thus is generally only ‘the contention of one of the
parties to the litigation.’ ’’ (citation omitted) (quoting Estate of Smead v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 43, 47 n.5 (1982))); see also Xilinx, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 598 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2010) (‘‘A tax treaty is negotiated by
the United States with the active participation of the Treasury.’’), aff ’g 125
T.C. 37 (2005). But cf. Rauenhorst v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 157, 171
(2002) (describing cases where we have treated revenue rulings as conces-
sions by the Commissioner where the rulings were relevant to the disposi-
tion of the case).
(351)                  BHUTTA v. COMMISSIONER                               363


  We use these definitions, which focus on the object or goal
to be attained, to guide our analysis. 13 In so doing, we recog-
nize that the better indicator of an individual’s purpose is his
conduct and not the individual’s self-serving representations
regarding his purpose. We examine the entire record and
consider all of the relevant facts and circumstances to dis-
cern petitioner’s purpose in coming to the United States.
  Before coming to the United States, petitioner obtained a
medical degree in Pakistan. He believed the medical training
in the United States was ‘‘far superior’’ to the training he
received in Pakistan and, for that reason, decided to pursue
a medical residency here. In furtherance of his stated goal of
obtaining U.S. medical training, petitioner obtained a Form
DS–2019 from ECFMG, which allowed him to apply for and
receive a J–1 visa. The Form DS–2019, which we consider to
be objective, credible evidence of petitioner’s and ECFMG’s
understanding regarding the nature of petitioner’s trip to the
United States, describes petitioner as a ‘‘university post grad
medical trainee’’, an ‘‘alien physician’’, and a ‘‘research
scholar’’. 14 Although both ‘‘teacher’’ and ‘‘professor’’ are pos-
   13 Petitioner cites Rev. Rul. 55–211, 1955–1 C.B. 676, to support his posi-

tion. We address petitioner’s contentions infra but for now note that Rev.
Rul. 55–211, supra, the subject of which is the income tax treaty between
the United States and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, interprets the phrase ‘‘the purpose’’ in a nearly identical context
to mean ‘‘the primary purpose’’. Id., 1955–1 C.B. at 677. We neither en-
dorse nor reject that interpretation because we find that petitioner’s only
purpose in coming to and remaining in the United States in 2010 was to
receive medical training.
   Further, in reaching our holding today, we need not address whether the
definite article ‘‘the’’ restricts or otherwise modifies the ‘‘purpose’’ that is
the subject of treaty art. XII. Cf. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. ll,
ll, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561 (2014) (discussing the meaning of ‘‘the’’ in the
Constitution); Baldwin Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Siebert, Inc., 512 F.3d 1338,
1342–1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (discussing the meaning and use of definite ar-
ticles in patent law); Colorado v. Sunoco, Inc., 337 F.3d 1233, 1241–1242
(10th Cir. 2003) (discussing the meaning and use of definite articles under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96–510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. secs. 9601–9675 (2000))); Ltd., Inc. v. Commissioner, 286 F.3d 324,
333–334 (6th Cir. 2002) (addressing the word ‘‘the’’ as used in sec.
956(b)(2)(A)), rev’g 113 T.C. 169 (1999).
   14 Regulations implementing the Mutual Educational and Cultural Ex-

change Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87–256, 75 Stat. 527 (codified as amended
                                                  Continued
364                 145 UNITED STATES TAX COURT                         (351)


sible categories of participant eligibility on Form DS–2019,
see 22 C.F.R. sec. 62.4(d) and (e) (2010); supra note 14, peti-
tioner was not described as a teacher or a professor on the
original Form DS–2019 or any subsequent renewal of the
form.
   The 2009 agreement outlines the university’s and peti-
tioner’s responsibilities during the residency training pro-
gram and frames petitioner’s expectations of the residency
training program. The university agreed to provide a ‘‘grad-
uate medical education program’’ with ‘‘faculty oversight and
at 22 U.S.C. secs. 2451–2464 (1988)) govern the issuance of Form DS–2019
and define the categories of participant eligibility in an exchange visitor
program underlying the issuance of a J–1 visa. See 22 C.F.R. secs. 62.1,
62.2, 62.4 (2010). Under the regulations, ‘‘alien physician’’ is a category of
participant eligibility in which foreign medical school graduates may enter
the United States to participate in either a clinical exchange program or
a nonclinical exchange program. Id. sec. 62.27(b) and (c); see id. para. (d).
A clinical exchange program is a program for alien physicians pursuing
graduate medical education or training, and, inter alia, requires that an
alien physician provide a statement from the Government of his home
country that (1) there is a need in that country for qualified medical practi-
tioners in the alien physician’s chosen speciality and (2) the alien physi-
cian has in writing agreed to return to the home country upon completion
of the training and intends to practice medicine in the chosen speciality.
Id. para. (b)(6). A nonclinical exchange program is a program in which an
alien physician enters the United States for the predominant purposes of
observation, consultation, teaching, or research, wherein patient care, if
any, is incidental and under direct supervision. Id. sec. 62.27(c). Although
petitioner’s Form DS–2019 does not specifically state whether he entered
the United States for the purpose of a clinical or a nonclinical exchange
program, the record indicates that petitioner intended to pursue a clinical
exchange program. For example, only alien physicians entering a clinical
exchange program need to pass steps 1 and 2 of the USMLE (or a similar
examination). Petitioner testified that he needed to pass the USMLE to
begin his residency training program. See id. para. (b)(5).
   ‘‘Graduate medical education or training’’ is defined as ‘‘participation in
a program in which the alien physician will receive graduate medical edu-
cation or training, which generally consists of a residency or fellowship
program involving health care services to patients, but does not include
programs involving observation, consultation, teaching or research in which
there is no or only incidental patient care.’’ Id. sec. 62.2 (emphasis added).
   The applicable definition of research scholar is: ‘‘An individual primarily
conducting research, observing, or consulting in connection with a research
project at research institutions, corporate research facilities, museums, li-
braries, post-secondary accredited educational institutions, or similar types
of institutions. The research scholar may also teach or lecture, unless dis-
allowed by the sponsor.’’ Id. sec. 62.4(f).
(351)                 BHUTTA v. COMMISSIONER                            365


supervision of all educational and clinical activities’’. Peti-
tioner agreed to ‘‘fulfill the educational requirements of the
training program’’ and use his ‘‘best efforts to provide safe,
effective and compassionate patient care’’. In the context of
the 2009 agreement, the ‘‘educational * * * activities’’ and
‘‘educational requirements’’ are most reasonably interpreted
to refer to the education petitioner would receive by partici-
pating in the residency training program. The offer letter,
which does not speak to petitioner’s duties, and the 2009
agreement encompassed the entire understanding between
the university and petitioner. 15 Neither document refers to
any obligation to teach medical students nor suggests that
petitioner’s remuneration was for teaching. Rather, the 2009
agreement focuses on the education petitioner would be
receiving and the patient care he would be providing as a
resident. Moreover, the 2009 agreement was renewed for
each year of petitioner’s residency without a material change
in the description of the residency training program or peti-
tioner’s responsibilities as a resident.
   During the residency training program petitioner’s training
consisted of treating patients under faculty supervision, con-
ducting and presenting research, and supervising and
training medical students. Petitioner was responsible for
taking three to five medical students with him on rounds,
preparing them for their monthly examinations, and evalu-
ating them at the end of each month. Although petitioner
estimated that he spent 70% of his time in ‘‘education-
related’’ activities, we do not find his estimate convincing
because, as he acknowledged, much of his time spent with
medical students occurred while he was also treating
patients. Nor do we assign much weight to the Form 9210
and unsigned Form 9250 that petitioner completed in 2012,
in which petitioner stated that his primary purpose in vis-
iting the United States was ‘‘teaching/research/training in
internal medicine’’ and estimated that he spent 50% of his
time teaching and 50% of his time researching during tax-
able years 2010–12. Petitioner completed these forms two
   15 In the record is a letter dated November 20, 2012, from the univer-

sity’s director of the internal medicine residency training program describ-
ing petitioner’s position and duties during his residency. Although helpful
in ascertaining what petitioner did during his residency, the letter is not
part of the offer or contract between petitioner and the university.
366                145 UNITED STATES TAX COURT                        (351)


years after the year in issue, and we regard them only as
petitioner’s post hoc position regarding his 2010 claimed
treaty exemption. Moreover, on the Form 9250 petitioner
indicated that his occupation before coming to the United
States was medical student and his occupation upon
returning to Pakistan would be consultant physician in
nephrology. This description of petitioner’s occupation before
and after the residency training program clearly implies that
he participated in the residency training program to obtain
a change in professional status.
   Petitioner contends that his time spent ‘‘teaching’’ medical
students is sufficient to prove that he was in the United
States for the ‘‘purpose of teaching’’. However, petitioner’s
involvement in the supervising and training of medical stu-
dents was a component of his stated goal to receive U.S.
medical training and become a fully licensed doctor and was
not his objective or aim during the year in issue. The over-
whelming weight of the evidence shows that petitioner did
not enter the residency training program to become a
teacher. The university did not hire petitioner to teach, and
he did not hold a faculty appointment. The Form DS–2019
and the 2009 agreement show that neither ECFMG nor the
university contemplated that petitioner was coming to the
United States with the ‘‘objective’’ or ‘‘goal’’ of teaching. See
Black’s Law Dictionary 1356. Instead, teaching was an inci-
dental part of petitioner’s overall training to become a doctor,
which primarily involved treating patients and also included
conducting research. 16 On the basis of all the facts and cir-
cumstances, we find that petitioner’s purpose in coming to
and remaining in the United States in 2010 was to receive
postgraduate medical training and that he was not in the
United States for the purpose of teaching.
   Petitioner cites several revenue rulings to support his posi-
tion that he was in the United States for the purpose of
teaching. However, they do not help him.
   16 Some income tax treaties to which the United States is a party exempt

from income tax any remuneration received for conducting research. See,
e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention
of Fiscal Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Belg., art. 19(2),
Nov. 27, 2006, Tax Treaties (CCH) para. 31,011 (entered into force Dec. 28,
2007). The United States-Pakistan Income Tax Convention is not one of
them.
(351)                BHUTTA v. COMMISSIONER                          367


   Rev. Rul. 55–211, 1955–1 C.B. 676, concerns the applica-
tion of a treaty provision similar to treaty art. XII to
nationals of the United Kingdom who held faculty appoint-
ments at various universities in the United States. The rev-
enue ruling concludes that the treaty benefit obtains if an
individual’s ‘‘primary purpose * * * is to teach, lecture or
instruct’’ and ‘‘a substantial portion of his time is devoted to
such duties’’. Id., 1955–1 C.B. at 677. ‘‘Where, however, the
primary purpose of his presence in the United States is the
pursuit of research and like duties and any teaching is inci-
dental to such research it cannot be considered that he is
present in the United States ‘for the purpose of teaching’ ’’.
Id. The revenue ruling also states: ‘‘Activities in which a
teacher engages for the purpose of conferring on students the
benefit of his knowledge and methods as distinguished from
the pursuit of his own projects would be considered a part of
his teaching.’’ Id.
   Rev. Rul. 74–174, 1974–1 C.B. 371, interprets Rev. Rul.
55–211, supra, and applies its reasoning to different facts. 17
It involves a citizen and resident of Canada who was an
assistant professor in Canada, entered the United States to
study for a doctoral degree, and spent 60% of his time in the
United States performing duties as a teaching assistant. Rev.
Rul. 74–174, supra. Applying an objective facts and cir-
cumstances analysis, the revenue ruling concludes that the
individual’s compensation for his duties as a teaching assist-
ant was exempt from income tax because he ‘‘was engaged in
the business of teaching before coming to the United States’’
and because he spent substantial time performing teaching
duties even though he was also a doctoral student. Id., 1974–
1 C.B. at 372.
   Petitioner contends that ‘‘because the vast majority of his
time was spent engaged in educational duties’’, he falls
within the purview of Rev. Rul. 55–211, supra, and qualifies
for an exemption under treaty art. XII. However, the evi-
dence in the record supports findings that petitioner was a
medical student, not a teacher, before coming to the United
States for his residency training program, see supra note 3,
and that he did not hold a faculty or teaching position at the
  17 Petitioner does not explicitly rely on Rev. Rul. 74–174, 1974–1 C.B.

371, but we address it for the sake of completeness.
368             145 UNITED STATES TAX COURT              (351)


university during 2010. Petitioner’s supervising and training
of medical students, which he performed mainly while
treating patients, was incidental to his graduate medical
education, and he has not ‘‘distinguished [supervising and
training of medical students] from the pursuit of his own
projects’’. See Rev. Rul. 55–211, 1955–1 C.B. at 677. Peti-
tioner’s situation is distinguishable from those in Rev. Rul.
55–211, supra, and Rev. Rul. 74–174, supra.
   Petitioner also cites Rev. Rul. 69–46, 1969–1 C.B. 365, and
Rev. Rul. 70–382, 1970–2 C.B. 331, for the proposition that
an individual does not need to have taught in his home
country before entering the United States for the purpose of
teaching. The revenue rulings state that, as applied to treaty
provisions similar to the one at issue here, an individual’s
remuneration for teaching is exempt from income tax even if
the individual had not taught in his home country before
entering the United States. Rev. Rul. 70–382, 1970–2 C.B. at
331; Rev. Rul. 69–46, 1969–1 C.B. at 365. However, in both
revenue rulings the individuals qualified as teachers in their
home countries and entered the United States for the express
purpose of teaching in schools. Rev. Rul. 70–382, supra; Rev.
Rul. 69–46, supra. The record overwhelmingly establishes
that petitioner did not enter the United States for the
express purpose of teaching. Rev. Rul. 69–46, supra, and Rev.
Rul. 70–382, supra, do not support petitioner’s contention.
   Finally, petitioner cites United States v. Mem’l Sloan-Ket-
tering Cancer Ctr., 563 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2009), for the propo-
sition that modern medical residents are principally teachers.
The issue in Sloan-Kettering was whether medical residents
were liable for payroll taxes because they were employees or
whether their income was excepted from payroll taxes
because they were students. Id. at 24–25. In remanding the
two consolidated cases, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that ‘‘[w]hether a medical resident is a
‘student’ and whether he is employed by a ‘school, college, or
university’ are separate factual inquiries that depend on the
nature of the residency program in which the medical resi-
dents participate and the status of the employer.’’ Id. at 28
(quoting United States v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr. of Fla., Inc.,
486 F.3d 1248, 1252 (11th Cir. 2007)). Petitioner argues that,
consistent with the Court of Appeals’ reasoning, the record
(351)                  BHUTTA v. COMMISSIONER                             369


proves that he was a teacher rather than a student because
he was compensated and received benefits for his services.
   Sloan-Kettering is not binding precedent in this case 18 and
is inapplicable to services performed on or after April 1,
2005, the effective date of regulations that created a bright-
line rule for distinguishing between students and full-time
employees for purposes of the student exception to payroll
taxes under section 3121(b)(10). See Sloan-Kettering, 563
F.3d at 25 n.2; sec. 31.3121(b)(10)–2(d)(3)(iii), (e) Example
(4), (f), Employment Tax Regs.; see also Mayo Found. for
Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011)
(holding the regulations that apply to services performed on
or after April 1, 2005, valid). Moreover, petitioner takes the
analysis of Sloan-Kettering several inferential steps too far.
Sloan-Kettering involved payroll taxes rather than a treaty
provision and focused on whether medical residents are stu-
dents or employees without specifying whether a medical
resident who was an employee was compensated for treating
patients, researching, teaching, or performing other personal
services.
   The guidance that petitioner cites is inapposite or distin-
guishable. The record clearly proves that petitioner’s purpose
in the United States during 2010 was to receive medical
training. The supervising and teaching of medical students
that petitioner did was an incidental part of his medical
training and was not his objective or goal in coming to or
remaining in the United States. We conclude that petitioner
was not in the United States in 2010 for the purpose of
teaching. 19

  18 Under   the rule of Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970),
aff ’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), this Court will ‘‘follow a Court of Ap-
peals decision which is squarely in point where appeal from our decision
lies to that Court of Appeals and to that court alone.’’ This case appears
to be appealable to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, absent
a stipulation to the contrary. See sec. 7482(b)(1)(A), (2). Therefore caselaw
from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit would not be binding
in this case even if United States v. Mem’l Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 563
F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2009), were ‘‘squarely in point’’, which it is not.
   19 Because we find that petitioner was not in the United States for the

purpose of teaching, we do not address respondent’s remaining contentions
regarding the applicability of treaty art. XII.
370               145 UNITED STATES TAX COURT                        (351)


  B. Article XIII(3) of the United States-Pakistan Income Tax
     Convention
  Petitioner’s alternative contention is that, if his income is
not exempt under treaty art. XII, then $10,000 of his income
is exempt under treaty art. XIII(3). Article XIII(3) of the
United States-Pakistan Income Tax Convention provides:
 A resident of one of the contracting States temporarily present in the
 other contracting State under arrangements with such other State or
 any agency or instrumentality thereof solely for the purpose of training,
 study or orientation shall be exempted from tax by such other State with
 respect to compensation not exceeding 10,000 United States dollars for
 the rendition of services directly related to such training, study or ori-
 entation (including emoluments and remuneration, if any, from the
 employer abroad of such resident).

As applicable here, ‘‘other State’’ means the United States.
See id. art. II(1)(c). The Department of the Treasury tech-
nical explanation of the treaty clarifies that this exemption
applies to ‘‘Pakistan personnel invited to the United States
for training or study by our Government,’’ including ‘‘military
and armed forces trainees, central bank employees studying
budgetary and financial policies, and trainees under tech-
nical assistance programs.’’ Technical Explanation, supra.
     In the petition, petitioner vaguely contends that he quali-
fies for this exemption because the university is a Govern-
ment contractor and therefore is an agency or instrumen-
tality of the United States. We have recognized that
‘‘ ‘[a]gency’ and ‘instrumentality’ are terms of considerable
breadth, and they are susceptible of different meanings in
different contexts.’’ Guardian Indus. Corp. v. Commissioner,
143 T.C. 1, 12–14 (2014) (listing cases where ‘‘agency’’ and
‘‘instrumentality’’ have different definitions in various cir-
cumstances). However, even if petitioner had provided
authority to support his contention that a Government con-
tractor qualifies as an agency or instrumentality in this con-
text, which he has not, he has failed to introduce any cred-
ible evidence showing that the university was a Government
contractor for the U.S. Government in 2010. Moreover, there
is no credible evidence to prove that the signatories of the
treaty intended article XIII(3) to apply to anything other
than a Government-sponsored or -supported program. See
Technical Explanation, supra; cf. Rev. Rul. 72–301, 1972–1
(351)             BHUTTA v. COMMISSIONER                   371


C.B. 439–440 (analyzing similar provisions in other income
tax treaties to conclude that treaty art. XIII(3) applies only
to ‘‘individuals who, under arrangements with the United
States or an agency or instrumentality thereof, are invited to
the United States for training or study under a specific pro-
gram, sponsored or supported by the United States Govern-
ment’’). Because petitioner bears the burden of proof with
respect to this issue, see supra p. 359, and has not proven
that he was in the United States under arrangements with
the U.S. Government or an agency or instrumentality
thereof, he is not entitled to an exemption under treaty art.
XIII(3).
IV. Conclusion
  Petitioner does not qualify for an exemption under article
XII or article XIII(3) the United States-Pakistan Income Tax
Convention. We therefore sustain respondent’s determination
as amended in the first supplemental stipulation of facts. See
supra note 1. We have considered the parties’ remaining
arguments, and to the extent not discussed above, conclude
those arguments are irrelevant, moot, or without merit.
  To reflect the foregoing,
                     Decision will be entered under Rule 155.

                        f
