

Dae Kyoo Kim v Lemon Transp. Corp. (2017 NY Slip Op 08808)





Dae Kyoo Kim v Lemon Transp. Corp.


2017 NY Slip Op 08808


Decided on December 20, 2017


Appellate Division, Second Department


Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.


This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.



Decided on December 20, 2017
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P.
LEONARD B. AUSTIN
SHERI S. ROMAN
SYLVIA O. HINDS-RADIX
FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, JJ.


2016-06208
 (Index No. 700646/14)

[*1]Dae Kyoo Kim, plaintiff, Do Hyun Cho, appellant,
vLemon Transportation Corp., et al., respondents (and a third-party action).


Andrew Park, P.C., New York, NY (Jason Ginsberg of counsel), for appellant.
Milene Mansouri, P.C. (Marjorie E. Bornes, Brooklyn, NY, of counsel), for respondents.

DECISION & ORDER
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff Do Hyun Cho appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Dufficy, J.), dated May 9, 2016, as granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by him on the ground that he did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff Do Hyun Cho (hereinafter the appellant) did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the lumbar region of the appellant's spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614). In addition, the defendants established, prima facie, that the appellant did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) by submitting a transcript of the appellant's deposition testimony, which demonstrated that he missed only two weeks of work following the accident (see John v Linden, 124 AD3d 598, 599; Marin v Ieni, 108 AD3d 656, 657; Richards v Tyson, 64 AD3d 760, 761).
In opposition, the appellant failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Il Chung Lim v Chrabaszcz, 95 AD3d 950, 951; McLoud v Reyes, 82 AD3d 848, 849).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the [*2]appellant.
RIVERA, J.P., AUSTIN, ROMAN, HINDS-RADIX and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Aprilanne Agostino
Clerk of the Court


