
USCA1 Opinion

	




                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT                              _________________________          No. 96-1729                          JESUS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ RODRIGUEZ,                                Plaintiff, Appellant,                                          v.                           IBERIA LINEAS AEREAS DE ESPANA,                                 Defendant, Appellee.                              _________________________                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                           FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO                    [Hon. Hector M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]                                              ___________________                              _________________________                                        Before                           Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges,                                            ______________                            and Woodlock,* District Judge.                                           ______________                              __________________________               Alberto Acevedo Colom on brief for appellant.               _____________________               James  D.  Noel,  III  and  McConnell  Valdes on  brief  for               _____________________       _________________          appellee.                              __________________________                                December 9, 1996                              __________________________          ______________          *Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.                    Per  Curiam.   This appeal stems  from a  suit alleging                    Per  Curiam.                    ___________          failure   to  pay   proper  overtime   and  other   extraordinary          compensation in violation of both federal statutes and local law.          The  plaintiff, Jesus  Rafael  Rodriguez  Rodriguez  (Rodriguez),          alleges that his former employer, Iberia Lineas  Aereas de Espana          (Iberia), a commercial passenger  airline, underpaid him during a          portion of the period in which he served as its traffic manger at          the Luis  Munoz Marin  International Airport in  Carolina, Puerto          Rico.    Iberia  defended  on the  ground  that  the  plaintiff's          position was "administrative"  and-or "executive" in nature,  and          therefore exempt from the statutory sweep.                    The district  court conducted a  three-day bench  trial          concerning Rodriguez's allegations.  The court thereafter wrote a          carefully reasoned opinion in which it concluded  that Iberia had          carried the devoir of  persuasion in regard to the  applicability          of the cited  exemptions.  See Rodriguez v. Iberia,  923 F. Supp.                                     ___ _________    ______          304 (D.P.R. 1996).   The court thereupon dismissed  the complaint          with prejudice and entered judgment for the defendant.  Rodriguez          appeals.                    Having  read the entire record and carefully considered          the parties' briefs,  we find  no basis to  disturb the  district          court's  decision.    Moreover,  we  have  determined  that  oral          argument of this appeal would not advance the decisional process.          In the final analysis, we regard this as a suitable case in which          to act upon our previously stated belief that when "a trial court          has  produced a  first-rate  work product,  a reviewing  tribunal                                          2          should  hesitate to wax longiloquent simply to hear its own words          resonate."  In re  San Juan Dupont Plaza  Hotel Fire Litig.,  989                      _______________________________________________          F.2d  36,  38  (1st Cir.  1993).    Consequently,  we affirm  the          judgment for substantially the  reasons elucidated in the opinion          below.  We add only a brief comment.                    Rodriguez  rehashes the  evidence and  essentially asks          that we reweigh the facts  de novo.  Our proper  office, however,          is  much  more  circumscribed.    Following  a  bench  trial,  an          appellate court is  not warranted in rejecting  the trial judge's          "findings of  fact or conclusions drawn therefrom  unless, on the          whole of the  record, [the  court of appeals]  form[s] a  strong,          unyielding belief that  a mistake  has been made."   Cumpiano  v.                                                               ________          Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1990); see also          ____________________                                     ___ ____          Fed.  R. Civ. P. 52(a).  Contrary to Rodriguez's suggestion, this          paradigm applies  full force to  findings of fact  concerning the          significance (or  lack of significance) of  documentary evidence.          See Reliance Steel Prods. Co. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 880 F.2d          ___ _________________________    ______________________          575, 576 (1st  Cir. 1989);  RCI Northeast Servs.  Div. v.  Boston                                      __________________________     ______          Edison Co., 822 F.2d 199, 202-03 (1st Cir. 1987).          __________                    The   clearly   erroneous   standard   of   review   is          determinative of the outcome here.  The record, read objectively,          does not yield a conviction that a mistake has been  made.  Thus,          clear error is clearly absent.                    This does not mean,  of course, that the case  was open          and  shut at the district court level.   But once the trier found                    ___________________________          the facts, the dynamics changed.  Where, as here, the trial court                                          3          has  indulged no  error of  law and  its conclusions  following a          jury-waived   trial  are   dependent  upon   its  choices   among          conflicting facts  and its elections  as to  which inferences  to          draw  from the  facts as  found, appellate  tribunals are  not at          liberty  to meddle.   See Foster v.  Dalton, 71 F.3d  52, 55 (1st                                ___ ______     ______          Cir. 1995); Irons v. FBI, 811 F.2d 681, 684 (1st Cir. 1987).  Nor                      _____    ___          do the appellant's criticisms of certain testimony suffice to tip          the  balance; credibility calls  are for the  district court, not          for the court of appeals.   See Anthony v. Sundlun, 952 F.2d 603,                                      ___ _______    _______          606 (1st Cir. 1991).                    We  need go no further.   The judgment  of the district          court is summarily affirmed.  See 1st Cir. R.27.1.                                        ___                    Affirmed.                    Affirmed.                    ________                                          4
