                         T.C. Memo. 2007-20



                       UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                  LINDA L. POOL, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 15413-05L.            Filed January 31, 2007.


     Linda L. Pool, pro se.

     Erin K. Salel, for respondent.



                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

     VASQUEZ, Judge:    This case is before the Court on

respondent’s motion for summary judgment and to impose a penalty

under section 6673.1




     1
        Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and
all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
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                              Background

     Petitioner submitted to the Internal Revenue Service Forms

1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, for 1999, 2000, 2001,

2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005.    Petitioner listed only zeros on the

Forms 1040 for 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005--

e.g., listing zero income and zero tax due.

     Respondent mailed petitioner statutory notices of deficiency

for 1999, 2000, and 2003.   Petitioner received the notices of

deficiency for 1999, 2000, and 2003.       Petitioner, however, did

not petition the Court regarding the notices of deficiency for

1999, 2000, and 2003.

     On September 15, 2004, respondent sent petitioner a Final

Notice, Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a

Hearing with respect to petitioner’s 1999, 2000, and 2003 taxable

years (notice of levy).

     On or about October 14, 2004, petitioner sent respondent a

Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing (hearing

request).   On the hearing request, petitioner wrote that “I will

explain at the collection due process hearing” why she did not

agree with the notice of levy; she did not list any years in the

space provided for “taxable years”.      Petitioner did not propose

any collection alternatives.

     On January 11, 2005, Appeals Team Manager Leland J. Neubauer

sent petitioner a letter advising her that the Oklahoma City
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Appeals Office received petitioner’s hearing request.   The tax

periods were identified as petitioner’s 1999, 2000, and 2003 tax

years.

     On January 23, 2005, petitioner sent a letter to Mr.

Neubauer advising him that she wanted a face-to-face section 6330

hearing in San Diego, California.

     Petitioner’s case was transferred to the San Diego Appeals

Office, and on February 24, 2005, Appeals Team Manager Jon Leo

sent petitioner a letter advising her that the San Diego Appeals

office received petitioner’s hearing request.

     On April 21, 2005, Settlement Officer Cynthia Chadwell sent

petitioner a letter advising petitioner that she (Ms. Chadwell)

was assigned to petitioner’s hearing request and requesting

petitioner contact her (Ms. Chadwell) by May 5, 2005, to schedule

a face-to-face hearing.   Ms. Chadwell included with this letter a

Form 433-A, Collection Information Statement for Wage Earners and

Self-Employed Individuals, for petitioner to complete and return

with supporting information.   She also requested a copy of

petitioner’s 2004 income tax return.   Petitioner did not contact

Ms. Chadwell on or before May 5, 2005.

     On May 9, 2005, Ms. Chadwell sent petitioner a letter

requesting petitioner contact Ms. Chadwell by May 24, 2005, to

schedule a face-to-face hearing.
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     On May 24, 2005, petitioner contacted Ms. Chadwell and

requested a face-to-face hearing.   That same day, Ms. Chadwell

sent petitioner a letter to confirm the date, time, and location

of the section 6330 hearing, which was scheduled for June 23,

2005.   Ms. Chadwell again asked petitioner to submit a completed

Form 433-A and bring her 2004 tax return to the section 6330

hearing.

     On June 21, 2005, petitioner left Ms. Chadwell a voice

message that petitioner could not keep the scheduled appointment

due to a change in her work schedule.

     On June 22, 2005, Ms. Chadwell called petitioner, and

petitioner stated that she wished to reschedule the hearing for

June 29, 2005.   Ms. Chadwell told petitioner that this was

petitioner’s last chance for a face-to-face hearing.   That same

day, Ms. Chadwell sent petitioner a letter rescheduling the

hearing for June 29, 2005, advising petitioner this was

petitioner’s last chance for an in-person hearing, and stating

that petitioner could have a telephone hearing and/or submit

documents for Ms. Chadwell to consider (i.e., a correspondence

hearing).

     On June 29, 2005, petitioner called Ms. Chadwell and advised

her that she (petitioner) could not make the scheduled hearing.

Ms. Chadwell told petitioner that she would not be offered
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another opportunity for a face-to-face hearing, but Ms. Chadwell

would schedule a telephone hearing for July 14, 2005.

      On July 5, 2005, Ms. Chadwell sent petitioner a letter

confirming their discussion on June 29, 2005.   Ms. Chadwell also

noted that petitioner’s Form 1040 for 2004 had been posted to

petitioner’s account, it reflected no income and no tax, and that

information returns in respondent’s possession showed that

petitioner received income from various sources for 2004.    Ms.

Chadwell attached transcripts for 2004 to this letter indicating

petitioner’s sources of income for 2004.   Ms. Chadwell requested

a corrected Form 1040 for 2004 in advance of the scheduled

telephone conference.

      On July 7, 2005, petitioner’s son contacted Ms. Chadwell.

He stated that petitioner would not be providing the requested

information to Ms. Chadwell and requested that the notice of

determination be issued.   Ms. Chadwell asked to speak to

petitioner to confirm this information, and petitioner confirmed

it.   Ms. Chadwell gave petitioner another opportunity for a phone

conference.   Petitioner, however, refused this offer and stated

she would not provide the requested information.

      Ms. Chadwell reviewed the administrative file for 1999,

2000, and 2003, and confirmed that respondent had complied with

all applicable laws and administrative procedures regarding 1999,

2000, and 2003.
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     On July 12, 2005, respondent issued a Notice of

Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320

and/or 6330 to petitioner regarding petitioner’s 1999, 2000, and

2003 tax years.   In the notice of determination, respondent

determined to sustain the proposed levy.

     On August 15, 2005, petitioner timely filed a petition

regarding the notice of determination.   At the time she filed her

petition, petitioner lived in La Mesa, California.   The petition

contains frivolous and groundless arguments.

     On June 29, 2006, respondent sent petitioner a letter

advising her of the provisions of section 6673 and that

respondent would file a motion requesting sanctions under section

6673.

     On August 17, 2006, respondent filed a motion for summary

judgment and to impose a penalty under section 6673.

     On August 21, 2006, the Court ordered petitioner to file any

objection to respondent’s motion for summary judgment and to

impose a penalty under section 6673 on or before September 5,

2006.   Petitioner did not file any objection, and the Court

calendared said motion for hearing at the Court’s San Diego,

California, session on September 25, 2006.

     Petitioner appeared at the hearing, admitted receiving

income for the years in issue, advanced frivolous and groundless

arguments that the income was not subject to tax, and was warned
                                 - 7 -

by the Court that her arguments were frivolous and groundless and

the Court could impose a penalty pursuant to section 6673.

Petitioner, however, disregarded these warnings and continued to

advance frivolous and groundless arguments.

                              Discussion

I.     Motion for Summary Judgment

        Rule 121(a) provides that either party may move for summary

judgment upon all or any part of the legal issues in controversy.

Full or partial summary judgment may be granted only if it is

demonstrated that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact

and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law.     Rule 121(b);

Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd.

17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994).

       We conclude that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of

law.

II.    Determination To Proceed With Collection

        Section 6330(a) provides that the Secretary shall furnish

taxpayers with written notice of their right to a hearing before

any property is levied upon.     Section 6330 further provides that

the taxpayer may request administrative review of the matter (in

the form of a hearing) within a prescribed 30-day period.     Sec.

6330(a) and (b).
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     Pursuant to section 6330(c)(2)(A), a taxpayer may raise at

the section 6330 hearing any relevant issue with regard to the

Commissioner’s collection activities, including spousal defenses,

challenges to the appropriateness of the Commissioner’s intended

collection action, and alternative means of collection.     Sego v.

Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 609 (2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114

T.C. 176, 180 (2000).   If a taxpayer received a statutory notice

of deficiency for the years in issue or otherwise had the

opportunity to dispute the underlying tax liability, the taxpayer

is precluded from challenging the existence or amount of the

underlying tax liability.   Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B); Sego v.

Commissioner, supra at 610-611; Goza v. Commissioner, supra at

182-183.

     Petitioner received notices of deficiency for 1999, 2000,

and 2003.   Accordingly, she cannot challenge her underlying

liabilities.   See sec. 6330(c)(2)(B); Sego v. Commissioner, supra

at 610-611; Goza v. Commissioner, supra at 182-183.   Therefore,

we review respondent’s determination for an abuse of discretion.

See Sego v. Commissioner, supra at 610.

     Petitioner has failed to raise a spousal defense, make a

valid challenge to the appropriateness of respondent’s intended

collection action, or offer alternative means of collection.

These issues are now deemed conceded.   See Rule 331(b)(4).
                                  - 9 -

       Accordingly, we conclude that respondent did not abuse his

discretion, and we sustain respondent’s determination to proceed

with collection.

III.    Section 6673

       Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes this Court to require a

taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty not to exceed

$25,000 if the taxpayer took frivolous or groundless positions in

the proceedings or instituted the proceedings primarily for

delay.    A position maintained by the taxpayer is “frivolous”

where it is “contrary to established law and unsupported by a

reasoned, colorable argument for change in the law.”      Coleman v.

Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Hansen v.

Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1464, 1470 (9th Cir. 1987) (section 6673

penalty upheld because taxpayer should have known claim was

frivolous).

       Petitioner has advanced shopworn arguments characteristic of

tax-protester rhetoric that has been universally rejected by this

and other courts.      Wilcox v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 1007 (9th

Cir. 1988), affg. T.C. Memo. 1987-225; Carter v. Commissioner,

784 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1986).      We will not painstakingly

address petitioner’s assertions “with somber reasoning and

copious citation of precedent; to do so might suggest that these

arguments have some colorable merit.”      Crain v. Commissioner, 737

F.2d 1417, 1417 (5th Cir. 1984).     Petitioner was warned several
                             - 10 -

times by respondent and the Court that her arguments were

frivolous and without merit, and that if she continued to advance

them she could be subject to a penalty of up to $25,000.    Even

after receiving these repeated warnings, petitioner continued to

advance the same frivolous and meritless arguments.

     We conclude petitioner’s position was frivolous and

groundless and that petitioner instituted and maintained these

proceedings primarily for delay.   Accordingly, pursuant to

section 6673(a) we hold petitioner is liable for a $2,500

penalty.

     To reflect the foregoing,

                                         An appropriate order and

                                    decision will be entered.
