                   T.C. Summary Opinion 2009-84



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                  KENNIE BLACKMON, Petitioner v.
           COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 5165-07S.              Filed May 28, 2009.



     Kennie Blackmon, pro se.

     Michael T. Sargent, for respondent.



     GUSTAFSON, Judge:   This case was heard pursuant to the

provisions of section 74631 in effect when the petition was

filed.   Pursuant to section 7463(b), the decision to be entered

is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion shall not

be treated as precedent for any other case.


     1
      Unless otherwise indicated, all citations of sections refer
to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C.) in effect for
the tax year at issue.
                               - 2 -

     The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) determined a deficiency

of $3,833 in the 2003 Federal income tax of petitioner Kennie

Blackmon.   After concessions,2 the issue for decision is whether

Mr. Blackmon is entitled to deductions under section 162 for (i)

his mileage between his residence and his work site; and (ii) his

purchase of work clothes, boots, and tools.   On the facts proved

at trial, Mr. Blackmon is not entitled to deductions under

section 162 greater than respondent has conceded.

                            Background

     Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

The stipulation of facts filed December 8, 2008, and the attached

exhibits are incorporated herein by this reference.   At the time

that he filed his petition, Mr. Blackmon resided in North

Carolina.

Mr. Blackmon’s Residence and Place of Work

     Mr. Blackmon is a pipe fitter and maintenance worker.   He

has resided in Chadbourn, North Carolina, for many years, but he

has not worked in Chadbourn for many years.   Since 1996 he has

worked mostly, but not entirely, at a plant in Darlington, South

Carolina, about 71 miles from his home (i.e., 142 miles round




     2
      Respondent concedes that before application of the
limitation imposed by section 67(a) (i.e., 2 percent of adjusted
gross income), Mr. Blackmon is entitled to (i) a deduction of
$300 under section 162 for the expense of tools, and (ii) a
deduction of $181 for tax preparation fees under section 212(3).
                                 - 3 -

trip).   During the year at issue (2003), Mr. Blackmon worked at

the Darlington plant between January 1 and December 21.

     On about three occasions from 1996 to 2003, there were

layoffs at the Darlington plant, during which for periods of

several months Mr. Blackmon worked at other jobs in Maxton, North

Carolina (44 miles from Chadbourn, 88 miles round trip),

Riegelwood, North Carolina (38 miles from Chadbourn, 76 miles

round trip), and other locations that Mr. Blackmon could not

recall at trial.   These distances were not proved at trial, but

we take judicial notice of them pursuant to rule 201(b) of the

Federal Rules of Evidence.     Because of these layoffs,

Mr. Blackmon believes that his work in Darlington was

“temporary”.   He testified:    “I mean, you may go in tomorrow and

be laid off, so I consider all jobs temporary.”

Mr. Blackmon’s 2003 Form 1040

     Mr. Blackmon timely filed his 2003 Form 1040, U.S.

Individual Income Tax Return, claiming the following “Job

Expenses and Most Other Miscellaneous Deductions” on his Schedule

A, Itemized Deductions:   (i) unreimbursed employee expenses of

$25,300; (ii) tax preparation fees of $181 (which respondent has

conceded); and (iii) other expenses of $500.

     Mr. Blackmon’s claimed unreimbursed employee expenses

consisted of the following:     (i) vehicle expenses of $23,400,

i.e., 65,000 business miles at the standard mileage rate of
                               - 4 -

36 cents per mile; and (ii) job expenses for “WORK CLOTHES AND

BOOTS” of $1,900.   Mr. Blackmon’s claimed other expenses

consisted entirely of an itemized deduction for “TOOLS” of $500,

of which respondent has conceded $300, leaving only $200 still at

issue.

Mr. Blackmon’s Substantiation of His Expenses

     With respect to his claimed deduction for vehicle expenses,

Mr. Blackmon testified that during his employment at the

Darlington plant in 2003, he drove to and from his residence and

work site each workday.   He presented no log, calendar, diary,

work or leave record, or other written record to corroborate his

mileage claim.

     With respect to his claimed deduction for work clothes and

boots, Mr. Blackmon testified that in his line of work as a pipe

fitter, he worked in close proximity to welders, and that he

purchased denim jeans, denim shirts, and boots to avoid getting

burned by sparks from the nearby welding activity.    He

acknowledged that his claimed deduction of $1,900 for work

clothes and boots was an estimate.     With respect to his deduction

for tools, Mr. Blackmon testified that he purchased a protracting

level for $200 or $300, and “other stuff” that he could not

recall in detail.   However, he presented no receipts, credit card

slips, canceled checks, or checkbook registers to substantiate

the expenditures for work clothes, boots, or tools.
                                - 5 -

                              Discussion

     At issue is Mr. Blackmon’s entitlement to deductions that he

claimed on his 2003 tax return for job-related expenses.      Section

162(a) allows a deduction for all the ordinary and necessary

expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on

a trade or business.    Section 262, however, provides that no

deduction is allowed for personal, living, or family expenses.

Deductions are strictly a matter of legislative grace, and

taxpayers must satisfy the specific requirements for any

deduction claimed.   See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S.

79, 84 (1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435,

440 (1934).   Taxpayers are required to maintain records

sufficient to substantiate their claimed deductions.    See

sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs. (26 C.F.R.).

I.   Vehicle Expenses

     A.    Personal Versus Business Purpose

     Mr. Blackmon contends that he is entitled to deduct the

standard mileage rate for the miles he drove between his

residence in Chadbourn, North Carolina, and his work site in

Darlington, South Carolina.    However, in general, the cost of

daily commuting to and from work is a nondeductible personal

expense.   See Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 473-474

(1946); sec. 1.162-2(e), Income Tax Regs.     In order to prevail,

Mr. Blackmon needed to prove that his transportation to and from
                                 - 6 -

work was not a normal commuting expense, but he was unable to do

so.

      Mr. Blackmon has not worked in Chadbourn, North Carolina,

for many years.   Rather, Mr. Blackmon must have other reasons,

sufficient to him, for living in Chadbourn, North Carolina; and

he is certainly free to live there and free to work wherever he

pleases.   However, it is clear that his reason for living in

Chadbourn is not related to his reason for working 71 miles away

in Darlington, South Carolina.    Rather, personal reasons motivate

that decision, and in 2003 he made his long drive to work each

day for those personal reasons.    Cf. Tucker v. Commissioner, 55

T.C. 783, 785-788 (1971).

      A taxpayer may deduct daily transportation expenses that he

incurs in going between his residence and a work location that is

temporary and that is outside the metropolitan area where he

lives and normally works.   Brockman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2003-3; Aldea v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-136; Rev. Rul.

99-7, 1999-1 C.B. 361.   However, Mr. Blackmon does not meet this

exception, both because his work at the Darlington plant was not

really temporary and because there was not a single metropolitan

area where he both lived and normally worked.

      Although Mr. Blackmon considers his work in the Darlington

plant “temporary”, the facts show otherwise.    He worked in the

Darlington plant for 11-1/2 months of 2003 and for most of the 7
                               - 7 -

years before.   His testimony about the layoffs and his other

employment was summary and vague.    Those layoffs were few and

brief during his long tenure at the Darlington plant, and it is

clear that the Darlington plant was always his default work

location--the one to which he intended to return and did return

when the layoffs were over.

     Even if Mr. Blackmon’s 2003 work at the Darlington plant

could be characterized as temporary, the temporary nature of a

job is not, in and of itself, a sufficient basis to make

transportation expenses deductible.    Rather, that temporary work

location must be outside the metropolitan area where he lives and

normally works.   If a taxpayer like Mr. Blackmon ordinarily works

outside the metropolitan area in which he lives, then his

transportation expenses to a temporary job that is also outside

the metropolitan area where he lives are not deductible.    See

Aldea v. Commissioner, supra; Rev. Rul. 99-7, supra.     From at

least as early as 1996 through the year at issue, Mr. Blackmon

did not ordinarily work in the metropolitan area of Chadbourn,

North Carolina, in which he lived.     Consequently, his decision to

live apart from his work was a personal one; and even if his job

or jobs were temporary, that fact would not render his daily

transportation expense deductible.     Rather, it remains a personal

commuting expense.
                               - 8 -

     B.   Substantiation

     Respondent contends that Mr. Blackmon’s deduction of $23,400

under section 162 for vehicle expenses must be disallowed for the

additional reason that he has not substantiated the mileage he

claims to have driven between his residence and his work site.

Section 274(d) imposes stringent substantiation requirements for

claimed deductions relating to the use of “listed property”,

which is defined under section 280F(d)(4)(A)(i) to include

passenger automobiles.   Under this provision, any deduction

claimed with respect to the use of a passenger automobile, like

Mr. Blackmon’s, will be disallowed unless the taxpayer

substantiates specified elements of the use by adequate records

or by sufficient evidence corroborating the taxpayer’s own

statement.   See sec. 274(d); sec. 1.274-5T(c)(1), Temporary

Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg. 46016 (Nov. 6, 1985).

     The elements that must be substantiated to deduct the

business use of an automobile are:     (i) the amount of the

expenditure; (ii) the mileage for each business use of the

automobile and the total mileage for all uses of the automobile

during the taxable period; (iii) the date of the business use;

and (iv) the business purpose of the use of the automobile.    See

sec. 1.274-5T(b)(6), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg.

46016 (Nov. 6, 1985).
                               - 9 -

      Mr. Blackmon testified that each workday from January 1 to

December 21 he drove 71 miles each way between his residence and

his work site, and he claimed a deduction for 65,000 miles on his

2003 Form 1040.   Mr. Blackmon has not corroborated his testimony

with any records or other evidence to substantiate these claims

or the other specified elements of his business use of his

vehicle that are required by the regulations.   Moreover, if he

drove the 142-mile round trip 5 days each week during that

50-week period (i.e., 250 days), he would have driven only 35,500

miles, not the 65,000 miles alleged.   Because of Mr. Blackmon’s

failure to present any records or other evidence to supplement

his testimony, we find that he has not substantiated the required

elements of his vehicle expense under section 274(d) and the

regulations thereunder.   Accordingly, we hold that Mr. Blackmon

is not entitled to deduct his alleged vehicle expenses for

transportation between his residence and his work site in 2003.

II.   Purchase of Work Clothes and Boots

      Respondent contends that Mr. Blackmon is not entitled to a

deduction of $1,900 under section 162 for his estimated cost of

work clothes and boots,3 because he has not substantiated any

such purchases during 2003.   As is noted above, taxpayers are



      3
      It is unlikely that the costs of denim jeans and shirts
would be deductible in any event, because they could be worn for
general or personal purposes. Hynes v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.
1266, 1290 (1980).
                               - 10 -

required to maintain records sufficient to substantiate their

claimed deductions.    See sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax

Regs.    However, Mr. Blackmon has not corroborated his testimony

with any records or other evidence to substantiate his claimed

deduction of $1,900.    We find that Mr. Blackmon’s uncorroborated

testimony--in tandem with his admission that the dollar amount of

his claimed deduction was a mere estimate--is insufficient to

meet the substantiation requirements of section 6001.4

Accordingly, we hold that Mr. Blackmon is not entitled to any

deduction for his alleged purchase of work clothes and boots in

2003.

III. Purchase of Tools

     On the basis of Mr. Blackmon’s testimony at trial that he

purchased a protracting level for use at his work site,

respondent concedes that Mr. Blackmon is entitled to a deduction

of $300 under section 162 for that purchase.   However, respondent

contends that Mr. Blackmon is not entitled to an additional

deduction of $2005 under section 162 for purchasing other tools,


     4
      The Court may estimate allowable expenses under Cohan v.
Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930), but only if
there is sufficient evidence in the record to provide a basis for
the estimate, Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743
(1985), and the substantiation requirements under section 274(d)
do not apply.
     5
      Mr. Blackmon claimed on his 2003 Form 1040 a deduction of
$500 for the purchase of tools. The excess of that $500 claimed
deduction over respondent’s concession of a $300 deduction for a
                                                   (continued...)
                                 - 11 -

because he has not substantiated any purchases of other tools

during 2003.

      Mr. Blackmon has not corroborated the estimate given in his

testimony with any records or other evidence to substantiate his

deduction of $500 for the claimed purchase of tools, as the law

requires.   See sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax Regs.    In

making his concession that Mr. Blackmon is entitled to a

deduction of $300 under section 162 for his purchase of a

protracting level, respondent has generously construed section

6001 and has applied it liberally to concede the deductibility of

Mr. Blackmon’s purchase.   We find that Mr. Blackmon’s

uncorroborated testimony is insufficient to substantiate the

remainder of his claimed deduction for the purchase of tools

under section 6001.   Accordingly, we hold that Mr. Blackmon is

not entitled under section 162 to a deduction greater than

respondent has conceded for Mr. Blackmon’s alleged purchase of

tools.

IV.   Respondent’s Concessions

      Respondent has conceded that Mr. Blackmon is entitled to

miscellaneous deductions of $181 (for tax return preparation)

plus $300 (for tools), totaling $481.     However, such

miscellaneous deductions are deductible only to the extent that



      5
      (...continued)
protracting level is the $200 that remains in dispute.
                               - 12 -

they exceed 2 percent of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income

(AGI).   Sec. 67.   Mr. Blackmon’s AGI for 2003 was $38,799, so his

miscellaneous expenses are deductible only to the extent they

exceed $776 (i.e., 2 percent of $38,799).      Since the conceded

deductions of $481 do not exceed that amount, they do not affect

the calculation of the deficiency.      As a result, the IRS’s

determination of Mr. Blackmon’s deficiency in income tax for 2003

will be sustained in full.

     To reflect the foregoing,


                                      Decision will be entered for

                                 respondent.
