UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 98-6953

JERMAINE LAVONNE CHASE,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke.
Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District Judge.
(CR-94-106)

Submitted: February 26, 1999

Decided: March 16, 1999

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Jermaine Lavonne Chase, Appellant Pro Se. Ray B. Fitzgerald, Jr.,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlottesville,
Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Jermaine Lavonne Chase appeals the district court's order denying
his motion for return of seized property filed pursuant to Fed. R.
Crim. P. 41(e) (1994). We affirm.

Chase's motion involves the forfeiture of D.J. equipment seized
from the Sugar Hill Club and forfeited pursuant to a jury verdict.
Chase contends that he was the actual owner of the equipment
because he received the equipment in exchange for his services at the
club as a disc jockey. He alleges that he did not receive personal
notice of the forfeiture and requests the return of the property or just
compensation.

Although Chase claimed ownership of the property and the Drug
Enforcement Administration's (DEA) investigation report indicated
that he asserted his ownership, Chase could not provide any docu-
mentation regarding his ownership interest in the property. A DEA
agent informed Chase of the requirement that he establish ownership
of the property, and Chase was aware of the property's seizure and
subsequent forfeiture because he was a party to the criminal proceed-
ings in which the property was ordered forfeited. All of these facts
lead us to conclude that Chase had actual knowledge of the seizure
and impending forfeiture.

To the extent that Chase failed to establish more than a third-party
interest in the property, we find that the Government provided all the
notice required under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(1). Further, we find that
Chase's petition was untimely under § 853(n)(7).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dis-
pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

                     2
