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    .
                           Tm% ATTORNEY   GENERAL                                    .
                                  OFTEXAS



                                             March     6, 1974


        The Honorable Mark W. White,             Jr.      Opinion   No. H-   253
        Secretary   of State
        Office of the Secretary’of State                  Re:       Does “at his (Governor’s)
        Austin,   Texas 78711                                       pleasure”  constitute a
                                                                    term of office within the
        Dear Secretary           White:                             definition of i 2(3)(C) 7

              Article 6252-9b (Acts 1973, 63rd Leg.,     ch. 421, 6. 1086), the
        Ethics Bill, in its 5 t(3) defines “Appointed officer” to igclude,  as
        Subsection   C:

                                  “an officer of a state agency who is appointed
                           for a term of office specified   by the constitution or
                           a statute of this state. . . .‘I


                The Constitution and statutes “specify”     a term of years for num-
        erous   officers of state agencies.    For example,    Article ,j,’ $49-b, Con-
        stitution of ,Texas; and Article    54212, Vernon’s   Texas CiLl Statutes.

                 For others,  no term is given.    See, Article 43.003,   Vernon’s
        Texas Water Code and Article        6008-1, V. T. C. S. Finally,  there are
        officers    who are to be appointed to serve at the “will” or “pleasure”    of
        the appointing officer.     See, for example,   Articles 4413(201) and 4413d-1,
        Vernon’s     Texas Civil Statutes.

                Your question  is whether an appointment “at his (Governor’s)  pleasure”
        consl,itutes a term of office so as to make such appointees  “Appointed officers”
        under Article   6252-9b,  w.

              ,Generally, the phrase “term of office” is used to mean the fixed period
        of time for which the office may be held.     It is the period designated by the
        Constitution or laws as the time during which the office may be held rather
        than the time an individual holds the office.    67 C. J. S., Officers.  $42, pp.




                                                  p.    1182
The Honorable   Mark W. White,    Jr.,    page 2   (H-253)




t95-96~, .and cases cited. And see, for example, State v. Galusha, 104
N. W. 197 (Neb. 1905); Recall Bennett Committee   v. Bennett, 249 P. 2d
479 (Ore. 1952); Mutlins v. Jones, 162 S. W. 2d 761 (Ky. 1942); Smith v.
Pettis County, 136 S. W. 2d 282 (MO. 1940).

       A person holding office at the pleasure of the appointing officer
do(!s not have a term of office.    Arthur v. Hubbard, 70 A. 2,d 925 ,(My.
1950); City of Gwensboro   v. Hazel, 17 S. W. 2d 1031 (Ky. 1929); Kraterr
v, Commonwealth,     15 S. W. 2d 473 (Ky. 1929); State ex rel. Gilbert v.
Board of Commissioners      of Sierra County, 222 P. 654 (N. M. 1924);
Bayley v. Garrison,    214 P. 871 (Cal. 1923); State ex rel. Matlack v.
Oklahoma City, 134 P. 58 (Okla. 1913); State ex rel. Rumbold v. Gordoni
142 S. W. 315 (MO. 1911); Harrold v. Barnum, 96 P. 104’~(Cal.‘App. 1908);
Ida County Savings Bank v. Seidensticker,     92 N. W. 862 (Iowa 1902); &
re Batey, 52 N.Y.S.    871 (App. Div. 1898); Somers v. State, 58 N. W. 804
(S. D. 1894).

      In Spears v. Davis, 398 S.W. 2d 921 (Tex; 1966),’ where the question
was whether two,state senators were disqualified  from running for Attor-
ney General by Article 3, $18, of the Texas Constitution,  which forbida
such a candidacy  “during the term for which he may be elected, ” the
Supreme Court said:

                   “In order to avoid confusion,    a clear dietinction
            must be made between the phrase,        ‘term of office’ and
            an individual’s  tenure of office.    The period of time
            designated as a term of office may not and often does
            not coincide with an individual’s    tenure of office.   . . .”
            (398 S. W. 2d at 926)

And see Hall v. Baum,     452 S.W.~ 2d 699 (Tex.     1970).

        We believe that by referring   to the “term of office specified by the
constitution  or a statute of this state, ” the Legislature  evidenced its inten-
tion to refer to a apbcific,  designated period of time, following the line of
authority set out abovei




                                     p.   1183
_ .   -


          The Honorable   Mark   W. White,    Jr.,    page 3   (H-253)



                 Therefore,   it is our opinion that an officer of a state agency appointed
          “at the pleasure”   or “at the will” of the Governor   or other appointing autho-
          rity is not one appointed for a term of office specified    by the Constitution or
          a statute of this state.

                                       SUMMARY

                               Officers of state agencies appointed for a term of
                       office,  as contemplated   by Article 6252-9b.  0 2,(3)(C),
                       V. T. C. S., do not include those appointed at the “plea-
                       sure” or “will” of the appointing officer.

                                                 Very truly yours,




                                                 JOHN L. HILL
                                                         General     of Texas




          DAVID M. KENDALL,        Chairman
          Opinion Committee




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