UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                     No. 98-4682

ALLEN WAYNE BENNETT,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Beckley.
Elizabeth V. Hallanan, Senior District Judge.
(CR-94-149)

Submitted: March 2, 1999

Decided: April 22, 1999

Before WILKINS and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and
PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Hunt L. Charach, Federal Public Defender, Brian J. Kornbrath, Assis-
tant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appel-
lant. Rebecca A. Betts, United States Attorney, Monica K. Schwartz,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Allen Wayne Bennett appeals from the twenty-four-month sen-
tence he received after the district court revoked his term of super-
vised release. He alleges that the court erroneously sentenced him to
the maximum statutory penalty because it mistakenly believed that it
did not have the authority to impose a lower sentence or another term
of supervised release. Finding no error, we affirm.

Bennett was originally convicted of aiding and abetting the posses-
sion with intent to distribute LSD, and his sentence included a three-
year term of supervised release. Less than a year after beginning his
term of supervised release, Bennett's probation officer filed a petition
to revoke his release, alleging that Bennett had been convicted of var-
ious motor vehicle offenses, failed to report to the probation officer
as directed, failed to notify the probation officer of changes in address
and employment, used drugs on three separate occasions, and failed
to report for urinalysis testing and substance abuse counseling.1

Prior to Bennett's revocation hearing, the probation officer pre-
pared a violation worksheet. However, the probation officer errone-
ously stated in the worksheet that Bennett was not eligible for
supervised release upon resentencing under the applicable statute.2 It
is undisputed that this statement was incorrect, and Bennett was eligi-
ble for supervised release. Bennett did not object to the worksheet at
the hearing.3 After hearing testimony and argument from counsel, the
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1 Bennett admitted to all of the violations except the second one, and
the Government voluntarily dismissed it.

2 See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) (1994).
3 In fact, the worksheet was not mentioned during the hearing by either
party or the court.

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district court revoked Bennett's supervised release and sentenced him
to the statutory maximum.

Since Bennett did not challenge the content of the probation offi-
cer's worksheet at the hearing, we review his claim for plain error and
find none. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993);
United States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 440 (4th Cir. 1993). Even
though the worksheet contained an error, it is clear from the record
that Bennett was not prejudiced. Defense counsel asked for a term of
supervised release, but the court rejected the request. The record
shows that the court's decision was based on its belief that the viola-
tions were serious and that Bennett needed to be incarcerated for the
maximum period so that he could receive necessary drug treatment.
There is nothing in the record suggesting that the court believed it
lacked authority to grant counsel's request or to sentence Bennett to
a shorter term of imprisonment.

Accordingly, we affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the material before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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