                                 T.C. Memo. 2016-192



                            UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                   MICHAEL J. ST. CLAIRE, Petitioner v.
             COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



      Docket No. 18700-15.                             Filed October 19, 2016.



      Andre Alexander Gibson, for petitioner.

      Brandon S. Cline, for respondent.



                              MEMORANDUM OPINION


      GUY, Special Trial Judge: This matter is before the Court on petitioner’s

motion for litigation and administrative costs filed pursuant to section 7430 and

Rules 230 through 233.1 Respondent filed a response opposing petitioner’s


      1
          Unless otherwise specified, section references are to the Internal Revenue
                                                                          (continued...)
                                          -2-

[*2] motion, and petitioner filed a reply and a first amended reply to respondent’s

response. Neither party requested an evidentiary hearing, and the Court concludes

that such a hearing is not necessary to dispose of petitioner’s motion. See Rule

232(a)(2). We therefore decide the matter before us on the basis of the record that

has been developed to date.

                                    Background

      Petitioner was previously married to Ethlyn St. Claire, and they have three

children together. The marriage ended in July 2006, and at that time Ms. St. Claire

had physical custody of the children. Because no appearance was entered by or on

behalf of Ms. St. Claire in the divorce proceedings, the court that entered the

judgment dissolving the marriage reserved ruling on various issues including child

custody, child support, and visitation.

      Petitioner timely requested an extension of time to file his Federal income

tax return for 2012. On June 15, 2013, petitioner’s counsel, Andre Alexander

Gibson, sent a letter to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) stating:

      Our client [petitioner] electronically filed his 2012 tax return and [sic]
      or about March 27, 2012 [sic]; however, the return was rejected on
      March 28, 2013. Based on the information and reason for the

      1
       (...continued)
Code, as amended, and Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
                                         -3-

[*3] rejection, it appears that another filer has claimed our Clients
     children/dependents. For the following reason, our client objects to
     any person being eligible to claim his children as dependents:
            1. The custodial parent has represented to our client that she
            did not file a return and that she has not given authorization to
            anyone to claim the children;
            2. The custodial parent did not file a tax return; and
            3. The custodial parent has agreed and authorized our client to
            claim the children;

      We have also attached hereto our client’s 2012 income tax return with
      forms 8332 for each of his children which were executed by his
      former spouse – the custodial parent. Our client also attaches the
      birth certificates of his children to establish that he is in fact the
      parent.

      We have attached hereto form 2848 so that our office will receive
      communications on the issues related to this filing. If you have any
      question on this matter, please feel free to contact me at your
      convenience.

      Petitioner’s 2012 tax return was filed on or about June 19, 2013. As is

relevant here, petitioner claimed three dependency exemption deductions

(reporting that two of the children were under the age of 17) and a child tax credit

of $1,750.

      On November 18, 2013, the IRS sent a letter to petitioner informing him

that his tax return was under examination and requesting that he provide additional

information to substantiate the dependency exemptions and the child tax credit

that he had claimed. On December 17, 2013, Mr. Gibson sent a letter to the IRS
                                          -4-

[*4] and attached copies of three Forms 8332, Release/Revocation of Release of

Claim to Exemption for Child by Custodial Parent, dated February 18, 2013.2

While each form included a signature under part II (release for future years), it

showed 2012 as the subject year.3 The signatures on the three forms appear fairly

uniform, with some minor variations. Mr. Gibson also forwarded financial records

showing that petitioner had transferred funds to Ms. St. Claire and his children in

2012.

        On April 4, 2014, the IRS sent a Form 886-A, Explanation of Items, to Mr.

Gibson which stated that, although petitioner had demonstrated that he was the

biological father of the children, he would need to submit to the IRS “a complete

copy of your divorce decree, separate maintenance agreement, any written

agreement showing which parent has custody and/or is entitled to claim the

dependent(s).”




        2
       The parties do not agree whether Forms 8332 were attached to petitioner’s
original tax return. In the light of our disposition of petitioner’s motion, we need
not resolve this factual dispute.
        3
        Forms 8332 include three parts and separate signature lines for each part.
Part I is reserved for a release of claim to exemption for the current year, part II is
reserved for a release of claim to exemption for future years, and part III is
reserved for a revocation of release of claim to exemption for future years.
                                         -5-

[*5] On May 5, 2014, Mr. Gibson sent a letter to the IRS and attached several

documents related to petitioner’s divorce proceedings. Mr. Gibson explained (as

previously mentioned) that issues concerning child custody, visitation, and support

had never been resolved. He went on to assert that the IRS should simply

acknowledge that Ms. St. Claire had executed the Forms 8332 and thereby

released her right to claim the children as her dependents for 2012.

      On November 7, 2014, the IRS sent a letter and a Form 886-A to Mr.

Gibson stating that petitioner was not entitled to the dependency exemption

deductions and the child tax credit in dispute “because the Form 8332 provided

appears to be altered.” The letter invited petitioner to provide any additional

documents that he wanted the IRS to consider by November 22, 2014, and stated

that he was entitled to file an administrative appeal.

      In a letter to the IRS dated November 12, 2014, Mr. Gibson expressed his

disagreement with the suggestion that the Forms 8332 had been altered and

questioned how the IRS had made that determination without a sample of Ms. St.

Claire’s signature. He further asserted that, because neither parent had been

awarded legal custody of the children, petitioner should be entitled to claim the

children as his dependents without further inquiry. Arguing that petitioner had

provided all of the information necessary to establish his entitlement to the
                                         -6-

[*6] dependency exemption deductions and the child tax credit, Mr. Gibson

attached Form 12203, Request for Appeals Review, to his letter and requested that

the matter be referred to the IRS Office of Appeals (Appeals Office) so that he

could present the original Forms 8332 for review.

      On March 6, 2015, the IRS sent a letter and Form 886-A to Mr. Gibson,

stating that the IRS would not allow the dependency exemption deductions and the

child tax credit in dispute on the grounds that (1) the Forms 8332 were incorrectly

filled out; (2) the Forms 8332 did not appear to have been submitted with

petitioner’s 2012 tax return; (3) petitioner did not provide any documentation that

included Ms. St. Claire’s signature; (4) Ms. St. Claire was the custodial parent;

and (5) in the absence of valid Forms 8332, petitioner did not provide

documentation to satisfy the requirements set forth in IRS Publication 17, Your

Federal Income Tax. The IRS also stated that Mr. Gibson’s request for review by

the Appeals Office was denied because the audit was being conducted as a

correspondence examination.

      In a letter to the IRS dated March 10, 2015, Mr. Gibson again expressed his

disagreement with the decision to disallow the disputed items and requested that

the IRS issue a statutory notice of deficiency. On June 19, 2015, the IRS issued to

petitioner a statutory notice of deficiency disallowing the dependency exemption
                                         -7-

[*7] deductions and the child tax credit. On July 22, 2015, petitioner filed a timely

petition for redetermination with the Court.4 In the petition, petitioner referred to

Ms. St. Claire as the “alleged custodial” parent and stated that his eldest child,

now an adult, was living with him and would testify that the Forms 8332 were

signed by Ms. St. Claire.

      Respondent’s counsel subsequently identified a possible address for Ms. St.

Claire and on August 19, 2015, mailed a letter to her requesting that she contact

him regarding the authenticity of the Forms 8332. Ms. St. Claire called shortly

thereafter, respondent’s counsel sent copies of the Forms 8332 to her, and she

promptly verified that she had signed them.

      On September 4, 2015, respondent filed an answer to the petition and

conceded all adjustments in the notice of deficiency. In subsequent

communications Mr. Gibson requested that the IRS reimburse petitioner for

attorney’s fees and other costs that he incurred from April 14, 2013, through

September 16, 2015. Respondent offered to pay $1,320 to petitioner to account

for administrative costs in the form of attorney’s fees that petitioner had incurred

from March 6, 2015, when the IRS denied Mr. Gibson’s request for Appeals

      4
        At the time the petition was filed, petitioner resided in Florida. Contrary to
the flush language of Rule 34(b), the petition includes allegations in support of
petitioner’s claim for litigation and administrative costs.
                                         -8-

[*8] Office review, through June 22, 2015, when Mr. Gibson reviewed the notice

of deficiency.

      On March 30, 2016, petitioner filed the motion pending before the Court.

At that time petitioner asserted that he should be awarded attorney’s fees of

$11,797 and costs of $73 incurred from June 15, 2013, through March 18, 2016.

On May 2, 2016, respondent filed a response in opposition to petitioner’s motion

maintaining that any award should be limited to $1,320.5 On May 9, 2016, the

Court issued an order directing petitioner to file a reply to respondent’s response

and to attach thereto an affidavit or declaration as described in Rule 232(d)

(related to a dispute as to reasonable attorney’s fees). Simultaneously with the

issuance of the Court’s order on May 9, petitioner filed an unsolicited reply to

respondent’s response. Notably, petitioner’s reply did not address respondent’s

objection to an award of attorney’s fees computed at an hourly rate in excess of the

statutory rate. On May 24, 2016, petitioner filed a first amended reply, including a

declaration signed by Paul M. Cowan, Esq., expressing his opinion as to the

reasonableness of the hourly fees that Mr. Gibson had charged petitioner. In his

      5
        As discussed in detail below, petitioner maintains that his litigation and
administrative costs comprising attorney’s fees should be computed at an hourly
rate of $325 (the hourly rate he had agreed to pay Mr. Gibson) whereas respondent
maintains that petitioner’s attorney’s fees should be computed at the lower
statutory rate prescribed in sec. 7430(c)(1)(B)(iii).
                                         -9-

[*9] amended reply, petitioner conceded that he is not entitled to an award for

attorney’s fees of $390 incurred on June 15, 2013, but included additional

attorney’s fees of $3,477.50 attributable to the preparation of his reply and first

amended reply.6

                                     Discussion

      Under section 7430, a judgment for reasonable litigation or administrative

costs incurred in connection with a court or administrative proceeding may be

awarded if a taxpayer: (1) is the prevailing party; (2) has exhausted his

administrative remedies with the IRS (with respect to litigation costs only); and (3)

did not unreasonably protract the proceedings. Sec. 7430(a), (b)(1), (3); Polz v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-117; Nguyen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2003-313. A taxpayer (the moving party) must satisfy each of the respective

requirements to be entitled to an award of litigation or administrative costs under

section 7430. Rule 232(e); see Minahan v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 492, 497

(1987); Marten v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-186. Reasonable litigation




      6
        The Court provides this procedural history to emphasize that Rule 232(a)
contemplates that the Court, in its discretion, may direct the moving party to file a
reply to the Commissioner’s response to a motion for reasonable litigation or
administrative costs. Mr. Gibson’s failure to recognize this procedural rule
appears to have needlessly added to the legal costs to his client.
                                           -10-

[*10] and administrative costs include, in relevant part, court costs and fees paid

or incurred for the services of an attorney. Sec. 7430(c)(1) and (2).

      To be a prevailing party, the taxpayer must: (1) substantially prevail with

respect to either the amount in controversy or the most significant issue or set of

issues presented and (2) satisfy the applicable net worth requirement. Sec.

7430(c)(4)(A). The taxpayer will nevertheless fail to qualify as the prevailing

party if the Commissioner’s position in the proceeding is shown to have been

substantially justified. Sec. 7430(c)(4)(B)(i).

      The parties agree that petitioner substantially prevailed with respect to the

amount in controversy, satisfies the applicable net worth requirement, exhausted

the administrative remedies available to him, and did not unreasonably protract the

proceedings. In addition, respondent concedes that petitioner is entitled to an

award of $1,320 for administrative costs incurred after March 6, 2015 (the date the

IRS denied petitioner’s request for Appeals Office review), through June 22, 2015

(the date Mr. Gibson reviewed the notice of deficiency), compensating petitioner

for attorney’s fees for 6.6 hours of work at the statutory rate of $200 per hour.

Otherwise, respondent asserts that his position in the administrative and judicial

proceedings was substantially justified.
                                        -11-

[*11] To establish that his position was substantially justified, the Commissioner

must show that his position was “justified to a degree that could satisfy a

reasonable person” or that his position has a “reasonable basis both in law and

fact.” Swanson v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 76, 86 (1996) (quoting Pierce v.

Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)) (interpreting a similar legal standard in the

Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. sec. 2412 (1988)). A position has a

reasonable basis in fact if there is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Corkrey v. Commissioner, 115 T.C.

366, 373 (2000) (citing Pierce, 487 U.S. at 564-565). In determining whether the

position of the Commissioner was substantially justified, we must consider the

basis for the legal position and the manner in which the position was maintained.

Wasie v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 962, 969 (1986). A significant factor to be

considered is the information available to the Commissioner at the time he

established his position in the case and whether relevant information was

presented to him. Sec. 301.7430-5(c)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs.

      The Commissioner is entitled to maintain his position, for purposes of

determining whether it was substantially justified, until adequate substantiation is

received from the taxpayer. See Baldwin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-66.

Further, where the resolution of adjustments hinges on factual determinations, the
                                         -12-

[*12] Commissioner is not required to concede the adjustments until he has

received, and has had reasonable time to review, sufficient substantiation for the

matter in question. See Huynh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-110.

      The Commissioner’s decision to concede a case is not conclusive that the

taxpayer is entitled to an award under section 7430, but a concession is a factor

that may be considered. See Wilfong v. United States, 991 F.2d 359, 364 (7th Cir.

1993); Maggie Mgmt. Co. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. 430, 443 (1997).

      Where a taxpayer seeks both litigation and administrative costs, we apply

the “substantially justified” standard as of the two separate dates on which the

Commissioner took a position, first in the administrative proceeding and later in

the court proceeding. See Maggie Mgmt. Co. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. at 442-

444. For purposes of the administrative proceeding, the Commissioner’s position

is that taken on the earlier of the date of the receipt by the taxpayer of the notice of

decision of the Appeals Office or the date of the notice of deficiency. Sec.

7430(c)(7)(B). Generally, the position of the United States in the judicial

proceeding is established in the answer to the petition. See, e.g., Sher v.

Commissioner, 861 F.2d 131, 134-135 (5th Cir. 1988), aff’g 89 T.C. 79 (1987).
                                         -13-

[*13] I. Administrative Costs

      The IRS took the position in the notice of deficiency (and throughout the

administrative proceedings) that petitioner had not properly substantiated the

dependency exemptions and the child tax credit. Respondent maintains that the

Government’s position was substantially justified until March 6, 2015, when

petitioner was notified that his request for Appeals Office review was denied.

Petitioner counters that the Government’s position was not substantially justified

because he provided adequate substantiation from the outset of the examination by

presenting the IRS with copies of the Forms 8332 in question.

      As an initial matter, we note that section 7430(c)(2) limits the term

“reasonable administrative costs” to costs paid or incurred on or after the earliest

of (1) the date on which the taxpayer receives a notice of decision from the

Appeals Office, (2) the date of the notice of deficiency, or (3) the date on which

the IRS mails a first letter of proposed deficiency giving the taxpayer a right to

protest the proposed deficiency to the Appeals Office. Although petitioner

apparently contends that he is entitled to administrative costs that he incurred as

early as November 21, 2013, we conclude, consistent with the provisions of

section 7430(c)(2), that he is not entitled to an award of any administrative costs
                                           -14-

[*14] incurred before November 7, 2014 (i.e., the date that the IRS first sent him a

letter that offered the opportunity for Appeals Office review).

          As a backdrop to our evaluation of whether the Government’s position was

substantially justified, we will first outline the statutory provisions and legal

precedents governing deductions for dependency exemptions and the child tax

credit.

          Section 151(c) provides that a taxpayer generally is allowed a deduction for

the applicable exemption amount for each individual who is a dependent (as

defined in section 152) of the taxpayer for the taxable year. Section 152(a)

generally defines a “dependent” to include a “qualifying child” or a “qualifying

relative”.

          Section 152(e) provides special rules governing the assignment of

dependency exemptions in the case of parents who are divorced or legally

separated and who provide over one-half of their child’s support during a calendar

year in which the child is in the custody of one or both parents for more than one-

half of the calendar year. In this scenario, a noncustodial parent7 may become

          7
       A “custodial parent” is defined for purposes of sec. 152(e) as the parent
having custody for the greater portion of the calendar year, and a “noncustodial
parent” means the parent who is not the custodial parent. Sec. 152(e)(4)(A) and
(B). The record reflects that Ms. St. Claire was the children’s custodial parent in
                                                                       (continued...)
                                         -15-

[*15] entitled to a dependency exemption deduction for minor children if two

conditions are met: The custodial parent signs a written declaration releasing his

or her claim to the exemption and the noncustodial parent attaches such written

declaration to his or her tax return for the taxable year. Sec. 152(e)(2)(A) and (B).

The required written declaration can be set forth on a completed Form 8332 or a

written statement conforming to the substance of the form. See Armstrong v.

Commissioner, 139 T.C. 468 (2012), aff’d, 745 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2014).

        Section 24(a) allows a tax credit for each “qualifying child” of a taxpayer

for whom the taxpayer is allowed a deduction under section 151. Section 24(c)(1)

defines a “qualifying child” as a qualifying child as defined in section 152(c) who

has not attained the age of 17.

        Deductions and tax credits are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer

generally bears the burden of proving entitlement to any deduction or credit

claimed. Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992);

New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934). It is well settled

that deductions for dependency exemptions and the child tax credit are subject to

this general rule. See Miller v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 184, 189-190 (2000),


        7
            (...continued)
2012.
                                         -16-

[*16] aff’d sub nom. Lovejoy v. Commissioner, 293 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2002);

Gassoway v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-203.

      Having claimed dependency exemption deductions and a child tax credit,

petitioner had the burden to present to the IRS adequate substantiation during the

examination. Although petitioner provided the IRS with copies of Forms 8332,

the IRS was not obliged to accept those documents at face value. Rather, the IRS

had the right to develop and was justified in developing a record regarding

petitioner’s relationship with Ms. St. Claire and the children, and, ultimately, to

challenge the authenticity of the Forms 8332. This is particularly so given that

some individual (unidentified in the record) had attempted to claim the children as

dependents earlier in the 2012 tax return filing season, the signatures on the Forms

8332, although substantially similar, were not identical, and the forms were

completed in a way that left some ambiguity as to their intended application.8

Considering all the circumstances, we agree with respondent that, until March 6,

2015, the Government’s position was reasonably based in fact and law and

therefore was substantially justified and represented a good-faith effort to enforce

the internal revenue laws. See Huynh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-110.

      8
       Sec. 1.152-4(e)(1), Income Tax Regs., provides in pertinent part: “A
written declaration that specifies all future years is treated as specifying the first
taxable year after the taxable year of execution and all subsequent taxable years.”
                                         -17-

[*17] Respondent reasonably concedes that, at the conclusion of the examination

process, the IRS was not justified in denying petitioner the opportunity for

Appeals Office review. We view respondent’s concession as an acknowledgment

that, in the context of a correspondence examination, petitioner had by then

provided all the information reasonably available to him to substantiate the items

in dispute. It follows that petitioner is entitled to an award for administrative costs

equal to reasonable attorney’s fees for 6.6 hours of work.

II. Litigation Costs

      Respondent asserts that petitioner is not entitled to an award of litigation

costs because all substantive adjustments were conceded in the answer to the

petition. Petitioner maintains that, inasmuch as respondent conceded that it was

unreasonable to deny him the opportunity for Appeals Office review (and the

opportunity to resolve the matter administratively), he should be entitled to an

award that includes the cost of preparing and filing the petition for

redetermination.

      As previously discussed, Congress has mandated that claims for litigation

and administrative costs be reviewed in the light of the Government’s position at

distinct times, a process that allows the Commissioner to change his position. See

Maggie Mgmt. Co. v. Commissioner, 108 T.C. at 442. In evaluating a taxpayer’s
                                          -18-

[*18] claim for litigation costs, we evaluate the reasonableness of the

Government’s position as set forth in its answer to the petition. See Sher v.

Commissioner, 861 F.2d at 134-135. Because respondent had verified the

authenticity of the Forms 8332 and conceded the disputed adjustments in his

answer to the petition, we conclude that the Government’s litigation position was

substantially justified and therefore petitioner is not entitled to an award of

litigation costs related to the preparation and filing of the petition.

III. Litigation Costs Attributable to Petitioner’s Motion for Litigation and
     Administrative Costs

      Respondent contends that petitioner is not entitled to an award for the costs

he incurred in filing and prosecuting his motion for litigation and administrative

costs because respondent made a reasonable offer to settle the matter before the

motion was filed. Petitioner maintains that he is entitled to the full amount of the

legal costs that he incurred in prosecuting his motion for costs. The record reflects

that Mr. Gibson spent 15.7 hours preparing and litigating the motion for costs.

      Reasonable litigation costs generally encompass the costs incurred to

litigate a claim for litigation and administrative costs. See Huffman v.

Commissioner, 978 F.2d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 1992), aff’g in part, rev’g in part

T.C. Memo. 1991-144; Powell v. Commissioner, 891 F.2d 1167, 1170 (5th Cir.
                                         -19-

[*19] 1990), rev’g 91 T.C. 673 (1988); Dixon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2006-97; Han v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-386. We evaluate the costs that

petitioner incurred to litigate his motion for costs, however, against his level of

success in doing so. See Dixon v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-97

(discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment of the so-called limited success factor

in Commissioner, INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154 (1990)).

      Petitioner failed to persuade the Court that he is entitled to reasonable

administrative costs beyond the costs that respondent conceded or (as discussed

more fully below) that he is entitled to attorney’s fees in excess of the statutory

rate. On this record, we will award petitioner litigation costs to cover four hours

(or approximately one-quarter) of the time that Mr. Gibson devoted to preparing

and prosecuting petitioner’s motion for costs.

IV. Reasonableness of Litigation and Administrative Costs

      In the light of respondent’s concession that petitioner is entitled to

administrative costs equal to reasonable attorney’s fees for 6.6 hours of work in

2015, and having concluded that petitioner is entitled to litigation costs to cover

reasonable attorney’s fees for four hours of work in 2016, we turn to the question

of the proper hourly rate for computing those fees. As mentioned above, while

petitioner maintains that it is reasonable to compensate Mr. Gibson at a rate of
                                         -20-

[*20] $325 per hour, respondent asserts that attorney’s fees in this case should be

capped at the lower statutory rate.

      Section 7430(a)(1) and (2) limits the prevailing party to an award of

“reasonable” litigation and administrative costs. In this regard, section

7430(c)(1)(B)(iii) (and its flush language) generally limits the hourly rate for

attorney’s fees to $125 per hour, plus an adjustment for cost of living, unless the

Court determines that a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified

attorneys for the proceeding, the difficulty of the issues presented, or the local

availability of tax expertise justifies a higher rate. For purposes of this case, the

statutory rate for attorney’s fees incurred in 2015 and 2016 was $200 per hour.

See Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615; Rev. Proc. 2014-61, 2014-47 I.R.B.

860. Petitioner bears the burden of proving that the amount of costs he claimed is

reasonable. See Rule 232(e).

      Mr. Gibson submitted to the Court a declaration stating that his $325 hourly

rate is reasonable “based on the prevailing community rate” and his expertise in

tax matters. Mr. Gibson stated that petitioner could not find an attorney to

represent him at less than $325 per hour and that it made practical sense for him to

provide legal representation given that he had prepared petitioner’s tax return for

2012 and was already familiar with the underlying facts of the case. Petitioner
                                         -21-

[*21] also relies on a declaration executed by Mr. Cowan, an attorney specializing

in Federal estate tax matters, who opined that Mr. Gibson’s hourly rate was

reasonable.

      General expertise in tax law in itself is not a special factor warranting a fee

award in excess of the statutory rate under section 7430. See Huffman v.

Commissioner, 978 F.2d at 1150; Powers v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 457, 489

(1993), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded on another issue, 43 F.3d 172 (5th

Cir. 1995). Moreover, there was nothing particularly unique or unusual about

these proceedings (involving a simple question of substantiation) that presented

extraordinary difficulty or required specialized expertise. See Nguyen v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-41. Considering all the facts and circumstances,

we conclude that petitioner has failed to establish any special factor that warrants

attorney’s fees in excess of the statutory rate provided in section

7430(c)(1)(B)(iii).

      Consistent with the foregoing, we conclude that petitioner is entitled to

reasonable administrative costs of $1,320 and reasonable litigation costs of $800

for a total award of $2,120.
                                     -22-

[*22]   To reflect the foregoing,


                                            An appropriate order and decision

                                    will be entered.
