UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 99-4267

DAVID A. RAMEY, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke.
Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District Judge.
(CR-95-126)

Submitted: October 8, 1999

Decided: November 4, 1999

Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

John H. Kennett, Jr., Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Robert P.
Crouch, Jr., United States Attorney, Anthony P. Giorno, Assistant
United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

David A. Ramey, Jr., appeals his conviction for two counts of dis-
tribution of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C.§ 841(a)(1) (1994).
On appeal, Ramey contends that the twenty-two month delay between
the date the indictment was returned and his arrest violated his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial. Ramey also contends that the
eighteen month delay between the date of the two incidents of drug
distribution and the return of the indictment prejudiced his defense.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

We find there was no Sixth Amendment violation. The delay
between the date the indictment was returned and Ramey's arrest was
long enough to trigger the speedy trial analysis set forth in Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). See Doggett v. United States, 505
U.S. 647, 651-52 (1992). While it appears that the Government did
not aggressively seek Ramey's arrest after he moved to Pennsylvania,
there was no evidence or suggestion that the Government was in pos-
session of information as to Ramey's whereabouts that it disregarded.
On the other hand, by waiting several months after learning at the
indictment to assert his Sixth Amendment right, Ramey was himself
dilatory. Finally, Ramey failed to show how he was prejudiced by the
delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. This factor was highly significant
because none of the remaining factors weighed strongly against the
Government. Accordingly, we find no infringement of Ramey's right
to a speedy trial.

We also find that the delay between the distribution incidents and
the return of the indictment did not violate Ramey's right to due pro-
cess. Ramey's failure to show how he was actually prejudiced by the
delay was singularly dispositive of this claim. See Jones v. Angelone,
94 F.3d 900, 905-06 (4th Cir. 1996).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's judgment of conviction.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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