
110 U.S. 325 (1884)
UNITED STATES
v.
ALEXANDER & Others.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued January 22d, 1884.
Decided February 4th, 1884.
IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE.
*327 Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Maury for plaintiff in error.
No appearance for defendants in error.
MR. JUSTICE WOODS delivered the opinion of the court.
The act of May 27th, 1872, 17 Stat. 162, under authority of which the abatement of taxes pleaded by defendants was made, provides as follows:
"That the Secretary of the Treasury be, and he is hereby, authorized, upon the production of satisfactory proof to him of the actual destruction by accidental fire or other casualty, and without any fraud, collusion, or negligence of the owner thereof, of any distilled spirits on which the tax, at the time of the destruction of said spirits, had not been paid, and while the same remained in the custody of any officer of internal revenue, in any distillery, warehouse, or bonded warehouse of the United States, to abate *328 the amount of internal revenue taxes accruing thereon, and to cancel any warehouse bond, or enter satisfaction thereon in whole or in part, as the case may be."
We are of opinion that the action of the Secretary of the Treasury shown by the bill of exceptions was a virtual cancellation of the bond sued on in this case.
It is clear that after the Secretary had abated the taxes, and had given notice thereof to the collector of internal revenue, with directions to take credit therefor in his accounts, which he had done, and official notice of the abatement had been given to the principals upon the warehouse distillers' bond, and they had given notice to their sureties, no suit could be maintained upon the bond. Its obligation was gone, and both the principals and sureties were discharged.
The question is, therefore, whether the obligation of the bond could be restored by an order of the Secretary of the Treasury, not communicated to the makers, revoking the abatement. It may be conceded, and we think that the Secretary of the Treasury might, on new evidence or further consideration, reimpose the taxes. But his reassessment would only subject the spirits and the distiller to a liability for their payment; it could not restore the obligation of the distillers' bond.
If we yield to the contention of the appellants in this case, we must hold that the Secretary of the Treasury may, at his discretion and at any time, subject the obligors, both principals and sureties, upon a bond which had once been discharged, to a new liability, by an order of which they had no notice. It may be fairly presumed that sureties take indemnity from their principals. We cannot hold that after they have had notice of the discharge of the bond on which they were sureties, and when their relations to their principals may have entirely changed, and their indemnity been surrendered, it is within the power of the Secretary of the Treasury, without notice to them, to revive the bond and reimpose its obligation upon them. We do not think that the statute which authorizes the abatement of taxes and the cancellation of the bond gives authority to the *329 Secretary of the Treasury to retry the question of abatement so as to keep alive the liability of the obligors upon the bond after the taxes have once been abated and they have received notice thereof.
The only ground upon which the liability of the defendants in error can be maintained is that the abatement of the taxes and the cancellation of the bond were conditional and subject to the power of the Secretary to retry the question whether the spirits had been destroyed without the fraud, collusion, or negligence of the owner. We find no warrant in its language for such a construction of the statute. If the power had been given some terms or limit of time would have been imposed on its exercise. If it exists no restraint is imposed upon it. It may be exercised at any time, no matter how remote, without notice to the makers of the bond, and at the discretion or caprice of the Secretary for the time being. We do not think that any such unlimited power is conferred by the statute. The Secretary, having once decided the question of abatement, his authority was exhausted, so far as it concerned the tax secured by the bond.
In the case of The Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666, it was held by this court that, under our system of government, the powers and duties of all its officers are limited and defined either by statutory or constitutional law. Applying this rule to the present case, we are unable to find in the statute any authority for the action of the Secretary of the Treasury in revoking the abatement of taxes once made by him, and must conclude that the authority does not exist. He might re-assess the tax, but the bond given for the tax which had been abated would not be security for the re-assessed tax. As this view was substantially embodied in the charge to the jury of the Circuit Court, which is assigned for error, we are of opinion that the charge was right, and that
The judgment must be affirmed.
