                  T.C. Memo. 2000-33



                UNITED STATES TAX COURT



GERALD CHAMALES AND KATHLEEN CHAMALES, Petitioners v.
     COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



Docket No. 14839-98.             Filed February 3, 2000.




     In 1994, Ps contracted to purchase a home located
in the Brentwood Park area of Los Angeles, California,
adjacent to the residence owned by O.J. Simpson.
Shortly thereafter, Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald
Goldman were murdered, and O.J. Simpson was arrested in
connection therewith. The neighborhood surrounding the
Simpson property became inundated with media personnel
and so-called looky-loos (celebrity-enthralled
sightseers), and this unprecedented attention continued
for many months. On their 1994 Federal income tax
return, Ps took the position that these events
constituted a casualty which permanently devalued their
property and for which they were entitled to a sec.
165(c)(3), I.R.C., casualty loss deduction. R
disallowed the deduction and also determined a sec.
6662(a), I.R.C., accuracy-related penalty on account of
negligence.
                                - 2 -

          Held: Ps are not entitled to a casualty loss deduction
     for fluctuation in the market value of their property and
     are liable for the deficiency determined by R.
          Held, further, Ps are not liable for the sec.
     6662(a), I.R.C., accuracy-related penalty on the
     grounds that the deduction claimed was taken with
     reasonable cause and in good faith.



     Bruce I. Hochman, Dennis L. Perez, and Stuart A. Simon, for

petitioners.

     Michele F. Leichtman and Jason M. Silver, for respondent.



               MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

     NIMS, Judge:    Respondent determined a Federal income tax

deficiency for petitioners’ 1994 taxable year in the amount of

$291,931.   Respondent also determined an accuracy-related penalty

of $58,386 for 1994, pursuant to section 6662(a).

     The issues for decision are as follows:

     (1) Whether petitioners are entitled to deduct a net

casualty loss of $751,427 for the taxable year 1994; and

     (2) whether petitioners are liable for the section 6662(a)

accuracy-related penalty on account of negligence.

     Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to

sections of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect for the

year in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules

of Practice and Procedure.
                                - 3 -

                          FINDINGS OF FACT

     Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

The stipulations of the parties, with accompanying exhibits, are

incorporated herein by this reference.

     Gerald and Kathleen Chamales (petitioners) are married and

resided in Los Angeles, California, at the time of filing their

petition in this case.   In the spring of 1994, petitioners became

interested in purchasing a residence in Brentwood Park, an

exclusive Los Angeles neighborhood.     They were attracted to the

beautiful, parklike setting and the quiet peacefulness of the

area.   Subsequently, on June 2, 1994, petitioners opened escrow

on property located in Brentwood Park, at 359 North Bristol

Avenue.    They were represented in this transaction by Jay Solton

(Solton), a real estate agent with more than 20 years of

experience.   Solton’s work focused on sales of properties in the

Westwood, Brentwood, Palisades, and Santa Monica areas of Los

Angeles.

     At the time petitioners opened escrow, O.J. Simpson

(Simpson) owned and resided at the property located directly west

of and adjacent to that being purchased by petitioners.

Simpson’s address was 360 North Rockingham Avenue.    Both parcels

were corner lots, bounded on the north by Ashford Street.    The

rear or westerly side of petitioners’ land abutted the rear or

easterly side of the Simpson property.
                               - 4 -

     During the escrow period, on June 12, 1994, Nicole Brown

Simpson and Ronald Goldman were murdered at Ms. Brown Simpson’s

condominium in West Los Angeles.   Simpson was arrested for these

murders shortly thereafter.   Following the homicides and arrest,

the Brentwood Park neighborhood surrounding the Simpson property

became inundated with media personnel and equipment and with

individuals drawn by the area’s connection to the horrific

events.   The media and looky-loos1 blocked streets, trespassed on

neighboring residential property, and flew overhead in

helicopters in their attempts to get close to the Simpson home.

Police were summoned to the area for purposes of controlling the

crowds, and barricades were installed at various Brentwood Park

intersections to restrict traffic.     This police presence,

however, had little practical effect.     Significant media and

public attention continued throughout 1994 and 1995.     Although

Simpson was acquitted on October 4, 1995, civil proceedings in

1996 reignited public interest.

     Petitioners closed escrow on June 29, 1994, purchasing the

residence on North Bristol Avenue for $2,849,000.     Petitioners


     1
       As explained by petitioners’ counsel, “looky-loo” is a
term developed in Hollywood to describe individuals who gather at
places and events in hopes of glimpsing celebrities. The phrase
is apparently used in California to denote those who frequent a
location not because of its status as a conventional tourist
sight but because of its association with a famous or notorious
person. We adopt the terminology and spelling as used in
petitioners’ briefs and by the witnesses at trial.
                                - 5 -

had considered canceling the escrow and had discussed this

possibility with their attorney, but upon being advised that

liability would result from a cancellation, they decided to go

through with the transaction.   Later that summer, as the crowds

and disruption persisted, Gerald Chamales (petitioner) inquired

of his broker Solton whether the value of his property had

declined.   Solton indicated that she estimated a decrease in

value of 20 to 30 percent.

     Petitioners’ 1994 tax return was prepared by Ruben Kitay

(Kitay), a certified public accountant.   In the course of

preparing this return, Kitay and petitioner discussed the

possibility of claiming a deduction for casualty loss.   After

preliminary research in the regulations addressing casualty loss,

Kitay spoke with two area real estate agents regarding the amount

by which petitioners’ property had decreased in value.   The

agents estimated the decline at 30 to 40 percent.   Kitay and

petitioner decided to use the more conservative 30 percent figure

in calculating the deduction to be taken on petitioners’ return.

An expert appraisal was not obtained at this time, as Kitay felt

that a typical appraisal based on values throughout the Brentwood

Park area would be inconclusive as to the loss suffered by the

few properties closest to the Simpson home.

     Kitay and petitioner also recognized and discussed the fact

that there existed a substantial likelihood of an audit focusing
                               - 6 -

on petitioners’ 1994 return.   Hence, to clarify the position

being taken and the reasons underlying petitioners’ deduction, an

explanatory supplemental statement labeled “Casualty Loss” was

attached to the return.   After indicating the location of

petitioners’ property in relation to that of Simpson, it stated

that the casualty loss was premised on “the calamity of the

murder & trial, which was sudden & unavoidable & which resulted

in a permanent loss to value of property.”    A table enumerating

instances of minor physical damage to petitioners’ property, such

as damage to lawn and sprinklers, was also attached to the

return, but no valuation was placed upon the harm caused thereby.

     At the time petitioners purchased their property, they were

aware that the existing home required remodeling and repair.    In

the fall of 1994, petitioners demolished most of the house.

Then, in March of 1995, they began a reconstruction project

costing approximately $2 million.   This reconstruction was

completed in December of 1996, and petitioners moved into the

residence.   Petitioners continued to reside at 359 North Bristol

Avenue up to and through the date of trial.

     Other residents of Brentwood Park have undertaken similar

reconstruction projects in recent years.   The Nebekers, who own

the property across Ashford Street from the former Simpson

residence, are proceeding with a $1 million remodeling of their
                               - 7 -

home.   Likewise, the property owned by Simpson was sold after he

moved out in 1998, the existing house was demolished, and a new

residence is currently being constructed.

     As of early 1999, the area surrounding the former Simpson

home was no longer inundated with media personnel or equipment.

The police barricades restricting traffic in the immediate

vicinity of petitioners’ property had been removed.   Looky-loos,

however, continued to frequent the neighborhood, often advised of

the location of Simpson’s former residence by its inclusion on

“star maps” published for the Los Angeles area.   Anniversaries of

the murders were also typically accompanied by periods of

increased media and public attention.

                              OPINION

     We must decide whether petitioners are entitled to a

casualty loss deduction based upon a postulated decline in the

value of their residential property and, if not, whether they are

liable for the section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty.

     Petitioners contend that the media and onlooker attention

following the murders and focusing on Simpson’s home has

decreased the value of their adjacent property.   They argue that

because the homicides were a sudden, unexpected, and unusual

event, and because aspects of the public interest precipitated

thereby continued at least to the time of trial in this case,

they have suffered a permanent casualty loss.   Petitioners
                               - 8 -

further allege that the proximity of their residence to that of

Simpson has stigmatized their property and rendered it subject to

permanent buyer resistance.

     Conversely, respondent asserts that public attention over

the course of a lengthy murder trial is not the type of sudden

and unexpected event that will qualify as a casualty within the

meaning of the Code.   Respondent additionally contends that the

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to which appeal in this

case would normally lie, has limited the amount that may be

claimed as a casualty loss deduction to the loss suffered as a

result of physical damage to property.     According to respondent,

since petitioners have failed to substantiate any such damage,

they are entitled to no deduction.     In respondent’s view, any

decline in market value represents merely a temporary fluctuation

and not a permanent, cognizable loss.

     We agree with respondent that petitioners have not

established their entitlement to a casualty loss deduction.     The

difficulties suffered by petitioners as a consequence of their

proximity to the Simpson residence do not constitute the type of

damage contemplated by section 165(c)(3).     However, because we

find that petitioners acted reasonably and in good faith in the

preparation of their tax return, no additional liability for the

section 6662(a) accuracy-related penalty will be imposed.
                                  - 9 -

Issue 1.   Casualty Loss

     Section 165 governs the tax treatment of losses and reads in

relevant part as follows:

     SEC. 165.   LOSSES.

          (a) General Rule.--There shall be allowed as a
     deduction any loss sustained during the taxable year
     and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.

                 *   *       *    *       *   *   *

          (c) Limitation on Losses of Individuals.--In the
     case of an individual, the deduction under subsection
     (a) shall be limited to–-

                 *   *       *    *       *   *   *

                (3) except as provided in subsection
           (h), losses of property not connected with a
           trade or business or a transaction entered
           into for profit, if such losses arise from
           fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or
           from theft.

Subsection (h) of section 165 further limits the allowable

deduction to the amount by which the casualty loss exceeds (1)

$100 and (2) the sum of personal casualty gains plus 10 percent

of the adjusted gross income of the individual.

     Regulations promulgated under section 165 additionally

provide that, to be allowable as a deduction, a loss must be both

“evidenced by closed and completed transactions” and “fixed by

identifiable events”.      Sec. 1.165-1(b), Income Tax Regs.

     As interpreted by case law, a casualty loss within the

meaning of section 165(c)(3) arises when two circumstances are

present.   First, the nature of the occurrence precipitating the
                               - 10 -

damage to property must qualify as a casualty.    See, e.g., White

v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 430 (1967); Durden v. Commissioner, 3

T.C. 1 (1944).    Second, the nature of the damage sustained must

be such that it is deductible for purposes of section 165.    See,

e.g., Squirt Co. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 543 (1969), affd. 423

F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1970); Pulvers v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 245

(1967), affd. 407 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1969); Citizens Bank v.

Commissioner, 28 T.C. 717 (1957), affd. 252 F.2d 425 (4th Cir.

1958); Kamanski v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1970-352, affd. 477

F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1973).    At issue here then are whether the

events surrounding the alleged Simpson murders and affecting

petitioners’ property can properly be termed a casualty and

whether the type of loss suffered by petitioners as a consequence

of these events is recognized as deductible.    We conclude that

both inquiries must be answered in the negative.

     A.   Nature of Occurrence Constituting a Casualty

     The word “casualty” as used in section 165(c)(3) has been

defined, through application of the principle of ejusdem generis,

by analyzing the shared characteristics of the specifically

enumerated casualties of fire, storm, and shipwreck.     See, e.g.,

White v. Commissioner, supra at 433-435; Durden v. Commissioner,

supra at 3-4.    As explained by this Court:

     wherever unexpected, accidental force is exerted on
     property and the taxpayer is powerless to prevent
     application of the force because of the suddenness
     thereof or some disability, the resulting direct and
                               - 11 -

     proximate damage causes a loss which is like or similar
     to losses arising from the causes specifically
     enumerated in section 165(c)(3). * * * [White v.
     Commissioner, supra at 435.]

Hence, casualty for purposes of the Code denotes “‘an undesigned,

sudden and unexpected event’”,    Durden v. Commissioner, supra at

3 (quoting Webster’s New International Dictionary), or “‘an event

due to some sudden, unexpected or unusual cause’”, id. (quoting

Matheson v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir. 1931), affg.

18 B.T.A. 674 (1930)).    Conversely, the term “‘excludes the

progressive deterioration of property through a steadily

operating cause.’”   Id. (quoting Fay v. Helvering, 120 F.2d 253,

253 (2d Cir. 1941), affg. 42 B.T.A. 206 (1940)).    The sudden and

unexpected occurrence, however, is not limited to those events

flowing from forces of nature and may be a product of human

agency.   See id. at 4.

     Here, we cannot conclude that the asserted devaluation of

petitioners’ property was the direct and proximate result of the

type of casualty contemplated by section 165(c)(3).    While the

stabbing of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman was a sudden

and unexpected exertion of force, this force was not exerted upon

and did not damage petitioners’ property.    Similarly, the initial

influx of onlookers, although perhaps sudden, was not a force

exerted on petitioners’ property and was not, in and of itself,

the source of the asserted decrease in the home’s market value.

Rather, petitioners base their claim of loss on months, or even
                                - 12 -

years, of ongoing public attention.      If neither media personnel

nor looky-loos had chosen to frequent the Brentwood Park area

after the murders, or if the period of interest and visitation

had been brief, petitioners would have lacked grounds for

alleging a permanent and devaluing change in the character of

their neighborhood.    Hence, the source of their difficulties

would appear to be more akin to a steadily operating cause than

to a casualty.   Press and media attention extending for months

bears little similarity to a fire, storm, or shipwreck and is not

properly classified therewith as an “other casualty”.

     B.   Nature of Damage Recognized as Deductible

     With respect to the requisite nature of the damage itself,

this Court has traditionally held that only physical damage to or

permanent abandonment of property will be recognized as

deductible under section 165.    See, e.g., Squirt Co. v.

Commissioner, supra at 547; Pulvers v. Commissioner, supra at

249-250; Citizens Bank v. Commissioner, supra at 720; Kamanski v.

Commissioner, supra.    In contrast, the Court has refused to

permit deductions based upon a temporary decline in market value.

See, e.g., Squirt Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 547; Pulvers v.

Commissioner, supra at 249-250; Citizens Bank v. Commissioner,

supra at 720; Kamanski v. Commissioner, supra.

     For example, in Citizens Bank v. Commissioner, supra at 720,

the Court stated that “physical damage or destruction of property
                                  - 13 -

is an inherent prerequisite in showing a casualty loss.”            When

again faced with taxpayers seeking a deduction premised upon a

decrease in market value, the Court further explained in Pulvers

v. Commissioner, supra at 249 (quoting Citizens Bank v.

Commissioner, 252 F.2d at 428):        “‘The scheme of our tax laws

does not, however, contemplate such a series of adjustments to

reflect the vicissitudes of the market, or the wavering values

occasioned by a succession of adverse or favorable

developments.’”       Such a decline was termed “a hypothetical loss

or a mere fluctuation in value.”        Id. at 250.       The Court likewise

emphasized in Squirt Co. v. Commissioner, supra at 547, that “Not

all reductions in market value resulting from casualty-type

occurrences are deductible under section 165; only those losses

are deductible which are the result of actual physical damage to

the property.”     This rule was reiterated yet again in Kamanski v.

Commissioner, supra, when the Court observed:

          In the instant case there was likewise relatively
     small physical damage to petitioner’s property and the
     primary drop in value was due to buyer resistance to
     purchasing property in an area which had suffered a
     landslide. If there had been no physical damage to the
     property, petitioner would be entitled to no casualty
     loss deduction because of the decrease in market value
     resulting from the slide. * * *

                  *      *    *    *     *    *       *

                  * * * the only loss which petitioner is
             entitled to deduct is for the physical damage to
             his property
     * * *
                              - 14 -

     Moreover, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, to

which appeal in the present case would normally lie, has adopted

this rule requiring physical damage.   See, e.g., Kamanski v.

Commissioner, 477 F.2d at 452; Pulvers v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d

838, 839 (9th Cir. 1969), affg. 48 T.C. 245 (1967).   In Pulvers

v. Commissioner, supra at 839, the Court of Appeals reviewed the

specific casualties enumerated in section 165(c)(3) and

concluded:   “Each of those surely involves physical damage or

loss of the physical property.   Thus, we read ‘or other

casualty,’ in para materia, meaning ‘something like those

specifically mentioned.’”   Even more explicitly, the Court of

Appeals based affirmance in Kamanski v. Commissioner, supra at

452, on the following grounds:

          The Tax Court ruled that the loss sustained was a
     nondeductible personal loss in disposition of
     residential property and not a casualty loss; that the
     drop in market value was not due to physical damage
     caused by the [earth]slide, but to “buyer resistance”;
     that casualty loss is limited to damage directly caused
     by the casualty. We agree.

     Furthermore, two recent opinions from U.S. District Courts

within the Ninth Circuit, although nonbinding and not officially

reported, nonetheless serve as an indication that the Court of

Appeals has not rejected the physical damage requirement.   In

Gordon v. United States, No. C-94-4210 MHP (N.D. Cal., July 3,

1995), affd. without published opinion 82 F.3d 422 (9th Cir.

1996), the District Court, citing the appellate decision in
                               - 15 -

Pulvers v. Commissioner, supra, stated:    “Section 165 of the IRC

covers only casualty losses arising from physical damage caused

by one of the enumerated casualties or by other, similar

casualties”, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

       In Caan v. United States, 83 AFTR 2d 99-1640, 99-1 USTC par.

50,349 (C.D. Cal. 1999), the District Court dismissed for failure

to state a claim the complaint of taxpayers alleging facts nearly

identical to those at issue here.   The Caans, residents of

Brentwood Park, argued that they were entitled to a section

165(c)(3) casualty loss deduction for the decline in market value

and permanent buyer resistance to which they asserted their

property became subject as a result of the “‘O.J. Simpson double

murders’”.    Id. at 99-1641 n.2, 99-1 USTC par. 50,349, at 87,829

n.2.    The court, however, reiterated that “the Ninth Circuit only

recognizes casualty losses arising from physical damage caused by

enumerated or other similar casualties” and held that “Because

the Caans have not alleged any physical damage to their property

due to the murders and subsequent media frenzy, they have not

alleged a casualty loss that is a proper basis for a deduction.”

Id. at 99-1641, 99-1 USTC par. 50,349, at 87,829.

       Given the above decisions, we conclude that petitioners here

have failed to establish that their claimed casualty loss is of a

type recognized as deductible for purposes of section 165(c)(3).

They have not proven the extent to which their property suffered
                              - 16 -

physical damage, and their attempt to base a deduction on market

devaluation is contrary to existing law.

     With respect to physical damage and assuming arguendo that

petitioners’ loss stemmed from an occurrence that could properly

be deemed a casualty, they would be entitled to a deduction for

physical harm to their property.   Nonetheless, although

petitioners attached to their return a list of minor instances of

physical damage and mentioned several other items at trial, they

have neither offered evidence of the monetary value of nor

provided any substantiation for such losses.   We therefore have

no basis for determining what, if any, portion of the claimed

deduction might be allowable, and we cannot sustain a $751,427

deduction on the grounds of damage to a lawn or a sprinkler

system.

     As regards decrease in property value, petitioners’ efforts

to circumvent the established precedent repeatedly rejecting

deductions premised on market fluctuation, through reliance on

Finkbohner v. United States, 788 F.2d 723 (11th Cir. 1986), are

misplaced.   In Finkbohner v. United States, supra at 727, the

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit permitted a deduction

based on permanent buyer resistance in absence of physical

damage.   The Finkbohners lived on a cul-de-sac with 12 homes, and

after flooding damaged several of the houses, municipal

authorities ordered 7 of the residences demolished and the lots
                               - 17 -

maintained as permanent open space.     See id. at 724.    Such

irreversible changes in the character of the neighborhood were

found to effect a permanent devaluation and to constitute a

casualty within the meaning of section 165(c)(3).    See id. at

727.

       However, as explicated above, this Court has long

consistently held that an essential element of a deductible

casualty loss is physical damage or, in some cases, physically

necessitated abandonment.    Furthermore, under the rule set forth

in Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 756-757 (1970), affd. 445

F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971), we are in any event constrained to

apply the law of the court in which an appeal would normally lie.

Since the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has adopted and

has not diverged from a requirement of physical damage for a

section 165(c)(3) deduction, to hold otherwise would contravene

Golsen.

       Moreover, we further note that petitioners’ circumstances do

not reflect the type of permanent devaluation or buyer resistance

which would be analogous to that held deductible in Finkbohner v.

United States, supra.    The evidence in the instant case reveals

that media and onlooker attention has in fact lessened

significantly over the years following the murders.       Access to

petitioners’ property is no longer restricted by media equipment

or police barricades.    Residents of Brentwood Park have continued
                              - 18 -

to invest substantial funds in remodeling and upgrading their

homes.   Hence, petitioners’ difficulties are more akin to a

temporary fluctuation in value, which no court has found to

support a deduction under section 165(c)(3).    We therefore hold

that petitioners have failed to establish their entitlement to a

casualty loss deduction.   Respondent’s determination of a

deficiency is sustained.

     Additionally, in light of our holding that the element of

physical damage must be present, we also grant respondent’s

motion in limine to exclude the report of petitioners’ expert,

Randall Bell (Bell), a real estate appraiser.    Bell’s report

focuses on the diminution in value that can result from the

stigma which attaches to crime scene property.    As this

information relates solely to the issue of buyer resistance, the

report is irrelevant to our decision.   Furthermore, we note that

because Bell bases his conclusions on studies of actual murder

scenes and offers no examples or statistics regarding the effect

of a homicide on values of either neighboring properties or the

killer’s residence, the probative worth of his report, even if

admitted, would at best be minimal.
                                - 19 -

Issue 2.    Accuracy-Related Penalty

     Section 6662(a) and (b)(1) imposes an accuracy-related

penalty in the amount of 20 percent of any underpayment that is

attributable to negligence or disregard of rules or regulations.

“Negligence” is defined in section 6662(c) as “any failure to

make a reasonable attempt to comply with the provisions of this

title”, and “disregard” as “any careless, reckless, or

intentional disregard.”    Case law similarly states that

“Negligence is a lack of due care or the failure to do what a

reasonable and ordinarily prudent person would do under the

circumstances.”     Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 849, 887 (1987)

(quoting Marcello v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 499, 506 (5th Cir.

1967), affg. on this issue 43 T.C. 168 (1964) and T.C. Memo.

1964-299), affd. 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990), affd. 501 U.S.

868 (1991).

     An exception to the section 6662(a) penalty is set forth in

section 6664(c)(1) and provides:       “No penalty shall be imposed

under this part with respect to any portion of an underpayment if

it is shown that there was a reasonable cause for such portion

and that the taxpayer acted in good faith with respect to such

portion.”    The taxpayer bears the burden of establishing that

this reasonable cause exception is applicable, as the

Commissioner’s determination of an accuracy-related penalty is

presumed correct.    See Rule 142(a).
                               - 20 -

       Regulations interpreting section 6664(c) state:

       The determination of whether a taxpayer acted with
       reasonable cause and in good faith is made on a case-
       by-case basis, taking into account all pertinent facts
       and circumstances. * * * Generally, the most
       important factor is the extent of the taxpayer’s effort
       to assess the taxpayer’s proper tax liability. * * *
       [Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.]

       Furthermore, reliance upon the advice of an expert tax

preparer may, but does not necessarily, demonstrate reasonable

cause and good faith in the context of the section 6662(a)

penalty.    See id.; see also Freytag v. Commissioner, supra at

888.    Such reliance is not an absolute defense, but it is a

factor to be considered.    See Freytag v. Commissioner, supra at

888.    In order for this factor to be given dispositive weight,

the taxpayer claiming reliance on a professional such as an

accountant must show, at minimum, that (1) the accountant was

supplied with correct information and (2) the incorrect return

was a result of the accountant’s error.    See, e.g., Ma-Tran Corp.

v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 158, 173 (1978); Pessin v. Commissioner,

59 T.C. 473, 489 (1972); Garcia v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-

203, affd. without published opinion 190 F.3d 538 (5th Cir.

1999).

       Applying these principles to the instant case, we conclude

that petitioners have sustained their burden of establishing

reasonable cause and good faith for the deduction taken on their

return.    Petitioner first inquired of his real estate agent, an
                               - 21 -

experienced broker, regarding a potential decline in value as a

result of events stemming from the alleged Simpson murders.      He

then sought advice from his accountant Kitay concerning the

propriety of a casualty loss deduction.     Kitay, in turn,

discussed devaluation with two additional real estate brokers.

Kitay’s opinion that a typical appraisal would be inconclusive as

to petitioners’ property also appears to have played a

significant role in the decision not to seek such an evaluation.

     Moreover, the explanatory statement prepared by Kitay and

attached to petitioners’ return indicates, on the part of

petitioners, both communication to the accountant of relevant

information and good faith.    Petitioners supplied Kitay with

factual data related to the nature of the loss, and they chose to

make full disclosure rather than to obscure the reasons for their

deduction.    We therefore conclude that petitioners did not

exhibit the type of unreasonableness or imprudence that would

support imposition of the section 6662(a) accuracy-related

penalty.

     We further observe that on brief respondent alternatively

contends that petitioners should be held liable for the section

6662(a) penalty on the grounds of a substantial understatement of

income tax.    See sec. 6662(b)(2).   We note, however, that the

notice of deficiency sent to petitioners reads, in the section

explaining the accuracy-related penalty:     “Underpayment due to
                              - 22 -

negligence 291,931”, followed by “Underpayment due to substantial

understatement 0”.   As respondent has not amended his pleadings

to assert an underpayment due to substantial understatement, this

issue was not properly raised.   In addition, we also observe that

the section 6664(c) reasonable cause exception is equally

applicable in the case of a section 6662(a) penalty attributed to

a substantial understatement of income tax.    Respondent’s

determination of an accuracy-related penalty is denied.

     To reflect the foregoing,



                                         An appropriate order will

                                    be issued, and decision will

                                    be entered for respondent with

                                    respect to the deficiency and

                                    for petitioners with respect

                                    to the accuracy-related

                                    penalty.
