                IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                        FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

                        _____________________

                             No. 00-20268
                        _____________________



     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA


                                      Plaintiff - Appellee

           v.

     MARK R SKELTON


                                      Defendant - Appellant

_________________________________________________________________

           Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the Southern District of Texas
                      USDC No. H-97-CR-169-1
_________________________________________________________________
                           April 4, 2001

Before KING, Chief Judge, and REAVLEY and JONES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

     The district court did not err in refusing to reconsider the

four-level upward adjustment under the Sentencing Guidelines of

the sentence of Defendant-Appellant Mark R. Skelton.        See U.S.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2F1.1(b)(7)(A) (1998).   This court’s


     *
        Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
opinion in Skelton’s initial appeal limited the district court on

resentencing to recalculation of the special assessment and the

amount of restitution.    “[T]he resentencing court can consider

whatever this court directs – no more, no less.    All other issues

not arising out of this court’s ruling and not raised before the

appeals court, which could have been brought in the original

appeal, are not proper for reconsideration by the district court

below.”    United States v. Marmolejo, 139 F. 3d 528, 531 (5th Cir.

1998).    We are not persuaded that Skelton could not have raised

in his initial appeal the issue of whether affirmance of his

conviction on less than all counts required reconsideration of

the determination that Skelton’s offense substantially

jeopardized the soundness of Westheimer Bank.

     Skelton’s further argument that, under the Supreme Court’s

decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), facts

affecting his sentence were required to have been proved to a

jury beyond a reasonable doubt is foreclosed by this court’s

opinions in United States v. Keith, 230 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir.

2000) (stating that Apprendi is “limited to facts which increase

the penalty beyond the statutory maximum, and does not invalidate

a court’s factual finding for the purposes of determining the

applicable Sentencing Guidelines”), and United States v. Meshack,

225 F.3d 556, 576-77 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.

834 (2001), amended on reh’g in part, --- F.3d ----, 2001 WL

224656 (2001).

                                  2
Skelton’s sentence is therefore AFFIRMED.




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