
119 U.S. 74 (1886)
OREGON
v.
JENNINGS.
Supreme Court of United States.
Submitted October 19, 1886.
Decided November 15, 1886.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.
*85 Mr. James K. Edsall for plaintiff in error.
*89 Mr. Samuel W. Packard for defendant in error.
*88 MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD, after stating the facts as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.
The court refused to submit to the jury, and we think properly, any question as to whether the making or execution of the bonds and coupons was obtained by fraud or circumvention.
Even if the statute applies to town bonds and their coupons, no fraud or imposition was practised on Potter or Marsh to induce them to sign these bonds and coupons. They knew what they were signing and signed intentionally. The fraud or circumvention intended by the statute, which only embodies a rule of the common law, is not that which goes merely to the consideration of the instrument, but it must go to the execution or making; and there must be a trick or device by which one kind of instrument is signed in the belief that it is of another kind, or the amount or nature or terms of the instrument must be misrepresented to the signer. No different ruling as to the statute has ever been made by the Supreme Court of Illinois, especially in a case where, as here, the holder of the instrument is a bona fide holder of it, before maturity, for a valuable consideration, without notice. In Latham v. Smith, 45 Ill. 25, decided in 1867, in construing this statute, the court said: "A fraud in obtaining a note may consist of any artifice practised upon a person to induce him to execute it, when he did not intend to do such an act. Circumvention seems to be nearly, if not quite, synonymous with fraud. It is any fraud whereby a person is induced by deceit to make a deed or other instrument. It must be borne in mind that the fraud or covin must relate to the obtaining of the instrument itself, and not to the consideration upon which it is based. It is not fraud which relates to the quality, quantity, value, or character of the consideration that moves the contract, but it is such a trick or device as induces the giving of one character of instrument under the belief that it is another of a different character; such as giving a note or *90 other agreement for one sum or thing when it is for another sum or thing; or as giving a note under the belief that it is a receipt." This ruling was followed in Shipley v. Carroll, 45 Ill. 285; Elliott v. Levings, 54 Ill. 213; and Maxcy v. Williamson County, 72 Ill. 207.
It is also contended that the appointment of Potter as supervisor was invalid, because Schultz, though he had resigned as justice, legally continued in office till his successor was elected, and yet took no part in the appointment. But it is plain, we think, that, within the language and meaning of the statute, as respects the four members of the appointing board designated by statute, two of them were out of office so far as their acting as such members was concerned. The supervisor and Schultz had resigned, and their offices were vacant, and it was lawful for the remaining two officers to fill the vacancy in the office of supervisor. No authority to which we are referred holds to the contrary. Where a town is trying to escape the enforcement of its liability to creditors through the resignation of an officer on whom process is to be served, and the failure to supply his place, the resigning officer is rightly held, quoad creditors, to continue in office, subject to the service of process, till his successor qualifies. In the present case there was not only a "vacancy" in the office of supervisor, for the purpose of filling it, under § 1, but there was a vacancy in the office which Schultz had held, for the purpose of the action of Cartwright and Marsh alone, as the remaining officers of the appointing board, to appoint a supervisor, under § 2. On any other construction, as, by § 2, a vacancy in the office of justice can be filled only by election, a town would, in case of a vacancy in the office of justice, have to go without a supervisor, in case of a vacancy in his office, till a justice could be elected.
Another defence is set up, under the amended third plea, founded on § 12 of Article 9 of the Constitution of Illinois, which went into effect August 8th, 1870, and provides as follows: "§ 12. No county, city, township, school district, or other municipal corporation shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose, to an amount, *91 including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding five per centum on the value of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by the last assessment for the State and county taxes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness. Any county, city, school district, or other municipal corporation, incurring any indebtedness as aforesaid, shall, before or at the time of doing so, provide for the collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on such debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal thereof within twenty years from the time of contracting the same. This section shall not be construed to prevent any county, city, township, school district, or other municipal corporation from issuing their bonds in compliance with any vote of the people which may have been had prior to the adoption of this Constitution, in pursuance of any law providing therefor."
It appearing that, when the bonds in question in this suit were issued, the debt of the town was already greater than five per centum on the value of its taxable property, as ascertained by the assessment for 1870, it is contended that the bonds could not be lawfully issued, except in compliance with the vote of June 23d, 1870, and in conformity with the conditions imposed by that vote, one of which was the completion and equipment of the first division of the road on or before January 1st, 1871, and that that condition was not observed. The question is sought to be made one of power or authority to issue the bonds, within the rules laid down by this court as applicable even in the case of bonds in the hands of a bona fide holder.
At the time the bonds in question were issued, a statute enacted April 16th, 1869, was in force in Illinois, § 7 of which, Gross' Stat., 1869, vol. 1, 3d ed., p. 556, provided that any town should have the right, "upon making any subscription or donation to any railroad company, to prescribe the conditions upon which such bonds, subscriptions, or donations shall be made, and such bonds, subscriptions, or donations shall not be valid and binding until such conditions precedent shall have been complied with."
The language of this statute was as imperative as is that of *92 the Constitution of 1870 in regard to complying with the conditions contained in any vote of the people; and § 6 of the Act of March 30th, 1869, before cited, prescribes that the proper corporate authorities of the town shall make the donation or subscription, "as shall be determined at said election."
In respect to this compliance with the conditions imposed by the vote of the people, whether the question is to be regarded as arising under the provision of the Constitution or that of a statute, it must equally be regarded as concluded by the recital in the bonds, made by the supervisor and the town clerk. Section 6 of the Act of March 30th, 1869, provides that if a majority of the legal voters of the town, voting at the election, vote for the donation, the town shall, by its "corporate authorities," make the donation to the company, "as shall be determined at said election," and shall issue its bonds to the company, "which bonds shall be signed by the supervisor and countersigned by the clerk in towns organized under the township law." Within the numerous decisions by this court on the subject, the supervisor and the town clerk, they being named in the statute as the officers to sign the bonds, and the "corporate authorities" to act for the town in issuing them to the company, were the persons entrusted with the duty of deciding, before issuing the bonds, whether the conditions determined at the election existed. If they have certified to that effect in the bonds, the town is estopped from asserting, as against a bona fide holder, that the conditions prescribed by the popular vote were not complied with. They state, in each bond, that the faith, credit, and property of the town are, by the bond, solemnly pledged for the payment of the principal and interest named in it "under authority of" the Act of March 30th, 1869, reciting its title, and that the 60 bonds, amounting to $50,000, "are the only bonds issued by said town of Oregon under and by virtue of said Act." The provision in § 6 of the Act, that the town shall, by its proper corporate authority, annually assess and levy a tax to pay the interest and principal of the bonds, is a warrant for the pledge made, in the bonds, of the faith, credit, and property of the town. The recitals are within the adjudged *93 cases in this court, as to the effect of recitals in bonds, that they are issued "under authority of" a specified statute, and "under and by virtue of" that statute, and they estop the town from taking the defence that the first division of the road was not completed by the time specified, as against the plaintiff, as a bona fide holder of the bonds.
In Pana v. Bowler, 107 U.S. 529, 539, this court upheld the effectiveness of a recital in bonds, in favor of a bona fide holder, as against an alleged defect in the mode of conducting an election, held prior to the adoption of this same Constitution of Illinois, the bonds being issued after its adoption, although that instrument forbade the issuing of the bonds, unless their issue should have been authorized under then existing laws, by a vote of the people prior to the adoption of the Constitution.
The present case is directly within the decision of this court in Ins. Co. v. Bruce, 105 U.S. 328, where it was held that recitals in bonds estopped a town in Illinois, as against a bona fide holder, from showing that conditions imposed on its liability by the vote of the people had not been complied with, although the statute declared that the bonds should not be valid and binding until such conditions precedent had been complied with. There are numerous other cases in this court to the same effect.
The provision of § 12 of Article 9 of the Constitution of Illinois did not introduce any new rule of evidence in regard to the mode of proving, in favor of a bona fide holder, the compliance with the vote of the people, but left the compliance to be conclusively established in such a case by the recital in the bonds, made by the designated official authorities.
We are not referred to any decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois, made prior to the issuing of the bonds in question, which holds to the contrary of the views we have announced. The case of The People v. Dutcher, 56 Ill. 144, decided at September Term, 1870, was a mandamus applied for by a railroad company to compel a supervisor to subscribe for stock, where conditions imposed by the vote of the town had not been complied with, and its bonds had not been issued. The *94 mandamus was refused. This direct proceeding is, as this court has uniformly held, a very different thing from a suit on the bonds, by a bona fide holder, the cases not being analogous or governed by the same rules.
A defence is also set up, under the amended fourth plea, founded on the second additional section or article to the Constitution of Illinois, of 1870, which took effect July 2, 1870, and is in these words: "No county, city, town, township, or other municipality shall ever become subscriber to the capital stock of any railroad or private corporation, or make donation to or loan its credit in aid of such corporation: Provided, however, That the adoption of this article shall not be construed as affecting the right of any such municipality to make such subscriptions where the same have been authorized, under existing laws, by a vote of the people of such municipalities prior to such adoption."
The bonds in question having been issued after July 2, 1870, and the requirement, to make them valid, being that they must have been authorized, under laws in force before July 2, 1870, by a vote of the people of the town given before that date, it is contended that they were not so authorized, because the vote of June 23, 1870, was taken at a town meeting held and presided over by a moderator, and not by judges of election. The argument made is, that § 6 of the Act of March 30th, 1869, provided that the election should "be held and conducted and return thereof made as is provided by law, and, in any village or city, as is provided by the law under which the same is incorporated;" and that a town meeting, presided over by a moderator, and not held by the supervisor, assessor, and collector, as judges of election, was not an "election," within the meaning of the statute, and so was not an election "under existing laws," within the meaning of the Constitution.
The election was in fact conducted in the manner required for the election of town officers, and not in the manner required for general elections. We are of opinion that, under the Act of 1869, the election in a town could properly be conducted in the manner prescribed by law for the election in towns of town officers, namely, by a moderator and the town *95 clerk, the town clerk having given, as required by the Act, the prior notice of the election, and the return of the election being filed in the office of the town clerk, and the two officers being paid by the town. The voting for town officers at annual town meetings in the manner prescribed therefor by the statutes of Illinois, is called in those statutes an "election," and this special voting in the same manner for this town object was an "election," within the meaning of the Act of 1869. The requirement of the Act is, that the "election shall be held and conducted and return thereof made as is provided by law," and not "as is provided by law for general elections." If a town, it is the law provided for town elections. If a village or city, and the law of its incorporation has special provisions, those are to be followed; otherwise, any general law as to village or city elections is to be observed. As the proceeding was to originate by an application filed in the town clerk's office, so the same officers who would conduct an ordinary town election were to be concerned with this election, and the town clerk's office was to be the place of deposit of all the papers and of the return of the vote, and two town officers were to issue the bonds. None of the proceedings were to be connected with the county clerk's office, as in the case of a general election. This was the ruling of the Supreme Court of Illinois, in a case decided after June 23, 1870, though before these bonds were issued, The People v. Dutcher, 56 Ill. 144; and it was followed in other cases, in that court, after the bonds were issued, though somewhat modified more recently. We think it was the correct ruling.
The questions above considered cover substantially all the assignments of error. The direction to find a verdict for the plaintiff was proper.
Judgment affirmed.
