                          REPORTS

                           OF THE

       UNITED STATES TAX COURT


MONEYGRAM INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES,
   PETITIONER v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
            REVENUE, RESPONDENT
 Docket Nos. 12231–12, 30309–12.          Filed January 7, 2015.

   To qualify as a ‘‘bank’’ under I.R.C. section 581, a taxpayer
 must meet three distinct requirements. First, it must be ‘‘a
 bank or trust company incorporated and doing business’’
 under Federal or State law. Second, ‘‘a substantial part’’ of its
 business must ‘‘consist[ ] of receiving deposits and making
 loans and discounts.’’ Third, it must be ‘‘subject by law to
 supervision and examination’’ by Federal or State authorities
 having supervision over banking institutions. P, a U.S. cor-
 poration, is in the ‘‘money services business.’’ Its business
 involves the movement of money through three main chan-
 nels: money transfers, money orders, and payment processing
 services. During 2007 and 2008 P undertook a recapitalization
 that included writing down or writing off a substantial volume
 of partially or wholly worthless securities. P claimed ordinary
 loss deductions on disposition of certain of these securities, a
 treatment available only to banks. See I.R.C. sec. 582. R dis-
 allowed the ordinary loss deductions on the ground that P did
 not qualify as a ‘‘bank.’’
   1. Held: P during 2007 and 2008 did not qualify as a ‘‘bank’’
 within the meaning of I.R.C. section 581 because it did not
 display the essential characteristics of a bank as that term is
 commonly understood and because a substantial part of its
 business did not consist of receiving bank deposits or making
 bank loans.
   2. Held, further, because P was not a ‘‘bank’’ within the
 meaning of I.R.C. section 581, it was ineligible to claim ordi-

                                                                     1
2            144 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                        (1)


      nary loss deductions on account of the worthlessness of its
      securities under I.R.C. section 582.

  Henry Todd Miller, James A. Bruton, James Tazwell
Fuller, and Peter J. Anthony, for petitioner.
  Dana E. Hundrieser, Reid Michael Huey, and James L.
Gessford, for respondent.

                                       OPINION

  LAUBER, Judge: With respect to petitioner’s Federal income
tax for the taxable years 2005–2007 and 2009, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS or respondent) determined deficiencies
in the following amounts:
                  Year                                    Deficiency

                  2005   ..............................   $13,852,600
                  2006   ..............................    25,471,993
                  2007   ..............................    31,796,692
                  2009   ..............................    11,644,589

   In large part, these deficiencies stem from the disallowance
of bad debt deductions that petitioner claimed for 2007 and
2008 under section 166(a) with respect to ‘‘non-real-estate
mortgage investment conduit’’ (non-REMIC) asset-backed
securities. 1 Normally, losses realized upon the worthlessness
of such securities are deductible as capital losses under sec-
tion 165(g)(1) and (2)(C). Under section 582(a), however, peti-
tioner was entitled to bad debt deductions on account of
these losses—deductible in full against ordinary income—if it
qualified as a ‘‘bank’’ within the meaning of section 581. The
parties have filed cross-motions for partial summary judg-
ment on this question. We conclude that petitioner was not
a ‘‘bank’’ within the meaning of section 581 and hence that
the losses in question must be treated as capital losses. We
will accordingly grant respondent’s motion for partial sum-
mary judgment and deny petitioner’s motion.


  1 All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for

the years in issue, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure. We round all monetary amounts to the nearest
dollar.
(1)   MONEYGRAM INT’L, INC. & SUBS. v. COMMISSIONER          3


                         Background
   The following facts are not in dispute. MoneyGram Inter-
national,    Inc.,  is   incorporated     in   Delaware   and
headquartered in Texas. It is the parent of a group of compa-
nies that operate a global payment services business. This
business is conducted chiefly through MoneyGram Payment
Systems, Inc. (MPSI), a wholly owned subsidiary incor-
porated in Delaware. We will refer to MoneyGram Inter-
national, Inc., and its subsidiaries, including MPSI, as peti-
tioner or MoneyGram.
MoneyGram’s Lines of Business
   MoneyGram has been in business since 1940. Its core pur-
pose is to provide consumers and financial institutions with
payment services that are affordable, reliable, and conven-
ient. MoneyGram’s business involves the movement of money
through three main channels: money transfers, money
orders, and payment processing services.
   MoneyGram sells money orders and money transfer serv-
ices to consumers through ‘‘agents.’’ These agents include
banks, credit unions, supermarkets, convenience stores, and
other retail locations. MoneyGram’s agents range from well-
known businesses such as Wal-Mart (during the years in
issue), Albertson’s, and CVS Pharmacy, to thousands of
‘‘mom and pop’’ convenience stores. MoneyGram sells pay-
ment processing services directly to banks and other finan-
cial institutions.
   A money transfer involves the transfer of funds from a con-
sumer at one location to a consumer at a different location
in the United States or abroad. In a typical money transfer,
a consumer goes to the location of a MoneyGram agent, com-
pletes a form, and pays the agent the money to be trans-
ferred (plus a fee). This form explicitly states that the agent
is not accepting a ‘‘deposit.’’
   In a matter of minutes, the funds are made available for
payment to the designated recipient, in various currencies,
through MoneyGram’s agent network. The fee paid by the
consumer at the sending location is based on the amount to
be transferred and the location at which the funds are to be
received. The ‘‘sending’’ and ‘‘receiving’’ agents each receive
a commission from MoneyGram on the transaction.
4          144 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS             (1)


MoneyGram derives its revenue from the transaction fees
paid by consumers and from management of currency
exchange spreads on international money transfers.
  MoneyGram in 2007 was the leading issuer of money
orders in the United States. It sells money orders under the
MoneyGram brand, on a private label basis, and under co-
branding arrangements with retail agents. Money orders,
much like checks, can be presented by a consumer to make
a payment or receive cash. To obtain a money order, a cus-
tomer enters the location of a MoneyGram agent and gives
the agent cash equal to the money order amount (plus a fee).
The customer receives a blank money order in that amount.
He completes the money order by filling in the name of the
person to whom the money order is to be paid and signing
the order. Once presented for payment, the money order is
cleared through the Federal Reserve interbank system. Typi-
cally, money orders remain outstanding for fewer than ten
days.
  MoneyGram generally receives a transaction fee from its
agents for each money order sold. MoneyGram also derives
revenue from the investment of funds remitted by its agents.
MoneyGram earns income on these funds until the money
orders are cleared through the banking system or (if not pre-
sented for payment) escheat to the relevant State. Out-
standing money orders are classified as ‘‘payment service
obligations’’ and treated as liabilities on MoneyGram’s
consolidated financial statements.
  In the absence of an agreement otherwise, when a cus-
tomer purchases a money order by giving cash to a
MoneyGram agent, the agent must remit these funds to
MoneyGram immediately. However, MoneyGram typically
enters into agreements with its agents allowing them to
retain and use these funds for an agreed-upon period. These
agreements, called ‘‘delayed remittance agreements,’’ set
forth a schedule that generally requires agents to remit
funds to MoneyGram twice weekly.
  To effectuate a delayed remittance agreement, MoneyGram
and its agent typically execute a ‘‘Master Trust Agreement’’
(MTA). Under the MTA MoneyGram’s agent accepts appoint-
ment as ‘‘Trustee’’ for MoneyGram. The MTA defines ‘‘Trust
Funds’’ as ‘‘fees, face amounts of money orders, gift certifi-
cates, money transfer checks, principal amounts of * * *
(1)    MONEYGRAM INT’L, INC. & SUBS. v. COMMISSIONER          5


money transfers and all proceeds from the sale’’ of money
transfer services. The agent ‘‘agrees to hold Trust Funds in
trust for * * * [MoneyGram] and separate from Trustee’s
funds.’’
   Funds due MoneyGram under delayed remittance agree-
ments are classified as ‘‘accounts receivable’’ and treated as
assets on MoneyGram’s consolidated financial statements.
MoneyGram does not charge interest on these accounts
receivable unless a remittance is late. In that event, the
MTA states that MoneyGram ‘‘may charge interest at the
highest legal rate until payment is made.’’
   Whereas money transfers and money orders usually
involve       transactions    with     individual    consumers,
MoneyGram’s ‘‘payment systems’’ segment provides services
to financial institutions. These services generally consist of
payment processing, including the provision of money orders
for sale to financial institution clients and outsourcing serv-
ices for ‘‘official checks.’’
   Financial institutions provide clients with official checks,
such as bank checks, cashier’s checks, and teller checks, for
use in various transactions. Official checks are commonly
used in closings of consumer home and car loans and in other
situations where the payee requires assurance of payment
and availability of funds. Financial institutions also use offi-
cial checks to pay their own obligations. In 2007 MoneyGram
provided official check services to more than 1,900 financial
institutions, consisting mainly of banks, thrifts, and credit
unions.
   Typically, MoneyGram and its customer (say a bank) exe-
cute a ‘‘payment processing services agreement’’ that lasts
between three and five years. Before the first day on which
the bank issues official checks, it supplies MoneyGram with
funds equal to its anticipated average daily volume of official
checks. This is called the ‘‘first day settlement.’’ At the end
of each business day, the bank generates a settlement report
showing the dollar volume of official checks it issued that
day. The bank then transfers funds in that amount to
MoneyGram, typically before 11 a.m. central time the next
business day. As official checks clear, the bank’s account bal-
ance with MoneyGram is drawn down, but it is replenished
with funds from the next day’s settlement report. If a bank
issues significantly more official checks than anticipated, its
6          144 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS              (1)


account balance with MoneyGram may temporarily go nega-
tive. In that event, MoneyGram will allow the bank’s official
checks to clear, but will demand payment from the bank that
same business day.
   MoneyGram receives fees from financial institution cus-
tomers for its official check services and related money order
services. MoneyGram also derives revenue from the tem-
porary investment of funds remitted from its financial
institution customers until such time as the official checks
and money orders clear. Outstanding official checks and
money orders are classified as ‘‘payment service obligations’’
and treated as liabilities on MoneyGram’s consolidated finan-
cial statements.
Regulation of MoneyGram
  MoneyGram is registered with the Department of the
Treasury as a ‘‘money services business’’ (MSB). MSBs
include money transmitters, check cashing services, issuers
and sellers of money orders, and issuers and sellers of trav-
elers checks. MoneyGram is subject to regulation under title
31 of the United States Code and title 31 of the Code of Fed-
eral Regulations, which govern ‘‘Money and Finance.’’ Other
money transmitters and check issuers, such as Western
Union and American Express Travel Related Services, are
also regulated as MSBs.
  As an MSB, MoneyGram is subject to laws covering data
protection, consumer protection, and consumer privacy; to
anti-money-laundering laws; and to State licensing require-
ments. MoneyGram is licensed and regulated as a money
transmitter by most States, the District of Columbia, and the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. To be licensed as a money
transmitter, MoneyGram must satisfy State law require-
ments concerning minimum net worth, provision of surety
bonds, and compliance with operational procedures. It must
also maintain reserves or ‘‘permissible investments’’ adequate
to meet its outstanding payment obligations. The types of
securities that are considered ‘‘permissible investments’’ vary
from State to State but generally include U.S. Government
securities and other highly rated debt instruments.
  Banks are generally regulated under title 12 of the United
States Code and title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations,
which govern ‘‘Banks and Banking.’’ All U.S. banks are sub-
(1)    MONEYGRAM INT’L, INC. & SUBS. v. COMMISSIONER          7


ject to supervisory regulation by one or more Federal
banking regulators, viz., the Federal Reserve Board, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and/or the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). All U.S.
banks that receive deposits generally maintain deposit insur-
ance through the FDIC.
   MoneyGram is not subject to regulation under title 12, and
it has never been regulated as a bank by any Federal
banking regulator. MoneyGram has never maintained
deposit insurance through the FDIC. No MoneyGram affil-
iate is incorporated as a bank under State law. As a licensed
money transmitter, MoneyGram is subject to financial regu-
lation in every State in which it does business, generally by
officials of the State banking (or similar) department.
   As a publicly held corporation, MoneyGram files with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Forms 10–K,
Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. On its Forms 10–K MoneyGram
has described itself as a ‘‘global payment services company’’
that conducts two business segments: ‘‘global funds transfer,’’
consisting primarily of money transfers and money orders,
and ‘‘payment systems,’’ consisting primarily of payment
processing services for financial institutions. MoneyGram has
never represented to the SEC or to its shareholders that it
is a bank or that any part of its business consists of receiving
deposits or making loans. The financial statements that
accompany MoneyGram’s Forms 10–K do not list any ‘‘loans’’
among its assets and do not list any ‘‘deposits’’ among its
liabilities.
   For 2005–2007 MoneyGram filed with the IRS annually
Form 1120, U.S. Corporation Income Tax Return. On these
returns MoneyGram classified its business as ‘‘nondepository
credit intermediation’’ (business activity code 522298). Activi-
ties within ‘‘nondepository credit intermediation’’ include
money transmitting, check clearing, and loan brokering. On
none of these returns did MoneyGram classify its business as
‘‘depository credit intermediation’’ (business activity codes
522110, 522120, 522130, and 522190). Activities within
‘‘depository credit intermediation’’ include the activities of
commercial banks, savings institutions, credit unions, and
other financial institutions that accept deposits.
8          144 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS               (1)


   For 2008 MoneyGram filed with the IRS a Form 1120 that
again classified its business as ‘‘nondepository credit inter-
mediation.’’ But while continuing to use business activity
code 522298, MoneyGram changed the typed description of
its business activity and of its products and services.
Whereas its prior returns had described its business activity
as ‘‘payment services/credit agency,’’ its 2008 return
described its business activity as ‘‘banking.’’ And whereas its
prior returns had described its products and services as
‘‘money/wire transfers,’’ its 2008 return described its products
and services as ‘‘financial services.’’ No meaningful change in
MoneyGram’s mode of operation occurred between 2007 and
2008.
The Present Controversy
   At the beginning of 2007 MoneyGram held asset-backed
securities valued at approximately $4.2 billion. During 2007
and 2008, global financial markets experienced turmoil. In
response, ratings agencies undertook reviews of asset-backed
securities, especially mortgage-backed securities. Many of
these securities, formerly rated A or higher, were suddenly
downgraded to ‘‘junk bond’’ status. These securities lost much
of their value.
   Because its asset-backed securities were no longer rated A
or higher and had declined precipitously in value,
MoneyGram by yearend 2007 had fallen out of compliance
with State law requirements concerning ‘‘permissible assets’’
and minimum net worth. To satisfy State regulators’
demands and ensure sufficient operational liquidity,
MoneyGram undertook a recapitalization that included
writing down or writing off a substantial volume of partially
or wholly worthless asset-backed securities. Upon completion
of this recapitalization in March 2008, MoneyGram brought
itself back into compliance with State regulatory demands.
   As a result of this recapitalization MoneyGram reported on
its 2007 and 2008 Federal income tax returns substantial
losses with respect to its asset-backed securities portfolio.
These asset-backed securities fell into two categories: REMIC
and non-REMIC. The parties have filed a stipulation of set-
tled issues that resolves all matters arising from the IRS’
disallowance of deductions in connection with MoneyGram’s
disposition of its regular REMIC interests.
(1)     MONEYGRAM INT’L, INC. & SUBS. v. COMMISSIONER                   9


   The question the parties have submitted for resolution by
summary judgment concerns MoneyGram’s disposition of its
non-REMIC asset-backed securities. On its 2007 and 2008
Federal income tax returns MoneyGram claimed under sec-
tion 166(a) bad debt deductions of $524,435,525 and
$16,516,192, respectively, on account of the partial or com-
plete worthlessness of those securities. (Treating these losses
as capital losses would have generated no current tax benefit
for MoneyGram because it had no capital gains net income
during 2007 and 2008 against which capital losses could be
offset.) The IRS determined that these securities were ‘‘debts
evidenced by a security’’ under section 165(g)(2)(C) and hence
that MoneyGram could claim bad debt deductions, as
opposed to capital losses, only if it were a ‘‘bank’’ within the
meaning of section 581. See sec. 582(a). The IRS determined
that MoneyGram was not a ‘‘bank’’ and hence disallowed the
bad debt deductions. 2 MoneyGram timely petitioned this
Court in response to the notice of deficiency that followed.

                              Discussion
I. Summary Judgment Standard
   The purpose of summary judgment is to expedite litigation
and avoid unnecessary and expensive trials. See FPL Grp.,
Inc. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 73, 74 (2001). We
may grant partial summary judgment when there is no gen-
uine dispute of material fact and a decision may be rendered
as a matter of law. Rule 121(b); Elec. Arts, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 118 T.C. 226, 238 (2002). The parties agree on all
questions of basic fact and have expressed that consensus by
filing cross-motions for partial summary judgment. We con-
clude that the question presented is appropriate for summary
adjudication.
II. Governing Statutory Framework
 Section 165 governs ‘‘losses.’’ Petitioner concedes that ‘‘non-
REMIC asset-backed securities’’ are debts evidenced by a
  2 MoneyGram    contends that it made an informal claim for refund that
increased by $14,760,201 the bad debt deduction it claimed for 2007. Given
our disposition of these cases, we need not address the magnitude of the
deduction.
10          144 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                        (1)


‘‘security’’ within the meaning of section 165(g)(2)(C). Thus,
losses realized on the worthlessness of petitioner’s non-
REMIC asset-backed securities would normally be treated as
losses ‘‘from the sale or exchange, on the last day of the tax-
able year, of a capital asset.’’ Sec. 165(g)(1). For corporations,
capital losses for a particular year are deductible only to the
extent of capital gains for that year. Sec. 1211(a).
    Section 166, captioned ‘‘Bad Debts,’’ allows a deduction for
any debt that ‘‘becomes [wholly] worthless’’ or becomes
‘‘recoverable only in part’’ during the taxable year. Sec.
166(a)(1) and (2). Section 166(e), however, provides that
‘‘[t]his section shall not apply to a debt which is evidenced by
a security as defined in section 165(g)(2)(C).’’ Because non-
REMIC asset-backed securities are debts ‘‘evidenced by a
security,’’ a taxpayer generally cannot claim a bad debt
deduction on account of the partial or complete worthlessness
of these securities.
    Banks are entitled to special treatment. Section 582(a) pro-
vides that ‘‘[n]otwithstanding sections 165(g)(1) and 166(e),
subsections (a) and (b) of section 166 (relating to allowance
of deduction for bad debts) shall apply in the case of a bank
to a debt which is evidenced by a security as defined in sec-
tion 165(g)(2)(C).’’ The term ‘‘bank’’ is defined in section 581.
It provides:
 For purposes of sections 582 and 584, the term ‘‘bank’’ means a bank or
 trust company incorporated and doing business under the laws of the
 United States (including laws relating to the District of Columbia) or of
 any State, a substantial part of the business of which consists of
 receiving deposits and making loans and discounts, or of exercising fidu-
 ciary powers similar to those permitted to national banks under
 authority of the Comptroller of the Currency, and which is subject by
 law to supervision and examination by State, or Federal authority
 having supervision over banking institutions. Such term also means a
 domestic building and loan association.

   MoneyGram does not contend that it is ‘‘a domestic
building and loan association’’ or that it ‘‘exercis[es] fiduciary
powers.’’ To qualify as a ‘‘bank’’ as defined by section 581,
therefore, MoneyGram must meet three requirements. First,
it must be ‘‘a bank or trust company incorporated and doing
business’’ under Federal or State law. Second, ‘‘a substantial
part’’ of MoneyGram’s business must ‘‘consist[ ] of receiving
deposits and making loans and discounts.’’ Third,
(1)       MONEYGRAM INT’L, INC. & SUBS. v. COMMISSIONER                     11


MoneyGram must be ‘‘subject by law to supervision and
examination’’ by Federal or State authorities having super-
vision over banking institutions.
      A. ‘‘Bank or Trust Company’’
   The first requirement for ‘‘bank’’ status is set forth in the
principal clause of the first sentence of section 581: ‘‘For pur-
poses of sections 582 and 584, the term ‘bank’ means a bank
or trust company incorporated and doing business under the
laws of the United States (including laws relating to the Dis-
trict of Columbia) or of any State.’’ This clause has a readily
ascertainable meaning. To be classified as a ‘‘bank,’’ an entity
must be incorporated and must be a bank or trust company
within the common understanding of those terms. 3
   The statute’s text makes clear that this first requirement—
that an entity be a ‘‘bank’’ as the term is commonly under-
stood—is a distinct requirement, separate from the require-
ments that it accept deposits, make loans, and be subject to
banking regulation. These latter requirements are set forth
in a pair of restrictive relative clauses that follow the prin-
cipal clause. These clauses specify two features that an entity
must have, apart from being a ‘‘bank’’ as commonly under-
stood, in order to be a ‘‘bank’’ within the meaning of section
581: a substantial part of its business must consist of
receiving deposits and making loans, and it must be subject
to regulation by Federal or State banking authorities. Basic
rules of English syntax require that the principal clause of
a sentence be given meaning independent from that of suc-
ceeding subordinate clauses. And elementary rules of statu-
tory construction require that we interpret section 581 so
that no clause, sentence, or word is rendered superfluous,
void, or insignificant. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167,
174 (2001); Sophy v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 204, 211 (2012).
   In the seminal case in this area, the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit interpreted the predecessor of section 581
   3 The same principle of construction applies to the second sentence of

section 581: ‘‘Such term also means a domestic building and loan associa-
tion.’’ An entity can qualify as a ‘‘bank’’ under this sentence only if it is
a ‘‘domestic building or loan association’’ within the common under-
standing of that term. Since MoneyGram does not contend that it is a
‘‘trust company’’ or a ‘‘domestic building and loan association,’’ the relevant
inquiry is whether it is a ‘‘bank’’ as the term is commonly understood.
12           144 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                        (1)


consistently with these principles. See Staunton Indus. Loan
Corp. v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 930 (4th Cir. 1941), rev’g 42
B.T.A. 1030 (1940). The question in Staunton was whether
an entity chartered as an ‘‘industrial loan corporation’’ under
Virginia law was a ‘‘bank’’ within the meaning of section
104(a) of the Revenue Act of 1936 (1936 Act), ch. 690, 49
Stat. at 1677. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that ‘‘the peculiarities of state laws’’ were not deter-
minative in answering this question, reversing the Board of
Tax Appeals (this Court’s predecessor) on that point. See
Staunton, 120 F.2d at 932, 934. The Court of Appeals thus
held that an entity can be a ‘‘bank’’ for Federal tax purposes
even though it is not chartered as a bank under State law. 4
   The Court of Appeals in Staunton then considered the defi-
nition of ‘‘bank’’ set forth in section 104(a) of the 1936 Act,
which was essentially the same as the current definition in
section 581. See Austin State Bank v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.
180, 186 (1971) (noting that section 581 and its predecessor
statute encompass ‘‘nearly the same elements’’). Section
104(a) provided that ‘‘the term ‘bank’ means a bank or trust
company incorporated and doing business’’ under Federal or
State law, ‘‘a substantial part of the business of which
consist[ed] of receiving deposits and making loans,’’ and
which was ‘‘subject by law to supervision and examination’’
by Federal or State banking authorities. The Court of
Appeals in Staunton, 120 F.2d at 933, quickly determined
that ‘‘[a]ll of the business of petitioner consists of receiving
deposits * * * and making loans’’ and that it was subject to
‘‘supervision and examination’’ by Virginia banking authori-
ties. But the Court’s analysis did not stop there. It went on
to consider the ‘‘sum total of petitioner’s business activities’’
to ascertain whether ‘‘petitioner comes within the classifica-
tion set out in section 104 of a ‘bank’, and within the general
meaning of that term.’’ Ibid.
   The Court of Appeals concluded that an entity must mani-
fest three basic features to be classified as a bank: ‘‘(1) the
receipt of deposits from the general public, repayable to the
  4 In Mutual Sav. & Loan Co. of Norfolk v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 1204,

1205 (1941), the Board of Tax Appeals decided to follow the decision of the
Court of Appeals in Staunton, ruling that an industrial loan corporation
could be a ‘‘bank’’ within the meaning of section 104(a) of the 1936 Act
even though it was not chartered as a bank under State law.
(1)     MONEYGRAM INT’L, INC. & SUBS. v. COMMISSIONER                       13


depositors on demand or at a fixed time; (2) the use of
deposit funds for secured loans; and (3) the relationship of
debtor and creditor between the bank and depositor.’’
Staunton, 120 F.2d at 933–934. The court determined that
the industrial loan company displayed these features, which
it described as ‘‘the bare requisites’’ for bank status, and also
noted that it ‘‘was eligible for membership in the Federal
Reserve System.’’ Id. at 934, 932. Because the taxpayer
‘‘possesse[d] the essential characteristics of a bank,’’ received
deposits, made loans, and was subject to banking regulation,
the court held that its activities brought it ‘‘within the
express terms of this statute, as well as within the commonly
understood definition of a ‘bank’.’’ Id. at 934. The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has described the ‘‘interpreta-
tive technique’’ it adopted in Staunton as ‘‘a practical,
commercial, functional approach’’ to determining what con-
stitutes a ‘‘bank.’’ Magruder v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of
Balt., 121 F.2d 981, 985 (4th Cir. 1941). 5
   Under Staunton and its progeny, an incorporated entity
will satisfy the first requirement of the section 581 definition,
even though it is not chartered as a bank under State law,
if it possesses the essential characteristics of a bank.
MoneyGram and its affiliates are organized under Delaware
General Corporation Law; no MoneyGram affiliate is char-
tered as a bank under the law of any State. In order to be
   5 In Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Balt., 121 F.2d at 985, the Court of Ap-

peals for the Fourth Circuit brought the same ‘‘practical, commercial, func-
tional approach’’ to interpretation of section 117(d) of the Revenue Act of
1934, 48 Stat. at 715. That provision afforded certain tax benefits to ‘‘a
bank or trust company incorporated under the laws of the United States
or of any State * * * a substantial part of whose business is the receipt
of deposits.’’ The court ruled against the taxpayer: ‘‘We entertain no doubt
that the taxpayer is a ‘trust company incorporated under the laws’ of
Maryland; but we do not think it can qualify under the second and equally
essential clause of the exempting statute: ‘a substantial part of whose busi-
ness is the receipt of deposits’.’’ Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Balt., 121 F.2d
at 982. In that case, as in Staunton, the court treated the statutory re-
quirement that an institution be a ‘‘bank or trust company’’ as distinct
from the requirement that it accept deposits. See also Morris Plan Bank
of New Haven v. Smith, 125 F.2d 440, 441 (2d Cir. 1942) (holding that an
industrial loan corporation forbidden by Connecticut law to receive ‘‘depos-
its’’ was nevertheless a ‘‘bank’’ under the predecessor to section 581 in part
because ‘‘in other essential respects it admittedly fell within the defini-
tion’’).
14         144 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS              (1)


classified as a ‘‘bank’’ under section 581, therefore,
MoneyGram must possess the essential attributes of a bank.
We find that it does not do so.
    MoneyGram does not meet ‘‘the bare requisites’’ for bank
status enumerated in Staunton. 120 F.2d at 934. The
amounts that MoneyGram seeks to characterize as ‘‘deposits’’
consist of funds, held by MoneyGram for temporary invest-
ment, that are remitted by its money order agents and its
1,900 financial institution customers. These agents and
institutions are connected with MoneyGram by preexisting
contractual relationships; members of the public who lack
these business connections with MoneyGram cannot make
the types of payments it seeks to characterize as ‘‘deposits.’’
For this reason, MoneyGram would not appear to ‘‘recei[ve]
* * * deposits from the general public.’’ See id. at 933–934;
Austin State Bank, 57 T.C. at 187 (The term ‘‘general public’’
in the Staunton definition ‘‘differentiate[s] between deposits
received from sources in some way connected with the bank
and those received from ordinary and unrelated customers of
banking services’’). Moreover, the funds so held by
MoneyGram are not ‘‘repayable to the depositors on demand
or at a fixed time.’’ See Staunton, 120 F.2d at 934. Rather,
these funds are payable to third-party payees when the
checks and money orders clear through the banking system.
    MoneyGram’s business likewise does not involve ‘‘the use
of deposit funds for secured loans.’’ See Staunton, 120 F.2d
at 934. The items that MoneyGram seeks to characterize as
‘‘loans’’ consist primarily of amounts due to MoneyGram that
its agents are permitted to retain temporarily under ‘‘delayed
remittance agreements.’’ Pursuant to the MTA, the agents
hold these funds not as borrowers but as ‘‘trustees’’ for
MoneyGram under a ‘‘trust agreement.’’ These items are
classified on MoneyGram’s books not as ‘‘loans,’’ but as
‘‘accounts receivable.’’ Whereas banks normally charge
interest on their loans, MoneyGram charges no interest on
these ‘‘accounts receivable’’ unless they are past due. And
MoneyGram does not ‘‘use deposit funds’’ to make these sup-
posed ‘‘loans.’’ See ibid. Quite the contrary: The supposed
‘‘loans’’ consist of supposed ‘‘deposits’’ that MoneyGram’s
agents have not yet made.
    Nor does MoneyGram possess any other characteristics
that bring it ‘‘within the commonly understood definition of
(1)       MONEYGRAM INT’L, INC. & SUBS. v. COMMISSIONER                 15


a ‘bank’.’’ See Staunton, 120 F.2d at 934. MoneyGram is not
regulated as a ‘‘bank’’ by the Federal Reserve Board, the
OCC, or the FDIC, and it is not eligible for membership in
the Federal Reserve System. Rather, it is regulated as an
MSB. Federal banking regulations specifically exclude MSBs
from the definition of ‘‘bank.’’ See 31 C.F.R. sec.
1010.100(d)(7) (2011); id. sec. 103.11 (2009) (predecessor of
sec. 1010.100(d)(7) in effect for the tax years at issue).
MoneyGram is licensed and regulated by the States in which
it does business not as a ‘‘bank’’ but as a ‘‘money trans-
mitter.’’ Check cashing services and issuers of travelers
checks are not commonly understood to be ‘‘banks,’’ and
MoneyGram stands on no stronger footing in this respect. 6
   MoneyGram does not contend that it possesses the essen-
tial characteristics of a bank as that term is commonly
understood. Rather, it contends that this first requirement
does not exist and that section 581 requires only that an
institution accept deposits, make loans, and be regulated by
a banking authority. As discussed previously, this argument
fails as a matter of statutory construction: It renders mean-
ingless the principal clause of the first sentence of section
581, and the argument must be rejected for that reason.
   In any event, the case on which MoneyGram principally
relies—Austin State Bank—does not support its position. The
taxpayer there was ‘‘incorporated as a bank under the laws
of the State of Indiana.’’ Austin State Bank, 57 T.C. at 185.
The taxpayer ‘‘looked like a bank, conducted business like a
bank, and believed it was a bank.’’ Id. at 186. ‘‘That peti-
tioner was a bank,’’ we concluded, ‘‘is not open to serious
question.’’ Id. at 185. Because the taxpayer was plainly a
‘‘bank’’ in the commonly accepted sense of that term, ‘‘[t]he
parties agree[d] * * * that the only part of section 581 whose
application to petitioner * * * [was] doubtful’’ was the stat-
  6 The  mere fact of State supervision does not transform MoneyGram into
a ‘‘bank.’’ MSBs are frequently supervised by the same State authority
that regulates banks; in Idaho, for example, the Department of Finance
regulates banks and money transmitters as well as collection agencies and
cemeteries. See Idaho Code Ann. secs. 26–1101, 27–403 (2014). Being regu-
lated by a State authority ‘‘having supervision over banking institutions’’
may enable MoneyGram to satisfy the third requirement of the section 581
definition. But State regulation, without more, does not make MoneyGram
‘‘a bank or trust company’’ as commonly understood.
16            144 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                     (1)


ute’s second requirement, namely, that ‘‘a substantial part of
* * * [its] business’’ consist of receiving deposits and making
loans. Id. at 186.
   The Commissioner argued in Austin State Bank that the
bank made too few loans and that it accepted too few
deposits from the general public to have these activities
regarded as ‘‘a substantial part’’ of its business. We rejected
that argument and held that the bank satisfied the section
581 definition. See 57 T.C. at 187–188. Because we empha-
sized in Austin State Bank that the taxpayer was a ‘‘bank’’
and hence satisfied this part of the section 581 definition, our
Opinion in that case clearly does not support the proposition
that this first requirement does not exist. Rather, the rea-
soning and holding of Austin State Bank are fully consistent
with the interpretation of the statute enunciated above: An
entity is not ‘‘a bank or trust company incorporated and
doing business’’ under section 581 unless it is a ‘‘bank or
trust company’’ within the ordinary meaning of those words.
Id. at 185.
   In sum, MoneyGram is not chartered as a bank, is not
regulated as a bank, and does not manifest ‘‘the bare req-
uisites’’ for bank status established in Staunton and its
progeny. Because MoneyGram does not display the essential
characteristics of a bank as that term is commonly under-
stood, and because the requirements of section 581 are
conjunctive rather than disjunctive, MoneyGram is not a
‘‘bank’’ for purposes of section 582.
     B. ‘‘Receiving Deposits and Making Loans’’
   The conclusion that MoneyGram is not a ‘‘bank’’ as the
term is commonly understood would suffice for us to grant
respondent’s motion for partial summary judgment. We
will nevertheless consider, for the sake of completeness,
MoneyGram’s ability to satisfy the second requirement of the
section 581 definition, namely, that ‘‘a substantial part’’ of its
business consist of ‘‘receiving deposits and making loans.’’ We
find that receiving deposits and making loans do not con-
stitute any meaningful part of MoneyGram’s business, much
less ‘‘a substantial part.’’ 7
  7 In most or all States MoneyGram appears to be ‘‘subject by law to su-

pervision and examination by State * * * authority having supervision
(1)        MONEYGRAM INT’L, INC. & SUBS. v. COMMISSIONER              17


      1. ‘‘Receiving Deposits’’
   The term ‘‘deposit’’ for purposes of section 581 is not
defined in the statute, the regulations, or the legislative his-
tory. We therefore employ the standard tools of construction
to discern its meaning. The starting point is the statutory
language. Greyhound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc., 437 U.S.
322, 330 (1978). We also ‘‘consider relevant legal authority
and the statute’s purpose and context.’’ Dolan v. USPS, 546
U.S. 481, 486 (2006); Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489
U.S. 803, 809 (1989) (‘‘It is a fundamental canon of statutory
construction that the words of a statute must be read in their
context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme.’’).
   At least since Staunton, courts have held that business
realities, rather than labels, control in determining whether
a bank receives ‘‘deposits’’ within the meaning of section 581
and its predecessors. In Staunton, the entity accepted funds
from the public and, as evidence thereof, issued ‘‘certificates
of investment’’ to its customers. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit concluded that this terminology was employed
to comply with Virginia regulations governing industrial loan
corporations and that the funds held under these ‘‘certificates
of investment’’ were functionally equivalent to bank deposits.
See Staunton, 120 F.2d at 933. In Morris Plan Bank, 125
F.2d at 441, the entity accepted funds from the public and
issued to its customers ‘‘certificates of indebtedness’’ that
were similar to the ‘‘certificates of investment’’ in Staunton.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the
entity was a ‘‘bank’’ under the predecessor to section 581:
‘‘Names are not what control. * * * Realities do. * * * It
issued the certificates of indebtedness in form similar to that
of deposit books used by savings banks.’’ Ibid.
   Under this functional approach, courts have ascertained
whether a bank receives ‘‘deposits’’ by considering the pur-
pose for which customers transfer the funds and the terms
under which the bank holds the funds. The Court of Appeals

over banking institutions.’’ See sec. 581. Respondent contends that
MoneyGram nevertheless fails to satisfy the third requirement of section
581 because it is not regulated by any banking authority as a bank. Since
we conclude that MoneyGram fails to satisfy the first and second require-
ments, we need not decide whether it meets the third requirement.
18           144 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                         (1)


for the Fourth Circuit noted in Staunton, 120 F.2d at 934:
‘‘Strictly speaking the term bank implies a place for the
deposit of money, as that is the most obvious purpose of such
an institution. Originally the business of banking consisted
only in receiving deposits, such as bullion, plate, and the
like, for safe-keeping until the depositor should see fit to
draw it out for use.’’
   Courts following Staunton have repeatedly described
‘‘deposits’’ as funds that customers place in a bank for the
purpose of safekeeping. See Jackson Fin. & Thrift Co. v.
Commissioner, 260 F.2d 578, 582 (10th Cir. 1958), rev’g 29
T.C. 272 (1957); Commissioner v. Valley Morris Plan, 305
F.2d 610, 618 (9th Cir. 1962) (purchase of thrift certificates
was a ‘‘deposit transaction, the money to be kept safely for
the purchaser and to be repaid’’); id. at 623 (‘‘Depositors
place their money in banks primarily for safekeeping.’’), rev’g
in part 33 T.C. 720 (1960) and 33 T.C. 572 (1959); Nat’l Bank
of Commerce v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 769, 772 (1951) (‘‘The
main purpose of a deposit is safekeeping.’’). State courts, as
well as Federal courts, have defined ‘‘deposits’’ in this way.
See, e.g., Appeal of Metro. Life Ins. Co., 164 A. 715, 717 (Pa.
1932) (‘‘The term ‘depositor’ must be understood in its pop-
ular sense, as one who has intrusted money to a bank for
convenient safe-keeping, subject to his control.’’).
   In Staunton, 120 F.2d at 933–934, the Court of Appeals
described deposits as funds that are ‘‘repayable to the
depositor on demand or at a fixed time.’’ In practice, banks
generally hold ‘‘deposits’’ for extended periods:
 In the commercial banking industry, deposit relationships represent the
 most favorable source of funds * * * . Since the ability of a bank to
 attract and retain core deposits is the main factor in the size and scope
 of its business, most banking services are designed to keep and develop
 those deposit relationships. Once a deposit relationship is established, it
 generally will be retained, all things being equal, for a period of time
 with little, if any, need for the bank to engage in further direct mar-
 keting efforts. * * * [AmSouth Bancorp. & Subs. v. United States, 681
 F. Supp. 698, 705 (N.D. Ala. 1988).]

See also S. Bancorporation, Inc. v. Commissioner, 847 F.2d
131 (4th Cir. 1988), aff ’g T.C. Memo. 1986–601.
   The first definition of ‘‘deposit’’ in many dictionaries is
‘‘something placed or entrusted for safekeeping, specif.,
money put in a bank.’’ E.g., Webster’s New World Dictionary
(1)    MONEYGRAM INT’L, INC. & SUBS. v. COMMISSIONER           19


379 (2d coll. ed. 1980). ‘‘On deposit’’ means ‘‘placed or
entrusted for safekeeping.’’ Ibid.; American Heritage Dic-
tionary 487 (5th ed. 2011) (defining ‘‘deposit’’ as a verb to
mean ‘‘[t]o give over or entrust for safe keeping’’ or ‘‘[t]o put
(money) in a bank or financial account’’). In its broadest
sense, ‘‘deposit’’ can mean ‘‘something deposited or left lying,’’
like mineral deposits or volcanic ash. Webster’s New World
Dictionary 379. But construing statutory language is not ‘‘an
exercise in ascertaining ‘the outer limits of [a word’s] defini-
tional possibilities.’ ’’ FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 407
(2011) (quoting Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486). The significance of
a word is derived from its unambiguous meaning in its con-
text, notwithstanding its susceptibility to alternative
meanings in other contexts. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S.
379, 391 (2009). As used in section 581, the term ‘‘deposits’’
plainly refers to deposits of the sort received by banks; it
thus has a specific meaning narrower than its broadest
reach. See Commissioner v. Valley Morris Plan, 305 F.2d at
616 (the term ‘‘deposit’’ has always had ‘‘a meaning of its
own, peculiar to the banking business’’).
   The funds that MoneyGram seeks to characterize as
‘‘deposits’’ are funds that it receives from its agents and
financial institution customers, which it invests temporarily
until money orders and official checks clear through the
banking system. MoneyGram’s public financial statements do
not describe these funds as ‘‘deposits’’; rather, these amounts
are shown on its books as ‘‘payment service obligations.’’
Until 2008 MoneyGram on its Federal tax returns described
its business as ‘‘nondepository credit intermediation,’’ thereby
representing that it does not receive deposits. The forms com-
pleted by MoneyGram’s money order customers explicitly
state that MoneyGram is not receiving ‘‘deposits.’’ As an
MSB, MoneyGram is prohibited by law from receiving actual
‘‘deposits.’’ See 12 U.S.C. sec. 378 (2006).
   Nor do the funds that MoneyGram receives display the
essential features of bank deposits. Customers do not place
funds with MoneyGram for safe keeping, nor does
MoneyGram hold its customers’ funds for extended periods of
time as part of its capital structure. Quite the contrary:
MoneyGram’s customers expect that it will transmit the
funds to the payee instantaneously (in the case of money
transfers) or the moment the payee presents the instrument
20            144 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                          (1)


for payment (in the case of money orders). Except in rare
cases of escheat, money orders typically remain outstanding
for fewer than ten days. MoneyGram has brought to our
attention no bank whose ‘‘deposits’’ turn over this rapidly.
See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Balt., 121 F.2d at 985 (con-
cluding that funds held by trust company as fiscal agent for
favored corporations ‘‘were clearly not the ordinary commer-
cial deposits which banks receive’’). 8
  The same analysis applies to MoneyGram’s ‘‘official check’’
services. Banks provide funds to MoneyGram for the proc-
essing of official checks, not for safekeeping. To open an
account, a ‘‘bank must provide to MoneyGram funds equiva-
lent to the amount of the official checks it estimates it will
issue on an average daily basis.’’ After making its initial
settlement report, the bank must provide to MoneyGram ‘‘the
amount of the official checks it issued the previous day.’’ This
daily process of drawing down and replenishing the account
continues indefinitely for the life of the agreement between
MoneyGram and its customer. MoneyGram accepts these
funds, not to satisfy its customers’ need to protect their own
money from risk of loss, but to protect itself from risk of loss
in the event its customer should default or delay in payment.
This account is essentially a short-term holding tank for
funds in transit, and the funds in it are not ‘‘bank deposits’’
in any sense of the word. 9
  MoneyGram’s business consists of moving its customers’
money from point A to point B as quickly as possible. The
funds it holds pending completion of that service are not
  8 When a customer cancels a transaction or the payee delays in pre-

senting the instrument for payment, MoneyGram may end up holding its
customers’ funds longer than expected. But people patronize MoneyGram
to move money, not to hold it. The fact that the service offered by
MoneyGram sometimes is not completed, or has its completion date de-
ferred, does not transform the service into the receipt of a bank deposit.
  9 Cf. State ex rel. Meyer v. Am. Comty. Stores Corp., 228 N.W.2d 299, 303

(Neb. 1975) (for purposes of State law making it illegal for a nonbank to
receive deposits, an entity engaged only in the electronic transfer of funds
was ‘‘not engaging in either a banking or savings and loan business’’); Ap-
peal of Metro. Life Ins., Co., 164 A. at 717 (for purposes of State insolvency
law guaranteeing preferential payment of ‘‘deposits,’’ trust company hold-
ing mortgage collections as agent for its principal held a ‘‘running account
of the collections made * * * [that had] none of the ordinary incidents of
a deposit’’).
(1)       MONEYGRAM INT’L, INC. & SUBS. v. COMMISSIONER       21


placed with it for safekeeping and are not held for any mean-
ingful period of time. Its money order customers are explic-
itly told that they are not making ‘‘deposits,’’ and these funds
are reflected on its financial statements not as ‘‘deposits’’ but
as ‘‘payment service obligations.’’ Because ‘‘receiving
deposits’’ does not constitute any meaningful part, much less
‘‘a substantial part,’’ of MoneyGram’s business, it does not
qualify as a ‘‘bank’’ under section 581.
      2. ‘‘Making Loans’’
    In order to satisfy the second requirement of the section
581 definition, ‘‘a substantial part’’ of the institution’s busi-
ness must consist not only of ‘‘receiving deposits’’ but also of
‘‘making loans.’’ As with the term ‘‘deposits,’’ we interpret the
term ‘‘loans’’ according to the ordinary meaning of that word.
We also consider relevant legal authority and the statute’s
purpose and context. Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486.
    A ‘‘loan’’ is defined as ‘‘a sum of money lent at interest.’’
Black’s Law Dictionary 1077–1078 (10th ed. 2014). Given the
context in which the phrase ‘‘making loans’’ appears, a ‘‘loan’’
for purposes of section 581 must be made in a form similar
to that of a bank loan. A bank loan is memorialized by a loan
instrument, is repayable with interest, and generally has a
fixed (and often lengthy) repayment period. See, e.g., 11
C.F.R. sec. 100.82 (2008) (‘‘bank loan’’ to a political candidate
or committee does not constitute a political contribution if it
is made in the ordinary course of business, ‘‘[b]ears the usual
and customary interest rate,’’ assures repayment, is evi-
denced ‘‘by a written instrument,’’ and is ‘‘subject to a due
date or amortization schedule’’).
    In Staunton, 120 F.2d at 931, the entity was an ‘‘industrial
loan corporation’’ that made ‘‘loans to any one having accept-
able credit or collateral.’’ Its loans were evidenced by printed
forms of notes signed by the borrower, and the loans were
repaid by the borrower in regular installments. The institu-
tion derived its income exclusively from interest charged on
these loans. The Court of Appeals concluded that the com-
pany was a ‘‘bank’’ because (among other things) it lent
money to third parties on terms consistent with the common
understanding of ‘‘bank loans.’’ Id. at 930, 933.
    The items that MoneyGram seeks to characterize as
‘‘loans’’ consist primarily of amounts due MoneyGram that its
22            144 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS            (1)


agents are permitted to retain temporarily under ‘‘delayed
remittance agreements.’’ Under these agreements, the agents
typically forward to MoneyGram, twice weekly rather than
daily, the cash that agents receive from money order cus-
tomers. The MTA that implements these agreements classi-
fies the agents holding funds for transmission to MoneyGram
as ‘‘trustees,’’ not as borrowers. These items are classified on
MoneyGram’s books not as ‘‘loans’’ but as ‘‘accounts receiv-
able.’’ And whereas banks invariably charge interest on their
loans, MoneyGram does not charge interest on these
accounts receivable except in the unusual circumstance
where the account is past due.
   Most corporations have, among the assets on their balance
sheet, accounts receivable from customers, agents, and other
persons. Any company having accounts receivable must
specify the period within which it expects its customers to
pay such accounts. Some invoices may say that they are pay-
able immediately upon receipt; other invoices may afford the
customer 30 days to pay. MoneyGram’s ‘‘deferred remittance
agreements’’ simply specify the period—generally, half a
week—within which its agents are expected to transmit to
MoneyGram the sums they owe MoneyGram. These agree-
ments do not give rise to ‘‘loans’’ within the meaning of sec-
tion 581, any more than garden variety payment terms speci-
fied by any business give rise to ‘‘loans.’’ Were that not so,
any company that has accounts receivable on its balance
sheet could plausibly contend that it satisfies this require-
ment for ‘‘bank’’ status.
   We conclude that MoneyGram’s ‘‘accounts receivable’’ do
not constitute ‘‘loans’’ within the meaning of section 581.
The supposed loans are an inevitable consequence of
MoneyGram’s business model: Its agents accept cash from
customers and pay that cash to MoneyGram several days
later as previously agreed. This pattern is not unique to
MoneyGram but is the pervasive pattern for all businesses
that sell goods or services and receive deferred payment.
     C. Petitioner’s Arguments
   MoneyGram cites ‘‘policy considerations’’ as support for its
submission that it should be allowed bad debt deductions for
its securities losses. According to MoneyGram, section 582
‘‘recognizes that certain institutions hold securities not for
(1)       MONEYGRAM INT’L, INC. & SUBS. v. COMMISSIONER      23


speculation or profit but because of government regulation
and as part of their ordinary course of doing business.’’
MoneyGram notes that State regulators require it to hold
highly rated securities to protect its customers and that it
was forced to sell its non-REMIC asset-backed securities to
ensure continued compliance with regulatory mandates.
Because it incurred these losses in the ordinary course of its
business, MoneyGram insists that ordinary loss deductions
should follow.
   The question before us is not whether the rule petitioner
advocates reflects sound policy but whether Congress enacted
petitioner’s preferred rule. The answer to the latter question
is certainly ‘‘no.’’ Many businesses may plausibly contend
that they incur investment losses in the ordinary course of
their business. But Congress has determined that such losses
can give rise to bad debt deductions under section 166(a) only
if the business in question is a ‘‘bank.’’
   The legislative history shows that Congress acted delib-
erately in limiting the benefits of section 582 to ‘‘banks’’ as
opposed to other financial institutions. When enacting the
predecessor statute in 1942, Congress explicitly stated that it
intended to limit bad debt deductions for securities losses to
‘‘banks,’’ to the exclusion of life insurance companies, which
had argued for similar treatment. See H.R. Conf. Rept. No.
77–2586, at 45 (1942), 1942–2 C.B. 701, 708. MoneyGram
has offered no policy rationale why MSBs should enjoy better
treatment than life insurance companies. And even if
MoneyGram could enunciate such a rationale, we are bound
by the language of the statute that Congress actually
enacted. See Commissioner v. Lundy, 516 U.S. 235, 252
(1996); Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 250–251 (1926);
Eanes v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 168, 171 (1985).
      D. Conclusion
  MoneyGram does not possess the essential characteristics
of a ‘‘bank’’ as that term is commonly understood, and it does
not have as a substantial part of its business ‘‘receiving
deposits’’ or ‘‘making loans.’’ MoneyGram is not regulated as
a bank or regarded as a bank by any Federal or State bank
regulator. MoneyGram is a ‘‘money services business.’’ As a
consequence of the services it provides, it holds amounts due
from its agents as accounts receivable, and it places in tem-
24         144 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS            (1)


porary investments the funds corresponding to its payment
service obligations. Innumerable MSBs and other financial
institutions act similarly, but this does not make them
‘‘banks.’’
   We think it absolutely clear that Congress never intended
an institution such as MoneyGram to qualify as a ‘‘bank’’
within the meaning of section 581. Because MoneyGram
during 2007 and 2008 was not a ‘‘bank,’’ it was ineligible to
claim bad debt deductions on account of the partial or com-
plete worthlessness of its non-REMIC asset-backed securi-
ties. We will therefore grant respondent’s motion for partial
summary judgment and deny petitioner’s motion.
   In consideration of the foregoing,
                         An appropriate order will be issued.

                       f
