UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DIANNE G. PARKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.                                                                         No. 99-1551

LENS CRAFTERS, INCORPORATED,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Aiken.
Charles E. Simons, Jr., Senior District Judge.
(CA-97-3668-1-6-BD)

Submitted: April 10, 2000

Decided: September 13, 2000

Before MURNAGHAN,* NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

John D. Watkins, WATKINS & WATKINS, P.C., Augusta, Georgia,
for Appellant. Deborah S. Adams, FROST & JACOBS, L.L.P., Cin-
cinnati, Ohio, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________

*Judge Murnaghan was assigned to the panel in this case but died prior
to the time the decision was filed. The decision is filed by a quorum of
the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 46(d).
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Dianne G. Parks sued her employer alleging that she was denied
promotions and pay raises because of her race in violation of 42
U.S.C. S 1981 (1994). The district court, accepting the magistrate
judge's recommendation, granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment on the sole ground that Parks could not proceed under
S 1981 because she was an at-will employee.

After the magistrate judge's recommendation, upon which the dis-
trict court relied, this court held that an at-will employee could prevail
on a S 1981 claim. See Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 165 F.3d
1015, 1018-19 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that at-will employment rela-
tionship is sufficiently contractual to serve as a predicate contract for
purposes of a S 1981 action). Accordingly, we vacate and remand the
district court's opinion because it is inconsistent with this court's
opinion in Spriggs. We do not, however, express any opinion regard-
ing alternative grounds for either granting or denying the employer's
motion for summary judgment.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

VACATED AND REMANDED

                     2
