                         T.C. Memo. 2006-184



                       UNITED STATES TAX COURT



               EDWIN J. DUNBAR, JR., Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 11473-01L.1          Filed August 30, 2006.


     Edwin J. Dunbar, Jr., pro se.

     Alvin A. Ohm, for respondent.



                         MEMORANDUM OPINION


     CHIECHI, Judge:    This case is before the Court on respon-



     1
      The proceedings herein were automatically stayed when
petitioner filed a petition for bankruptcy with the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas on Mar. 5, 2002.
On Mar. 17, 2003, after that bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed,
the Court lifted the automatic stay. The proceedings herein were
automatically stayed again when petitioner filed another petition
for bankruptcy with the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Texas on Aug. 6, 2003. On Sept. 12, 2005, after that
bankruptcy proceeding was discharged, the Court lifted the
automatic stay.
                               - 2 -

dent’s motion for summary judgment (respondent’s motion).2      We

shall grant respondent’s motion.

                             Background

     The record establishes and/or the parties do not dispute the

following.

     Petitioner resided in Euless, Texas, at the time he filed

the petition in this case.

     Petitioner did not file a Federal income tax (tax) return

for any of his taxable years 1992, 1993, and 1994.     Respondent

prepared a substitute for return for each such year.

     On March 17, 1999, respondent issued to petitioner a notice

of deficiency (notice) with respect to his taxable years 1992,

1993, and 1994, which he received.     In that notice, respondent

determined a deficiency in, and an addition to, petitioner’s tax

for each such year, as follows:

                                          Addition to Tax
         Year     Deficiency           Under Sec. 6651(a)(1)3
         1992       $1,369                      $108
         1993        1,369                       312
         1994          994                       223

     Petitioner did not file a petition with the Court with

respect to the notice relating to his taxable years 1992, 1993,



     2
      Although the Court ordered petitioner to file a response to
respondent’s motion, petitioner failed to do so.
     3
      All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect at all relevant times. All Rule references are to the Tax
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
                               - 3 -

and 1994.   Instead, on or about June 5, 1999, in response to the

notice, petitioner sent a letter (petitioner’s June 5, 1999

letter) to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) that contained

statements, contentions, arguments, and/or requests that the

Court finds to be frivolous and/or groundless.4

     On July 19, 1999, respondent assessed petitioner’s tax, as

well as an addition to tax and interest as provided by law, for

each of his taxable years 1992, 1993, and 1994.   (We shall refer

to those unpaid assessed amounts, as well as interest as provided

by law accrued after July 19, 1999, as petitioner’s unpaid

liabilities for 1992, 1993, and 1994.)

     On July 19, 1999, respondent issued to petitioner a notice

of balance due with respect to petitioner’s unpaid liabilities

for 1992, 1993, and 1994, as required by section 6303.    On August

23, 1999, respondent issued a second notice of balance due with

respect to those unpaid liabilities.

     On March 23, 2000, respondent issued to petitioner a final

notice of intent to levy and notice of your right to a hearing

(notice of intent to levy) with respect to (1) petitioner’s

unpaid liabilities for 1992, 1993, and 1994 and (2) a frivolous




     4
      Petitioner’s June 5, 1999 letter is very similar   to the
letters that certain other taxpayers with cases in the   Court sent
to the IRS in response to the notices issued to them.    See, e.g.,
Copeland v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-46; Smith v.   Commis-
sioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-45.
                                - 4 -

return penalty under section 6702 with respect to his taxable

year 1998.

     On or about April 7, 2000, in response to the notice of

intent to levy, petitioner filed Form 12153, Request for a

Collection Due Process Hearing (petitioner’s Form 12153), and

requested a hearing with respondent’s Appeals Office (Appeals

Office).5    Petitioner’s Form 12153 contained statements, conten-

tions, arguments, and/or requests that the Court finds to be

frivolous and/or groundless.6

     On or about August 17, 2000, petitioner sent a letter

(petitioner’s August 17, 2000 letter) to a settlement officer

with respondent’s Appeals Office (settlement officer) in which

petitioner requested certain documents.    That letter contained

requests that the Court finds to be frivolous and/or groundless.7




     5
      The notice of intent to levy did not pertain to peti-
tioner’s taxable year 1996. Nonetheless, petitioner indicated in
petitioner’s Form 12153 that he was requesting a hearing with
respondent’s Appeals Office with respect to that year as well as
his taxable years 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1998.
     6
      Petitioner’s Form 12153 contained statements, contentions,
arguments, and/or requests that are similar to the statements,
contentions, arguments, and/or requests contained in the attach-
ments to Forms 12153 filed with the IRS by certain other taxpay-
ers with cases in the Court. See, e.g., Copeland v. Commis-
sioner, supra; Smith v. Commissioner, supra.
     7
      Petitioner’s August 17, 2000 letter contained requests that
are similar to the requests that certain other taxpayers with
cases in the Court made to the IRS. See, e.g., Copeland v.
Commissioner, supra; Smith v. Commissioner, supra.
                               - 5 -

     On or about August 22, 2000, in response to petitioner’s

August 17, 2000 letter, respondent’s settlement officer sent a

letter to petitioner.   That letter stated in pertinent part:

     Your letter dated August 17, 2000, addressed to IRS
     Appeals for documents and records has been forwarded
     for processing to the IRS North Texas Disclosure Office
     * * *. This is the responsible office for your re-
     quest. * * *

     On or about April 10, 2001, an Appeals officer with respon-

dent’s Appeals Office (Appeals officer) sent petitioner a letter

(Appeals officer’s April 10, 2001 letter).   That letter stated in

pertinent part:

     The District issued a Final Notice of Intent to Levy on
     March 23, 2000 for taxes due for the years ended
     December 31, 1992, 1993 and 1994 and a Civil Penalty
     for the year ended December 3, 1998 [sic]. You re-
     quested a Collection Due Process Hearing on April 7,
     2000. Your case was forwarded to the Dallas Appeals
     Office and was assigned to * * * [respondent’s settle-
     ment officer]. * * * [Respondent’s settlement officer]
     responded to your letter of August 17, 2000 in which
     you requested documents and records and informed you
     that this is the responsibility of the IRS’s Disclosure
     Office.

     Your case has been transferred to me.

        *         *     *        *       *       *       *

     Appeals has jurisdiction in this case to hear relevant
     issues related to unpaid liability, challenges to the
     appropriateness of collection actions, offers of col-
     lection alternatives and challenges to the underlying
     liability.

     On Form 12153, Request for Collection Due Process, you
     listed the year ending December 31, 1996. This year
     was not included on the Final Notice.
                              - 6 -

     Under IRC 6330(c)(2)(B), a taxpayer may not challenge
     the underlying tax liability if the taxpayer received a
     Statutory Notice of Deficiency or otherwise had the
     opportunity to dispute the liability. A Statutory
     Notice was issued for the years 1992, 1993 & 1994 on
     March 17, 1999. In a letter dated June 5, 1999 you
     acknowledged receipt of the Statutory Notice. The
     underlying liability existence or amounts are not
     issues to be discussed during the due process hearing.

     On or about May 5, 2001, in response to the Appeals offi-

cer’s April 10, 2001 letter, petitioner sent a letter (peti-

tioner’s May 5, 2001 letter) to respondent’s Appeals officer.

That letter contained statements, contentions, arguments, and/or

requests that the Court finds to be frivolous and/or groundless.

     On or about May 9, 2001, in response to petitioner’s May 5,

2001 letter, the Appeals officer sent a letter (Appeals officer’s

May 9, 2001 letter) to petitioner.    That letter stated in perti-

nent part:

     In the Reform Act of 1998, Congress enacted Sections
     6320 (Pertaining to Liens) and 6330 (Pertaining to
     Levies) to provide due process protections for taxpay-
     ers in tax collection matters. Sec. 6330 generally
     provides that the Commissioner cannot proceed with the
     collection of taxes by way of levy on a taxpayer’s
     property until the taxpayer has been given notice and
     the opportunity for an administrative review of the
     matter (in the form of an Appeals Office hearing), and
     if dissatisfied, with Judicial review of the adminis-
     trative determination in either the Tax Court or Fed-
     eral District Court. I.R.C. section 6330(d). A hear-
     ing in Appeals is not a court proceeding or a trial.
     It is informal.

     In Davis V. Commissioner, 115 T.C. (July 31, 2000), The
     Court stated that the hearing at the Appeals level have
     historically been conducted in an informal setting.
     Section 601.106(c).
                              - 7 -

     The Court also stated that when Congress enacted sec-
     tion 6330 and required that taxpayers be given an
     opportunity to seek a pre-levy hearing with Appeals,
     Congress was fully aware of the existing nature and
     function of Appeals. Nothing in section 6330 or the
     legislative history suggests that Congress intended to
     alter the nature of an Appeals hearing. The Court
     concluded that Congress contemplated the type of infor-
     mal administrative Appeals hearing that has been his-
     torically conducted by Appeals and prescribed by sec-
     tion 601.106(c).

     As to your request to record the hearing, you are
     welcome to have your tape recorder with you. I will
     also record the hearing. With respect to the informa-
     tion you requested, enclosed is a copy of I.R.C. 63320
     and I.R.C. 6330 and the applicable regulations. Since
     the enactment of the 1998 law, there has been many
     court cases dealing with due process issues. You may
     want to check some of these cases to see what the
     courts opinion is. These cases also refer to the law
     and its implementation. [Reproduced literally.]

     On or about June 13, 2001, in response to the Appeals

officer’s May 9, 2001 letter, petitioner sent a letter (peti-

tioner’s June 13, 2001 letter) to respondent’s Appeals officer.

That letter contained statements, contentions, arguments, and/or

requests that the Court finds to be frivolous and/or groundless.8

     On or about June 29, 2001, in response to petitioner’s June

13, 2001 letter, the Appeals officer sent a letter to petitioner.

That letter stated in pertinent part:




     8
      Petitioner’s June 13, 2001 letter contained statements,
contentions, arguments, and/or requests that are similar to the
statements, contentions, arguments, and/or requests that certain
other taxpayers with cases in the Court made to the IRS. See,
e.g., Copeland v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-46; Smith v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-45.
                                - 8 -

     I will hold a Collection Due Process Hearing, as you
     requested, at the Appeals Office in Dallas, on July 9,
     2001 at 10:00 am. As for the documents you requested,
     please contact Disclosure Office * * *. The Collection
     Due Process Hearing will be conducted based on Collec-
     tion Due Process Procedures under I.R.C. 6320 and 6330
     and the IRS regulations relating to these Code sec-
     tions.

     On July 9, 2001, respondent’s Appeals officer held an

Appeals Office hearing with petitioner with respect to the notice

of intent to levy.   At the Appeals Office hearing, the Appeals

officer gave petitioner, inter alia, a document known as MFTRA-X,

a literal transcript of account with respect to each of his

taxable years 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1998.

     On August 6, 2001, the Appeals Office issued to petitioner a

notice of determination concerning collection actions under

section 6320 and/or 6330 (notice of determination).   That notice

stated in pertinent part:

     Summary of Determination

     The District’s proposed action is appropriate. The tax
     liability and the civil penalty are valid, due and
     outstanding.

An attachment to the notice of determination (attachment to the

notice of determination) stated in pertinent part:

            MATTERS CONSIDERED AT THE APPEALS HEARING

     •    On March 17, 2000, the Small Business/Self-
          Employed Operating Division mailed letter 1058,
          Final Notice of Intent to Levy, to Mr. Dunbar for
          income tax liability outstanding for the tax years
          ended December 31, 1992, 1993 and 1994 and Civil
          Penalty under I.R.C. 6702 for 1998.
                         - 9 -

•    Mr. Dunbar requested a hearing by completing form
     12153 on April 7, 2000. A hearing was held on
     July 9, 2001. He listed the same periods in addi-
     tion to 1996. The year 1996 is not included on
     the Notice and therefore is not subject to a Col-
     lection Due Process Hearing. Notice CP504, Urgent
     Notice, was issued for 1996.

                 History/Years Involved

     *       *       *       *       *       *       *

Mr. Dunbar’s main argument is that there are no re-
quirements for filing federal income tax returns [for
his taxable years 1992, 1993, and 1994] and there are
no requirements to pay federal income tax. These
arguments are invalid. The taxes for 1992, 1993 and
1994 were assessed after a Statutory Notice of Defi-
ciency was issued. The penalty was assessed after he
failed to file a proper income tax return for 1998.

During the hearing, Mr. Dunbar was provided with a copy
of the Statutory Notice of Deficiency and a copy of
MFTRA-X transcript showing the assessments. Under
I.R.C. 6330(c)(2)(B), a taxpayer may not challenge the
underlying tax liability or the amount if the taxpayer
received a Statutory Notice of Deficiency. Mr. Dunbar
did and this was made clear to him in Appeals letter
dated April 10, 2001 and during the hearing.

During the collection due process hearing, Mr. Dunbar
presented the same arguments. Mr. Dunbar wanted to
know if there is a requirement for filing income tax
returns and payment of federal income tax. He wanted
to see Form 1040 and approval of the use of such form.
He wanted the rules and implementing regulations that
govern the hearing and a copy of the volume, date and
page of the federal register in which these rules were
published. A copy of I.R.C. 6320 and 6330 were pro-
vided to Mr. Dunbar along with the Income Tax Regula-
tions for these sections. Mr. Dunbar was not con-
vinced. In one of his letters, Mr. Dunbar wanted a
photograph of the appeals officer and any witnesses
appeals wants to present at the hearing.

On his Form 12153, Request for Collection Due Process
hearing, and during the hearing, Mr. Dunbar stated that
there was no Notice a Demand for payment provided to
                        - 10 -

him. He was informed that the transcript indicates
that such notices were issued. These notices are
issued within (10) days from assessment. Mr. Dunbar
wanted to know if IRS personnel have the authority to
issue notices and adjust income tax returns? He wanted
copies of delegation orders and authorization from the
Secretary.

Our system of taxation is dependent on taxpayers’
belief that the laws they follow apply to everyone.
The courts have consistently upheld the constitutional-
ity of the federal income tax. See Schiff v. Commis-
sioner, T.C.M. 1984-223, aff’d, 751 F.2d 116(2nd Cir.
1984).

Appeals cannot consider arguments dealing with the
legality of the federal tax law.

Whether an individual is liable for income tax is
determined under Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue
Code (the Code), Chapter 1, Subchapter A- Determination
of Tax Liability. Part I, Section 1, imposes a tax on
the taxable income of every individual. Whether an
individual has taxable income is determined under
Chapter 1, Subchapter B- Computation of Taxable Income.

Part I, Section 63, defines “taxable income”, gener-
ally, as gross income minus the deductions allowed by
Chapter 1.

The current federal tax law enacted by Congress is the
Code. Section 6001 and 6011 of the Code provide, in
pertinent part, that every person liable for any tax
imposed by the Code shall make a return. Section 6012
of the Code provides that a federal income tax return
shall be made by every individual whose gross income
equals or exceeds certain amounts. “Shall” as used in
Sections 6001, 6011 and 6012 means “must”; “must” means
to be required to. Who is required by the Code to file
a return is explained in the instructions for Form 1040
under the heading “Filing Requirements”.

Section 6001 of the Code states that every person
liable for a tax imposed by the Code shall make returns
and comply with such rules and regulations as the
Secretary of the Treasury may from time to time pre-
scribe. Section 1.6012(a)(6) of the Income Tax Regula-
tions states that Form 1040 is prescribed for general
                        - 11 -

use in making the return required under Section 6012 of
the Code.

During the hearing, this was explained to Mr. Dunbar
and he was provided with a summary of Code sections and
applicable regulations dealing with imposition of tax
and the requirement for filing income tax returns.

Collection issued its Final Notice of Intent to Levy
and filed its NFTL based on valid and outstanding tax
liability and Mr. Dunbar was provided with the right to
request a hearing.

Collection Due Process Hearing:

This Appeals Officer has never dealt with Mr. Dunbar
before on any matter.

     1.   APPLICABLE LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

We have closely reviewed the administrative file and
the other appropriate records of the Internal Revenue
Service (Audit files, transcripts, assessments made and
payments credited and actions by the Collection Divi-
sion). We have made inquires to the Secretary regard-
ing the issues raised during the hearing and the Secre-
tary furnished us with their position on these matters.
The tax liability is valid. A Final Notice of Intent
to levy was issued based on an outstanding liability
and Mr. Dunbar was provided with the right to request a
hearing. His request was timely and a hearing was held
on July 9, 2001.

The Final Notice issued is based on a valid and out-
standing tax liability for 1992, 1993 and 1994 * * *.
Mr. Dunbar was provided with his right to request a
hearing. A Collection Due Process Hearing was held at
the Dallas Appeals Office.

Our determination is that the Secretary has complied
with the applicable law and administrative procedures
with respect to the periods included in the Secretary’s
notice.
                        - 12 -

     2.   RELEVANT ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE TAXPAYER

The arguments presented during the hearing dealt with
the legality of federal income tax. Mr. Dunbar’s
position is that there are no requirements for filing
income tax returns or payment of federal income tax
liability. He filed income tax returns with $0 entries
for all items on such returns except for taxes with-
held.

During the hearing Mr. Dunbar presented no valid argu-
ments and no valid alternatives. Mr. Dunbar was told
that Appeals couldn’t consider arguments dealing with
the legality of the federal tax law. A letter was
mailed to Mr. Dunbar on July 9, 2001 confirming discus-
sions during the hearing. Based on Mr. Dunbar’s re-
quest he audio recorded the hearing.

     3.   Spousal Defenses not an issue in this case.

This was not presented as an issue in this case.

     4.   Challenges made to the appropriateness of the
          collection action

The liability is due and outstanding. Mr. Dunbar
argued the legality of the federal tax law and not the
amounts.

Matters that are well established in law and precedent
concerning the legality of income tax do not require
discussion. The courts have consistently upheld the
constitutionality of the federal income tax.

In Pierson v. Commissioner, 115   T.C. No. 39 (Dec. 14,
2000), the taxpayer argued that   he had no income sub-
ject to tax, and Appeals issued   a Notice of Determina-
tion. The Tax Court found this    position groundless.

Since the liability was not paid and Mr. Dunbar contin-
ues to present invalid arguments dealing with the
legality of the tax law and provided no valid alterna-
tives, the collection action proposed is appropriate.
                               - 13 -

            5.   Collection Alternatives offered by the Tax-
                 payer

     During the hearing, Installment Agreements and Offer in
     Compromise Procedures were discussed. A taxpayer may
     request an Installment Agreement or an Offer to be
     considered for payment of an outstanding tax liability.
     However, these can only be considered when a taxpayer
     is in compliance with tax law. Mr. Dunbar is not in
     compliance and he did not complete the financial infor-
     mation forms requested. Mr. Dunbar provided no valid
     alternatives.

            6.   Whether the collection action represents a
                 balance between the need for the efficient
                 collection of taxes and the legitimate con-
                 cern that such action be no more intrusive
                 than necessary for collection of taxes due.

     The action proposed does balance the need for efficient
     collection of taxes due and Mr. Dunbar’s concern that
     it be no more intrusive than necessary. Mr. Dunbar
     argued the legality of the tax law. He filed income
     tax returns with $0 entries on all items except for
     income taxes withheld. Under such circumstances, the
     District’s action is necessary to protect the Govern-
     ment interest and it is appropriate. Mr. Dunbar is not
     in compliance with filing requirements. [Reproduced
     literally.]

     In response to the notice of determination, the Court

received a letter from petitioner that the Court had filed as a

“Petition for Lien or Levy Action Under Code Section 6320(c) or

6330(d)”.    On January 10, 2002, as ordered by the Court, peti-

tioner filed with the Court an amended petition for lien or levy

action under section 6320(c) or 6330(d) (amended petition).

     On March 2, 2006, the Court issued an Order (Court’s March

2, 2006 Order) in which, inter alia, the Court indicated that

petitioner’s pleadings contained statements, contentions, and
                               - 14 -

arguments that the Court found to be frivolous and groundless.9

In that Order, the Court reminded petitioner about section

6673(a)(1) and admonished him as follows:

     In the event that petitioner continues to advance
     frivolous and/or groundless statements, contentions,
     and arguments, the Court will be inclined to impose a
     penalty not in excess of $25,000 on petitioner under
     section 6673(a)(1), I.R.C.

     On March 17, 2006, the Court received from petitioner a

pretrial memorandum (petitioner’s pretrial memorandum) that the

Court had filed as of that date.    Petitioner’s pretrial memoran-

dum contained (1) certain statements, contentions, arguments,

and/or requests that, although stated somewhat differently, are

very similar to certain statements, contentions, arguments,

and/or requests that petitioner previously advanced and

(2) certain additional statements, contentions, arguments, and/or

requests that petitioner did not previously advance and that the

Court finds to be frivolous and/or groundless.

                              Discussion

Jurisdictional Matter

     The Court does not have jurisdiction over a frivolous return

penalty under section 6702.    Van Es v. Commissioner, 115 T.C.



     9
      The frivolous and/or groundless statements, contentions,
and/or arguments in petitioner’s amended petition are very
similar to the frivolous and/or groundless statements, conten-
tions, and/or arguments in the petitions filed with the Court by
certain other taxpayers. See, e.g., Copeland v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2003-46; Smith v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-45.
                              - 15 -

324, 328-329 (2000).   The Court will sua sponte dismiss this case

for lack of jurisdiction insofar as the amended petition seeks

review of the notice of determination as it relates to a frivo-

lous return penalty under section 6702 with respect to peti-

tioner’s taxable year 1998.

Respondent’s Motion

     The Court may grant summary judgment where there is no

genuine issue of material fact and a decision may be rendered as

a matter of law.   Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner,

98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994).    We

conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact

regarding the questions raised in respondent’s motion.

     Petitioner did not file a petition with the Court with

respect to the notice of deficiency that respondent issued to him

relating to his taxable years 1992, 1993, and 1994.   Where, as is

the case here, the validity of the underlying tax liability is

not properly placed at issue, the Court will review the determi-

nation of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for abuse of

discretion.   Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610-611 (2000);

Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000).

     Based upon our examination of the entire record before us,

we find that respondent did not abuse respondent’s discretion in

determining to proceed with the collection action as determined
                               - 16 -

in the notice of determination with respect to petitioner’s

taxable years 1992, 1993, and 1994.

     Although respondent does not ask the Court to impose a

penalty on petitioner under section 6673(a)(1), we now consider

sua sponte whether the Court should impose a penalty on peti-

tioner under that section.   Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes the

Court to require a taxpayer to pay a penalty to the United States

in an amount not to exceed $25,000 whenever it appears that a

taxpayer instituted or maintained a proceeding in the Court

primarily for delay or that a taxpayer’s position in such a

proceeding is frivolous or groundless.

     In the Court’s March 2, 2006 Order, the Court, inter alia,

indicated that petitioner’s pleadings contained statements,

contentions, and arguments that the Court found to be frivolous

and groundless.   In that Order, the Court reminded petitioner

about section 6673(a)(1) and admonished him that, in the event he

continued to advance frivolous and/or groundless statements,

contentions, and arguments, the Court would be inclined to impose

a penalty not in excess of $25,000 on him under section

6673(a)(1).10   Despite the admonitions in that Order, on March

17, 2006, the Court received from petitioner and had filed as of


     10
      Before petitioner commenced the instant proceedings,
respondent informed petitioner in the attachment to the notice of
determination that in Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576
(2000), “the taxpayer argued that he had no income subject to tax
* * *. The Tax Court found this position groundless.”
                               - 17 -

that date petitioner’s pretrial memorandum that contained state-

ments, contentions, arguments, and/or requests that the Court

finds to be frivolous and/or groundless.

     In the instant case, petitioner advances, we believe primar-

ily for delay, frivolous and/or groundless statements, conten-

tions, arguments, and/or requests, thereby causing the Court to

waste its limited resources.     We shall impose a penalty on

petitioner pursuant to section 6673(a)(1) in the amount of

$1,000.

     We have considered all of petitioner’s statements, conten-

tions, arguments, and/or requests that are not discussed herein,

and, to the extent we have not found them to be frivolous and/or

groundless, we find them to be without merit and/or irrelevant.

     On the record before us, we shall grant respondent’s motion.

     To reflect the foregoing,

                                      An appropriate order and

                                 decision will be entered.
