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             KORTNER v. MARTISE—THIRD CONCURRENCE

  VERTEFEUILLE, J., concurring and dissenting. I
agree with and join in part I of the majority opinion,
which concludes that the plaintiff, Mary H. Kortner,
acquired standing to bring this action after she was
substituted as the administratrix of the estate of her
daughter, Caroline Kendall Kortner, pursuant to Gen-
eral Statutes § 52-109. I further agree with and join in
part III of the majority opinion, which concludes that
the issue of Caroline Kendall Kortner’s capacity to con-
sent to sexual conduct with the defendant, Craig L.
Martise, was a question of fact properly submitted to
the jury.
   I also agree with and join the reasoning and conclu-
sion of part II of the concurring and dissenting opinion
by Justice McDonald that despite the plaintiff’s waiver
of any objection to the submission of plaintiff’s exhibit
71 as a full exhibit to the jury, the subsequent failure
of the court clerk to bring to the trial court the jury’s
written note questioning the propriety of its consider-
ation of plaintiff’s exhibit 7, together with the conces-
sion in this court by the defendant’s counsel that it
should not have been submitted to the jury, rendered
the admission of plaintiff’s exhibit 7 improper. I further
agree with Justice McDonald that we should neverthe-
less affirm the judgment of the trial court because, on
the record as a whole, the admission of plaintiff’s
exhibit 7 was harmless and the trial court properly
denied the motion to set aside the verdict and for a
new trial.
     I therefore respectfully concur and dissent.
 1
     See part II of the majority opinion for the text of plaintiff’s exhibit 7.
