                  T.C. Summary Opinion 2004-171



                     UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                 HILARY HARRY SAX, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 8363-03S.              Filed December 20, 2004.


     Hilary Harry Sax, pro se.

     Mindy S. Meigs, for respondent.



     PAJAK, Special Trial Judge: This case was heard pursuant to

the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in

effect at the time the petition was filed.   The decision to be

entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion

should not be cited as authority.   Unless otherwise indicated,

subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in

effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the
                               - 2 -

Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

     Respondent determined a deficiency in petitioner’s 1999

Federal income tax in the amount of $8,788 and a penalty under

section 6662(a) in the amount of $1,755.60.

     Petitioner conceded that he (1) received long-term capital

gain income in the amount of $1,154 in 1999, (2) received $11,154

from Social Security, (3) received interest income in the amount

of $155 in 1999, (4) is liable for an addition to tax for 1999

pursuant to section 6651(a)(1) and (5) is liable for a penalty

under section 6662(a).   After concessions by petitioner, this

Court must decide whether petitioner is entitled to a deduction

for expenses from Schedule C, Profit or Loss From Business, in

the amount of $28,780.

     Some of the facts in this case have been stipulated and are

so found.   Petitioner resided in Los Angeles, California, at the

time he filed his petition.

     Petitioner is 86 years old, is an attorney, and is currently

an active member of the State Bar of California.   Petitioner

graduated from Harvard Law School in 1944.    He has been engaged

in the practice of law for 60 years.

     In 1999, petitioner was a lawyer operating as a sole

proprietor.   On occasion, he used the Sax-Brook Structural

Building Systems, Inc. (Sax Brook) name for his own purposes.
                               - 3 -

     Petitioner requested an extension of time to file a Form

1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (return), for 1999 which

extension was approved to August 15, 2000.    On January 16, 2001,

petitioner untimely filed his return for 1999, attaching the

relevant Schedule C.   Petitioner prepared the return himself.    He

admitted it was a mistake to use the Sax-Brook name on his

Schedule C because Sax-Brook was inactive in 1999 and remained

inactive until the time of trial.   Petitioner claimed his

business activities in 1999 were those of a lawyer.

     Section 7491 does not apply in this case because petitioner

did not meet the substantiation requirements.

     Petitioner received payments in the amount of $11,154 from

the Social Security Administration in 1999.    Petitioner failed to

include any portion of these payments on his 1999 return.

     Petitioner was the president of Sax-Brook from 1994 to date

of trial.   On September 9, 1994, petitioner and a business

associate, Mr. Robert L. Timbrook, organized the Sax-Brook

corporation.

     Sax-Brook was created in order to manufacture and sell

building panels that could be used in new home construction.     Mr.

Timbrook had invented a panel made of inexpensive materials to be

used in the construction of houses.    Because the inexpensive

materials would replace lumber, including plywood, used in

building a house, it was projected to be cost-effective.
                               - 4 -

Unfortunately, because the materials did not fit under the

requirements of building codes, petitioner could not sell the

idea to investors.   The cost of getting building codes revised

was prohibitive.

     During 1999, petitioner wrote letters to individuals and

entities in an attempt to cover the costs of obtaining building

permits to build houses and to secure investors in order to begin

manufacturing the building panels.

     During 1999, Sax-Brook did not pay any employees or officers

to perform services for the business.     Petitioner was not

reimbursed by Sax-Brook for any expenses incurred by him in

connection with the corporation during 1999.     Sax-Brook did not

file a corporate income tax return with respect to 1999 with the

Internal Revenue Service.

     Respondent in the notice of deficiency, among other things,

disallowed petitioner’s Schedule C deductions in full.

Respondent determined that petitioner did not establish that the

Schedule C expenses were ordinary and necessary business expenses

and that he did not substantiate the expenses.

     Section 162(a) allows a deduction for all the ordinary and

necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in

carrying on any trade or business.     To be deductible as a

business expense, the expenditure must relate to activities which

constitute the current carrying on of an existing trade or
                               - 5 -

business.   Corbett v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 884, 887 (1971).

Whether activities carried on by an individual can be

characterized as a trade or business is a question of fact.       Id.

at 887.   Petitioner has the burden of proof.   Rule 142(a); Welch

v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).

     Deductions are strictly a matter of legislative grace.

INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); New

Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).

Taxpayers must substantiate claimed deductions.     Hradesky v.

Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89 (1975), affd. per curium 540 F.2d

821 (5th Cir. 1976).   Moreover, taxpayers must keep sufficient

records to establish the amounts of the deductions.     Meneguzzo v.

Commissioner, 43 T.C. 824, 831 (1965); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income

Tax Regs.   Generally, except as otherwise provided by section

274(d), when evidence shows that a taxpayer incurred a deductible

expense, but the exact amount cannot be determined, the Court may

approximate the amount, bearing heavily if it chooses against the

taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his own making.     Cohan v.

Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930).    The Court,

however, must have some basis upon which an estimate can be made.

Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743 (1985).    There are

strict substantiation requirements under section 274(d) for items

such as travel expenses and meals.

     Respondent stated that up to the date of trial, petitioner
                                - 6 -

provided no substantiation.   At trial, petitioner offered no

substantiation for any of the deductions.      Petitioner did not

have any books, records, receipts, or other documents to

substantiate expenses claimed on his Schedule C.      Petitioner also

candidly admitted that “We didn’t build anything in 1999" and

that we were “unable to raise the money to do business.”

     Petitioner acknowledged that he did not maintain a separate

bank account to pay expenses.   He did not maintain a business

office.   He operated out of his own apartment.     He had no

business records, no books, no checks, and no receipts.        When

asked about these, he replied “No I did not keep them.”

     We conclude that petitioner did not prove that the claimed

deductions were his ordinary and necessary business expenses.         We

further conclude that petitioner failed to substantiate any

Schedule C expenses claimed as deductions in 1999.        For these

reasons, the Schedule C expenses are disallowed in full.

     Contentions we have not addressed are irrelevant, moot, or

without merit.

     Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Case

Division.

                                             Decision will be entered

                                        for respondent.
