UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)
GARDNER BRADLEY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)

v. ) Civil Action No. 12-0080 (RJL)
)
UNITED STATES PAROLE )
COMMISSION, et al., )

) F I L E D
Defendants. )

JAN l 7 2013
Clerk, U.S. District & Bankruptcy
MEMORANDUM PINION Courts for the District of Columbia

January __[_G;, 2013
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
[Dkt. #l l].l For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be granted
I. BACKGROUND
In the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, plaintiff was convicted of
assault on a police officer and destruction of property. See Defs.’ Corrected Mot. for
Summ. J. [Dkt. #12] ("Defs.’ Mot."), Attach. l (Sentencing Monitoring Computation
Data as of 12-15-2010). On completion of his prison term, on or about February 1, 2011,
plaintiff began to serve a five-year term of supervised release under the supervision of the
Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency ("CSOSA"). See Compl. at l-2 [Dl<t.

#4] (page numbers designated by ECF); Defs.’ Mot., Attach. 5 (Certificate of Supervised

l Plaintiff’s motion for judgment and for appointment of counsel [Dkt. #17] will be
denied as moot.

Release dated january ll, 201 l). Based on a 1988 conviction in South Carolina for
sexual misconduct with a minor, see Compl., Ex. (Sex Offender Registration
Information), the United States Parole Commission ("USPC") imposed the following

special condition:

[Y]ou shall be subject to the Special Sex Offender Aftercare
Condition. You shall participate in an in-patient or out-
patient mental health program as directed by your
Supervision Officer, with special emphasis on long-term sex
offender testing and treatment. You are expected to
acknowledge your need for treatment and to participate in
good faith in achieving the program goals that will be
established for you.

Ia'., Ex. (excerpt from Certificate of Supervised Release).
Details of the South Carolina conviction came to the attention of Anthony Hinton,

plaintiff’s Community Supervision Officer ("CSO"):

An investigation into [plaintiff’ s] criminal history reflects that
in l989 he was convicted of Second Degree Criminal
Conduct with a Minor. This officer . . . contacted the South
Carolina Department of Probation and Parole and requested
information relative to the sex offense committed by
[plaintiff]. The information was forwarded . . . by email. lt is
to be noted that the victim of the offense was [plaintiff’s] 12
year old cousin. [Plaintiff] fondled the victim and placed her
mouth on his penis. The Presentence Report from the South
Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon
Services, along with other documents [were made available
for the USPC’s] review. lt is of significance to note that
[plaintiff] has been required to register as a sex offender
under DC law.

Defs.’ Mot., Attach. 6 (Letter from Anthony Hinton, CSO, CSOSA, to Rhonda Moore,

Case Analyst, USPC, dated May 5, 201 l) at l; see id. (Presentence Investigation Report

prepared by Youthful Offender Services Branch of the South Carolina Department of
Probation, Parole and Pardon Services dated January ll, 1989). Based on this
information, CSO Hinton recommended that the conditions of plaintiffs supervised

release be modified to include the following:

No contact with minors . . . without the Approval of your
Community Supervision Off`icer.

Id., Attach. 6 (May 5, 20ll Letter from Hinton to Moore) at l. Plaintiff was notified of
the proposed modif`1cation. Over plaintiffs objection, see ia'., Attach. 7 (Modification of

Release Conditions) at 2, the USPC approved the following modif`1cation:

You shall have no contact with any child under age l8,
including your own children and step-children, except with
the prior written approval of your [CSO]. This prohibition
includes any volunteer work or employment in which you
would have contact with children under age l8. You shall
provide your [CSO] with the name, address, and phone
number of any person whom you date or with whom you
socialize, if the person is responsible for the care of a child
under age l8. You shall immediately report any unauthorized
contact with a child under 18 to your [CSO], but in no event
later than 24 hours from the contact.

[a’., Attach. 8 (Notice of Action dated June l3, 201 l) at l.

Plaintiff reportedly refused to participate in sex offender treatment. See generally
id., Attach. 9 (Alleged Violation(s) Report dated November l, 201 l) at 2. He chose to
discharge himself from two treatment programs in 201 l. See ia’., Attach. 9 at 3. Plaintiff
"was . . . referred to The Center for Clinical and Forensic Services incorporated (CCFS)

for a psychosexual risk assessment to determine his risk for continued criminal sexual

behavior and his need for sex offender treatment." Id. Although plaintiff purportedly
began the assessment phase, he refused to sign forms required for his continued
participation. Id. CSO Hinton concluded that plaintiff "poses a potential risk to
community safety based on his criminal history that includes a sex offense against a
minor," and thus recommended a Reprimand and Sanctions Hearing. Id. at 4.

The hearing took place on November 30, 2011, at which time plaintiff was ordered to
"undergo a psychosexual risk assessment to determine whether [he is] a candidate for sex
offender treatment." Compl., Ex. (USPC Reprimand and Sanctions Hearing dated
November 30, 201 l).

Plaintiff subsequently explained that he has participated in a sex offender assessment
interview and has undergone and passed a sexual history polygraph test. Objection to
Summ. J. Filed by the U.S. Attorney Office for District of Columbia [Dkt. #14] at 4. He
represented that he has been excused from further assessment interviews, z'd., and that
neither the USPC nor CSOSA "is currently . . . requiring [him] to undergo any sex
offender treatment" notwithstanding the conditions set forth in the January 11, 2011
Certificate of Supervised Release. Pet. for a Judgment of the Legal Controversy Being
Moot or a Pleading for the Appointment of Counsel by the Court [Dkt. #17] at 2.

1l. DlSCUSSlON

A. Summary Judgrnent Under Rule 56 of the F ederal Rules of C z'vil Procedure

The Court grants summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one "that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law,” and further, a court will consider a dispute as genuine if "the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party."
Anderson v. Liberzy Lobby, [nc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (l986). A party opposing summary
judgment "is obligated to produce affirmative evidence supporting the challenged aspects
of his claims by affidavit or other competent evidence." Mulhern v. Gates, 525 F. Supp.
2d 174, 186 (D.D.C. 2007). He must "do more than simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Imz’us. C0. v. Zem`th Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), and he cannot create a genuine dispute by relying on
conclusory assertions without any factual basis in the record. See Ass ’n of F light

AtIena’anz‘s-CWA v. U.S. Dep ’t ofTransp., 564 F.3d 462, 465-66 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

B. T/ze USPC ls Authorizea' 10 Impose and Modz'jj) Conditions of Supervised Release

Plaintiff does not dispute the fact of his South Carolina conviction. However, he
erroneously "believes that [the USPC] is abusing its authority" by imposing conditions on
the terms of his supervised release based on a 24-year old conviction. Compl. at 3. He
noted that the Superior Court did not include or authorize sex offender treatment as a part
of his criminal sentence. See z`d. And because the offenses of conviction are not sex
offenses, and absent a designation by the Superior Court that he is a sexual psychopath,

plaintiff has objected to long-term sex offender treatment. See z'd. at 2-3.

The USPC has jurisdiction over an offender serving a term of supervised release
imposed by the Superior Court.z D.C. Code § 24-133(c)(2) (providing that supervised
releasees are under CSOSA supervision and are "subject to the authority of the [USPC]
until completion of the term of supervised release"); z`cl. § 24-403.01(b)(6) ("Offenders on
supervised release shall be subject to the authority of the [USPC] until completion of the
term of supervised release."); see Foster v. Waz'nwrz'ght, 820 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38-39
(D.D.C. 201 l). lt may impose, modify or add to conditions of supervised release. See,
e.g., Taylor v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 860 F. Supp. 2d 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2012); Denson v.
United States, 918 A.2d 1193, 1195 (D.C. 2006); see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.204, 2.2l8(a).
Furthermore, the USPC’s administrative authority over the execution of a sentence, see
Maa’a’ox v. Elzz'e, 238 F.3d 437, 445 (D.C. Cir. 2001), and its exercise of such authority in
no way usurps the authority of the Superior Court. See, e.g., Smallwood v. U.S. Parole
Comm’n, 777 F. Supp. 2d 148, 150 (D.D.C. 2011).

In short, the USPC had the authority to impose and to modify the conditions of
plaintiff s supervised release.

I11. CONCLUSION
There is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, and plaintiff has not

countered the USPC’s showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2 Supervised release is considered the functional equivalent of parole. See Ana’erson v.
U.S. Parole Comm ’n, No. 10-1451, 2010 WL 5185832, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2010)
("For most purposes, supervised release is the functional equivalent of parole and the law
pertaining to the revocation of parole is applicable to the revocation of supervised
release.") (citations omitted); see also Jones v. Um`tea’ States, 669 A.2d 724, 727 (D.C.
1995) ("A supervised release revocation hearing is the functional equivalent of a
probation or parole revocation hearing.”).

Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment for defendant. An Order is issued

separately.

RIC J. LEON
United States District Judge

