                                 ORIGINAL
       3Jn tbe Wniteb ~tates <!Court of jfeberal q[laims
                                     No. 16-703C
                                (Filed July 18, 2016)
                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION

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                                         *
                                         *
OLIVER-VAUGHN DOUCE     *
AL-DEY,                 *
                        *
             Plaintiff, *
         v.             *
                        *
THE UNITED STATES,      *
                        *
             Defendant. *
                        *
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                                        ORDER

       On June 20, 2016, the Court issued an order sua sponte dismissing this case
because the United States Court of Federal Claims does not have jurisdiction over
its subject matter. Eight days after judgment was entered, the Clerk's office
received from Oliver-Vaughn Douce Al-Dey what purports to be a motion for leave
to amend the complaint under Rule 15 of the Rules of the United States Court of
Federal Claims (RCFC). Accompanying this motion is a copy of the proposed
amended complaint.

      The basis for the motion appears to be Mr. Douce Al-Dey's desire to provide a
more definite statement of his claim under RCFC 12(e). As his case has been
dismissed, a motion to amend the complaint would not be proper. Taking into
consideration that plaintiff is representing himself, and noting that the motion does
include the word "reconsider," the Court will treat the document as a motion for
reconsideration under RCFC 59, and the Clerk shall file it accordingly.

       A review of the proposed amended complaint reveals that plaintiff has added
no allegations that would place his case within our court's subject matter
jurisdiction. His dispute is with New York City officials and their contractors who
apparently towed his car. Calling the responsible parties "municipal entity agents
for U.S.A.," Prop. Am. Compl. ii 8, does not make them so, and the allegation that
the United States government is "in charge of" the City, id. ii 9, is legally incorrect.
See Gharb v. United States, No. 12-911C, 2013 WL 4828589, at *6 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 9,
2013) (citing Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 751 (2002)).
As the Court explained in the previous order, we cannot hear cases concerning the
actions of state or local government officials and their agents. See Vlahakis v.
United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 1018, 1018 (1978); Clark v. United States, No. 11-lOC,
2014 WL 3728172, at *9 (Fed. Cl. July 28, 2014). The allegation that the United
States is holding plaintiff's stolen property, Prop. Am. Compl. ~ 11, appears to be
based on nothing more than plaintiff's mistaken belief that the federal and
municipal governments are one and the same, see Compl. ~ 11. And plaintiff's
citation to Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172 (1985), see Prop. Am. Compl. ~ 10, while in some regards
commendable considering his prose status, is irrelevant, as that case concerns the
procedures for ripening a takings claim to be brought in a U.S. district court. The
U.S. Court of Federal Claims is not a district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 171.

       In sum, plaintiff has provided no valid ground for reconsidering the dismissal
of his case. The motion is accordingly DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.




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