                        T.C. Memo. 2010-103



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



          THE RINGGOLD TELEPHONE COMPANY, Petitioner v.
           COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 22783-07.              Filed May 10, 2010.



     Timothy J. Peaden and Timothy L. Fallaw II, for petitioner.

     Eric B. Jorgensen and James C. Lanning, Jr., for respondent.



             MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION


     WELLS, Judge:   Respondent determined a deficiency of

$925,260 in petitioner’s Federal income tax for tax year 2000 and

a penalty under section 6662(a)1 of $185,052.   The issues to be


     1
      Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the year in issue, and
all subchapter references are to ch. 1 of that Code. All Rule
                                                   (continued...)
                               - 2 -

decided are:   (1) For purposes of determining built-in gain under

section 1374, whether the fair market value of a partnership

interest petitioner owned as of January 1, 2000, was $2,980,000,

as petitioner contends, or $5,220,423, as respondent contends,

and (2) whether petitioner is liable for the accuracy-related

penalty respondent determined pursuant to section 6662.

                         FINDINGS OF FACT

     Some of the facts and certain exhibits have been stipulated.

The stipulations of fact are incorporated in this opinion by

reference and are found as facts.   Petitioner was a Georgia

corporation at the time the petition was filed.

     Petitioner provides telecommunications services to customers

in Georgia and Tennessee.

     Before tax year 2000, petitioner was taxed as a C

corporation for Federal income tax purposes.   Petitioner made a

valid election to be classified as an S corporation for Federal

income tax purposes effective January 1, 2000.

Petitioner’s Interest in CRC and CHAT

     On January 1, 2000, petitioner owned a 25-percent

partnership interest in Cellular Radio of Chattanooga (CRC)

(hereinafter we will refer to petitioner’s partnership interest

in CRC as the CRC interest).   As of January 1, 2000, the other



     1
      (...continued)
references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
                                - 3 -

partners in CRC, each with a 25-percent interest, were BellSouth

Mobility, Inc. (BellSouth), Trenton Telephone Co., and Bledsoe

Telephone Co.

      As of January 1, 2000, CRC’s primary asset was a 29.54-

percent limited partnership interest in the Chattanooga MSA

Limited Partnership (CHAT), which provided wireless

telecommunications service in Chattanooga, Tennessee.

      Before September 30, 2000, CHAT’s general partner was

Chattanooga CGSA, Inc.    Effective October 1, 2000, CHAT’s general

partner was Chattanooga CGSA, L.L.C.    Both of the successive

general partners were, at all times relevant to this proceeding,

wholly owned by BellSouth, and hereinafter they collectively are

referred to as Chattanooga CGSA.   As the only general partner of

CHAT, Chattanooga CGSA was the only partner with the authority to

request additional capital contributions and make distributions

of partnership profits.

      From January 1 through November 27, 2000, CHAT was owned as

follows:

                                Ownership Interest (percentage)
                                General      Limited
        Partnership           partnership partnership     Total
Chattanooga CGSA                   40         15.31       55.31
Alltel Cellular
  Associates of
  South Carolina Limited
  Partnership                                 15.15       15.15
CRC                                           29.54       29.54
                                - 4 -

     At all times between January 1 and November 27, 2000,

petitioner indirectly owned a 7.385-percent interest in CHAT as a

result of petitioner’s 25-percent partnership interest in CRC and

CRC’s 29.54-percent limited partnership interest in CHAT.

     BellSouth acquired petitioner’s 25-percent interest in CRC

on November 27, 2000.    Before that date, BellSouth owned 62.7

percent of CHAT--7.385 percent through its interest in CRC and

55.31 percent through its ownership of Chattanooga CGSA.    Through

its ownership of Chattanooga CGSA, BellSouth controlled CHAT.

     The interests of petitioner and BellSouth in CHAT by virtue

of their ownership of interests in CRC and Chattanooga CGSA

before November 27, 2000, were are as follows:

                      Ownership interest (percentage)
                 CHAT via
             Chattanooga CGSA     CHAT via CRC     CHAT total
BellSouth          55.31                7.385          62.695
Petitioner              --              7.385           7.385

     On January 1, 2000, CRC interests were not publicly traded,

and petitioner’s right to sell its 25-percent interest in CRC was

subject to a right of first refusal in favor of the other CRC

partners.

     On January 1, 2000, partnership interests in CHAT were not

publicly traded.
                                - 5 -

Reporting of Built-In Gain on the Sale of the CRC Interest

     On September 30, 1999, at petitioner’s request, the

certified public accounting firm Warinner, Gesinger & Associates,

L.L.C. (Warinner), issued a report using 1998 financial data that

valued the CRC interest of petitioner at approximately $4,600,000

(September 1999 report).

     In early 2000, Phil Erli (Mr. Erli), then the general

manager of petitioner, requested that Warinner prepare a revised

valuation report to correct arithmetical errors in the September

1999 report and to include more recent data in the valuation

analysis.    On February 15, 2000, Warinner issued a revised report

on the basis of financial data through September 30, 1999, which

estimated the value of the CRC interest to be approximately

$2,600,000 (February 2000 report).

     At the time that Mr. Erli requested the February 2000

report, he was not aware of the existence of the built-in gains

tax and the impact that the determination of fair market value

would have on that tax.

            Petitioner’s management did not become aware of the

built-in gains tax until sometime in late 2000 or early 2001.

     In March of 2000, petitioner engaged the investment banking

firm Robinson-Humphrey Co., L.L.C. (Robinson-Humphrey), to

identify potential buyers and to market the CRC interest.

Robinson-Humphrey prepared an offering memorandum, which was
                                - 6 -

provided to prospective purchasers and listed the value of the

CRC interest as approximately $7 million.    Robinson-Humphrey’s

compensation was contingent on the sale price of the CRC

interest; accordingly, it had an incentive to try to generate a

high sale price.    The Robinson-Humphrey memorandum was prepared

for marketing purposes rather than as an objective assessment of

value.

     Petitioner did not expect to get an offer of $7 million for

its interest.    Indeed, petitioner’s management had decided that

it would accept as little as $2 million for the CRC interest.

     On July 6, 2000, BellSouth offered to purchase the CRC

interest for $5,022,929, subject to working capital adjustments

as of the date of closing.

     Petitioner received no other offers to purchase the CRC

interest.    The other partners in CRC did not exercise their

rights of first refusal with respect to the offer made by

BellSouth.

     Petitioner accepted BellSouth’s offer on July 11, 2000, and

the sale of the CRC interest to BellSouth was completed on

November 27, 2000, for $5,220,043.

     Petitioner timely filed a Federal income tax return on Form

1120S, U.S. Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, for the 2000

tax year.
                              - 7 -

     On its 2000 Form 1120S, petitioner reported the amount of

recognized built-in gain attributable to the CRC interest using a

fair market value as of January 1, 2000 (the valuation date), of

$2,600,000, the amount determined by the February 2000 report.

Petitioner used the valuation of the CRC interest contained in

the February 2000 report on the advice of Stephen Henley, a

certified public accountant petitioner consulted to review its

2000 Federal income tax return.

     Respondent sent petitioner a notice of deficiency dated

August 3, 2007, that determined a deficiency of $925,260 and a

penalty pursuant to section 6662(a) of $185,052.   The deficiency

resulted from respondent’s determination that the fair market

value of the CRC interest was $5,243,6022 rather than the

$2,600,000 shown on petitioner’s 2000 Federal income tax return.

                             OPINION

I.   Valuation of the CRC Interest

     The issue we must decide is the fair market value of the CRC

interest on the valuation date; i.e. on January 1, 2000, the

effective date of petitioner’s subchapter S election.




     2
      We note that Schedule 2 to the notice of deficiency,
Explanation of Adjustments, states that the value of the CRC
interest is determined to be $5,220,423. However, Schedule 3 to
the notice of deficiency uses the value of $5,243,602 in
calculating the built-in gains tax.
                                   - 8 -

     A.      Built-In Gains Tax

     Section 1374 imposes a tax on built-in gains--gains accrued

while an asset is held by a C corporation which later makes a

subchapter S election.       An S corporation’s gain upon disposition

of an asset generally is treated as built-in gain to the extent

that the fair market value of that asset on the first day of the

first taxable year for which the corporation’s subchapter S

election is in effect exceeds that asset’s adjusted basis on such

date.     Sec. 1374(d)(1).   If an asset with built-in gain is sold

during the 10-year period beginning on such date, the S

corporation will be taxed on the built-in gain.      Sec. 1374(a),

(d)(7).

     The parties agree that petitioner is subject to built-in

gains tax under section 1374 on the sale of the CRC interest.

Respondent asserts that the fair market value of the CRC interest

on the valuation date was $5,220,423, the price for which the

interest was sold to BellSouth on November 27, 2000.      Petitioner

contends that the value of the CRC interest on the valuation date

was $2,980,000.
                                 - 9 -

     B.     Fair Market Value Standard

     The standard for valuation is fair market value, which is

defined as the price that a willing buyer would pay a willing

seller, both persons having reasonable knowledge of all relevant

facts and neither person being under a compulsion to buy or to

sell.     See United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973)

(applying the standard set forth in section 20.2031-1(b), Estate

Tax Regs.).    The standard is objective, using a hypothetical

willing buyer and seller who are presumed to be dedicated to

achieving maximum economic advantage in any transaction involving

the property.    See Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94 T.C.

193, 218 (1990).    The objective willing buyer, willing seller

standard    must be achieved in the context of market and economic

conditions    on the valuation date.     Id.

     The valuation of stock is a question of fact resolved on the

basis of the entire record.    See Ahmanson Found. v. United

States, 674 F.2d 761, 769 (9th Cir. 1981); Estate of Newhouse v.

Commissioner, supra at 217.    The trier of fact must weigh all

relevant evidence to draw the appropriate inferences.    See

Commissioner v. Scottish Am. Inv. Co., 323 U.S. 119, 123-125

(1944); Helvering v. Nat. Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282, 294-295

(1938); Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, supra at 217.

     In valuing unlisted securities, “actual arm’s length sales

of such stock in the normal course of business within a
                              - 10 -

reasonable time before or after the valuation date are the best

criteria of market value”.    Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner,

79 T.C. 938, 940 (1982); See also Estate of Davis v.

Commissioner, 110 T.C. 530, 535 (1998).   Where the value of

unlisted stock cannot be determined from actual sale prices, its

value generally is to be determined by taking into consideration

a host of factors, including, among others, the company’s net

worth, prospective earning power, and dividend-paying capacity.

See, e.g., Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, supra at 536.

     As is customary in valuation cases, the parties offered

expert opinion evidence to support their opposing valuation

positions.   In such cases, we evaluate the opinions of experts in

the light of the demonstrated qualifications of each expert and

all other evidence in the record.   See Estate of Christ v.

Commissioner, 480 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir. 1973), affg. 54 T.C.

493 (1970); Parker v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 547, 561 (1986).     We

have broad discretion to evaluate “‘the overall cogency of each

expert’s analysis.’”   Sammons v. Commissioner, 838 F.2d 330, 334

(9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Ebben v. Commissioner, 783 F.2d 906, 909

(9th Cir. 1986), affg. in part and revg. in part T.C. Memo.

1983-200), affg. in part and revg. in part on another ground T.C.

Memo. 1986-318.

     We are not bound by the formulas and opinions proffered by

an expert witness and may accept or reject expert testimony in
                               - 11 -

the exercise of sound judgment.    See Helvering v. Nat. Grocery

Co., supra at 295; Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, supra at

217.    Where necessary, we may reach a determination of value on

the basis of our own examination of the evidence in the record.

See Silverman v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir. 1976),

affg. T.C. Memo. 1974-285; Estate of Davis v. Commissioner, supra

at 538.    Where experts offer divergent estimates of fair market

value, we decide what weight to give these estimates by examining

the factors they used in arriving at their conclusions.    See

Casey v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 357, 381 (1962).

       We have broad discretion in selecting valuation methods, see

Estate of O’Connell v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 249, 251 (9th Cir.

1981), affg. on this issue and revg. in part T.C. Memo. 1978-191,

and in evaluating the weight to be given the facts in reaching

our conclusion because “finding market value is, after all,

something for judgment, experience, and reason”, Colonial

Fabrics, Inc. v. Commissioner, 202 F.2d 105, 107 (2d Cir. 1953),

affg. a Memorandum Opinion of this Court.    Moreover, while we may

accept the opinion of an expert in its entirety, see Buffalo Tool

& Die Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 441, 452 (1980),

we may be selective in the use of any part of such opinion, or

reject the opinion in its entirety, see Parker v. Commissioner,

supra at 561.    Because valuation necessarily results in an

approximation, the figure at which this Court arrives need not be
                               - 12 -

one as to which there is specific testimony if it is within the

range of values that may properly be arrived at from

consideration of all the evidence.      See Estate of O’Connell v.

Commissioner, supra at 252; Silverman v. Commissioner, supra at

933.

       C.   The Parties’ Expert Testimony

       Petitioner’s expert witness, William E. King (Mr. King),

prepared a report (King report) that concludes that the value of

the CRC interest was $2,980,000 on the valuation date.

Respondent’s expert witness, Steven C. Hastings (Mr. Hastings),

prepared a report (Hastings report) that concludes that the value

of the CRC interest was $5,155,000 on the valuation date.

       Mr. King is a certified public accountant and is accredited

in business valuation by the American Institute of Certified

Public Accountants.    Mr. King has substantial experience in

valuing telecommunications entities.     Since 1998 Mr. King’s work

has been focused on the telecommunications industry, and Mr.

King’s company provides, on average, between 35 and 45 valuations

per year related to telecommunications businesses.     Mr. King

testified that in any given year he spends between 25 percent and

75 percent of his time working on telecommunications valuations.

On the basis of his experience in telecommunications valuation,

Mr. King was able to factor in the specific conditions and
                              - 13 -

outlook of the telecommunications industry, as well as the

economic outlook in general, existing on the valuation date.

     Mr. Hastings is a certified public accountant but is not

accredited specifically in business valuation.     Mr. Hastings

worked in the area of business valuation during the late 1980s

and early 1990s before leaving to work in other areas of finance.

Mr. Hastings returned to business valuation work in 2006, and he

testified that about 95 percent of his billable hours are

currently spent on valuation issues.     However, Mr. Hastings had

never valued a telecommunications company before preparing his

expert report in the instant case.     Consequently, Mr. Hastings

took a more mechanical approach to the valuation of the CRC

interest, relying heavily on historical data without significant

adjustment to reflect prevailing market conditions in the

telecommunications industry on the valuation date.

     Mr. King valued the CRC interest using both a business

enterprise value analysis and a distribution yield analysis.      The

business enterprise value analysis incorporated four valuation

methods (capitalization of income method, discounted future

income method, guideline company method, and guideline

transaction method).   The capitalization of income method applied

a capitalization rate of 13.6 percent to CHAT’s determined net

cashflows for four distinct periods preceding the valuation date.

The discounted future income method applied discount rates
                              - 14 -

ranging from 14.33 percent to 17.03 percent to CHAT’s projected

annual net cashflows for each of the years during a 10-year

period ending on December 31, 2009, and a 17.03-percent discount

rate to CHAT’s residual value.   The guideline company method

reflected prices paid for companies similar to CHAT and whose

stock was traded in a public market.   The guideline transaction

analysis reflected transactions involving the acquisition of

privately held entities similar to CHAT.   The resulting values

derived under these four enterprise valuation methods, and the

weights assigned to each, were as follows:

                                                       Weight
              Method              Value of CHAT     (percentage)
Capitalization of income           $44,902,000           50
Discounted future income            34,516,000           30
Guideline company                   32,471,000           10
Guideline transaction               26,528,000           10
Concluded enterprise value          38,735,000

     On the basis of the above, Mr. King determined in his report

that, on the valuation date, the total business enterprise value

of CHAT was $38,735,000, the fair market value of CRC’s interest

in CHAT was $11,442,000, and the fair market value of the CRC

interest was $2,861,000.   In his report, Mr. King then applied a

5-percent lack of marketability discount and concluded that the

appropriate business enterprise valuation of the CRC interest was

$2,718,000.
                               - 15 -

     Using the distribution yield analysis, Mr. King estimated

the value of CHAT by applying a capitalization factor of 12.41

percent that reflected a 5-percent marketability discount to

CHAT’s net after-tax distributions for the 3 years before the

valuation date (1997 through 1999).     On the basis of the

distribution yield analysis, Mr. King determined that the fair

market value of the CRC interest on the valuation date was

$3,243,000.   In his report, Mr. King weighted the business

enterprise analysis and the distribution yield analysis equally

to arrive at a fair market value of $2,980,000 for the CRC

interest.

     In his report, Mr. Hastings valued the CRC interest by

considering three business enterprise valuation methods

(discounted cashflow method, merger and acquisition method, and

guideline company method) to determine the fair market value of

CHAT.   Using the discounted cashflow method, Mr. Hastings applied

a 14-percent discount rate to CHAT’s projected annual income for

each of the years during a 10-year period ending on December 31,

2009.   Mr. Hastings used the merger and acquisition method to

reflect transactions involving acquisitions of privately held

entities comparable to CHAT.   Mr. Hastings used the guideline

company method to reflect prices paid for companies which were

engaged in a business similar to CHAT and whose stock was

publicly traded.   In his report, Mr. Hastings determined that the
                              - 16 -

guideline company method potentially overstated the value of CHAT

and gave it no weight.   Mr. Hastings concluded that the

discounted cashflow method and the merger and acquisition method

should be weighted equally.   The resulting values derived under

these three methods were as follows:

                                                         Weight
  Valuation Method               Value of CHAT        (percentage)

Discounted cashflow                $98,900,000               50
Merger & acquisition               115,900,000               50
Guideline company                  127,800,000                0
Concluded value                    107,400,000

     On the basis of the above, Mr. Hastings, in his report,

determined that the total value of CHAT was $107,400,000, applied

a 35-percent marketability discount, and concluded that the value

of a 7.385-percent equity interest in CHAT on January 1, 2000,

was $5,155,000.   He also concluded that a multilevel discount was

not appropriate and concluded that the value of the CRC interest

on the valuation date was $5,155,000.

     In his report, Mr. Hastings did not consider CHAT’s

distribution history when preparing his valuation analysis, and

respondent asserts that Mr. King’s use of a distribution yield

analysis in his report was inappropriate.    Specifically,

respondent contends that a distribution yield analysis is

appropriate only where the company being valued has been

distributing almost all of its net income.    Relying on section
                              - 17 -

25.2512-2(f)(2), Gift Tax Regs., and Rev. Rul. 59-60, 1959-1 C.B.

237, respondent further asserts that dividend-paying capacity,

not dividends paid or distributed, should be used to value

closely held stock.   Respondent contends that a distribution

yield analysis will understate the value of a company’s stock

when the company is not paying out all of the cash that it has

available for dividends.   It is important to note that while

dividend-paying capacity may well be more important than actual

dividends paid or distributed when determining the value of a

controlling interest in a closely held business, this Court has

recognized that “Dividends paid can be more important than

dividend-paying capacity in appraising minority interests because

a minority shareholder cannot force the company to pay dividends

even if it has the capacity to do so”.   Barnes v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 1998-413 (citing Pratt, et al., Valuing a Business:

The Analysis and Appraisal of Closely Held Companies 227 (3d ed.

1996)).

     D.   Sale Price of the CRC Interest as Evidence of Fair
          Market Value

     Since a reasonably contemporaneous arm’s-length sale is the

best evidence of value, we must decide whether the sale of the

CRC interest to BellSouth meets that criterion.   During July

2000, approximately 6 months after the valuation date, petitioner

and BellSouth entered into an agreement for the purchase of the

CRC interest.   Petitioner sold the CRC interest to BellSouth on
                              - 18 -

November 27, 2000, for $5,220,043.     Respondent contends that the

best evidence of the value of the CRC interest on January 1,

2000, is the subsequent sale of that interest to BellSouth on

November 27, 2000.   Petitioner contends that the sale of the CRC

interest to BellSouth did not reflect arm’s-length pricing

between a willing and informed hypothetical buyer and seller and

that the sale price must be disregarded or adjusted.    Petitioner

further contends that BellSouth would have paid more than an

average hypothetical buyer for the CRC interest because BellSouth

already owned a controlling interest in CHAT, the primary asset

of CRC.

     In deciding whether the sale of the CRC interest to

BellSouth is probative evidence of its value on the valuation

date, we first consider whether the sale was within a reasonable

time after the valuation date.   The price at which the CRC

interest sold was fixed by a formula agreed to 6 months after the

valuation date.   Petitioner has not established, and does not

argue, that there were intervening circumstances that would have

affected value between the valuation date and the sale date, and

neither party asserts that the sale date was not within a

reasonable time after the valuation date.    We conclude, on the

basis of the record, that the sale of the CRC interest to

BellSouth occurred within a reasonable time after the valuation
                              - 19 -

date and that there were no intervening events that would have

affected value between the valuation date and the sale date.

     We next consider whether the sale to BellSouth was an arm’s-

length sale in the normal course of business.   The evidence

indicates that BellSouth was an unrelated buyer acting in its own

self-interest when it purchased the CRC interest.   Neither party

argues that the sale to BellSouth was not an arm’s-length

transaction.   We conclude, on the basis of the record, that the

sale of the CRC interest was an arm’s-length sale in the normal

course of business.

     Finally, even though we have concluded that the sale of the

CRC interest to BellSouth was an arm’s-length transaction, we

consider whether unique characteristics of the transaction

persuade us to adjust the sale price in our valuation analysis.

Petitioner argues that if we use the BellSouth purchase price as

evidence of the value of the CRC interest on the valuation date,

that purchase price must be adjusted to reflect “special

circumstances surrounding the buyer, the seller, or the

transaction generally that could have skewed the sale price from

a measure of true fair market value that would have been reached

between a hypothetical buyer and seller absent those

circumstances”.   We agree with petitioner that in the instant

case we should consider the unique characteristics of the actual

buyer, seller, and transaction.   See Epic Associates 84-III v.
                               - 20 -

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-64; Hansen v. Commissioner, a

Memorandum Opinion of this Court dated July 28, 1952; sec.

20.2031-2(e), Estate Tax Regs.

     Petitioner contends that the sale price must be adjusted

because “BellSouth was a truly unique buyer that would have

likely valued the CRC interest at a higher price than literally

anyone else in the world based on its unilateral control of

CHAT”.    Additionally, petitioner contends that we must consider

BellSouth’s history of submitting “high bids” in order to

discourage exercise of rights of first refusal.

     E.     Whether the BellSouth Sale Price Included a Control
            Premium

     Petitioner argues that, as a matter of law, the fair market

value of a minority interest in a business cannot be ascertained

by reference to what a controlling interest holder would pay for

the interest because a controlling interest holder would place a

greater value on a minority interest than would a hypothetical

purchaser who lacks control.    Petitioner therefore contends that

the BellSouth purchase price reflects a “control” value to

BellSouth and must be disregarded or discounted in determining

the fair market value of the CRC interest to a hypothetical buyer

who did not control CHAT as BellSouth did.

     Respondent counters with the argument that BellSouth already

controlled CHAT before its acquisition of the CRC interest and

did not gain any additional measure of control over CHAT by
                                  - 21 -

virtue of its purchase of the CRC interest.      Consequently,

respondent contends, BellSouth would not have paid a control

premium for the CRC interest but instead would have paid only

what any other buyer would have paid for a minority interest in

CRC.       Respondent, therefore, argues that the BellSouth sale price

reflects a discount for lack of control.

       According to petitioner, valuing the CRC interest by

reference to the BellSouth sale price, without applying a

discount for lack of control, would violate the precedent of this

Court and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.3

Petitioner contends that Estate of Bright v. Commissioner, 658

F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc),4 and Estate of Andrews v.

Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938 (1982), prohibit the Commissioner from

valuing an interest on the basis of its value to a person who




       3
      The Tax Court follows the law of the Court of Appeals to
which an appeal would lie if the law of that circuit is on “all
fours”. Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), affd.
445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). Absent stipulation to the
contrary, any appeal of the instant case would be to the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. See sec. 7482(b)(1)(B).
       4
      The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has adopted
as binding precedent certain decisions of the former Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc); Stein v. Reynolds
Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982). However, as discussed
below, because Estate of Bright v. Commissioner, 658 F.2d 999
(5th Cir. 1981), is not on “all fours” with the instant case, we
need not consider whether it would be binding precedent in the
Eleventh Circuit.
                              - 22 -

already holds a controlling interest without applying a discount

for lack of control.

      In Estate of Bright, the decedent and her husband owned, as

community property, a 55-percent interest in each of several

closely held corporations.   The issue in Estate of Bright was the

valuation of the decedent’s one-half of that community property

interest.   The Commissioner argued that the proper valuation

method was to value the entire 55-percent interest, including a

control premium, and then take one-half thereof.   The Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that family attribution did

not apply to lump the decedent’s minority interest with the

interest of her husband to create a controlling interest for

valuation purposes.    Id.

     In Estate of Andrews v. Commissioner, supra, the issue was

the valuation of a decedent’s 20-percent interest in each of four

closely held corporations.   As there had been no sales of

interests in the corporations being valued within a reasonable

time before or after the valuation date, this Court valued the

stocks indirectly by weighing net worth, prospective earning

power, dividend-paying capacity, and other relevant factors.        Id.

at 940.   The portion of the Estate of Andrews Opinion on which

petitioner relies addresses whether a control discount should be

applied to that indirectly determined value.   Id. at 951.    The

Commissioner’s position in Estate of Andrews was that a control
                                - 23 -

discount should not be applied if family members control a

corporation.    Id. at 952.   Because all the shareholders,

including the decedent, were family members and shared in

control, the Commissioner argued that no discount should be

allowed in valuing the decedent’s 20-percent interest.        Id.

Citing Estate of Bright v. Commissioner, supra, this Court

rejected the family attribution argument and applied a minority

discount in determining the value of the decedent’s minority

interests.     Id. at 956.

     We do not agree that either Estate of Bright or Estate of

Andrews controls the valuation issue in the instant case as a

matter of law.    In both Estate of Bright and Estate of Andrews,

the question was not whether a majority shareholder would pay a

premium for a minority interest in an entity that it controlled

but whether family attribution should apply to prevent the

application of a lack of control discount even though the

interest being valued was a minority interest.    Neither Estate of

Andrews nor Estate of Bright involved an actual, contemporaneous

sale of an interest in any of the entities being valued as is

present in the instant case.    In both Estate of Bright and Estate

of Andrews, the Commissioner’s position was that a minority

interest in a closely held corporation should be valued with a

control premium.    Those are not the circumstances of the instant

case.   Respondent concedes that the CRC interest was a minority
                               - 24 -

interest and that a minority discount is appropriate in valuing

that interest.5    As discussed above, respondent contends that the

minority discount is reflected in the BellSouth sale price.

     For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that neither Estate

of Bright v. Commissioner, supra, nor Estate of Andrews v.

Commissioner, supra, establishes that a controlling shareholder

would necessarily be willing to pay a premium for a minority

interest in a corporation that it already controlled.

Accordingly, we do not agree with petitioner that we must, as a

matter of law, apply a lack of control discount to the actual

sale price of the CRC interest because the buyer, BellSouth,

controlled CHAT.

     We next consider whether petitioner has proved that, under

the particular circumstances present, the CRC interest would have

been more valuable to BellSouth than to another investor who was

merely acquiring a minority interest.    We find nothing in the

record to support petitioner’s assertion.    To the contrary,

petitioner’s own expert, Mr. King, indicated that BellSouth had

no incentive, from a control perspective, to buy the CRC

interest.   Mr. King testified at trial that “it’s already been

indicated that BellSouth had no reason to buy this.    There was no

control element that * * * was associated with this.”    He further


     5
      The parties disagree as to what the appropriate minority
discount is and as to when and how that discount should be
reflected in the different valuation methodologies.
                              - 25 -

stated that “there’s no reason for it, they already had control.

They already had operating control of the partnership.”

Accordingly, we conclude that petitioner has not established that

BellSouth paid a control premium for the CRC interest.

     F.    Whether Rights of First Refusal Affected the Sale Price

     We next consider whether, as petitioner contends, there is

evidence that BellSouth paid a premium for the CRC interest in

order to discourage the exercise by the other CRC partners of

their rights of first refusal.   The sale of the CRC interest was

subject to a right of first refusal in favor of the three

nonselling partners of CRC.   Mr. King testified that, in his

extensive prior experience dealing with BellSouth and its

successor entities, once BellSouth determines that a transaction

is strategic it will “do whatever it takes to win” including

submitting high bids to discourage exercise of rights of first

refusal.   Regarding the CRC purchase, Mr. King stated that “In

other words, they wanted to make sure that they put an offer out

that was sufficient enough to essentially discourage Bledsoe

Telephone Company and Trenton Telephone Company from exercising

their right of first refusal.”

     We found Mr. King’s testimony to be credible, and there is

no evidence contradicting his testimony in that regard.

Consequently, we conclude that the BellSouth sale price should be

adjusted to reflect the likelihood that BellSouth viewed the CRC
                              - 26 -

interest as a strategic acquisition and was willing to pay a

premium to avoid exercise of the rights of first refusal of the

other CRC partners.   For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that

the BellSouth sale price is probative, but not conclusive,

evidence of the value of the CRC interest on the valuation date.

     G.   Fair Market Value of the CRC Interest

     Because we find that the BellSouth sale price is probative,

but not conclusive, evidence of the value of the CRC interest on

the valuation date, we have also carefully considered all of the

other evidence in the record in arriving at a determination of

the fair market value of the CRC interest.   In making a

determination of value, we have considered the sale of the CRC

interest to BellSouth and the valuation reports of Mr. King and

Mr. Hastings, as well as all the other relevant factors,

including the unique characteristics of BellSouth as a purchaser,

the business climate on the valuation date, the double-tiered

partnership structure, and the dividend and capital call history

of CRC.

     We found petitioner’s expert, Mr. King, to be the more

persuasive of the two expert witnesses.   As discussed above, his

experience in the field of telecommunications valuation allowed

him to tailor his analyses to reflect industry conditions

existing on the valuation date.   Additionally, Mr. King’s

analysis considered the distribution history of CHAT, a factor
                               - 27 -

ignored by Mr. Hastings but likely to be an important

consideration for a purchaser of a minority interest.   Finally,

the Court found Mr. King’s testimony at trial to be credible and

persuasive.   Accordingly, we place great weight on Mr. King’s

expert report.   However, we do believe that Mr. King failed to

adequately consider the sale to BellSouth in his analysis, and we

take that sale into account in reaching a determination of value.

     We accept the values determined by Mr. King in his business

enterprise valuation analysis and his distribution yield analysis

and his decision to weight those factors equally in valuing the

CRC interest.    However, we have also determined that it is

appropriate to include a third factor in the analysis; i.e., the

BellSouth sale price.   After considering all of the evidence in

the record, we conclude that the values yielded by the business

enterprise analysis ($2,718,000), the distribution yield analysis

($3,243,000), and the BellSouth sale price ($5,220,423) should be

weighted equally in arriving at the value of the CRC interest.

Weighting each of those numbers equally results in a value of

$3,727,141.   On the basis of the foregoing considerations and the

entire record, we conclude that the fair market of the CRC

interest as of the valuation date was $3,727,142.
                              - 28 -

II.   Substantial Understatement Penalty

      A taxpayer may be subject to an accuracy-related penalty of

20 percent of any underpayment which is attributable to a

substantial understatement of income tax.    Sec. 6662(a) and

(b)(2).   For an S corporation, there is a substantial

understatement of income tax if the amount of the understatement

for the tax year exceeds the greater of 10 percent of the amount

required to be shown on the return or $5,000.    Sec.

6662(d)(1)(A).   Pursuant to section 7491(c), the Commissioner

generally bears the burden of production for any penalty, but the

taxpayer bears the ultimate burden of proof.    Higbee v.

Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 446 (2001).

      The accuracy-related penalty does not apply where it is

shown that there was substantial authority for the position taken

by the taxpayer.   Sec. 6662(d)(2)(B)(i).   The accuracy-related

penalty also does not apply to any part of an underpayment of tax

if it is shown that the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and

in good faith.   Sec. 6664(c)(1).   That determination is made on a

case-by-case basis, taking into account all the pertinent facts

and circumstances.   Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.

Taxpayers bear the burden of proving that they had reasonable

cause and acted in good faith.   See Higbee v. Commissioner, supra

at 446; Dollander v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-187.      Relevant

factors include a taxpayer’s efforts to assess his proper tax
                               - 29 -

liability, including the taxpayer’s reasonable and good-faith

reliance on the advice of a professional such as an accountant.

Sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income Tax Regs.

     Respondent determined that petitioner is liable for a

substantial understatement penalty pursuant to section 6662 of

$185,052.   Because we conclude below that petitioner acted with

reasonable cause and in good faith, it is unnecessary to

determine the precise amount of the understatement resulting from

our determination of the value of the CRC interest.

     Petitioner contends that it is not liable for an accuracy-

related penalty because it acted in good faith and reasonably

relied on the advice of Mr. Henley in reporting the value of the

CRC interest.   Respondent asserts that petitioner did not act

reasonably and in good faith because it disregarded two

appraisals and the actual sale price, all of which would have

resulted in a value for the CRC interest higher than that which

was reported on petitioner’s 2000 income tax return.

     Mr. Erli, who was petitioner’s general manager in 2000,

testified that he was not an expert in tax matters, and that, in

fact, tax was one of his areas of weakness.   For that reason, Mr.

Erli suggested that petitioner should bring in someone to consult

on its tax returns.   Consequently, Mr. Henley, a certified public

accountant specializing in tax, was hired to review petitioner’s

tax returns.    It was Mr. Henley who first raised the issue of
                               - 30 -

built-in gains tax.   Mr. Erli’s uncontradicted testimony

establishes that the decision to use the $2.6 million valuation

of the CRC interest from the February 2000 report was based on

the advice of Mr. Henley.   We conclude that it was reasonable for

petitioner to rely on the advice of Mr. Henley in determining the

valuation of the CRC interest to report on its income tax return

     Mr. Henley testified that he was made aware of the sale to

BellSouth, but that he did not recommend that petitioner use the

sale price in determining the value of the CRC interest on the

valuation date.   On the basis of the testimony of Mr. Erli and

Mr. Henley, it appears that petitioner did not provide Mr. Henley

with the September 1999 report or the Robinson-Humphrey

memorandum.    All of the evidence indicates that the February 2000

report was an update of the September 1999 report to correct

errors and incorporate more current data.    Respondent does not

dispute that the September report contained errors, nor does

respondent contend that the February 2000 report did anything

more than correct errors and incorporate more recent financial

information.   We conclude that there was no reason for petitioner

to have provided Mr. Henley with an appraisal that contained

errors and outdated financial information when a more current

version of that same report was available.    Furthermore, we

conclude that the Robinson-Humphrey memorandum was prepared

primarily as a marketing tool, not as an objective valuation of
                              - 31 -

the CRC interest.   Consequently, we conclude that petitioner did

not act in bad faith when it failed to provide Mr. Henley with

the September 1999 report and the Robinson-Humphrey memorandum.

     For the foregoing reasons we conclude that petitioner acted

with reasonable cause and in good faith in relying on the advice

of Mr. Henley regarding the valuation of the CRC interest.

Because we so conclude, we need not reach the question of whether

petitioner’s position was supported by substantial authority.    We

hold that petitioner is not liable for a substantial

understatement penalty under section 6662.

III. Conclusion

     On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the value of

the CRC interest on January 1, 2000, was $3,727,142 and that

petitioner is not liable for a substantial understatement

penalty.

     We have considered all of the contentions and arguments of

the parties that are not discussed herein, and we find them to be

without merit, irrelevant, or moot.

     To reflect the foregoing,


                                           Decision will be entered

                                      under Rule 155.
