UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CHRISTINE AYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                                        No. 96-1438
TOWN OF CULPEPER; JERRY W. DAVIS,
Town Manager; C. B. JONES, Chief
of Police; H. P. PUGH,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville.
B. Waugh Crigler, Magistrate Judge.
(CA-95-65-3-C)

Submitted: October 29, 1996

Decided: November 20, 1996

Before HAMILTON, LUTTIG, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Robert P. Dwoskin, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. C. Lamar
Garren, MARTIN & RAYNOR, P.C., Charlottesville, Virginia, for
Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Christine Aylor appeals the district court's dismissal of her 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) action. Finding no error, we affirm.

On May 1, 1994, Culpeper police officer H. P. Pugh responded to
a report at the Culpeper Holiday Inn to "go to Room 230, a woman
is in real trouble." Apparently, Aylor's boyfriend had found her in the
room with another man. Pugh found Aylor crying and her boyfriend
standing next to her. Aylor told him to leave because she was all right
and the matter was personal.

Subsequently, Pugh wrote an incident report, noting that
"[a]lthough reports of this nature are not usually taken," he took a
report because of Aylor's position as a Magistrate Judge for the Six-
teenth Judicial Circuit of the Commonwealth of Virginia. Culpeper
Police Chief C.B. Jones approved the report and sent a copy to the
Chief Magistrate Judge for the jurisdiction, who ultimately dismissed
Aylor.

Other than Pugh and Jones, Aylor also named as defendants the
Town of Culpeper and its manager, Jerry W. Davis. Aylor sued each
under § 1983, claiming deprivation of privacy and employment, and
defamation.

We review dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) de novo.
Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 489 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 936 (1992). First, the district court properly dismissed the
claims against the Town of Culpeper because Aylor failed to allege
or offer any facts that the alleged acts occurred as a result of a town
policy or custom. See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978). Second, the district court properly dismissed the claims
against Davis because Aylor conceded he was not"directly involved

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in the incidents surrounding this action" and§ 1983 liability is not
available under a theory of respondeat superior. Vinnedge v. Gibbs,
550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977).

Third, the district court properly dismissed the§ 1983 defamation
claims because the United States Constitution does not afford a rem-
edy for reputational injury alone. Paul v. Davis , 424 U.S. 693, 702
(1976); see also Cox v. Northern Virginia Transp. Comm'n, 551 F.2d
555, 558 (4th Cir. 1976) (stating that "defamation by a state official
is not a federal constitutional or statutory tort").

Fourth, the district court properly dismissed Aylor's claims for
deprivation of employment because she lacked a property interest in
her position as a magistrate judge. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972); see also Va. Code Ann.§ 19.2-38 (Michie 1995)
(stating that such appointment is "revocable at the pleasure of the
chief circuit judge"). Further, even if Aylor held a protected interest
in her employment, the only available remedy is a hearing, which
would have been unavailable from the Defendants because they did
not employ her. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573.

Finally, the district court properly dismissed Aylor's claim for
deprivation of privacy because she did not have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in either the information contained in the report or the
report itself. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 713. Aylor concedes that Pugh was
obligated to respond to the report of trouble; thus the information con-
tained in the report does not enjoy privacy protection. Further, the
report was a public record; thus, Jones did not deprive Aylor of pri-
vacy by sending it to Aylor's employer. See Walls v. City of
Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 193 (4th Cir. 1990).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's decision. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
quately presented in the material before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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