
70 U.S. 97 (1865)
3 Wall. 97
SPARROW
v.
STRONG.
Supreme Court of United States.

*100 Messrs. Browning and Cope, for the motion to dismiss.
*103 Messrs. O'Connor and Billings, contra.
*102 The CHIEF JUSTICE now delivered the opinion of the court, on all three of the points.
The first ground taken in favor of dismissing the writ of error, to wit, that the record was not filed in time by the plaintiff in error, is untenable. The writ was regularly sued out on the 14th of August, 1863, returnable at the next term of the court thereafter, and was duly served; a citation was also issued and served, returnable at the same term; and the writ and citation, with the record, were returned here and filed, and the cause docketed before the motion to dismiss. It has been repeatedly held that, in such a case, no motion to dismiss, under the ninth rule, can be entertained.[*]
Nor do we think that the appeal should be dismissed for the second reason assigned by the defendant in error, namely, that the subject of controversy is not of the jurisdictional value. It is insisted that the matter in dispute is a mining claim; that the land where the mine exists has never been surveyed and brought into market; and that, consequently, there can be no mining right to such land in any person, capable of being estimated in money.
It is true, that in the case of Lownsdale v. Parrish,[] this court held, that an obstruction to the enjoyment of land claimed under a law or regulation of a convention in Oregon, held without the sanction of the United States, and during the joint occupation of that country by Great Britain and the United States, was not an injury capable of being so valued as to give jurisdiction to this court; nor, indeed, an injury of which the courts of the United States could take cognizance at all. But that decision was put distinctly on the ground that Congress, when it came to act on the organization of Oregon, expressly declared that all laws theretofore passed in that Territory, making grants of lands or *104 otherwise affecting or encumbering the titles to lands, should be and were thereby declared "null and void."
The claim, which the court was asked to protect, was asserted under a law thus declared null and void by the highest legislative authority. It was for this reason that the court refused to take jurisdiction in Lownsdale v. Parrish and dismissed the appeal.
The writ of error now before us relates to a very different subject of controversy. The Territory, of which Nevada is part, was acquired by treaty. Rights and titles, acquired under ceding governments, remain unimpaired under our government. We cannot know judicially, therefore, that the right and title in controversy was not so acquired. If it was, it certainly may be capable of being valued in money.
But if this were otherwise, we do know that in the act organizing the Territory of Nevada there is no clause annulling grants or claims to land, while large legislative powers are conferred by the Territorial legislature, limited only, as to lands, by the prohibition of interference with the primary disposal of the soil by the United States, and of unequal taxation in certain cases. We know, also, that the Territorial legislature has recognized by statute the validity and binding force of the rules, regulations, and customs of the mining districts.[*] And we cannot shut our eyes to the public history, which informs us that under this legislation, and not only without interference by the national government, but under its implied sanction, vast mining interests have grown up, employing many millions of capital, and contributing largely to the prosperity and improvement of the whole country.
We cannot dismiss this writ of error, therefore, on the ground that a controversy concerning the possessory right to a mining claim, existing under the express sanction of the Territorial legislature and the implied sanction of the national government, does not relate to a subject-matter capable of being valued in money.
*105 As the questions, thus far considered, were argued at the last term, the motion would have been then disposed of had not doubts been excited by an inspection of the record, upon the point for the argument of which the motion was ordered to stand over.
It is insisted, on this point, that the judgment is merely an affirmance of the order of the District Court overruling the motion for new trial. If this be so, the judgment itself is, in substance and effect, nothing more; and it is settled[*] that this court will not review such an order. The granting or refusing of new trials is a matter of discretion, with the exercise of which, by the court below, this court will not interfere. The circumstance that the discretion was exercised under a peculiar statute by an appellate court, and on appeal, cannot withdraw the case from the operation of the principles which control this court.
But the majority of the court does not feel at liberty to disregard the plain import of the terms of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of the Territory. It does not purport to be an order or judgment affirming an order overruling a motion for new trial, but a judgment affirming the judgment or decree of the District Court, and the only judgment or decree, which we find in the record, is the judgment for the defendants in the action of ejectment.
If this view be correct, the judgment of the Supreme Court is one to review which a writ of error may be prosecuted. And the record shows that the writ has been regularly sued out and returned. This court therefore has jurisdiction, and it has been repeatedly held in similar cases,[] that on a motion to dismiss, the court will look to the regularity of the writ and the fact of jurisdiction. Other questions must, in general, await final hearing.
MOTION TO DISMISS OVERRULED.
NOTES
[*]  Bingham v. Morris, 7 Cranch, 99; Wood v. Lide, 4 Id. 180; Picketts' Heirs v. Legerwood, 7 Peters. 146; Owings v. Tierman, 10 Id. 24; Given v. Breedlove, 15 Id. 284.
[]  21 Howard, 290.
[*]  Laws of Nevada Territory, p. 16, § 40, and p. 21, §§ 74, 77.
[*]  Doswell v. De la Lanza, 20 Howard, 29; Henderson v. Moore, 5 Cranch, 12; Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 6 Id. 206; Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheaton, 220.
[]  Minor v. Tillotson, 1 Howard, 288; Hecker v. Fowler, 1 Black, 95.
