
133 U.S. 387 (1890)
CALIFORNIA INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
UNION COMPRESS COMPANY.
No. 1051.
Supreme Court of United States.
Submitted October 30, 1889.
Decided March 3, 1890.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS.
*399 Mr. E.W. McGraw and Mr. E.W. Kimball for plaintiff in error.
Mr. U.M. Rose and Mr. G.B. Rose for defendant in error.
Mr. John F. Dillon, for defendant in error, in the interest of the St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Company.
*408 MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
The foregoing exceptions, except the two which relate to the sustaining of the demurrer to paragraphs 7 and 8 of the answer, may be grouped together, because they relate to the same question. The court refused to strike out the matter in the complaint which is before recited in brackets, and also overruled the demurrer of the defendant to that portion of the complaint; and on the trial the plaintiff was permitted to introduce evidence tending to prove some of the allegations contained in that part of the complaint. The three instructions before quoted as asked by the defendant, and not given, relate to the same matter.
The defendant contends that there was error in the action of the court covered by those exceptions, and complains that the court treated the words in the policy, "their own or held by *409 them in trust, or on commission," as if they read, "on account of whom it may concern;" that, as the plaintiff did not own the cotton, the beneficiaries under the policy were its owners; that no interest of any common carrier was covered by the policy; that it was not ambiguous; and that no parol testimony was admissible to aid in its interpretation or to show that the railroad companies were intended to be beneficiaries under it. The view urged is, that the plaintiff did not own any of the cotton or hold any of it on commission; that the insurance on goods held in trust was an insurance only for the benefit of the owners of the cotton; and that evidence of an intention to effect the insurance for the benefit of one who was not the owner of the goods was inadmissible, because it would contradict the policy.
But we think the positions taken on behalf of the defendant are not sound. The title to cotton in the temporary custody of a bailee for compression, for which receipts or bills of lading have been given, is manifestly changing hands constantly. The language of the present policy, insuring cotton "their own or held by them in trust or on commission," accommodates such a state of things. In the present case, the insurance was really taken out by the railroad companies, and that fact was well known to the agents of the defendant at the time the policy was issued. The railroad companies had an insurable interest in the cotton, and to that extent were the owners of the cotton, which was held in trust for them by the plaintiff. Evidence of their ownership of the cotton was admissible. Home Ins. Co. v. Balt. Warehouse Co., 93 U.S. 527, 542.
The policy covered all the cotton which was placed in the hands of the plaintiff by those companies. It was lawful for the plaintiff to insure in its own name goods held in trust by it, and it can recover for their entire value, holding the excess over its own interest in them for the benefit of those who have entrusted the goods to it. DeForest v. Fulton Fire Ins. Co., 1 Hall, 94; Home Ins. Co. v. Balt. Warehouse Co., 93 U.S. 527, 543; Stillwell v. Staples, 19 N.Y. 401; Waring v. Indemnity Fire Ins. Co., 45 N.Y. 606; Waters v. Monarch Fire Ass. Co., 5 El. & Bl. 870; Siter v. Morrs, 13 Penn. St. *410 218; Johnson v. Campbell, 120 Mass. 449; Fire Ins. Asso. v. Merchants' & Miners' Trans. Co., 66 Maryland, 339; London & Northwestern Railway v. Glyn, 1 El. & El. 652; Phnix Ins. Co. v. Hamilton, 14 Wall. 504, 508.
The words "held by them in trust," in this policy, cannot properly be limited to a holding in trust merely for an absolute owner, when it clearly appears that the railroad companies had an insurable interest in the cotton, and the plaintiff held the property in trust exclusively for those companies. The reasoning of the cases where the bailor was the owner of the goods insured by the bailee applies equally to any person, who, having an insurable interest in property, entrusts it to another; and such bailor can, to the extent of his insurable interest, claim the benefit of insurance effected in his favor by his bailee. The original depositors of the cotton surrendered to the railroad companies the receipts which they had taken from the plaintiff, and those companies were thus substituted in the relation to the plaintiff which before had been held by such depositors. The railroad companies thus became the beneficiaries of the trust, so far as the plaintiff was concerned, because they thus became the persons to whom the plaintiff owed the duty of bailment, and the persons entitled to demand the possession of the property from the plaintiff. There was privity in the plaintiff with the person who held its receipt, and privity with no one else. This is a necessary and obvious result of the course of business; and the business in question could not be carried on under any other circumstances so as to give protection by insurance to the parties really interested.
The case is not varied or affected by the clause in the receipts given by the plaintiff, "not responsible for any loss by fire," because the relation of the plaintiff to the property entrusted to it, and its duty to the bailor, determine the legal propriety of the insurance for the benefit of the latter. In the present case, the arrangement was that the railroad companies should pay to the plaintiff, in connection with the charge for compressing, an additional sum which would provide for the insurance of all cotton in the possession of the plaintiff, for which the railroad companies should issue bills of lading. The *411 defendant had notice that the insurance was effected in the interest of the railroad companies; and it issued the policy in the terms it did, to include the protection of the railroad companies. The fact that the same policy might protect the interest of other persons in respect to cotton held for them by the plaintiff cannot affect the question whether it protects the interest of the railroad companies in respect to cotton held by the plaintiff for them, during the life of the policy. Nor is it material whether the cotton was originally deposited by the railroad companies, or whether their interest accrued through the subsequent transfer to the railroad companies of receipts given by the plaintiff on a deposit of cotton made by other parties.
(2) We come now to another group of errors assigned. The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury as follows: "The policy in question provides that it shall be void if there be any change in the possession of the insured property, except under circumstances which have no bearing on this case. If the jury believe from the evidence that after the policy in question was issued, any common carrier, with the knowledge and consent of plaintiff and under agreement with plaintiff, issued its bills of lading for any of the cotton which at the date of the policy was or thereafter came into possession of the plaintiff, the issuance of such bills of lading, under the conditions of the policy, avoided the policy as to all cotton covered by such bills of lading." The court refused to give such instruction, and the defendant excepted to the refusal.
The court instructed the jury as follows: "By an agreement made between the plaintiff and the St. Louis, Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Company and the Memphis and Little Rock Railway Company, the plaintiff engaged to insure for said railway companies, respectively, all cottons stored in the compress sheds and yards of the plaintiff, at the foot of Main Street, Little Rock, when the railway companies or either of them should notify the plaintiff of the issuance by them of bills of lading therefor. This agreement was carried out, and on the day of the fire the plaintiff held insurance in various companies, aggregating the sum of $142,500.00, in *412 trust and to indemnify the railway companies against loss or damage by fire of the cotton for which they had issued their bills of lading and which was stored in the plaintiff's sheds and yards described in the policy, at the foot of Main Street." The defendant excepted to this instruction.
The court also charged the jury as follows: "As the plaintiff is a trustee, and insured the cotton for the benefit of the railway companies, and has no separate claim of its own on the property, it is only entitled to recover an amount equal to its liability to the railroad companies; or, in other words, a sum that will make the railway companies whole for the cotton on which they had issued bills of lading; so that, if the market price of cotton produces a larger sum than the aggregate loss of the railway companies (and 2670 bales at $50 per bale, if you should find that was the number of bales and their value, produces an amount slightly in excess of the claims of the railroad companies), then the plaintiff's recovery must be on the basis of the latter sum  that is, one that makes the railway companies whole. In no event is the market value of the cotton to be increased, but it may be reduced by the difference between the value and the amount that will satisfy the just claims of the railway companies. What amount of cotton was burned for which the railway companies had issued bills of lading and which was covered by policies taken out by the plaintiffs, the value of the same, and the amount of the just demands of the railway companies against the plaintiff for the cotton so burned, are questions of fact to be determined by you." The defendant excepted to this charge.
The court also charged the jury as follows: "This suit is brought on a policy of insurance issued by the defendant's company to the Union Compress Company to indemnify the railroad company for the loss of cotton or for cotton that might be burned after the railroad company issued its bills of lading for it, and while it yet remained in the custody of the Compress Company. Now, the Compress Company, under its contract with the railroad company, is bound to make good, by insurance, to the railroad company, any damages resulting to it *413 from the loss of cotton which the Compress Company held for the railroad company after the railroad company had issued its bills of lading therefor and notified it thereof." The defendant excepted to this charge.
The defendant contends that, although, under a proper construction of the policy, the railroad companies may be regarded as properly beneficiaries under it, the matters involved in the instructions so given by the court were questions of mingled fact and law, and were erroneous, in the light of the facts proved by the plaintiff. The ground urged is, that the policy cannot be reconciled with any intent to insure a railroad company against a loss caused by its own negligence, because the policy insures against "all direct loss or damage by fire;" that, therefore, the only interest which the railroad companies had in the cotton was a contingent interest, arising from their liability for damages for loss by a fire occurring through their own negligence; that the interest alleged to have been insured as that of the railroad companies was not such as could have sustained a claim on a direct loss by fire, because it was a contingent or doubtful interest, and not a certain or direct interest; that the fire alone could not inflict any loss, and that whether the railroad companies would suffer loss would depend on the contingencies, (1) whether or not their negligence caused the loss; (2) whether the owner would be able to prove negligence in the railroad companies; (3) whether the owner was innocent of contributory negligence; and, (4) whether the owner should make a claim for loss against the railroad companies within the statute of limitations.
Under this head, it is also urged, that, on the face of the policy, the insurance was on cotton held in trust by the plaintiff, in a designated place, for thirty days after November 2, that it was claimed by the plaintiff, in the face of the policy and contradictory of its terms, that cotton covered by a bill of lading issued November 8th, by the Missouri Pacific Railway Company, which was held in trust by the plaintiff, and was in the place described, was not covered by the policy until the bill of lading was issued; that if, as the defendant *414 alleges the fact to be, that cotton was covered by the policy from the 3d to the 8th of November, for the benefit of its owners, there was no process known to the law by which the benefit of such insurance could be transferred to the railroad companies, without action by either the owner or the insurer; that the fact that the plaintiff understood that the insurance was for the benefit of the owners of the cotton was shown by the practical construction put upon the insurance by the plaintiff after the fire, in putting in a claim on behalf of Hanger for 112 bales of cotton burned not covered by the bills of lading, and being paid for it, on behalf of Hanger, as owner of the cotton; and that thus the plaintiff claims that the insurance was for the owners of the cotton, or for the railroad companies, according to circumstances.
It is further urged that, if the bills of lading changed the possession of the cotton, it was at the time of the fire in the possession of the railroad companies and not in that of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had ceased to hold it in trust; that in such case it was not insured, because of the provision in the policy that any change in the possession should avoid the policy; that if the bills of lading did not change the possession, there could have been no insurance on behalf of the railroad companies, because, in the absence of possession by them, they had no right to insure and no contingent liability to loss; and that it was error in the court to charge that at the time of the fire the plaintiff held insurance on cotton covered by bills of lading.
This court is also asked to review its announcement of the principle of law laid down in Phnix Ins. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., 117 U.S. 312, 324, that "no rule of law or of public policy is violated by allowing a common carrier, like any other person having either the general property or a peculiar interest in goods, to have them insured against the usual perils, and to recover for any loss from such perils, though occasioned by the negligence of his own servants."
It is also contended that the jury had a right to decide whether or not the policy was issued on goods held in trust for the railroad companies by the plaintiff, and whether or not *415 the plaintiff or the railroad companies held the cotton at the time of the fire; and that these were not questions for the court to decide.
In reply to these suggestions, it is to be said, that the exception of loss by fire, contained in the receipts given by the plaintiff, and in the bills of lading given by the railroad companies, did not free them from responsibility for damages occasioned by their own negligence or that of their employés. Nor are we disposed to review our decision that common carriers can insure themselves against loss proceeding from the negligence of their own servants. The doctrine announced in the case cited has been referred to with approval in the subsequent cases of Orient Ins. Co. v. Adams, 123 U.S. 67, 72, and Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phnix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 438.
As to the suggestion that by the bills of lading the possession of the cotton was transferred to the railroad companies, and that the policy was avoided thereby, the answer is, that the cotton was still in the hands of the plaintiff, in its actual possession and upon its premises. At most, the railroad companies, by acquiring the receipts of the plaintiff and issuing bills of lading for the cotton, took only constructive possession of it; and the plaintiff, retaining actual and physical possession of it, did not lose any element of possession necessary to give it the right to effect insurance for its own benefit, and, as bailee or agent, for the protection of the railroad companies. All that the railroad companies acquired was the right to ultimate possession, which passed to them by the transfer to them, by the original depositors, of the cotton receipts given by the plaintiff.
As to the argument that no recovery can be had in the interest of the railroad companies, because the injury to them depended upon their liability for the negligence of their employés in causing the fire, and the point taken in regard to the words of the policy, "direct loss or damage by fire," the reply is, that those words mean loss or damage occurring directly from fire as the destroying agency, in contradistinction to the remoteness of fire as such agency. The books are *416 full of cases on that subject, and the meaning of the policy is not doubtful. Remoteness of agency is the explosion of gunpowder, gases or chemicals, caused by fire; the explosion of steam-boilers; the destruction of buildings to prevent the spread of fire, or their destruction through the falling of burning walls; and so forth. In the present case, the bales of cotton were physically burned by the direct action of fire.
(3) The court also charged the jury as follows: "Now, you have heard the testimony, gentlemen, with reference to the situation under which this cotton was placed and the length of time it remained there. If you think there is no negligence on the part of the railroad company, then you will find that the railroad company is not liable for this cotton. If you can say that that was a proper place to store cotton, and that leaving a passage-way there of not exceeding four feet up and down, through which persons passed at all hours of the day and night to the boat-house and skiff ferry, and it being a dry season, with three or four thousand bales of cotton stored there  then, if you say this is not negligence, you excuse this railroad company, and to that extent will disallow the claim of the plaintiff; but if you should so find I would be very much surprised at your verdict, and would not be surprised if I should set it aside; but I will leave it for you to say." The defendant excepted to this instruction, and especially to the italicized portion thereof.
It is urged that in this part of the charge the court did not allude to facts proved which the defendant claimed disproved negligence, and that thus the instruction was not a fair one as to the facts; that the place of storage was selected and the cotton was stored there by the owners of it, and not by the Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Company; that no negligence can be imputed to the latter on account of the unfitness of the place; that it had no control over the cotton stored in that place, and had no track at that place, the Missouri Pacific Railway Company having the track there; that the Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Company had no opportunity to obtain possession of the cotton until after it had been compressed at Argenta; that the bills of lading of the latter *417 company exempted it from liability for loss occurring on the lines of other carriers, and the cotton was burned, not on its line, but on the line of the Missouri Pacific Railway Company; that the court made no allusion to any of these matters as going to establish the absence of negligence and liability on the part of the Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Company; that the court threatened the jury with its displeasure and the setting aside of the verdict if the jury should bring in a verdict for the defendant on that issue; and that this action of the court was erroneous.
But the mere fact of the dwelling by the court with emphasis upon facts which seemed to it of controlling importance, and expressing its opinion as to the bearing of those facts on the question of negligence, is immaterial, if the court left the issue to the jury. In the charge, just before the passage complained of, the court, in referring to the question of the liability of the Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Company for the destruction of the cotton, had said to the jury: "It is for you to determine whether this railroad company was not guilty of negligence, and was not at fault in leaving this cotton in an exposed condition after it issued bills of lading therefor;" and in the clause of the charge objected to, the court expressly states that it leaves the question of negligence to the jury.
On this subject, this court said, in Vicksburg &c. Railroad v. Putnam, 118 U.S. 545, 553: "In the courts of the United States, as in those of England, from which our practice was derived, the judge, in submitting a case to a jury, may, at his discretion, whenever he thinks it necessary to assist them in arriving at a just conclusion, comment upon the evidence, call their attention to parts of it which he thinks important and express his opinion upon the facts; and the expression of such an opinion when no rule of law is incorrectly stated, and all matters of fact are ultimately submitted to the determination of the jury, cannot be reviewed on writ of error." See, also, Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426; Indianapolis &c. Railroad v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291; St. Louis &c. Railway v. Vickers, 122 U.S. 360.
*418 (4) In the course of the trial the plaintiff offered evidence tending to prove that the contracts and custom of business stated in the bill of exceptions were well known to shippers and to the defendant when the policy sued on was issued, it having been stated to the agents of the defendant by an officer of the plaintiff, when the policy was applied for, that it was intended to cover the interests of the plaintiff and of the railroad companies. The defendant objected to the admission of the evidence, but the objection was overruled, and the defendant excepted; and this is alleged as error.
In this connection it is urged that the complaint does not allege any such knowledge on the part of the defendant, or any intention on its part to issue its policy for the benefit of the railroad companies. The case of Hough v. People's Fire Ins. Co., 36 Maryland, 398, is cited in support of this assignment of error. But we think the evidence was admissible. In the Hough case the policy covered the merchandise insured, "their own, or held by them in trust, or in which they have an interest or liability." Parol evidence was held to be incompetent which was offered to show that the policy did not cover merchandise which was their own. The evidence would have contradicted the plain terms of the policy. In the present case, the evidence offered was admissible under the ruling in Home Ins. Co. v. Balt. Warehouse Co., 93 U.S. 527, 542. In that case the court says: "It is no exception to the rule" (governing the admission of parol evidence) "that, when a policy is taken out expressly `for or on account of the owner' of the subject insured, or `on account of whomsoever it may concern,' evidence beyond the policy is received to show who are the owners or who were intended to be insured thereby. In such cases, the words of the policy fail to designate the real party to the contract, and, therefore, unless resort is had to extrinsic evidence, there is no contract at all." See, also, Finney v. Bedford Ins. Co., 8 Met. 348; Fire Ins. Asso. v. Merchants' & Miners' Trans. Co., 66 Maryland, 339; Snow v. Carr, 61 Alabama, 363.
Having issued the policy with notice that it was intended to cover the interest of the railroad companies, the defendant is *419 estopped from asserting that the policy was intended to protect only the legal owners of the cotton.
(5) It is alleged, also, that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer of the plaintiff to paragraph 7 of the defendant's answer, which alleged that at the time of the loss 2172 bales of the cotton alleged to have been burned were covered by marine policies theretofore issued to the respective owners of the cotton, and therefore, under the terms of the policy in this suit, such cotton was not covered by it. It is alleged, also, as error, that the court, at the trial, rejected, on the objection of the plaintiff and under the exception of the defendant, evidence offered by the latter tending to prove that that number of bales of the cotton covered by the bills of lading, and alleged to have been burned, were, at the time of the fire, covered by marine policies of insurance theretofore issued to the respective owners of such cotton, residing in various portions of the United States and in England.
It is to be said, in reply, that paragraph 7 of the answer does not show that the marine policies were on the same interest as that covered by the fire policy. This element is necessary, because otherwise the policy sued on would be of no practical force. As soon as the consignees of the cotton were advised by telegraph of its shipment, they would take out marine policies to cover their own risk; and thus the fire insurance companies would obtain the premiums of insurance from the railroad companies, and immediately avoid all risk, because of the taking out of the marine policies. North British Ins. Co. v. London, Liverpool & Globe Ins. Co., 5 Ch. D. 569. The question of the legal effect of the contribution clause of the policy, before recited, is not presented by the record.
The objection alleged at the trial to the introduction of evidence as to the marine policies was made on the ground that it was immaterial and irrelevant, and that the insured knew nothing of those policies and had no interest in them. This was the objection which was sustained; and the allegation of paragraph 7 of the answer was, that the marine policies had been issued to the respective owners of the cotton. It did not appear that either the insurer or the insured had any previous *420 knowledge of the existence of the marine policies, nor did it appear whether they were issued before or after the date of the fire policy. The issuing of the marine policies, in order to have any effect in this case, must amount to double insurancé. In no other view can the defendant have any interest in the question of marine insurance. Double insurance exists only in the case of risks upon the same interest in property and in favor of the same person. North British Ins. Co. v. London, Liverpool & Globe Ins. Co., 5 Ch. D. 569; Lowell Mfg. Co. v. Safeguard Fire Ins. Co., 88 N.Y. 591; Phillips on Insurance, § 359; Wood on Fire Ins. 1st ed. § 352. No reason can exist for a distinction between the construction of a provision avoiding a policy in case of marine insurance and in case of further or additional fire insurance. In the latter case the provision is always construed as relating only to additional insurance upon the same interest and effected by the same person or in his interest.
The contention of the defendant is, that its policy is avoided by the taking out of a marine policy by the owner of the cotton, without the knowledge or participation of the plaintiff or of the railroad companies, whether the marine insurance was effected before or after the fire insurance in favor of the railway companies, and although the fire insurance policy was taken to protect the independent interests of the railroad companies. We cannot admit the soundness of this view. The cases cited where a policy is avoided by the carrying on of a prohibited business, or the storing of a prohibited article, without the knowledge or consent of the insured owner of a building, are placed upon the ground that the possession of the tenant or occupant of a building is the possession of its owner, and that the contracts which he makes as to the use of the insured premises are in the nature of warranties, and relate to matters over which he has legitimate control. It cannot be contended successfully that the condition in question here was intended by the plaintiff to subject the policy to forfeiture if any person who had a remote and independent insurable interest should take out a policy of marine insurance to protect that interest, the plaintiff having no privity with such *421 person. As was said in Grandin v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 107 Penn. St. 26, 37: "We are not to suppose that conditions involving forfeitures are introduced into policies by insurance companies, which are purely arbitrary and without reason, merely as a trap to the assured or as a means of escape for the company in case of loss. When, therefore, a general condition has no application to a particular policy; where the reason which alone gives it force is out of the case, the condition itself drops out with it." See, also, Hoffman v. Ætna Ins. Co., 32 N.Y. 405.
The offer of evidence by the defendant at the trial, in regard to the marine insurance, was by its terms an offer to prove the mere fact of marine insurance, in support of the defence set up in paragraph 7 of the answer; and the claim on the part of the defendant that the evidence was proper to support the further defence set up in the answer, as to the amount of the proportionate liability of the defendant, is not tenable. The offer was to prove merely the fact of marine insurance, and not to prove its amount. It was an offer in bar of liability, and not an offer applicable to a reduction of the verdict. No suggestion of the latter object was made in the offer, and the evidence, if admitted as offered, could have no bearing upon the question as to how much the proportionate liability of the defendant would be reduced by virtue of the marine policies. The only specific offer to prove the terms of any marine policy, and the extent of the insurance under it, was made in the form of an offer of the deposition of one Phillips and the testimony of one Bowen, both of which were excluded on proper grounds, and complaint is made only of the exclusion of the deposition of Phillips.
(6) It is assigned for error that the court erred in striking out the testimony in the deposition of Phillips, the clerk of Ralli Bros., who were claiming pay from the Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Company for 158 bales of cotton, to the effect that that cotton was covered by marine policies taken out by Ralli Bros. The policies of insurance mentioned in the testimony in the deposition were not attached to it. The testimony was objected to by the plaintiff as incompetent because *422 it was an attempt to prove by parol the contents of written instruments; it was stricken out by the court, and the defendant excepted.
The ruling of the court was manifestly correct. There was no proof that the policies referred to were in Liverpool, for all that the witness Bowen said was that he was informed they were there; and as to the copy which Phillips refused to attach to his deposition, all the evidence in regard to its identity is that Phillips said to the witness Bowen that such copy was a copy of the marine policy which had been issued on the cotton. This was, all of it, only hearsay evidence.
(7) The court was requested by the defendant to instruct the jury as follows: "As this action is brought solely on behalf of the railroad companies on account of liability incurred through carelessness of the agents and servants of the companies, no cause of action accrued against the defendant until the actual payment by said companies of damages on account of the alleged fire, and the recovery cannot be greater than the value, on November 14, 1887, at Little Rock, of the cotton so burned and paid for  nor greater than the sum paid by the railroad companies  that is, if they have paid more than the value of the cotton they cannot recover the excess from the defendant; if they have paid less than the value, they can recover only to the extent of the payment." The court refused to give that instruction, and defendant excepted. This is alleged as error. It is urged that the Memphis and Little Rock Railroad Company has never paid any damages, and that the Missouri Pacific Railway Company had not paid any when this suit was commenced; and it is contended that no cause of action accrues, in a case of that kind, until payment of the damages by the railroad companies is made.
But, as a bailee, under a policy taken out to cover property, his own or held by him in trust or on commission, may enforce the contract of insurance to the full value of the property destroyed, holding the proceeds primarily for his own benefit and the balance for that of his bailor, the right of action of the plaintiff accrued on the occurring of the loss. The case cited by the defendant, Cin., Hamilton & Dayton Railroad *423 v. Spratt, 2 Duvall, 4, does not apply to the present case. That was a suit brought by a consignee of goods against a carrier, where the carrier was entitled, under a bill of lading given by it to the consignee, to insurance obtained by the consignee; and it was held that the consignee could not be compelled to proceed upon the policy of insurance before enforcing his claim against the carrier, even where it appeared that the insurer had agreed to pay its loss under the policy, and although it was alleged that the suit was prosecuted for the benefit of the insurer. But here the plaintiff is the assured. The insurance included the protection of the railroad companies. The premium was paid. The insured property was destroyed by fire. The condition of the liability of the insurer was complete, and its liability had fully accrued. The only question for litigation was whether the railroad companies were protected by the insurance. The defendant is called upon to perform only its agreement to pay the insurance money in case of the destruction of the cotton by fire. Its liability is not dependent upon the question whether the liability of the railroad companies has been discharged; nor is the plaintiff's right of action contingent upon the payment by the railroad companies of the value of the cotton burned, but it is contingent only upon the destruction of the cotton by fire under circumstances which impose a liability upon the railroad companies.
We see no error in the record, and the judgment is Affirmed.
