UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                     No. 96-4221

OMAR ABDULLA ALI,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.
Frank W. Bullock, Jr., Chief District Judge.
(CR-95-206)

Submitted: February 28, 1997

Decided: April 10, 1997

Before WILLIAMS and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

A. Wayne Harrison, H. Davis North, III, HARRISON, NORTH,
COOKE & LANDRETH, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Lisa B. Boggs, Assis-
tant United States Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston, Assistant United
States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Omar Ali appeals conviction for possession of crack cocaine with
intent to distribute. See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A) (West
1981 & Supp. 1996). He claims that the trial court erred in its finding
that the search which led to the discovery of the cocaine fell within
the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule and therefore
improperly admitted evidence resulting from that search. He also con-
tends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 because there was insuf-
ficient evidence to support his conviction for constructive possession
of crack cocaine with intent to distribute.

Ali also appeals his sentence. He contends that the trial court erred
in increasing his offense level by two for possession of a dangerous
weapon during a drug offense, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Man-
ual § 2D1.1 (1995). He argues that he did not possess the gun and that
no evidence was presented suggesting that he knew of the gun or
should have reasonably foreseen its presence.

First, we already have determined in a prior opinion relating to one
of Ali's co-defendants that the search at issue was conducted in good-
faith and therefore evidence resulting from it was admissible under
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984). See United States
v. David, No. 96-4204 (4th Cir. Feb. 10, 1997) (unpublished). Ali
advances no new arguments regarding this claim and, accordingly, we
come to the same conclusion as before.

Second, we review the district court's denial of Ali's motion for
acquittal under a sufficiency of evidence standard. See Fed. R. Crim.
P. 29; United States v. Brooks, 957 F.2d 1138, 1147 (4th Cir. 1992).
To sustain a conviction, substantial evidence -- when viewed in the
light most favorable to the government -- must support the convic-

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tion beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d
849, 860 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 80 (1942). Constructive possession may be established by circum-
stantial or direct evidence and exists when the Government estab-
lishes the defendant's ownership, dominion, or control over the drug
(or the area in which the drug was concealed), and knowledge of its
presence. See United States v. Bell, 954 F.2d 232, 235 (4th Cir. 1992).
In light of these standards, we conclude that there was sufficient evi-
dence for a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ali
constructively possessed crack cocaine with the intent to distribute.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Ali's Rule 29
motion.

Finally, neither the absence of actual possession nor the lack of a
conspiracy conviction prohibits the application of a two-point
enhancement for possession of a gun during a drug trafficking crime.
Rather, the decision to apply such an enhancement is controlled by
whether it is clearly improbable that the weapon at issue was con-
nected to the offense and whether a co-defendant's possession of the
weapon falls within the Sentencing Guidelines's definition of relevant
conduct. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3; United States v. White, 875 F.2d 427,
433 (4th Cir. 1989). We conclude that the district court did not err in
assessing the two-point enhancement.

Accordingly, we affirm Ali's conviction and sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
quately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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