
159 U.S. 687 (1895)
THE BAYONNE.
No. 215.
Supreme Court of United States.
Submitted November 18, 1895.
Decided December 2, 1895.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
*692 Mr. Solicitor General Conrad for the motion to dismiss.
Mr. J. Parker Kirlin opposing.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
No question as to the constitutionality of the act of Congress arises on this appeal, but it is contended that the jurisdiction of the District Court was in issue, and that therefore the appeal was properly taken directly to this court. But the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, provides that in cases where the jurisdiction of the court below is in issue, that question, and that alone, shall be certified to this court for decision, the inquiry being limited to the question thus certified. United States v. Jahn, 155 U.S. 109, 113.
In Maynard v. Hecht, 151 U.S. 324, we held that a certificate from the court below of the question of jurisdiction to be decided was an absolute prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction here, and indicated by reference to the settled rules in relation to certificates of division of opinion in what manner we thought the certificate should be framed.
In Colvin v. Jacksonville, 158 U.S. 456, it was decided that such certificate must be granted during the term at which the judgment or decree is entered.
The District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York has monthly terms. Rev. Stat. 572. The decree here was entered December 21, and the appeal allowed December 31, 1892. On the seventeenth of the following January, during a new term of the court, the assignment of errors was directed to be filed nunc pro tunc as of December 31, 1892. If that assignment could be treated as a certificate, it came too late, and, as there is nothing in the record prior to the expiration of the December term, to indicate any attempt or intention to file a certificate during that *693 term, and there was no omission to enter anything which had actually been done at that term, the case did not come within the rule that permits an amendment of the record nunc pro tunc. Hickman v. Fort Scott, 141 U.S. 415, 418; Michigan Insurance Bank v. Eldred, 143 U.S. 293, 299. We do not, however, regard the assignment of errors, and the action of the court in directing it to be filed, as a compliance with the statutory provision and equivalent to the certificate required.
The certificate of November 8, 1895, which gives a statement of the case and certifies certain specific questions as questions of jurisdiction, was also wholly unavailing at that date.
Nor do we think that the allowance of the appeal can be treated as a certificate. The prayer for appeal did, indeed, state that claimant appealed "upon the ground that this court was without jurisdiction to make the said decree," but it specified no question of jurisdiction, and asked "that a transcript of the record and proceedings and papers upon which said final decree was made should be sent up," as if the appeal were on the whole case. The entry of the district judge thereon was "appeal allowed." This was wholly insufficient to subserve any other than the ostensible purpose.
In the case of The Lehigh Mining and Manufacturing Company, 156 U.S. 322, the defendant in an action of ejectment filed two pleas to the jurisdiction of the court, which pleas were sustained, and judgment thereupon entered as follows: "And for reasons in writing filed herewith, as part of this order, the court doth further consider that it has no jurisdiction of this case, and that the said action of ejectment be and the same is hereby dismissed for want of jurisdiction, but without prejudice to the parties to this suit." A bill of exceptions was taken, in which it was declared that the court "held that the court did not have jurisdiction of this suit, and ordered the same to be dismissed, to which opinion and action of the court, the plaintiff did then and there except." The plaintiff then prayed for a writ of error from this court, which was allowed by an order under the hand of the judge, and entered of record, reciting the final judgment entered, "dismissing the *694 said case because the said court, in its opinion, did not have jurisdiction thereof," and the plaintiff prayed for a writ of error "upon the said question of jurisdiction," and averring "that said writ of error be allowed and awarded as prayed for." Under these circumstances it was thought that the question was sufficiently certified.
In Shields v. Coleman, 157 U.S. 168, a receiver appointed by a state court intervened in a suit in the Circuit Court of the United States for the recovery of possession of railroad property from the receiver of the Circuit Court, and, his application having been denied, he prayed an appeal to this court from the decree and interlocutory orders by which the Circuit Court assumed and asserted jurisdiction over the property. The Circuit Court allowed the appeal by an order stating "this appeal is granted solely upon the question of jurisdiction," and reserving to the court the right, which it subsequently exercised, of determining what portion of the proceedings should be incorporated into the record for the purpose of presenting that question. We entertained jurisdiction in that case also. But we are of opinion that this case cannot be brought within either of those last cited.
The conclusion is that this appeal must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, because of the lack of the proper certificate, a defect which cannot now be supplied. We have assumed that jurisdictional questions existed, within the meaning of section 5 of the act of March 3, 1891, though not properly raised, but we do not wish to be understood as intimating any opinion on that subject.
Appeal dismissed.
