                        T.C. Memo. 2007-219



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



RHONDA K. JUELL, a.k.a. RHONDA K. JUELL-PODLAK, Petitioner, AND
                  GLENN M. EVANS, Intervenor v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 9631-06.              Filed August 8, 2007.



     Kelly W. Hoversten, for petitioner.

     Glenn M. Evans, pro se.

     Melissa J. Hedtke, for respondent.



             MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

     SWIFT, Judge:   Respondent determined deficiencies in

petitioner and intervenor’s Federal income taxes for 1987 through

1994 as follows:
                                   - 2 -
                       Year                Deficiency
                       1987                  $7,993
                       1988                   6,710
                       1989                   5,993
                       1990                   7,465
                       1991                   8,253
                       1992                   6,787
                       1993                   7,326
                       1994                   2,016


     Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to

the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue.

     The issue for decision is whether petitioner Rhonda Juell is

entitled to relief from joint and several liability under section

6015(b), (c), or (f) with respect to the entire amount of each of

the above tax deficiencies determined by respondent.    Intervenor

Glenn Evans (Glenn) objects to petitioner’s right to any relief

under section 6015.


                              FINDINGS OF FACT

     Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

     At the time the petition was filed, petitioner resided in

St. Cloud, Minnesota.

     On October 10, 1987, Glenn and petitioner were married.

     In 1988, petitioner received her teaching degree and ever

since has been employed as an elementary school teacher.   In

1994, the last year in issue, petitioner received a master’s

degree in education.
                               - 3 -
     During the marriage, Glenn maintained two separate checking

accounts and one separate savings account.    Petitioner never had

access to Glenn’s separate bank accounts.    Petitioner never

opened and never reviewed Glenn’s bank statements.

     Petitioner has never received any training or instruction in

business or taxes.   Over the years, petitioner has simply

deposited what remained, after expenses, of her approximate

$18,000 yearly salary into a checking account jointly maintained

by Glenn and petitioner.

     During the years in issue, Glenn was a college graduate

employed as a high school principal and earned approximately

$42,000 annually.

     During Glenn and petitioner’s marriage, Glenn handled all

significant financial matters, leaving some routine bills and

expenses to be paid by petitioner, which petitioner paid out of

the joint checking account.   Glenn made all mortgage and life

insurance payments and the payments relating to his separate

investments out of his separate checking accounts.

     In early 1990, through staff members at the school where

Glenn was a principal, Glenn learned of an investment opportunity

promoted by Walter J. Hoyt III that involved investing in cattle

breeding partnerships (the Hoyt partnerships).1



     1
      For a detailed description of the Hoyt partnerships see
Bulger v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2005-147.
                                - 4 -
     Generally, the Hoyt partnerships enabled investors to

receive partnership interests without making initial capital

contributions.    Investors were required to allow the Hoyt

partnerships or related entities to prepare the investors’ tax

returns, on which returns large losses would be allocated to the

partners, thereby reducing the investors’ reported tax

liabilities to zero.    Related tax refunds investors received

would be returned to the Hoyt partnerships to pay the investors’

capital contributions and related fees.

     Glenn traveled to Oregon to inspect a Hoyt partnership

ranch.   Glenn toured the ranch and met and spoke with individuals

affiliated with the Hoyt partnerships.    Petitioner did not

accompany Glenn to the ranch.

     Upon returning, Glenn explained to petitioner some aspects

of the Hoyt partnerships.    Petitioner told Glenn that she did not

understand the investments and that she did not want to get

involved in the Hoyt partnerships.

     Despite petitioner’s objection, Glenn invested in the Hoyt

partnerships.    To overcome petitioner’s objection, Glenn assured

petitioner that the investments were to be treated as his

separate investments and his responsibility and that petitioner

need not have anything to do with them.

     Glenn received documents and materials relating to the Hoyt

partnerships.    Included in these materials were subscription
                               - 5 -
agreements relating to three series of Hoyt partnership units,

powers of attorney granting Walter J. Hoyt III authority over

partnership matters, and various partnership agreements.    Glenn

signed the documents and instructed petitioner to sign the

documents.   When petitioner objected, Glenn explained to

petitioner that, because they were married, her signature was

required in order for him to invest.   Again, Glenn reassured

petitioner that she need not worry and that he would take full

responsibility.

     Relying on Glenn’s representations, and without reading

them, petitioner signed the Hoyt partnership documents.

     Petitioner never communicated with any Hoyt partnership

representatives, never attended any partnership-related meetings,

and never read any correspondence or promotional materials from

the Hoyt partnerships.   Petitioner placed mail relating to the

Hoyt partnerships aside, unopened, for Glenn to deal with, as she

considered the Hoyt partnerships his investments.

     All payments and contributions to the Hoyt partnerships were

made by Glenn from his separate bank accounts.   Over the years,

Glenn wrote more than 20 checks exceeding $55,956 to the Hoyt

partnerships and related entities.

     At no time did petitioner contribute any funds to the Hoyt

partnerships.
                               - 6 -
     Glenn collected and gathered the necessary documents to

enable WJ Hoyt Sons Laguna Tax Service, a Hoyt partnership-

related entity, to prepare his and petitioner’s joint Federal

income tax returns.

     On or about July 25, 1991, on behalf of Glenn and

petitioner, WJ Hoyt Sons Laguna Tax Service prepared and

submitted to respondent a Form 1045, Application for Tentative

Refund, for the years 1987, 1988, and 1989, on which a claimed

$143,854 net operating loss relating to the Hoyt partnerships was

carried back from 1990.   For 1990 through 1993, the same Hoyt

partnership-related tax preparer prepared Glenn and petitioner’s

joint Federal income tax returns.

     During the years in issue, claimed Hoyt partnership-related

losses dramatically reduced Glenn and petitioner’s reported joint

adjusted gross income (AGI), resulting in Glenn and petitioner’s

receiving tax refunds of Federal income taxes paid for 5 of the 8

years in issue, and significantly reducing Glenn and petitioner’s

reported tax liabilities for the other tax years.

     The schedule below reflects, for each of the years in issue,

Glenn and petitioner’s reported AGI before claiming the Hoyt

partnership-related items and their reported AGI after claiming

the Hoyt-related items:
                                - 7 -

            Glenn and Petitioner’s        Glenn and Petitioner’s
             Reported AGI Before            Reported AGI After
           Hoyt Partnership-Related      Hoyt Partnership-Related
  Year        Claimed Tax Benefits         Claimed Tax Benefits
  1987                $51,210                        0
  1988                 46,696                        0
  1989                 51,435                        0
  1990                 64,522                    ($142,216)
  1991                 61,669                       5,030
  1992                 69,530                      29,639
  1993                 68,124                      25,882
  1994                 86,523                      76,368


     When a tax refund was received, it was deposited by Glenn

into one of Glenn’s separate bank accounts, and Glenn would then,

pursuant to his commitment under the Hoyt partnership agreement,

write a check on one of his separate bank accounts to either a

Hoyt partnership or a Hoyt partnership-related entity for a

nearly identical amount.

     Attached to the 1991, 1992, and 1993 joint Federal income

tax returns were material participation statements indicating

that Glenn and petitioner were co-owners of a cattle production

and sales business.    Attached to the 1992 return was an affidavit

signed by Glenn and petitioner, stating that Glenn and petitioner

were “actively engaged” in the business of cattle ranching.

     Petitioner, however, was not in any way involved in the

preparation of the above joint Federal income tax returns.    Glenn
                                 - 8 -
told petitioner, and petitioner believed, that because they were

married they had to file joint tax returns.    Glenn further told

petitioner that, because he was involved in the Hoyt

partnerships, she was required to sign the documents attached to

the returns relating to the Hoyt partnerships.    Relying on Glenn,

petitioner signed the tax returns and attached materials, despite

having not read the materials.    Petitioner did not read the

materials attached to the return because she felt she did not

know enough to understand them.

     Each year, petitioner objected to signing the tax returns

reflecting the tax benefits relating to the Hoyt partnerships,

and petitioner asked Glenn to get out of the Hoyt partnership

investments.   Petitioner reluctantly signed the tax returns and

attached documents only after Glenn reassured petitioner that tax

professionals had prepared them and that she was required to

sign.

     During the years in issue, petitioner’s standard of living

remained constant.   There were no lavish expenditures of any kind

that benefited petitioner, and petitioner did not receive any

benefit from the tax refunds and the tax reductions based on the

Hoyt partnerships because the tax refunds were deposited into

Glenn’s separate accounts and then contributed by Glenn back to

the partnerships.
                                 - 9 -
     The credits and deductions relating to the Hoyt partnerships

claimed on Glenn and petitioner’s joint Federal income tax

returns for the years in issue were eventually disallowed by

respondent, resulting in the tax deficiencies determined by

respondent as set forth above.    See supra p. 2.

     In or about October 1997, Glenn and petitioner were

separated, and they were divorced in February of 2000.

     During 2000, petitioner received her first correspondence

from respondent alerting her to the above tax deficiencies that

respondent had determined.

     On August 13, 2001, petitioner acknowledged and entered into

a closing agreement with respondent with respect to the above tax

deficiencies relating to the Hoyt partnerships for 1987 through

1997.

     On May 21, 2002, petitioner submitted to respondent a Form

8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief, under section 6015(b),

(c), and (f) with respect to the entire amount of each tax

deficiency for each year in issue.

     On July 16, 2003, respondent issued a preliminary

determination letter denying petitioner’s request for innocent

spouse relief.

     On February 17, 2006, respondent issued a notice of

determination denying petitioner’s request for innocent spouse

relief.
                               - 10 -
       On May 22, 2006, petitioner timely filed a petition with

this Court for relief from joint and several liability with

regard to the entire amount of the above tax deficiencies

relating to the Hoyt partnership investments in which Glenn had

invested.

       Shortly before trial, respondent agreed that petitioner

qualified for partial relief from joint liability under section

6015(c) for each year in issue, reducing the tax deficiency for

which petitioner is allegedly liable for each year by

approximately two-thirds.

       Since her divorce in 2000, petitioner has timely filed

separate individual Federal income tax returns, and no tax

deficiencies for years subsequent to 1994 have been determined by

respondent against petitioner.

       Petitioner has since remarried, and petitioner and her

current husband earn approximately $100,000 a year, of which

petitioner earns approximately $60,000.


                               OPINION

       Generally, taxpayers filing joint Federal income tax returns

are jointly and severally liable for all taxes due.    Sec.

6013(d)(3).    However, relief from joint liability may be

available in circumstances described in section 6015(b), (c), and

(f).
                                - 11 -
     Petitioner claims that she is entitled to additional relief

from joint liability under section 6015(b), (c), and (f), beyond

the two-thirds relief already granted by respondent.

     A taxpayer spouse who meets certain qualifications may elect

relief under section 6015(b).     Generally, to qualify for relief

under section 6015(b)(1), the electing spouse must establish

that:


             (A) A joint return was filed;

          (B) there is an understatement of tax on the return
     which is attributable to the erroneous items of the
     nonelecting spouse;

          (C) in signing the return, the electing spouse did not
     know, and had no reason to know, that there was such an
     understatement;

          (D) taking into account all the facts and
     circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the electing spouse
     liable for the deficiency in tax for the taxable year
     attributable to the understatement; and

             (E) a timely election has been made.


     Respondent does not dispute that petitioner meets the

requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (E) of section 6015(b)(1),

but respondent contends that petitioner has not satisfied the

requirements of subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D).


Section 6015(b)(1)(B):     Attributable to Nonelecting Spouse

        When determining whether an erroneous item is attributable

to a nonelecting spouse, we look not only to how ownership is
                              - 12 -
nominally held between the spouses but also to each spouse’s

level of participation in the activity which gave rise to the

erroneous item.

     Joint ownership, by itself, is not determinative of whether

the erroneous item is attributable to one or both spouses.   See

Rowe v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-325; Buchine v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-36, affd. 20 F.3d 173 (5th Cir.

1994).   A key factor is whether and to what extent the electing

spouse voluntarily participated in the investment which gave rise

to the erroneous item.

     Generally, an electing spouse who voluntarily agrees to

enter into an investment and who actively participates in it is

precluded from attributing the entire investment to the

nonelecting spouse.   See Abelein v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2004-274; Capehart v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-268, affd.

204 Fed. Appx. 618 (9th Cir. 2006); Bartak v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2004-83, affd. 158 Fed. Appx. 43 (9th Cir. 2005); Ellison

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-57; Doyel v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2004-35.

     However, if the electing spouse is not an active

participant, the electing spouse may qualify for relief even

though being named as a shareholder or partner.   See McKnight v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-155 (in the context of section
                              - 13 -
6015(c) and (f)); Rowe v. Commissioner, supra; Buchine v.

Commissioner, supra.

     In Bartak v. Commissioner, supra, Ellison v. Commissioner,

supra, and Doyel v. Commissioner, supra, the electing spouses

each agreed to invest in the investments which gave rise to the

erroneous items and did so jointly with their spouses by using

funds from joint bank accounts.   Further, the electing spouses

considered the investments to be their own, as well as their

husbands’, and were denied relief because the erroneous items

were not entirely attributable to their husbands.

     Similarly, in Abelein v. Commissioner, supra, and Capehart

v. Commissioner, supra, the electing spouses not only used funds

from joint accounts to invest, but also met and toured with

persons associated with the business activities, contacted them

on occasion, and received and read materials relating to them.

     In contrast, in McKnight v. Commissioner, supra, Rowe v.

Commissioner, supra, and Buchine v. Commissioner, supra, because

they did not participate in the business activity, the electing

spouses were granted relief despite being named as shareholders or

partners.   In Rowe the electing spouse did not make or participate

in any decision relating to the activity, did not sign any checks

relating to the activity, and was not otherwise involved in the

activity.   In Buchine, the electing spouse’s name appeared as

shareholder and partner, but she had no knowledge of being named on

the Schedule K-1, and she only attended one promotional meeting.
                              - 14 -
     In McKnight v. Commissioner, supra, erroneous items were

attributed entirely to the nonelecting spouse, even though the

electing spouse signed organizational documents relating to the

investment and was listed as a director.   We noted that the

spouse signed the documents at her husband’s insistence, after

assurances from him that he was sole owner of the business and

without awareness on her part of the legal significance.

     On the facts before us, petitioner more closely resembles

the spouses who were granted relief in Rowe v. Commissioner,

supra, and Buchine v. Commissioner, supra.    Petitioner

participated in the Hoyt partnerships in name only.   Petitioner

repeatedly objected to Glenn’s involvement in the Hoyt

partnerships.   Petitioner never agreed to invest in the Hoyt

partnerships, and petitioner signed Hoyt documents solely because

of Glenn’s representations and insistence and without being aware

of the legal significance thereof.

     At no time did petitioner invest any of her funds in the

Hoyt partnerships.   Petitioner did not attend any meetings, make

any contact, or read any promotional materials.   Glenn made all

payments to the Hoyt partnerships from his separate accounts,

accounts to which petitioner had no access.   Mail relating to the

Hoyt partnerships was left unopened for Glenn.

     Respondent argues that introductory language in the closing

agreement petitioner entered into with respondent constitutes an

admission by petitioner that she was a partner in and agreed to
                              - 15 -
the investment in the Hoyt partnerships.    To the contrary, that

particular language simply associates the Hoyt partnerships with

the tax deficiencies and does not constitute an admission as to

the level of petitioner’s involvement in the Hoyt partnerships.

See Zaentz v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 753, 762 (1988).

     Because the understatements are attributable entirely to

Glenn, petitioner satisfies section 6015(b)(1)(B).


Section 6015(b)(1)(C):   Know or Reason To Know2

     A spouse seeking relief from joint liability under section

6015(b) must not have known or had reason to know at the time of

signing a joint tax return that there was an understatement of

tax on a return.   Sec. 6015(b)(1)(C).   In deduction cases, the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has adopted

the standard set forth in Price v. Commissioner, 887 F.2d 959,

963-965 (9th Cir. 1989).   See Erdahl v. Commissioner, 930 F.2d

585, 589 (8th Cir. 1991), revg. T.C. Memo. 1990-101.3

     Under the Price standard, the Court inquires as to whether

“‘a reasonably prudent taxpayer under the circumstances of the


     2
      “The requirement in sec. 6015(b)(1)(C) * * * is virtually
identical to the same requirement of former sec. 6013(e)(1)(C);
therefore, cases interpreting former sec. 6013(e) remain
instructive to our analysis.” Doyel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2004-35.
     3
      Because an appeal in this case would lie in the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, we follow Eighth Circuit law.
See Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), affd. 445 F.2d
985 (10th Cir. 1971).
                              - 16 -
spouse at the time of signing the return could be expected to

know that the tax liability stated was erroneous or that further

investigation was warranted.’”   Id. at 590 (quoting Stevens v.

Commissioner, 872 F.2d 1499, 1505 (11th Cir. 1989), affg. T.C.

Memo. 1988-63).

     Even if a spouse is not aware of sufficient facts to give

her reason to know of the substantial understatement, she

nevertheless may know enough facts to put her on notice that an

understatement exists.   Price v. Commissioner, supra at 965.     The

question to ask is whether “a reasonably prudent taxpayer in her

position [would] be led to question the legitimacy of the

deduction.”   Guth v. Commissioner, 897 F.2d 441, 445 (9th Cir.

1990) (citing Price v. Commissioner, supra at 975) (emphasis

removed), affg. T.C. Memo. 1987-522).

     A spouse electing relief may satisfy the duty to inquire by

questioning the deductions and receiving assurances as to their

legitimacy.   Erdahl v. Commissioner, supra at 590 n.7.   These

assurances may come from the electing spouse’s husband.   See

Price v. Commissioner, supra at 966 (duty of inquiry satisfied

where spouse questioned husband about large deductions who

assured her that the returns were prepared by a C.P.A.); Foley v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-16 (spouse satisfied duty of

inquiry by asking husband about tax shelter deductions, hearing

that she should not worry because he invested in tax shelters and
                                - 17 -
because return preparer had signed return); Estate of Killian v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-365 (spouse took reasonable steps

to determine the accuracy of the return by questioning husband

about sham losses, who assured her that the losses were due to an

investment recommended by a C.P.A. who prepared the return).

     The factors established in Price v. Commissioner, supra, as

to whether the electing spouse had reason to know or a duty to

inquire include the spouse’s level of education, the spouse’s

involvement in family financial affairs, the evasiveness or

deceit of the culpable spouse, and any unusual or lavish

expenditures inconsistent with the family’s ordinary standard of

living.   Erdahl v. Commissioner, supra at 591 (quoting Guth v.

Commissioner, supra at 444).

     On the facts before us, we find that petitioner did not know

and did not have reason to know of the understatements on the tax

returns when she signed them.    Petitioner satisfied her duty of

inquiry by questioning her husband and receiving strong and

repeated assurances from him.

     All four factors discussed in Price v. Commissioner, supra,

weigh in favor of granting petitioner relief.   Petitioner had no

experience academically or practically regarding business, taxes,

or investments and has worked as an elementary school teacher.

Petitioner’s involvement in the family financial affairs was

limited to paying routine bills out of the joint account.   Glenn
                              - 18 -
was deceptive in that he told petitioner she had to file joint

Federal income tax returns with him and that the Hoyt

partnerships would be his responsibility.    Finally, there

occurred no unusual or lavish family expenditures that would have

notified petitioner of the understatement.

     Respondent contends that the size of the deductions on the

tax returns was sufficient to instill in petitioner a duty to

inquire.   Even if such a duty arose, petitioner satisfied the

duty of inquiry by confronting Glenn each year and questioning

the Hoyt partnership-related items.

     Because petitioner did not know or have a reason to know

that the deductions were erroneous, and because she satisfied her

duty of inquiry, petitioner satisfies section 6015(b)(1)(C).


Section 6015(b)(1)(D):   Inequity

     Whether it would be inequitable to hold a spouse liable for

a tax deficiency is determined by “taking into account all the

facts and circumstances.”   Sec. 6015(b)(1)(D).4   The two most

often cited factors to be considered are: (1) Whether there has

been a significant benefit to the spouse claiming relief, and

(2) whether the failure to report the correct tax liability on



     4
      “The requirement in sec. 6015(b)(1)(D) * * * is virtually
identical to the same requirement of former sec. 6013(e)(1)(D);
therefore cases interpreting former sec. 6013(e) remain
instructive to our analysis.” Doyel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2004-35.
                              - 19 -
the joint return results from concealment, overreaching, or any

other wrongdoing on the part of the other spouse.    Alt v.

Commissioner, 119 T.C. 306, 314 (2002), affd. 101 Fed. Appx. 34

(6th Cir. 2004).   We also consider factors utilized in

determining “inequity” in the context of section 6015(f).5

Normal support is not considered a significant benefit.       Estate

of Krock v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 672, 678 (1989).   Where the

electing spouse’s standard of living remains constant,

significant benefit may still be found if the tax savings are

“immensely beneficial”.   Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106,

119-120 (2002), affd. 353 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003).

     Because, as stated previously, petitioner’s standard of

living remained constant throughout the years in issue and

because the claimed tax refunds and savings were not needed or

used to support petitioner but were returned to the Hoyt

partnerships by Glenn, petitioner received no benefit as a result

of the erroneously claimed Hoyt partnership-related tax benefits.

     Respondent contends that petitioner could have received a

significant benefit from the refunds even though they were

reinvested and cites Capehart v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-




     5
      Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2000-1 C.B. 447, 448-449,
lists nonexclusive factors to be considered in determining
whether it is inequitable to hold the electing spouse liable for
all or part of a deficiency under sec. 6015(f).
                              - 20 -
268 (spouse benefited from receiving refund despite reinvestment

in Hoyt partnerships).

     The determinative fact, however, is not that a refund was

received but who benefited from it.    In particular, we have held

that, where a refund was used to benefit an electing spouse in a

manner beyond normal support or where an electing spouse chooses

to invest a refund in business activities, a significant benefit

was received.   See Abelein v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-274

(spouse and her husband reinvested portions of refund into a

business activity); Pierce v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-188

(spouse used refund to contribute capital and lend funds to an

investment); French v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-38 (spouse

used refund to jointly purchase several certificates of deposit

in large denominations); Schlosser v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

1992-233 (spouse used refund for investments and to pay off

debts), affd. without published opinion 2 F.3d 404 (11th Cir.

1993).

     If, however, a tax refund is used only by a nonelecting

spouse for his or her own investment, the electing spouse would

not necessarily have received a significant benefit.   See Hillman

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-151 (nonelecting spouse used

refund to buy himself a Porsche automobile and a Rolex watch and

to invest in a motion picture); Estate of Killian v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-365 (nonelecting spouse used refund
                               - 21 -
to pay off his personal loans and to invest in a limited

partnership).

     Petitioner resembles the innocent spouses in Hillman and

Killian, in that the funds were not used to benefit her in any

way but were funneled into Glenn’s investments in the Hoyt

partnerships.

     Because petitioner received little to no benefit from the

erroneously claimed Hoyt partnership-related tax benefits, we

find that this factor weighs heavily in favor of granting

petitioner relief.

       The second prominent factor--namely, concealment or

wrongdoing by the nonrequesting spouse, also weighs in

petitioner’s favor.    As stated, Glenn repeatedly told petitioner

that they were required to file joint Federal income tax returns,

that the Hoyt partnerships were his investments, and that he

would be responsible for them.    This factor, combined with other

factors, demonstrates that it would be inequitable to hold

petitioner liable.    We note that petitioner is divorced from

Glenn, that none of the erroneous deductions is attributable to

her, that she did not know and had no reason to know of the

substantial understatements, that she satisfied her duty of

inquiry, and that she has subsequently made a good faith effort

to comply with the tax laws.
                              - 22 -
     The facts that weigh against granting relief, such as

petitioner’s lack of financial hardship, are insufficient to deny

petitioner relief.   Petitioner satisfies section 6015(b)(1)(D).


Section 6015(c) and (f)

     Because petitioner qualifies under section 6015(b) for

relief from joint liability with regard to 100 percent of the tax

deficiencies relating to the Hoyt partnership investments, we

need not address petitioner’s eligibility for relief under

subsections (c) and (f) of section 6015.

     To reflect the foregoing,


                                      Decision will be entered for

                                 petitioner.
