                        T.C. Memo. 2006-209



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



  CLAIRE C. MEADE, Petitioner AND JAMES W. MEADE, Intervenor v.
           COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 8357-04.                  Filed September 27, 2006.



     Claire C. Meade, pro se.

     James W. Meade, pro se.

     Lauren B. Epstein, for respondent.



                        MEMORANDUM OPINION


     KROUPA, Judge:   This case was assigned to and trial was

conducted by Chief Special Trial Judge Peter J. Panuthos pursuant

to section 7443A(b)(6)1 and Rules 180 and 183.    His recommended


     1
         All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
                                                    (continued...)
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findings of fact and conclusions of law were filed and served

upon the parties on November 25, 2005.    Neither party filed

anything in response to the recommended findings of fact and

conclusions of law.

     We are mindful in reviewing Chief Special Trial Judge

Panuthos’s recommended findings of fact that new Rule 183(d)

provides we shall give due regard to the circumstance that the

Special Trial Judge had the opportunity to evaluate the

credibility of witnesses and shall presume the findings of fact

recommended by the Special Trial Judge to be correct.

     We have given appropriate deference to the Special Trial

Judge’s recommended findings of fact.    We have made major changes

to his conclusions, however, taking into account subsequent

decisions by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth

Circuits and by this Court.   See Sjodin v. Commissioner, 174 Fed.

Appx. 359 (8th Cir. 2006), vacating and remanding per curiam T.C.

Memo. 2004-205; Bartman v. Commissioner, 446 F.3d 785 (8th Cir.

2006), affg. in part and vacating in part T.C. Memo. 2004-93;

Commissioner v. Ewing, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006), revg. 118

T.C. 494 (2002), vacating 122 T.C. 32 (2004); Billings v.

Commissioner, 127 T.C. ___ (2006).     The recommended findings of

fact and conclusions of law of Chief Special Trial Judge


     1
      (...continued)
Practice and Procedure, and all section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code.
                                 - 3 -

Panuthos, as modified in major respects, are set forth below as

the report of the Court.

     This case arose from petitioner’s request for relief from

joint and several liability under section 6015(f) for the taxable

years 1998, 1999, and 2000.2   After our Opinion was filed in

Billings, we issued an order directing the parties to show cause

why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Respondent filed a response to the Court’s order agreeing that we

lack jurisdiction.   Petitioner filed a document that was

nonresponsive to the jurisdictional issue but questioned whether

she had any liability if no deficiency was asserted against her.

We have concluded that we lack jurisdiction to review

respondent’s denial of relief under section 6015(f) where no

deficiency has been asserted, and we shall therefore dismiss this

case for lack of jurisdiction.

                            Background

     Some of the facts have been stipulated, and the stipulated

facts are incorporated by this reference.   Petitioner and




     2
        Petitioner elected small tax case status pursuant to sec.
7463, and the Court granted the request. Before trial,
respondent made an oral motion to discontinue small tax case
proceedings because the amount of relief sought exceeded the
applicable jurisdictional amount prescribed in the statute. The
Court agreed with respondent and granted respondent’s oral motion
to strike the “S” designation from this case. See secs. 6015(e),
7463(f). The Court explained to the parties that the case would
be considered under the Rule 183 procedures.
                                - 4 -

intervenor resided in Sarasota, Florida, at the time she filed

the petition and he filed the notice of intervention.

     Petitioner and intervenor were married in 1981, and they

have lived together as husband and wife.     At the time of trial

they had not divorced or separated.     On August 11, 2003,

petitioner submitted a Form 8857, Request for Innocent Spouse

Relief, to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).     The IRS issued a

notice of determination with respect to the taxable year 1998 on

March 23, 2004.   On June 18, 2004, a notice of determination was

issued with respect to the taxable years 1999, 2000, and 2001.

The petition seeking relief for the taxable years 1998, 1999, and

2000 was filed May 20, 2004.3

                            Discussion

     A tax deficiency is a prerequisite to relief under section

6015(b) or (c).   Sec. 6015(b)(1)(B) and (c)(1); Block v.

Commissioner, 120 T.C. 62, 65-66 (2003).     Petitioner and

intervenor filed joint returns resulting in an underpayment.

There being no tax deficiency, relief is not available under

either subsection (b) or (c).   See Washington v. Commissioner,




     3
        While the petition was filed before the notice of
determination issued on June 18, 2004, the petition appears to
have been filed on a date that is 6 months after the date the
sec. 6015 election was made. See sec. 6015(e)(1)(A)(i)(II).
Neither party has questioned jurisdiction with respect to 1998,
1999, or 2000 in this respect.
                                 - 5 -

120 T.C. 137, 146-147 (2003).    Thus, petitioner’s only claim is

that she is entitled to equitable relief under section 6015(f).

     After the trial, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit both

held that we do not have jurisdiction to consider the

Commissioner’s denials of requests for relief under section

6015(f) where no deficiency has been asserted.     Sjodin v.

Commissioner, supra; Bartman v. Commissioner, supra; Commissioner

v. Ewing, supra.   We have since come to the same conclusion.

Billings v. Commissioner, supra.

     The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction, and we may

exercise that jurisdiction only to the extent authorized by

Congress.   Naftel v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 527, 529 (1985).

Whether this Court has jurisdiction is fundamental, and we may

question our jurisdiction at any time.     Smith v. Commissioner,

124 T.C. 36, 40 (2005) (citing Raymond v. Commissioner, 119 T.C.

191, 193 (2002), Neely v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 287, 290 (2000),

and Romann v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. 273, 280 (1998)); Naftel v.

Commissioner, supra at 530.     As we have concluded that we do not

have jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s denials of

requests for relief under section 6015(f) where no deficiency has

been asserted, we shall dismiss this case for lack of

jurisdiction.
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To reflect the foregoing,


                                       An order of dismissal

                                    for lack of jurisdiction

                                    will be entered.
