                         T.C. Memo. 2004-3



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



        PERRY GOLDMAN AND SANDRA GOLDMAN, Petitioners v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 14639-02L.            Filed January 5, 2004.



     Perry Goldman and Sandra Goldman, pro sese.

     Leonard T. Provenzale, for respondent.



                        MEMORANDUM OPINION


     GERBER, Judge:   Respondent, in a motion filed on October 27,

2003, moved for summary judgment on the question of whether he

may proceed with the collection process with respect to

petitioners.   Respondent alleges that the section 6330

prerequisites have been met and that he should be allowed to

proceed with collection of petitioners’ assessed and outstanding
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tax liabilities.   Petitioners’ objection to respondent’s motion

was presented at a hearing on December 1, 2003.   Petitioners

contend that there was an abuse of discretion because

respondent’s Appeals officer refused to discharge or release the

Federal tax lien, notice of which has been filed, with respect to

certain real property.   Petitioners resided in Florida at the

time they filed their petition.

Background

     Petitioners’ 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994 income tax returns

were examined, and respondent determined income tax deficiencies

in each year.   Petitioners petitioned this Court with respect to

the 1991, 1992, and 1993 years and, eventually, entered into an

agreed decision that was entered on July 16, 1998.   With respect

to the 1994 year, petitioners attempted to petition this Court,

but the matter was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.   Based on

these events, petitioners’ 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994 income tax

deficiencies were assessed.

     Respondent sent petitioners a Notice of Federal Tax Lien

Filing And Your Right To A Hearing Under I.R.C. section 6320,

dated March 27, 2002, advising that a Notice of Federal Tax Lien

had been filed on March 22, 2002.   Prior to the filing of the

notice, petitioners submitted several offers-in-compromise with

respect to doubt as to collectibility of the outstanding

assessments.    The offers were rejected because it was determined
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that petitioners were able to pay the outstanding liabilities in

full.

     Petitioners’ requested hearing under sections 6320 and 6330

was held on July 25, 2002, and, again, petitioners offered to

compromise due to lack of collectibility.   In a July 26, 2002,

letter, respondent’s Appeals officer rejected petitioners’ offer

on the grounds that petitioners were capable of payment in full.

The Appeals officer’s conclusion was based on information that

petitioners had purchased real property in Fort Pierce, Florida,

for $130,000 on August 10, 1999, and that the same property was

quitclaimed to petitioners’ son, Craig Goldman, on July 3, 2001,

for $100.

     Petitioners contend that the Fort Pierce realty was actually

in their son’s name as well as their own since the purchase in

1999.   Petitioners further contend that respondent should have

discharged or released the lien as it relates to that realty and

accepted their offer to compromise.

Discussion

     Respondent seeks summary judgment with respect to whether he

may proceed to collect certain outstanding tax liabilities

against petitioners.   Rule 121 provides for summary judgment for

part or all of the legal issues in controversy if there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact.   Sundstrand Corp. v.

Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th
                                 - 4 -

Cir. 1994).     In that regard, summary judgment is intended to

expedite litigation and avoid unnecessary and expensive trials.

Fla. Peach Corp. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988).        There

remains no genuine issue as to any material fact in this case.

     Petitioners had the opportunity to contest the underlying

merits of their 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994 income tax

deficiencies.    Accordingly, our review is limited to the

administrative determination for abuse of discretion.     Sec.

6330(c)(2)(B); Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000).

Petitioners allege an abuse of discretion by respondent due to

the fact that the Appeals officer rejected petitioners’ $1,800

offer in compromise.     That decision was made based on information

available to respondent showing that petitioners owned real

property in Fort Pierce, Florida, which was sufficient in value

to satisfy all outstanding tax liabilities.

     Petitioners contend, in effect, that their son was the true

owner of the Fort Pierce realty and that, in some manner,

petitioners were nominees and not true owners.     Petitioners,

however, provided no evidence to respondent to verify or

substantiate their contention.     Conversely, respondent provided

evidence to petitioners showing that they were the sole owners of

the subject realty at the time the Government’s assessments were

made and the Federal tax lien arose.     Under the circumstances,

petitioners have not shown an abuse of discretion by respondent
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in refusing to accept their offer-in-compromise.       In addition,

respondent has, in all other respects, complied with the

requirements of sections 6320 and 6330 so as to be entitled to

proceed with collection of petitioners’ outstanding tax

liabilities for 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994.

     To reflect the foregoing,



                                         An appropriate order and

                                 decision will be entered granting

                                 respondent’s motion for summary

                                 judgment.
