UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                 No. 96-4793

ANTHONY MCQUEEN, a/k/a Champ,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Wilmington.
W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge.
(CR-95-26-BR)

Submitted: March 31, 1998

Decided: June 18, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN, WILKINS, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Dismissed in part and affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

John J. Korzen, SMITH, HELMS, MULLISS & MOORE, L.L.P.,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Janice McKenzie Cole,
United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant United States
Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Anthony McQueen appeals from an amended judgment of convic-
tion on one count of possession with intent to distribute heroin. The
district court entered the original judgment on August 28, 1995, sen-
tencing McQueen to 189 months' imprisonment followed by five
years of supervised release. McQueen did not appeal his conviction
and sentence. In August 1996, the United States filed a motion for
consideration of a sentencing departure, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P.
35(b), on McQueen's behalf. The district court granted the motion
and reduced the term of imprisonment to 110 months. The district
court entered the amended judgment on October 21, 1996. McQueen
timely noted an appeal of the amended judgment.

I

On appeal, McQueen first argues that his guilty plea should be
invalidated, and that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and Fifth Amendment right to due process when the district
court denied his motion for appointment of counsel on the day of trial,
one month after the court granted his request to proceed pro se.

These claims arise from the 1995 judgment of conviction. We are
without jurisdiction to review these claims. The October 1996 notice
of appeal is untimely with respect to the August 1995 judgment of
conviction. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b). The August 1995 judgment was
a final order for purposes of appeal; the 1996 judgment only modified
the 1995 judgment with respect to the Rule 35(b) motion. See 18
U.S.C. § 3582(b) (1994).1 Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction to
review these claims, and we dismiss the appeal in part.
_________________________________________________________________
1 McQueen did not address the lack of jurisdiction in his opening brief.
In his reply brief, McQueen argues that because the district court erred

                    2
II

McQueen also claims that the prosecutor provided false informa-
tion to the district court during the departure hearing, in violation of
his due process rights. We have jurisdiction to review this claim. Mc-
Queen did not object to the allegedly false information during the
departure hearing, so this claim is reviewable only for plain error. See
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993).

McQueen alleges that the false information put forth by the prose-
cutor at the departure hearing was the following statement: "[Mc-
Queen has not shown] full, complete cooperation, debriefings, and
willingness to testify." (JA 202). McQueen argues that the statement
is false and that he did cooperate because he was debriefed three
times and had been willing to testify at the trial of other defendants.

At the departure hearing,2 the Government's position on Mc-
Queen's cooperation was that it was late, that he minimized his
involvement, and that he was not credible regarding the amount of
drugs involved. However, the prosecutor also stated that McQueen
"provided information and accepted he would testify. . . . We're say-
ing he did substantially assist but in the range of what other people
have done, that is full complete cooperation, debriefings and willing-
ness to testify and put their life behind them, Mr. McQueen did not
_________________________________________________________________
by failing to advise him that he had a right to appeal his sentence, as
required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(5), the ten day appeal period did not
begin to run after entry of the original judgment. Even if the district court
failed to properly inform McQueen, the merits of that issue cannot be
reached here. McQueen may raise this claim in a collateral proceeding
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). The appeal
period for a criminal case cannot be tolled or suspended unless the defen-
dant makes a timely motion under limited circumstances that are inappli-
cable in this case. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b) (listing motions that delay the
ten day appeal period).

2 McQueen represented himself at the departure hearing. Contrary to
his assertion on appeal, he was not entitled to counsel at that hearing. See
United States v. Palomo, 80 F.3d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Boyce, 352 F.2d 786, 787-88 (4th Cir. 1965).

                     3
rise to that level . . . ." (JA 201-202). In addition, the Government
advised the court that McQueen had substantially assisted. The Gov-
ernment's position reflects the perception that McQueen was less
forthcoming in the matter than other similarly situated defendants.
Taken in context, and considering the entirety of the proceedings, the
Government's statement cannot be construed as a denial that Mc-
Queen participated in debriefing or that he was wholly unwilling to
testify.

McQueen did not present evidence to contradict the Government's
position.3 Further, although McQueen may have hoped for a greater
reduction in his sentence, he received a substantial reduction as a
result of the Government's motion. On this record, we cannot say that
the prosecutor's statements constituted plain error. Thus, we affirm
the district court's order reducing McQueen's sentence.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART
_________________________________________________________________
3 On appeal and in his pleading in support of the Rule 35(b) motion,
McQueen states that he took and passed a lie detector test. McQueen did
not elaborate further as to what questions the test encompassed or how
the test was related to the claims presented on appeal. Regardless, this
court has held that results of polygraph examinations are not admissible
evidence. See United States v. Chambers, 985 F.2d 1263, 1270-71 (4th
Cir. 1993).

                    4
