UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
                                                                       No. 96-4759
MAURICE SHELTON LYONS, a/k/a
David Lewis,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro.
Frank W. Bullock, Jr., Chief District Judge.
(CR-96-96)

Submitted: May 15, 1997

Decided: June 3, 1997

Before RUSSELL, HALL, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

William E. Martin, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis, Assis-
tant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appel-
lant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney, Timika Shafeek,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Maurice Shelton Lyons pled guilty to possession with intent to dis-
tribute cocaine hydrochloride under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(B) (1994). He appeals his sentence, alleging that the district
court erred by failing to grant him an adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility under the Sentencing Guidelines.* For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.

While conducting drug interdiction at the Greensboro airport, offi-
cers approached Lyons and another man. Lyons lied to police and told
them his name was David Lewis and produced identification in that
name. After a drug detection dog alerted on a box (which was later
found to contain cocaine), Lyons initially denied it was his luggage
and then later admitted it was. After his arrest, Lyons continued to
identify himself as David Lewis and provided a pretrial services offi-
cer with false information regarding his residence, social security
number, and employment. Only after fingerprint analysis showed his
true identity did Lyons admit his falsehoods. Accordingly, the proba-
tion officer recommended in the presentence report (PSR) an upward
adjustment for obstruction of justice under USSG§ 3C1.1 and did not
recommend a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility
under USSG § 3E1.1. At his sentencing hearing, Lyons withdrew his
objection to the obstruction of justice enhancement in the PSR but
maintained that he should receive a downward adjustment for accep-
tance of responsibility. The district court declined, finding that Lyons
failed to make "an extraordinary, if you will, effort to cooperate or
indicat[e] his willingness immediately to cooperate with the govern-
ment . . . [or] show that not only had he recognized that he was wrong
in giving a false identity for obstruction, but that. . . he would do any-
thing he could to make it right."
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*See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual,
(USSG) § 3E1.1 (Nov. 1995).

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Whether to apply § 3E1.1 is a factual issue reviewed for clear error.
See United States v. Melton, 970 F.2d 1328, 1335 (4th Cir. 1992). A
defendant who enters a guilty plea prior to trial is not thereby entitled
to an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. See USSG § 3E1.1
comment. (n.3). Further, conduct resulting in an enhancement for
obstruction of justice ordinarily indicates that a defendant has not
accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct, although there may
be "extraordinary cases" in which an adjustment for obstruction of
justice and acceptance of responsibility may apply. See USSG
§ 3E1.1 comment. (n.4). We do not find that the district court clearly
erred by denying Lyons an adjustment for acceptance of responsibil-
ity. Merely pleading guilty prior to trial does not create the "extraordi-
nary case" warranting the acceptance of responsibility adjustment. See
Melton, 970 F.2d at 1335; USSG § 3E1.1 comment. (n.4). Accord-
ingly, we affirm Lyons' sentence and dispense with oral argument as
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materi-
als before the court and argument would not aid the decisional pro-
cess.

AFFIRMED

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