                       T.C. Memo. 2000-138



                     UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                  ANN JORGENSEN, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 19001-98.                     Filed April 13, 2000.



     Ann Jorgensen, pro se.

     Wendy Abkin, for respondent.



                       MEMORANDUM OPINION


     DEAN, Special Trial Judge:     Respondent determined

deficiencies in petitioner's Federal income taxes of $1,596 and

$2,282 for taxable years 1995 and 1996, respectively.

     The issue for decision is whether petitioner incurred

nondeductible expenses for travel as a form of education within
                                - 2 -

the meaning of section 274(m)(2) or whether she had ordinary and

necessary employee business expenses for travel and education

under section 162.1

     Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are

incorporated herein by reference.    Petitioner resided in San

Francisco, California, at the time she filed her petition.

                              Background

     Petitioner teaches English at Abraham Lincoln High School, a

culturally diverse San Francisco public high school with a

predominantly Asian student population.    During 1995 and 1996,

petitioner also was the chair of the high school's English

department.   Most of petitioner's students are immigrants or have

parents who are immigrants.

     As a teacher in the San Francisco Unified School District,

petitioner has a mission to promote both intellectual growth and

cultural and linguistic sensitivity to enable students from all

cultural backgrounds to succeed.    Petitioner's duties as a

teacher include, among others, to be competent in her subject

field, to be involved in the development and implementation of

curriculum, to demonstrate a repertoire of teaching strategies



     1
        Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years in issue, and all
Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
                                 - 3 -

and techniques, and to participate in professional growth

activities.     Some of petitioner's additional duties and

responsibilities as English department chair were to assist in

establishing department curriculum objectives and develop a plan

for the implementation and evaluation of these objectives, to

develop innovative or experimental work and articulate

instruction with various grade levels, to assist department

teachers with day-to-day problems of instruction, to act as a

resource person for department teachers on curriculum questions,

and to be able to relate successfully with diverse groups of

students and adults.

     In 1995 petitioner enrolled in a summer course sponsored by

the University of California, Berkeley Extension Program (U.C.

Extension) entitled "Legendary Greece:     Minoans, Mycenaeans, and

Classical Athens" (Legendary Greece) in order to study how legend

grew out of historical events.     The course took place in Greece

from June 20 to July 8, 1995.     Petitioner paid the following

amounts for the Legendary Greece course and deducted the total

amount on her 1995 Federal income tax return as an employee

business expense:

     U.C. Extension:
       Tuition, lodging, meals                  $4,140
     Airfare                                     1,117
     Miscellaneous:
      Two extra nights at hotel          $240
      Books and airport shuttle            77      317

        Total                                    5,574
                                 - 4 -

     In 1996, petitioner attended a U.C. Extension course

entitled "Southeast Asia:    Sacred Places" (Southeast Asia) to

study how the religious traditions of Buddhism and Hinduism have

shaped and continue to shape the culture of Southeast Asia.         The

course took place in Thailand, Cambodia, and Indonesia from

December 27, 1996, to January 11, 1997.       Petitioner paid the

following amounts in connection with the Southeast Asia course

and deducted the total amount on her 1996 Federal income tax

return as an employee business expense:

     U.C. Extension:
       Tuition, meals, lodging                    $4,500
     Airfare                                       2,235
     Visas, transfers, taxes, misc.                1,070

          Total                                    7,805

     Both of these courses were taught by university professors

and qualified for upper division, undergraduate U.C. Extension

credit.    In both courses, credit requirements included the

completion of a research paper.    Petitioner did not seek or

obtain credit for the courses.

     Both courses had focused academic purposes and consisted of

a series of formal lectures and visits to historical and cultural

sites.    The Legendary Greece course had a required reading list

for all attendees, and the Southeast Asia course required reading

only for attendees seeking credit.       Petitioner completed all

credit requirements for the courses with the exception of the

research papers.    Petitioner's employer did not require her to
                                 - 5 -

take these courses as a condition to retaining her employment as

a high school English teacher.

     Petitioner has applied what she learned in the Legendary

Greece course to develop additional curriculum for her English

classes.   This curriculum includes the study of methods Homer

used to "compose" the "Odyssey" and of the historical Mycenaean

palace culture, in which ancient Greek tragedies were set.         In

addition, petitioner has added a "strand" explaining the

historical and cultural roots of certain myths and legends.

     Petitioner has applied what she learned in the Southeast

Asia course to understand better her Asian students' responses in

class and to work more effectively with them.       Petitioner's

experiences in Asia serve as a basis for further intelligent and

respectful discussion with her students about their cultures.

Petitioner also has used the knowledge she gained in the

Southeast Asia course to enhance her curriculum:       Introducing

works written by Americans of Southeast Asian origin, discussing

novels with an Asian immigrant theme, and working to bring the

Indian epic "Ramayana" into her high school's world literature

curriculum.

     In the notice of deficiency, respondent disallowed $5,676

and $8,125 of the deductions petitioner claimed as employee

business expenses on her Federal income tax returns for taxable

years 1995 and 1996, respectively.       Respondent concedes that
                                  - 6 -

petitioner is entitled to $103 of the disallowed deductions for

1995 and $320 of the disallowed deductions for 1996.        The

remaining disallowed deductions are for the expenditures

associated with petitioner's participation in the Legendary

Greece and Southeast Asia courses.        Respondent maintains that

these expenses were incurred for travel as a form of education

and that such expenses are nondeductible under section 274(m)(2).

In the alternative, respondent argues that even if the expenses

are for education other than that which resulted from the travel

itself, the expenses are nevertheless not deductible under

section 162 because they are not ordinary and necessary business

expenses.

                            Discussion

     Section 162(a) permits a deduction for all ordinary and

necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in

carrying on a trade or business.     Such expenses generally include

expenditures for travel, including amounts expended on meals and

lodging, while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or

business.   See sec. 162(a)(2).

     In contrast, no deductions are allowed for personal, living,

or family expenses unless otherwise expressly provided by the

Internal Revenue Code.   See sec. 262(a).       Expenditures made by a

taxpayer in obtaining or furthering education are considered

personal expenses and are not deductible unless they qualify
                                - 7 -

under section 162 and section 1.162-5, Income Tax Regs., as

business expenses.    See sec. 1.262-1(b)(9), Income Tax Regs.

Objective criteria for distinguishing between business expenses

and personal expenses are set forth in section 1.162-5, Income

Tax Regs.   See Boser v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1124, 1128-1129

(1981), revised 79 T.C. II (1982), affd. without published

opinion (9th Cir., Dec. 22, 1983); McCulloch v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 1988-84.

     Before 1987, section 1.162-5(d), Income Tax Regs.,

specifically provided that expenditures for travel as a form of

education could properly be deducted under section 162 to the

extent the travel was directly related to the duties of the

individual in his or her employment or other trade or business.

This regulation, however, was expressly overruled for years

beginning after 1986 by the enactment of section 274(m)(2).      See

Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, sec. 142(b), 100 Stat.

2118.   Section 274(m)(2) provides that "No deduction shall be

allowed under this chapter for expenses for travel as a form of

education."

     Although no regulations have yet been promulgated under

section 274(m), its legislative history offers insight into

congressional intent in enacting section 274(m)(2).    In H. Conf.

Rept. 99-841 (Vol. 2), at II-30 (1986), 1986-3 C.B. (Vol. 4) 1,

30, the legislation was explained as follows:
                              - 8 -

          Educational travel.–-No deduction is allowed for
     costs of travel that would be deductible only on the
     ground that the travel itself constitutes a form of
     education (e.g, where a teacher of French travels to
     France to maintain general familiarity with the French
     language and culture, or where a social studies teacher
     travels to another State to learn about or photograph
     its people, customs, geography, etc.). This provision
     overrules Treas. Reg. sec. 1.162-5(d) to the extent
     that such regulation allows deductions for travel as a
     form of education.

     While the statute expressly overrules section 1.162-5(d),

Income Tax Regs., the report makes no mention of section 1.162-

5(e), Income Tax Regs., which provides, in part, for the

deductibility of a taxpayer's travel expenses if the primary

purpose of the travel is to engage in activities that themselves

represent deductible education expenses.   A report from the House

of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means provides

additional insight into the rationale underlying section

274(m)(2) and further indicates that Congress intended to leave

intact the provisions for deductibility under section 1.162-5(e),

Income Tax Regs.:

     The committee is concerned about deductions claimed for
     travel as a form of "education". The committee
     believes that any business purpose served by traveling
     for general educational purposes, in the absence of a
     specific need such as engaging in research which can
     only be performed at a particular facility, is at most
     indirect and insubstantial. By contrast, travel as a
     form of education may provide substantial personal
     benefits by permitting some individuals in particular
     professions to deduct the cost of a vacation, while
     most individuals must pay for vacation trips out of
     after-tax dollars, no matter how educationally
     stimulating the travel may be. Accordingly, the
     committee bill disallows deductions for travel that can
                                - 9 -

     be claimed only on the ground that the travel itself is
     "educational", but permits deductions for travel that
     is a necessary adjunct to engaging in an activity that
     gives rise to a business deduction relating to
     education. [H.Rept. 99-426, at 122 (1985), 1986-3 C.B.
     (Vol. 2) 1, 122.]

     Petitioner argues that her travel was not travel as a form

of education within the meaning of section 274(m)(2) because she

traveled to participate in academic courses, and thus, the travel

was "a necessary adjunct to engaging in an activity that gives

rise to a business deduction relating to education."    Respondent,

on the other hand, contends that petitioner's travel does not

differ materially from any organized group tour with a

knowledgeable group leader.    We agree with petitioner that the

U.C. Extension courses fall outside the scope of section

274(m)(2).

     Both of the courses had focused educational purposes beyond

mere travel as evidenced by the fact that university credit was

available for the courses.    Unlike the example of a French

teacher improving her familiarity with the French language and

culture simply through traveling in France, the U.C. Extension

courses were conducted on an organized basis with regular

lectures from university professors and planned tours of

historically and culturally significant sites directly related to

the course of study.   Petitioner's participation in the courses

involved following structured syllabi and completing significant

reading assignments.   Both U.C. Extension courses and instructors
                              - 10 -

who teach them are reviewed and approved by the appropriate

academic department on the University of California, Berkeley

campus, and the Committee on Courses of the Academic Senate.

Although petitioner did not complete the credit requirements, we

are satisfied that her participation in the courses was not

within the ambit of section 274(m)(2).

     Having determined that the U.C. Extension courses were

educational activities beyond mere travel, we nevertheless must

determine whether petitioner's expenses meet the requirements for

deductibility under section 162.   Expenditures made by a taxpayer

for education are deductible, with certain exceptions not

relevant here,2 if the education either:   (1) Maintains or

improves skills required in an individual's employment or other

trade or business; or (2) meets the express requirements of the

individual's employer, or meets the requirements of applicable

law or regulations, imposed as a condition to the retention of

employment, status, or rate of compensation.   See sec. 1.162-

5(a), Income Tax Regs.   Petitioner's employer did not expressly




     2
        The parties agree that the U.C. Extension courses do not
meet the minimum educational requirements of petitioner's
employment. They further agree that the courses do not qualify
petitioner for a new trade or business. Thus, deductions
associated with the courses are not prohibited under sec. 1.162-
5(b), Income Tax Regs.
                               - 11 -

require her to take the courses at issue.   We therefore assess

whether these course maintained or improved petitioner's skills

as a high school English teacher.

     Whether education maintains or improves skills required by

the taxpayer's employment is a question of fact.   See Boser v.

Commissioner, 77 T.C. at 1131; Schwartz v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.

877, 889 (1978); Baker v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 243, 247 (1968).

The burden of proof is on the taxpayer.   See Rule 142(a); Welch

v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); Boser v. Commissioner, supra

at 1131; cf. sec. 7491.3   The fact that petitioner's education is

helpful to her in the performance of her employment does not

establish that its cost is deductible as a business expense.      See

Carroll v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 213, 215 (1968), affd. 418 F.2d

91 (7th Cir. 1969).   Petitioner must establish that there is a

direct and proximate relationship between the U.C. Extension

courses and the skills required in her employment as a high

school English teacher.    See Kornhauser v. United States, 276

U.S. 145, 153 (1928); Boser v. Commissioner, supra at 1131.    A

precise correlation is not necessary, but the expenditure must



     3
        Sec. 7491, as effective for court proceedings arising in
connection with examinations commencing after July 22, 1998,
shifts the burden of proof to the Commissioner, subject to
certain limitations, where a taxpayer introduces credible
evidence with respect to factual issues relevant to ascertaining
the taxpayer's liability for tax. Petitioner does not contend
that her examination commenced after July 22, 1998, or that sec.
7491 is applicable to her.
                              - 12 -

enhance existing employment skills.    See Boser v. Commissioner,

supra.

     We believe that petitioner's participation in the U.C.

Extension courses improved her teaching skills in a direct and

proximate manner.   Petitioner is able to provide specific

examples of how her teaching skills were enhanced by both

courses.

     Petitioner's duties as an English teacher and as chair of

the English department entailed more than simply providing

instruction in English reading and writing skills.   The mission

of the San Francisco Unified School District (school district) is

in part "to provide each student with an equal opportunity to

succeed by promoting intellectual growth, creativity, self

discipline, [and] cultural and linguistic sensitivity".    In

promoting this mission, petitioner's duties and responsibilities

as a teacher required her to be competent in her subject field,

to be involved in the development and implementation of

curriculum, and to demonstrate a repertoire of teaching

strategies and techniques.   A 1998 resolution of the school

district provides in part that the English/language arts

curriculum of the school district must "reflect the diversity of

culture, race, and class of the students of the San Francisco

Unified School District", and the required reading in high

schools shall include those works of literature which are
                              - 13 -

referenced on college entrance examinations.   Petitioner

testified that as an English teacher, she spends 9 to 12 weeks

out of a 36-week school year teaching Greek mythology to ninth

graders and that she teaches a minimum of 6 weeks of Greek drama

to students in the 12th grade.   Petitioner did not provide any

materials as evidence of the specific content of English courses

at Abraham Lincoln High School, nor did she explain why her ninth

grade English class includes the study of mythology.

Petitioner's testimony, however, explaining why she chose to

enroll in the Legendary Greece course, illuminates the need to

teach mythology as part of an English class.   Petitioner

testified that as an undergraduate English major, she took a

course in mythology so that she could become familiar with Greek

myths and understand the mythical allusions prevalent in

literature, but she further explained that the course neglected

to relate the mythology to the culture or the civilization in

Greece.   Turning to the study of Greek drama, we understand such

material to be among the great works of Western literature and a

fundamental component in the study of world literature.     On these

bases and with our observations of petitioner, we find

petitioner's testimony regarding the curriculum of her English

classes credible.
                              - 14 -

     As a result of the Legendary Greece course, petitioner now

is able to explain the historical and cultural roots of certain

myths and legends which helps her to capture her students'

interest and impart greater understanding of the literature her

students read for class.   The Legendary Greece course also helped

petitioner develop additional curriculum for her English classes,

including study of the methods Homer used to "compose" the

"Odyssey" and study of the historical Mycenaean palace culture,

in which ancient Greek tragedies were set.

     With regard to the Southeast Asia course, petitioner

testified that she is now able to understand better her students

from Southeast Asian countries and modify her teaching approaches

appropriately.   Her understanding also helps petitioner introduce

literature written by Southeast Asian writers and enables her to

help students understand the themes.   Petitioner is also seeking

to make the "Ramayana", an ancient Indian epic poem pervasive in

Southeast Asia that she discovered through the course, part of

the world literature curriculum at her high school.

     In contrast to the situation in Takahashi v. Commissioner,

87 T.C. 126 (1986), in which we found that the taxpayers failed

to demonstrate a connection between their attendance at a seminar

in Hawaii on "Hawaiian Cultural Transition in a Diverse Society"

and their jobs as science teachers, petitioner is able to point

to tangible ways in which the Southeast Asia course improved her
                              - 15 -

teaching skills.   Petitioner testified that, before taking the

course, she sometimes had difficulty determining when an Asian

student's response to a piece of literature signified a problem

with reading comprehension or was a cultural response to a theme

the student had difficulty understanding.   Petitioner testified

that the course has improved her ability to assess students'

responses and help them understand themes in literature.

Petitioner's study in Southeast Asia enhanced her skills beyond

merely helping her to increase rapport with her Asian students.

See Dollins v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1982-394.    But see Gino

v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 304, 310-311 (1973), revd. on other

issue 538 F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1976).    Petitioner has incorporated

much of the knowledge she gained and many of the skills she

acquired in the Southeast Asia course into her English classes.

See Dollins v. Commissioner, supra.

     Respondent acknowledges that petitioner's participation in

the U.C. Extension courses has improved her skills by helping her

relate to her students and develop curriculum for both her

classes and the English department, but respondent maintains that

petitioner's skills improved as a result of her travel and not as

a result of the courses.   Although petitioner was required to

travel to participate in the courses, it was the content of the

courses that directed petitioner's attention to materials that

enhanced her teaching.   Through the course lectures and readings,
                              - 16 -

petitioner was able to gain more from her travel experience.    In

light of the classes petitioner taught, her role in developing

curriculum for the English department, the racial and cultural

background of many of her students, and petitioner's

incorporation of tangible knowledge and skills learned in the

U.C. Extension courses into the classes she teaches, we find the

courses had a direct and proximate relationship in maintaining

and improving petitioner's skills as a high school English

teacher and as chair of the English department.

     In addition to proving that the U.C. Extension courses

maintained or improved her teaching skills, petitioners must

prove that such expenses were "ordinary and necessary" within the

meaning of section 162(a).   See Boser v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. at

1132; Ford v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1300, 1305-1307 (1971), affd.

per curiam 487 F.2d 1025 (9th Cir. 1973); Stricker v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-530; McCulloch v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 1988-84; Raines v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-125;

sec. 1.262-1(b)(9), Income Tax Regs.

     "Ordinary" has been defined in the context of section 162(a)

as that which is "normal, usual, or customary" in the taxpayer's

trade or business.   Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940).

The activity which gives rise to the expense must not be one that

is rare in the taxpayer's business.    See Welch v. Helvering, 290

U.S. at 114; Stricker v. Commissioner, supra.     An activity that
                               - 17 -

is not required by the taxpayer's employer may still be ordinary.

See Boser v. Commissioner, supra at 1132; Carlucci v.

Commissioner, 37 T.C. 695 (1962).

     Respondent acknowledges that it is a customary practice of

teachers to travel for the sake of professional development, but

respondent argues that petitioner has not established that it is

normal, usual, or customary for teachers to take U.C. Extension

courses involving travel to foreign countries for professional

development.   It is not necessary that petitioner establish that

teachers customarily enroll in U.C. Extension courses.   See Hill

v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906, 908 (4th Cir. 1950), revg. 13 T.C.

291 (1949).    In Hill, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

found that it was unreasonable to require the taxpayer to show

that the course she pursued in obtaining further education was

the usual method followed by teachers in obtaining renewal of

their teaching certificates.   See id.   The court found it

sufficient to establish that an expense is ordinary if the

"particular course adopted by the taxpayer is a response that a

reasonable person would normally and naturally make under the

specific circumstances".    Id.; see also Sanders v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 1960-61.

     Petitioner is expected, as a teacher in the San Francisco

Unified School District, to pursue a program of professional

growth.   One of the accepted means of pursuing such a program is
                               - 18 -

to complete college or university courses.    Petitioner enrolled

in the U.C. Extension courses with specific educational

objectives.   She testified that she has not seen classes

available elsewhere offering similar courses of study.    As

evidenced by several Tax Court cases involving teachers enrolling

in university courses and studying abroad in order to improve

teaching skills, such an expenditure is "normal" for a high

school teacher.    See, e.g., Ford v. Commissioner, supra; Weiman

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1971-92.     Professional educators act

on the assumption that further education improves their ability

to use their knowledge effectively.     See Ford v. Commissioner,

supra at 1306.    Under the particular facts of this case,

petitioner's participation in the U.C. Extension courses resulted

in ordinary business expenditures.

     "Necessary" has been construed to mean "appropriate" or

"helpful", not "indispensable" or "required".     Id. at 1305-1307.

If there are "reasonably evident business ends to be served, and

the intention to serve them appears adequately from the record",

expenses satisfy the "necessary" requirement.     Manischewitz Co.

v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 1139, 1145 (1948).     As discussed, the

U.C. Extension courses improved petitioner's teaching skills.

The expenses associated with a teacher's pursuing further

education that develops her understanding of topics which are

part of the curriculum she teaches in her classroom, helps her
                              - 19 -

incorporate new materials into her curriculum, and increases her

ability to reach out to her students are "appropriate" and

"helpful" for a high school teacher.

     Inherent in the concept of necessary, however, is that an

expenditure must be reasonable in relation to its purpose.   See

Boser v. Commissioner, supra at 1133; Stricker v. Commissioner,

supra; McCulloch v. Commissioner, supra.   To the extent that an

expense is unreasonable, it is not necessary.   See McCulloch v.

Commissioner, supra; Raines v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1983-125.

In such case, only the portion which is reasonable is deductible

under section 162.   See United States v. Haskel Engg. & Supply

Co., 380 F.2d 786, 788-789 (9th Cir. 1967); Boser v.

Commissioner, supra at 1133; McCulloch v. Commissioner, supra.

An expenditure may be ordinary and necessary, but at the same

time it may be unreasonable in amount.   See United States v.

Haskel Engg. & Supply Co., supra at 788; Stricker v.

Commissioner, supra.

     Respondent contends that because petitioner did not isolate

the tuition cost for the courses, it is impossible to determine

whether the cost petitioner incurred for the education itself is
                                - 20 -

reasonable.4    In the case at hand, isolation of the expense is

not necessary to determine the reasonableness of the expense.

Whether an expenditure is reasonable is a question of fact.    See

Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 475 (1943); Boser v.

Commissioner, supra at 1133; Voigt v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 82,

89 (1980).     The focus of our inquiry is on "the primary purpose

of the expenditure as it may be inferred from the totality of the

facts concerning the benefits to be achieved, the direct

relationship of those benefits to petitioner's business, and the

reasonableness of the expenses."     Stricker v. Commissioner, supra

(citing Love Box Co. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1985-13, affd.

842 F.2d 1213 (10th Cir. 1988)).

     As discussed, the course improved petitioner's teaching

skills.    Given the important purpose served by the skills

petitioner developed and the benefit derived from her

participation in the courses, the expenses associated with the

courses appear to be reasonable.    See McCulloch v. Commissioner,

supra.    None of the expenses incurred appear to be lavish, and

the particular courses selected by petitioner served important

educational purposes.    See id.


     4
        Petitioner paid $4,140 for the Legendary Greece course
and $4,500 for the Southeast Asia course. These amounts include
course tuition, lodging, and meals. Petitioner contends that
respondent assured her that no breakdown of expenses was
necessary. Petitioner, therefore, objects to respondent's
raising this issue in brief.
                               - 21 -

     In order for petitioner to be able to deduct the travel

expenses associated with the U.C. Extension courses, she also

must establish that her travel was undertaken primarily to obtain

education which maintains and improves the skills required in her

employment.   See sec. 1.162-5(e), Income Tax Regs.   If a taxpayer

travels to a destination and engages in both business and

personal activities while at that destination, the expenses

attributable to the personal activity constitute nondeductible

personal or living expenses.   See id.

     Whether a trip is related primarily to the taxpayer's trade

or business or is primarily personal in nature depends on the

facts and circumstances of each case.    See McCulloch v.

Commissioner, supra; sec. 1.162-5(e), Income Tax Regs.      The

amount of time during the trip which is spent on activities

directly relating to the taxpayer's trade or business relative to

the amount of time devoted to personal activity is an important

factor in determining the trip's primary purpose.     See McCulloch

v. Commissioner, supra; sec. 1.162-5(e), Income Tax Regs.

     Petitioner's travel to Greece and Southeast Asia undoubtedly

involved significant elements of personal pleasure; however, we

are satisfied that petitioner's primary purpose in undertaking

the travel was to maintain and improve her skills as an English

teacher.
                                - 22 -

     In petitioner's case, the U.C. Extension courses involved

significant travel and tours.    Although a number of the sites

petitioner visited while she participated in the courses were

places many tourists would visit while sightseeing in the

respective countries, each site visit served an educational

purpose as part of an organized course of study.

     While traveling in Greece and in Southeast Asia, petitioner

spent the majority of her time involved in course activity.    The

record indicates she was primarily engaged in course activity on

all but one of the 18 days that the Legendary Greece course was

in session.   During these 17 days, a course itinerary indicates

petitioner spent a minimum of 5 hours a day engaged in course

activity.   Although a detailed itinerary with the time allocated

to specific activities is not available for the Southeast Asia

course, petitioner testified that during the Southeast Asia

course most of her time during the day was spent either en route

to sites, observing sites, or hearing lectures at the sites.      She

further testified that she had minimal free time during the

course which might consist of up to 3 hours on some days.

     Given the nature of the educational programs petitioner

pursued, it is impossible to separate definitively the personal

aspects of petitioner's travel during the time she participated

in the U.C. Extension courses from the business aspects.    The

fact that she undoubtedly derived personal benefit from her
                               - 23 -

travels does not subvert their business purpose.    On the basis of

the record, we find that petitioner spent most of her time in

Greece and in Southeast Asia participating in the U.C. Extension

courses.5

     Petitioner, however, has not established that the $240

expense she incurred for hotel accommodations before the

Legendary Greece course began is attributable to business

activity.   Petitioner testified that she arrived 2 days early in

Greece so that she would have an opportunity to recover from jet

lag before the course began.   We find this expense to be

attributable to personal activity.

     We thus hold that petitioner's education and travel

expenses, with the exception of the $240, are ordinary and

necessary business expenses within the meaning of section 162.

     In addition to being subject to the requirements of section

162 and the provisions under section 274 already discussed, a

taxpayer's deductions for certain travel expenditures are subject

to other provisions of section 274.     Respondent, however, has not

challenged petitioner's travel expenses under the substantiation

requirements of section 274(d) or under the limitation on meal



     5
        Although respondent does not contend that petitioner’s
travel expenses are subject to the provisions of sec. 274(c), the
regulations issued under this section tend to support our
determination that petitioner was primarily engaged in business
activity during the time she spent in Greece and in Southeast
Asia. See sec. 1.274-4(d)(2), Income Tax Regs.
                             - 24 -

and entertainment expenses under section 274(n).   We consequently

do not address the extent to which these provisions may limit

petitioner's deductions.

     Accordingly, we find petitioner is entitled to deduct all

but $240 of her education and travel expenses.

     To reflect the foregoing,



                                        Decision will be

                                   entered under Rule 155.
