

Moina v Daddario (2020 NY Slip Op 03509)





Moina v Daddario


2020 NY Slip Op 03509


Decided on June 24, 2020


Appellate Division, Second Department


Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.


This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.



Decided on June 24, 2020
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

LEONARD B. AUSTIN, J.P.
ROBERT J. MILLER
FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY
VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ.


2019-03405
 (Index No. 13004/16)

[*1]Diana Moina, appellant, 
vJoseph Daddario, respondent.


Law Offices of Michael A. Cervini, P.C. (The Altman Law Firm, PLLC, Woodmere, NY [Michael T. Altman], of counsel), for appellant.
James F. Butler & Associates, Jericho, NY (Michael D. Abneri and Kathleen E. Fioretti of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Allan B. Weiss, J.), entered February 1, 2019. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, and that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident is denied.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on August 7, 2016. The defendant moved, inter alia, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident. The Supreme Court granted that branch of the defendant's motion, and the plaintiff appeals.
The defendant failed to meet his prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did
not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The papers submitted by the defendant failed to eliminate triable issues of fact regarding the plaintiff's claim, set forth in the bill of particulars, that she sustained a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969; Rouach v Betts, 71 AD3d 977; cf. Calucci v Baker, 299 AD2d 897). Since the defendant failed to meet his prima facie burden in this regard, it is unnecessary to determine whether the plaintiff's submissions in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d at 969).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
AUSTIN, J.P., MILLER, CONNOLLY and BRATHWAITE NELSON, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Aprilanne Agostino
Clerk of the Court


