
167 U.S. 310 (1897)
MAY
v.
MAY.
No. 269.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued April 2, 5, 1897.
Decided May 10, 1897.
APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.
*317 Mr. W.D. Davidge for appellants. Mr. W.D. Davidge, Jr., was on his brief.
Mr. Enoch Totten and Mr. William Henry Dennis for appellees.
MR. JUSTICE GRAY, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The important question in this case is whether William May has been rightly removed from the office of trustee under the will and codicil of his father.
As to the facts bearing upon this question, we concur, after careful examination of the voluminous record, in the conclusions expressed by the courts below in the following passages of their opinions:
In the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, Justice Hagner said: "In the present case, the testimony clearly proves that between Mrs. May, the other trustee, and William May there exists so wide a breach that they can have no personal communication. The jealousy and unfriendliness existing before the testator's death on each side has widened into positive, distinct and most unnatural enmity. On William May's part, it has been undoubtedly increased by his mother's positive refusal to confer with him on the business of the estate, because, as she testifies, quarrels would always result from such conferences, which would be perilous to her health, and also by the terms in which she had expressed herself towards him in her pleadings and testimony in this cause and by her execution of the instrument intended to effect his removal; and, on the part of Mrs. May, that dislike has been intensified by the statements in William May's pleadings and his testimony, and perhaps more pointedly because of his introduction of the painful correspondence, many years old, between her husband and herself, and of Dr. May's letters to the plaintiff on the subject of his domestic troubles. She and all the beneficiaries have testified in painful terms that they believe him to be untrustworthy, dishonest, dictatorial and *318 disagreeable in manner, and incompetent as a business man. Under such circumstances, anything like free conference between the trustees, or concert of action, in the proper sense of the term, is impossible. If either is to act at all as trustee, each must pursue his or her independent way, with a certainty of differing as to the proper performance of many of the duties of the trust, if not as to all." "This unfortunate state of feeling between the trustee and sisters and brother must equally prevent that peaceable intercourse that beneficiaries should enjoy with the party charged with the management of their interests in this considerable estate. They are certainly entitled to confer in peace with the agent appointed to manage their affairs, and receive from him good-tempered explanations, and give their suggestions as to what they consider the proper steps in the management of their business, without risk of unpleasant disputes, naturally liable to increase in violence at each successive difference. Such a state of affairs would ultimately become insufferable, and most hurtful to the interests of all concerned."
The Court of Appeals, speaking by Justice Morris, expressed the same view as follows: "Dissension, however, very soon arose between William May on the one side, and his mother, brother and sisters, on the other; and, as usual in such cases, the dissensions became intense and bitter. There is in the record a painful disclosure of domestic discord which should have been avoided, and into the details of which we do not deem it necessary for the purposes of this case to enter." "As we have stated, we will not enter into any investigation of the causes of dissension between the parties, or of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of their respective positions. That there is dissension, bitter and uncompromising, is beyond question. That such dissension precludes intercourse between the parties, is their mutual declaration. If there can be no intercourse between them, no communication of views, their joint execution of their joint trust is an impossibility. The due execution of the trust requires concurrence of action, and consultation preliminary to action." 5 App. D.C. 555, 561.
We agree with both the lower courts in thinking it to be *319 unnecessary and undesirable to enter upon a discussion of the conflicting testimony, or to enlarge upon the details of the conduct and expressions of the parties.
It is sufficient to say that, while nothing is shown to justify an imputation of dishonesty against the appellant, it is indisputable that, from the time of his entering upon the execution of the trust, he treated his mother and cotrustee without due respect and consideration, and was somewhat careless and inaccurate in his accounts rendered to her; that his conduct was calculated to excite, and did excite, resentment in her, sympathy with her in his sisters and brother, and suspicion and distrust upon the part of all of them; and that, as is too apt to happen in family quarrels, the breach once made became wider and wider until there was no longer any natural, or even friendly, intercourse between the appellant and the rest of the family.
What, then, are the rules of law applicable to the case, taking into consideration the peculiar provisions of the will and codicil?
The testator by his will, dated February 4, 1890, devised all his estate to his widow in fee, in trust, to receive herself one third of the income of the real estate for life, and one third of the personal property absolutely; to divide the income of the other two thirds of the estate, after paying his debts and cancelling existing mortgages, among his children and the issue of any deceased child; and, in certain circumstances, to sell or mortgage the real estate; and gave her power to appoint a trustee to succeed her, and appointed her sole executrix. Some ten months afterwards, on December 17, 1890, he gave his son William a power of attorney to lease or rent his real estate, to recover possession of the same, and to collect the rents thereof. About three months later, on March 27, 1891, he executed the codicil, by which he appointed William a cotrustee with the widow, the two together to have and exercise all the powers created by the will, except that William alone was to take charge of, care for, manage and keep in repair the real estate, to collect the rents thereof, and to pay the taxes and other expenses thereon, *320 receiving a commission of five per cent on his collections, and rendering monthly accounts to the widow. The separate authority thus given to William was substantially that of an agent, little more than he had under the power of attorney in his father's lifetime. The powers of paying and cancelling mortgages, and of distributing income among the children, and of making sales or new mortgages of the real estate, belonged to him and the widow jointly as trustees; and were active trusts, requiring mutual consultation and the exercise of discretion in carrying them into execution.
The clause in the codicil, which gave his other heirs, "for good and sufficient cause," and with the concurrence of the widow, power "by their unanimous resolution" to remove William May from his office as trustee, and to appoint another person in his stead, was evidently intended to enable them to remove him by their own act, without being obliged to resort to a court of equity. If no such power had been given them by the testator, any one of them could have applied to a court of equity, and have had the trustee removed, on proving good and sufficient cause therefor, satisfactory to the court. If the words "for good and sufficient cause," in the codicil, mean only such cause as would be deemed by a court of equity to be good and sufficient, the only effect of conferring the express power of removal would be to restrict the power of removal by requiring their action to be unanimous. This cannot have been the testator's intention. The extent of the power conferred appears to us to have been well and accurately stated by the Court of Appeals in these few words: "The power to remove their trustee was vested in the defendants to this cause. The power to determine when there was good and sufficient cause for such removal was necessarily in them also, subject to the restraining power of a court of equity against the abuse of it." 5 App. D.C. 561.
The power of a court of equity to remove a trustee, and to substitute another in his place, is incidental to its paramount duty to see that trusts are properly executed; and may properly be exercised whenever such a state of mutual *321 ill-feeling, growing out of his behavior, exists between the trustees, or between the trustee in question and the beneficiaries, that his continuance in office would be detrimental to the execution of the trust, even if for no other reason than that human infirmity would prevent the cotrustee or the beneficiaries from working in harmony with him, and although charges of misconduct against him are either not made out, or are greatly exaggerated. Uvedale v. Ettrick, 2 Ch. Cas. 130; Letterstedt v. Broers, 9 App. Cas. 371, 386; McPherson v. Cox, 96 U.S. 404, 419; Scott v. Rand, 118 Mass. 215, 218; Wilson v. Wilson, 145 Mass. 490, 493; 2 Story Eq. Jur. § 1288.
A good illustration of this is afforded by the leading case of Uvedale v. Ettrick, above cited, decided by Lord Chancellor Nottingham in 1682. In that case, the plaintiff's husband, being seized of Horton and other manors, by his will devised them to his wife and Ettrick and three other persons, in trust to be sold, "and, after his debts and legacies paid, the surplus of the land to be conveyed to his heir"; and died, "having, after his marriage with the plaintiff, mortgaged Horton, so as the plaintiff was dowable of all the estate." She brought a bill in equity against Ettrick and the other three trustees and the heir  "which was to have a sale made, but principally that Ettrick might be put out of the trust." The other three trustees declined the trust. The bill alleged that the plaintiff "was drawn into agreement to release her dower" in the other manors, "and to give a bond of £4000 that, if any of the children died, she would not take administration, except they all died; after which, Ettrick turns to be the plaintiff's enemy, and divers matters are charged in the bill upon Ettrick, as if he practised to get Horton, and to be the whole manager himself." At the hearing, the plaintiff declared in court that she was content to accept dower in the manor of Horton, and to join in the sale of the rest of the land, thereby to extinguish her dower therein, "so that Ettrick might be discharged of the trust. On the other side, Ettrick insisted to be continued in the trust, and would attend a master from time to time to get *322 a purchaser, and to do all reasonable acts," etc. "Lord Chancellor. `I like not that a man should be ambitious of a trust, when he can get nothing but trouble by it'; and declared that, without any reflection on Ettrick, he should meddle no farther in the trust, etc." 2 Ch. Cas. 131.
The facts of the case at bar, therefore, far from showing any abuse of the power conferred by the testator, present a state of things which would justify a removal of the appellant by a court of equity, had the will been silent upon the subject.
The filing of this bill by one trustee did not suspend the power of removal given by the will to the beneficiaries with the concurrence of the other trustee; but only subjected their action to the supervision and control of the court. Cafe v. Bent, 3 Hare, 245, 249.
The form in which their power to remove the appellant was undertaken to be executed was by a resolution in writing, declaring that there was good and sufficient cause for his removal; specifying, among other reasons, his failure to render full and true accounts to his cotrustee, and his domineering and disagreeable conduct towards her; and signed by the widow and the four daughters in person, and by the widow as attorney in fact of the other son. Whether the widow was authorized by the power of attorney from him to act in his behalf in the removal need not be considered, since he afterwards formally ratified her action, and the unanimous wish of all concerned that the removal should take place was made manifest to the court before it acted upon the matter.
The necessary conclusion is that the decree appealed from, in so far as it ordered William May to be removed from his office as trustee, was in accordance with law and justice.
The direction, in the decree, that he should surrender possession and control of the trust property, and all the leases and papers in his hands, and all moneys, whether derived from the collection of rents or otherwise, was a necessary incident of his removal and the appointment of a new trustee in his stead. The management of the real estate would have been one of the duties imposed upon the two trustees jointly by the first clause of the codicil, but for the concluding words of *323 that clause, "except as hereinafter otherwise directed," followed by the direction that he should manage the real estate. This duty of management was not separate from, but annexed to, his office of trustee; and after his removal from that office, he could not perform this or any other duty connected with the administration of the trust.
The question who will take the estate after the deaths of the wife and the children cannot be decided now, before those events happen, and in the absence of parties who may then be interested. Upon a bill in equity by a trustee for instructions in the execution of his trust, the court will not decide questions depending upon future events, and affecting the rights of persons not in being, and unnecessary to be decided for the present guidance of the trustee. As was said by Mr. Justice Grier, "The court has no power to decree in thesi, as to the future rights of parties not before the court or in esse." Cross v. De Valle, 1 Wall. 1, 16.
The decree, in allowing the wife one third of the net income of the real estate, deducting taxes, insurance and repairs, but without any deduction for interest on debts or mortgages, was clearly in accordance with the explicit provisions of the will, that she should receive one third of the net annual income, and that her thirds should be exempted from the payment of debts or mortgages.
That part of the decree which substitutes Dennis as trustee in the place of the appellant was not specifically objected to in argument, and we allude to it only to prevent any inference that, in affirming the decree generally, we express any opinion upon the question whether Dennis, by acting as counsel for the rest of the family throughout this suit, and supporting all the charges, whether grave or frivolous, made by them against the appellant, has so far identified himself with one side of this unhappy controversy as to make it unfit that he should hold the office of trustee under the will. That question is left to be dealt with by the court below, under the right reserved by the decree to the appellant to apply to the court as he may be advised, in his quality as a beneficiary interested in the trust.
Decree affirmed.
