                            NUMBER 13-08-00014-CR

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                  THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

                    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG


CARL ANTHONY JONES,                                                          Appellant,

                                            v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                           Appellee.


                 On appeal from the 252nd District Court of
                        Jefferson County, Texas.


                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

    Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza
            Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez

       On February 22, 2007, appellant, Carl Anthony Jones, was indicted for the offense

of robbery, a second-degree felony. See TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 29.02 (Vernon 2003).

Jones entered into a plea agreement with the State in which he pleaded guilty to the

indicted offense in exchange for a recommendation by the State that his adjudication of

guilt be deferred and that he be placed on community supervision for seven years. See

TEX . CODE CRIM . PROC . ANN . art. 42.12 (Vernon Supp. 2008). On April 23, 2007, the trial
court accepted the plea agreement, deferred adjudication, and placed Jones on community

supervision.

       Subsequently, the State moved to revoke Jones’s community supervision on the

grounds that he violated the terms of his community supervision by possessing a controlled

substance—cocaine. Jones answered “true” to the allegation in the motion to revoke. The

trial court granted the State’s motion, revoked Jones’s community supervision, adjudicated

his guilt, and sentenced him to twenty years’ confinement. Jones’s court-appointed

appellate counsel has filed an Anders brief. We affirm.

                                      I. ANDERS BRIEF

       Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), Jones’s court-appointed

appellate counsel has filed a brief with this Court, stating that his review of the record

yielded no grounds or error upon which an appeal can be predicated. Although counsel’s

brief does not advance any arguable grounds of error, it does present a professional

evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced

on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In

Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel

finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and

set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343-44 (Tex.

App.–Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1991).

       In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]

1978), appellant’s counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there

are no errors in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has informed this Court that he has:

(1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal, (2) served

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a copy of the brief and counsel’s motion to withdraw on Jones, and (3) informed him of his

right to review the record and to file a pro se response within thirty days.1 See Anders, 386

U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409

n.23. More than an adequate period of time has passed, and Jones has not filed a pro se

response. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409.

                                        II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

        Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel’s brief and have found

nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824,

826-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the

opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for

reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule

of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

                                       III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

        In accordance with Anders, Jones’s attorney has asked this Court for permission to

withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman,

252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779-80 (Tex. App.–Dallas

1995, no pet.) (noting that “[i]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must

withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed

attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court

        1
           The Texas Court of Crim inal Appeals has held that “the pro se response need not com ply with the
rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court
those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case
presents any m eritorious issues.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W .3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim . App. 2008) (quoting
W ilson v. State, 955 S.W .2d 693, 696-97 (Tex. App.–W aco 1997, no pet.)).
                                                     3
that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of

the opinion and judgment to Jones and to advise him of his right to file a petition for

discretionary review.2 See TEX . R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at

412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).




                                                               ________________________
                                                               ROGELIO VALDEZ
                                                               Chief Justice

Do Not Publish. TEX . R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
Memorandum Opinion delivered and filed
this the 15th day of October, 2009.




         2
            No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case
by the Texas Court of Crim inal Appeals, he m ust either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary
review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review m ust be filed within
thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last tim ely m otion for rehearing that was overruled by this
Court. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review m ust be filed with this Court, after which
it will be forwarded to the Texas Court of Crim inal Appeals. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 68.3; 68.7. Any petition for
discretionary review should com ply with the requirem ents of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 68.4.
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