                                                                                   ACCEPTED
                                                                               01-15-00599-CV
                                                                    FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                            HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                                                         10/9/2015 10:07:13 AM
                                                                         CHRISTOPHER PRINE
                                                                                        CLERK

                 CAUSE NO. 01-15-00599-CV

                                                              FILED IN
                                                       1st COURT OF APPEALS
            IN THE FIRST COURT OF APPEALS                  HOUSTON, TEXAS
                    HOUSTON, TEXAS                     10/9/2015 10:07:13 AM
                                                       CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
                                                                Clerk

                 BILLY JOE HENDERSON,

                           Appellant,

                               v.

IOWA COLONY, IOWA COLONY POLICE DEPARTMENT, AND LOUIS
                     C. HEARN, JR.

                           Appellees


             On Appeal from the 239th District Court
                   Brazoria County, Texas
                  Trial Court No. 80216-CV


              APPELLEES’ RESPONSE BRIEF


                 Steven D. Selbe
                 State Bar No. 18004600
                 Andrew J. Pratka
                 State Bar No. 24079159
                 GORDON & REES, LLP
                 1900 W. Loop S., Ste. 1000
                 Houston, TX 77027
                 Telephone: (713) 961-3366
                 Facsimile: (713) 961-3938
                 sselbe@gordonrees.com
                 apratka@gordonrees.com

                 Counsel for Appellees
  The City of Iowa Colony
  and Louis C. Hearn, Jr.


ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED




              ii
                          PARTIES AND COUNSEL

       The parties to the trial court's judgment and the names and addresses of all
trial and appellate counsel are listed below. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(a).

Pro Se Plaintiff/Appellant Billy Joe Henderson

2003 W. Adoue #3
Alvin, Texas 77511
Telephone: (832) 305-2012
Billyh713@hotmail.com

Defendants/Appellees The City of Iowa Colony and Louis C. Hearn, Jr.

Steven D. Selbe
State Bar No. 18004600
Andrew J. Pratka
State Bar No. 24079159
GORDON & REES, LLP
1900 West Loop South, Suite 1000
Houston, Texas 77027
Telephone: (713) 961-3366
Facsimile: (713) 961-3938
sselbe@gordonrees.com
apratka@gordonrees.com




                                        iii
                                       TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................................................................1

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................................3

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES .....................................................................4

I.      STANDARDS OF REVIEW...........................................................................4

II.     STANDARD FOR PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION ....................................4

        A.       Governmental Immunity .......................................................................5

III.    ISSUE NO. 1: Iowa Colony is immune from Appellant’s claims
        because Appellant’s state law causes of action for false arrest and
        malicious prosecution do not fall within the limited waiver of
        immunity provision contained in § 101.021 of the Texas Civil
        Practices & Remedies Code for immunity to be waived.................................6

        A.       Plaintiff’s State Law Claims Do Not Fall Within The Limited Waiver
                 of Immunity...........................................................................................6

        B.       Waiver by Deceit or Misconduct Argument Not Presented to the Trial
                 Court and Raised for the First Time on Appeal ....................................8

IV.     ISSUE NO. 2: Iowa Colony is also immune from Appellant’s claims
        because Appellant’s intentional tort claims for false arrest and
        malicious prosecution are specifically exempted from the waiver of
        immunity pursuant to § 101.057 of the Texas Civil Practices &
        Remedies Code. ...............................................................................................9

        A.       Immunity Not Waived for Intentional Torts .........................................9

V.      ISSUE NO. 3: Appellant’s decision to file suit against Iowa Colony
        forever barred Appellant from recovering individually against Hearn
        and the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claims against Hearn was
        mandatory and proper pursuant to § 101.106 of the Texas Civil
        Practices & Remedies Code. .........................................................................11

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................13


                                                         iv
PRAYER ..................................................................................................................14

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE UNDER TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(I)(3) .............14

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................15




                                                            v
                                       TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue,
  34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000) .................................................................................. 5

Callis v. Sellars,
 953 F. Supp. 793 (S.D. Tex. 1996)..................................................................... 10

Central Education Agency v. Burke,
 711 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. 1986) .................................................................................... 9

City of Denton v. Page,
  701 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. 1986) ................................................................................ 7

City of Hempstead v. Kmiec,
  902 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
  Dist.] 1995, no writ.) ...................................................................................... 8, 10

City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth.,
  589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1979) ................................................................................ 9

City of San Antonio v. Dunn,
  796 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990,
  writ denied)................................................................................................... 10, 11

Cont’l Coffee Prod. Co. v. Cazarez,
 937 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. 1996) ................................................................................ 4

Cronen v. Ray,
  2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7952 (Tex. App.—
  Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) ............................................................. 11

Dallas County Mental Health & Mental
 Retardation v. Bossley,
 968 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1998),
 cert. denied, 142 L. Ed. 2d 450, 119 S. Ct. 541
 (1998).................................................................................................................. 13

Delaney v. University of Houston,
 835 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. 1992) .................................................................................. 9



                                                             vi
Dupre v. Harris County Hosp. Dist.,
 8 F. Supp. 2d 908 (S.D. Tex. 1998).................................................................... 10

Hardin County Sheriff’s Dept. v. Smith,
 290 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009,
 no pet.) .................................................................................................................. 8

Hintz v. Lally,
  305 S.W.3d 761 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
  Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) ..................................................................................... 12

Holland v. City of Houston,
 41 F. Supp. 2d 678 (S.D. Tex. 1999).................................................................. 12

In re SCCI Hosp. Ventures, Inc.,
  2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 8612 (Tex. App.—
  Amarillo 2004, no pet.) ........................................................................................ 3

Lamar Univ. v. Doe,
  971 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1998,
  no pet.) .................................................................................................................. 5

Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ.,
  540 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1976) ................................................................................ 5

McCord v. Memorial Med. Ctr. Hosp.,
 750 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
 1988, no writ) ..................................................................................................... 10

Montgomery County v. Fuqua,
 22 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2000, no
 pet.) ....................................................................................................................... 5

Nall v. Plunkett,
 404 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. 2013) ................................................................................ 3

Newman v. Obersteller,
 960 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. 1997) .............................................................................. 13

Pineda v. City of Houston,
  175 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
  2004, no pet.) ...................................................................................................... 10



                                                              vii
Riggs v. City of Pearland,
  177 F.R.D. 395 (S.D. Tex. 1997) ....................................................................... 10

Salmeron v. T-Mobile West Corp.,
  2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 1105 (Tex. App.—
  Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.)...................................................................... 8

San Jacinto River Auth. v. Duke,
  783 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. 1990) ............................................................................ 3, 9

Taylor v. Gregg,
  36 F.3d 453 (5th Cir. 1994) ................................................................................ 10

Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.,
  852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) ................................................................................ 4

Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones,|
  8 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. 1999) ................................................................................ 6, 7

Tex. Dept. of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda,
  133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) .................................................................... 4, 5, 6, 7

Tex. Highway Dep’t v. Jarrell,
  418 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. 1967) ................................................................................ 5

Thomas v. Oldham,
  895 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1995) .............................................................................. 13

White v. Annis,
 864 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ
 denied) ................................................................................................................ 13

Williams v. Nealon,
 394 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
 June 7, 2012, pet. denied)................................................................................... 12

STATUTES

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.001 et. seq. ................................................... 7

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021.............................................. 3, 6, 7, 8, 13

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.057................................................ 3, 9, 10, 13


                                                            viii
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.106.......................................................... 3, 11

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.106(a)......................................................... 12

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.106(e) ....................................... x, 1, 2, 12, 13

RULES

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 ................................................................................................. 8

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(a)............................................................................................ iii

TEX. R. APP. P. 39.7 ................................................................................................. x

TEX. R. APP. P. 53.2(i).......................................................................................... 3, 4

TEX. R. APP. P. 53.4 ................................................................................................. 4

TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(I)(2)(B).................................................................................... 14

TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(I)(3) ......................................................................................... 14




                                                           ix
                 STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

      Appellees request oral argument of this appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 39.7. Oral

argument may be helpful to the Court in deciding whether any waiver of

government immunity exists in this matter. Oral argument will also be helpful to

the Court in deciding whether the election of remedies provision contained in

Section 101.106(e) of the Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code applies.




                                       x
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

        Appellees Iowa Colony1 (“Iowa Colony”) and Louis C. Hearn, Jr. (“Hearn”)

(Collectively the “Appellees”) request that this Court uphold the trial court’s Order

Granting Motion to Dismiss of Louis C. Hearn, Jr. and Order Granting Defendant

The City of Iowa Colony’s Plea to the Jurisdiction.

                               STATEMENT OF THE CASE

        This is a damages case arising out of injuries Plaintiff/Appellant Billy Joe

Henderson (“Henderson”) allegedly sustained after being arrested and charged by

Hearn on January 28, 2015 for criminal mischief after allegedly tampering with

electrical services provided by Centerpoint Energy. [CR 5-7]. Plaintiff later filed

suit against Hearn, Iowa Colony, and the Iowa Colony Police Department alleging

state law causes of action for false arrest and malicious criminal prosecution. [CR

5-7].

        On February 19, 2015, Hearn filed his Motion to Dismiss pursuant to the

election of remedies provision contained in Section 101.106(e) of the Texas Civil

Practices & Remedies Code, which provides, “if a suit is filed under this chapter

against both a governmental unit and any of its employees, the employees shall

immediately be dismissed on the filing of a motion by the governmental unit.”
1
  Iowa Colony Police Department (“Iowa Colony P.D.”) has been named as a Defendant in
Plaintiff’s District Court pleadings, but is not an entity that is capable of being sued as it does not
have a jural existence separate and apart from the Village of Iowa Colony. Thus, this Motion
assumes the actual Defendant/Appellee is the Village of Iowa Colony, a Type A general law
municipality incorporated according to the laws of the State of Texas.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.106(e); [CR 10]. Plaintiff filed Plaintiff’s

Opposition to Defendants Answer and Motion to Dismiss on March 18, 2015. [CR

13-16]. After an oral hearing, the Court granted Hearn’s Motion to Dismiss on

March 23, 2015. [CR 17].

      On April 30, 2015, Iowa Colony filed its Plea to the Jurisdiction asserting

governmental immunity to Plaintiff’s state law false arrest and malicious

prosecution claims.    [CR 18-28].      Plaintiff filed Plaintiff’s Opposition to

Defendants Plea of Jurisdiction/Motion to Dismiss on May 19, 2015. [CR 29-32].

After oral argument, the Court granted Iowa Colony’s Plea to the Jurisdiction on

May 27, 2015. [CR 43]. Plaintiff did not file a notice of appeal within thirty days

after the Court’s dismissal was signed and did not file a motion to extend time

before filing his untimely Notice of Appeal on July 8, 2015. [CR 45].

                           STATEMENT OF FACTS

      On June 15, 2013, Plaintiff was charged with criminal mischief based on a

criminal complaint filed by Centerpoint Energy alleging that Plaintiff stole

$1,229.87 of electrical utility service. [CR 5-6]. A warrant was issued based upon

Centerpoint energy’s complaint and Officer Louis C. Hearn, Jr. arrested Plaintiff

on June 20, 2013. [CR 5-6]. The charges against Plaintiff were later dismissed

and Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against Iowa Colony, the Iowa Colony Police

Department, and Hearn on January 28, 2015, alleging state law causes of action for



                                        2
false arrest and malicious prosecution. [CR 5-7]. Plaintiff sought damages for the

loss of his job, emotional distress, and loss of consortium. [CR 6].

                              SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

       The trial court did not err in granting Iowa Colony’s Plea to the Jurisdiction

and Louis C. Hearn, Jr.’s Motion to Dismiss and this Court should uphold the trial

court’s orders dismissing Appellant’s claims against Iowa Colony and Hearn on

the following grounds:

       1.      Iowa Colony is immune from Appellant’s claims because
               Appellant’s state law causes of action for false arrest and
               malicious prosecution do not fall within the limited waiver of
               immunity provisions contained in § 101.021 of the Texas Civil
               Practices & Remedies Code;

       2.      Iowa Colony is also immune from Appellant’s claims because
               Appellant’s intentional tort claims for false arrest and malicious
               prosecution are specifically exempted from the waiver of
               immunity pursuant to § 101.057 of the Texas Civil Practices &
               Remedies Code; and

       3.      Appellant’s decision to file suit against Iowa Colony forever
               barred Appellant from recovering individually against Hearn
               and the trial court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claims against
               Hearn was mandatory and proper pursuant to § 101.106 of the
               Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code.2

2
 Although Appellant stated in his Notice of Appeal [CR 45] that he was appealing the dismissal
of Hearn, he does not appear to have visited that issue or presented an argument on this point in
his Brief. Thus, Appellant’s point should be waived and Appellee only addressees it out of an
abundance of caution. TEX. R. APP. P. 53.2(i); Nall v. Plunkett, 404 S.W.3d 552, 556-57 (Tex.
2013) (plaintiff waived the issue of whether summary judgment was proper on the merits by
failing to brief it in the court of appeals); San Jacinto River Auth. v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209, 209-
10 (Tex. 1990) (‘it is a “well-established rule that grounds of error not asserted by points of error
or argument in the court of appeals are waived”’); In re SCCI Hosp. Ventures, Inc., 2004 Tex.
App. LEXIS 8612, at *11-12 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, no pet.) (contention waived on appeal


                                                 3
                       ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.     STANDARDS OF REVIEW

       Appellate courts reviewing a challenge to a trial court’s subject matter

jurisdiction review the trial court’s ruling de novo.          Tex. Dept. of Parks and

Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004). When reviewing a plea to

the jurisdiction in which the pleading requirements have been met and evidence

has been submitted to support the plea that implicates the merits of the case, the

appellate court must take as true all evidence favorable to the non-movant. Id.

II.    STANDARD FOR PLEA TO THE JURISDICTION

       It is well established under Texas law that a plaintiff bears the burden of

demonstrating that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim asserted

against a governmental entity. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852

S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to the power

of a tribunal to decide a case, and without subject-matter jurisdiction a court cannot

render a valid judgment.         Id. at 443.     Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be

presumed and cannot be waived. Cont’l Coffee Prod. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d

444, 448-49 n.2 (Tex. 1996).

       A plea to the jurisdiction is proper when a court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction to determine the subject to the controversy. Tex. Highway Dep’t v.


because party presented no argument as required by TEX. R. APP. P. 53.2(i)); see also TEX. R.
APP. P. 53.4.


                                             4
Jarrell, 418 S.W.2d 486, 488 (Tex. 1967). A plea to the jurisdiction raises defects

in jurisdiction that cannot be cured; therefore, the goal of the plea to the

jurisdiction is to have the court dismiss the cause of action. Id. at 489. The

purpose of a plea to the jurisdiction is to defeat a cause of action without regard to

whether the claims asserted have merit. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d

547, 554 (Tex. 2000).

     A.     Governmental Immunity

      Governmental immunity from suit defeats a trial court’s subject matter

jurisdiction and is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction. Miranda, 133

S.W.3d at 226. A governmental unit may not be sued for the torts of its agents in

the absence of a constitutional or statutory provision that waives its governmental

immunity for alleged wrongful acts. Lowe v. Tex. Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297,

298 (Tex. 1976). As such, dismissal for want of jurisdiction is proper when a

lawsuit is barred by governmental immunity. Lamar Univ. v. Doe, 971 S.W.2d

191, 196 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1998, no pet.). If a plaintiff fails to allege facts

within a petition which establish a waiver of immunity, dismissal for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction is appropriate. Montgomery County v. Fuqua, 22

S.W.3d 662, 665 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2000, no pet.).




                                          5
III.   ISSUE NO. 1: IOWA COLONY IS IMMUNE FROM APPELLANT’S
       CLAIMS BECAUSE APPELLANT’S STATE LAW CAUSES OF
       ACTION FOR FALSE ARREST AND MALICIOUS PROSECUTION
       DO NOT FALL WITHIN THE LIMITED WAIVER OF IMMUNITY
       PROVISION CONTAINED IN § 101.021 OF THE TEXAS CIVIL
       PRACTICES & REMEDIES CODE FOR IMMUNITY TO BE
       WAIVED.

       The Court did not err in granting Iowa Colony’s Plea to the Jurisdiction

because Plaintiff’s state law claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution do

not fall within the limited waiver of immunity provision contained in § 101.021 of

the TEX. PRAC. & REM. CODE.

       A.   Plaintiff’s State Law Claims Do Not Fall Within The Limited
            Waiver of Immunity
       Plaintiff’s state law causes of action for false arrest and malicious

prosecution are causes of action for which Iowa Colony is immune as a

governmental entity. That is, Plaintiff’s claims do not fall within the limited

wavier of immunity provision contained within § 101.021 of the TEX. PRAC. &

REM. CODE for immunity to be waived. Therefore, Plaintiff’s state law causes of

action for false arrest and malicious prosecution are completely barred against

Iowa Colony based upon sovereign immunity. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v.

Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225-226 (Tex. 2004); Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8

S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999) (Immunity from suit deprives a court of subject

matter jurisdiction).




                                        6
      The Texas Tort Claims Act modifies the sovereign immunity of Texas

governmental entities by waiving immunity to suit; however, the waiver is limited

to the specific grounds for liability and to the amount of damages specified by the

Act. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 224 (“The Texas Tort Claims Act provides a limited

waiver of sovereign immunity.”) (citing Jones, 8 S.W.3d at 638, “Sovereign

immunity includes two distinct principles, immunity from suit and immunity from

liability.”); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.001 et. seq. The waiver

of immunity under the Act is limited to three general areas:

      (1)    claims arising out of the use of motor-driven vehicles and
             motor-driven equipment;
      (2)    claims arising from the condition or use of real property; and
      (3)    claims arising from the condition or use of tangible personal
             property.

See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021; City of Denton v. Page, 701 S.W.2d

831, 834 (Tex. 1986).

      In this instance, Plaintiff’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims do

not arise out of the use of a motor vehicle, condition or use of real property, or

condition or use of tangible personal property. Pl.’s Orig. Pet., pp 1-3, ¶¶ 6-13.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims do not fall within the limited waiver of immunity

provision contained in § 101.021 of the TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE in order for

Plaintiff to recover against Iowa Colony.




                                            7
      Because Plaintiff’s state law claims do not fall within the limited waiver of

immunity provision of § 101.021, Iowa Colony is immune to Plaintiff’s claims.

Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting Iowa Colony’s Plea to the

Jurisdiction dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against Iowa Colony because it does not

have subject matter jurisdiction to determine the subject in controversy. City of

Hempstead v. Kmiec, 902 S.W.2d 118, 122 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995,

no writ.); see also Hardin County Sheriff’s Dept. v. Smith, 290 S.W.3d 550 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont 2009, no pet.) (Person who was wrongfully arrested did not state

a viable claim under § 101.021 because injury was not caused by motor vehicle or

condition or use of property).

     B.     Waiver by Deceit or Misconduct Argument Not Presented to the
            Trial Court and Raised for the First Time on Appeal
      Plaintiff’s argument that government immunity has been waived by deceit

and misconduct (Appellant’s Brief, pg. 4) should be overruled because Plaintiff did

not raise this argument with the trial court and, therefore, is waived. [CR 29-32];

See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Salmeron v. T-Mobile West Corp., 2009 Tex. App.

LEXIS 1105, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (to preserve

complaint for review, appellant was required to make a timely request, objection,

or motion specifying the action the trial court was requested to take, and obtain an

adverse ruling, or the issue is waived); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth.,




                                         8
589 S.W.2d 671, 677 (Tex. 1979) (non-movant may not urge on appeal as reason

for reversal “any and every new ground that he can think of”).

      Accordingly, the Court should overrule Plaintiff’s argument that government

immunity has been waived by deceit and misconduct because Plaintiff did not

present this issue to the trial court and is waived. Duke, 783 S.W.2d at 210 (“A

court of appeals may not reverse a trial court’s judgment in the absence of properly

assigned error”); Central Education Agency v. Burke, 711 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex. 1986)

(“the court of appeals could not raise grounds for reversal sua sponte.”).

IV.   ISSUE NO. 2: IOWA COLONY IS ALSO IMMUNE FROM
      APPELLANT’S CLAIMS BECAUSE APPELLANT’S INTENTIONAL
      TORT CLAIMS FOR FALSE ARREST AND MALICIOUS
      PROSECUTION ARE SPECIFICALLY EXEMPTED FROM THE
      WAIVER OF IMMUNITY PURSUANT TO § 101.057 OF THE TEXAS
      CIVIL PRACTICES & REMEDIES CODE.

      The Court did not err in granting Iowa Colony’s Plea to the Jurisdiction

because Appellant’s intentional tort claims for false arrest and malicious

prosecution are specifically exempted from the waiver of immunity pursuant §

101.057 of the TEX. PRAC. & REM. CODE.

      A.    Immunity Not Waived for Intentional Torts

      The Court did not err in granting Iowa Colony’s Plea to the Jurisdiction

because the Texas Tort Claims Act does not waive immunity for intentional torts.

Delaney v. University of Houston, 835 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1992); City of San

Antonio v. Dunn, 796 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, writ


                                          9
denied); See also Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1994); Riggs v. City

of Pearland, 177 F.R.D. 395, 405 (S.D. Tex. 1997). In fact, intentional torts are

specifically exempted from the coverage of the Texas Tort Claims Act. Section

101.057 of the TEX. PRAC. & REM. CODE provides:

      This chapter does not apply to a claim:

      (1) based on an injury or death connected with any act or omission
         arising out of civil disobedience, riot, insurrection, or rebellion; or

      (2) arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, or any other
         intentional tort, including a tort involving disciplinary action by
         school authorities.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.057. “This limitation provides that claims

‘arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, or any other intentional tort’ are

not actionable” under the TTCA. McCord v. Memorial Med. Ctr. Hosp., 750

S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1988, no writ); see also Riggs, 177

F.R.D. at 405; Callis v. Sellars, 953 F. Supp. 793, 801 (S.D. Tex. 1996); Dunn, 796

S.W.2d at 261; Dupre v. Harris County Hosp. Dist., 8 F. Supp. 2d 908, 928 (S.D.

Tex. 1998).

      Furthermore, Appellant’s causes of action against Iowa Colony for false

arrest and malicious prosecution have consistently been held by Texas courts to be

causes of action that are not viable against governmental entities in Texas. Pineda

v. City of Houston, 175 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.)

(TTCA specifically waiver of immunity for intentional torts); Kmiec, 902 S.W.2d


                                          10
at 122 (City was not liable under the Tort Claims Act for false arrest, malicious

prosecution, or defamation claims); Cronen v. Ray, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 7952,

*12 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied) (Appellant’s false arrest

and imprisonment claims did not fall within the limited waiver of immunity

provision of the TTCA and are barred); Dunn, 796 S.W.2d at 261 (City immune

from liability for false arrest of police officer). Intentional tort claims of the kind

that Appellant is attempting to assert in this matter simply are not actionable

against governmental entities under Texas law.

      Thus, it is clear that the causes of action that Appellant attempted to plead

against Iowa Colony are not within the exceptions to immunity contained within

the Texas Tort Claims Act and Iowa Colony’s sovereign immunity remains intact.

As such, the Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the Appellant’s

state law claims against Iowa Colony and these claims were properly dismissed.

V.    ISSUE NO. 3: APPELLANT’S DECISION TO FILE SUIT AGAINST
      IOWA COLONY FOREVER BARRED APPELLANT FROM
      RECOVERING INDIVIDUALLY AGAINST HEARN AND THE
      TRIAL COURT’S DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT’S CLAIMS
      AGAINST HEARN WAS MANDATORY AND PROPER PURSUANT
      TO § 101.106 OF THE TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICES & REMEDIES
      CODE.

      The Court did not err in granting Hearn’s Motion to Dismiss because

Appellant’s decision to file suit against Iowa Colony forever barred Appellant from




                                          11
recovering individually against Hearn pursuant to § 101.106(a) of the Texas Civil

Practices & Remedies Code.

      Hearn is entitled to government immunity from Appellant’s state law claims

as a government employee acting within the course and scope of his duties and

Appellant’s claims against Hearn are barred as a matter of law under the Texas

Tort Claims Act. Section 101.106(a) of the Texas Civil Practices & Remedies

Code provides that “[t]he filing of a suit under this chapter against a governmental

unit constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever

bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff against an individual employee of the

governmental unit regarding the same subject matter.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 101.106(a); Hintz v. Lally, 305 S.W.3d 761 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2009, pet. denied), abrogated in part as stated in, followed by, cited by

Williams v. Nealon, 394 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 7,

2012, pet. denied).

      In addition, Section 101.106(e) of the Texas Civil Practices & Remedies

Code provides that, “[i]f a suit is filed under this chapter against both the

governmental unit and any of its employees, the employees shall be immediately

dismissed on the filing of a motion by the governmental unit.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE § 101.106(e) (emphasis added); see Holland v. City of Houston, 41 F.

Supp. 2d 678, 716-18 (S.D. Tex. 1999); Dallas County Mental Health & Mental



                                         12
Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1998), cert. denied, 142 L. Ed.

2d 450, 119 S. Ct. 541 (1998); Newman v. Obersteller, 960 S.W.2d 621, 622 (Tex.

1997); Thomas v. Oldham, 895 S.W.2d 352, 355 (Tex. 1995); White v. Annis, 864

S.W.2d 127, 131 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied).

      Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting Hearn’s Motion to

Dismiss because Hearn is entitled to government immunity as a government

employee acting within the course and scope of his duties and Appellant’s claims

against Hearn are barred as a matter of law under the Texas Tort Claims Act.

                                 CONCLUSION

      The trial court did not err in granting Iowa Colony’s Plea to the Jurisdiction

because Plaintiff’s state law claims do not fall within the limited waiver of

immunity provision of § 101.021 of the Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code.

In addition, the trial court did not err in granting Iowa Colony’s Plea to the

Jurisdiction because the Texas Tort Claims Act does not waive immunity for

intentional torts pursuant to § 101.057 of the Texas Civil Practices & Remedies

Code. Finally, the trial court did not err in granting Hearn’s Motion to Dismiss

because Hearn is entitled to a dismissal of this matter pursuant to § 101.106(e) of

the Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code.




                                        13
                                      PRAYER

      For these reasons, Appellees Iowa Colony and Louis C. Hearn, Jr.

respectfully pray that this Court overrule Appellant’s claim that the trial court erred

and affirm the trial court’s orders granting Iowa Colony’s Plea to the Jurisdiction

and Hearn’s Motion to Dismiss. Appellees pray for any further relief, in law or

equity, to which they may show themselves to be justly entitled.

                                        Respectfully submitted,

                                        GORDON & REES, LLP

                                        By: /s/ Steven D. Selbe
                                           STEVEN D. SELBE
                                           State Bar No. 18004600
                                           sselbe@gordonrees.com
                                           ANDREW J. PRATKA
                                           State Bar No. 24079159
                                           apratka@gordonrees.com
                                           1900 West Loop South, Suite 1000
                                           Houston, Texas 77027
                                           Telephone: (713) 961-3366
                                           Facsimile: (713) 961-3938

                                        Attorneys for the City of Iowa Colony
                                        and Louis C. Hearn, Jr.


   CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE UNDER TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(I)(3)

      This brief complies with the word limitation of TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(I)(2)(B)
because it contains 2,392 words.

                                         /s/ Steven D. Selbe
                                        Steven D. Selbe



                                          14
                                          CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

                        This is to certify that on this 9th day of October, 2015, a true and correct
                 copy of the foregoing was served on the counsel and parties identified below by
                 Certified U.S. Mail RRR, Regular U.S. Mail, and Electronic Mail in accordance
                 with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure:

                   Billy Joe Henderson, Pro Se Appellant
                   2003 S. Adoue #3
                   Alvin, Texas 77511
                   (832) 305-2012
                   Billyh713@hotmail.com


                                                        /s/ Steven D. Selbe
                                                       STEVEN D. SELBE




IOWA/1103932/25033002v.1



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