 

In the Missouri Court of Appea[s
Eastern District

DIVISION FOUR

AMOSO REALTY, LLC, )
)

Piaintiff/Respondent, )

)

Vs. )
)

MONIQUE MILTON, )
)

Defendant/Respondent, )

)

and )
)

BRYCE WEATHERS, )
)

Proposed Intervenor/Appellant. )

Introduction

No. ED104375

Appeal from the Circuit Court
of the City of St. Louis

Honorable Paula Perl<ins Bryant

FILED: December 27, 2016

Bryce Weathers (“Weathers”) appeals from the trial court’s order denying his motion to

intervene in Ainoso Realty’s (“Amoso”) suit for rent and possession against Monique Milton

(“Milton”). Weathers filed his motion to intervene after Amoso (the plaintiff and counter-

defendant) and Milton (tlle defendant and counter-plaintiff) filed a voluntary dismissal of all

claims against one another under Rule 67.02(3).1 Because the trial eourt’s order denying

Weathei's’s intervention motion was not a final appealable judgment under Seetion 512.020,2 we

dismiss this appeal.

 

l All rule references are to Mo. R. Civ. P. (2015).
2 Al| statutory references are to RSMo (Cnm. Supp. 2012).

 

Factual and Procedural Historv

Amoso fiied a petition for rent and possession against Monique Mi|ton. The petition
alleged that Amoso was acting as the authorized agent of Weathers, the property owner, for
purposes of the rent-and-possession action. The petition further alleged that Miiton rented the
property for 3475 per month, and, due to Milton’s failure to pay rent, Amoso sought restitution
of the premises and damages for rent and other fees.

In response, Milton asserted counterclaims against both Alnoso and Weathers. The
counterclaims alleged that Amoso and Weathers were negligent for failing to exterminate the bed
bugs, and further alleged that Amoso and Weathers brought the rent-and-possession action in
retaliation for Milton`s reporting bed bugs to the St. Louis Health Departlnent.

The trial court entered an order granting leave for Miiton to file a third-party petition
against Weathers, but Weathers was never served and thus never became a party.3 The trial
court set a court date for January 2016.

Amoso and Miiton filed a joint “STIPULATION FOR DISM[SSAL” on December 18,
2015. Regarding Amoso’s claims against Milton, the stipulation stated that Amoso agreed to
dismiss all claims against Milton Witli prejudice The stipulation also stated that Milton Would
dismiss all of her claims against Amoso with prejudice and against Weathers-Hwho had not yet
been served_wr'thouf prejudice The corresponding entry on the trial court’s docket was titled,
“Dismissed by Parties.”

Weathcrs subsequently filed a motion to intervene in the rent-and-possession action,
alleging that Amoso was the agent for Weathers in the lawsuit, and that Amoso and Milton had

settled the case for their considerable benefit, without Weatllers’ “knowiedge, consent or

 

3 Section 535.020 allows the landlord’s agent (|1ere, Amoso) to sue a tenant (Milton) as the named plaintifl`in a rent-
and-possession suit. Thus, the landlord (Weathers) need not become a party if the agent files the suit.

2

authorization,” thereby breaching Amoso’s fiduciary duties to Weathers. Thus, Weathers
requested leave to intervene.

A|most two months later the trial court entered an order setting a hearing date on the
motion to intervene. While our record does not contain a transcript of the hearing, the trial court
subsequentiy ordered briefing on “whether the proposed dismissal of December 18, 2015 is valid
or not as per the face of the present record.”

In a subsequent written order, the trial court denied Weathers’s motion to intervene The
trial court reasoned that Amoso and Milton’s Stipuiation of Dismissal was a voluntary dismissal
under Rule 67.02(a), which was effective_-withoutjudicial approval_on the date it was filed.
Thus, the trial court found that it lacked jurisdiction and denied Weathers’s motion to intervene
The written order did not contain the word “judgment,” but the corresponding docket entry
stated, “SEE ORDER AND JUDGMENT-THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT BRYCE
WEATHERS [s:'c] MOTION TO INTERVENE IS HEREBY DENIED. SO ORDERED:
JUDGE PAULA P. BRYANT.” The trial judge’s name was typewritten Weathers appeals

Discussion

Before we reach the merits of the appeal, we have a duty to determine if Weathers is
entitled to an appeal. State ex rel. Koster v. ConocoPhillips Co.. 493 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. banc
2016). The right to appeal is purely statutory. Buemi v. Kerckhoff, 359 S.W.Zd 16, 20 (Mo.
banc 2011). No right to appeal exists unless specifically provided for by statute. Ld. Section
512.020 provides the general mechanism for determining who may appeal in a civil case,“ it
states:

Any party to a suit aggrieved by any judgment of any trial court in any civil cause

from which an appeal is not prohibited by the constitution, nor clearly limited in
special statutory proceedings, may take his or her appeal to a court having

 

4 Weathers does not suggest any other statutory authority entitling him to appeal.

3

 

appellate jurisdiction from any: (5) Final judgment in the case or from any
special order after tinaljudgment in the cause; (Emphasis added.)

A final judgment is a prerequisite to appeiiate review, subject to exceptions not relevant

here.5 Buemi, 359 S.W.3d at 20. A final appealable judgment is a writing signed by thejudge

 

and specifically denominated “judgment” or “decree” that resolves all issues in a case and leaves

nothing for future determination Basta v. Kansas Citv Power & Light Co., 410 S.W.Bd 743, 746

 

(Mo. App. W.D. 2013); Rule 74.0i(a).

“The designation of ‘judgment’ may occur at the top of the writing, within the body of
the writing, or in a docket-sheet entry, but it must be clear from the writing that the trial
court is calling the document or docket-sheet entry a judgment.” SLJ v. RJ, 101 S.W.?>d
339, 340 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003) (emphasis added). The requirement that a trial court denominate
a writing as a “judgment” is not a mere formality; it establishes a “bright line” test to determine

when a writing is a judgment. Citv of St. Louis v. Hughes, 950 S.W.Zd 850, 853 (Mo. banc

 

199'/`).

fn §Ll, a written trial-court order did not include the word “judgment,” although the
docket entry stated, “Judgment Granted.” 101 S.W.3d at 340. This Court held that the written
order did not constitute a final judgment because the written order was not denominated a
“judgment.” I_d_. We further explained that the docket entry did not constitute a “judgment”
because it lacked another requirement of Rule 74.0i(a): it was not signed or initiated by the
judge. I_d_. We held that the two documents (the written order and the docket entry) could not
combine to create a final appealable judgment, even though the docket entry clearly referred to

the written order. §§ § We dismissed the appeal. §

 

5 Section 512.020, subsections (1)_(4), also allows appeals front a few specific interlocutory orders. None of those
subsections are relevant here.

In U, this Court followed and applied our reasoning in M on nearly identical facts.
Orfv. Orf, 208 S.W.3d 306, 307 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006). The trial court issued an order that was
not denominated a “judgment.” Ld. The corresponding docket entry stated, “Judgment Entered,”
but it was not signed or initialed by the judge. § After reviewing our analysis in _S_“[HJ,_J_, we held
that “this case involves an order that is not properly denominated, and an unsigned docket entry,
and we lackjurisdiction to consider the appeal.” igl_.

Weathers appeals from the trial court’s April 28, 2016, Order denying his motion to
intervene Similar to M and O_rf`, the trial court’s written order was not denominated a
“judgment” and the order did not contain the word “judgment." As in §_L_.[ and _Q_r;f, we
acknowledge that the corresponding docket entry stated, “SEE ORDER AND JUDGMENT.”
We further note that the docket entry included the trial judge’s typewritten name However, the
judge’s typewritten name is not a signature for the purposes of Rule 74.0l(a). § Rule 41 .08(a)
(“Documents requiring a judgc’s or commissioner’s signature may be signed by an original

signature, stamped signature or an electronic graphic representation of a signature.”); see also

 

Kearns v. New York Cmtv. Bank‘ 389 S.W.3d 294, 297 n.5 (Mo. App. W.D. 2013] (in dicta,
noting, “If` a judge’s typewritten name appears beneath the docket entry, the signing requirement
is satisfied if the judge initials the entry.”),6

As in M and _Qrf, here we have an order that has not been denominated a “judglnent”
and an unsigned docket entry, neither of which constituted a final judgment. B M, 101
S.W.3d at 340; _Q_t;f, 208 S.W.3d at 307. Because Weathers lacks a final appealablejudgment,

we dismiss this appeal. I_d.

 

5 Further, this handwritten-typewritten distinction exists with regard to judicial initials constituting a “signaturc.”
Cornnare Kessinger v. Kessinger. 935 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996) (handwrittcn initials satisfy the
signature requirement) with Grissum v. Soldi 87 S.W.Sd 915, 917 (Mo. App. S.D. 2002) (typewrittelt initials do
not).

 

Conclusion

rfhe appeal is dismissed.
KufRT s. onEi~twALD, image

James M. Dowd, P.J'., concurs
Gary M. Gaertner, Jr., J., concurs.

 

