                           NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 14 2020
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LEVI GARCIA STRANGE,                            No. 18-16974

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:17-cv-02699-JAM-AC

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES ARMY,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of California
                    John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted January 8, 2020**

Before:      CALLAHAN, NGUYEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

      Levi Garcia Strange appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment

dismissing his action alleging claims related to his military service. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.



      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
1998) (order). We affirm.

      The district court properly dismissed Strange’s action because Strange failed

to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, a

plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for

relief); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for misconduct alleged.”).

      We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

      AFFIRMED.




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