UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIAN COOKE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NATIONAL TIRE WHOLESALE,
                                                                      No. 95-2530
INCORPORATED; STEVE THEIL,
Assistant Manager; DENNIS FOSTICK,
Assistant Regional Manager,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-93-2736-AW)

Submitted: April 16, 1996

Decided: May 22, 1996

Before HALL, ERVIN, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed as modified by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Erroll D. Brown, Kirk A. Wilder, Landover, Maryland, for Appellant.
David B. Stratton, Dwight D. Murray, William Nooter, JORDAN,
COYNE & SAVITS, Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

The Appellant, Brian Cooke, appeals the district court's order
granting the Defendant summary judgment in a Title VII discrimina-
tion suit. Cooke contends that the district court erred in granting sum-
mary judgment to the Defendant, National Tire Wholesale, and
abused its discretion in denying Cooke's motion to amend his com-
plaint and limiting Cooke's damages after Cooke failed to comply
with the court's order to specify damages sought. Cooke's claims are
without merit.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine
issue of material fact that could lead a trier of fact to find for the non-
moving party.1 "In determining whether to grant summary judgment,
all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-movant."2
This court reviews de novo a district court's grant of summary
judgment.3 The district court properly granted summary judgment
against Cooke because he offered no evidence in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment. To raise a genuine issue of material
fact, Cooke may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his
pleadings.4 Rather, he must present evidence supporting his position
through "depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with . . . affidavits, if any." 5 Specific material evidenti-
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1 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Miller
v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir. 1990) (in banc), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1109 (1991).
2 Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 852 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson,
477 U.S. at 255).
3 Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 63
U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. 1994) (No. 94-9).
4 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
5 Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)).

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ary facts, not unsupported speculation, must be shown to overcome
summary judgment.6 Because the district court properly granted sum-
mary judgment on the claims over which it had original jurisdiction,
the court also properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Cooke's state tort claims.7 However, the order striking the case
from the active docket of the district court does not specify whether
the dismissal of the pendent state law claims was with prejudice. The
district court should have dismissed the claims without prejudice to
Cooke's opportunity to bring them in state court. 8

The rulings of the district court challenged by Cooke's remaining
claims had no effect on the entry of summary judgment. Those claims
are therefore now moot. We find no error in these rulings but even
if this court did, it would not change the conclusion that summary
judgment was appropriate.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court but mod-
ify the final order to reflect that the state court claims are dismissed
without prejudice. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
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6 Ash v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 800 F.2d 409, 411-12 (4th Cir.
1986).
7 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c)(3) (West 1993); United Mine Workers of
America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
8 Jenkins v. Weatherholtz, 909 F.2d 105, 110 (4th Cir. 1990) (citing
United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 726).

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