UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
                                                                No. 96-4198
WILLIE DUNBAR, a/k/a Doug, a/k/a
Dougie, a/k/a Dougie Fresh,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.
Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-94-723)

Submitted: October 17, 1996

Decided: October 29, 1996

Before MURNAGHAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Langdon D. Long, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. John Michael Barton, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Willie Dunbar pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1994). The district court sentenced
Dunbar to serve 135 months in prison to be followed by five years of
supervised release and to pay a special assessment fee of $50. He
appeals his conviction and sentence. Dunbar's attorney has filed a
brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
raising two issues but indicating that, in his view, there are no merito-
rious issues for appeal. Dunbar was informed of his right to file a pro
se supplemental brief, but he has failed to do so. We affirm.

Dunbar first challenges the district court's compliance with the
requirements outlined in Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure when taking Dunbar's plea. We have reviewed the entire
record and conclude that the district court fully complied with all the
mandates of Rule 11.

Dunbar also contends that the district court erred in applying a two-
level enhancement for possession of a firearm under U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(1).* Although Dunbar initially objected to this enhance-
ment, he withdrew the objection at the sentencing hearing. Our
review, therefore, is only for plain error. See United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993). A defendant "possesses" a firearm for
purposes of § 2D1.1(b)(1) if the weapon was merely "present," unless
it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the
offense. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, comment. (n.3). The district court did not
plainly err in applying the enhancement because, according to the pre-
sentence report, eyewitnesses saw Dunbar with a firearm during the
drug transactions involved in the conspiracy.
_________________________________________________________________
*United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov.
1994).

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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and
find no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm Dunbar's
conviction and sentence. This court requires that counsel inform his
client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If the client requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from repre-
sentation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served
on the client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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