
70 U.S. 514 (1865)
3 Wall. 514
THE BERMUDA.
Supreme Court of United States.

*536 Mr. G.M. Wharton and Mr. W.B. Reed, on both arguments, for these appellants.
After argument, on the other side, by Mr. Speed, A.G., and by Mr. Coffey, special counsel of the captors, who argued the case thoroughly every way  on the facts, on principles of public law, and on English and American precedents &mdash.
*542 The CHIEF JUSTICE delivered the opinion of the court.
These appeals were very fully and ably argued at the last term; and, because of the desire of the court to have all the aid that counsel could give in the examination of the important questions of fact and law presented by the record, were ordered to be reargued at this term. Under this order they have been again thoroughly and exhaustively discussed, and have since received our most deliberate consideration.
The questions arising upon the ownership of the steamship, will first be disposed of.
She was built in 1861, on the eastern coast of England, at Stockton-upon-Tees. On the 1st of August in that year, Edwin Haigh made the declaration of ownership required by the British Merchants' Shipping Act of 1854.[] In this *543 declaration he described himself as a natural born British subject, asserted himself to be the sole and exclusive owner, and named E.L. Tessier as master. Upon this declaration a certificate of registry was issued the next day, which repeated the statement that Haigh was owner, and Tessier master; and on the following day, the 3d of August, a joint and several power of attorney to sell the ship, at any place out of the kingdom, at any time within twelve months, and for any price thought sufficient by the attorneys, or either of them, was given by Haigh to A.S. Hanckel and G.A. Trenholm, of Charleston, in South Carolina. With these papers the steamship was despatched to Charleston, on her first voyage; but finding, probably, the entrance of that port too dangerous, ran successfully the blockade of Savannah, and returned to England in January, 1862, after an absence of about five months.
The power of sale was sent to Charleston, and remained there. Haigh asserts that this power was intended only for the first voyage; was given because he wished to have the steamer sold in Charleston, or in some other port of the United States, if opportunity should offer, and a sufficient price could be obtained; and was afterwards virtually revoked when he abandoned the idea of sending her again to any southern port.
It is unfortunate for the credit of these statements, that the power was given to enemies of the United States, resident in Charleston, without access to any loyal port except by running the blockade; that it was not limited by its terms to the first voyage, but, on the contrary, was to continue in force twelve months; that it contained no provision insuring a sufficient price, but left that matter, so important to a real owner contemplating a real sale, to the decision of the attorneys, or either of them; and that there is no evidence in the record of any actual revocation of the power, or of any attempt to revoke it, and none, except Haigh's assertion, that the purpose of again sending the ship to a rebel port was ever abandoned.
These first acts bring the ownership into doubt. Haigh *544 may have been then the true owner; but it is certainly strange that he was in such haste to remove her from his own neutral control, and place her absolutely in the power and at the disposal of the enemies of the United States.
After her return to England a new voyage was planned for the Bermuda, and Fraser, Trenholm & Co., under whose direction, probably, the first voyage was made, now appear conspicuously in her concerns.
Of the members of this firm, Fraser and Trenholm were, doubtless, citizens of South Carolina; so also were, probably, Prioleau and Wellsman, who are mentioned as partners.[*] The only partner whose declaration that he was a British subject appears in the record was J.R. Armstrong. The Liverpool house thus composed was a branch of the house of John Fraser & Co., of Charleston, and was employed as a depositary and agent of the rebel government at Richmond.[]
It was under the direction of this firm that the Bermuda was loaded at Liverpool in February, 1862.
Her former master, Tessier, had been transferred to the Bahama, then at Stockton-on-Tees, but destined to become notorious three months later by her employment, under Tessier, in the conveyance of guns and munitions to the Alabama.[] In his place, Westendorff had become master of the Bermuda. This person, a citizen of South Carolina, arrived in Liverpool from Charleston in December, in command of the Helen, a ship belonging to John Fraser & Co. Through Fraser, Trenholm & Co., he obtained the official certificate of competency necessary to enable him to take command of the Bermuda, and was appointed master, probably by them, on the 17th January. On the day before this appointment, Fraser, Trenholm & Co. had advised John Fraser & Co. of the despatch of the ship Ella with a cargo to Bermuda Island, to be followed by the steamship Bermuda with goods. The letter containing the advice is not in the record, but the fact appears from a letter of John Fraser & Co. to N.T. Butterfield at Bermuda, relating to these vessels and their cargoes.
*545 The Bermuda, at the date of the Liverpool letter, was lying at a port on the eastern coast, but was at once brought round to Liverpool to receive her cargo.
Her whole lading was under the direction of the Liverpool firm. Haigh was not known in it; while, on the other hand, Fraser, Trenholm & Co. were regarded as owners by many persons on the ship, and by others who certainly were not ill-informed. Thus Tessier, then in command of the Bahama, writing to Westendorff on the 20th February, spoke of Fraser, Trenholm & Co. as "our owners." And so Graham, chief engineer of the Bermuda, deposed on the preparatory examination, "To the best of my knowledge and belief, Fraser, Trenholm & Co. of Liverpool, England, are the owners of the captured vessel." The depositions of Heenan, Noble, and Pierson, firemen on board, were to the same effect.
Against this evidence are the declaration of Haigh, the deposition of Westendorff, and the affidavit of Armstrong, all affirming ownership in Haigh.
Thus stood matters in relation to ownership when the Bermuda left Liverpool on the 1st of March. She was controlled absolutely, in all respects, by Fraser, Trenholm & Co., and they were quite generally regarded as her owners. They, on the other hand, assert that Haigh was the real owner, and that they were acting as his agents; admitting, however, that they had no charter, and no written authority to represent him.
On the day before sailing, Fraser, Trenholm & Co. addressed a letter to the master, Westendorff, directing him to proceed to the island of Bermuda, and deliver his cargo according to the bills of lading. After some general directions as to money for disbursements and other matters, the letter concludes with the information that "the friends" of the firm "in Nassau, New Providence, are H. Adderly & Co.," and with a direction to "call on them, in case of having to take cargo from Bermuda to that port." What other special instructions were given to Westendorff, at Liverpool, the record does not disclose. Every bill of lading required *546 the cargo mentioned in it to be delivered at Bermuda, to order or assigns. It is clear that the ship was to go to Bermuda, and not beyond, unless something not specified should occur; and the cargo was to be delivered there and not elsewhere, except in the same contingency, to the order of somebody not named.
The ship arrived at the port of St. George's, in Bermuda, on the 19th or 20th March, and remained there five weeks waiting for orders.
And here we may expect to learn who was the unnamed party to whose order the cargo was to be delivered, and what was the contingency in which it was to be taken from Bermuda to another port.
Haigh asserts, and so does Westendorff, that the unnamed consignee was one Butterfield, a resident of Hamilton, one of the ports of Bermuda, and that Butterfield, as consignee of the cargo, being desirous to have it carried on to Nassau, "made an arrangement with the master to that effect." Nothing in the proofs supports, but everything contradicts, this. Butterfield is nowhere named in any paper as consignee; we find no instructions anywhere given to deliver the cargo to him; nor was it by his direction or arrangement that the cargo was sent forward from Bermuda to Nassau.
The real state of facts is disclosed by the letters of Fraser, Trenholm & Co. to John Fraser & Co., and of John Fraser & Co. to N.T. Butterfield, considered in connection with some other matters in the record. On the 23d January, 1862, the branch house at Liverpool wrote to the Charleston house, giving advice of the immediate despatch of the ship Ella to Bermuda with a cargo consigned to John Fraser & Co., or their authorized agent, with authority to dispose of it in any market they should select. This letter suggested that if the Charleston house should not think best to send an agent to Bermuda, any communication for the master of the Ella should be sent, under cover, to Butterfield, and added, that the master was instructed to await orders at Bermuda. On the 28th of February the Liverpool firm directed another letter to John Fraser & Co., or their authorized *547 agent at Bermuda, in which they spoke of the "invoices and bills of lading" of the cargo of the Bermuda as "very full, and as suited to facilitate greatly the delivery and also the transshipment, should this be determined upon." The letter goes on to say that, "should the loss of any of the invoices or bills of lading unfortunately happen, duplicates can be furnished hereafter," but strongly urges, "in case of an opportunity to send them forward with the letters, the adoption of the most certain measures of preventing any of them falling into improper hands."
These letters show what unlimited control John Fraser & Co. were expected to exercise over the ship and cargo of the Bermuda; and that control was exercised.
They had been advised of the coming both of the Ella and Bermuda by the letter of the 16th of January, and on the 1st of April they wrote to their correspondent, Butterfield, saying: "We suppose the steamer Bermuda may be with you ere this, and the ship Ella. We will thank you to request the masters to act as follows, namely: Captain Westendorff to take in the tea and other light articles per Ella, if he has room for them, and proceed to Nassau, reporting himself, on arrival there, to Messrs. Henry Adderly & Co.; Captain Carter to keep in his cargo, and wait further orders from us. They will reach him, we think, very shortly."
This direction was received at Hamilton, where Butterfield resided, on the 19th of April, and was forwarded the same day to Westendorff, at St. George's, and was implicitly obeyed. Captain Westendorff even refused to allow certain printing presses and materials, which formed part of his cargo, to be landed at Bermuda, though requested to do so by George Dunn, the person who seems to have had them in charge, and though the bills of lading expressly required that they should be delivered at Bermuda. He said that the bills were "signed to be delivered to order;" that "the responsibility" of delivery to Dunn would be too great, unless he received instructions to that effect.
No ownership could give more absolute control than was exercised over the ship and whole cargo by John Fraser & *548 Co. That control and the action of the master leave no doubt that they were the unnamed party to whom the cargo was to be delivered, and whose orders the Bermuda was to await; nor can there be any doubt that Westendorff had instructions to obey, absolutely and in all things, their directions, both as to ship and cargo.
Whether the cargo was to be transshipped, or to be carried on to Charleston without transshipment, was probably left to be determined by circumstances after arrival at Nassau.
It appears from letters and papers in the record that a light draft steamship, named the Herald, was connected with the Bermuda as a tender; and it seems that it was to transshipment into that steamship that Fraser, Trenholm & Co. referred in their letter of January 28.
There is not much about the Herald in the record; but what we find is instructive. A letter, dated Liverpool, February 16, 1862, without signature, but addressed to one of the engineers of the Bahama, and written, probably, by one of the engineers of the Bermuda, says: "Our tender left yesterday; don't be at all surprised that we have got a tender. They bought a light draft boat at Dublin, used to run the mail once, called the Herald." The writer proceeds to describe this tender as "two hundred and eighty feet in length," drawing "ten feet heavy, and five and a half feet light;" with "her boilers stayed and strengthened;" with "an average speed of eighteen and a half knots;" with "all her lower cabins razeed to make cargo space;" with "a crew shipped for twelve months, for some port or ports south of Mason's and Dixon's line;" with "three captains on board: one an Englishman, nominal; another, an experienced coast pilot from the Potomac to Charleston; and another, the same from Charleston to San Juan." This correspondent expresses the opinion, that "if the Yankees catch her, they are smarter than he gives them credit for;" and adds, "she waits our arrival at Bermuda," "but goes into Charleston first, to see about the stone fleet." The letter of Tessier to Westendorff, written four days later and already cited, speaks of the Herald as on her voyage across *549 the Atlantic, under the command of Captain Mitchell. There is a statement, too, in the deposition of Farrally, one of the firemen of the Bermuda, that the Herald was at Bermuda with several captains, while the steamship was there, and was understood to be intended to run the blockade; and that it was "the talk that the Herald was connected with our ship." It appears, also, from a bill of exchange drawn by Mitchell, master of the Herald, on Fraser, Trenholm & Co., that Westendorff supplied funds for that steamer at Bermuda.
This bill must have been drawn under instructions, and the fact strongly confirms what other parts of the record disclose of the connection between the two vessels.
The attendance of the Herald was, doubtless, to facilitate transshipment, should transshipment be directed by John Fraser & Co., and to secure the conveyance of the cargo to its ultimate destination.
Why no transshipment took place at Bermuda; whether transshipment was intended at Nassau; whether the Herald visited Charleston during the detention of Westendorff's ship at St. George's; whether it was finally concluded that the Bermuda herself should attempt to run the blockade, are matters thus far left in doubt.
The Bermuda sailed from St. George's on the 23d of April, and was captured on the 27th.
At the time of capture, two small boxes and a package, supposed to contain postage-stamps, were thrown overboard, and a bag, understood to contain letters, was burned. The bag was burned by the captain's brother, and under the orders of the captain, after the vessel had been boarded by the captors. It was burnt, as Westendorff says, in pursuance of his instructions. One of the passengers, also, burned a number of letters, which, he says, were private.
The instructions, in pursuance of which this destruction of papers was made, are not produced; nor is any explanation of this spoliation offered. The instructions were, doubtless, given by John Fraser & Co., in view of the contingency of capture, and were in accordance with the suggestion of *550 Fraser, Trenholm & Co.'s letter of the 28th of February, that the most certain measures should be adopted to prevent any of the bills of lading or invoices falling into improper hands. They, doubtless, included directions for the destruction of all compromising papers, and among them of the instructions themselves. If they had been preserved and produced, it is not unlikely that they would have disclosed the real ownership of the vessel, the true nature of her employment, and the actual destination of both ship and cargo.
This spoliation was one of unusual aggravation, and warrants the most unfavorable inferences as to ownership, employment, and destination.
All these transactions, prior to capture, and at the time of capture, repel the conclusion that Haigh was owner. Not a document taken on the ship shows ownership in him except the shipping articles, and these were false in putting upon the crew list employees of the rebel government and enemy passengers  the last under assumed names. He was permitted to put into the cause his original declaration of ownership of August 1, 1861, by way of further proof; but we cannot give much weight to this, in view of the "Certificate of Transactions subsequent to Registry," which shows his execution of the power of sale to Hanckel & Trenholm. After giving that power, there is no indication that he performed a single act of ownership. No letter alluded to him as owner. No direction relative to vessel or cargo recognized him as owner. All the papers and all the circumstances indicate rather that a sale was made in Charleston under the power, by which the beneficial control and real ownership were transferred to John Fraser & Co., while the apparent title, by the British papers, was suffered to remain in Haigh as a cover.
The spoliation makes the conclusion of ownership out of Haigh and in John Fraser & Co. wellnigh irresistible. Would the master have obeyed such instructions from John Fraser & Co., if he had been really appointed by Haigh, and was really responsible to him as owner? We are obliged to *551 think that the ownership of Haigh was a pretence, and that the vessel was rightly condemned as enemy property.
We will next consider the questions relating both to vessel and cargo, which join arising from employment in the trade and under the direction and control shown by the record, assuming for the moment that Haigh was owner.
How, then, was the Bermuda employed? In what trade, and under what control and direction?
The theory of the counsel for Haigh is that she was a neutral ship, carrying a neutral cargo, in good faith, from one neutral port to another neutral port; and they insist that the description of cargo, if neutral, and in a neutral ship, and on a neutral voyage, cannot be inquired into in the courts of a belligerent.
We agree to this. Neutral trade is entitled to protection in all courts. Neutrals, in their own country, may sell to belligerents whatever belligerents choose to buy. The principal exceptions to this rule are, that neutrals must not sell to one belligerent what they refuse to sell to the other, and must not furnish soldiers or sailors to either; nor prepare, nor suffer to be prepared within their territory, armed ships or military or naval expeditions against either. So, too, except goods contraband of war, or conveyed with intent to violate a blockade, neutrals may transport to belligerents whatever belligerents may agree to take. And so, again, neutrals may convey in neutral ships, from one neutral port to another, any goods, whether contraband of war or not, if intended for actual delivery at the port of destination, and to become part of the common stock of the country or of the port.
It is asserted by counsel that a British merchant, as a neutral, had, during the late civil war, a perfect right to trade, even in military stores, between their own ports, and to sell at one of them goods of all sorts, even to an enemy of the United States, with knowledge of his intent to employ them in rebel war against the American government.
If by trade between neutral ports is meant real trade, in *552 the course of which goods conveyed from one port to another become incorporated into the mass of goods for sale in the port of destination; and if by sale to the enemies of the United States is meant sale to either belligerent, without partiality to either, we accept the proposition of counsel as correct.
But if it is intended to affirm that a neutral ship may take on a contraband cargo ostensibly for a neutral port, but destined in reality for a belligerent port, either by the same ship or by another, without becoming liable, from the commencement to the end of the voyage, to seizure, in order to the confiscation of the cargo, we do not agree to it.
Very eminent writers on international maritime law have denied the right of neutrals to sell to belligerents, even within neutral territory, articles made for use in war, or to transport such articles to belligerent ports without liability to seizure and confiscation of goods and ship. And this is not an illogical inference from the general maxim that neutrals must not mix in the war. International law, however, in its practical administration, leans to the side of commercial freedom, and allows both free sale and free conveyance by neutrals to belligerents, if no blockade be violated, of all sorts of goods except contraband; and the conveyance, even of contraband goods, will not, in general, subject the ship, but only the goods, to forfeiture.
We are to inquire, then, whether the Bermuda is entitled to the protection of this rule, or falls within some exception to it.
It is not denied that a large part of her cargo was contraband in the narrowest sense of that word. One portion was made up of Blakely cannon and other guns in cases, of howitzers, of cannon not in cases, of carriages for guns, of shells, fuses, and other like articles  near eighty tons in all; and of seven cases of pistols, twenty-one cases of swords, seventy barrels of cartridges, three hundred whole barrels, seventy-eight half-barrels, and two hundred and eighty-three quarter-barrels of gunpowder. Another portion consisted of printing-presses and materials, paper, and Confederate States *553 postage stamps, and is described in a letter, found on board, as "presses and paraphernalia complete," "obtained from Scotland by a commissioner of the Confederate government,' and sent with a "lot of printers and engravers." The names of these printers and engravers, or at least the names by which they were known on board, are in the crew list; but Westendorff, in a letter already referred to, calls them his "government passengers;" and all the facts connected with this part of the cargo indicate that it actually belonged to the rebel government and was intended for its immediate use. Other very considerable portions of the cargo were also contraband within the received definitions of the term.
The character of this cargo makes its ulterior, if not direct, destination to a rebel port quite certain. And there is other evidence. The letters of Fraser, Trenholm & Co. make distinct references to the contingency of transshipment; and the evidence shows that the Herald was sent over with a view to this. The consignment of the whole cargo was to order or assigns  that is to say, as we have seen, to the order of John Fraser & Co. or assigns, and is conclusive, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that its destination was the port in which the consignee resided and transacted business.[*] There is much other evidence leading to the same conclusion; but it is needless to go further.
It makes no difference whether the destination to the rebel port was ulterior or direct; nor could the question of destination be affected by transshipment at Nassau, if transshipment was intended, for that could not break the continuity of transportation of the cargo.
The interposition of a neutral port between neutral departure and belligerent destination has always been a favorite resort of contraband carriers and blockade-runners. But it never avails them when the ultimate destination is ascertained. A transportation from one point to another remains continuous, so long as intent remains unchanged, no matter what stoppages or transshipments intervene.
*554 This was distinctly declared by this court in 1855,[*] in reference to American shipments to Mexican ports during the war of this country with Mexico, as follows: "Attempts have been made to evade the rule of public law by the interposition of a neutral port between the shipment from the belligerent port and the ultimate destination in the enemy's country; but in all such cases the goods have been condemned as having been taken in a course of commerce rendering them liable to confiscation."
The same principle is equally applicable to the conveyance of contraband to belligerents; and the vessel which, with the consent of the owner, is so employed in the first stage of a continuous transportation, is equally liable to capture and confiscation with the vessel which is employed in the last, if the employment is such as to make either so liable.
This rule of continuity is well established in respect to cargo.
At first, Sir William Scott held that the landing and warehousing of the goods and the payment of the duties on importation was a sufficient test of the termination of the original voyage; and that a subsequent exportation of them to a belligerent port was lawful.[] But in a later case, in an elaborate judgment, Sir William Grant[] reviewed all the cases, and established the rule, which has never been shaken, that even the landing of goods and payment of duties does not interrupt the continuity of the voyage of the cargo, unless there be an honest intention to bring them into the common stock of the country. If there be an intention, either formed at the time of original shipment, or afterwards, to send the goods forward to an unlawful destination, the continuity of the voyage will not be broken, as to the cargo, by any transactions at the intermediate port.
There seems to be no reason why this reasonable and settled doctrine should not be applied to each ship where several *555 are engaged successively in one transaction, namely, the conveyance of a contraband cargo to a belligerent. The question of liability must depend on the good or bad faith of the owners of the ships. If a part of the voyage is lawful, and the owners of the ship conveying the cargo in that part are ignorant of the ulterior destination, and do not hire their ship with a view to it, the ship cannot be liable; but if the ulterior destination is the known inducement to the partial voyage, and the ship is engaged in the latter with a view to the former, then whatever liability may attach to the final voyage, must attach to the earlier, undertaken with the same cargo and in continuity of its conveyance. Successive voyages, connected by a common plan and a common object, form a plural unit. They are links of the same chain, each identical in description with every other, and each essential to the continuous whole. The ships are planks of the same bridge, all of the same kind, and all necessary to the convenient passage of persons and property from one end to the other.
There remains the question whether the Bermuda, on the supposition that she was really a neutral ship, should be condemned for the conveyance of contraband. For, in general, as we have seen, a neutral may convey contraband to a belligerent, subject to no liability except seizure in order to confiscation of the offending goods. The ship is not forfeited, nor are non-offending parts of the cargo.
This has been called an indulgent rule, and so it is.[*] It is a great, but very proper relaxation of the ancient rule, which condemned the vessel carrying contraband as well as the cargo. But it is founded on the presumption that the contraband shipment was made without the consent of the owner given in fraud of belligerent rights, or, at least, without intent on his part to take hostile part against the country of the captors; and it must be recognized and enforced in all cases where that presumption is not repelled by proof.
*556 The rule, however, requires good faith on the part of the neutral, and does not protect the ship where good faith is wanting.
The Franklin, therefore, carrying contraband with a false destination, was condemned, after mature consideration, by Sir William Scott in 1801.[*] He said that, "the benefit of the relaxation could only be claimed by fair cases." This doctrine was shortly after applied to The Neutralitet by the same great judge;[] and it received the sanction of this court in an opinion delivered by an equal judge, in 1834.[] The leading principle governing this class of cases was stated very clearly by Mr. Justice Story in that opinion, thus: "The belligerent has a right to require a frank and bonâ fide conduct on the part of neutrals in the course of their commerce in times of war, and if the latter will make use of fraud and false papers to elude the just rights of belligerents and cloak their own illegal purposes, there is no injustice in applying to them the penalty of confiscation."
Mere consent to transportation of contraband will not always or usually be taken to be a violation of good faith. There must be circumstances of aggravation. The nature of the contraband articles and their importance to the belligerent, and the general features of the transaction, must be taken into consideration in determining whether the neutral owner intended or did not intend, by consenting to the transportation, to mix in the war.
The Ranger, though a neutral vessel, was condemned for being employed in carrying a cargo of sea stores to a place of naval equipment under false papers. The owner had not consented, but the master had, and Sir William Scott said, "If the owner will place his property under the absolute management and control of persons who are capable of lending it in this manner to be made an instrument of fraud in the hands of the enemy, he must sustain the consequences of such misconduct on the part of his agent."[§]
*557 So, too, The Jonge Emilia, a neutral vessel, was condemned on the ground that she appeared to have been altogether in the hands of enemy merchants and employed for seven voyages successively in enemy trade;[*] and The Carolina[] was condemned for employment in the transportation of troops, though the master alleged that it was under duress, and the actual service was at an end.
Now, what were the marks by which the conveyance of contraband on the Bermuda was accompanied? First, we have the character of the contraband articles, fitted for immediate military use in battle, or for the immediate civil service of the rebel government; then the deceptive bills of lading requiring delivery at Bermuda, when there was either no intention to deliver at Bermuda at all, or none not subject to be changed by enemies of the United States; then the appointment of one of these enemies as master, necessarily made with the knowledge and consent of Haigh, if he was owner; then the complete surrender of the vessel to the use and control of such enemies, without even the pretence of want of knowledge, by the alleged owner, of her destined and actual employment.
We need not go further. We are bound to say, considering the known relations of Fraser, Trenholm & Co. with the rebel leaders; and the relations of John Fraser & Co. to the same combination, justly inferable from the fact that they were the consignees of the whole cargo; and considering, also, the ascertained character of most of it, that it seems to us highly probable that the ship, at the time of capture, was actually in the service of the so-called Confederate government, and known to be so by all parties interested in her ownership.
However this may be, we cannot doubt that the Bermuda was justly liable to condemnation for the conveyance of contraband goods destined to a belligerent port, under circumstances of fraud and bad faith, which make the owner, if *558 Haigh was owner, responsible for unneutral participation in the war.
The cargo, having all been consigned to enemies, and most of it contraband, must share the fate of the ship.
Having thus disposed of the questions connected with the ownership, control, and employment of the Bermuda, and the character of her cargo, we need say little on the subject of liability for the violation of the blockade. What has been already adduced of the evidence, satisfies us completely that the original destination of the Bermuda was to a blockaded port; or, if otherwise, to an intermediate port, with intent to send forward the cargo by transshipment into a vessel provided for the completion of the voyage. It may be that the instructions to Westendorff were not settled when the steamship left St. George's for Nassau; but it is quite clear to us that the ship was then at the disposition of John Fraser & Co., and that the voyage, begun at Liverpool with intent to violate the blockade, delayed at St. George's for instructions from that firm, continued toward Nassau with the purpose of completion from that port to a rebel port, either by the Bermuda herself or by transshipment, was one voyage from Liverpool to a blockaded port; and that the liability to condemnation for attempted breach of blockade was, by sailing with such purpose, fastened on the ship as firmly as it would have been by proof of intent that the cargo should be transported by the Bermuda herself to a blockaded port, or as near as possible, without encountering the blockading squadron, and then sent in by a steamer, like the Herald, of lighter draft or greater speed.
We have not thought it necessary to examine the questions made by counsel touching the right of belligerents to make captures within cannon-shot range of neutral territory, for there is nothing in the evidence which proves to our satisfaction that the Bermuda was within such range.
Our conclusion is, that both vessel and cargo, even if both were neutral, were rightly condemned; and, on every ground, the decree below must be
AFFIRMED.
*559 [After the preceding confirmation of the decree of the District Court of Philadelphia  which, it will have been noted by the reader, was one condemning only the vessel (claimed by Haigh), and the munitions of war, &c. (claimed by Captain Blakely)  judgment as to the residue of the cargo having been reserved,  a decree was passed by the District Court, condemning this whole residue also.  Sec 23 Legal Intelligencer, 116.]

NOTE.
Along with the preceding case was submitted another, much like it, the case of 
NOTES
[]  22 British Statutes at Large, 267, 351, 352.
[*]  Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863, Part I, App., p. lxxii.
[]  Ib., 1863, Part I, p. 90.
[]  Ib., 224, 304, and App., lxxv.
[*]  Grove v. O'Brien, 8 Howard, 439; Lawrence v. Minturn, 17 Id. 106.
[*]  Jecker v. Montgomery, 18 Howard, 114.
[]  The Polly, 2 Robinson, 369.
[]  The William, 5 Id. 395; 1 Kent's Commentaries, 84, note
[*]  The Ringende Jacob, 1 Robinson, 90; The Sarah Christina, Id. 238. See opinions of Bynkershoeck and Heineccius, cited in notes to The Mercurius, Id. 288, and The Franklin, 3 Id. 222.
[*]  The Franklin, 3 Robinson, 224.
[]  The Neutralitet, Id. 296.
[]  Carrington v. Merchants' Insurance Co., 8 Peters, 518, opinion by Story. J.
[§]  The Ranger, 6 Robinson, 126.
[*]  The Jonge Emilia, 3 Robinson, 52.
[]  The Carolina, 4 Id. 256.
