UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                             No. 98-4524

MAURICE WILSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                             No. 98-4526

MAURICE WILSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Benson E. Legg, District Judge.
(CR-97-133, CR-96-358)

Submitted: July 27, 1999

Decided: September 20, 1999

Before MURNAGHAN and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL

Dennis M. Hart, Washington, D.C.; Christopher M. Davis, Washing-
ton, D.C., for Appellant. Lynne A. Battaglia, United States Attorney,
Virginia B. Evans, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Maurice Wilson appeals his convictions and sentences for three
counts of mail fraud and aiding and abetting mail fraud, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 2 (1994), and two counts of income tax evasion
and aiding and abetting income tax evasion, in violation of 26 U.S.C.
§ 7201(1994) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The convictions arose through Wil-
son's involvement with Industrial Medical and Physical Therapy, a
clinic that operated as an "accident mill," and his participation in sub-
mitting over-inflated bills to insurance companies. Wilson contends
that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to show that he had the specific
intent to engage in mail fraud; (2) the court erred in permitting the
Government to introduce evidence concerning his involvement in sev-
eral bad and illegal acts; (3) the amount of loss attributed to him for
sentencing purposes was in error; (4) the court erred by increasing his
offense level for his role in the offense and for his conscious or reck-
less risk of serious bodily injury; and (5) the sentence, which was
within the properly calculated sentencing guidelines, violated due
process and was cruel and unusual punishment. We affirm.

Evidence at trial established that Wilson ran the physical therapy
department and the pharmacy. He ordered and dispensed medications
without a license. He billed insurance companies for expensive neck
braces when much cheaper collars were given to the patients. We find

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that a reasonable factfinder could have found that Wilson had the spe-
cific intent to commit fraud. See United States v. Hudgins, 120 F.3d
483, 486 (4th Cir. 1997).

We also find that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence that Wilson dispensed medications and practiced physical
therapy without a license. This evidence was an intrinsic part of Wil-
son's criminal conduct. See United States v. Chin, 83 F.3d 83, 88 (4th
Cir. 1996). Evidence that Wilson ran a clinic engaged in a scheme
similar to that of Industrial Medical after Industrial Medical was
closed was reliable. It was also necessary because it established Wil-
son's knowledge and intent regarding the fraud, a disputed issue at
trial. The probative value was high and Wilson was not unfairly preju-
diced by this evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Wilson opened the
door to evidence regarding Wilson's profits from Industrial Medical's
arrangement with a third party because he initially introduced evi-
dence establishing the arrangement.

As for Wilson's challenges to the court's factual findings regarding
his base offense level, we find that the court did not clearly err. See
United States v. Smith, 914 F.2d 565, 569 (4th Cir. 1990). The court's
decision not to depart from the guidelines range is not reviewable. See
United States v. Aramony, 166 F.3d 655, 665 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 67 U.S.L.W. 3729, 67 U.S.L.W. 3731 (U.S.
June 1, 1999).

We therefore affirm Wilson's convictions and sentences. We dis-
pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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