
79 U.S. 226 (____)
12 Wall. 226
THE JUNCTION RAILROAD COMPANY
v.
THE BANK OF ASHLAND.
Supreme Court of United States.

*229 Messrs. C.P. James, Rufus King, and S.J. Thompson, for the plaintiffs in error; Messrs. A.G. Porter and W.H. Wadsworth, contra.
Mr. Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.
Unless this case has become embarrassed by the pleadings, the facts as found by the court present a clear case in favor of the plaintiff. If they could have been given in evidence under the common count, we should have felt no hesitation in sustaining the judgment on that count alone, disregarding the special counts and the pleadings thereto. But it has been held that an agreement under seal for the payment of money cannot be received to support the common money counts. It will be necessary, therefore, to examine the case with reference to the defences set up in the special pleas. In all of them usury and want of authority in the original parties to make the negotiation are the points of defence relied on.
With regard to the question what law is to decide whether a contract is, or is not, usurious, the general rule is the law of the place where the money is made payable; although it is also held that the parties may stipulate in accordance with the law of the place where the contract is made. In this case it is conceded by all the pleas, and shown by the special finding of the court, that the place of payment of the bonds in question was the city of New York. By the law of that State, passed April 6th, 1850 (of which the Circuit Court had a right to take judicial notice),[*] no corporation is allowed to interpose the defence of usury. None of the special pleas allege that the place of payment mentioned in the bonds was adopted as a shift or device to avoid the statute of usury. The device complained of was a pretended sale of *230 the bonds, when the transaction was really a loan. Admitting that it was a loan, it is not denied that it was made bonâ fide payable in New York. Hence the pleas cannot stand as pleas of usury, properly so called. They must stand, if at all, on the allegation that one or both of the contracting parties was prohibited by law from making such a contract.
It is certain, however, that no such prohibition exists in the case of the defendant. By the supplement to its charter, passed by the legislature of Indiana January 29th, 1851, it was authorized to borrow money or sell its securities at any rate of interest or price it might deem proper. The courts in Indiana are authorized by the constitution of that State to take judicial notice of all its laws; and, therefore, the Circuit Court could take judicial notice of this law. By the law of Ohio, passed December 15th, 1852, any railroad company authorized to borrow money, and to execute bonds or promissory notes therefor, was authorized to sell such bonds or notes at such times and in such places, either within or without the State, and at such rates, and for such prices, as in the opinion of the directors might best advance the interests of the company. This is tantamount to a repeal of the usury laws as to such companies. And although this law had primary reference to the railroad companies of Ohio, yet the Supreme Court of that State, in a very sensible and judicious opinion, has decided that it extends by comity to railroad companies of other States borrowing money in Ohio. Indeed, the second special plea sets forth a statute of Ohio, in relation to this very defendant, which makes it a corporation of Ohio, as well as Indiana, and authorizes it to perform any act within the State of Ohio the same as if it had originally been incorporated therein. This act, it seems to us, rendered the exercise of comity hardly necessary to bring the defendant within the privileges of the Ohio act of 1852.
It must be conceded, therefore, first, that the transaction in question, if a loan at all, was not a usurious loan by the law of the place which governed the contract; and, secondly, that the defendant had a perfect right to make it. This observation *231 is applicable to all the special pleas, and disposes entirely of the second of them, in which the defendant relies on its own disability to borrow money at a higher rate of interest than seven per cent.; and also disposes of the third of said pleas, in which the statute of usury of the State of New York is pleaded. There remains, then, only the first plea, in which the point is taken that the Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Company was, by its charter, prohibited from taking more than seven per cent. interest. This point is fully presented in the last plea on which issue was taken, and the defendant can, therefore, receive no harm, though the demurrer to its first plea was wrongly sustained. It still had the benefit of that defence under the last plea; and the result is presented to us in the finding of the court. That finding is, that the transaction was not a loan at all, but only a sale of the bonds; and it is not pretended that the Ohio Life and Trust Company might not purchase securities of this sort at any price it might deem expedient. But the defendant contends that this was a conclusion of law on the part of the court, and that it was erroneous. Surely the question whether a negotiation of bonds was a sale or a loan is ordinarily, and primâ facie, a question of fact. To make it a question of law, some fact must be admitted or proved, which is irreconcilable with one conclusion or the other. What fact in this case is irreconcilable with the conclusion that this negotiation was a sale? The defendant contends that the fact that the bonds were its own obligations is such a fact, and alleges that in law a party cannot sell its own obligations to pay money. But it certainly may do this, if authorized by law to do it; and it is shown that this very thing was authorized by the laws of Ohio, to the benefit of which the defendant was expressly, as well as by comity, entitled.
Again, the defendant alleges that the exaction of collateral security for the payment of the bonds was a fact wholly irreconcilable with a sale. We do not think so. Once concede that the obligor may sell its own bonds, what difference can it make how fully and strongly they may be secured? *232 The requirement of guaranties can only amount to evidence of intention at most; the weight of which, in connection with all the circumstances of the case, is to be judged of by the tribunal to which the facts are submitted. This has been fairly done in the present case, and the decision is against the defendant.
In this view of the case we do not decide whether the demurrer to the first plea was, or was not, well taken. We are disposed to think that it was; but do not deem it necessary to incumber the case with the discussion of that question.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[*]  Owings v. Hall, 9 Peters, 625.
