
USCA1 Opinion

	




                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT                              _________________________          No. 96-1948                                    DAVID W. HANN,                                Plaintiff, Appellant,                                          v.                              MICRON SEPARATIONS, INC.,                                 Defendant, Appellee.                              __________________________                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS                   [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]                                              ___________________                              __________________________                                        Before                                Selya, Circuit Judge,                                        _____________                              Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,                                   ____________________                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.                                         _____________                              _________________________               William T. Murphy on brief for appellant.               _________________               Edward  J.  Goddard and  Day, Berry  &  Howard on  brief for               ___________________      _____________________          appellee.                              _________________________                                  February 12, 1997                              _________________________                    Per Curiam.   In the suit  that underlies this  appeal,                    Per Curiam.                    __________          plaintiff-appellant  David  W.  Hann  alleges  that  his  quondam          employer, Micron Separations,  Inc. (Micron),  a manufacturer  of          industrial   filtration  systems,  disregarded  a  severance  pay          obligation  when it  terminated  him as  its marketing  director.          Micron  moved for  summary  judgment on  the  ground that  Hann's          written employment contract provided  for such remuneration  only          in  the  event of  another  company's  acquisition  of Micron  (a          circumstance that  had not occurred).   A magistrate  judge heard          arguments and wrote a carefully reasoned report recommending that          the district  court grant  brevis disposition in  Micron's favor.                                     ______          The magistrate concluded, after examining the relevant  evidence,          that the proof,  taken in  the aspect most  flattering to  Hann's          case, proves neither a  modification of the terms of  his written          employment  contract nor  a breach  of those terms.   On  de novo          review,  the  district  court  accepted  the  recommendation  and          entered  summary  judgment  for  the defendant.    Hann  appeals.          Having  determined  that  oral  argument would  not  advance  the          decisional process, we summarily affirm.                    On  whole-record review,  we   believe that  this is  a          suitable  case in  which to  act upon  our long-held  belief that          "when  a  lower  court produces  a  comprehensive,  well-reasoned          decision,  an  appellate court  should  refrain  from writing  at          length to  no other  end than  to hear  its own words  resonate."          Lawton v.  State Mut. Life Assur.  Co. of Am., 101  F.3d 218, 220          ______     __________________________________          (1st  Cir. 1996); accord In  re San Juan  Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire                            ______ ________________________________________                                          2          Litig., 989  F.2d 36, 38 (1st  Cir. 1993).  Hence,  we affirm the          ______          judgment for substantially  the reasons set forth  in the opinion          below.  We add only a small coda.                    In his brief, Hann rehashes the evidence and invites us          to take  a more expansive view of the facts than did the district          court.   We decline the invitation.   When summary judgment is at          stake,  we, like the trial  court, must scrutinize  the record in          the light most  favorable to the nonmoving party,  "indulging all          reasonable  inferences in  that party's  favor,"   Griggs-Ryan v.          __________                                         ___________          Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990) (emphasis supplied), but          _____          disregarding  unsupported  allegations, unreasonable  inferences,          and conclusory speculation.   See Smith  v. F.W.  Morse & Co., 76                                        ___ ______    _________________          F.3d  413, 428  (1st Cir.  1996); Medina-Munoz  v.  R.J. Reynolds                                            ____________      _____________          Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d  5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990).  If no genuine issue          ___________          of  material fact  percolates  through the  record, then  summary          judgment  is proper.  So viewed, the essential purpose of summary          judgment  is "to  pierce the  boilerplate  of the  pleadings" and          appraise the proof to determine whether a trial is needed.  Wynne                                                                      _____          v.  Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976  F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir. 1992),              ________________________          cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1030 (1993).  Here, a trial would serve no          _____ ______          useful purpose.                    We  will not tarry.  Despite the generosity of the Rule          56 standard  vis- -vis the party opposing  summary judgment, that          party  is not entitled to the benefit  of every inference that he          can conjure  up;  he is  only entitled  to the  benefit of  every          reasonable inference.   See National Amusements, Inc. v.  Town of          __________              ___ _________________________     _______                                          3          Dedham,  43 F.3d 731,  735 (1st Cir.),  cert. denied, 115  S. Ct.          ______                                  _____ ______          2247 (1995).  In this instance, we cannot draw the inference that          the  appellant hawks.  To the contrary, the statement of Micron's          president,  Dr. John Greenwood, which  the appellant cites as the          basis for his claim of an oral modification, simply will not bear          the weight that the appellant piles upon it.                    The  appellant's promissory  estoppel  claim  fares  no          better  than his breach  of contract claim.   Under Massachusetts          law, a  promisee's reliance  on  a promise  may give  rise to  an          enforceable contract,  but only  if such reliance  is reasonable.          See  Rhode Island Hosp. Trust  Nat'l Bank v.  Varadian, 419 Mass.          ___  ____________________________________     ________          841,  849-50,  647  N.E.2d  1174,  1178-79  (1995); Cambridgeport                                                              _____________          Savings Bank v. Boersner, 413 Mass. 432, 442-43, 597 N.E.2d 1017,          ____________    ________          1023-24 (1992); Loranger Constr. Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman Co., 376                          ______________________    __________________          Mass.  757, 760-61, 384 N.E.2d  176, 179 (1978);  Hall v. Horizon                                                            ____    _______          House  Microwave, Inc., 24 Mass.  App. Ct. 84,  93-94, 506 N.E.2d          ______________________          178, 184  (1987); see also  Coll v. PB Diagnostic  Sys., Inc., 50                            ___ ____  ____    _________________________          F.3d 1115, 1124-25 (1st  Cir. 1995) (refusing under Massachusetts          law to honor a  promissory estoppel claim for an  orally modified          employment  contract  when  reliance  was  unreasonable).    Even          assuming  for argument's  sake  that Dr.  Greenwood had  apparent          authority  to  bind  Micron  to  a  change  in  Hann's  severance          arrangement   an  assumption that the record tends  to belie   no          factfinder  rationally   could  conclude  that   the  appellant's          professed reliance  on  Dr. Greenwood's  remark  was  reasonable.          Even  on  the  appellant's  version,  Dr.  Greenwood's  statement                                          4          amounted  to  no  more than  a  passing  comment.   Only  wishful          thinking could have  led Hann  to believe that  his contract  had          been improved by this  passing comment   and wishful  thinking is          not enough to support a cognizable claim of detrimental reliance.          Thus, the magistrate judge and district court  acted within their          proper office  in rejecting  the unreasonable inference  on which          the appellant's case rests.  See Smith, 76 F.3d at 428.                                       ___ _____                    We need  go no further.   Finding,  as we do,  that the          district   court  appropriately   granted  Micron's   motion  for          judgment, we summarily affirm.  See 1st Cir. R. 27.1.                                          ___                    Affirmed.                    Affirmed.                    ________                                          5
