
738 N.W.2d 221 (2007)
Sue Ann Marie ANSARI, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Edward D. GOLD, Patricia Erhart Nessel, and Butzel Long, P.C., Defendants-Appellees.
Docket No. 131161. COA No. 263920.
Supreme Court of Michigan.
September 14, 2007.
On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court's April 6, 2007 order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was entered erroneously.
MICHAEL F. CAVANAGH and MARILYN J. KELLY, JJ., would grant the motion for reconsideration.
WEAVER, J., dissents and states as follows:
I dissent from the majority's order denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration because the plaintiff is entitled to a stay pending the resolution of attorney Geoffrey Fieger's lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, see Fieger v. Ferry, 471 F.3d 637 (C.A.6, 2006). I would grant the motion for stay.
I further object to the continued participation of the majority of four, Chief Justice Taylor and Justices Corrigan, Young, and Markman, in this case in which Mr. Fieger's law firm represents the plaintiff. For my reasons in detail, see my dissent in Ansari v. Gold, 477 Mich. 1076, 729 N.W.2d 213 (2007), set forth in its entirety below.[1]
NOTES
[1]  WEAVER, J. (dissenting). I dissent from the participation of the majority of four, Chief Justice Taylor and Justices Corrigan, Young, and Markman in this case, where Mr. Geoffrey N. Fieger's law firm represents the plaintiff. For my reasons in detail, see my dissent in Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 476 Mich. 231, 328-347, 719 N.W.2d 123 (2006) (Weaver, J., dissenting), and my dissent to the denial of the motion for stay in Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228, 1231-1271, 729 N.W.2d 451 (2006) (Weaver, J., dissenting).

I also dissent from the order denying plaintiff's motion for stay of proceedings pending Mr. Fieger's lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan concerning Michigan's disqualification rules governing Supreme Court justices. See Fieger v. Ferry, 471 F.3d 637 (C.A.6, 2006). I would grant the motion to stay.
Furthermore, although MCR 2.003 is inadequate and in need of reform, which reform I have urged,1 without success for almost 4 years, this Court to undertake action and achieve, the disqualification of justices is governed by the disqualification procedure contained in MCR 2.003. Although the majority of four asserts the contrary, the past four years have exposed inconsistencies in the standards that individual justices apply to themselves when making their decision to participate, or not to participate, in a case. At times the justices have applied the court rule governing the disqualification of judges, MCR 2.003, to themselves, and at times they have not.
1 Since May 2003, I have repeatedly called for this Court to recognize, publish for public comment, place on a public hearing agenda, and address the need to have clear, fair, orderly, and public procedures concerning the participation or disqualification of justices. See, e.g., statements of WEAVER, J., in In re JK, 468 Mich. 202, 661 N.W.2d 216 (2003); Gilbert v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 469 Mich. 883, 669 N.W.2d 265 (2003); Advocacy Org. for Patients & Providers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n, 472 Mich. 91, 693 N.W.2d 358 (2005); McDowell v. Detroit, 474 Mich. 999, 708 N.W.2d 104 (2006); Stamplis v. St. John Health Sys., 474 Mich. 1017, 708 N.W.2d 377 (2006); Heikkila v. North Star Trucking, Inc., 474 Mich. 1080, 712 N.W.2d 153 (2006); Lewis v. St. John Hosp., 474 Mich. 1089, 711 N.W.2d 351 (2006); Adair v. Michigan, 474 Mich. 1027, 709 N.W.2d 567 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 476 Mich. 231, 719 N.W.2d 123 (2006); Grievance Administrator v. Fieger, 477 Mich. 1228, 729 N.W.2d 451 (2006); People v. Parsons, ___ Mich. ___, 728 N.W.2d 62 (2007); Ruiz v. Clara's Parlor, 477 Mich. 1044, 728 N.W.2d 855 (2007) and Neal v. Dep't of Corrections, 477 Mich. 1049, 728 N.W.2d 857 (2007).
For example in Adair v. Michigan, 474 Mich. 1027, 1043, 709 N.W.2d 567 (2006), Chief Justice Taylor and Justice Markman stated that "[p]ursuant to MCR 2.003(B)(6), we would each disqualify ourselves if our respective spouses were participating as lawyers in this case, or if any of the other requirements of this court rule were not satisfied." Justice Young concurred fully in this legal analysis. Id. at 1053, 709 N.W.2d 567. Similarly, in Grosse Pointe Park v. Michigan Muni. Liability & Prop. Pool, 473 Mich. 188, 702 N.W.2d 106 (2005), then-Chief Justice Corrigan used the remittal of disqualification process of MCR 2.003(D). At other times, however, the same justices have not followed the provisions of MCR 2.003. For example, in Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 469 Mich. 883, 889, 669 N.W.2d 265 (2003), then-Chief Justice Corrigan and Justices Taylor, Young, and Markman denied a motion for reconsideration of the Court's order denying the motion for disqualification and did not refer the motion to the State Court Administrator for the motion to be assigned to another judge for review de novo, as would be proper under MCR 2.003(C)(3).
Assertions that justices can continue to look into their consciences and conclude they are able to accord fair, impartial, and equal treatment to parties' counsel and clients without any independent check on justices' decisions are incorrect. This method is insufficient and inadequate to meet the due process rights of parties and their counsel. Further while it appears to continue to be for some justices a "tradition" of this Court for a justice who disqualifies himself or herself from a case to not give written reasons, and to sometimes apply MCR 2.003 to himself or herself, and to sometimes not, it is a "tradition of secrecy" and inadequacy that must for all justices end now. An impartial judiciary is "ill served by casting a cloak of secrecy around the operations of the courts. . . . "2
2 Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 215 (C.A.5, 1990).
[Ansari, supra at 1077-1079, 729 N.W.2d 213.]
