                         T.C. Memo. 2004-9



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



     JOHN G. GOETTEE, JR. AND MARIAN GOETTEE, Petitioners v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent*



     Docket No. 26591-96.                  Filed January 6, 2004.



          Ps filed a motion for reconsideration, and an amended
     motion for reconsideration, of our opinion in Goettee v.
     Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-43.

          Held:   Ps’ amended motion for reconsideration is
     denied.



     Matthew J. McCann, for petitioners.

     William J. Gregg, for respondent.




     *
        This opinion supplements our previously filed opinion in
Goettee v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-43.
                                 - 2 -



         SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

     CHABOT, Judge:     This matter is before us on petitioners’

amended motion under Rule 1611 for reconsideration of our opinion

reported as Goettee v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-43,

hereinafter sometimes referred to as Goettee I.    In Goettee I, we

made findings of fact, which we adopt for purposes of this

supplemental opinion.    For clarity, however, we begin with a

brief recital of the facts pertinent to this supplemental

opinion.

                           FINDINGS OF FACT

     During September 1981, petitioners acquired a limited

partnership interest in The Thompson Equipment Associates

partnership, hereinafter sometimes referred to as TEA.

Petitioners claimed flowthrough losses from TEA on their tax

returns for 1981, 1982, and 1983.    Petitioners carried back

“credits/losses” from 1981 to 1978 and 1979.

     On October 15, 1986, respondent sent to petitioners a notice

of deficiency, in which respondent made adjustments on account of




     1
        Unless indicated otherwise, all Rule references are to
the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

     Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on March 27,
2003. On May 27, 2003, pursuant to the Court’s order, they filed
their amended motion for reconsideration.
                                - 3 -

TEA items and determined deficiencies and additions to tax for

1978, 1979, 1981, and 1982.

     On November 3, 1986, petitioners filed a petition with this

Court seeking a redetermination of their tax liabilities for

1978, 1979, 1981, and 1982.    Petitioners’ case was assigned to a

group of cases collectively referred to as the Barrister Books

project, hereinafter sometimes referred to as Barrister.    Andrew

M. Winkler (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Winkler) served

as lead counsel for the Commissioner in the Barrister cases.

     Sometime around 1986, the Commissioner extended a uniform

settlement offer to any Barrister investor.    The Commissioner

withdrew the offer on or about May 16, 1989.    In the spring of

1993, the Commissioner renewed the earlier settlement offer.

     The task of processing the settlement of the Barrister cases

fell to Winkler and Elmer Craig (hereinafter sometimes referred

to as Craig), an Appeals officer in respondent’s Louisville,

Kentucky, office, hereinafter sometimes referred to as the

Louisville office.    Winkler and Craig generally processed the

Barrister cases–-including petitioners’ case--in taxpayer

alphabetical order.

     In the spring of 1993, the Commissioner’s Appeals Office in

Cincinnati, Ohio (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the

Cincinnati office), learned of the Barrister case settlements

that Winkler and Craig were processing.    At that time, the
                                - 4 -

Cincinnati office Appeals officers’ caseloads were about half of

their normal caseloads.    The chief of the Cincinnati office, the

associate chief (Paul R. Becker, hereinafter sometimes referred

to as Becker), and Appeals Officer Fran Rowland (hereinafter

sometimes referred to as Rowland) went to the Louisville office

to discuss with Winkler and Craig the possibility of the

Cincinnati office’s processing some of the Barrister case

settlements.   By the end of the meeting, it was decided that the

Cincinnati office would take some 200 of the Barrister cases.

Winkler remained responsible for executing Tax Court decision

documents on behalf of the Commissioner in Barrister cases.     The

Cincinnati office picked up the cases from the Louisville office

in June of 1993.

     The number of cases transferred to the Cincinnati office,

coupled with their complexity, created the need for Craig to

conduct an all-day training session about how to process the

settlement of the cases.   The need for a training session to

become able to settle a case was not typical.

     About July of 1993, about 75 cases, including petitioners’

case, were assigned to Rowland.

     Appeals officers in the Cincinnati office managed multiple

priorities while they processed the settlement of the Barrister

cases.   Cases nearing the end of the limitations period, and Tax

Court cases calendared for trial in Cincinnati and Columbus,
                               - 5 -

Ohio, were given a higher priority than the Barrister cases.

Rowland typically did all of the service center claim cases–-

these, too, were given a higher priority than the Barrister

cases.

     Although Rowland’s caseload was about half her normal

caseload in the spring of 1993, her caseload returned to normal

about the same time the Barrister cases were assigned to her.

Because of the increase in her workload, Rowland did not send any

settlement letters to any Barrister taxpayers until about

September of 1993.

     The settlement letters (1) stated the terms of the

settlement offer, (2) asked the recipients to submit to Rowland

copies of their canceled checks within 10 days so that she could

verify the recipients’ actual cash investment in the partnership,

and (3) stated that upon receipt of the verification information,

Rowland would send to the Barrister taxpayer computations which

showed the tax effects of the settlement offer to that taxpayer.

     If a taxpayer accepted the settlement offer and returned the

signed decision document, then Rowland prepared and submitted to

Becker an appeals transmittal and case memorandum for his

approval.   If Becker approved, then he signed the appeals

transmittal and case memorandum and transmitted the settlement

documents to Winkler.   Winkler then reviewed the format and

contents of the decision documents, signed them, and forwarded
                                - 6 -

them to the Court for entry of decision.   It ordinarily took

Winkler less than 1 hour to review and sign an average decision

document that did not have any problems.   However, Winkler gave

priority to working on cases calendared for trial by the Court.

     On November 24, 1993, Rowland sent to petitioners a

settlement letter.   On December 2, 1993, petitioners’

verification information was sent to Rowland.

     On October 26, 1994, Rowland mailed the settlement documents

to petitioners.   Petitioners signed the decision document on

November 25, 1994, and mailed it to Rowland on December 14, 1994.

The decision document stated, in pertinent part:

          It is further stipulated that, effective upon entry of
     this decision by the Court, the petitioners waive the
     restriction contained in I.R.C. § 6213(a) prohibiting
     assessment and collection of the deficiencies in income tax
     and additions to tax (plus statutory interest) until the
     decision of the Tax Court has become final.

     On December 23, 1994, Rowland prepared, signed, and sent to

Becker an appeals transmittal and case memorandum which outlined

the terms of the settlement of petitioners’ case.

     On January 13, 1995, Becker signed and approved the appeals

transmittal and case memorandum.   Becker then delivered

petitioners’ proposed decision document to the records office of

the Cincinnati office, which had 5 days to send the proposed

decision document to Winkler.
                              - 7 -

     Winkler signed petitioners’ decision document on April 25,

1995, and then forwarded it to the Court for entry of decision.

On May 2, 1995, the Court entered decision in petitioners’ case.

                             OPINION

     Petitioners urge us to grant their amended motion for

reconsideration of our opinion in Goettee I in order to correct

what they contend are the following errors:   (1) Goettee I failed

to address respondent’s error in computing the amount of interest

due from petitioners; (2) the Commissioner’s Appeals Office

ignored or confused specific time periods (September 9 through

October 3, 1995, and September 21 through November 13, 1996) for

which interest should have been abated; (3) respondent abused

respondent’s discretion by failing to abate interest that accrued

from December 2, 1993, through October 26, 1994; (4) respondent’s

delay in assessing the liabilities warrants additional abatement

periods; and (5) the Court should give full effect to

respondent’s concession that interest should be abated for April

25, 1995.

     Respondent contends that petitioners have not presented

evidence of unusual circumstances or substantial error that would

warrant the granting of a motion for reconsideration.   Respondent

argues that (1) respondent did not err in computing the amount of

interest due, but rather, underabated interest for the conceded

abatement periods; (2) petitioners’ request for additional time
                               - 8 -

periods is a departure from petitioners’ briefs; (3) the record

supports respondent’s prioritization decisions; (4) the alleged

delay in assessing the liabilities does not warrant additional

periods of abatement; and (5) the Court’s conclusion that

interest should not be abated for April 25, 1995, is correct.

Respondent concludes that petitioners’ amended motion for

reconsideration should be denied.

     We agree with respondent’s conclusion.

     Reconsideration under Rule 161 permits the Court to correct

manifest errors of fact or law and allows a party to introduce

newly discovered evidence that could not have been introduced in

a prior proceeding even if the moving party had exercised due

diligence.   See Estate of Quick v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 440,

441 (1998); see also Traum v. Commissioner, 237 F.2d 277, 281

(7th Cir. 1956), affg. T.C. Memo. 1955-127.    The granting of a

motion for reconsideration rests within the discretion of the

Court, and we generally deny such a motion unless unusual

circumstances or substantial error is shown.    See Alexander v.

Commissioner, 95 T.C. 467, 469 (1990), affd. without published

opinion sub nom. Stell v. Commissioner, 999 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.

1993); Estate of Halas v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 570, 574 (1990);

Vaughn v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 164, 166-167 (1986).

Reconsideration is not the appropriate forum for rehashing

previously rejected arguments or offering new legal theories to
                                  - 9 -

reach the result desired by the moving party.     See Estate of

Quick v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. at 441-442; Stoody v.

Commissioner, 67 T.C. 643, 644 (1977).     In the instant case,

petitioners have not presented such newly discovered evidence and

have not shown such unusual circumstances or substantial error.

     We discuss seriatim petitioners’ requests.

     1.      Erroneous calculations.

        Respondent acknowledged, and we found, that respondent

overassessed interest in at least the amounts of $108.33 for 1981

and $298.47 for 1982.     We directed the parties in note 26 of the

Opinion, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, to correct these

errors and any other calculation errors by recalculating the

amounts of interest for each year in issue.     Accordingly, this

issue is already dealt with, and properly dealt with, in Goettee

I and will not be reconsidered.

        2.   Sept. 9 through Oct. 3, 1995; Sept. 21 through Nov. 13,

1996.

     Petitioners did not ask us to consider at trial or on brief

the specific time periods set forth in their motion that were

allegedly confused or ignored by the Commissioner’s Appeals

Office during which errors or delays occurred that warrant

abatement of interest.     Instead, petitioners asked the Court, on

answering brief, to order an abatement for additional unspecified

time periods.     In Goettee I we declined to do so.   We do not now
                              - 10 -

entertain petitioners’ more detailed request.    As we stated,

supra, reconsideration is not the appropriate forum for offering

new legal theories or rehashing previously rejected arguments to

reach the desired result.

     3.   Dec. 2, 1993, through Oct. 26, 1994.

     We specifically dealt with this time period in Goettee I and

concluded that respondent’s prioritizations in the settings in

which they occurred did not constitute ministerial acts and so

petitioners were not entitled to any relief.     Petitioners direct

our attention to Jacobs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-123.     In

contrast to Jacobs, the record in the instant case includes

substantial evidence as to what happened, when, and why, as to

this time period.   Petitioners have not presented anything

(evidence, caselaw, or other) warranting reconsideration of our

Goettee I rejection of this contentions.

     4.   Section 6601(c).2

     Petitioners raise on this motion, for the first time,

section 6601(c) as a basis for arguing that additional time

periods should be abated because of respondent’s delay in

assessing the liabilities.




     2
        Unless indicated otherwise, all section references are to
sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as in effect for
proceedings commenced at the time the petition in the instant
case was filed.
                              - 11 -

     Petitioners contend that, under section 6601(c), interest

should have stopped accruing on January 13, 1995, 30 days after

they transmitted to Rowland the executed decision document, which

included a waiver of restrictions on assessment pursuant to

section 6213(d).   They argue that “any suggestion that Respondent

has the right to decide when to file stipulated decision

documents” is a “tortured interpretation” of section 6601(c).

     Respondent maintains that all of respondent’s interest

computations comport with section 6601(c), and that interest

properly stopped accruing on June 1, 1995, 30 days after the

decision document was entered by the Court.

     The language of the parties’ agreed-upon waiver itself

resolves this issue.   See also, e.g., Pallottini v. Commissioner,

90 T.C. 498, 502-503 (1988), where we focused on the text of the

document (in that case, a statute) itself, rather than general

rules, in order to determine the document’s effect.

     The parties stipulated as follows:

     effective upon entry of this decision by the Court, the
     petitioners waive the restriction contained in I.R.C.
     6213(a) prohibiting assessment and collection of the
     deficiencies in income tax and additions to tax (plus
     statutory interest) until the decision of the Tax Court has
     become final.
                               - 12 -

     Thus, the parties’ waiver directed that it was to become

effective on the entry of decision, which was May 2, 1995.     The

30-day period began on that date.3

     5.   Apr. 25, 1995.

     Petitioners ask us to give full effect to respondent’s

concession that interest should be abated for April 25, 1995.        We

explained in Goettee I (at note 15) that we do not “give effect

to that 1 day because the record clearly and indisputably shows

that on that day Winkler moved the process along.      Indeed, the

parties have so stipulated.”   We shall not now revisit this

issue.

     Accordingly, petitioners’ amended motion for reconsideration

will be denied.

     To take account of the foregoing,

                                          An appropriate order

                                     will be issued.




     3
        We agree with petitioners that respondent cannot simply
place decision documents to the side and file them with the Court
when respondent sees fit. In Goettee I, respondent conceded that
“an abatement of interest, for the period from February 25, 1995
through April 25, 1995, should be allowed to petitioners in the
unusual circumstances of this case.” Moreover, we concluded that
interest should be abated for the period from Jan. 25 through
Feb. 24, 1995 (i.e., up until the period of respondent’s
concession). Accordingly, any injustice that might have resulted
from the stipulation was ameliorated by respondent’s concession
and our conclusion. We explained in Goettee I our reasons for
not ordering abatement for the remaining days during this period
(Jan. 13 through May 31, 1995).
