UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
                                                                    No. 96-4020
CHRISTOPHER TODD LITTLEJOHN, a/k/a
Chris,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Shelby.
Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge.
(CR-95-3)

Submitted: January 13, 1998

Decided: January 26, 1998

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

George V. Laughrun, II, GOODMAN, CARR, NIXON,
LAUGHRUN & LEVINE, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Deborah Ann Ausburn, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Christopher Todd Littlejohn pled guilty to conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1994), and waived his rights to appeal his
conviction and sentence.1 After granting the Government's motion for
a sentence reduction based on substantial assistance,2 the district court
sentenced Littlejohn to seventy-eight months imprisonment, followed
by a five-year term of supervised release. Littlejohn appeals his sen-
tence.

Littlejohn's counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), presenting three issues, but stating
that, in his view, there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Little-
john's counsel provided him with a copy of the Anders brief and
informed him of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief; Little-
john failed to do so. Because Littlejohn expressly waived his right to
appeal, we dismiss.

A defendant may waive the right to appeal if that waiver is know-
ing and intelligent.3 In determining whether a waiver is knowing and
intelligent, we examine the background, experience, and conduct of
the defendant.4 We have held that if the district court fully questions
a defendant regarding waiver of his right to appeal during the Fed. R.
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1 The waiver excluded claims of ineffective assistance or prosecutorial
misconduct. Littlejohn did not raise such a claim in this appeal.

2 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (1994); United States Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 5K1.1 (1995).

3 See United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143, 1146 (4th Cir.
1995).

4 See id.

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Crim. P. 11 colloquy, generally the waiver is valid and enforceable.5
However, a waiver of appeal rights does not prohibit the appeal of a
sentence imposed in excess of the statutory maximum, a sentence
based on a constitutionally impermissible factor such as race,6 or pro-
ceedings following entry of a guilty plea that were conducted in viola-
tion of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.7

The transcript of Littlejohn's Rule 11 hearing reveals that he under-
stood the full significance of the waiver provision of his plea agree-
ment. When the district court specifically asked Littlejohn about the
waiver, he stated that he understood he was waiving his right to
appeal. We find that Littlejohn's waiver is knowing and intelligent.
Because Littlejohn has not raised any claim that is not precluded by
his valid waiver of appeal rights, we dismiss the appeal.

This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Coun-
sel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
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5 See United States v. Wessells , 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991);
see generally United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53-54 (4th Cir.
1990).
6 See United States v. Marin, 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992).
7 See United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732-33 (4th Cir. 1994).

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