                         T.C. Memo. 1999-379



                       UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                BEVERLEE COCHRANE, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 12144-98.                 Filed November 16, 1999.



     Beverlee Cochrane, pro se.

     Rick V. Hosler, for respondent.



                         MEMORANDUM OPINION


     CHIECHI, Judge:    Respondent determined the following defi-

ciencies in, and additions to, petitioner’s Federal income tax

(tax):
                                - 2 -

                                            Additions to Tax
                                         Section       Section
     Year        Deficiency             6651(a)(1)1      6654
     1989          $1,724                  $349          ---
     1990          37,975                 9,494        $2,486
     1991           2,462                   616           141
     1992          25,267                 6,317         1,102
     1993             812                   189          ---

     The issues remaining for decision are:

     (1) Have the respective periods of limitations under section

6501 expired with respect to petitioner’s taxable years 1989,

1990, 1991, and 1992?    We hold they have not.

     (2) Is petitioner liable for the addition to tax under

section 6651(a)(1) for each of the years 1989, 1990, 1991, and

1992?    We hold that she is.

     (3) Is petitioner liable for the addition to tax under

section 6654 for each of the years 1990, 1991, and 1992?         We hold

that she is to the extent stated herein.

     Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

     Petitioner, who was single during the years at issue,

resided in Phoenix, Arizona, at the time the petition was filed.

     Petitioner requested, and received, extensions of time until

August 15, 1990, and August 15, 1991, respectively, within which

to file her 1989 and 1990 tax returns and included tax payments

with those requests in the amounts of $390 and $1,128.25, respec-



     1
      All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the years at issue. All Rule references are to the
Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
                                - 3 -

tively.   The Internal Revenue Service (Service) has no record

that petitioner filed her 1989 and 1990 tax returns on those

respective dates or on any other dates.    Nor does the Service

have a record that petitioner filed tax returns for 1991, 1992,

and 1993.

     Tax was withheld in the amounts of $330 and $58 from the

wages that petitioner received during 1989 and 1993, respec-

tively.   No tax was withheld from the $18 of wages that peti-

tioner received during each of the years 1990 and 1991.    No tax

was withheld for petitioner’s taxable year 1992 because she

received no wages during that taxable year.

     On April 10, 1998, respondent sent petitioner a notice of

deficiency (notice) with respect to her taxable years 1989, 1990,

and 1991 and a separate notice with respect to her taxable years

1992 and 1993.    In those notices, respondent determined, inter

alia, that petitioner had failed to file tax returns for the

years at issue, that she is liable for additions to tax under

section 6651(a)(1) for those years, and that she is liable for

additions to tax under section 6654 for her taxable years 1990,

1991, and 1992.

     Petitioner bears the burden of showing error in the determi-

nations in the notices.    See Rule 142(a); Welch v. Helvering, 290

U.S. 111, 115 (1933).    We reject petitioner’s argument that the

standard of proof applicable in criminal proceedings is control-
                              - 4 -

ling in the instant case.

     Before addressing each of the issues remaining for decision,

we note that we have considered all of petitioner’s contentions

and arguments that are not discussed herein, and we find them to

be baseless, without merit, and/or irrelevant.

Period of Limitations

     Although not pled in the petition, petitioner argues that

the respective periods of limitations under section 6501 with

respect to her taxable years 1989 through 1992 have expired.2

That is because, according to petitioner, she timely filed her

tax returns for those years, and the notices with respect to

those years were not issued until April 10, 1998.   We reject

petitioner’s contention.

     Except for petitioner’s self-serving, uncorroborated, and

conclusory testimony that she timely filed her tax returns for

the years 1989 through 1992, the record is devoid of evidence

supporting petitioner’s position under section 6501.   In fact,


     2
      Although petitioner also argues on brief about her taxable
year 1993, petitioner conceded at trial that she did not file a
tax return for that year. Therefore, we find that petitioner
also conceded that the period of limitations under sec. 6501 with
respect to petitioner’s taxable year 1993 has not expired.
Petitioner also conceded at trial that she is liable for the
addition to tax under sec. 6651(a)(1) for 1993. Assuming arguen-
do that petitioner had not made the foregoing concessions with
respect to her taxable year 1993, on the record before us, we
would nonetheless find that petitioner has failed to establish
that the period of limitations under sec. 6501 with respect to
1993 has expired and that she is not liable for the addition to
tax under sec. 6651(a)(1) for that year.
                               - 5 -

official records of the Service that are part of the record in

this case show that petitioner did not file tax returns for any

of the years 1989 through 1992.3   We are not required to, and we

shall not, accept petitioner’s testimony that she timely filed

her tax returns for those years.   See Geiger v. Commissioner, 440

F.2d 688, 689 (9th Cir. 1971), affg. per curiam T.C. Memo. 1969-

159; Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986).

     On the record before us, we find that petitioner has failed

to establish that she filed tax returns for the years 1989

through 1992.   Accordingly, we hold that the respective periods

of limitations under section 6501 with respect to those years

have not expired.

Addition to Tax for Failure to File

     Section 6651(a)(1) imposes an addition to tax for failure to

file a tax return on the date prescribed for filing.    That

addition to tax does not apply if it is shown that the failure to

file was due to reasonable cause, and not due to willful neglect.

See sec. 6651(a)(1).

     Petitioner contends that she is not liable for the additions

to tax under section 6651(a) for the years 1989 through 1992.4


     3
      Service records also show that petitioner did not file a
tax return for 1993. See supra note 2 for petitioner’s conces-
sions regarding 1993.
     4
      As we indicated supra note 2, petitioner concedes that she
is liable for the addition to tax under sec. 6651(a) for her
taxable year 1993.
                              - 6 -

In support of her position, petitioner states, inter alia:

     Why did it take Respondent nine years to notify Peti-
     tioner that they did not have her returns on file for
     the years 1989 through 1993, if, in fact, they did not
     have the returns, unless Respondent, through laxity and
     clerical bungling, lost track of Petitioner’s returns;
     or else, deceitfully and intentionally, with malice
     aforethought, submerged Petitioner’s returns and de-
     ferred contact with her, all the while tabulating
     penalties and interest that would have been far less
     significant had the “Total” lines been timely drawn?
     The Notice of Deficiency sent to Petitioner in January
     of 1998 clearly witnesses that the potential for stun-
     ning penalties and interest is increased proportionate
     to the delay in notification * * * .

               *    *    *    *       *   *   *

     If the IRS is allowed to collect monies for alleged
     “unfiled” returns from 10 years past, when taxpayers
     are only required to keep them for three, what’s to
     stop them from seeking to collect for returns they
     claim to have no record of that date back 20 years, or
     more? The taxpayer should have some means of protect-
     ing him-or herself from the burden of filing proof when
     the date of notification exceeds the requirement date
     for keeping such return. If Respondent can’t keep
     track of a taxpayer in this high-tech age, when every-
     thing about everyone is easily knowable and privacy
     rights are flagrantly violated by legions of both
     professional and personal snoops-–many of them employed
     by Respondent * * * , then Respondent deserves to lose
     any revenue that would accrue from its assessments,
     whether taxpayer has proof of filing or not. If Re-
     spondent deliberately defers contact with a taxpayer in
     order to subsequently collect greater penalties and
     interest, then this would constitute not only malicious
     intent, but fraud.

               *    *    *    *       *   *   *

          It is convenient-–and necessary, in the absence of
     proof--for Respondent to assert that Petitioner did not
     file taxes for the years 1989 through 1993, though it
     is impossible to prove such assertion. In fact, Peti-
     tioner would not dare willfully omit a filing, in view
     of the harassment visited upon her by Respondent in
                               - 7 -

     years when her returns did not bear the signature of a
     professional preparer. The provisions of Section 6651
     cannot even apply to Petitioner because Petitioner did,
     in fact, file her returns, and Respondent has offered
     no proof to the contrary, nor can it. If the burden of
     proof rests with Petitioner, there is a standoff, and
     the case should be dismissed.

     We find petitioner’s contentions and arguments under section

6651(a)(1) to be baseless, without merit, and/or irrelevant.    On

the record before us, we find that petitioner has not shown that

her failure to file tax returns for her taxable years 1989

through 1992 was due to reasonable cause, and not to willful

neglect.   Consequently, we sustain respondent’s determinations

that petitioner is liable for additions to tax under section

6651(a)(1) for those years.

Addition to Tax for Failure to Pay Estimated Tax

     Section 6654(a) imposes an addition to tax for failure to

pay estimated tax.   The addition to tax under section 6654(a) is

mandatory unless the taxpayer establishes that one of the excep-

tions in section 6654(e) applies.   See Grosshandler v. Commis-

sioner, 75 T.C. 1, 20-21 (1980).

     Petitioner contends that she is not liable for the additions

to tax under section 6654(a) for the years 1990 through 1992.     In

support of that contention, petitioner argues:

     in 1990, Petitioner prepaid over 100% of the estimated
     taxes owed in 1989; thus, no further estimated payments
     were required and no penalty was due therefor in 1990.
     In 1991, no tax was due; thus, no estimated tax payment
     was required in 1992. No estimated taxes were required
     to be paid from 1989 through 1993. Exceptions to the
                                - 8 -

     underpayment penalty under §6654(e)(2), apply for 1990
     and 1992.

     Section 6654(e) provides in pertinent part:

     (e) Exceptions.--
           (1) Where tax is small amount.--No addition to tax
     shall be imposed under subsection (a) for any taxable
     year if the tax shown on the return for such taxable
     year (or, if no return is filed, the tax), reduced by
     the credit allowable under section 31, is less than
     $500.
           (2) Where no tax liability for preceding taxable
     year.-–No addition to tax shall be imposed under sub-
     section (a) for any taxable year if–-
                (A) the preceding taxable year was a taxable
           year of 12 months,
                (B) the individual did not have any liability
           for tax for the preceding taxable year, and
                (C) the individual was a citizen or resident
           of the United States throughout the preceding
           taxable year.

     The parties made various concessions at trial as well as in

the stipulation of facts and the supplemental stipulation of

facts filed in this case.    Consequently, computations under Rule

155 will be necessary.   On the present record, we find that

petitioner is liable for the additions to tax under section

6654(a) for 1990, 1991, and 1992 except to the extent that the

Rule 155 computations in this case establish that the exception

provided in either section 6654(e)(1) or section 6654(e)(2)

applies for any such year.

     To reflect the foregoing and the concessions of the parties,


                                                   Decision will be

                                            entered under Rule 155.
