
95 U.S. 576 (____)
RAILROAD COMPANY
v.
DURANT.
Supreme Court of United States.

*578 Mr. Andrew J. Poppleton for the appellant.
Mr. James M. Woolworth, contra.
MR. JUSTICE SWAYNE delivered the opinion of the court.
There are no questions of law or fact of any difficulty in this case. A brief opinion will be sufficient to dispose of it.
An examination of the record has satisfied us that the consideration for the conveyances to the appellee proceeded wholly from the appellant; that the appellee took the titles in trust; that he was a trustee; that the appellant was the cestui que trust; and that the appellee has stood in that relation ever since the conveyances were executed to him, and that he still holds the premises in that capacity. This is the whole case. The claim of the appellee that he took the titles in trust for the grantors is absurd upon its face, and contradicted by the proofs. If the grantors intended to deny the right of the company to demand the performance of the contract, why did they convey at all? Potior est conditio defendentis. Why interpose a trustee? and especially why recite in the deeds that the condition of the subscriptions had been fulfilled?
These suggestions set in a strong light the character of this pretence.
But it is said the conveyances grew out of an illegal transaction between the company and the grantors. To this there are several answers. The grantors have voluntarily executed the contract. They have not intervened, and do not complain.
The conveyances to the trustee were, in the view of the law, the same thing as if they had been to the company. The transaction between the parties in interest was thus finally closed. There will be neither more nor less of illegality between the original parties, whether the trustee does or does not respond to his obligation to the company. In that obligation there is no pretence *579 for saying there is any taint of any kind; and it is that obligation alone which it is sought to enforce by this proceeding. All the deeds but one designate the appellee as "trustee," without setting forth for whom or for what purpose. Parol evidence was admissible to show these things. The designation alone was sufficient to devolve the duty of inquiry upon any third person dealing with the property. Duncan v. Jaudon, 15 Wall. 165; Shaw v. Spencer and Others, 100 Mass. 321; Sharp v. Taylor, 2 Ph. 801; McBlair v. Gibbs, 17 How. 232; Brooks v. Martin, 2 Wall. 70. The appellee cannot claim adversely to those for whom he acquired and holds the property. The rights of others, if such rights exist, do not concern him. He cannot vicariously assert them.
The office of a trustee is important to the community at large, and frequently most so to those least able to take care of themselves. It is one of confidence. The law regards the incumbent with jealous scrutiny, and frowns sternly at the slightest attempt to pervert his powers and duties for his own benefit. The tenant cannot deny the title of his landlord. A multo fortiori ought not the trustee to be permitted to deny that of his beneficiary.
The position assumed by the trustee in this case is not unlike that of one who, having deprived the owner of the possession of his property, when called to account civilly or criminally, should insist that the owner's title was fatally tainted with fraud, and that hence the offender had the right to "take and carry away," and keep and enjoy, the property himself with impunity.
The conduct of the appellee, stripped of the verbiage with which it has been surrounded, and viewed in its nakedness, strongly offends the moral sense of the judicial mind.
The decree will be reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to enter a decree in favor of the complainant; and it is
So ordered.
