UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 96-4549

CLARENCE MCKINLEY MELSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
James C. Cacheris, Chief District Judge.
(CR-96-30-A)

Submitted: April 17, 1997

Decided: May 1, 1997

Before NIEMEYER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Alan H. Yamamoto, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F.
Fahey, United States Attorney, Markus H. Meier, Special Assistant
United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Clarence McKinley Melson, a District of Columbia inmate housed
at Lorton Reformatory, was found guilty by jury of assaulting a cor-
rectional officer in violation of D.C. Code Ann.§ 22-505(a) (1996).1
On appeal, he alleges that the evidence at trial was insufficient to sup-
port his conviction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

On direct appeal, a verdict must be sustained if there is substantial
evidence, viewed most favorably to the Government, to support it.
See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). The relevant
question is "whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the government, any rational trier of facts could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v.
Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted).
"Given the lack of any real deficiency in the evidence, this court is
bound by the credibility choices of the jury," e.g., we "do not weigh
the evidence or review the credibility of witnesses in resolving the
issue of substantial evidence." United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56,
60 (4th Cir. 1989) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

At trial, the involved correctional officer testified that as he looked
down to check Melson's identification card, Melson hit him in the
face twice. During the ensuing struggle Melson choked him, which
prevented him from radioing for help; ultimately the officer was able
to handcuff Melson. Conversely, Melson testified that the correctional
officer attempted to handcuff him without warning and that, when
Melson resisted, the officer attempted to strike him in the head. Dur-
ing the scuffle, the correctional officer was hit in the face with a hand-
cuff and fell over a locker and onto the floor. The parties stipulated
to the fact that as a result of the altercation the correctional officer
"sustained bruises and abrasions on his left cheek and jaw and scrapes
and scratches to both of his hands." Melson sustained no injuries.
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1 Although Melson was charged with a violation of the law of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, because the prison is located in the Eastern District of
Virginia the trial court properly had jurisdiction. See D.C. Code Ann. 22-
505(a); United States v. Young, 916 F.2d 147, 150 (4th Cir. 1990).

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Melson's defense counsel was able to show that the correctional offi-
cer's trial testimony was somewhat inconsistent with a memorandum
and incident report previously authored by the officer. Also, defense
counsel presented inmate witnesses who gave testimony contrary to
the officer's. Nonetheless, the jury found Melson guilty of the
offense.

Viewing the facts as we must under Tresvant, 677 F.2d at 1021,
and considering that we cannot review credibility, see Saunders, 886
F.2d at 60, we find there is substantial evidence to support Melson's
conviction. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 80. The jury simply believed the cor-
rectional officer rather than Melson.2

Thus, we affirm Melson's conviction. We dispense with oral argu-
ment because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
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2 Further, as noted by the Government on appeal, even if the jury found
Melson's evidence credible, the jury could have reasonably concluded
that Melson's actions constituted a violation of the statute. See D.C.
Code Ann. § 22-505(a) ("[w]hoever without justifiable and excusable
cause, assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with
any officer or . . . employee of any penal or correctional institution . . .
while engaged in or on account of the performance of his or her official
duties," violates the statute).

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