                  T.C. Memo. 2005-289



                UNITED STATES TAX COURT



             HAROLD E. CALL, Petitioner v.
     COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



Docket No. 19609-03L.             Filed December 15, 2005.



     P filed a petition for judicial review pursuant to
secs. 6320 and 6330, I.R.C., in response to a
determination by R to leave in place a filed notice of
Federal tax lien.

     Held: Because P has advanced groundless
complaints in dispute of the filed notice of tax lien,
R’s determination to proceed with collection action is
sustained.

     Held, further, a penalty under sec. 6673, I.R.C.,
is due from P and is awarded to the United States in
the amount of $5,000.


Harold E. Call, pro se.

Alan J. Tomsic, for respondent.
                               - 2 -

             MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION


     WHERRY, Judge:   This case arises from a petition for

judicial review filed in response to a Notice of Determination

Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330.1

The issues for decision are:   (1) Whether respondent may proceed

with collection action as so determined, and (2) whether the

Court, sua sponte, should impose a penalty under section 6673.

                         FINDINGS OF FACT

     Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

The stipulations of the parties, with accompanying exhibits, are

incorporated herein by this reference.

     Petitioner submitted to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)

Forms 1040EZ, Income Tax Return for Single and Joint Filers With

No Dependents, for the 1998 and 1999 taxable years.    On each of

these returns, petitioner reported $0 on substantially all

pertinent lines, including $0 of income and $0 of tax.   The 1998

return also incorporated petitioner’s request for a refund of

$1,427, derived from income tax withholdings.   Petitioner

attached to each return a statement contending, inter alia, that

no law established his liability for income taxes or required him

to file a return.



     1
       Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and Rule references
are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
                               - 3 -

     Respondent issued to petitioner by certified mail a

statutory notice of deficiency for 1998 on February 11, 2000, and

for 1999 on March 30, 2001.   Petitioner did not file a petition

with this Court in response to either notice of deficiency, and

respondent assessed the taxes, additions to tax, penalty, and/or

interest for 1998 on August 14, 2000, and for 1999 on September

24, 2001.   A notice of balance due was promptly sent to

petitioner with respect to each year.

     Thereafter, respondent issued to petitioner a Notice of

Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC

6320 regarding his unpaid liabilities for 1998 and 1999.   On or

about April 16, 2003, petitioner submitted to respondent a Form

12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing, setting

forth his disagreement with the lien.   He challenged, among other

things, the validity of the assessments, the issuance of a

statutory notice of deficiency or notice and demand for payment,

and the authority of Internal Revenue Service personnel.   A cover

letter with the Form 12153 indicated that petitioner had

initially attempted to respond to respondent’s proposed

collection activities by a letter dated March 26, 2003, and also

stated petitioner’s intention to record the requested hearing.

     The Appeals officer to whom petitioner’s case had been

assigned subsequently scheduled a hearing for July 2, 2003, in

Las Vegas, Nevada.   Petitioner appeared for the scheduled hearing
                              - 4 -

on July 2, 2003, but the hearing did not proceed when the Appeals

officer refused to permit petitioner to record the meeting.

Following the aborted meeting, in a July 3, 2003, letter to the

Appeals officer, petitioner listed issues that he wished to have

considered before any determination was issued.   The enumerated

matters largely reprised the challenges submitted with

petitioner’s Form 12153, disputing, e.g., underlying liability,

proper assessment, receipt of valid notices of deficiency and

demand for payment, verification from the Secretary that all

applicable legal and procedural requirements had been met, and

right to record.

     On October 7, 2003, respondent issued to petitioner the

aforementioned Notice of Determination Concerning Collection

Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330, sustaining the proposed

lien action.

     Petitioner’s petition disputing the notice of determination,

having been timely mailed, was filed with the Court on

November 12, 2003, and reflected an address in Las Vegas, Nevada.

In the petition and in an accompanying document filed as a motion

to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, petitioner relied

principally on the claim that he was denied a proper hearing

under section 6330 due to the inability to record.2


     2
       Petitioner’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
was denied by order of this Court on Jan. 22, 2004.
                               - 5 -

     On September 10, 2004, respondent filed a motion for summary

judgment.   Petitioner filed a timely response in opposition to

respondent’s motion on October 12, 2004.   The response again

essentially repeated petitioner’s demands for a recorded hearing

and documentation.   The Court on November 10, 2004, issued an

order denying the motion for summary judgment, ruling as set

forth below:

          As respondent correctly notes in the motion for
     summary judgment, issues raised by petitioner during
     the administrative process and before us have been
     repeatedly rejected by this and other courts or are
     refuted by the documentary record. Moreover, the Court
     observes that maintenance of similar frivolous
     arguments, primarily for delay, has served as grounds
     for imposition of penalties under section 6673.
     However, the case in its current posture does present a
     procedural shortcoming.

          On July 8, 2003, this Court issued Keene v.
     Commissioner, 121 T.C. 8, 19 (2003), in which it was
     held that taxpayers are entitled, pursuant to section
     7521(a)(1), to audio record section 6330 hearings. The
     taxpayer in that case had refused to proceed when
     denied the opportunity to record, and we remanded the
     case to allow a recorded Appeals hearing. Id. In
     contrast, we have distinguished, and declined to
     remand, cases where the taxpayer had participated in an
     Appeals Office hearing, albeit unrecorded, and where
     all issues raised by the taxpayer could be properly
     decided from the existing record. E.g., id. at 19, 20;
     Frey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-87; Durrenberger
     v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-44; Brashear v.
     Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-196; Kemper v.
     Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-195.

          The circumstances of the instant case are
     analogous to those in Keene v. Commissioner, supra, and
     diverge from those where it was determined that remand
     was not necessary and would not be productive.
     Critically, the notice of determination was issued on
     October 7, 2003. Although this date is subsequent to
                                 - 6 -

     the opinion in Keene v. Commissioner, supra, petitioner
     was not afforded an opportunity for a recorded
     conference. Further, because the requested face-to-
     face hearing was not held, there still exists a
     possibility that petitioner might have raised one or
     more nonfrivolous issues if the meeting had proceeded.

          In this situation, the Court declines to
     characterize the failure to allow recording as harmless
     error. Hence, the Court will deny respondent’s motion
     for summary judgment at this time. As in Keene v.
     Commissioner, supra at 19, however, we admonish
     petitioner that if he persists in making primarily
     frivolous and groundless tax protester arguments in any
     further proceedings with respect to this case, rather
     than raising relevant issues, as specified in section
     6330(c)(2), the Court may consider granting a future
     motion for summary judgment. In such an instance, the
     Court would also be in a position to impose a penalty
     under section 6673(a)(1).

     This case was called from the calendar of the trial session

of the Court in Las Vegas, Nevada, on December 6, 2004, and a

trial was held that afternoon.       At the outset, the Court reminded

petitioner that respondent’s motion for summary judgment had been

denied by our November 10, 2004, order because recording was not

permitted, and we explained as follows:

          THE COURT: And as of that time the arguments that
     had been made by you in the record that I was reviewing
     were deemed by me to be frivolous protester arguments
     that had not been sustained by the Courts in other
     cases, and whose precedent I have to follow.

               *    *    *       *       *   *    *

          THE COURT: But that clearly you were correct in
     noting that you had the right to record your hearing
     and that that right had not been afforded you, and
     therefore you never got your face-to-face hearing,
     which you are also entitled to.
                               - 7 -

           And so their motion for summary judgment was
     denied. At this trial today, there is a verbatim
     record being made, and if you have any other issues
     that you wish to raise other than those that were in
     your previous documents, this is your chance to raise
     them.

          If you don’t raise what I deem to be a legitimate
     issue under Section 6330(c)(2), which I have
     jurisdiction to consider, and I rule against you, then
     other than your right to appeal to a Circuit Court of
     Appeals, your case will be over.

          So if you have any other additional issues that
     you wanted to raise or discuss with the Appeals
     Officer, you need to raise them here today so that I
     can determine if this case should be remanded to
     appeals to consider those issues, or if there is not
     reason to remand the case because there is [sic] no
     issues that I can’t adequately dispose of here at this
     trial. All right?

     The sole new issue specifically raised by petitioner at

trial was that the filing of the notice of tax lien was invalid

because he did not receive proper notification of this action

from respondent.   Petitioner testified that he instead learned of

the filing from a credit watch service to which he subscribes and

which alerts him of adverse activity concerning his credit

report.

     The parties subsequently filed posttrial briefs.   Petitioner

recapitulated the position taken throughout these proceedings and

at trial, focusing once again on lack of a recorded hearing and

of sufficient notification, verification, and documentation of

procedural requisites.
                                 - 8 -

                                OPINION

I.   Collection Actions

      A.   General Rules

      Section 6321 imposes a lien in favor of the United States

upon all property and rights to property of a taxpayer liable for

tax where there exists a failure to pay the tax liability after

demand for payment.    The lien generally arises at the time

assessment is made.    Sec. 6322.   Section 6323, however, provides

that such lien shall not be valid against any purchaser, holder

of a security interest, mechanic’s lienor, or judgment lien

creditor until the Secretary files a notice of lien with the

appropriate public officials.    Section 6320 then sets forth

procedures applicable to protect taxpayers in lien situations.

Section 6320(a)(1) establishes the requirement that the Secretary

notify in writing the person described in section 6321 of the

filing of a notice of lien under section 6323.    This notice

required by section 6320 must be sent not more than 5 business

days after the notice of tax lien is filed and must advise the

taxpayer of the opportunity for administrative review of the

matter in the form of a hearing before the IRS Office of Appeals.

Sec. 6320(a)(2) and (3).    Section 6320(b) and (c) grants a

taxpayer, who so requests, the right to a fair hearing before an

impartial Appeals officer, generally to be conducted in
                               - 9 -

accordance with the procedures described in section 6330(c), (d),

and (e).

     Section 6330(c) addresses the matters to be considered at

the hearing:

          SEC. 6330(c). Matters Considered at Hearing.--In
     the case of any hearing conducted under this section--

                (1) Requirement of investigation.--The
           appeals officer shall at the hearing obtain
           verification from the Secretary that the
           requirements of any applicable law or
           administrative procedure have been met.

                (2) Issues at hearing.--

                     (A) In general.--The person may raise at
                the hearing any relevant issue relating to
                the unpaid tax or the proposed levy,
                including--

                          (i) appropriate spousal defenses;

                          (ii) challenges to the
                     appropriateness of collection actions;
                     and

                          (iii) offers of collection
                     alternatives, which may include the
                     posting of a bond, the substitution of
                     other assets, an installment agreement,
                     or an offer-in-compromise.

                     (B) Underlying liability.--The person
                may also raise at the hearing challenges to
                the existence or amount of the underlying tax
                liability for any tax period if the person
                did not receive any statutory notice of
                deficiency for such tax liability or did not
                otherwise have an opportunity to dispute such
                tax liability.

     Once the Appeals officer has issued a determination

regarding the disputed collection action, section 6330(d) allows
                                  - 10 -

the taxpayer to seek judicial review in the Tax Court or a U.S.

District Court, depending upon the type of tax.     In considering

whether taxpayers are entitled to any relief from the

Commissioner’s determination, this Court has established the

following standard of review:

     where the validity of the underlying tax liability is
     properly at issue, the Court will review the matter on
     a de novo basis. However, where the validity of the
     underlying tax liability is not properly at issue, the
     Court will review the Commissioner’s administrative
     determination for abuse of discretion. [Sego v.
     Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610 (2000).]

     B.   Analysis

           1.   Appeals Hearing

     Hearings conducted under section 6330 are informal

proceedings, not formal adjudications.     Katz v. Commissioner, 115

T.C. 329, 337 (2000); Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 41

(2000).   There exists no right to subpoena witnesses or documents

in connection with section 6330 hearings.     Roberts v.

Commissioner, 118 T.C. 365, 372 (2002), affd. 329 F.3d 1224 (11th

Cir. 2003); Nestor v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162, 166-167 (2002);

Davis v. Commissioner, supra at 41-42.     Taxpayers are entitled to

be offered a face-to-face hearing at the Appeals Office nearest

their residence.     Where the taxpayer declines to participate in a

proffered face-to-face hearing, hearings may also be conducted by

telephone or correspondence.      Katz v. Commissioner, supra at 337-

338; Dorra v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-16; sec. 301.6330-
                                 - 11 -

1(d)(2), Q&A-D6 and D7, Proced. & Admin. Regs.      Furthermore, once

a taxpayer has been given a reasonable opportunity for a hearing

but has failed to avail himself or herself of that opportunity,

we have approved the making of a determination to proceed with

collection based on the Appeals officer’s review of the case

file.     See, e.g., Taylor v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-25,

affd. 130 Fed. Appx. 934 (9th Cir. 2005); Leineweber v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-17; Armstrong v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2002-224; Gougler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-185;

Mann v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-48.      Thus, a face-to-face

meeting is not invariably required.

        Regulations promulgated under section 6330 likewise

incorporate many of the foregoing concepts, as follows:

             Q-D6.   How are CDP hearings conducted?

             A-D6. * * * CDP hearings * * * are informal in
        nature and do not require the Appeals officer or
        employee and the taxpayer, or the taxpayer’s
        representative, to hold a face-to-face meeting. A CDP
        hearing may, but is not required to, consist of a face-
        to-face meeting, one or more written or oral
        communications between an Appeals officer or employee
        and the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s representative, or
        some combination thereof. * * *

             Q-D7. If a taxpayer wants a face-to-face CDP
        hearing, where will it be held?

             A-D7. The taxpayer must be offered an opportunity
        for a hearing at the Appeals office closest to
        taxpayer’s residence or, in the case of a business
        taxpayer, the taxpayer’s principal place of business.
        If that is not satisfactory to the taxpayer, the
        taxpayer will be given an opportunity for a hearing by
        correspondence or by telephone. If that is not
                              - 12 -

     satisfactory to the taxpayer, the Appeals officer or
     employee will review the taxpayer’s request for a CDP
     hearing, the case file, any other written
     communications from the taxpayer (including written
     communications, if any, submitted in connection with
     the CDP hearing), and any notes of any oral
     communications with the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s
     representative. Under such circumstances, review of
     those documents will constitute the CDP hearing for the
     purposes of section 6330(b). [Sec. 301.6330-1(d)(2),
     Q&A-D6 and D7, Proced. & Admin. Regs.]

This Court has cited the above regulatory provisions, and

corresponding promulgations under section 6320, with approval.

See, e.g., Taylor v. Commissioner, supra; Leineweber v.

Commissioner, supra; Dorra v. Commissioner, supra; Gougler v.

Commissioner, supra.

     With respect to the instant matter, the record reflects that

petitioner was provided with an opportunity for a face-to-face

hearing on July 2, 2003.   The hearing did not proceed when

petitioner was not permitted to record the meeting.   As explained

in our previous order in this case, in Keene v. Commissioner, 121

T.C. 8, 19 (2003), this Court held that taxpayers are entitled,

pursuant to section 7521(a)(1), to audio record section 6330

hearings.   The taxpayer in that case had refused to proceed when

denied the opportunity to record, and we remanded the case to

allow a recorded Appeals hearing.   Id.

     In contrast, again as noted in our November 10, 2004, order,

we have distinguished, and declined to remand, cases where the

taxpayer had participated in an Appeals Office hearing, albeit
                              - 13 -

unrecorded, and where all issues raised by the taxpayer could be

properly decided from the existing record.   E.g., id. at 19-20;

Frey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-87; Durrenberger v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-44; Brashear v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2003-196; Kemper v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-195.

Stated otherwise, cases will not be remanded to Appeals, nor

determinations otherwise invalidated, merely on account of the

lack of a recording when to do so is not necessary and would not

be productive.   See, e.g., Frey v. Commissioner, supra;

Durrenberger v. Commissioner, supra; Brashear v. Commissioner,

supra; Kemper v. Commissioner, supra; see also Lunsford v.

Commissioner, 117 T.C. 183, 189 (2001).   A principal scenario

falling short of the necessary or productive standard exists

where the taxpayers rely on frivolous or groundless arguments

consistently rejected by this and other courts.   See, e.g., Frey

v. Commissioner, supra; Brashear v. Commissioner, supra; Kemper

v. Commissioner, supra.

     Because no hearing had been conducted at all in petitioner’s

case, we declined to grant respondent’s motion for summary

judgment.   The record as it then existed did not foreclose the

possibility that petitioner might have raised valid arguments had

a hearing been held.   Accordingly, we provided petitioner an

opportunity before the Court at the trial session in Las Vegas to

identify any legitimate issues he wished to raise that could
                                - 14 -

warrant further consideration of the merits of his case by the

Appeals Office or this Court.    Petitioner, however, continued to

focus on the denial of a recorded hearing and offered no

substantive issues of merit.

     Hence, despite repeated warnings and opportunities, the only

contentions other than the recorded hearing advanced by

petitioner are, as will be further discussed below, of a nature

previously rejected by this and other courts.     The record

therefore does not indicate that any purpose would be served by

remand or additional proceedings.    The Court concludes that all

pertinent issues relating to the propriety of the collection

determination can be decided through review of the materials

before it.

          2.   Review of Underlying Liabilities

     Statutory notices of deficiency for 1998 and 1999 were

issued to petitioner by certified mail.   Furthermore, statements

in the memorandum of law filed in support of petitioner’s

response to respondent’s earlier motion for summary judgment make

clear that he received the notices, despite assertions in various

other documents that might suggest the contrary.     In addition,

the following colloquy on this subject took place at trial:

          THE COURT: All right. I have one question, Mr.
     Call. The order that I previously entered in your case
     denying the motion for summary judgment noted that the
     service had issued statutory notices of deficiencies to
     you for both the years of ’98 and ’99.
                                  - 15 -

             THE WITNESS:    Yes, sir.

          THE COURT: I believe that you received those
     statutory notices of deficiency, and that you did not
     file a petition with the U.S. Tax Court within the 90
     day period--

             THE WITNESS:    No, sir, I was remiss in not doing
     that.

          THE COURT: --if you disagreed with the numbers on
     those notices that probably or that would have been in
     your best interest to file that.

          THE WITNESS: That is not what I disagreed with.
     It is some of the subsequent notices that I have gotten
     and the figures don’t seem to add up.

Given these remarks, the Court is satisfied that petitioner

received the statutory notices and did not timely petition this

Court for redetermination when he had the opportunity to do so.

Accordingly, petitioner is precluded under section 6330(c)(2)(B)

from disputing his underlying 1998 and 1999 liabilities in this

proceeding.       Other comments and contentions in the record

generally challenging the “existence” of any statute imposing or

requiring him to pay income tax warrant no further comment.       See

Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417, 1417 (5th Cir. 1984) (“We

perceive no need to refute these arguments with somber reasoning

and copious citation of precedent; to do so might suggest that

these arguments have some colorable merit.”).

             3.    Review for Abuse of Discretion

     Petitioner has also made various arguments relating to

aspects of the assessment and collection procedures that we
                              - 16 -

review for abuse of discretion.   Action constitutes an abuse of

discretion under this standard where arbitrary, capricious, or

without sound basis in fact or law.     Woodral v. Commissioner, 112

T.C. 19, 23 (1999).

     Federal tax assessments are formally recorded on a record of

assessment in accordance with section 6203.    The Commissioner is

not required to use Form 23C in making an assessment.        Roberts v.

Commissioner, 118 T.C. at 369-371.     Furthermore, section

6330(c)(1) mandates neither that the Appeals officer rely on a

particular document in satisfying the verification requirement

nor that the Appeals officer actually give the taxpayer a copy of

the verification upon which he or she relied.     Craig v.

Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252, 262 (2002); Nestor v. Commissioner,

118 T.C. at 166.

     A Form 4340, Certificate of Assessments, Payments and Other

Specified Matters, for instance, constitutes presumptive evidence

that a tax has been validly assessed pursuant to section 6203.

Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. at 40 (and cases cited thereat).

Consequently, absent a showing by the taxpayer of some

irregularity in the assessment procedure that would raise a

question about the validity of the assessments, a Form 4340

reflecting that tax liabilities were assessed and remain unpaid

is sufficient to support collection action under section 6330.

Id. at 40-41.   We have specifically held that it is not an abuse
                                - 17 -

of discretion for an Appeals officer to rely on Form 4340, Nestor

v. Commissioner, supra at 166; Davis v. Commissioner, supra at

41, or a computer transcript of account, Schroeder v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-190; Mann v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2002-48, to comply with section 6330(c)(1).

     Here, the record contains Forms 4340 for 1998 and 1999,

indicating that assessments were made for each of these years and

that taxes remain unpaid.     Although the Form 4340 for 1999

contains one labeling error explained by respondent in the notice

of determination, the error does not affect the existence of

valid, unsatisfied assessments.3    Petitioner has cited no further

irregularities that would cast doubt on the pertinent liability

information recorded the Forms 4340.

         In addition to the specific dictates of section 6330, the

Secretary, upon request, is directed to furnish to the taxpayer a

copy of pertinent parts of the record of assessment setting forth

the taxpayer’s name, the date of assessment, the character of the

liability assessed, the taxable period, if applicable, and the

amounts assessed.     Sec. 6203; sec. 301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin.


     3
       The assessment of income tax for 1999 was inadvertently
labeled as an “agreed audit deficiency prior to 30 or 60 day
letter”, as opposed to an “audit deficiency per default to 90 day
letter”. Nonetheless, other entries on the form clarify the
factual circumstances, and in any event the issue was adequately
considered and addressed by the Appeals officer in determining
whether the collection action should be sustained (an observation
unaffected by a typographical error in the notice of
determination referring to the 1999 year as 1990).
                                - 18 -

Regs.     A taxpayer receiving a copy of Form 4340 has been provided

with all the documentation to which he or she is entitled under

section 6203 and section 301.6203-1, Proced. & Admin. Regs.

Roberts v. Commissioner, supra at 370 n.7.     This Court likewise

has upheld collection actions where taxpayers were provided with

literal transcripts of account (so-called MFTRAX).     See, e.g.,

Frank v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-88; Swann v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2003-70.     The notice of determination states

“certified transcripts (Form 4340)” were mailed to petitioner.

Petitioner challenges that statement on brief with the assertion:

“The so-called transcripts were not properly certified and were

not signed by an Assessment Officer as required by law.”     The

Court concludes that petitioner’s complaints regarding the

assessments and verification are meritless.

     Petitioner has denied receiving the notice and demand for

payment that section 6303(a) establishes should be given within

60 days of the making of an assessment.     However, a notice of

balance due constitutes a notice and demand for payment within

the meaning of section 6303(a).     Craig v. Commissioner, supra at

262-263.     The Forms 4340 indicate that petitioner was sent

notices of balance due for each of the tax years involved.

        Finally, at trial petitioner raised an issue regarding

proper notification of the filing of the notice of tax lien.       His
                                - 19 -

testimony on this matter on cross-examination included the

following:

          Q    Mr. Call, you say that you never received a
     copy of the notice of the Federal Tax lien filed?[4]

          A    No, sir. I got one when I found the notice
     from Credit Watch in my e-mail actually. I went to the
     County Recorder and got a copy of the notice of tax
     lien that was filed, or actually there was two of them.

               There was one for each year, but I got my
     copies of the notices of a tax lien from the County
     Recorder’s order.

          Q    And you still managed to get that in time to
     file a request for a CDP hearing?

          A       Yes, sir, apparently I did.

          Q    Do you have a date of notice from this Credit
     Watch Service or any sort of a document that indicates
     when you received it originally?

          A    I have the notices that I picked up from the
     County Recorder, and I think they have a stamp on them.
     I am not absolutely certain, but I think they stamped
     it or date stamped it.

He later added:

     I am assuming that the Credit Watch notified me, I
     guess, within a day or two of the time that the notice
     of tax lien was filed at the County Recorder.

          And I was probably at the Recorder’s office the
     next day possibly, and possibly the same day. I don’t
     remember. But I didn’t dillydally. I went up there
     and got that, knowing that my time was limited to file.




     4
       The Court notes that sec. 6320(a)(1) by its terms requires
only that a taxpayer be given notification that a tax lien has
been filed, not that a copy of the notice of tax lien so filed be
furnished to the taxpayer.
                              - 20 -

     On reply brief, petitioner expresses his position on this

issue as follows:

          Two Notices of Federal Tax Lien were filed with
     the Clark County Recorder in March of 2003, for tax
     years 1998 and 1999. Petitioner was not notified of
     these filings within five days as required by law, and
     Internal Revenue Regulations. Respondent claimed
     during the inquisition in Tax Court that notification
     was sent to Petitioner. According to normal procedures
     such notices are sent Certified Mail and the signed
     delivery receipt is retained by the sender. To date,
     no such evidence of delivery has been produced by
     Respondent. Petitioner was made aware of the filing of
     the notices by an on-line credit watch agency and filed
     a request for Collection Due Process Hearing on
     April 16, 2003. Petitioner did not obtain copies of
     the Notices of Federal Tax Lien until October 30, 2004
     when Petitioner went to the Clark County Recorder’s
     office in person and requested them. * * *

Petitioner attached to his reply brief copies of the notices of

tax lien, prepared and signed by the IRS on March 5, 2003, and a

copy of his order receipt for copies of these notices from the

Clark County Recorder, dated October 30, 2003.

     The Forms 4340 show March 7, 2003, as the date of the

Federal tax liens.   The notice of determination similarly

references March 7, 2003, as the “Date of CDP Notice” and

March 26, 2003, as the “Date Form 12153 Received”.   As previously

noted, petitioner’s Form 12153 was submitted on April 16, 2003,

with a cover letter indicating that he had sent an earlier March

26, 2003, letter pertaining to respondent’s collection

activities, to which he had received no response.
                              - 21 -

     Hence, the combination of petitioner’s testimony and the

various documentary submissions leaves several facts unexplained.

For instance, if petitioner did not receive the notice of lien

filing and attached copy of Form 12153 sent by the IRS, when and

how did he learn about and obtain the Form 12153.    The record

likewise remains vague on the timing and content of the alleged

e-mail notification from the credit watch service.    It is also

unusual from a timing perspective that petitioner’s request to

the county recorder’s office for copies of the lien notices

occurred after the administrative proceedings in this case were

concluded, after the notice of determination issued, and less

than a week before he mailed his petition to this Court.    Suffice

it to say that the claims of nonreceipt of proper notice from the

IRS are less than thoroughly convincing.

     Regardless of the veracity of these claims, however, it is

clear that petitioner was aware of the lien filing within a

period to communicate in a timely manner so as to preserve his

rights to an Appeals hearing and subsequent judicial review.      In

similar circumstances, this Court has ruled:    “Because the

hearing had been timely requested within the prescribed 30-day

period, petitioner’s claims that respondent did not send Letter

3172 to petitioner’s last known address and that petitioner never

received it are beside the point.”     Stein v. Commissioner, T.C.

Memo. 2004-124.   In that case, the Court concluded that any error
                              - 22 -

was harmless and did not give rise to an abuse of discretion in

sustaining the lien, and we see no reason to depart from such an

analysis in the instant scenario.

      Thus, with respect to those issues enumerated in section

6330(c)(2)(A) and subject to review in collection proceedings for

abuse of discretion, petitioner has not raised any spousal

defenses, valid challenges to the appropriateness of the

collection action, or collection alternatives.   As this Court has

noted in earlier cases, Rule 331(b)(4) states that a petition for

review of a collection action shall contain clear and concise

assignments of each and every error alleged to have been

committed in the notice of determination and that any issue not

raised in the assignments of error shall be deemed conceded.     See

Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. at 185-186; Goza v.

Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 183 (2000).   For completeness, we

have addressed various points advanced by petitioner during the

administrative process and this litigation, but the items listed

in section 6330(c)(2)(A) were not pursued in any proceedings.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that respondent’s determination

to proceed with collection of petitioner’s tax liabilities was

not an abuse of discretion.

II.   Section 6673 Penalty

      Section 6673(a)(1) authorizes the Court to require the

taxpayer to pay a penalty not in excess of $25,000 when it
                                - 23 -

appears to the Court that, inter alia, proceedings have been

instituted or maintained by the taxpayer primarily for delay or

that the taxpayer’s position in such proceeding is frivolous or

groundless.   In Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576, 581

(2000), we warned that taxpayers abusing the protections afforded

by sections 6320 and 6330 through the bringing of dilatory or

frivolous lien or levy actions will face sanctions under section

6673.   We have since repeatedly disposed of cases premised on

arguments akin to those raised herein summarily and with

imposition of the section 6673 penalty.      See, e.g., Craig v.

Commissioner, 119 T.C. at 264-265 (and cases cited thereat).

     With respect to the instant matter, we are convinced that

petitioner instituted this proceeding primarily for delay.

Throughout the administrative and trial process, petitioner

advanced contentions and demands previously and consistently

rejected by this and other courts.       He submitted communications

quoting, citing, using out of context, and otherwise misapplying

portions of the Internal Revenue Code, regulations, Supreme Court

decisions, and other authorities.    While his procedural stance

concerning recording was correct, he ignored the Court’s explicit

warning that any further proceedings would be justified only in

the face of relevant and nonfrivolous issues.

     Moreover, petitioner was expressly alerted to the potential

use of sanctions in his case.    Yet he appeared at the trial
                              - 24 -

session in Las Vegas without any legitimate evidence or argument

in support of his position.   He instead continued to espouse

positions that had been explicitly addressed and rejected in this

Court’s order of November 10, 2004, or in other cases previously

decided by the Court.   The Court sua sponte concludes that a

penalty of $5,000 should be awarded to the United States in this

case.   To reflect the foregoing,


                                         An appropriate decision

                                    will be entered.
