                                                                                       ACCEPTED
                                                                                   01-15-00294-CV
                                                                        FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                                                             7/24/2015 11:12:18 AM
                       No. 01-15-00294-CV                                    CHRISTOPHER PRINE
                                                                                            CLERK
                                In the
                         Court of Appeals
                               For the
                                                              FILED IN
                       First District of Texas         1st COURT OF APPEALS
                             At Houston                    HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                                       7/24/2015 11:12:18 AM
                                            CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
                                                                Clerk
                            No. 1884399
         In the County Criminal Court at Law Number Fifteen
                       Of Harris County, Texas
                      

                      AMINA ROSE WHITE
                           Appellant
                                 V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS
                           Appellee
                      

                 STATE’S APPELLATE BRIEF
                      
                                          DEVON ANDERSON
                                          District Attorney
                                          Harris County, Texas
                                          MELISSA P. HERVEY
                                          Assistant District Attorney
                                          Harris County, Texas
                                          State Bar Number: 24053741
                                          LAUREN CLEMONS
                                          Assistant District Attorney
                                          Harris County, Texas
                                          1201 Franklin Street, Suite 600
                                          Houston, Texas 77002
                                          Telephone: (713) 755-5826
                                          Fax Number: (713) 755-5809
                                          Hervey_Melissa@dao.hctx.net
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED ONLY IF REQUESTED BY APPELLANT
               STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

      Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(g) and Texas Rule of

Appellate Procedure 39.1, the State requests oral argument only if appellant

requests oral argument.

                     IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES

      Pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.1(a) and 38.2(a)(1)(A), a

complete list of the names of all interested parties, and the names and addresses of

all trial and appellate counsel, is provided below:

      Counsel for the State, Appellee:

             Devon AndersonDistrict Attorney of Harris County

             Melissa P. HerveyAssistant District Attorney on appeal

             Lauren Clemons—Assistant District Attorney at trial

             Harris County District Attorney’s Office
             1201 Franklin Street, Suite 600
             Houston, Texas 77002

      Appellant or Criminal Defendant:

             Amina Rose White

      Counsel for Appellant:

             Ashton Christopher Adair—Defense Counsel on appeal and at the
             hearing on appellant’s petition for an order of nondisclosure

             The Adair Law Firm
             7400 Gulf Freeway


                                           i
                 Houston, Texas 77017

        Trial Judge:

                 Honorable Jean Spradling Hughes—Presiding Judge of the County
                 Criminal Court at Law Number Fifteen


                                     TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................................i

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES ....................................................................i

TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................................... ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................................................................. 1

STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................ 2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ........................................................................ 3

REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR ......................................... 3

        I.    STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW REGARDING A
              PETITION FOR AN ORDER OF NONDISCLOSURE OF CRIMINAL HISTORY
              RECORD INFORMATION ............................................................................ 4

        II. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
            APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR NONDISCLOSURE ........................................ 6

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER ............................................................................. 14

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 16

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 17




                                                      ii
                                   INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Chadwick v. State,
  309 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) .............................................................13
Harris v. State,
 402 S.W.3d 758 (Tex. App.—
 Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) ................................................................. 12, 14
Jackson v. State,
  No. 14-13-00747-CV, 2014 WL 6085593 (Tex. App.—
  Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 13, 2014, no pet.) .........................................................5
Montgomery v. State,
 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) ...............................................................6
State v. Gonzalez,
  855 S.W.2d 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ...............................................................9
State v. Herndon,
  215 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) ...............................................................9
State v. Thomas,
  428 S.W.3d 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) ...........................................................9, 10


STATUTES

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(d)............................................. 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 13
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(d)(1) .................................................................10
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(d)(1)-(3) .............................................................7
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(e) ....................................................... 5, 7, 11, 12
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 .................................................................................1




                                                      iii
RULES

TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(g) ................................................................................................. i
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(i)................................................................................................16
TEX. R. APP. P. 21.3 ...................................................................................................9
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2(a)(1)(A) ..................................................................................... i
TEX. R. APP. P. 39.1.................................................................................................... i




                                                           iv
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

                           STATEMENT OF THE CASE

      In cause number 1884399, the State charged appellant by information with

the Class B misdemeanor offense of theft of property valued at more than $50.00

but less than $500.00. (CR – 6);1 see generally TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03.

On April 30, 2013, appellant pled guilty to the offense as charged, pursuant to

appellant’s and the State’s plea-bargain agreement. (CR – 13-20). The trial court

agreed to follow the plea-bargain agreement and accepted appellant’s guilty plea,

but deferred a finding of guilt and ordered that appellant be placed on deferred

adjudication community supervision for a term of six months. (CR – 13-20). On

September 23, 2013, the State filed a Motion to Adjudicate Guilt in appellant’s

case, alleging that appellant violated various conditions of her community

supervision. (CR – 21-22). The trial court denied the State’s adjudication motion

on October 17, 2013. (CR – 25). Then, on November 4, 2013, after the expiration

of appellant’s term of deferred adjudication community supervision, the trial court

discharged appellant from community supervision and ordered that the proceedings

against appellant be dismissed. (CR – 26).




1
 The Clerk’s Record consists of one volume, hereinafter referenced as (CR – [page number]).
The Reporter’s Record also consists of one volume, which will be referenced as (RR – [page
number]). Citations to appellant’s brief will be referenced as (AB – [page number]).
         On January 5, 2015, appellant filed a Petition for Nondisclosure of Criminal

History Record Information with the trial court. (CR – 30-32). On February 23,

2015, after a hearing on the merits of appellant’s petition, the trial court denied the

petition and signed a written order to that effect.       (CR – 33); (RR – 9-11).

Appellant timely filed written notice of appeal on March 16, 2015, to challenge the

trial court’s ruling to deny appellant’s petition for an order of nondisclosure. (CR

– 39).

                         

                              STATEMENT OF FACTS

         On March 15, 2013, a Houston Police Officer arrested appellant for the

Class B misdemeanor offense of theft of property from Sears department store

valued at more than $50.00 but less than $500.00, namely, one dress and four pairs

of tights. (CR – 6, 13). Appellant pled guilty to the offense as charged, on April

30, 2013, whereupon the trial court ordered that appellant be placed on deferred

adjudication community supervision for a term of six months. (CR – 13-20). On

November 4, 2013, the trial court discharged appellant from community

supervision and ordered that the proceedings against appellant be dismissed, after

appellant’s term of deferred adjudication community supervision had expired. (CR

– 26).




                                           2
      On January 5, 2015, appellant filed with the trial court a petition for an order

of nondisclosure related to appellant’s theft offense. (CR – 30-32). Appellant was

then arrested for the offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI), on January 14,

2015. (RR – 10). On February 23, 2015, after an evidentiary hearing, the trial

court denied appellant’s petition for an order of nondisclosure for the criminal

history record information regarding appellant’s theft. (CR – 33); (RR – 9-11).

                        

                       SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

      The trial judge acted within her discretion when she denied appellant’s

petition for an order of nondisclosure upon concluding that the issuance of such an

order would not be in the best interest of justice.

                        

            REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SOLE POINT OF ERROR

      Appellant contends in her only point of error that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying appellant’s petition for an order of nondisclosure because

“[a]ppellant testified that she met all of the conditions” necessary for the issuance

of a nondisclosure order. (AB – 7).




                                           3
   I. Standard of Review and Applicable Law Regarding a Petition for an Order
      of Nondisclosure of Criminal History Record Information

      Texas Government Code Sections 411.081(d) and 411.081(e) provide the

following, in pertinent part, regarding a person’s ability to request and receive

from the trial court an order of nondisclosure of the person’s criminal history

record information:

      (d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, if a person
         is placed on deferred adjudication community supervision under
         Section 5, Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure,
         subsequently receives a discharge and dismissal under Section
         5(c), Article 42.12, and satisfies the requirements of Subsection
         (e), the person may petition the court that placed the defendant on
         deferred adjudication for an order of nondisclosure under this
         subsection.
         ...

         After notice to the state, an opportunity for a hearing, and a
         determination that the person is entitled to file the petition and
         issuance of the order is in the best interest of justice, the court shall
         issue an order prohibiting criminal justice agencies from disclosing
         to the public criminal history record information related to the
         offense giving rise to the deferred adjudication.
         ...

         A person may petition the court that placed the person on deferred
         adjudication for an order of nondisclosure only on or after:

         (1) the discharge and dismissal, if the offense for which the
             person was placed on deferred adjudication was a
             misdemeanor other than a misdemeanor described by
             Subdivision (2);

         (2) the second anniversary of the discharge and dismissal, if the
             offense for which the person was placed on deferred

                                           4
             adjudication was a misdemeanor under Chapter 20, 21, 22, 25,
             42, or 46, Penal Code; or

        (3) the fifth anniversary of the discharge and dismissal, if the
            offense for which the person was placed on deferred
            adjudication was a felony.

     (e) A person is entitled to petition the court under Subsection (d) only
         if during the period of the deferred adjudication community
         supervision for which the order of nondisclosure is requested and
         during the applicable period described by Subsection (d)(1), (2), or
         (3), as appropriate, the person is not convicted of or placed on
         deferred adjudication community supervision under Section 5,
         Article 42.12, Code of Criminal Procedure, for any offense other
         than an offense under the Transportation Code punishable by fine
         only. A person is not entitled to petition the court under
         Subsection (d) if the person was placed on the deferred
         adjudication community supervision for or has been previously
         convicted or placed on any other deferred adjudication for:

        (1) an offense requiring registration as a sex offender under
            Chapter 62, Code of Criminal Procedure;

        (2) an offense under Section 20.04, Penal Code, regardless of
            whether the offense is a reportable conviction or adjudication
            for purposes of Chapter 62, Code of Criminal Procedure;

        (3) an offense under Section 19.02, 19.03, 22.04, 22.041, 25.07,
            25.072, or 42.072, Penal Code; or

        (4) any other offense involving family violence, as defined by
            Section 71.004, Family Code. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §
            411.081(d); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(e).

     A trial court’s decision to deny a person’s petition for an order of

nondisclosure is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. See Jackson v.

State, No. 14-13-00747-CV, 2014 WL 6085593, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] Nov. 13, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
                                        5
(concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jackson’s

petition for an order of nondisclosure). A reviewing court should not find that a

trial court abused its discretion unless it is clear that the trial court’s ruling was

arbitrary or unreasonable, or that the trial court acted without reference to any

guiding rules or principles. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1990).

   II. The Trial Court Acted Within its Discretion in Denying Appellant’s
       Petition for Nondisclosure

      The above-cited portions of Texas Government Code Section 411.081

establish that, before a trial court must issue an order of nondisclosure, four

requirements must be met. First, the person petitioning the trial court for an order

of nondisclosure must provide the State with notice of the person’s petition. TEX.

GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(d). Second, the trial court must afford the parties an

opportunity for a hearing regarding the person’s petition. Id.

      Third, the petitioner must be statutorily entitled to file a petition for

nondisclosure with the court. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(d). That is, the

petitioner must not be disqualified from filing the petition because of the time

constraints imposed by Section 411.081(d)(1)-(3), or because of Section

411.081(e), which prevents a person from petitioning the court for an order of

nondisclosure when:      (i) the person is convicted of or placed on deferred

adjudication community supervision for any offense other than an offense under
                                          6
Transportation Code punishable by a fine only, or (ii) the person was placed on

deferred adjudication community supervision for or has been previously convicted

or placed on any other deferred adjudication for:         (1) an offense requiring

registration as a sex offender under Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure;

(2) an offense under Section 20.04 of the Penal Code [aggravated kidnapping],

regardless of whether the offense is a reportable conviction or adjudication for

purposes of Chapter 62 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; (3) an offense under

Penal Code Sections 19.02 [murder], 19.03 [capital murder], 22.04 [injury to a

child, elderly individual, or disabled individual], 22.041 [abandoning or

endangering a child], 25.07 [violation of certain court orders or conditions of bond

in family violence, sexual assault or abuse, or stalking case], 25.072 [repeated

violation of certain court orders or conditions of bond in a family violence case], or

42.072 [stalking]; or (4) any other offense involving family violence, as defined by

Family Code Section 71.004. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(d)(1)-(3)

(stating that a person may not file a petition for nondisclosure outside of the

enumerated timeframes); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(e) (disqualifying a

person from petitioning for nondisclosure because of the person’s criminal

conviction or deferred adjudication during the relevant time frame for filing the

petition, because of the nature of the underlying offense to be nondisclosed, or




                                          7
because the person has been previously convicted or placed on deferred

adjudication community supervision for one of the listed penal code offenses).

      And fourth, the trial court must determine that it is in the best interest of

justice to issue the requested order of nondisclosure. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §

411.081(d) (requiring that a trial court issue a nondisclosure order only “[a]fter...a

determination that...issuance of the order is in the best interest of justice[.]”)

(emphasis added).

      The first of these three requirements are procedural and objective in nature,

and do not permit the trial court to exercise any discretion—either the person

properly notified the State, was given the opportunity for a hearing, and is lawfully

eligible to file a petition for nondisclosure, or she is not. The last requirement,

however, is subjective and calls upon the trial court to exercise its discretion to

determine whether issuance of the nondisclosure order would be in the best interest

of justice after the court assesses the particular facts and circumstances of the

petitioner’s situation. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(d) (stating that a trial

court shall issue a nondisclosure order only “[a]fter...a determination

that...issuance of the order is in the best interest of justice[.]”) (emphasis added).

Thus, even when a person is statutorily eligible to petition the trial court for an

order of nondisclosure because none of the disqualifications contained in Sections

411.081(d) and 411.081(e) are applicable to that person, the trial court may still

                                          8
rightly refuse to issue the requested nondisclosure order if the court determines that

entering the order would not be in the best interest of justice. Id.

      While there do not appear to be any cases which discuss the scope of a trial

court’s discretion to refuse to issue a nondisclosure order after concluding that it

would not be in the best interest of justice to do so, jurisprudence concerning the

similar situation of when a trial court may grant a motion for new trial “in the

interest of justice” may be useful.      Texas Rule of Appellant Procedure 21.3

enumerates eight specific grounds for granting the defendant a new trial. TEX. R.

APP. P. 21.3. In addition to these grounds, there is a long history of Texas trial

courts exercising their discretion to grant new trials “in the interest of justice.” See

State v. Thomas, 428 S.W.3d 99, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (recognizing that

“[f]or more than one hundred and twenty years, our trial judges have had the

discretion to grant new trials in the interest of justice.”) (quoting State v. Gonzalez,

855 S.W.2d 692, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). The Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals reiterated in Thomas, though, that a trial court’s discretion to grant a

motion for new trial “‘in the interest of justice’ is not ‘unbounded or unfettered’”;

“[i]nstead, ‘justice’ means ‘in accordance with the law.’” Thomas, 428 S.W.3d at

104-05 (quoting State v. Herndon, 215 S.W.3d 901, 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).

Hence, while a trial court is not restricted to the specific statutory grounds for

granting a motion for new trial enumerated in Rule 21.3, a trial court may grant a

                                           9
new trial in the interest of justice only when it has a valid legal basis to do so.

Thomas, 428 S.W.3d at 105.

      Applied to the field of nondisclosure orders, this law instructs that a trial

court may refuse to issue a requested order of nondisclosure because the petitioner

is ineligible to petition the court for the order for any of the statutory reasons

provided in Sections 411.081(d) and 411.081(e), or because the court has a valid

legal basis—as opposed to an arbitrary and inarticulate reason, such as the way that

the petitioner dresses—to conclude that it would not be in the best interest of

justice to do so. Cf. Thomas, 428 S.W.3d at 104-06. Such a valid legal basis could

certainly be that, at the time of the hearing on the merits of a person’s petition for

an order of nondisclosure, the person was under formal accusation of an additional

criminal offense.

      In this case, appellant was authorized to file her petition for an order of

nondisclosure at any time on or after November 4, 2013, the date that the trial

discharged appellant from deferred adjudication community supervision for

appellant’s underlying theft offense—a Class B misdemeanor under Texas Penal

Code Chapter 31—and dismissed those proceedings against her. (CR – 26); see

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(d)(1) (permitting a person file a petition for an

order of nondisclosure “on or after...the discharge and dismissal [of the person’s

deferred adjudication], if the offense for which the person was placed on deferred

                                         10
adjudication was a misdemeanor other than a misdemeanor [under Texas Penal

Code Chapters 20, 21, 22, 25, 42, or 46.]”). The record also demonstrates that

appellant properly notified the State of appellant’s petition for an order of

nondisclosure, and that the trial court held a hearing regarding the merits of

appellant’s petition. (CR – 32); (RR – 3-11); see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §

411.081(d) (requiring “notice to the state[] [and] an opportunity for a hearing”

before a trial court must issue an order of nondisclosure). Further, there is no

evidence in the record that appellant was convicted of or placed on deferred

adjudication for any offense other than a Transportation Code offense punishable

by fine only during appellant’s term of deferred adjudication community

supervision for the theft, or that appellant was previously convicted or placed on

deferred adjudication for any of the specified criminal offenses listed in Section

411.081(e)(1)-(4). See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(e). Thus, appellant was

eligible to file her petition for an order of nondisclosure because none of the

statutory timing and procedural disqualifications in Section 411.081(d), or the

offense-related disqualifications of Section 411.081(e), were applicable to her.

      Appellant’s arrest and charge for DWI after she filed her petition for an

order of nondisclosure did not statutorily disqualify her from petitioning the trial

court for that relief, per Section 411.081(e), because appellant did not commit the

DWI during her term of deferred adjudication for the underlying theft, and because

                                         11
theft is not one of the disqualifying crimes enumerated in Section 411.081(e)(1)-

(4). See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(e); see also Harris v. State, 402

S.W.3d 758, 765-66 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (determining

that Harris’s subsequent deferred adjudication, which occurred outside of the

pertinent timeframe of Section 411.081(d), did not preclude her from petitioning

for an order of nondisclosure for the offense underlying Harris’s first deferred

adjudication). However, despite that appellant was statutorily eligible for an order

of nondisclosure, the trial court retained discretion, per Section 411.081(d), to deny

appellant’s petition if the court nonetheless determined, based on the particular

facts and circumstances of appellant’s situation, that it would not be in the best

interest of justice to issue the nondisclosure order. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §

411.081(d) (requiring the trial court to determine that “issuance of the

[nondisclosure] order is in the best interest of justice,” in addition to finding that

appellant met the other procedural requirements, before the court was obligated to

issue the nondisclosure order).

      Although the trial court did not submit findings of fact and conclusions of

law in support of its ruling to deny appellant’s petition for an order of

nondisclosure, this Court may infer from the transcript of the hearing on the merits

of appellant’s petition that the trial court concluded that it would not be in the best

interest of justice to issue an order of nondisclosure because of appellant’s then-

                                          12
pending charge for DWI—which appellant committed on January 14, 2015, only

nine days after filing her petition for nondisclosure. See (RR – 9-10); see also

Chadwick v. State, 309 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (explaining that

when a trial court fails to make explicit findings of fact, reviewing courts will infer

any fact findings which are necessary to support the trial judge’s ruling so long as

such inferences are supported by the record). The trial court’s determination in

this regard was based on a valid legal reason—appellant’s recidivism—and, thus,

was an appropriate exercise of the trial court’s discretion.

      Appellant asserts that, given the language of Section 411.081(e) and the

outcome of Harris v. State, 402 S.W.3d 758 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012,

no pet.), “[t]he standard for ineligibility is a conviction or a deferred adjudication

for a subsequent offense” and, so, appellant’s pending DWI could not be viable

basis for the trial court to deny appellant’s petition for an order of nondisclosure.

(AB – 10-11). Appellant’s argument fails, though, because it overlooks the facts

that the issues of whether appellant is statutorily eligible for an order of

nondisclosure, and whether the issuance of such an order would be in the best

interest of justice, are two distinct inquiries, and that this Court acknowledged as

much in Harris. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.081(d) (“After notice to the

state, an opportunity for a hearing, and a determination that the person is entitled to

file the petition and issuance of the order is in the best interest of justice, the court

                                           13
shall issue an order [of nondisclosure]....”); Harris, 402 S.W.3d at 765-66

(concluding that Harris’s subsequent deferred adjudication, which occurred outside

of the pertinent timeframe of Section 411.081(d), did not preclude her from

petitioning for an order of nondisclosure for the offense underlying Harris’s first

deferred adjudication, but remanding the case to the trial court to specifically

consider whether it would be in the best interest of justice to issue a nondisclosure

order because of Harris’s second deferred adjudication, even though Harris was

otherwise statutorily eligible for the order; hence, recognizing that statutory

eligibility and the best interests of justice are separate considerations).

         The trial court had a valid legal reason to conclude that it would not be in the

best interest of justice to issue appellant’s requested order of nondisclosure, despite

that appellant was otherwise statutorily eligible for such an order. Accordingly,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s petition for an

order of nondisclosure, and this Court should overrule appellant’s sole point of

error.

                          

                            CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

         For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully submits that the trial court

properly denied appellant’s petition for an order of nondisclosure upon concluding

that it would not be in the best interest of justice to enter the order. Thus, the State

                                            14
respectfully prays that this Court will overrule appellant’s only point of error and

will affirm the trial court’s ruling to deny appellant’s petition for an order of

nondisclosure.


                                                   Respectfully submitted,


                                                   DEVON ANDERSON
                                                   District Attorney
                                                   Harris County, Texas


                                                   /S/ Melissa Hervey

                                                   MELISSA P. HERVEY
                                                   Assistant District Attorney
                                                   Harris County, Texas
                                                   State Bar Number: 24053741
                                                   1201 Franklin Street, Suite 600
                                                   Houston, Texas 77002
                                                   Telephone (713) 755-5826
                                                   Fax Number (713) 755-5809
                                                   Hervey_Melissa@dao.hctx.net




                                        15
                     CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

      Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i), the undersigned

attorney certifies that there are 3,076 words in the foregoing computer-generated

document, based upon the representation provided by Microsoft Word, the word

processing program that was used to create the document, and excluding the

portions of the document exempted by Rule 9.4(i)(1).


                                                 /S/ Melissa Hervey

                                                 MELISSA P. HERVEY
                                                 Assistant District Attorney
                                                 Harris County, Texas
                                                 State Bar Number: 24053741
                                                 1201 Franklin Street, Suite 600
                                                 Houston, Texas 77002
                                                 Telephone (713) 755-5826
                                                 Fax Number (713) 755-5809
                                                 Hervey_Melissa@dao.hctx.net




                                       16
                        CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

      This is to certify that the undersigned counsel has directed the e-filing

system eFile.TXCourts.gov to serve a true and correct copy of the foregoing

document upon Ashton Christopher Adair, appellant’s attorney of record on

appeal, on July 24, 2015, at the following e-mail address, through the electronic

service system provided by eFile.TXCourts.gov:

      ash@houstontxlawyer.com




                                                 /S/ Melissa Hervey

                                                 MELISSA P. HERVEY
                                                 Assistant District Attorney
                                                 Harris County, Texas
                                                 State Bar Number: 24053741
                                                 1201 Franklin Street, Suite 600
                                                 Houston, Texas 77002
                                                 Telephone (713) 755-5826
                                                 Fax Number (713) 755-5809
                                                 Hervey_Melissa@dao.hctx.net




                                       17
