

Moon v Vuolo (2014 NY Slip Op 07149)





Moon v Vuolo


2014 NY Slip Op 07149


Decided on October 22, 2014


Appellate Division, Second Department


Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.


This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.



Decided on October 22, 2014
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

MARK C. DILLON, J.P.
THOMAS A. DICKERSON
SHERI S. ROMAN
SANDRA L. SGROI, JJ.


2013-11241
 (Index No. 13838/11)

[*1]Won Hee Moon, etc., appellant, 
vDominick Vuolo, respondent.


Sim & Park, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Andrew Park and Haesun Alexis Kim of counsel), for appellant.
Martin, Fallon & Mullé, Huntington, N.Y. (Richard C. Mullé of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Brown, J.), dated September 10, 2013, as granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted by the plaintiff on behalf of Gloria Kim on the ground that Gloria Kim did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The defendant met his prima facie burden of showing that the infant Gloria Kim did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The defendant submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to Kim's right knee and right shoulder did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614). The defendant further submitted evidence demonstrating, prima facie, that Kim did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180-day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Che Hong Kim v Kossoff, 90 AD3d 969).
In opposition, no triable issue of fact was raised. Therefore, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant's motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted on behalf of Kim.
DILLON, J.P., DICKERSON, ROMAN and SGROI, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Aprilanne Agostino
Clerk of the Court


