                   T.C. Summary Opinion 2007-94



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



         DARRYL R. AND KRISTI L. STEPHENS, Petitioners v.
           COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 22230-05S.              Filed June 13, 2007.



     Darryl R. and Kristi L. Stephens, pro sese.

     Kristin Timmons, for respondent.



     KROUPA, Judge:   This case was heard pursuant to the

provisions of section 74631 of the Internal Revenue Code in

effect at the time the petition was filed.    Pursuant to section

7463(b), the decision to be entered is not reviewable by any




     1
      All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for 2003, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court
Rules of Practice and Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
                                - 2 -

other court, and this opinion shall not be treated as precedent

for any other case.

     Respondent determined a $3,323 deficiency in petitioners’

Federal income tax for 2003.    After concessions,2 we are asked to

decide two issues.    First, we are asked to decide whether

petitioner Darryl R. Stephens (Mr. Stephens) was away from home

when he worked as an airline mechanic for Northwest Airlines

(NWA) in Minnesota to determine whether petitioners are entitled

to deduct expenses for his vehicle and meals while he was away

from Georgia where he normally lived.      We conclude he was not

away from home.   Second, we are asked to decide whether

petitioners substantiated a claimed noncash charitable

contribution.   We conclude that petitioners have not

substantiated the contribution and are therefore not entitled to

a noncash charitable contribution deduction.

                              Background

     Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

Petitioners resided in Fayetteville, Georgia, at the time they

filed the petition.

Mr. Stephens’ Employment With Northwest Airlines

     Mr. Stephens began as an airline mechanic for NWA in 1988.

Petitioners moved to Georgia in 2002, and Mr. Stephens continued

working for NWA in Georgia.


     2
      See infra note 3 for the concessions each party made.
                               - 3 -

     NWA sent layoff notices to some of its employees when it

experienced financial difficulties.    The employees receiving the

notices could either choose to accept the layoff or exercise

their seniority.   Seniority depended on the length of time an

employee had worked for NWA regardless of where the airline

facility was located.   An employee with higher seniority could

exercise his or her seniority to bump an employee with less

seniority and take that employee’s position.   The employee with

less seniority could then take the layoff or find another

employee with less seniority to bump.   This seniority bumping

arrangement was in place across the country, so that an NWA

mechanic looking to keep his or her job at NWA had to look at

several different cities to find a less senior employee to bump.

     Mr. Stephens received a bump notice in October 2002.    He

chose to exercise his seniority and bump another employee rather

than accept the layoff.   Mr. Stephens was able to bump to

Minnesota.   He started working in Minnesota on December 17, 2002.

He planned to work in Minnesota until he was able to find a new

job in Georgia, and he sought other jobs in Georgia with other

employers.   Mr. Stephens received a job offer in May 2003 from

Lockheed Martin to work in Georgia at half the salary he was paid

by NWA.   Mr. Stephens was unable to accept the offer because

Lockheed Martin instituted a hiring freeze, which effectively
                               - 4 -

revoked the job offer.   Mr. Stephens continued to work for NWA in

Minnesota for 14 months, until March 2004.

     Mr. Stephens’ position in Minnesota had no specific end

date.   After Mr. Stephens was bumped from his position in

Georgia, no NWA position was available for him to return to in

Georgia.   He was forced to bump other employees and work in a

different city to stay with NWA.   Mr. Stephens expected to return

to Georgia as soon as a job became available in Georgia, with NWA

or otherwise, that he could obtain.    NWA’s needs for mechanics in

Georgia as well as the choices of the other mechanics also

subject to the seniority system would influence the timing of Mr.

Stephens’ return to an NWA position in Georgia.

     Mrs. Stephens and petitioners’ family members remained in

Georgia at the family residence while Mr. Stephens worked in

Minnesota.   Mr. Stephens lived with his parents in Otsego,

Minnesota, while he worked in Minnesota.   Mr. Stephens returned

to Georgia occasionally to visit his family.

     Petitioners claimed they contributed some items to charity

in 2003.

Petitioners’ Return

     Petitioners claimed deductions for certain expenses on

Schedule A, Itemized Deductions, on the joint return for 2003.

Respondent examined the return for 2003 and issued petitioners a

deficiency notice in which he disallowed many of the expense
                                - 5 -

deductions.   Of the expenses still in dispute,3 petitioners

claimed they were entitled to deduct unreimbursed employee

expenses related to Mr. Stephens’ NWA mechanic job.    The

unreimbursed employee business expenses petitioners claimed

include $6,413 of vehicle expenses and $2,501 of meals incurred

while Mr. Stephens worked in Minnesota.    Petitioners also claimed

that they were entitled to a $1,413 charitable contribution

deduction.    Petitioners reported on the return that they donated

personal property to the Salvation Army in Minneapolis,

Minnesota.    Petitioners produced a receipt at trial, however,

that shows a contribution of items to The Clothes Less Traveled

Thrift Shop, Inc., a charity in Peachtree City, Georgia, valued

at the same amount as the charitable contribution deduction they

claimed on the return.

     Petitioners timely filed a petition.

                             Discussion

     The parties resolved many of the disputed expenses before

trial.   We are asked to determine whether petitioners are

entitled to deduct the remaining expenses.   We begin by



     3
      Respondent concedes that petitioners are entitled to deduct
the State and local income taxes, real estate taxes, personal
property taxes, home mortgage interest, points, safety shoes,
union dues, and a portion of certain amounts for tools claimed on
the return for 2003. Petitioners concede the deductions claimed
for cash contributions, a cellular phone, uniform maintenance,
depreciation, and a portion of the amount for tools.
                                 - 6 -

considering whether Mr. Stephens was away from home when he

incurred expenses for his vehicle and meals in Minnesota.

Travel Expenses While Away From Home

     We begin by briefly outlining the rules for deducting travel

expenses.     A taxpayer may deduct reasonable and necessary travel

expenses such as vehicle, meals, and lodging expenses incurred

while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business.

Secs. 162(a)(2), 262(a).    A taxpayer must show that he or she was

away from home when he or she incurred the expense, that the

expense is reasonable and necessary, and that the expense was

incurred in pursuit of a trade or business.       Commissioner v.

Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470 (1946).       The determination of whether

the taxpayer has satisfied these requirements is a question of

fact.   Id.

     The purpose of the deduction for expenses incurred away from

home is to alleviate the burden on the taxpayer whose business

needs require him or her to maintain two homes and therefore

incur duplicate living expenses.     Kroll v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.

557, 562 (1968).    The duplicate costs are not deductible where

the taxpayer maintains two homes for personal reasons.      Sec. 262;

Commissioner v. Flowers, supra at 474.

     A taxpayer may deduct the expenses he or she incurred while

away from home.    Sec. 162(a)(2).   The word “home” for purposes of

section 162(a)(2) has a special meaning.      It generally refers to
                                 - 7 -

the area of a taxpayer’s principal place of employment, not the

taxpayer’s personal residence.     Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.

190, 195 (1979), affd. 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981); Kroll v.

Commissioner, supra at 561-562.

     There is an exception to the general rule that a taxpayer’s

tax home is his or her principal place of employment.        Peurifoy

v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59, 60 (1958).       The taxpayer’s tax home

may be the taxpayer’s personal residence if the taxpayer’s

employment away from home is temporary.       Id.; Mitchell v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-283.       On the other hand, the

exception does not apply and the taxpayer’s tax home remains the

principal place of employment if the employment away from home is

indefinite.   Kroll v. Commissioner, supra at 562.

     It is presumed that a taxpayer will generally choose to live

near his or her place of employment.       Frederick v. United States,

603 F.2d 1292, 1295 (8th Cir. 1979).      A taxpayer must, however,

have a principal place of employment and accept temporary work in

another location to be away from home.       Kroll v. Commissioner,

supra.   A person who has no principal place of business nor a

place he or she resides permanently is an itinerant and has no

tax home from which he or she can be away.       Deamer v.

Commissioner, 752 F.2d 337, 339 (8th Cir. 1985), affg. T.C. Memo.

1984-63; Edwards v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-396.
                                - 8 -

     All the facts and circumstances are considered in

determining whether a taxpayer has a tax home.   See Rev. Rul. 73-

529, 1973-2 C.B. 37 (describing objective factors the

Commissioner considers in determining whether a taxpayer has a

tax home).   The taxpayer must generally have some business

justification to maintain the first residence, beyond purely

personal reasons, to be entitled to deduct expenses incurred

while temporarily away from that home.    Hantzis v. Commissioner,

638 F.2d 248, 255 (1st Cir. 1981); Bochner v. Commissioner, 67

T.C. 824, 828 (1977); Tucker v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 783, 787

(1971).   Where a taxpayer has no business connections with the

primary residence, there is no compelling reason to maintain that

residence and incur substantial, continuous, and duplicative

expenses elsewhere.   See Henderson v. Commissioner, 143 F.3d 497,

499 (9th Cir. 1998), affg. T.C. Memo. 1995-559; Deamer v.

Commissioner, supra; Hantzis v. Commissioner, supra.     In that

situation, the expenses incurred while temporarily away from that

residence are not deductible.    Hantzis v. Commissioner, supra;

Bochner v. Commissioner, supra; Tucker v. Commissioner, supra;

see McNeill v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-65; Aldea v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-136.

     Once Mr. Stephens was bumped from Georgia, he had no job to

return to there.   His choices were to be laid off and have no

work, or to bump another employee and move to a different city to
                                 - 9 -

continue working.   NWA gave Mr. Stephens no end date for his

position in Minnesota.   NWA no longer required Mr. Stephens to

perform any services whatsoever in Georgia once he was bumped.

Mr. Stephens introduced evidence that he searched for work in

Georgia and actually accepted a position at Lockheed Martin that

ultimately was not available due to a hiring freeze.    Although

Mrs. Stephens and the family remained in Georgia with occasional

visits from Mr. Stephens while he worked in Minnesota, this fact

alone does not dictate that Mr. Stephens’ tax home was in

Georgia, where the family residence was located.    Unlike

traveling salespersons who may be required to return to the home

city occasionally between business trips, Mr. Stephens’ business

ties to Georgia ceased when he was bumped.

     The Court understands that the NWA mechanics’ lives were

unsettled and disrupted.   Mechanics did not know how long they

would have a job in one specific location.    They only knew the

system was based on seniority.    They could bump less senior

employees, and they could be bumped by more senior employees.

While we acknowledge that Mr. Stephens would have liked to return

to Georgia, Mr. Stephens did not know when such a return would be

possible due to the NWA seniority system and the Georgia job

market.   The likelihood of Mr. Stephens’ return to an NWA

position in Georgia depended on NWA’s needs for mechanics there

as well as the choices of more senior mechanics.    Mr. Stephens
                               - 10 -

did not know how long he would be in Minnesota or where he might

go next.   It was not foreseeable that he would be able to return

to Georgia at any time due to the seniority system and the job

market.    Thus we conclude there was no business reason for

petitioners to maintain a home in Georgia.    Petitioners kept the

family residence in Georgia for purely personal reasons.

Petitioners have failed to prove that Mr. Stephens had a tax home

in 2003.   Accordingly, Mr. Stephens was not away from home when

he worked as an NWA mechanic in Minnesota, and the expenses he

incurred while there are not deductible.4

Noncash Charitable Contributions

     We next turn to whether petitioners are entitled to a

noncash charitable contribution deduction of $1,413.    We begin by

noting the fundamental principle that the Commissioner’s

determinations are generally presumed correct, and the taxpayer

bears the burden of proving that these determinations are

erroneous.5   Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S.

79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).

Moreover, deductions are a matter of legislative grace, and the


     4
      Even if we had found that Mr. Stephens’ tax home during
2003 was in Georgia, Mr. Stephens may not be treated as
temporarily away from home while he worked in Minnesota because
the position lasted over a year. See sec. 162(a).
     5
      Petitioners do not claim the burden of proof shifts to
respondent under sec. 7491(a). Petitioners also did not
establish they satisfy the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2). We
therefore find that the burden of proof remains with petitioners.
                              - 11 -

taxpayer has the burden to prove he or she is entitled to any

deduction claimed.   Rule 142(a); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488,

493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440

(1934); Welch v. Helvering, supra.     This includes the burden of

substantiation.   Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 90 (1975),

affd. per curiam 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976).

     A taxpayer must substantiate amounts claimed as deductions

by maintaining the records necessary to establish he or she is

entitled to the deductions.   Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner,

supra.   The taxpayer shall keep such permanent records or books

of account as are sufficient to establish the amounts of

deductions claimed on the return.    Sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a),

(e), Income Tax Regs.   The Court need not accept a taxpayer’s

self-serving testimony when the taxpayer fails to present

corroborative evidence.   Beam v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-

304 (citing Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986)),

affd. without published opinion 956 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1992).

     Charitable contributions a taxpayer makes are generally

deductible under section 170(a).    No deduction is allowed,

however, for any contribution of $250 or more unless the taxpayer

substantiates the contribution by a contemporaneous written

acknowledgment of the contribution by a qualified donee
                              - 12 -

organization.6   Sec. 170(f)(8)(A).    The deduction for a

contribution of property equals the fair market value of the

property on the date contributed.     Sec. 1.170A-1(c)(1), Income

Tax Regs.

     A taxpayer claiming a charitable contribution deduction is

generally required to maintain for each contribution a canceled

check, a receipt from the donee charitable organization showing

the name of the organization and the date and amount of the

contribution, or other reliable written records showing the name

of the donee and the date and amount of the contribution.    Sec.

1.170A-13(a)(1), Income Tax Regs.

     Petitioners assert they are entitled to a charitable

contribution deduction.   Petitioners reported on the return for

2003 that they acquired personal property on January 1, 1920,7

for $2,000, which they donated to the Salvation Army in

Minneapolis, Minnesota.   At trial, however, petitioners provided



     6
      There are now stricter requirements for contributions of
money. Sec. 170(f)(17). No deduction for a contribution of
money in any amount is allowed unless the donor maintains a bank
record or written communication from the donee showing the name
of the donee organization, the date of the contribution, and the
amount of the contribution. Id. This new provision is effective
for contributions made in tax years beginning after Aug. 17,
2006. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-280, sec.
1217, 120 Stat. 1080.
     7
      We assume petitioners made an error on Form 8283, Noncash
Charitable Contributions, when they claimed that they acquired
the property they donated on Jan. 1, 1920, a date before
petitioners were born.
                               - 13 -

a copy of a receipt from The Clothes Less Traveled Thrift Shop,

Inc., a charity in Peachtree City, Georgia, for a donation valued

at the same amount as the charitable contribution deduction they

claimed on the return.   Petitioners’ documentation regarding the

donation of property is inconsistent with the position

petitioners took on the return because it lists a different

charity.    Petitioners offered no explanation for this

inconsistency.

     Mr. Stephens testified that his wife added the dollar value

amount to the statement.    Petitioners also introduced several

pages of a worksheet they completed to determine that the value

of the property they donated was $1,413.    Petitioners introduced

no documentation to establish the original purchase price of the

property.   We find that petitioners have failed to substantiate

and are therefore not entitled to deduct any amount of the

claimed charitable contribution.

     To reflect the foregoing and the concessions of the parties,



                                           Decision will be entered

                                     under Rule 155.
