Case vacated and remanded by Supreme
Court order filed 2/23/01
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                             No. 99-4689

FLOYD WEATHERSPOON,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
Frank W. Bullock, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-99-16)

Submitted: May 25, 2000

Decided: June 6, 2000

Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Walter Thaniel Johnson, Jr., Juanita Boger Allen, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United States Attorney,
Steven H. Levin, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Floyd Weatherspoon appeals his conviction and sentence for multi-
ple drug offenses in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 841(b)(1)(A),
841(b)(1)(B), 846 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999). We affirm.

Weatherspoon first contends that police officers executing a search
warrant on his home violated the "knock and announce" requirement
by failing to wait a reasonable period of time for an answer or refusal
prior to entering. Considering the facts particular to this case, the dis-
trict court determined that the length of time that elapsed between
announcement and entry was reasonable. See United States v. Ward,
171 F.3d 188, 194-95 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 68
U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1999) (No. 98-9824) (providing reason-
ableness standard). We review the district court's factual findings for
clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See United States v.
Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (providing standards).
Applying these standards, we find no error in the district court's
determination.

Weatherspoon next contends that the Government committed a
Brady* violation by failing to disclose the results of a latent finger-
print analysis conducted on a cooking pot found in Weatherspoon's
apartment. According to Government witnesses, Weatherspoon used
this pot in the preparation of crack cocaine on the day of his arrest.
Weatherspoon filed an unsuccessful motion for a new trial on the
basis of this evidence. We review a district court's denial of a motion
for a new trial for an abuse of discretion and a due process violation
under Brady for a reasonable probability that the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense. See United States v. Arrington , 757 F.2d 1484, 1486
(4th Cir. 1985) (providing standard for new trial motion); Moore v.
Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95 (1972) (providing Brady standard).
Because we find that the evidence allegedly withheld in this case is
immaterial, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying Weatherspoon's motion for a new trial.
_________________________________________________________________
*Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

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Finally, Weatherspoon contends that the district court erred in
enhancing his sentence for obstruction of justice under U.S. Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (1998). At trial, the girlfriend of Wea-
therspoon's co-defendant testified that Weatherspoon contacted her
and requested that she lie about matters material to the case. We find
that it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to credit this wit-
ness' testimony, and that such testimony establishes obstruction by a
preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Daughtry, 874
F.2d 213, 217-18 (4th Cir. 1989) (providing clear error standard);
United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1095 (4th Cir. 1995) (provid-
ing preponderance of the evidence standard). Accordingly, we affirm
the district court's application of the USSG § 3C1.1 enhancement.

Finally, Weatherspoon has moved to file a pro se supplemental
brief. Although we grant his motion, we find his arguments uncon-
vincing. Accordingly, we affirm both his conviction and sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argu-
ment would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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