                        T.C. Memo. 2005-285



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



           SOUTH COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 10959-03X.            Filed December 14, 2005.



     Roger J. Makley, Lance A. Gildner, and John T. Ernest,1 for

petitioner.

     William I. Miller and Linda C. Grobe, for respondent.



              MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION


     LARO, Judge:   Respondent determined that petitioner is not

exempt from Federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) and



     1
       John T. Ernest entered an appearance for petitioner on
Jan. 27, 2004, and withdrew as petitioner’s counsel on June 4,
2004.
                               - 2 -

revoked petitioner’s tax-exempt status effective January 1,

1992.2   Petitioner has exhausted its administrative remedies and

has petitioned this Court to declare its qualification for

tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3).   See sec. 7428; see

also Rule 211(a), (b), (g).   Following the parties’ filing with

the Court of the administrative record underlying respondent’s

determination, the Court’s granting of the parties’ joint motion

to calendar this case for trial, and the conclusion of the

ensuing trial, we decide whether respondent properly revoked

petitioner’s tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3).   We hold

that respondent did.

                         FINDINGS OF FACT

     Some facts were stipulated and are so found.   We incorporate

herein by this reference the parties’ stipulations of fact and

the exhibits submitted therewith.   Petitioner is an association

that was formed by Larry Parr (Parr) on June 17, 1979.    When its

petition for declaratory judgment was filed, petitioner’s

principal place of business was in Middletown, Ohio.

     On August 3, 1982, respondent determined that petitioner was

a section 501(c)(3) organization exempt from Federal income tax.

The determination was effective as of the day of petitioner’s

formation.   At the time of this determination, petitioner did not


     2
       Section references are to the applicable versions of the
Internal Revenue Code, Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules
of Practice and Procedure, and dollar amounts are rounded.
                                - 3 -

conduct any gaming activity.    According to its bylaws,

petitioner’s exempt purpose was (and is) to provide aid for all

forms of education.    At some time between August 3, 1982, and

January 1, 1992, petitioner began a gaming operation (gaming

operation).   The gaming operation was the idea of Parr, who

during the relevant years did not work for petitioner but whose

company sold to petitioner the supplies that petitioner used in

the gaming operation.

     From 1992 until 1995, the years audited by respondent in

connection with his determination revoking petitioner’s

exemption, petitioner contributed $1,423,729 to various charities

generally for the purposes of starting educational programs,

building a school, and transporting handicapped individuals to

various schools.    Petitioner’s contributions during the

respective years were $440,055, $323,088, $386,599, and $273,987.

Many of the recipients of these contributions were charities

controlled by petitioner’s president, James Clausing (Clausing).

Petitioner funded its contributions almost entirely through its

gaming operation.

     Petitioner’s gaming operation consisted of its sale of bingo

cards and instant pull-tab tickets.3    Petitioner sold its bingo


     3
       Each of petitioner’s instant pull-tab tickets was a paper
ticket with a covered symbol. Upon purchasing an instant
pull-tab ticket and uncovering the symbol, the purchaser won a
prize if the symbol was one that was predesignated to win.
                                                   (continued...)
                               - 4 -

cards and instant pull-tab tickets at bingo games that petitioner

held at a bingo hall in Middletown, Ohio, from 6:30 p.m. to 11:30

p.m. on every Saturday and Sunday.     An average of approximately

300 patrons attended the bingo games each night that the games

were held.   Beginning in 1993, petitioner also sold instant

pull-tab tickets at one or two other locations on each Saturday

and Sunday from 10:30 a.m. to 6 p.m. and on every other day of

the week from 10:30 a.m. to 7 p.m.4    Petitioner’s sales of

instant pull-tab tickets represented most of petitioner’s gaming

receipts in each of the years 1992 through 1995.    In addition to

sales of instant pull-tab tickets, petitioner’s remaining income

for those years was from interest and from petitioner’s sales

during the bingo games of bingo cards, raffle tickets, and

concessions.

     Eight or nine individuals generally worked in the bingo hall

on each night that the games were held.    These individuals

consisted of bingo workers, instant pull-tab ticket workers,

concession workers, kitchen workers, a security guard, and one or

two game administrators (Clausing and/or Mark Carroll (Carroll),



     3
      (...continued)
Whether the instant pull-tab ticket contained one of the
predesignated symbols was a matter of luck.
     4
       In 1993, 1994, and 1995, petitioner sold instant pull-tab
tickets at a storefront booth in Middletown, Ohio. In 1994 and
1995, petitioner also sold instant pull-tab tickets at a second
booth.
                                - 5 -

petitioner’s vice president).   Petitioner recruited its bingo,

instant pull-tab ticket, concession, and kitchen workers

(collectively, nonofficer/nonsecurity guard workers) through

informal means such as by word of mouth.    All of petitioner’s

nonofficer/nonsecurity guard workers were trained by one of

petitioner’s officers, Diane Whitaker (Whitaker).    Whitaker

instructed those workers on how to handle money and how to keep

certain records.   Whitaker also scheduled petitioner’s gaming

activities and approved any time off taken by the nonofficer/

nonsecurity guard workers.   Whitaker (and/or another one of

petitioner’s officers) informed these workers that they would be

paid in cash for their services and that they were not to discuss

this payment arrangement with anyone.

     The services performed in the gaming operation by the

nonofficer/nonsecurity guard workers were demanding, and it was

not easy for those workers to take a day off.    Many of those

workers were pressured to work in the bingo games on both

Saturday and Sunday, were required to give advance notice for any

vacation time that they sought, and seldom received time off.

Petitioner required that its nonofficer/nonsecurity guard workers

who worked at the bingo games be at the bingo hall from 4:30 p.m.

until approximately just after 11:30 p.m.    As of the latter time,

the workers were then required to accompany Clausing (and/or

Carroll) to a bank where the receipts from that night’s
                                - 6 -

activities were deposited.   Petitioner generally paid each of its

nonofficer/nonsecurity guard workers $65 in cash a day for his or

her work in the gaming operation (exclusive of tips or Christmas

bonuses).    Petitioner did not report any of these payments either

to the recipient (e.g., through a Form W-2, Wage and Tax

Statement) or to respondent.   In addition to working for

petitioner in the gaming operation, many of the nonofficer/

nonsecurity guard workers also worked fulltime for employers

other than petitioner.   At least one of the nonofficer/

nonsecurity guard workers traveled more than 20 miles to work in

the gaming operation.

     Ohio law requires that a security guard be present during

the bingo games, and petitioner paid a security agency to furnish

a security guard to work at the bingo games while the games were

conducted.   Petitioner also paid the security agency to furnish a

security guard to work with petitioner’s instant pull-tab ticket

workers when, and on the sites where, the instant pull-tab

tickets were sold.   For the services of these security guards,

petitioner paid the security agency $7,776, $12,936, $9,908, and

$11,643 during 1992 through 1995, respectively.

     Clausing was petitioner’s president and full-time

administrator from 1992 through 1995.   He worked for petitioner

an average of 30 hours per week in 1992 and an average of 35

hours per week in 1993 through 1995.    During 1992 through 1995,
                               - 7 -

petitioner reportedly paid Clausing compensation of $4,800,

$27,600, $32,428, and $41,627, respectively.   As to the gaming

operation, Clausing negotiated the bingo supply contracts, ran

the bingo games, handed out tickets at the bingo games, collected

the proceeds from petitioner’s sales of bingo cards and instant

pull-tab tickets, deposited most of petitioner’s daily proceeds

in the bank, prepared daily sheets, and managed petitioner’s

inventory (e.g., of instant pull-tab tickets).   Clausing also

each day visited the sites where petitioner sold its instant

pull-tab tickets and, when there, counted money and prepared

daily sheets.   As to petitioner’s activities other than the

gaming operation (nongaming operation), Clausing ran petitioner’s

monthly board meetings, made annual decisions about grants, and

wrote checks to petitioner’s grant recipients.   The amount of

time that Clausing spent on petitioner’s nongaming operation was

substantially less than the amount of time that Clausing spent on

the gaming operation.

     Carroll was petitioner’s vice president in 1992 through 1995

and an administrator of its gaming operation in 1994 and 1995.

Carroll reportedly was not paid by petitioner in 1992 and 1993.

Petitioner reportedly paid Carroll $18,928 and $23,427 in 1994

and 1995, respectively.   Carroll worked for petitioner an average

of 10 hours per week in 1994 and an average of 40 hours per week

in 1995.   As part of his work for petitioner, Carroll sometimes
                               - 8 -

visited the sites where the instant pull-tab tickets were sold

and supervised the bingo games.

     From 1992 through 1995, petitioner received no public

support.   For those years, petitioner reported to respondent that

its gross income was as follows:

           Year    Gaming Operation      Interest Income

           1992        $871,893              $20,199
           1993       1,305,461                7,128
           1994       2,085,332               11,456
           1995       2,043,145               11,291

     During petitioner’s audit, Clausing and petitioner’s counsel

informed petitioner’s workers that one of respondent’s agents

might question the workers on whether they were paid by

petitioner for their work in the gaming operation.     Clausing and

petitioner’s counsel advised the workers on what they should and

should not say in response to the questions.

                              OPINION

     Section 501(a) generally provides that organizations

described in section 501(c) are exempt from Federal income tax.

Section 501(c)(3) includes within that description certain

“Corporations * * * organized and operated exclusively for

religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,

literary, or educational purposes”.     Exemptions from tax are

exceptions to the norm, and petitioner bears a heavy burden to
                              - 9 -

prove that it falls within the terms of the quoted text.5    See

Harding Hosp., Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 1068, 1071 (6th

Cir. 1974); see also Fla. Hosp. Trust Fund v. Commissioner, 103

T.C. 140, 146 (1994) (taxpayers generally bear the burden of

proving that the Commissioner improperly revoked an exemption

from tax under section 501), affd. 71 F.3d 808 (11th Cir. 1996).

     In order for petitioner to prevail on the issue that we

decide herein, we must find that petitioner was both organized

and operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes.    See

sec. 1.501(c)(3)-1(a), Income Tax Regs.   We focus on the

statute’s requirement as to operation because the parties do not

dispute the statute’s requirement as to organization.     Under the

regulations, an “organization will be regarded as ‘operated

exclusively’ for one or more exempt purposes only if it engages

primarily in activities which accomplish one or more of such

exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3).”   Sec.



     5
       Sec. 7491(a) was added to the Code by the Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206,
sec. 3001(c), 112 Stat. 727, effective for court proceedings
arising from examinations commencing after July 22, 1998. Sec.
7491(a)(1) provides that the burden of proof shifts to the
Commissioner in specified circumstances. We need not and do not
decide whether sec. 7491(a)(1) applies in the setting of a
declaratory judgment action such as we have here. Petitioner in
its posttrial brief makes no mention of sec. 7491(a)(1), and we
conclude that, even if sec. 7491(a)(1) did apply in the setting
of a declaratory judgment action, it would not apply here. See,
e.g., sec. 7491(a)(2) (sec. 7491(a)(1) applies with respect to an
issue only if the taxpayer establishes certain requirements); see
also Mediaworks, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004-177.
                                 - 10 -

1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1), Income Tax Regs.     “An organization will not

be so regarded if more than an insubstantial part of its

activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.”        Id.; see

also Orange County Agric. Socy., Inc. v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d

529, 532 (2d Cir. 1990), affg. T.C. Memo. 1988-380.

     Respondent revoked petitioner’s tax-exempt status effective

January 1, 1992.   Respondent advances the following grounds for

revocation:   (1) Petitioner had as its primary activity the

operation of a trade or business, i.e., its gaming operation,

that was not in furtherance of its exempt purpose, (2) petitioner

operated as a “feeder organization” within the meaning of section

502, and (3) petitioner’s operation served the private interests

of its founder, Parr, and his company.     Petitioner argues in

response to respondent’s determination that petitioner was

operated exclusively for an exempt purpose.     According to

petitioner, its gaming operation should not be deemed unrelated

to its exempt purpose in that, it asserts, all of the work in

carrying on its gaming operation was performed by uncompensated

workers.   Cf. sec. 513(a)(1).    Respondent disputes that

substantially all of the work in that operation was

uncompensated.   We agree with respondent that petitioner’s

carrying on of the gaming operation disqualified petitioner from

the tax exemption that it seeks to retain.
                              - 11 -

     In support of their respective positions, the parties each

called witnesses to testify about any compensation paid by

petitioner for services performed in the gaming operation.

Petitioner’s witnesses on this subject were Clausing, Parr,

Edward Helton (Helton), Shawna Phillips (Phillips), Karen Cornett

(Cornett), and Lulu Blair (collectively, petitioner’s six

witnesses).   Petitioner’s six witnesses generally testified that

they were not paid for any services that they performed in the

gaming operation and that they believed none of petitioner’s

workers was paid for his or her work in the gaming operation.

Respondent’s witnesses on this subject were Jessica Seaks,

Melissa Conyer, and Linda Grooms (collectively, respondent’s

three witnesses).   Respondent’s three witnesses generally

testified that petitioner surreptitiously paid both them and each

other nonofficer worker cash of $65 a day (exclusive of tips and

Christmas bonuses) and that one or more of petitioner’s officers

instructed them (respondent’s witnesses and petitioner’s other

nonofficer/nonsecurity guard workers) not to disclose this

payment arrangement to anyone.

     Our resolution of this dispute turns mainly on a

determination of the credibility of petitioner’s six witnesses

and respondent’s three witnesses.   Such a determination

epitomizes the ultimate duty of a trial court, as trier of fact,

to determine the truth of a matter on the basis of conflicting
                              - 12 -

oral testimony.   We must be wary, on the one hand, of the

courtroom's becoming a quagmire in which an honest litigant is

mired and, on the other hand, of the courtroom’s becoming a

refuge for the proficient liar.   See Diaz v. Commissioner,

58 T.C. 560, 564 (1972); Hawkins v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

1993-517, affd. without published opinion 66 F.3d 325 (6th Cir.

1995).   We have evaluated each referenced witness’s testimony by

observing his or her candor, sincerity, and demeanor and by

assigning weight to the elicited testimony for the primary

purpose of finding disputed facts.     See Neonatology Associates v.

Commissioner, 115 T.C. 43, 84 (2000), affd. 299 F.3d 221 (3d Cir.

2002).   We determine the credibility of each witness, weigh each

piece of evidence, draw appropriate inferences, and choose

between conflicting inferences in finding the facts of a case.

See id.; see also Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108,

114-115 (1963); Boehm v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 287, 293 (1945);

Wilmington Trust Co. v. Helvering, 316 U.S. 164, 167-168 (1942).

     We hear and view the testimony of respondent’s three

witnesses to be more credible than that of petitioner’s six

witnesses, whom we find to be not credible.    Our perception of

petitioner’s six witnesses (and our resulting disregard of their

testimony) is supported by our review of independent indicia of

reliability found in the record and from the reasonable

inferences that we draw therefrom.     First, Clausing, the security
                               - 13 -

guards, and Carroll (at least in 1994 and 1995) were undisputably

paid by petitioner for their services, and we find such as a

fact.    Petitioner asserts that it paid Clausing and Carroll only

to work in its nongaming activities and that any work they

performed in the gaming operation was without compensation.    We

consider that assertion to be incredible.    We find as a fact that

petitioner’s payments to Clausing and Carroll were at least in

part payment for services that they performed in connection with

the gaming operation.    Indeed, we would be hard put to find to

the contrary given that almost all of petitioner’s resources

(including the time of its workers) were devoted to the gaming

operation and that the gaming operation represented the lion’s

share of petitioner’s activities.    We conclude from the record

before us that Clausing’s and Carroll’s compensation from

petitioner was attributable in small part to their services in

petitioner’s nongaming activity and, for the most part, to their

services in the gaming operation.    The mere fact that petitioner

may label all of their compensation as being paid only for the

former purpose is not dispositive of this matter.

     Second, as we understand it, none of the four of

petitioner’s six witnesses who received the $65 payments from

petitioner ever reported those payments as income.6   Petitioner



     6
       Of petitioner’s six witnesses, Clausing and Parr were
never paid the $65 payments.
                                - 14 -

does not dispute a proposed finding of fact by respondent, which

we find as a fact, that Clausing and counsel for petitioner

advised petitioner’s workers on what the workers should and

should not say in response to questions that respondent might ask

them during petitioner’s audit as to the gaming operation and

their compensation therefrom.    We believe that each of

petitioner’s six witnesses at the time of his or her testimony

knew that the $65 payments were reportable as taxable income and

that those payments were not reported as such.    We surmise that

petitioner’s six witnesses also were generally aware at the time

of their testimony of the potential repercussions of not

reporting the $65 payments as income and the consequences of any

admission that they may make at trial as to that omission.

     Third, five of petitioner’s six witnesses were generally

longtime workers for petitioner who continued to work for

petitioner as of the time that they testified in this proceeding,

and the sixth, Parr, was petitioner’s founder and its key

supplier.   Petitioner’s six witnesses’ allegiance to petitioner

and to its interests in this proceeding cannot be denied.

Petitioner and petitioner’s six witnesses all have much to lose

from a decision here adverse to petitioner and have much to gain

from a decision here favorable to petitioner.

     Fourth, we conclude from the record at hand that some if not

all of petitioner’s four witnesses who received the $65 payments
                              - 15 -

would have declined to work in the gaming operation had they

received no compensation for their services.   We find in the

record that working in the gaming operation was demanding, that

the nonofficer/nonsecurity guard workers were pressured to work

in the bingo games on both Saturday and Sunday for a total of 14

hours (exclusive of the additional time that they were required

to spend accompanying Clausing and/or Carroll to the bank to

deposit the days’ receipts), that those workers were required to

give advance notice for any vacation time that they sought, and

that those workers were seldom given time off.   We also find in

the record that at least Helton, Phillips, and Cornett also

worked full-time for employers other than petitioner and that at

least Cornett traveled more than 20 miles to work in the gaming

operation.   Given that we are unable to find on the basis of

credible evidence in the record that any of petitioner’s workers

worked in the gaming operation out of motivation to further

petitioner’s educational purpose, or even out of motivation by

charitable impulses in general, we are hard pressed to, and do

not, conclude that any of petitioner’s four witnesses who

received the $65 payments would have steadily and consistently

worked for petitioner without being paid for his or her services.

     As to respondent’s three witnesses, we perceive the

testimony of those witnesses to be candid, sincere, and credible.

Petitioner attempts to discredit that testimony by arguing that
                               - 16 -

respondent’s three witnesses seek revenge against petitioner

because their services in the gaming operation were discontinued.

We find this attempt unavailing.   Given that none of respondent’s

three witnesses reported her receipt of the $65 cash payments as

income, we do not believe that they simply out of revenge

testified against their self-interests by admitting clearly and

under oath that they received the $65 payments and knowingly did

not report those payments as income.

     In addition to its witnesses, petitioner relies upon

approximately 29 affidavits contained in the administrative

record.   These affidavits, which were mostly signed in bulk in

June or September of 1997 and were submitted to respondent during

the audit, were from various workers of petitioner and stated

that the affiant was not paid for his or her services in the

gaming operation.    We are unpersuaded by these affidavits, and we

give them no weight.   The affiants included 12 workers of

petitioner who did not work for petitioner during the relevant

years and 4 of petitioner’s officers (including Clausing,

Carroll, and Whitaker).   Many of the affiants did not testify at

trial so as to be subject to our determination of their

credibility or to questioning as to the circumstances under which

they signed or otherwise acquiesced in the statements contained

in the affidavits.   As to the affidavits, most of them were

written pro forma on petitioner’s letterhead and were prepared by
                               - 17 -

petitioner’s legal counsel for purposes of respondent’s audit

(and presumably for purposes of any litigation that resulted

thereafter); in some cases, the affidavits were incomplete as to

the dates of the affiant’s service in the gaming operation.    The

affidavits for the most part were presented to the affiants for

their signature at a monthly board meeting of petitioner in the

presence of petitioner’s current trial counsel, who signed as

notary of many of the affidavits.

     Petitioner also challenges a characterization of the

security guards as workers in petitioner’s gaming operation for

purposes of the “substantially all” test of section 513(a)(1).

We conclude that the characterization is appropriate.     Petitioner

argues that the security guards did not work in the gaming

operation because they were independent contractors rather than

employees.   We disagree.   The fact that the security guards were

directly compensated by another entity through a contract with

petitioner is of no consequence to our determination under

section 513(a)(1).   A plain reading of that section requires that

we focus on the “work” performed in “carrying on such trade or

business”.   We read nothing in the statute that limits this work

to that performed by employees as opposed to independent

contractors.   See also Executive Network Club, Inc. v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-21 (finding that casino workers

paid in tips by players worked for compensation even though the
                               - 18 -

exempt organization did not pay the workers directly); cf. Piety,

Inc. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 193, 194 (1984) (finding that

workers who conducted bingo games in a building rented by the

organization were “compensated” when the organization’s rental

payments included payment for “all labor for the supervision and

handling of each bingo occasion upon the premises”).

     Petitioner also argues that the security guards were not

petitioner’s workers in that petitioner paid the security agency

to safeguard petitioner against an attempted theft or robbery and

the guards did not actually work in carrying on petitioner’s

gaming operation.    In this regard, petitioner asserts, the

security guards were not an attraction important to the success

of the gaming operation, the security guards provided little

labor in the absence of a theft or robbery, and the gaming

participants received no direct products or services from the

security guards.    In addition, petitioner asserts, the guards

never called bingo numbers, never sold bingo cards or instant

pull-tab tickets, and never assisted in the actual administration

of the gaming operation.

     We find petitioner’s argument unpersuasive.    If the security

guards had not been present at the bingo games, petitioner would

have been precluded from conducting these games by virtue of the

State law requirement that security guards be present at bingo

games.   Moreover, irrespective of that law, the security guards
                              - 19 -

were physically present at the bingo games and at the locations

of the instant pull-tab ticket sales, and they were an integral

part of those activities.   While petitioner asks this Court to

view the role of the security guards narrowly so as not to

consider them as working in the gaming operation absent their

acting in the setting of a robbery or an attempted robbery, we

decline to do so.   The role of the security guards as we see it

was to prevent a robbery from being attempted in the first place,

primarily by virtue of their physical presence at the sites of

the bingo games and the instant pull-tab ticket sales.    We

consider the security guards to be part of the workforce of the

gaming operation, cf. Waco Lodge No. 166, Benevolent & Protective

Order of Elks v. Commissioner, 696 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1983)

(concluding that a bartender’s services on bingo night were

connected with the carrying on of the bingo games although the

bar was down the hall from the games), affg. T.C. Memo. 1981-546,

and conclude that the security guards worked in the gaming

operation for purposes of the “substantially all” test.

     Accordingly, on the basis of our review of the record before

us, we find that many (if not all) of the workers in the gaming

operation were compensated for their work.   We do not find that

any of the workers in the gaming operation were uncompensated

within the meaning of section 513(a)(1).   The gaming operation

was petitioner’s principal activity and was conducted by
                              - 20 -

petitioner as a business for profit.   Petitioner does not argue,

nor do we find, that this activity was in furtherance of its

exempt purpose.7   We therefore conclude that respondent properly

revoked petitioner’s tax-exempt status effective January 1, 1992,

because petitioner was not operated exclusively for an exempt

purpose.   See Help the Children, Inc. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.

1128 (1957); cf. Piety, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra.    While

Congress allows certain organizations tax-exempt status for

specific limited activities, petitioner attempts to retain tax-

exempt status for activities that are outside of those permitted.

     We have considered all arguments made by petitioner for a

contrary holding, and we conclude that any of those arguments not

discussed herein is without merit.


                                     Decision will be entered for

                               respondent.




     7
       Nor does petitioner argue in its posttrial brief that any
part of its activities is a “bingo game” as defined in sec.
513(f)(2). In fact, as to petitioner’s sale of instant pull-tab
tickets, the source of most of petitioner’s gaming receipts in
each of the years 1992 through 1995, the parties have stipulated
that petitioner’s instant pull-tab ticket activity is not a
“bingo game” as defined in sec. 513(f)(2). See also Julius M.
Israel Lodge of B’nai B’rith No. 2113 v. Commissioner, 98 F.3d
190 (5th Cir. 1996) (affirming this Court’s determination that
instant bingo games are not “bingo games” within the meaning of
sec. 513(f)(2)), affg. T.C. Memo. 1995-439.
