                              UNPUBLISHED

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                       FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT


                              No. 99-6124



ROLAND DAVIS,

                                              Plaintiff - Appellant,

          versus


MS. DORSEY; MR. GREENE; MICHALE SHWARTZ; MR.
COSCUS; DARRYL WATKINS,

                                             Defendants - Appellees.



Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville.   Patrick Michael Duffy, District
Judge. (CA-98-114-23-6-AK)


Submitted:   April 15, 1999                 Decided:   April 20, 1999


Before NIEMEYER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS, Senior
Circuit Judge.


Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.


Roland Davis, Appellant Pro Se. William Walter Doar, Jr., David J.
Mills, MCNAIR LAW FIRM, P.A., Georgetown, South Carolina, for
Appellees.


Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).
PER CURIAM:

     Roland Davis filed an untimely notice of appeal.     We dismiss

for lack of jurisdiction.     The time periods for filing notices of

appeal are governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4. These periods are

"mandatory and jurisdictional."        Browder v. Director, Dep't of

Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v.

Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). Parties to civil actions have

thirty days within which to file in the district court notices of

appeal from judgments or final orders. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1).

The only exceptions to the appeal period are when the district

court extends the time to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or

reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).

     The district court entered its order on August 7, 1998;

Davis's notice of appeal was filed on January 11, 1999, which is

beyond the thirty-day appeal period.       Davis's failure to note a

timely appeal or obtain an extension of the appeal period leaves

this court without jurisdiction to consider the merits of his ap-

peal.   We therefore dismiss the appeal.       We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.



                                                           DISMISSED




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