
100 U.S. 37 (____)
MINING COMPANY
v.
TAYLOR.
Supreme Court of United States.

*39 Mr. Harry I. Thornton and Mr. H.L. Smoot for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. W.E.F. Deal, contra.
*40 MR. JUSTICE STRONG, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
Upon the facts found by the Circuit Court it is evident that Taylor, the plaintiff below, was entitled to recover, unless he was barred by the Statute of Limitations. Claiming, as both parties did, under Payne and Cook, the regularity and validity of the location of the mining claim are not in question. And when, in 1862, the plaintiff purchased from one of the owners of the claim an undivided interest therein, and went into possession with his grantor and with others deriving title from the original locators, expending large sums in prospecting and developing it (acts which the State statute declares shall constitute adverse possession), he became a tenant in common with those who were then the owners. He was such when the Union Gold and Silver Mining Company purchased the interest of other owners. By that purchase that company succeeded to a tenancy in common with him, and so did the defendant when it became the purchaser. Although after 1863 the plaintiff did no work personally upon the property, he did not thereby lose the possession he had after his purchase from Wood. The possession of his co-tenants was his possession. They held it for him until he was ousted. That this is a settled rule of law is not denied. And we find nothing in the statutes of Nevada to which we have been referred that is at variance with the rule, even when applicable to mining claims. That it does apply is expressly held in Van Valkenburg v. Huff, 1 Nev. 142. It follows that neither the defendant nor its grantor had any possession adverse to the plaintiff prior to the time when the ouster was made, and no ouster is found to have been made two years before the suit was brought. The finding that the defendant was in possession more than two years before suit was brought is not a finding of an adverse possession during all that period, such as to constitute a bar under the Statute of Limitations. Such a bar, therefore, does not exist, unless the ouster took place anterior to the commencement of those two years; and as that is a matter of defence, it should appear affirmatively, to be of any avail.
It is, however, useless to enlarge upon this, for the findings show clearly that the defendant has no protection under the *41 Statutes of Limitations. The plaintiff was in possession with others who derived their title from the original locators, until the Union Gold and Silver Mining Company, a California corporation, acquired their title, in September, 1863. After that time the statute could not run against him in favor of that corporation, or its grantee, the defendant, also a foreign corporation. The Statutes of Limitations of Nevada are held by the Supreme Court of that State to except foreign corporations from their protection. Robinson v. Imperial Silver Mining Co., 5 Nev. 44; Barstow v. Union Consolidated Silver Mining Co., 10 id. 386. Hence those statutes cannot be set up by the defendant as a defence in this case; and as the Circuit Court found as a fact that the plaintiff had been ousted by the defendant from his property, no reason appears why he was not entitled to recover according to the interest which he held prior to the ouster.
It is insisted, however, that, if entitled to recover at all, judgment should have been given for no more than two and a half undivided feet of the mining claim. This position cannot be maintained. It is true the original locators claimed six hundred feet extending along the Comstock vein, but of more than three hundred feet they never had an undisputed title, and that three hundred feet lies next to the claim of the Ophir Company on the south. Indeed, the finding is express, that the Union claim begins at a point fifteen hundred feet north of the claim of the Ophir Company, and extends northward on the Comstock lode three hundred feet, including the ground in dispute. Of that claim Solomon Wood, the plaintiff's grantor, was the owner of at least fifty feet undivided; and he sold and conveyed to the plaintiff five undivided feet interest therein, describing the claim as consisting of three hundred feet, bounded on the south by the claim of the Ophir Company. There can be no doubt, therefore, what was intended to be conveyed. Plainly, it was five undivided feet of that three hundred, and, therefore, whether the whole claim in fact consisted of three hundred or six hundred feet can make no difference. Owning, as Wood did, fifty feet undivided, it was in his power to convey, as he did, an undivided interest of five feet in the southern three hundred.
*42 It is objected by the plaintiff in error that the special finding of the court was not sufficiently full and formal to justify any judgment; that it did not find the essential facts, but left presumptions of fact to be drawn; that it did not find how Solomon Wood became the owner, or set out in words the conveyances under which the parties claimed. Whether a special finding of facts by the court must have all the requisites of a special verdict, it is not necessary now to assert or deny, for all that is essential to such a verdict is an ascertainment of the ultimate facts. A jury is not to find evidence. We think the ultimate facts were sufficiently found in this case. The ownership of Wood in 1862 was an ultimate fact, and even if Taylor had no other right to the possession than that which he derived from Wood by conveyance, it was not necessary to set forth the chain of conveyances by which Wood became the owner. A transfer of possession is sufficient. They would have been but evidence of Wood's ownership. Besides, a written conveyance is not necessary to the transfer of a mining claim. Table Mountain Tunnel Co. v. Stranahan, 20 Cal. 198. But Wood was in possession when he sold to Taylor, and Taylor then went into joint possession within. That possession is enough to justify a recovery by him against a disseisor.
The only other assignment of error is the first, and it needs no consideration. Apart from the fact that the defendant claims under Payne and Cook, and is therefore not at liberty to dispute their title, it is impossible to discover how it could have been injured by the reception of Exhibits A and C. The instrument C was certainly sufficient to transfer an interest in the mining claim, and the mining rules, at worst, were only immaterial. The admission of immaterial or irrelevant evidence is no sufficient reason for reversing a judgment, when it is apparent, as in this case, that it cannot have affected the verdict or the finding injuriously to the plaintiff in error.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD did not sit in this case
