

 


 


NUMBER 13-10-00043-CR

 
COURT OF APPEALS

 
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS


CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG



DONALD RAY JONES,	 Appellant,

v.


THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                               Appellee.


On appeal from the 156th District Court

 of Live Oak County, Texas.



MEMORANDUM OPINION


Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Vela

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides


	Donald Ray Jones pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance.  See Tex. 
Health & Safety  Code Ann. § 481.115 (Vernon 2010).  He was sentenced to two years'
imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice--Institutional Division, which
the trial court suspended and placed him three years of community supervision. 
	Jones's appellate counsel, concluding that "there are no arguable grounds to be
advanced on appeal," filed an Ander's brief in which he reviewed the merits, or lack
thereof, of the appeal.   Jones filed a pro se response.  We affirm.
I.  Discussion

	Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), appellant's
court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief with this Court, stating that his review
of the record yielded no grounds or error upon which an appeal can be predicated. 
Although counsel's brief does not advance any arguable grounds of error, it does present
a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds
to be advanced on appeal.  See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008) ("In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance 'arguable' points of
error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and
procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.") (citing Hawkins v. State, 112
S.W.3d 340, 343-44 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813
S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).  
	In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]
1978), appellant's counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there
are no errors in the trial court's judgment.  Counsel has informed this Court that he has: 
(1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal; (2) served
a copy of the brief and counsel's motion to withdraw on appellant; and (3) informed
appellant of his right to review the record and to file a pro se response within thirty days. (1)
See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman,
252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. 
II. Independent Review

	Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the
proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous.  Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 80 (1988).  We have reviewed the entire record, counsel's brief, and appellant's pro se
response and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal.  See Bledsoe
v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ("Due to the nature of Anders
briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and
reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the
requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1."); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. 
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
III. Motion to Withdraw

	In accordance with Anders, appellant's attorney has asked this Court for permission
to withdraw as counsel for appellant.  See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779-80 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1995, no pet.) (noting that "[i]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he
must withdraw from representing the appellant.  To withdraw from representation, the
appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the
appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.") (citations omitted)).  We grant counsel's
motion to withdraw.  Within five days of the date of this Court's opinion, counsel is ordered
to send a copy of the opinion and judgment to appellant and to advise appellant of his right
to file a petition for discretionary review. (2) See Tex. R. App. P. 48.4; see also In re
Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006). 

								__________________________
								GINA M. BENAVIDES,
								Justice


Do not publish.
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the
8th day of July, 2010.








1.  The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that "the pro se response need not comply with the
rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered.  Rather, the response should identify for the court
those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case
presents any meritorious issues."  In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting
Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696-97 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no pet.)).
2.  No substitute counsel will be appointed.  Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case
by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary
review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review.  Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within
thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing that was overruled by this
Court.  See Tex. R. App. P. 68.2.  Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with this Court, after which
it will be forwarded to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.  See Tex. R. App. P. 68.3; 68.7.  Any petition for
discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure.  See Tex. R. App. P. 68.4.

