                        T.C. Memo. 2004-97



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                SCOTT WILLIAM KATZ, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 18019-02.            Filed April 7, 2004.


     Scott William Katz, pro se.

     Laura A. McKenna, for respondent.



                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

     CHABOT, Judge:   The instant case is before us on the

parties’ cross-motions under Rule 1211 for summary judgment.

     Respondent determined a deficiency in individual income tax

against petitioner for 2000 in the amount of $4,214.   The entire




     1
        Unless indicated otherwise, all Rule references are to
the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
                                - 2 -

amount of this deficiency is alternative minimum tax, under

section 55.2

     The issue for decision in both parties’ motions is whether

the alternative minimum tax applies to petitioner.3

     Our statements as to the facts are based entirely on those

matters that are admitted in the pleadings, those matters that

are admitted in the motion papers, those matters set forth in

affidavits or declarations submitted by the parties, and those

matters stated and not rebutted in the Court’s hearing on the

motions.

                             Background

     When the petition was filed in the instant case, petitioner

resided in West Palm Beach, Florida.

     On petitioner’s 2000 tax return, he claimed the status of

married filing separately.   On this tax return, petitioner showed

adjusted gross income of $46,834.16, itemized deductions of

$54,275.81, and personal exemptions of $2,800.   Petitioner

computed his taxable income as zero, and his tax liability as

zero.    He showed $133.66 as withheld income tax, all of which he




     2
        Unless indicated otherwise, all section references are to
sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as in effect for
the year in issue.
     3
        At the hearing, petitioner stated that he does not
contest the correctness of respondent’s “numbers”.
                                 - 3 -

wished refunded.     On December 9, 2002, respondent issued the full

refund to petitioner.

      In the notice of deficiency, respondent’s only adjustment to

income was the allowance of $225 of previously unclaimed Other

Interest Expense.4    Respondent agrees that petitioner’s “regular

tax” (see sec. 55(c)) is zero.

                              Discussion

1.   Parties’ Contentions

      Petitioner contends that the purpose of the alternative

minimum tax provisions is to prevent high-income taxpayers from

escaping all income tax liability by using exclusions,

deductions, and credits.    He maintains that “Obviously, the

Petitioner did not have a significant level of economic income

and all of his deductions and exemptions were deemed legitimate

by the Respondent.”    Petitioner concludes that the “Congress did

not intend the AMT to apply at [sic] low or middle-income

taxpayers like the Petitioner.”

      Respondent contends that the statute subjects petitioner to

the alternative minimum tax and that the legislative history does

not leave room for any interpretation of the statute that would


      4
        Because respondent rounded many items, this resulted in
reducing petitioner’s alternative minimum taxable income by
$223.35. Cf. Christman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-259,
(additional itemized deduction increased the taxpayer’s
alternative minimum taxable income under the statute as in effect
for 1980).
                                  - 4 -

result in petitioner’s not being subject to the alternative

minimum tax.

      We agree with respondent.

2.   Summary Judgment

      Summary judgment is a device used to expedite litigation; it

is intended to avoid unnecessary and expensive trials.   However,

it is not a substitute for trial; it should not be used to

resolve genuine disputes over material factual issues.     Cox v.

American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 249 F.2d 616, 618 (9th Cir.

l957); Vallone v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 794, 801 (1987).     A

decision will be rendered on a motion for summary judgment if the

pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, admissions,

and other acceptable materials, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is not any genuine issue as to any material

fact and that a decision may be rendered as a matter of law.

Rule 121(b).

      Because the effect of granting a motion for summary judgment

is to decide the case against a party without allowing that party

an opportunity for a trial, the motion should be “cautiously

invoked” and granted only after a careful consideration of the

case.   Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 6 (1945);

Cox v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 249 F.2d at 618; Kroh v.

Commissioner, 98 T.C. 383, 390 (1992).
                                  - 5 -

      As we understand the parties’ contentions, it is not

necessary for us to know more of the facts in order to determine

whether or not petitioner is subject to the alternative minimum

tax for 2000.   In light of the foregoing and petitioner’s

assertion that he does not dispute the correctness of

respondent’s calculations, we conclude that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact, within the meaning of Rule 121(b).

      Accordingly, we proceed to consider whether a decision may

be rendered as a matter of law.

3.   Alternative Minimum Tax

      Section 55 imposes a tax--the alternative minimum tax--equal

to the excess (if any) of the tentative minimum tax over the

regular tax.5   Sec. 55(a).    Petitioner’s regular tax is zero, and

so his alternative minimum tax is his full tentative minimum tax.

Using Form 6251 (Alternative Minimum Tax--Individuals),

respondent added back petitioner’s appropriate itemized

deductions to the amount by which petitioner’s total itemized

deductions exceeded his adjusted gross income.     This operation

resulted in petitioner’s alternative minimum taxable income (sec.

55(b)(2)) being $38,707.      From this amount, respondent subtracted

petitioner’s exemption amount.     For 2000, in the case of a

married person filing separately, this was $22,500.     Sec.

      5
        For a brief history of the original “minimum tax” and its
eventual replacement by the “alternative minimum tax”, see
Huntsberry v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 742, 748-752 (1984).
                               - 6 -

55(d)(1)(C).   This operation resulted in petitioner’s “taxable

excess” being $16,207.   Sec. 55(b)(1)(A)(ii).   To this amount

respondent applied a 26-percent tax rate.   Sec.

55(b)(1)(A)(i)(I).   This operation resulted in petitioner’s

tentative minimum tax being $4,214, which, as we noted supra,

becomes petitioner’s alternative minimum tax.

     In its unanimous opinion in Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S.

55, 60 (1930), the Supreme Court gave us the following advice as

to tax statutes:

          Courts have sometimes exercised a high degree of
     ingenuity in the effort to find justification for wrenching
     from the words of a statute a meaning which literally they
     did not bear in order to escape consequences thought to be
     absurd or to entail great hardship. But an application of
     the principle so nearly approaches the boundary between the
     exercise of the judicial power and that of the legislative
     power as to call rather for great caution and circumspection
     in order to avoid usurpation of the latter. Monson v.
     Chester, 22 Pick. 385, 387. It is not enough merely that
     hard and objectionable or absurd consequences, which
     probably were not within the contemplation of the framers,
     are produced by an act of legislation. Laws enacted with
     good intention, when put to the test, frequently, and to the
     surprise of the law maker himself, turn out to be
     mischievous, absurd, or otherwise objectionable. But in
     such case the remedy lies with the law making authority, and
     not with the courts. See In re Alma Spinning Company, L.R.
     16 Ch. Div. 681, 686; King v. Commissioner, 5 A. & E. 804,
     816; Abley v. Dale, L.J. (1851) N.S. Pt. 2, Vol. 20, 233,
     235. And see generally Chung Fook v. White, 264 U.S. 443,
     445; Commr. of Immigration v. Gottlieb, 265 U.S. 310, 313.

     More recently, the Supreme Court’s almost-unanimous opinion

in Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984), told us

the following about tax statutes:
                               - 7 -


          The cases before us, however, concern the construction
     of existing statutes. The relevant question is not whether,
     as an abstract matter, the rule advocated by petitioners
     accords with good policy. The question we must consider is
     whether the policy petitioners favor is that which Congress
     effectuated by its enactment of §6501. Courts are not
     authorized to rewrite a statute because they might deem its
     effects susceptible of improvement. See TVA v. Hill, 437
     U.S. 153, 194-195 (1978). * * *

See Rath v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 196, 200 (1993).

     We have noted some circumstances in which the alternative

minimum tax could produce results that may be perceived as

unfair.   See, e.g., Kenseth v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 399, 407-

408 (2000), affd. 259 F.3d 881 (7th Cir. 2001); Klaassen v.

Commissioner, 83 AFTR 2d 99-1750, 99-1 USTC par. 50,418 (10th

Cir. 1999), affg. T.C. Memo. 1998-241.

     The Congress did give some consideration to the treatment of

lower-income people.   The relevant relief that the Congress chose

is embodied in section 55(d), which provides an exemption amount

of $22,500 for petitioner for 2000.6   We are not free to alter

this amount, or otherwise engage in “wrenching from the words of

* * * [the] statute a meaning which literally they did not bear”

(Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. at 60) in order to achieve the

result petitioner seeks.

     6
        For 2003 and 2004, the exemption amount for a married
person filing separately is $29,000. Sec. 55(d)(1)(C). We do
not have authority to give even this limited relief any
retroactive effect beyond what the Congress provided. See, e.g.,
Sallies v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 44, 53 n.12 (1984) (and cases
there cited).
                         - 8 -

Petitioner must look to the Congress for relief.



                                      An appropriate order will

                                 be issued denying petitioner’s

                                 motion for summary judgment

                                 and granting respondent’s

                                 motion for summary judgment.

                                 Decision will be entered for

                                 respondent.
