                                                                             ACCEPTED
                                                                         01-15-00617-CV
                                                              FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                      HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                                                   11/12/2015 4:04:08 PM
                                                                   CHRISTOPHER PRINE
                                                                                  CLERK

               No. 01-15-00617-CV
                        ***
         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS                        FILED IN
     FIRST COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT             1st COURT OF APPEALS
                                                     HOUSTON, TEXAS
             HOUSTON, TEXAS                      11/12/2015 4:04:08 PM
                        ***                      CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
                  BOB DEUELL,                             Clerk
                    Appellant,

                         v.

  TEXAS RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC.,
                    Appellee
  On Appeal from the 152"'1 Judicial District Court
             Of Harris County, Texas
       Trial Court Cause No. 2014-32179
   Honorable Robert Schaffer, Presiding Judge

         APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF


DENTON NAVARRO ROCHA BERNAL HYDE & ZECH, P.C.
2500 W. William Cannon Drive, Suite 609
Austin, Texas 78745-5292
(512) 279-6431
(512) 279-6438 (Facsimile)
George E. Hyde
State Bar No. 45006157
Scott M. Tschirhart
State Bar No. 24013655
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

      ORAL ARGUMENTS REQUESTED
                IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL

Appellant:             BOB DEUELL

Appellant's Counsel:   George E. Hyde
                       State Bar No. 45006157
                       Scott M. Tschirhart
                       State Bar No. 24013655
                       Denton Navarro Rocha Bernal Hyde & Zech, P.C.
                       2500 W. William Cannon Drive, Suite 609
                       Austin, Texas 78745-5292
                       {512) 279-6431
                       {512) 279-6438 {Facsimile)
                       George E. Hyde
                       Scott M. Tschirhart
                       george.hvde(it rnmpage-aus.com
                       scott.tschirhartca:rampa!!e-aus.com

Appellee:              TEXAS RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, INC.

Appellee Counsel:      N. Terry Adams, Jr.
                       State Bar No. 00874010
                       Joseph M. Nixon
                       State Bar No. 15244800
                       Nicholas D. Stepp
                       State Bar No. 24077701
                       Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, L.L.P.
                       1300 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 2500
                       Houston, Texas 77056
                       {713) 623-0887
                       {713) 960-1527 {Facsimile
                       tadams(a 1bmpl Ip.com
                       jnixon(a bmpllp.com




                                      ii
James E. "Trey" Trainor, III
State Bar No. 24042052
Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, L.L.P.
401 W. l S'h Street, Suite 845
Austin, Texas 78701
(512) 623"6700
(512) 623"6701 (Facsimile)
ttrainor(a.bmpl Ip .com
                                          TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL. ........................................................... ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... v

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT........................................................................ I

   l. Appellee's argument that Appellee's lawsuit was not based on Senator
   Deuell' s exercise of free speech under the TCPA is misplaced............................ 2

  2. Appellee's argument regarding its establishment of a prima facie case of
  tortious interference fails because Appellee failed to provide the trial court with
  clear and specific evidence of each element. ......................................................... 6

  3. Appellee waived all objections and arguments to Appellant's affirmative
  defenses of judicial privilege and illegal contract.. ................................................ 9

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................... 11

PRAYER ................................................................................................................. 11

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ...................................................................... 12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 13




                                                            iv
                                       TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

ACS Investors, Inc. v. Mclaughlin, 943 S.W.2d 426 (Tex. 1997) ....................... 7, 8

Alpert v. Crain, Caaton and James, P.C., 178 S.W.3d 398 (Tex. App.--
  Houston [I st Dist.] 2005) ........................................................................................ 4

Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994,
 writ denied) ............................................................................................................ 4

Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Reyna, 865 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.1993) .............................. 7

Hill v. Heritage Res., Inc., 964 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App.- EI Paso 1997) .................. 8

Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1995) .................................................. 7

James v. Calkins, 446 S.W.3d 135, (Tex. App.- Houston [l st Dist]
  2014), reh'g overruled (Nov. 4, 2014) ........................................................... 6, 7, 9

James v. Easton, 368 S.W.3d 799 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
  2012, pet. denied) ................................................................................................... 4

In Re Lipsky/, 411S.W.3d530 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth, 2013) .............................. 5

In Re Lipsky JI, 460 S.W.3d 579 (Tex. 2015) ........................................................... 5

Rehak Creative Sen1s., Inc. v. Witt, 404 S.W.3d 716 (Tex. App.--Houston
 [141h Dist.] 2013) .................................................................................................... 7

Rio Grande H20 Guardian v. Robert Muller Family P's/zip ltd.,
  No. 04-13- 00441- CV, 2014 WL 309776, (Tex. App.- San
  Antonio Jan. 29, 2014, no pet.) (mem.op.) ............................................................ 5

Sacks v. Zimmerman, 401 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.]
  2013, pet. denied) ................................................................................................... 4

Serafine v. Blunt, 466 S. W.3d 352 (Tex. App.- Austin, 2015) ........................... 6, 9

Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 179 L. Ed. 2d 172 (2011) ........... 3

                                                             v
TGS- NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, (Tex. 2011) ................ 7

Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 811 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1991 ).......................... 7

Statutes

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(1) ............................................................ 2, 3

Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(3) ............................................................. 1, 2

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(4)(A)(i) .................................................. 6, 9

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(7) ................................................................ 4

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem, Code§ 27.001(7)(A) .......................................................... 3

Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(7)(8) ........................................................... 3

Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(7)(C) ........................................................... 3

Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(7)(D) ........................................................... 3

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.003(a) ................................................................ 5

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §27.00S(d) ........................................................... 2, 10

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.005(1) .............................................................. vii

Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.009(1) ............................................................... 11

Tex Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.009(2) ............................................................... 11

The Te xa s C 1.t.1zen ' s Pa rt'1c1p
                                   · at·on
                                       1 Act ............................................................. passim
                                                                                                               ·

Other Authorities

Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 229 (I Ith ed. 2003) ................................ 7

Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary at l I 98 (I l 'h ed. 2003) ........................... 7


                                                       vi
Senate Bill 303 .......................................................................................................... 3




                                                            vii
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT:
      NOW COMES APPELLANT, Bob Deuell (hereinafter "Appellant" and/or

"Deuell") and files this Appellant's Reply Brief in accordance with the Texas Rules

of Appellate Procedure ("TRAP").

                       SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

1.    The Texas Citizen's Participation Act (TCPA) clearly defines "the exercise of

the right of free speech" as "a communication made in connection with a matter of

public concern." Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(3). Senator Deuell, a sitting

State Senator, had his attorneys send letters to radio broadcasters complaining about

false, defamatory, and illegal campaign ads. These letters dealt with a matter of

public concern, specifically public statements in ads run on public airwaves during

a runoff election. These letters also threatened the exercise of the right to petition

(file a lawsuit) if the ads continued in the same form. These rights to free speech

and to petition are exactly what the TCP A was designed to protect. The trial court

should have dismissed Appellee's lawsuit because Appellant proved by a

preponderance of the evidence that Appellee's lawsuit was based on Appellant's

exercise of his right of free speech. See Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §

27.005(1 ).

2.    When Appellant met his burden under the TCPA, the burden shifted to

Appellee to establish, by clear and specific evidence, a prima facie case for each


                                          1
element of its tortious interference claim. Appellee failed to meet this burden by

failing to provide clear and specific evidence of each element of its claim.

3.      Appellant established by a preponderance of the evidence each essential

element of the valid defenses of judicial immunity and illegality. Appellee failed to

challenge the allegations in the pleadings, the affidavit and other evidence so that

the evidence was uncontested. Appellee failed to object to any pleading issues at

the trial court and thereby waived any complaint on appeal. The case should have

been dismissed by the trial court pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §

27.005(d).

                      ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

     1. Appellee's argument that Appellee's lawsuit was not based on Senator
        Deuell's exercise of free speech under the TCPA is misplaced.


     The TCPA clearly defines the "exercise of free speech" and "communication" as

anticipated by the Texas Legislature.

        '"Exercise of the right of free speech" means a communication made in
        connection with a matter of public concern.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(3)

        "Communication" includes the making or submitting of a statement or
        document in any form or medium, including oral, visual, written,
        audiovisual, or electronic.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code§ 27.001(1)



                                          2
       Appellee argues that the speech in question was not a matter of public concern.
However, Appellee admits that the political ads in question were made in connection
with a runoff election. See Appellee 's Briefpgs. 1-2. The subject matter of political
ads is beyond question a matter for public concern, or there would be no point in
running them on the radio.

       Speech deals with matters of public concern when it can "be fairly
       considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern
       to the community," or when it "is a subject of legitimate news interest;
       that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the
       public,".

Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216, 179 L. Ed. 2d 172

(2011 )(internal quotes omitted). The radio ads in question are about a political

campaign and are without question a matter of public concern.

       Moreover, as Appellee properly points out, these ads dealt with a bill that

Senator Deuell sponsored and the subject matter of S.B. 303 deals with advance

directives and healthcare and treatment decisions. The subject matter of S.B. 303

clearly fits within the definitions set forth in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem, Code

27.001(7)(A)(health or safety); (B)(community well-being); (C)(the government

and its role in the regulation of advance directives and healthcare and treatment

decisions); and (E)(a service in the marketplace, namely medical care).         The ads

attacked Senator Deuell and his sponsorship of S.B. 303 which falls under the

definitions of 27.001 (7)(C)(the government) and (D)(a public official or public

figure).   So a plain reading of the definitions in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem, Code




                                           3
27.001(7) shows that the letters dealt specifically with a matter of public concern

and therefore fall properly within the TCPA.

      Appellee argues that because the letters were written by Senator Deuell's

attorneys, they cannot be considered as Senator Deuell's speech. See Appellee 's

Briefpgs. 8-9. However, Appellee cannot have it both ways. If the statements in the

letters cannot be attributed to Senator Deuell then Appellee cannot complain that

Senator Deuell infringed on Appellee' s contract rights.   Of course, Appellee could

not maintain a lawsuit against Senator Deuell's attorney. "Texas courts have long

held that attorneys cannot be held civilly liable for damages to nonclients, under any

theory of recovery, for actions taken in connection with representing a client." Sacks

v. Zimmerman, 401 S.W.3d 336, 340 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet.

denied) (citing James v. Easton, 368 S.W.3d 799, 802 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th

Dist.] 2012, pet. denied)); Alpert, 178 S. W.3d at 405; Bradt v. West, 892 S. W.2d 56,

71- 72 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1994, writ denied). So Appellee attempts to

attribute the statements in the letters as being Senator Deuell's statements for the

purpose of a tortious interference claim.

      Appellee sued Senator Deuell for tortious interference with existing contracts.

(C.R. 84-85). The tortious act that was attributed to Senator Deuell by Appellee,

was the sending of the letters. (C.R. 83). Those letters were "communication(s)

made in connection with a matter of public concern" and properly fall within the


                                            4
legislatures definitions in the TCPA and the trial court should have dismissed the

lawsuit.

      Now, Appellee argues that threats and intimidation are not protected speech.

Appellee's Brief pg. 10. However, the threat to file a lawsuit is a threat to exercise

Senator Deuell's right to petition and is protected under the TCPA. So, if Appellee

had argued this in the trial court, the Court could have dismissed Appellee's lawsuit

on the grounds that these alleged "threats and intimidation" were protected under the

TCPA:

      Under Section 27.006 of the Act, the trial court may consider pleadings
      as evidence. Id. § 27.006(a). The Act does not require Serafine to
      present testimony or other evidence to satisfy her evidentiary burden.
      See Rio Grande H20 Guardian v. Robert Muller Family P'ship Ltd.,
      No. 04-13-00441 - CV, 2014 WL 309776, at *3 (Tex. App. -San
      Antonio Jan. 29, 2014, no pet.) (mem.op.) (deciding challenged legal
      action related to exercise of right to petition based on consideration of
      pleadings as evidence), disapproved on other grounds by Lipsky JI, 460
      S.W.3d at 587. The Blunts asserted in their tortious-interference
      counterclaim that "Serafine willfully and intentionally interfered with
      that contract [with the drainage and foundation company] through
      threats and the filing ofthis lawsuit." (Emphasis added.) They asserted
      in their fraudulent-lien counterclaim that Serafine knew that the lis
      pendens she had filed "in relation to this case" was not supported by
      any valid interest in the Blunts' property. All that the Act requires is that
      the challenged legal action be "based on, relate[ ] to, or is in response
      to" the movant's exercise of the right to petition. Tex. Civ. Prac. &
      Rem.Code§ 27.003(a). We conclude, based on the facts alleged in the
      Blunts' pleadings and in response to Serafine's motion, that the Blunts'
      tortious-interference counterclaim is in part based on, related to, or in
      response to Serafine's filing of the suit and that their fraudulent-lien
      counterclaim is based on, related to, or in response to Serafine's filing
      of the lis pendens, both of which filings are exercises of Serafine's
      "right to petition" as the Act defines that term. See LipsA-y I, 411 S.W.3d

                                           5
       at 541-42 (determining that nonmovant's claims were based on
       movants' exercise of their right to petition based on facts alleged in
       nonmovant's pleadings); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code §
       27.001 (4)(A)(i) (" 'Exercise of the right to petition' means ... a
       communication in or pertaining to: ... a judicial proceeding."); James v.
       Calkins, 446 S.W.3d 135, 147-48 (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.]
       2014, pet. filed) (concluding that fraudulent-lien claim based on filing
       of lis pendens was "communication in or pertaining to a judicial
       proceeding").

Serafine v. Blunt, 466 S.W.3d 352, 360 (Tex. App.- Austin, 2015)(emphasis added

to show that the case dealt with a claim of tortious interference). Since this Court

reviews the denial of a motion to dismiss under the TCPA de novo, and the Court

may consider pleadings as evidence, the Court should dismiss Appellee's lawsuit

because the conduct complained ofis related to Senator Deuell' s exercise of the right

to petition.

       Appellee argues that dismissing Appellee's lawsuit would undermine the

TCPA's purpose. However, in light of the Serafine v. Blunt decision, it is clear that

the threat to file a lawsuit is specifically protected by the TCPA. See id. Therefore,

Appellee's arguments about the relative merits of the threatened lawsuit should be

disregarded.

2. Appellee's argument regarding its establishment of a prima facie case of
   tortious interference fails because Appellee failed to provide the trial court
   with clear and specific evidence of each element.

       The elements of a cause of action for tortious interference with a
       contract are: ( 1) the existence of a contract subject to interference, (2)
       the occurrence of an act of interference that was willful and intentional,
       (3) the act was a proximate cause of the plaintifrs damage, and (4)

                                           6
      actual damage or loss occurred. Browning- Ferris Indus. v. Reyna, 865
      S.W.2d 925, 926 (Tex.1993); Victoria Bank & Trust Co. v. Brady, 811
      S. W.2d 931, 939 (Tex.1991 ).

Holloway v. Skinner, 898 S.W.2d 793, 795-96 (Tex. 1995).

      "As the statute does not define 'clear and specific' evidence, these
      tenns are given their ordinary meaning." Id. (citing TGS- NOPEC
      Geophysical Co. v. Combs, 340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex.2011)). '"Clear'
      means 'free from obscurity or ambiguity,' 'easily understood,' 'free
      from doubt,' or 'sure.' "Id. (quoting Merriam Webster's Collegiate
      Dictionary 229 (11th ed. 2003)). " 'Specific' means 'constituting or
      falling into a specifiable category,' 'free from ambiguity,' or 'accurate.'
      " Id. (quoting Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary at 1198).
      "Clear and specific evidence has also been described as evidence that
      is 'unaided by presumptions, inferences, or intendments.' "Id. (quoting
      Rehak Creative Sen1s., 404 S.W.3d at 726)).

James v. Calkins, 446 S.W.3d 135, 147 (Tex. App.- Houston [Pt Dist] 2014),

reh 'g overruled (Nov. 4, 2014).

      Appellee argues that it established the existence of two contracts by a

conclusory affidavit that simply states a dollar amount. Appellee's Brief at 22.

However, a statement that there was a contract in a certain dollar amount does not

provide the "clear and specific" evidence of the first element of a tortious

interference claim, specifically "that a contract subject to interference exists." ACS

Investors, Inc. v. Mclaughlin, 943 S. W.2d 426, 430 (Tex. 1997). Without the

specific language of the contracts in question, the Court cannot detennine the proper

parties to the contract, the specific tenns of the contract, whether the contract was

supported by adequate consideration, or whether the contract was capable of being


                                          7
interfered with. "The cause of action for tortious interference with a contract is

qualified with the requirement that the contract be 'subject to interference.' All

contracts are not subject to interference. There must at least be a 'valid' contract.

Unsupported by any valuable consideration ... these contracts were void and not

simply unenforceable." Hill v. Heritage Res., Inc., 964 S.W.2d 89, 115 (Tex. App. -

El Paso 1997); see also ACS Investors, Inc. v. Mclaughlin, 943 S.W.2d 426,

431 (Tex. 1997)( finding that the express terms of the contract in question showed

that it was not subject to tortious interference allegations, and therefore the defendant

could not have interfered as a matter of law.). Appellee failed to establish the first

element of its tortious interference claim by clear and specific evidence.

      Appellee failed to establish, by clear and specific evidence, the second

element of its tortious interference claim, specifically, the occurrence of an act of

interference that was willful and intentional. Appellee again cannot have it both

ways, Appellee says that the letters in question are not the letters of Senator Deuell,

but the letters of his lawyers. See Appellee 's Briefpgs. 8-9. If the letters in question

are not attributable to Senator Deuell, Appellee cannot establish that Senator Deuell

willfully and intentionally interfered with Appellee's contracts.

      Appellee failed to establish, by clear and specific evidence, the third element

of its tortious interference claim, specifically, the alleged the act was a proximate




                                           8
cause of the plaintifrs damage. Appellee has not brought forth any evidence to

support the element of proximate cause.

       Finally, Appellee failed to establish, by clear and specific evidence, the fourth

element of its tortious interference claim, specifically, actual damage or loss

occurred. Frankly, it would be almost impossible to show that Appellee suffered

any damages at all since there is no way to establish how many votes were gained

or lost by the failure of any of the ads to air.

       More importantly, Appellee cannot establish tortious interference by Senator

Deuell's attorney threatening to file a lawsuit.        The TCPA provides that "a

communication in or pertaining to a judicial proceeding" constitutes the exercise of

the right to petition. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.§ 27.001(4)(A)(i); James

v. Calkins, 446 S.W.3d 135, 147 (Tex. App.- Houston [1 5' Dist.] 2014), rehg

overruled (Nov. 4, 2014 ). Threats related to potential litigation cannot fonn the basis

of a claim for tortious interference. See Serafine v. Blunt, 466 S.W.3d 352, 360 (Tex.

App.- Austin, 2015).

   3. Appellee waived all objections and arguments to Appellant's affirmative
      defenses of judicial privilege and illegal contract.

       Appellee waived all arguments regarding Appellant's affirmative defenses

because Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Chapter 27 Motion to Dismiss (C.R.

90-98) failed to address the affirmative defenses in any way. Senator Deuell's

Motion to Dismiss specifically set forth the affinnative defense of judicial privilege
                                             9
stating that the statements in the letters were made in anticipation of litigation and

were therefore privileged under Texas law. (C.R. 16-20). The claim of judicial

privilege was supported by exhibits (C.R. 24-64) and affidavit (C.R. 65-66).

Appellee failed to challenge the pleadings or offer any controverting documents or

evidence to refute Senator Deuell's affirmative defense at the trial court.

      Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code §27.005(d) states:

      Notwithstanding of the provisions of Subsection ( c ), the court shall
      dismiss a legal action against the moving party if he moving party
      establishes by a preponderance of the evidence each essential element
      of a valid defense to the nonmovant's claim.

However, nothing in the TCPA requires that the defendant specifically plead these

defenses prior to asserting them in a motion to dismiss. By failing to object at the

trial court, Appellee waived any complaint about the status of the pleadings. Not

only did Senator Deuell establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the defense

of judicial privilege, Senator Deuell provided all of the evidence on this point. The

trial court should have dismissed the lawsuit against Senator Deuell.

      Likewise, Appellee made no challenges to the pleadings and offered no

controverting affidavits in response to the defense of illegal contract, Appellant has

established, by a preponderance of the evidence, each essential element of a valid

defense of illegal contract to Appellee's tortious interference claim. Tex. Civ. Prac.

& Rem. Code §27.00S(d). The trial court should have dismissed the lawsuit against

Senator Deuell.

                                          10
                                  CONCLUSION

      The trial court should have dismissed Appellee's lawsuit pursuant to the Texas

Citizen's Participation Act and should have awarded costs and attorneys' fees to

Appellant.

                                      PRAYER

      WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, Appellant Bob Deuell prays the

Court dismiss Appellee's lawsuit pursuant to Appellant's Motion to Dismiss

pursuant to Chapter 27 of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, and award

Appellant his appellate costs and remand the case to the trial court for a

determination of court costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and other expenses incurred

in defending this legal action pursuant to Section 27.009( I) of the Texas Civil

Practice & Remedies Code as well as sanctions against Appellee that the trial court

may determine would be sufficient to deter Appellee from bringing similar actions

in the future pursuant to Section 27 .009(2) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies

Code and for such further relief to which Appellant is justly entitled.




                                          11
      SIGNED on this the 12111 day of November, 2015.

             Respectfully submitted

             DENTON NAVARRO ROCHA BERNAL HYDE & ZECH, P.C.
             2500 W. William Cannon Drive, Suite 609
             Austin, Texas 78745-5292
             (512) 279-6431
             (512) 279-6438 (Facsimile)
             georne.hyde(a),rampage-aus.com
             scolt.tschirhait(airampage-aus.com


                                      =·
      By:
             George E. Hyde
             State Bar No. 45006157
             Scott M. Tschirhart
             State Bar No. 24013655

             ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
             BOB DEUELL


                       CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

       In compliance with Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(3), this is to certify that the
Appellant's Reply Brief contains 2,735 words, which does not include the caption,
identity of parties and counsel, statement regarding oral arguments, table of contents,
table of authorities, signature, proof of service, certificate of compliance and
appendix.




             George E. Hyde
             Scott M. Tschirhart
                           CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

      This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has
been served upon the below named individuals as indicated, and according to the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and/or via electronic notification on this the 11 'h day
of November, 2015:

N. Terry Adams, Jr.                            via electronic notification
Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, L.L.P.              tadams<a' bmpl Ip.com
1300 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 2500
Houston, Texas 77056

Joseph M. Nixon                                via electronic notification
Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, L.L.P.              jnixon(iz'bmpllp.com
1300 Post Oak Blvd., Suite 2500
Houston, Texas 77056

James E. "Trey" Trainor, III                   via electronic notification
Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, L.L.P.              ttrainor(a,bmpllp.com
401 W. l 51h Street, Suite 845
Austin, Texas 7870 I

Nicholas D. Stepp                              via electronic notification
Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, L.L.P.              nsteppfr~bmpllp.com
           1
40 l W. l 5 h Street, Suite 845
Austin, Texas 78701




                           George E. Hyde
                           Scott M. Tschirhart




                                          l3
