
131 U.S. 319 (1889)
HAWKINS
v.
GLENN.
No. 266.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued April 22, 23, 1889.
Decided May 13, 1889.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA.
*325 Mr. Samuel F. Phillips (with whom were Mr. W.H. Lamar and Mr. J.G. Zachry on the brief) for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Wilbur F. Boyle, by special permission of court, also addressed the court for plaintiff in error. Mr. John W. Dryden was with him on his brief.
Mr. Charles Marshall and Mr. John Howard for defendant in error.
*328 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court.
Counsel for plaintiff in error contends that the decree of the Richmond Chancery Court making the call and assessment was void as against him, because he was not a party to the suit; that the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations; that he was not responsible upon one hundred and fifty shares of the stock; and that interest should not have been allowed from the date of the call, but only from the time of the filing of the complaint.
The jurisdiction of the Richmond Chancery Court to settle the construction of the deed of trust, to remove the original trustees and substitute another, and to ascertain the extent of the liabilities and assets of the corporation, is not denied. It *329 is conceded that the balance remaining unpaid on subscriptions to stock is a trust fund for the payment of corporate debts and that a judgment obtained against a corporation cannot be impeached except for fraud.
But it is said that a binding assessment cannot be levied without the presence of the stockholders or service of process or notice upon them.
Under the charter of this company a call could only be made by the president and directors and was a corporate question merely, and in the situation of the company's affairs it was a duty to make it, failing the discharge of which by the president and directors, creditors could set the powers of a court of equity in motion to accomplish it.
Executing in that regard a corporate function for a corporate purpose, it is difficult to see upon what ground it could be held that the court could not order an assessment operating upon stockholders, who would be bound if the president and directors had ordered it.
Sued after such an order of court, the defendant does not deny the existence of any one of the facts upon which the order was made, but contends that there has been no call as to him, because he was not a party to the cause between creditor and corporation. We understand the rule to be otherwise, and that the stockholder is bound by a decree of a court of equity against the corporation in enforcement of a corporate duty, although not a party as an individual, but only through representation by the company.
A stockholder is so far an integral part of the corporation that, in the view of the law, he is privy to the proceedings touching the body of which he is a member. Sanger v. Upton, 91 U.S. 56, 58, in which case it is also said: "It was not necessary that the stockholders should be before the court when it [the order] was made, any more than that they should have been there when the decree of bankruptcy was pronounced. That decree gave the jurisdiction and authority to make the order. The plaintiff in error could not, in this action, question the validity of the decree; and for the same reasons she could not draw into question the validity of the *330 order. She could not be heard to question either, except by a separate and direct proceeding had for that purpose." As against creditors there is no difference between unpaid stock "and any other assets which may form a part of the property and effects of the corporation," (Morgan County v. Allen, 103 U.S. 498, 509,) and "the stockholder has no right to withhold the funds of the company upon the ground that ho was not individually a party to the proceedings in which the recovery was obtained." Glenn v. Williams, 60 Maryland, 93, 116. In the last cited case, which was an action to recover upon the assessment controverted here, the Court of Appeals of Maryland passed upon the question now before us, and held in an able opinion by Alvey, J., that the Richmond Chancery Court acquired jurisdiction over the express company and the trustee; that that court had power and jurisdiction to make assessments upon the unpaid subscriptions to raise funds to pay the corporation's debts, and its decree making such assessment was binding and effective "upon the stockholders who were not in their individual capacities parties to the cause;" that Glenn was legally appointed trustee; and that the statute of limitations began to run only from the time the assessment was made by the decree of the court in Virginia and could form no bar to the right to recover in the action. Sanger v. Upton, supra, is quoted from, and it is correctly stated that that decision "was made not in pursuance of any express provision of the bankrupt law, but in analogy to the powers and procedure of a court of equity and to meet the requirements and justice of the case."
In Hambleton v. Glenn, 13 Virginia Law Journal, 242, [decided in the Court of Appeals of Virginia March 14, 1889, and not yet reported in the official series,] the rejection by the Circuit Court of Henrico County, Virginia, to which the suit in the Richmond Chancery Court had been removed, of a petition of certain stockholders to be made parties, and for a rehearing of the cause, came under review in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, and that court among other things said: "The first question raised in this court is that the appellants are entitled to be made parties to the suit of Glenn v. *331 National Express and Transportation Company, because the relief sought is against them. The suit of Glenn v. The National Express and Transportation Company is a creditor's suit against a corporation, and, by the terms of its charter and the laws of this State applicable to said company, it was lawfully sued as such by its corporate name, and the individual stockholders were not proper parties to such a suit, the president and directors being by their selection their representatives for this purpose. The appellants admit this as to any live and going corporation, and claim, as the corporation is dead, that by its deed of trust it assigned to trustees and ceased to exist; that in a suit by a creditor, or by creditors generally, the suit against the corporation is in fact one not against the corporation, but against them as stockholders, and they are not represented by the company nor by the trustees. By the law of this State, (Code of 1873, c. 56, § 31,) `when any corporation shall expire or be dissolved, or its corporate rights and privileges shall have ceased, all its works and property, and debts due to it, shall be subject to the payment of debts due by it, and then to distribution among the members according to their respective interests; and such corporation may sue and be sued as before, for the purpose of collecting debts due to it, prosecuting rights under previous contracts with it, and enforcing its liabilities, and distributing the proceeds of its works, property and debts, among those entitled thereto.' By which it is provided that, notwithstanding its death, it stands, for the purpose of being sued by creditors, just as it did while live and going, and may sue and be sued as before, and that the directory has assigned to trustees alters the case only so far as to make the trustees necessary parties."
The section quoted from the Code of 1873 is identical with section 30 of chapter 56 of the Code of 1860; and as the corporation, notwithstanding it may have ceased the prosecution of the objects for which it was organized, could still proceed in the collection of debts, the enforcement of liabilities, and the application of its assets to the payment of its creditors, all corporate powers essential to these ends remained unimpaired. We concur in the decision to this effect of the highest *332 tribunal of the State where the corporation dwelt, in reference to whose laws the stockholders contracted, (Canada Southern Railway v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527,) and in whose courts the creditors were obliged to seek the remedy accorded. Barclay v. Tallman, 4 Edw. Ch. 123; Bank of Virginia v. Adams, 1 Parsons Sel. Cas. 534; Patterson v. Lynde, 112 Illinois, 196.
We think it cannot be doubted that a decree against a corporation in respect to corporate matters, such as the making of an assessment in the discharge of a duty resting on the corporation, necessarily binds its members in the absence of fraud, and that this is involved in the contract created in becoming a stockholder.
The decree of the Richmond Chancery Court determined the validity of the assessment; and that the lapse of time between the failure of the company and the date of the decree did not preclude relief, by creating a bar through statutes of limitation or the application of the doctrine of laches. And so it has been held in numerous cases referred to on the argument. The court may have erred in its conclusions, but its decree cannot be attacked collaterally, and, indeed, upon a direct attack, it has already been sustained by the Virginia Court of Appeals. Hambleton v. Glenn, supra.
Some further observations may not inappropriately be added. Unpaid subscriptions are assets, but have frequently been treated by courts of equity as if impressed with a trust sub modo, upon the view that, the corporation being insolvent, the existence of creditors subjects these liabilities to the rules applicable to funds to be accounted for as held in trust, and that therefore statutes of limitation do not commence to run in respect to them, until the retention of the money has become adverse by a refusal to pay upon due requisition.
But the conclusion as to the statute need not be rested on that ground; for, although the occurrence of the necessity of resorting to unpaid stock may be said to fix the liability of the subscriber to respond, he cannot be allowed to insist that the amount required to discharge him became instantly payable though unascertained, and though there was no request, or its equivalent, for payment.
*333 And here there was a deed of trust made by the debtor corporation for the benefit of its creditors, and it has been often ruled in Virginia, that the lien of such a trust deed is not barred by any period short of that sufficient to raise a presumption of payment. Smith v. Virginia Midland Railroad, 33 Grattan, 617; Bowie v. The Poor School, 75 Virginia, 300; Hambleton v. Glenn, 13 Virginia Law Journal, 242. This deed was not only upheld and enforced by the decree of December 14, 1880, but also the power of the substituted trustee to collect the assessment by suit in his own name, was declared by the Court of Appeals of Virginia, in Lewis's Administrator v. Glenn, 6 S.E. Rep. 866. See also Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Glenn, 28 Maryland, 287.
By the deed the subscriptions, so far as uncalled for, passed to the trustees, and the creditors were limited to the relief which could be afforded under it, while the stockholders could be subjected only to equality of assessment, and as the trustees could not collect except upon call, and had themselves no power to make one, rendering resort to the president and directors necessary, or, failing their action, then to the courts, it is very clear that the statute of limitations could not commence to run until after the call was made.
The rule laid down in Scovill v. Thayer, 105 U.S. 143, 155, applies. In that case it was said by Mr. Justice Woods, speaking for the court: "There was no obligation resting on the stockholder to pay at all until some authorized demand in behalf of creditors was made for payment. The defendant owed the creditors nothing, and he owed the company nothing save such unpaid portion of his stock as might be necessary to satisfy the claims of the creditors. Upon the bankruptcy of the company, his obligation was to pay to the assignees, upon demand, such an amount upon his unpaid stock as would be sufficient, with the other assets of the company, to pay its debts. He was under no obligation to pay any more, and he was under no obligation to pay anything until the amount necessary for him to pay was at least approximately ascertained. Until then his obligation to pay did not become complete." And it was held, "that when stock is subscribed to be paid *334 upon call of the company, and the company refuses or neglects to make the call, a court of equity may itself make the call, if the interests of the creditors require it. The court will do what it is the duty of the company to do. . . . But under such circumstances, before there is any obligation upon the stockholder to pay without an assessment and call by the company, there must be some order of a court of competent jurisdiction, or, at the very least, some authorized demand upon him for payment; and it is clear the statute of limitations does not begin to run in his favor until such order or demand."
Constituting, as unpaid subscriptions do, a fund for the payment of corporate debts, when a creditor has exhausted his legal remedies against the corporation which fails to make an assessment, he may, by bill in equity or other appropriate means, subject such subscriptions to the satisfaction of his judgment, and the stockholder cannot then object that no call has been made. As between creditor and stockholder, "it would seem to be singular if the stockholders could protect themselves from paying what they owe by setting up the default of their own agents." Hatch v. Dana, 101 U.S. 205, 214. The condition that a call shall be made is, under such circumstances, as Mr. Justice Bradley remarks in the matter of Glen Iron Works, 20 Fed. Rep. 674, 681, "but a spider's web, which the first breath of the law blows away." And as between the stockholder and the corporation, it does not lie in the mouth of the stockholder to say, in response to the attempt to collect his subscription, for the payment of creditors, that the claim is barred because the company did not discharge its corporate duty in respect to its creditors earlier. County of Morgan v. Allen, 103 U.S. 498.
These considerations dispose of the alleged error in not sustaining the defence of the statutory bar.
By § 26, c. 57, Tit. 18, "Chartered Companies" of the Virginia Code of 1873, (p. 551,) it is provided that "no stock shall be assigned on the books without the consent of the company, until all the money which has become payable thereon shall have been paid; and on any assignment the assignee and assignor shall each be liable for any instalments which may *335 have accrued, or which may thereafter accrue, and may be proceeded against in the manner before provided." And this was the provision of the Code of 1860, (c. 57, Tit. 18, § 24,) and in Hambleton v. Glenn, supra, it was held "that under that section the assignee and assignor are liable for any instalment which may have accrued or which may hereafter accrue," and to the same effect is McKim v. Glenn, 66 Maryland, 479.
Defendant claims that of the two hundred and fifty shares for which he subscribed, he took one hundred and fifty shares for three other persons. The stock ledger shows that five certificates of fifty shares each were sent to defendant, made out in his name; and it appears from his evidence that he transferred three certificates for fifty shares each to Hoge, Battle and Williamson, though they failed to have them transferred to their own names on the books of the company. Of the remaining one hundred shares, defendant retained fifty and transferred the other fifty to five other persons whom he had anticipated, when he subscribed, might take them. So far as appears from the stock register the plaintiff remained the original owner of two hundred shares and the assignor of fifty, and no error is assigned as to this fifty.
Section 25 of c. 57, Tit. 18, of the Code of Virginia of 1860, is as follows: "A person in whose name shares of stock stand on the books of a company shall be deemed the owner thereof as it regards the company." Code of 1873, Tit. 18, c. 57, § 27.
So far as creditors were concerned, Hawkins remained a shareholder as to the two hundred shares. Pullman v. Upton, 96 U.S. 328; Richmond v. Irons, 121 U.S. 27; Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45.
The judgment of the Circuit Court cannot be disturbed because the defendant was held liable on two hundred and fifty shares.
It is also objected that interest upon the amount called should have been allowed from the date of the commencement of the suit and not from the date of the decree, but the difficulty with this contention is, that there was no motion for a new trial in the case. The court, so far as appears, gave *336 no instruction on the subject of the amount of the interest, and the exception to the instruction to find for the plaintiff does not question the amount found by the jury. The Code of Virginia of 1860 provides: "If the money, which any stockholder has to pay upon his shares, be not paid as required by the president and directors, the same, with interest thereon, may be recovered by warrant, action or motion as aforesaid." (Code of 1860, Tit. 18, c. 57, § 21; Code of 1873, Tit. 18, c. 57, § 23.) Interest would, therefore, seem chargeable from the date of the call.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is
Affirmed.
