UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                     No. 97-4894

MARK JEFFREY DUNCAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke.
Jackson L. Kiser, Senior District Judge.
(CR-96-40-R)

Submitted: July 21, 1998

Decided: August 28, 1998

Before NIEMEYER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Robert Frank Rider, RIDER, THOMAS, CLEAVELAND, FERRIS &
EAKIN, P.C., Roanoke, Virginia; Michael Rogalin, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, for Appellant. Robert P. Crouch, Jr., United States Attor-
ney, Anthony P. Giorno, Assistant United States Attorney, Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Mark J. Duncan was sentenced on a guilty plea to eighteen counts
of a twenty-two count indictment, including fifteen counts of wire
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West Supp. 1998), and
three counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (West
Supp. 1998). On appeal, by counsel, Duncan claims error by the dis-
trict court relative to the order of restitution. Specifically, Duncan
alleges that the district court erred in ordering him to pay restitution
in the absence of a factual finding as to the financial impact of the res-
titution order upon his dependants, and claims that the court erred in
ordering $239,075 in restitution absent evidence of Duncan's ability
to pay. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the district court's
restitution order.

Congress enacted the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act
("MVRA") in 1996. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, Title II, §§ 201-211,
110 Stat. 1214; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A-3664 (West Supp. 1996). The
MVRA makes restitution mandatory for certain crimes, see 18
U.S.C.A. § 3663A(a)(1) (West Supp. 1998), including offenses com-
mitted by fraud, see id. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii), and mandates that full
restitution shall be ordered "without consideration of the economic
circumstances of the defendant," id.§ 3664(f)(1)(A). See United
States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1239, 1241 (8th Cir. 1997); United States
v. Baggett, 125 F.3d 1319, 1322 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1089 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1998) (No. 97-7346). After
ordering full restitution, the court must set a payment schedule. 18
U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(2) (West Supp. 1998). In considering the manner
and schedule of payment, the court is required to consider the defen-
dant's financial resources, assets, projected income, and financial
obligations. Id. If the defendant's financial situation does "not allow
the payment of any amount of a restitution order, and [does] not allow
for the payment of the full amount of a restitution order in the fore-

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seeable future under any reasonable schedule of payments," the court
can order nominal periodic payments. 18 U.S.C.A.§ 3664(f)(3)(B)
(West Supp. 1998).

We find that the MVRA applies to Duncan's case. The conduct on
which he entered his guilty plea included criminal conduct that was
not completed until after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the
MVRA.1 The conduct to which Duncan pled guilty consisted of fraud,
one of the enumerated crimes to which the MVRA applies. 18
U.S.C.A. § 3663A(c)(1)(A)(ii) (West Supp. 1998). The restitution
amount owed, as set forth in the Presentence Investigation Report
("PSR"), and adopted, in large part, by the district court, had a suffi-
cient factual basis.2 Moreover, Duncan does not contest the Govern-
ment's position that the MVRA applies to him. Because the MVRA
eliminates the provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of
1982, requiring the district court to make specific factual findings as
to the defendant's financial resources or the financial needs and earn-
ing ability of the defendant and his dependants in determining the
amount of restitution owed,3 and requires an order of full restitution
without regard for the defendant's economic circumstances, 18
U.S.C.A. § 3664(f)(1)(A), Duncan's claims on appeal are without
merit.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's restitution order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argu-
ment would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
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1 The indictment to which Duncan pled guilty is dated February 19,
1997, and specifies criminal conduct beginning on a date not known to
the Grand Jury, but not later than July 1991 and continuing thereafter
until the date of the indictment.

2 The probation officer who prepared the PSR testified at trial as to the
factual bases on which he relied in determining the amounts owed,
including his review of FBI interview reports and victims' statements
and forms which the victims completed and returned to the probation
officer.

3 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(a)(1)(B)(i)(II) (West Supp. 1998).

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