
USCA1 Opinion

	




          November 12, 1993     [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT                                 ____________________        No. 93-1355                                CHARLES MERRILL MOUNT,                                Plaintiff, Appellant,                                          v.                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                 Defendant, Appellee.                                 ____________________        No. 93-1411                                CHARLES MERRILL MOUNT,                                     Petitioner,                                          v.                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                     Respondent.                                                                                      ____________________        No. 93-1655                                     UNITED STATES,                                      Appellee,                                          v.                                CHARLES MERRILL MOUNT,                                Defendant, Appellant.                                 ____________________                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS                       [Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge]                                           ___________________                                 ____________________                                        Before                                 Breyer, Chief Judge,                                         ___________                         Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges.                                              ______________                                 ____________________            Charles Merrill Mount on briefs pro se.            _____________________            A.  John Pappalardo, United States Attorney, and  Tobin N. Harvey,            ___________________                               _______________        Assistant United States Attorney, on briefs for appellee/respondent.                                 ____________________                                 ____________________                 Per Curiam.  The judgments in these consolidated appeals                 __________            are each  affirmed.  The  contention that the  district judge            lacked jurisdiction  to preside  over appellant's  collateral            proceedings  because  she  presided  at  trial  is frivolous.            Appellant's reliance on  Halliday v. United States,  380 F.2d                                     ________    _____________            270  (1st Cir.  1967), is  misplaced.   See,  e.g., Panzardi-                                                    ___   ____  _________            Alvarez v. United States, 879  F.2d 975, 985 (1st Cir. 1989),            _______    _____________            cert. denied,  493 U.S. 1082 (1990); Tracey v. United States,            ____________                         ______    _____________            739 F.2d  679, 681  (1st Cir. 1984),  cert. denied,  469 U.S.                                                  ____________            1109 (1985).  Nor is there  any reason to disturb the  denial            of   appellant's  motion   to   "cancel"  the   $50   special            assessments.  Contrary to his assertion, such assessments are            to be imposed "per count  rather than per defendant."  United                                                                   ______            States v.  Smith, 857  F.2d 682, 686  (10th Cir.  1988); see,            ______     _____                                         ___            e.g., United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931 F.2d 148, 152 n.5            ____  _____________    _______________            (1st  Cir.),  cert. denied,  112  S.  Ct.  184 (1991).    The                          ____________            statutory directive that the "obligation to pay an assessment            ceases five  years after  the date of  the judgment,"  see 18                                                                   ___            U.S.C.   3013(c),  contemplates no judicial  intervention, at            least in the absence of an ongoing attempt to secure payment.            And cessation of the obligation  to pay is not the equivalent            of nullification ab initio of the assessment.                             _________                 The  judgments  are affirmed.   Appellant's  petition is                 ________________________________________________________            denied.   Appellant's "cross-motion  for summary judgment" is            _____________________________________________________________            denied.            _______                                         -3-
