                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                      FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
                       ____________________

                          No. 99-50697
                        Summary Calendar
                      ____________________

                         SILVIA M. PENA,

                                                Plaintiff-Appellant,
                             versus


                   USAA FEDERAL SAVINGS BANK,

                                              Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________

           Appeal from the United States District Court
                for the Western District of Texas
                          (SA-98-CV-88)
_________________________________________________________________
                          March 28, 2000

Before SMITH, BARKSDALE and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

     For this pro se action and appeal, at issue are the dismissal

of Silvia M. Peña’s claim that, in violation of Executive Order

11246, she was terminated by USAA Federal Savings Bank (USAA) in

retaliation for participating in a compliance review by the Office

of Federal Contract Compliance Programs; and the summary judgment

granted USAA on her claims that USAA discriminated against her on

the basis of sex, national origin, and disability, in violation of

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Americans with

Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).




    *
       Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
     For our de novo review of a dismissal for failure to state a

claim on which relief can be granted,    pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.

12(b)(6), we will affirm only if “it appears beyond doubt that

[Peña] can prove no set of facts” showing that she is entitled to

relief.   Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir.

1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis

added).   Likewise, we review a summary judgment de novo, applying

the same standard as the district court.         The movant, USAA,

prevails only if there is no material fact issue and it is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.   FED. R. CIV. PRO. 56(c); see, e.g.,

Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2000).

     Pursuant to our review of the record and the briefs, the

dismissal was proper, see Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375

F.2d 629, 632-33 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967) (no

private right of action under Executive Order 10925, predecessor to

Executive Order 11246), as was the summary judgment.      We so hold

essentially for the reasons stated in the magistrate judge’s

detailed opinion, Peña v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, No. SA-98-CA-0088-FB

(W.D. Tex. May 10, 1999), adopted by the district court.     Peña v.

USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, No. SA-98-CA-88-FB (W.D. Tex. June 18, 1999).

                                                       AFFIRMED




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