UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)
LILLIAN YVONNE ANDERSON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Civil Acti0n No. ll-1621 (RCL)
)
LAURETTE USHER et al., )
> F I L E D
Defendants. )
) SEP t ? 2012
~ . . ' 'c.t d
C‘%'§`a£.,§t?y"'§'<§t.rt;“
MEMORANDUM OPINION

ln this action filed pro se by a District of Columbia resident, plaintiff sues Christy
Nichols, Director of House of Ruth located in the District, and Laurette Usher, Program
Coordinator, "for deliberate, wanton and intentional violation of plaintiff s civil, constitutional,
human rights and common law." Compl. il l. Plaintiff seeks $2 million in damages Id. 11 lO.
The complaint arises out of plaintiff` s stay at House of Ruth’s New Pathways Transitional
Shelter (hereafter "the Shelter") between l\/larch 2006 and September 2008. Ia’. 11 2.

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint under Rule l2(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure [Dkt. # 5], which plaintiff opposes [Dkt. # 16]. Upon consideration of the
partics’ submissions, the Court will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss the federal claim
purportedly brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § l2l0l et
seq., and will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff s claims purportedly

brought under District of Columbia law and the common law.

BACKGROUND

Allegedly, plaintiff resided at the Shelter as "a homeless person with a physical and
mental disability." Compl. 11 2. She lived in a unit for which she was responsible and paid rent
and storage fees. Id. Plaintiff "was taking a number of different medications," but defendants
"disallowed and prevented [her] from hold[ing] or controlling any of her prescribed medications
[and] over the counter medications. Each pill was distributed by an unlicensed House of Ruth
staff member." Id. 11 4. Due to staff delays and the Shcltcr’s limited hours, plaintiff “was
sometimes unable to access her medications" and take them as scheduled and "oft times . . .
would be sick throughout the day . . . ." Ia'.

Plaintiff further alleges that "defendants would compel [her] to remove herself from the
premises during the day [between 8:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m.] unless a hyperthermia alert existed"
and, as a result, she "developed a serious and indescribable amount ofpain and suffering from
arthritis," ia’. 11 6; that when she was late entering the Shelter ‘“one time," she was forced to sleep
on a cot in the Shelter’s basement for approximately one month, which "resulted in retina
damage[] and possible glaucoma" due to her "[s]leeping in darkness without sunlight," ia’. 11 7;
and that she "endured very negative experiences with defendants Usher and Nichols and other
staff members," which included the television being turned off while she and other tenants were
watching and Usher having "offered to fight plaintiff while on duty from 2006 to 2008" and
making derogatory and disparaging remarks to her and other tenants with mental illnesses, z`d. 11
8.

Plaintiff filed this action on September 8, 201 l, claiming that defendants "are in violation
of regulations governing the distribution of prescription drugs as well as the [ADA]." Compl. 11

5. Plaintiff also claims that she "was entitled to the protections of the Rental Housing Act and
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common law tenancy protections, as well as the . . . Homeless Reform Act and civil rights laws."
Id. 11 3.
LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. S(a)(Z). A motion to dismiss is appropriate when
the complaint fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. l2(b)(6).
Such a failure occurs when the complaint is so factually deficient that the plaintiffs claim for
relief is not plausible on its face. Bell Atlantz`c Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
"Asking for plausible grounds to infer [a right to relief] does not impose a probability
requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the right to relief_|." Ia'. at 556. Though facts
in a complaint need not be detailed, Rule 8 "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court
must accept all factual statements as true when deciding a Rule l2(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Id.
at 678. However, conclusory legal allegations devoid of any factual support do not enjoy the
same assumption of truth. Id. at 679. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

"A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed and a pro se complaint, however
inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers." Erikson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, a pro se
plaintiffs complaint "must present a claim on which the Court can grant relief."’ Utterbczck v.
Geilhner, 754 F. Supp. 2d 52, 54 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Chandler v. Roche, 215 F. Supp. 2d

l66, 168 (D.D.C. 2002)').

DlSCUSSION

The Court finds dismissal warranted for the following reasons. First, defendants argue
correctly that since individuals are not subject to suit under the ADA, the federal claim must be
dismissed. See Mw>abz`ri-Simera v. Howard Um`versity, 692 F. Supp. 2d 65, 70 (D.D.C. 2010).
Second, plaintiff has not alleged that the House ol`Ruth is an entity covered by the ADA, and its
website identifying it as a 501(€)(3) tax-exempt organization, http://www.liouseofruth.org.,
suggests that it is not. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (defining public entity as "any State or local
government" or instrumentality thereof); § 12181(7) (listing "private entities [] considered public
accommodations for purposes of this subchapter, if the operations of such entities affect
commerce").

Third, plaintiff does not specify under which provision of the ADA her claim falls, but
whether she is claiming violations by a public entity or the denial of a public accommodation by
a private entity, see Pl.’s Opp’n [Dkt. # 16] at 3, 5, her claim cannot proceed because she has not
stated any facts in either the complaint or the opposition to establish that she is disabled within
the meaning of the ADA. See Sz`ngh v Geo. Wash. Univ. School ofMea’icz`ne and Health
Sciences, 597 F. Supp. 2d 89, 94-95 (D.D.C. 2009) ("To show that she has a disability for
purposes of the ADA, plaintiff must prove that ‘(l) [s]he suffers from an impairment; (2) the
impairment limits an activity that constitutes a maj or life activity under the Act; and (3) the
limitation is substantial."’) (quoting Haynes v. Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 481-82 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(citing § 12l02(2)(A) of the ADA and construing its language that a protected disability is "a

physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of

[an] individual").' Fourth, this Court may, and will, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over plaintiffs surviving claims arising under District of Columbia law and the common law.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(€)(3) (authorizing such action when "the district court has dismissed all
claims over which it has original jurisdiction").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant defendants’ Rule l2(b)(6) motion to

dismiss the federal claim arising under the ADA, and it declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining local law claims. A separate Order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.

K¢MM

Ro\€éE C. LAMBERTH
United States District Chief judge
DATE; September / , 2012

1n her opposition, plaintiff adds that defendants violated 21 U.S.C. § 822 and the Eighth

Amendment, Pl.’s Opp’n at 3, 4, but neither is applicable here. The Eighth Amendment applies
to convicted persons, City ofRevere v. Massachusetts General Hosp. 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983),
and 21 U.S.C. § 822, governing the registration requirements for manufacturers and distributors
of controlled substances, provides no private cause of action. Furthermore, plaintiff s assertion
that defendants "waived and abandoned defenses . . . with respect to . . . violations, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983," Pl.’s Opp’n at 5-6, is baseless since the instant complaint was not brought under that
statute, has not been amended to include a § 1983 claim, and states no facts from which such a

claim may be reasonably inferred.
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