           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                                     DIVISION ONE

                                                                                     _3       o> <-i
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                   No. 70319-6-1                      5        •£"
                       Respondent,

                  v.                               UNPUBLISHED OPINION                    ^

DWIGHT LLOYD CASADY,
                                                                                              <P
                       Appellant.
                                                   FILED: May 12, 2014

        Per Curiam — Dwight Casady appeals his convictions for felony driving under

the influence and first degree driving while license suspended. His counsel contends,

and Casady argues pro se, that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it had a

"duty to return a verdict of guilty" if it found all the elements of the offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. This argument is controlled by our decision in State v. Moore, No.

69766-8-I (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2014) and the cases cited therein.

        Casady raises several additional arguments in his pro se statement of additional

grounds for review. He contends he "wasn't found guilty of a felony DUI by the jury[.] I

was found guilty of a misdemeanor DUI . . . ." The jury found Casady guilty of "Driving

Under the Influence as charged in Count One." The charge in count one was "Felony

DUI."

        Casady contends "it was reversible error to admit into evidence Convictions That

are over TEN years old." But RCW 46.61.502(6)(b)(i) expressly provides that a person

commits felony DUI if "[t]he person has ever previously been convicted of: Vehicular
No. 70319-6-1/2



homicide while under the influence . . . , RCW 46.61.520(1 )(a)." (Emphasis added.)

The parties stipulated that Casady had a prior conviction under RCW 46.61.520(1 )(a).

       Next, Casady contends he had a right to be present at side bars that occurred

during his trial. Casady does not explain why this claim can be raised for the first time

on appeal. RAP 2.5(a). Nor does he indicate whether the side bars involved legal or

factual matters. See In re Pers. Restraint of Lord. 123 Wn.2d 296, 306, 868 P.2d 835,

870 P.2d 964 (1994) (defendant does not have a constitutional right to be present

during in-chambers or bench conferences between the court and counsel on legal

matters, at least where those matters "do not require a resolution of disputed facts");

State v. Miller,    Wn. App.     , 316P.3d 1143, 1150(2014). He thus fails to

demonstrate any basis for review or relief.

       Finally Casady's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are either too

conclusory to merit discussion, RAP 10.10(c) (appellate court will not consider
additional grounds for review that do not adequately inform the court of the nature of the
alleged errors), or involve matters outside the record.

               Affirmed.

                            FOR THE COURT:

                                                              All
