                        T.C. Memo. 2007-152



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



         DAVID A. AND REBECCA ROSE WILBERT, Petitioners v.
            COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 21972-05.               Filed June 14, 2007.



     David A. and Rebecca Rose Wilbert, pro sese.

     Lisa R. Woods, for respondent.



              MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION


     KROUPA, Judge:   Respondent determined a $6,787 deficiency in

petitioners’ Federal income tax for 2003.     After concessions,1 we

are asked to decide two issues.   First, we are asked to decide

whether petitioner David A. Wilbert (Mr. Wilbert) was away from


     1
      See infra note 3 for the concessions of each party.
                                - 2 -

home when he worked as an airline mechanic for Northwest Airlines

(NWA) in Chicago, Anchorage, and Flushing to determine whether

petitioners are entitled to deduct expenses for his vehicle,

lodging, travel, and meals while Mr. Wilbert was away from

Hudson, Wisconsin, in the Minneapolis area where he normally

lived.   We conclude that he was not away from home.   Second, we

are asked to decide whether petitioners are entitled to deduct

expenses for cleaning Mr. Wilbert’s uniforms.    We conclude that

petitioners are entitled to deduct a portion of these expenses.

                          FINDINGS OF FACT

     Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

Petitioners resided in Hudson, Wisconsin, at the time they filed

the petition.

Mr. Wilbert’s Employment With Northwest Airlines

     Mr. Wilbert began working for NWA in 1996.    He began as an

equipment service employee and, about 7 months later, started

working as a mechanic.    Mr. Wilbert worked in Minneapolis for

most of his career with NWA.

     NWA sent layoff notices to some of its employees when it

experienced financial difficulties.     The employees receiving the

notices could either choose to accept the layoff or exercise

their seniority.   Seniority depended on the length of time an

employee had worked for NWA, regardless of where the airline

facility was located.    An employee with higher seniority could
                               - 3 -

bump an employee with less seniority and take that employee’s

position.   The employee with less seniority could then take the

layoff or find another employee with less seniority to bump.

This seniority bumping arrangement was in place across the

country, so that an NWA mechanic looking to keep his or her job

at NWA had to look at several different cities to find a less

senior employee to bump.

     Mr. Wilbert first received a bump notice on April 6, 2003.

Mr. Wilbert chose to exercise his seniority and bump another

employee rather than accept the layoff.   Mr. Wilbert was able to

bump to Chicago, Illinois.   Mr. Wilbert began working in Chicago

in mid-April 2003, and he worked there for approximately a week

before being bumped again by a more senior employee.

     Mr. Wilbert then bumped to take a position in Anchorage,

Alaska.   He started working in Anchorage on April 19, 2003.    Mr.

Wilbert worked approximately 3 weeks in Anchorage until he was

bumped again.   Mr. Wilbert then bumped to the very last open

position in the NWA system, at LaGuardia Airport in Flushing, New

York.   Mr. Wilbert started working at LaGuardia Airport on May

12, 2003, and was laid off on May 19, 2003.   Mr. Wilbert had

fully exercised his seniority and there were no junior employees

left to bump.

     Mr. Wilbert was unemployed for several weeks.   He then

accepted a position as a mechanic for NWA in Anchorage, Alaska.
                                - 4 -

He worked in Anchorage, Alaska, from June 12 through November 11,

2003 and again from December 25, 2003, for about 20 months, until

August 2005.2

     No NWA position was available in Minneapolis for Mr. Wilbert

to return to once he was laid off from his position in

Minneapolis.    He was forced to bump other employees and work in

different cities to stay with NWA.      The timing of a return to

Minneapolis depended on NWA’s needs for mechanics in that city as

well as the choices of other mechanics also subject to the

seniority system.

     Mr. Wilbert’s wife, petitioner Rebecca Rose Wilbert (Mrs.

Wilbert) stayed in Hudson, Wisconsin, at the family residence

while Mr. Wilbert worked in Chicago, Anchorage, and Flushing.

Mr. Wilbert returned to the family residence as much as possible

while he worked in the other locations, and his wife also went to

visit him occasionally.   Mr. Wilbert paid for lodging while he

was working for NWA in Chicago, Anchorage, and Flushing in 2003.

     Mr. Wilbert wore a uniform while he worked for NWA.      He also

did some real estate work in 2003, but he did not report any

income from this activity in 2003.




     2
      There is no evidence in the record regarding Mr. Wilbert’s
activities between Nov. 12 and Dec. 24, 2003.
                               - 5 -

Petitioners’ Return

     Petitioners claimed certain expenses on Schedule A, Itemized

Deductions, on their joint return for 2003.   Respondent examined

petitioners’ return for 2003 and issued petitioners a deficiency

notice in which he disallowed many of the expenses.   Of the

expenses still in dispute,3 petitioners assert they are entitled

to deduct unreimbursed employee business expenses related to Mr.

Wilbert’s NWA mechanic job.   The unreimbursed employee business

expenses petitioners claimed include expenses for Mr. Wilbert’s

vehicle, lodging and pass travel, and meals while he worked in

Chicago, Anchorage, and Flushing.   Petitioners also claimed

expenses for cleaning Mr. Wilbert’s uniforms.

     Petitioners timely filed a petition.



     3
      Respondent concedes that petitioners are entitled to deduct
amounts claimed for State and local income taxes, real estate
taxes, home mortgage interest, tax preparation fees, union dues,
equipment, and professional licenses. Respondent also concedes
that petitioners are entitled to deduct portions of the amounts
claimed for “education job,” education supplies, gloves, job-
related software, office supplies, phone, professional
associations, safety boots, and safety equipment, as well as an
ID badge expense petitioners did not originally claim on the
return. Petitioners concede they are not entitled to deduct
amounts they claimed for cash contributions, noncash
contributions, financial publications, flight equipment,
Internet, miscellaneous supplies, certain amounts for tools,
professional publications, safety glasses, and uniform
alterations. Petitioners also concede they are not entitled to
deduct portions of the amounts claimed for “education job,”
education supplies, gloves, job-related software, office
supplies, phone, professional associations, safety boots, and
safety equipment.
                                  - 6 -

                                 OPINION

     The parties resolved many of the disputed expense deductions

before trial.     We are asked to determine whether petitioners are

entitled to deduct the remaining expenses.       We begin by

considering whether Mr. Wilbert was away from home when he

incurred expenses for his vehicle, lodging, travel, and meals in

Chicago, Anchorage, and Flushing.

Travel Expenses While Away From Home

     We begin by briefly outlining the rules for deducting travel

expenses.      A taxpayer may deduct reasonable and necessary travel

expenses such as vehicle expenses, meals, and lodging incurred

while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business.

Secs. 162(a)(2), 262(a).4     A taxpayer must show that he or she

was away from home when he or she incurred the expense, that the

expense is reasonable and necessary, and that the expense was

incurred in pursuit of a trade or business.        Commissioner v.

Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470 (1946).        The determination of whether

the taxpayer has satisfied these requirements is a question of

fact.    Id.

     The purpose of the deduction for expenses incurred away from

home is to alleviate the burden on the taxpayer whose business

needs require him or her to maintain two homes and therefore

     4
      All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for 2003, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court
Rules of Practice and Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
                                 - 7 -

incur duplicate living expenses.       Kroll v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.

557, 562 (1968).    The duplicate costs are not deductible where

the taxpayer maintains two homes for personal reasons.      Sec. 262;

Commissioner v. Flowers, supra at 474.

     A taxpayer may deduct the expenses he or she incurred while

away from home.    Sec. 162(a)(2).    The word “home” for purposes of

section 162(a)(2) has a special meaning.      It generally refers to

the area of a taxpayer’s principal place of employment, not the

taxpayer’s personal residence.       Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.

190, 195 (1979), affd. 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981); Kroll v.

Commissioner, supra at 561-562.

     There is an exception to the general rule that a taxpayer’s

tax home is his or her principal place of employment.       Peurifoy

v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59, 60 (1958).       The taxpayer’s tax home

may be the taxpayer’s personal residence if the taxpayer’s

employment away from home is temporary.       Id.; Mitchell v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-283.       On the other hand, the

exception does not apply and the taxpayer’s tax home remains the

principal place of employment if the employment away from home is

indefinite.   Kroll v. Commissioner, supra at 562.

     It is presumed that a taxpayer will generally choose to live

near his or her place of employment.       Frederick v. United States,

603 F.2d 1292, 1295 (8th Cir. 1979).      A taxpayer must, however,

have a principal place of employment and accept temporary work in
                                - 8 -

another location to be away from home.    Kroll v. Commissioner,

supra.    A person who has no principal place of business nor a

place he or she resides permanently is an itinerant and has no

tax home from which he or she can be away.    Deamer v.

Commissioner, 752 F.2d 337, 339 (8th Cir. 1985), affg. T.C. Memo.

1984-63; Edwards v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-396.

     All the facts and circumstances are considered in

determining whether a taxpayer has a tax home.    See Rev. Rul. 73-

529, 1973-2 C.B. 37 (describing objective factors the

Commissioner considers in determining whether a taxpayer has a

tax home).   The taxpayer must generally have some business

justification to maintain the first residence, beyond purely

personal reasons, to be entitled to deduct expenses incurred

while temporarily away from that home.    Hantzis v. Commissioner,

638 F.2d 248, 255 (1st Cir. 1981); Bochner v. Commissioner, 67

T.C. 824, 828 (1977); Tucker v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 783, 787

(1971).    Where a taxpayer has no business connections with the

primary residence, there is no compelling reason to maintain that

residence and incur substantial, continuous, and duplicative

expenses elsewhere.    See Henderson v. Commissioner, 143 F.3d 497,

499 (9th Cir. 1998), affg. T.C. Memo. 1995-559; Deamer v.

Commissioner, supra; Hantzis v. Commissioner, supra.      In that

situation, the expenses incurred while temporarily away from that

residence are not deductible.    Hantzis v. Commissioner, supra;
                               - 9 -

Bochner v. Commissioner, supra; Tucker v. Commissioner, supra;

see McNeill v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-65; Aldea v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-136.

     Once Mr. Wilbert was bumped from Minneapolis, he had no job

to return to there.   His choices were to be laid off and have no

work, or to bump other employees and move to different cities to

continue working.   NWA no longer required Mr. Wilbert to perform

any services whatsoever in the Minneapolis area once he was

bumped.   Although Mrs. Wilbert remained in the family residence

with occasional visits from Mr. Wilbert while Mr. Wilbert worked

in Chicago, Anchorage, and Flushing, this fact alone does not

dictate that Mr. Wilbert’s tax home was in Hudson, Wisconsin,

where the family residence was located.   Unlike traveling

salepersons who may be required to return to the home city

occasionally between business trips, Mr. Wilbert’s business ties

to Minneapolis ceased when he was bumped.5


     5
      Petitioners argue in their reply brief that Mr. Wilbert’s
real estate business in 2003 was operated from the Minneapolis
area and he therefore had a position to return to in the
Minneapolis area. Mr. Wilbert acknowledged at trial, however,
that he did not report any income from this activity in 2003. We
find that Mr. Wilbert’s principal employment in 2003 was with
NWA. We assume that, if it were feasible for Mr. Wilbert to
concentrate solely on real estate activities, he would have
accepted a layoff and returned to the Minneapolis area to pursue
the real estate activity full-time. Mr. Wilbert did not do this,
however. Instead, he continued to travel around the country to
keep his job with NWA. Mr. Wilbert’s real estate activities are
thus not a significant factor in our analysis of Mr. Wilbert’s
tax home.
                               - 10 -

     The Court understands that the NWA mechanics’ lives were

unsettled and disrupted.   Mechanics did not know how long they

would have a job in one specific location.    They only knew the

system was based on seniority.   They could bump less senior

employees, and they could be bumped by more senior employees.

While we acknowledge that Mr. Wilbert would have liked to return

to the Minneapolis area to work for NWA, Mr. Wilbert did not know

when such a return would be possible due to the seniority system.

The likelihood of Mr. Wilbert’s return to a position in

Minneapolis depended on NWA’s needs for mechanics there as well

as the choices of more senior mechanics.    Mr. Wilbert did not

know how long he would be in Chicago, Anchorage, Flushing, or

where he might go next.    It was not foreseeable that he would be

able to return to Minneapolis at any time due to the seniority

system.   Thus, we conclude there was no business reason for

petitioners to maintain a home in the Minneapolis area.

Petitioners kept the family residence in the Minneapolis area for

purely personal reasons.   Petitioners have failed to prove that

Mr. Wilbert had a tax home in 2003.     Accordingly, Mr. Wilbert was

not away from home in Chicago, Anchorage, and Flushing, and the

expenses he incurred while there are not deductible.6


     6
      Even if we had found that Mr. Wilbert’s tax home during
2003 was Hudson, Wisconsin, Mr. Wilbert may not be treated as
temporarily away from home while he worked in Anchorage because
the position lasted over a year. See sec. 162(a).
                                - 11 -

Substantiation of Expenses

     We next examine whether petitioners are entitled to deduct

expenses for cleaning Mr. Wilbert’s uniforms.   We begin by noting

the fundamental principle that the Commissioner’s determinations

are generally presumed correct, and the taxpayer bears the burden

of proving that these determinations are erroneous.7   Rule

142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992);

Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).    Moreover, deductions

are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer has the

burden to prove he or she is entitled to any deduction claimed.

Rule 142(a); Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New

Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934); Welch v.

Helvering, supra.   This includes the burden of substantiation.

Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 90 (1975), affd. per curiam

540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976).

     A taxpayer must substantiate amounts claimed as deductions

by maintaining the records necessary to establish he or she is

entitled to the deductions.   Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner,

supra.   The taxpayer shall keep such permanent records or books

of account as are sufficient to establish the amounts of

deductions claimed on the return.    Sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a),

     7
      Petitioners do not claim the burden of proof shifted to
respondent under sec. 7491(a). Petitioners also did not
establish that they satisfy the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2).
We therefore find that the burden of proof remains with
petitioners.
                               - 12 -

(e), Income Tax Regs.   The Court need not accept a taxpayer’s

self-serving testimony when the taxpayer fails to present

corroborative evidence.    Beam v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-

304 (citing Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986)),

affd. without published opinion 956 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1992).

     In general, all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or

incurred in carrying on a trade or business during the taxable

year are deductible, but personal, living, or family expenses are

not deductible.    Secs. 162(a), 262.   Services performed by an

employee constitute a trade or business.     O’Malley v.

Commissioner, 91 T.C. 352, 363-364 (1988); sec. 1.162-17(a),

Income Tax Regs.

     If a taxpayer establishes that he or she paid or incurred a

deductible business expense but does not establish the amount of

the deduction, we may approximate the amount of the allowable

deduction, bearing heavily against the taxpayer whose

inexactitude is of his or her own making.     Cohan v. Commissioner,

39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930).    For the Cohan rule to

apply, however, a basis must exist on which this Court can make

an approximation.    Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743

(1985).   Without such a basis, any allowance would amount to

unguided largesse.    Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d 559, 560

(5th Cir. 1957).
                              - 13 -

Cleaning Expenses for Uniforms

     Petitioners claimed $1,022 for cleaning expenses for Mr.

Wilbert’s NWA uniforms.   Expenses for uniforms are deductible if

the uniforms are of a type specifically required as a condition

of employment, the uniforms are not adaptable to general use as

ordinary clothing, and the uniforms are not worn as ordinary

clothing.   Yeomans v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 757, 767-769 (1958);

Beckey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-514.

     We are satisfied that petitioners incurred deductible

expenses for uniform cleaning.    Mr. Wilbert testified that he

needed to clean his uniforms separately from his other laundry,

often in coin-operated-laundry machines.    He acknowledged that he

did not have receipts for dry cleaning nor any other

documentation indicating how he arrived at $1,022.    Mr. Wilbert

testified that in previous years, it cost him approximately $10

per week to clean his uniforms.    Mr. Wilbert also testified it

cost more to clean his uniforms in 2003 than it had previously.

We are permitted to estimate the amount of cleaning expenses for

uniforms under the Cohan rule.    We find that $12 per week of

uniform cleaning costs for the approximate 43 weeks that Mr.

Wilbert worked for NWA in 2003 is reasonable.    Accordingly, we

find that petitioners are entitled to deduct $516 of cleaning

expenses for uniforms.
                        - 14 -

To reflect the foregoing and the concessions of the parties,


                                   Decision will be entered

                              under Rule 155.
