                                        In The

                                 Court of Appeals
                     Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
                            ____________________
                                NO. 09-18-00299-CV
                            ____________________

                          IN THE INTEREST OF I.J.G.

________________________________________________________________________

                     On Appeal from the 317th District Court
                           Jefferson County, Texas
                          Trial Cause No. C-230,177
________________________________________________________________________

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

      R.G. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her son, I.J.G. 1,2

The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence, statutory grounds exist for

termination of R.G.’s parental rights, and termination of her rights would be in

I.J.G.’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (2)

(West Supp. 2018).



      1
         To protect the identity of the minor, we use the initials for the child and his
parents. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
       2
         The Order of Termination also terminated the parental rights of I.J.G.’s
father, V.O., however, V.O. is not a party to this appeal.
                                           1
      Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel submitted a brief in which

counsel contends there are no meritorious grounds to be advanced on appeal. See

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d 728, 731

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.). The brief provides counsel’s professional

evaluation of the record. Counsel certified Appellant was served with a copy of the

Anders brief filed on her behalf. This Court notified Appellant of her right to file a

pro se response, as well as the deadline for filing the response. This Court did not

receive a pro se response from Appellant. We have independently reviewed the

appellate record and counsel’s brief, and we agree any appeal would be frivolous.

We find no arguable error requiring us to appoint new counsel to re-brief this appeal.

Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

      Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating R.G.’s parental

rights. We deny the motion to withdraw filed by R.G.’s court-appointed appellate

counsel, because an attorney’s duty extends through the exhaustion or waiver of all

appeals. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(B) (West Supp. 2018); In re P.M.,

520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016). In the event R.G. decides to pursue an appeal to the

Supreme Court of Texas, counsel’s obligations to R.G. can be met “by filing a

petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See In re P.M.,

520 S.W.3d at 27–28.

                                          2
      AFFIRMED.



                                                 _________________________
                                                      CHARLES KREGER
                                                           Justice

Submitted on October 29, 2018
Opinion Delivered November 8, 2018

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.




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