                                                                                     PD-0974-15
                                                                    COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
                                                                                    AUSTIN, TEXAS
                                                                  Transmitted 11/5/2015 10:30:31 PM
  November 9, 2015                                                   Accepted 11/9/2015 7:30:00 AM
                                No. PD-0974-15                                       ABEL ACOSTA
                                                                                             CLERK
______________________________________________________________________________

                                    IN THE
                       COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
                                      OF
                                    TEXAS
______________________________________________________________________________

                         OLIN ANTHONY ROBINSON,
                                 Petitioner,

                                     vs.

                            THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                  Respondent.
______________________________________________________________________________

                       Petition in Cause No. 05-05-7221 from the
                 24th Judicial District Court of Jackson County, Texas
         and the Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Supreme Judicial District
                        of Texas in Cause No. 13-13-00571-CR
______________________________________________________________________________

                   BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON THE MERITS
______________________________________________________________________________

                                           WILLIE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.

                                           Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
                                           4151 Southwest Freeway, Suite 490
                                           Houston, Texas 77027
                                           (713) 659-7330
                                           (713) 599-1659 (FAX)
                                           SBOT# 21633500
                                           attyjrwii@wisamlawyers.com

                                           ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
                                           OLIN ANTHONY ROBINSON




______________________________________________________________________________
                          IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL



       The following is a complete list of all parties to the trial court’s final order, as well as the

names and addresses of all trial and appellate counsel.



PARTIES                                                COUNSEL

Petitioner:
Olin Anthony Robinson                                  Willie & Associates, P.C.
                                                       Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
                                                       4151 Southwest Freeway, Suite 490
                                                       Houston, Texas 77027
                                                       Trial and Appellate Counsel for Petitioner



Trial Court:
The Honorable Kemper Stephen Williams, III
Presiding via assignment
24th Judicial District Court
Jackson County, Texas



Respondent:
The State of Texas                                     Law Offices of Jim Vollers
                                                       Jim Vollers, Esquire
                                                       2201 Westover Road
                                                       Austin, Texas 78703
                                                       Appellate Counsel for Respondent

                                                       Jackson County District Attorney’s Office
                                                       Robert E. Bell, Esquire
                                                       Jackson County District Attorney
                                                       115 W. Main Street, Room 205
                                                       Edna, Texas 77957
                                                       Trial Counsel for Respondent




                                                  ii
                                                    TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                                                                              Page

IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                                ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                   iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                      vi

ISSUES PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .               vi

STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                    1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                               2

ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                              3

I.         The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the order of the trial court due to
           the fact that the Court of Appeals erred in its statutory construction of TEX.
           CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 41.12, § 6 versus the specific provisions contained
           in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2 . . . . . .                                     3

II.        The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s order due to the
           fact that the Court of Appeals violated TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 by not
           addressing the Petitioner’s contention that TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
           44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2 controlled the disposition of this
           appellate litigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     8

III.       The Court of Appeals did not have the subject-matter jurisdiction to
           entertain a direct appeal from a trial court granting continuing jurisdiction
           community supervision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .            9

PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     10

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                       11

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                              11




                                                                       iii
                                                INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

                                                                                                                                  Page(s)

CASES:

Basaldua v. State,
      558 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 9, 10

Boykin v. State,
       818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                          4

Ex parte Dotson,
       76 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                       2, 4

Grimes v. State,
      807 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                           6

Houlihan v. State,
      579 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 9, 10

Keehn v. State,
      233 S.W.3d 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                         2, 8

Leos v. State Emp. Workers’ Comp. Div.,
        734 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                7

Lone Star Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission,
       767 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .               2, 8

Musgrove v. State,
      82 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App.--San Antonio
      2002, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     2, 6

McNatt v. State,
      188 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                       2, 5

Pippin v. State,
       271 S.W.3d 861 (Tex. App.--Amarillo
       2009, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    10

Roberts v. State,
       No. 04-10-00558-CR, 2010 WL 4523788
       (Tex. App.--San Antonio Nov. 10, 2010, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                            10



                                                                     iv
                                          INDEX OF AUTHORITIES (cont’d)

                                                                                                                               Page(s)

Sanders v. State,
      832 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. App.--Austin
      1992, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .          7

State v. Hardy,
        963 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                           6

State v. Robinson,
        No. 13-12-00121-CR, 2013 WL 1188101
        (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi Mar. 21, 2013, pet. ref’d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                               3

State v. Robinson,
        No. 13-13-00571-CR, 2014 WL 4401523
        (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi Aug. 26, 2014, pet. granted) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                                 1



CONSTITUTIONS:

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .        passim

TEX. CONST., art. I, § 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    passim

TEX. CONST., art. I, § 19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     passim



RULES AND STATUTES:

TEX. R. APP. P. 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     11

TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .       passim

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .         8

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 41.12, § 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                  3, 7

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.44.29(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                passim

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.44.29(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                passim



                                                                       v
                                   STATEMENT OF THE CASE



Nature of the Case:                                   This is an appeal brought by the State of
                                                      Texas with regard to the trial court’s
                                                      granting of “shock probation” to the
                                                      Defendant, Olin Anthony Robinson.

Trial Court:                                          The Honorable Kemper S. Williams, III,
                                                      Presiding via assignment,
                                                      24th Judicial District Court,
                                                      Jackson County, Texas.

Parties in the Court of Appeals:                      The State of Texas – Appellant;
                                                      Olin Anthony Robinson – Appellee.

Court of Appeals:                                     Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Supreme
                                                      Judicial District of Texas; Opinion by
                                                      Justice Garza joined by Justices Rodriguez
                                                      and Benavides; State v. Robinson, No. 13-
                                                      13-00571-CR (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi
                                                      Aug.26, 2014, pet. granted).

Court of Appeals’ Disposition:                        Order of the trial court reversed and case
                                                      dismissed for want of jurisdiction.



                                     ISSUES PRESENTED

       The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the order of the trial court due to
       the fact that the Court of Appeals erred in its statutory construction of TEX.
       CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 41.12, § 6 versus the specific provisions contained
       in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2.

       The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s order due to the
       fact that the Court of Appeals violated TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 by not
       addressing the Petitioner’s contention that TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
       44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2 controlled the disposition of this
       appellate litigation.

       The Court of Appeals did not have the subject-matter jurisdiction to
       entertain a direct appeal from a trial court granting continuing jurisdiction
       community supervision.



                                                 vi
                            STATEMENT OF FACTS



      It is uncontroverted and undisputed that the Petitioner timely filed his

motion for continuing jurisdiction community jurisdiction and it is also

uncontroverted and undisputed that the trial court timely held a hearing and

granted the motion. The State complained that it was not given the opportunity for

a full evidentiary hearing and appealed the ruling of the trial court. On the first

appeal, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court to afford the State

a full evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, No. 13-12-00121-CR, 2013

WL 1188101, at *2 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi Mar. 21, 2013, pet. ref’d). The trial

court complied with the Court of Appeals’ mandate and, after affording the State a

full evidentiary hearing, again granted the motion for shock probation. The State

brought this present appeal claiming that the trial court did not have the jurisdiction

to enter the order granting shock probation after remand and the Court of Appeals

issued its opinion and judgment agreeing with the premise of the State. See State v.

Robinson, No. 13-13-00571-CR, 2014 WL 4401523 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi

Aug.26, 2014, pet. granted).

      On July 28, 2015, the Petitioner filed his Petition for Discretionary Review

with the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. On November 4, 2015, this Court

granted the Petition for Discretionary Review.
                        SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT



        When a Court of Appeals reverses and remands a case for proceedings

consistent with its opinion, the parties are placed in the same position at the time

they were before the appeal. See McNatt v. State, 188 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2006); Musgrove v. State, 82 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2002, pet.

ref’d); Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(d); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(a), (b). Statutory

construction requires that the above-referenced statute and rule be given their

“plain meaning” and a specific statute and rule will control over a general statute

and rule. See Ex parte Dotson, 76 S.W.3d 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

        A Court of Appeals is obligated to address an issue that has been properly

assigned and briefed and is not at liberty to ignore the issue when adjudicating an

appeal. See Keehn v. State, 233 S.W.3d 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Lone Star

Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 767 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. 1989); TEX. R. APP. P.

47.1.

        There is no constitutional authority or statutory authority permitting a direct

appeal from an order granting or denying continuing jurisdiction community

supervision (“shock probation”). See Houlihan v. State, 579 S.W.2d 213 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1979); Basaldua v. State, 558 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).




                                            2
                        ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES



I.    The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the order of the trial court due
      to the fact that the Court of Appeals erred in its statutory construction
      of TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 41.12, § 6 versus the specific provisions
      contained in TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP.
      P. 43.2.

      The Court of Appeals’ interpretation of TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 41.12, §

6 is in direct conflict with the specific provisions contained in TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. art. 44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d) and stands the doctrine of

statutory construction “on its head.”

      It is uncontroverted and undisputed that the Petitioner timely filed his

motion for shock probation and it is also uncontroverted and undisputed that the

trial court timely held a hearing and granted the motion. The State complained that

it was not given the opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing and appealed the

ruling of the trial court. On the first appeal, the Court of Appeals remanded the

case to the trial court to afford the State a full evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., State

v. Robinson, No. 13-12-00121-CR, 2013 WL 1188101, at *2 (Tex. App.--Corpus

Christi Mar. 21, 2013, pet. ref’d). The trial court complied with the Court of

Appeals’ mandate and, after affording the State a full evidentiary hearing, granted

the motion for shock probation. The State brought this present appeal claiming that

the trial court did not have the jurisdiction to enter the order granting shock


                                            3
probation after remand. The Court of Appeals issued its opinion agreeing with the

premise of the State. It is the Petitioner’s contention that the Court of Appeals’

opinion violates the doctrine of statutory construction and in the process violates

the doctrine of stare decisis and violates the Equal Protection and Due Process

Rights of the Appellee guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and Article I, §§ 3 and 19 of the Texas Constitution.

        The Court in Ex parte Dotson, 76 S.W.3d 393, 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002),

held:



              One of our general rules of statutory construction is that a more
              specific statute or rule will prevail over a more general one. (Citation
              omitted.)


(Emphasis added.)

        The Petitioner contends that TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(a), (b) and

TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d) are a specific statute and rule which directly control the

issue in the case at bar and they are both outcome determinative.

        The Court in Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991),

succinctly and unambiguously held:



              When we interpret statutes . . ., we seek to effectuate the “collective”
              intent or purpose of the legislators who enacted the legislation.
              (Citation omitted.) We do so because our state constitution
                                           4
             assigns the law making function to the Legislature while assigning the
             law interpreting function to the Judiciary. (Citation omitted.)

             When attempting to discern this collective legislative intent or
             purpose, we necessarily focus our attention on the literal text of the
             statute in question and attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning
             of that text at the time of its enactment. . . . We focus on the literal
             text also because the text is the only definitive evidence of what the
             legislators (and perhaps the Governor) had in mind when the statute
             was enacted into law. . . . Yet a third reason for focusing on the literal
             text is that the legislature is constitutionally entitled to expect the
             Judiciary will faithfully follow the specific text that was adopted.

             Thus, if the meaning of the statutory text, when read using the
             established canons of statutory construction relating to such text,
             should have been plain to the legislators who voted on it, we
             ordinarily give effect to that plain meaning.



(Emphasis added.)

      The Court of Appeals was required to give TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.

44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d) their “plain meaning.” Moreover, the

Court of Appeals is required, under the doctrine of stare decisis, to interpret the

statute and rule as announced by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas. The

Court in McNatt v. State, 188 S.W.3d 198, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), held:

             When a court of appeals reverses and remands a case to the trial court
             without instructions to render a specific judgment, the effect is to
             restore the parties to the same situation as that in which they were
             before the appeal.




                                           5
(Emphasis added.) See also Grimes v. State, 807 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991); Musgrove v. State, 82 S.W.3d 34, 37 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2002,
pet. ref’d).

        The Court of Appeals did not and cannot cite to a case from the Court of

Criminal Appeals of Texas which would allow and uphold the contentions of the

State after the Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the trial court. The

cases cited by the Court of Appeals to buttress its opinion are totally inapplicable

as a matter of law.

        The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas has, on more than one occasion,

interpreted and construed the “plain meaning” of TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.

44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d). The interpretation, or lack thereof, by the

Court of Appeals of the aforementioned statute and rule is anathema to the

interpretation by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas and such interpretation

violates the doctrine of stare decisis in the process.

        The Court in State v. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d 516, 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998),

held:



              When the legislature meets, after a particular statute has been
              judicially construed, without changing that statute, we presume the
              Legislature intended the same construction should continue to be
              applied to that statute.




                                           6
      TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d), by the

Court of Appeals’ remand without instructions, restored the Petitioner’s case to its

legal status before the first hearing and does not freeze the case in point of time

and the time limitations imposed by TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.12, § 6 are

totally not applicable to a hearing on remand, as interpreted by the Court of

Criminal Appeals of Texas. See also Sanders v. State, 832 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tex.

App.--Austin 1992, no pet.). If the intent is clear, the court’s responsibility is to

interpret the statute as intended by the legislature, even when the legislature’s

intent is to overrule a court’s own previous opinion. Leos v. State Emp. Workers’

Comp. Div., 734 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. 1987).

      The Court of Appeals has incorrectly interpreted the “plain meaning” of

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d) when

juxtaposed with TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.12, § 6 and in so doing has

violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Rights of the Petitioner as well as

violating the doctrine of stare decisis. The opinion and judgment of the Court of

Appeals should be reversed and the order of the trial court should be affirmed.




                                            7
II.   The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court’s order due to
      the fact that the Court of Appeals violated TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 by not
      addressing the Petitioner’s contention that TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
      44.29(a), (b) and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2 controlled the disposition of this
      appellate litigation.

      In its opinion, the Court of Appeals completely ignored and refused to

address the Petitioner’s contention that TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 44.29(a), (b)

and TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(d) control whether the trial court had the requisite

subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the Petitioner’s motion for shock probation

on remand. That issue was briefed on pages 1-3 of the Brief of Appellee in the

Court of Appeals below. The Court of Appeals did not have the authority to not

adjudicate an issue that was properly briefed and before the Court of Appeals.

      The Supreme Court of Texas in Lone Star Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission,

767 S.W.2d 709, 710-711 (Tex. 1989), succinctly and unambiguously held:



             “The court of appeals is obliged to ‘address every issue raised and
             necessary to final disposition of the appeal.’ . . . The courts of appeals
             are not at liberty to disregard them. [T]he rules do mandate full
             consideration of all issues raised to move the case as far as possible
             toward final disposition.”



(Emphasis added.) See also TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

      The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas in Keehn v. State, 233 S.W.3d 348,

349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), completely adopted the Supreme Court of Texas’


                                           8
interpretation and rationale concerning TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. The Court of Appeals

violated the doctrine of stare decisis and has violated the Due Process Rights of the

Appellant guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and Article I, § 19 of the Texas Constitution by not addressing merits

of the issue. The opinion and judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed

and remanded with instructions to address of the Petitioner’s issue.

III.   The Court of Appeals did not have the subject-matter jurisdiction to
       entertain a direct appeal from a trial court granting continuing
       jurisdiction community supervision.

             It is uncontroverted and undisputed that the State of Texas, by and

through the Jackson County District Attorney’s Office, brought forth a direct

appeal of the order of the trial court granting continuing jurisdiction community

supervision (“shock probation”) to the Petitioner. This action by the State not only

violates the doctrine of stare decisis, its action violates the Equal Protection and

Due Process Rights of the Petitioner guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to

the United States Constitution and Article I, §§ 3 and 19 of the Texas Constitution.

       It is well-settled Texas law that there is no constitutional or statutory

authority permitting a direct appeal from an order granting or denying “shock

probation” or from an order modifying or refusing to modify the conditions of

“shock probation.” See, e.g., Houlihan v. State, 579 S.W.2d 213, 215-216 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1979); Basaldua v. State, 558 S.W.2d 2, 5 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). See


                                           9
also Pippin v. State, 271 S.W.3d 861, 863-864 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 2009, no

pet.); Roberts v. State, No. 04-10-00558-CR, 2010 WL 4523788, at *1-2 (Tex.

App.--San Antonio Nov. 10, 2010, pet. ref’d).

      Unless and/or until the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas overrules its

holdings in Houlihan, Basaldua, and their progeny, the Court of Appeals was and

is bound by those decisions under the doctrine of stare decisis. The Court of

Appeals did not have the requisite subject-matter jurisdiction nor did it have the

legal authority to adjudicate the State’s appeal. To repeat, there is no case,

constitutional provision and/or statute to confer subject-matter jurisdiction over the

State’s direct appeal. The State’s appeal should have been dismissed for want of

jurisdiction. The opinion and judgment of the Court of Appeals should be reversed

and the order of the trial court should be affirmed.



                                      PRAYER

      For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner, Olin Anthony Robinson, requests that

the Court reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and enter judgment

affirming the order of the trial court in Cause No. 05-05-7221 or, in the alternative,

reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of

Appeals to address the merits of the unadjudicated issue presented by the Petitioner

in this appeal.


                                          10
                                      Respectfully submitted,

                                      WILLIE & ASSOCIATES, P.C.



                                   By:/s/ Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
                                      Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
                                      4151 Southwest Freeway, Suite 490
                                      Houston, Texas 77027
                                      (713) 659-7330
                                      (713) 599-1659 (FAX)
                                      SBOT# 21633500
                                      attyjrwii@wisamlawyers.com

                                      ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
                                      OLIN ANTHONY ROBINSON

                         CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

      I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
served via e-service to Robert E. Bell, Jackson County District Attorney, 115 W.
Main Street, Room 205, Edna, Texas 77957 and the State Prosecuting Attorney,
P.O. Box 12405, Capitol Station, Austin, Texas 78711, on the 5th day of
November, 2015.

                                      /s/ Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
                                      Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.

                      CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

      I certify that the Brief of Petitioner on the Merits submitted complies with
TEX. R. APP. P. 9 and the word count of this document is 2,336. The word
processing software used to prepare the document and to calculate the word count
is Windows 7.

                                      /s/ Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.
                                      Joseph R. Willie, II, D.D.S., J.D.



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