UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 99-4850

ANTONIO KENYATTA WRIGHT,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.
Patrick Michael Duffy, District Judge.
(CR-98-333)

Submitted: August 10, 2000

Decided: September 12, 2000

Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Capers G. Barr, III, BARR, UNGER & MCINTOSH, L.L.C.,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Matthew R. Hubbell,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Antonio Wright appeals his conviction after a guilty plea to one
count of money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1994), and one count
of distribution of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994). He was
sentenced to 180 months on each count, to run concurrently, followed
by five years of supervised release. Wright's attorney has filed a brief
in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising
three issues but stating that, in his view, there are no meritorious
issues for appeal. Wright was informed of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief but has failed to do so. Finding no reversible error,
we affirm. Counsel questions whether (1) the quantity of crack
cocaine attributed to Wright at sentencing was supported by the evi-
dence; (2) the district court erred in relying on hearsay evidence at
sentencing; and (3) the district court erred in failing to sentence him
at the low end of the guidelines range.

We find, first, that the district court did not clearly err in finding
that Wright was responsible for at least 150 grams of crack cocaine
because there was reliable evidence before the court that established
that he personally distributed that amount. See United States v. Cook,
76 F.3d 596, 604 (4th Cir. 1996) (district court's finding concerning
drug amounts attributable to a defendant are reviewed for clear error).
We also find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting hearsay testimony at Wright's sentencing hearing. See
United States v. Uwaeme, 975 F.2d 1016, 1021 (4th Cir. 1992) (the
sentencing court may consider any relevant information, including
hearsay evidence, provided that the information has"sufficient indicia
of reliability to support its probable accuracy" (quoting U.S. Sentenc-
ing Guidelines Manual § 6A1.3(a) (1991)).

Finally, Wright challenges the district court's decision to impose
sentence near the top of the guideline range of 151-188 months. How-
ever, a sentencing court has complete discretion to impose sentence
at any point within a correctly calculated guideline range, and its deci-
sion is not reviewable on appeal. See United States v. Jones, 18 F.3d
1145, 1151 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Porter, 909 F.2d 789,
794-95 (4th Cir. 1990).

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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We there-
fore affirm Wright's conviction and sentence.* This court requires
that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the client
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a peti-
tion would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave
to withdraw from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a
copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral argu-
ment because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the deci-
sional process.

AFFIRMED
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*We have considered the effect of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
___, 68 U.S.L.W. 4576 (June 26, 2000) (No. 98-478), and find that,
because Wright received a sentence of imprisonment and term of super-
vised release that did not exceed the statutory maximums set out in 21
U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(C) (West 1999), no plain error occurred. See
United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, ___ F.3d ___, 2000 WL 988128, at *6
(8th Cir. July 18, 2000).

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