UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

RUTH L. HENDERSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                                   No. 99-2123
COLUMBIA NATURAL RESOURCES, a
corporation; EDISON L. CASTO,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston.
Charles H. Haden II, Chief District Judge.
(CA-98-447-2)

Submitted: March 31, 2000

Decided: April 18, 2000

Before WILKINS, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Theodore R. Dues, Jr., THEODORE R. DUES, JR., L.C., Charleston,
West Virginia, Sharon M. Mullens, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellant. William E. Robinson, Michael A. Kawash, ROBINSON &
MCELWEE, L.L.P., Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Ruth L. Henderson appeals the district court's order granting sum-
mary judgment in favor of Columbia Natural Resources (Columbia),
and dismissing her claims of age and race discrimination in violation
of Title VII, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994), and the West Virginia
Human Rights Act. See W. Va. Code § 5-11-13 (1994). Henderson
filed this suit following her termination from her position as Place-
ment and EEO Administrator for Columbia. Although her termination
came as part of an on-going reduction in force, Henderson believed
that her treatment in the company and eventual termination were the
result of impermissible age and racial discrimination.

On this belief, Henderson filed this suit in state court. After
removal to the federal district court and significant discovery, Colum-
bia filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court found
that Henderson's Title VII claims were untimely and that she had
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to
her claims under the West Virginia Human Rights Act. As a result of
this finding, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Columbia and dismissed the action. Henderson appealed this final
order.

This Court reviews the grant of summary judgment in discrimina-
tion cases de novo. See Henson v. Liggett Group , 61 F.3d 270, 274
(4th Cir. 1995). The district court correctly dismissed Henderson's
cause of action under Title VII as untimely filed despite the timely
nature of her claims under the West Virginia Human Rights Act. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994); Watts-Means v. Prince George's
Family Crisis Ctr., 7 F.3d 40, 42 (4th Cir. 1993). Similarly, we find
no error in the district court's treatment of Henderson's evidence in
reaching the conclusion that Henderson failed to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination under the West Virginia Human Rights

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Act. See Dawson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 433 S.E.2d 268, 274 (W. Va.
1993). Henderson failed to establish the necessary link between the
Columbia's employment decisions and her status as a member of the
protected class "to give rise to an inference that the employment deci-
sion was based on an illegal discriminatory criterion." Conaway v.
Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 358 S.E.2d 423, 429 (W. Va. 1986).
Finally, we find no merit to Henderson's claim that the district court
applied an inappropriately stringent standard in analyzing her prima
facie case. See Hanlon v. Chambers, 464 S.E.2d 741, 748 (W. Va.
1995).

Because Henderson failed to establish a prima facie case of
employment discrimination under the West Virginia Human Rights
Act and failed to act on her rights under Title VII in a timely fashion,
we conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment in favor of Columbia and dismissing Henderson's civil
action. The district court's order is hereby affirmed. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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