UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, on
behalf of Arthur Jackson,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

BETTY M. RACEY,                                                        No. 96-2023
Defendant-Appellant,

and

JAMES E. MUIR,
Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge.
(CA-95-1798-JFM)

Submitted: April 17, 1997

Decided: May 7, 1997

Before NIEMEYER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

W. Ray Ford, Bowie, Maryland, for Appellant. Lynne A. Battaglia,
United States Attorney, Douglas B. Farquhar, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Betty M. Racey appeals from the district court's order,
following a bench trial, finding her guilty of violating 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(c) (1994), which prohibits the making of any statement, with
respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling, that indicates a racial pref-
erence or intent to discriminate based on race. On appeal, Racey con-
tends that her statements were merely an expression of her opinion,
not commercial speech, and were thus protected by the First Amend-
ment. She also asserts that the statute is overbroad because it could
apply to non-commercial speech. Finding no error, we affirm.

Racey, who lives in a suburb of Washington, D.C., sought to rent
a room in the basement of her home, and she placed an advertisement
in The Washington Post. The advertisement did not contain a sugges-
tion of an intent to discriminate. Arthur Jackson, who is black, called
Racey to respond to the ad. When Jackson informed Racey that he
was black, she told him that she would not rent to blacks. The district
court found that while Racey's refusal to rent to blacks was not
actionable,1 her discriminatory statements violated § 3604(c).

We find Racey's assertion that her statements to Jackson were not
commercial unpersuasive. While Racey did not explicitly propose a
commercial transaction in the conversation itself, the purpose of Jack-
son's call was to respond to Racey's offer to rent property. Therefore,
we find that the statements were made in the context of a potential
commercial transaction.

Since Racey's comments fall within the realm of commercial
speech, we must balance the First Amendment interests at stake
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1 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1994) creates an exception for single-family
houses rented by the owner-occupant.

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against the public interest served by the statute. See Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York , 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822-26 (1975).
We find that the public has an important interest in preventing dis-
crimination in housing. Moreover, even though the owner of "an
exempted dwelling is free to indulge his discriminatory preferences
in selling or renting that dwelling, neither the[Fair Housing] Act nor
the Constitution gives him a right to publicize his intent to so discrim-
inate." United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 213 (4th Cir. 1972).
Allowing discriminatory statements such as those here would under-
mine the purposes of the Fair Housing Act2 and would deter minori-
ties from exercising their rights to fair housing. We further find that
the statute here is narrowly tailored to accomplish this purpose.
Racey's claims concerning overbreadth are unfounded since only
aggrieved persons (i.e., persons who have been discriminated against
in obtaining housing) can recover under the statute.

We therefore affirm the order of the district court. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
quately presented in the material before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
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2 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994).

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