UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 00-4116

JOHN FRANKLIN BANKS,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Charlottesville.
James H. Michael, Jr., Senior District Judge.
(CR-97-86)

Submitted: June 30, 2000

Decided: September 18, 2000

Before MURNAGHAN,* NIEMEYER, and LUTTIG,
Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Thomas H. Johnson, Jr., GRAY, NEWELL & JOHNSON, Greens-
boro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert P. Crouch, Jr., United
States Attorney, Anthony P. Giorno, Assistant United States Attorney,
Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
_________________________________________________________________
*Judge Murnaghan participated in the consideration of this case but
died prior to the time the decision was filed. The decision is filed by a
quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 46(d).
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

This Court previously affirmed John Franklin Banks' conviction
for operating a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 848 (West Supp. 2000), and vacated his conviction for conspiracy,
21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (West Supp. 2000), in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 300 (1996). We
remanded the case to the district court for the limited purpose of
resentencing Banks only on the CCE conviction. See United States v.
Banks, No. 98-4879 (4th Cir. Oct. 12, 1999) (unpublished). This
court's mandate issued on November 3, 1999.

In his appeal from the sentence imposed on resentencing, Banks
claims that the district court erred when it denied his Fed. R. Crim.
P. 33 motion for a new trial because the jurors in his case were not
instructed that they were required to unanimously agree on the same
series of violations supporting Banks' CCE conviction. See Richard-
son v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 824 (1999). Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.

As an initial matter, Banks' Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 motion was time-
barred because a motion for new trial based on grounds other than the
discovery of new evidence must be made within seven days following
the jury's verdict. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 33; see also, United States v.
Hall, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2000 WL 674904, at *3-4 (D.C. Cir. June
2, 2000) (No. 99-3141).

To the extent that Banks' claim is considered as an objection to the
validity of the sentence imposed on resentencing, we must decide
whether his claim was precluded by the operation of the mandate rule.
The mandate rule provides that on remand, the district court may not
consider any issue "expressly or implicitly decided by the appellate
court . . . [or] foregone on appeal or otherwise waived." United States

                    2
v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993). Here, Banks did not challenge
the validity of his CCE conviction in his first appeal.* Therefore, it
is barred unless it falls into an exception to the mandate rule.

A court may consider a new issue on remand if there is "a `show-

[ing] that controlling legal authority has changed dramatically; [(2)
that] significant new evidence, not earlier obtainable in the exercise
of due diligence[, has come to light]; or . . . [(3)] that a blatant error

in the prior decision will, if uncorrected, result in a serious injustice.'"
Id. at 67 (quoting United States v. Bell , 988 F.2d 247, 251 (4th Cir.
1993)) (alterations in original). Here, even assuming that Richardson
constituted a dramatic change in controlling legal authority, the

change occurred prior to this Court's decision in Banks' first appeal.
Moreover, no serious injustice will result if the error is not corrected.
In the first appeal, this Court could have affirmed the conspiracy

charge and vacated the CCE charge in compliance with Rutledge.
Banks would have received the same life sentence to which he was
sentenced on the conspiracy charge. As such, Banks can show no

prejudice permitting him to relitigate the validity of his CCE convic-
tion. See generally United States v. Brown, 202 F.3d 691, 699 (4th
Cir. 2000) (holding that Richardson error is subject to harmless error
analysis).

Accordingly, we affirm Banks' conviction and life sentence on the
CCE charge. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
_________________________________________________________________

*The Richardson decision was issued on June 1, 1999, more than four
months prior to this Court's disposition of Banks' first appeal. A review
of the briefs and appendix in Banks' prior appeal reveals that Banks did
not challenge his CCE conviction in that appeal, nor were the jury
instructions or verdict form reproduced in the appendix.

                      3
