UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                     No. 99-4894

DION BRANDON FRANCIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Gerald Bruce Lee, District Judge.
(CR-99-214)

Submitted: May 31, 2000

Decided: July 25, 2000

Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

C. Dean Latsios, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Helen F. Fahey,
United States Attorney, Joshua Drew, Special Assistant United States
Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Dion Brandon Francis appeals his conviction for possession of
ammunition by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 922(g)(1) (West Supp. 1999). Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.

Francis first contends that the district court erred in denying his
motion for judgment of acquittal because the Government provided
insufficient evidence to prove that he knowingly possessed a shotgun
shell. This Court reviews de novo a district court's decision to deny
a motion for judgment of acquittal. See United States v. Romer, 148
F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1141 (1999).
However, when a motion for judgment of acquittal is based on the
claim that the evidence was insufficient, this Court reviews the denial
under the sufficiency of the evidence standard. See id. Under this
standard, "we are not entitled to weigh the evidence or to assess the
credibility of witnesses, `but must assume that the jury resolved all
contradictions . . . in favor of the Government.'" Id. (quoting United
States v. United Med. & Surgical Supply Corp., 989 F.2d 1390, 1402
(4th Cir. 1993)).

Here, the record provided ample evidence that Francis construc-
tively possessed the shotgun shell. See United States v. Jackson, 124
F.3d 607, 610 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that a defendant can possess
contraband constructively). Several witnesses saw Francis with a
loaded shotgun the day before his arrest. One of these witnesses
observed Francis driving the vehicle, in which he was arrested one
day later, with a shotgun tucked between his leg and the vehicle's
console. After his arrest, a weapon search of the vehicle revealed an
unexpended shotgun shell in plain sight in front of the driver's seat
that the driver, Francis, could have easily reached. We find that, view-
ing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, this
evidence sufficiently established that Francis knowingly possessed
the shotgun shell. See United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106, 107 (4th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Lewis, 701 F.2d 972, 973-74 (D.C. Cir.
1983).

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Francis next contends that the district court erred when giving a
supplemental instruction in response to a question the jury posed after
it began deliberations. Because the necessity, intent, and character of
supplemental jury instructions are matters within the discretion of the
trial court, we review for abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 646 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Horton, 921
F.2d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 1990). In reviewing the district court's
response, this Court inquires whether the instruction responded to the
jury's question "fairly and accurately without creating prejudice."
Smith, 62 F.3d at 646. An error requires reversal only if it is prejudi-
cial in the context of the record as a whole. See United States v.
United Med. & Surgical Supply Corp., 989 F.2d 1390, 1406-07 (4th
Cir. 1993). Contrary to Francis' assertion on appeal, we find no basis
to conclude that the district court confused the jury by giving a sup-
plemental instruction that directly quoted Rule 404(b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Moreover, the instruction was not improper under
Rule 404(b) because it did not relate to extrinsic evidence. See United
States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 885 (4th Cir. 1994). Hence, we find
no abuse of discretion.

Accordingly, we affirm Francis' conviction. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pre-
sented in the material before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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