
192 U.S. 168 (1904)
WARD
v.
SHERMAN.
No. 25.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued October 15, 16, 1903.
Decided January 11, 1904.
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF ARIZONA.
*173 Mr. A.B. Browne and Mr. A.A. Hoehling, Jr., with whom Mr. C.S. Wilson was on the brief, for appellant.
*174 Mr. C.F. Ainsworth for appellee.
MR. JUSTICE BREWER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The Supreme Court of the Territory, without considering the merits of the case, affirmed the judgment on the ground that the assignment of errors was insufficient, citing in its opinion from a rule of practice which had been prescribed by it and in force for many years: "All assignments of errors must distinctly specify each ground of error relied upon, and the particular ruling complained of. . . . An objection to the ruling or action of the court below will be deemed waived here, unless it has been assigned as error, in the manner above provided." Undoubtedly the assignment of errors was general in its terms. An application was made to the Supreme Court for leave to amend the assignment of errors, but it was denied. In a short per curiam opinion that court, after condemning the assignments as insufficient, said:
"The rules relating to assignments and specifications of error have been so long in force, and we have so often decided that a failure to make proper assignments amounts to a waiver of all errors which are not fundamental, that it would seem there should be no longer occasion for disregard of these plain requirements. In the absence of any assignment of error in this case, and none appearing upon the face of the record, the judgment must be affirmed."
We shall not stop to inquire whether the court erred in refusing to permit an amendment of the assignment of errors, but accepting its conclusion that the failure to make proper assignments is "a waiver of all errors which are not fundamental," and bearing in mind the provisions of section 5 of the statute of 1897, that all rulings made by the court below in opposition to the plaintiff or appellant are to be taken as excepted to, we proceed to inquire whether there was not a fundamental error which should have been corrected by the *175 Supreme Court. We are of opinion that there was. It may be assumed, as no objection was made on that account, that the counterclaim, which was in its nature a bill in equity for the redemption of the mortgaged property, was properly filed in this action to recover money. Can such a bill be sustained under the circumstances disclosed by the answer? It appears from that answer that the property was turned over to Ward to hold, not as mortgagee, but under a contract by which he was to take the property in satisfaction of the debt, cancel the mortgage and return the notes. In other words, according to the averments of the answer a contract of sale was made by the company to Ward, and under the contract of sale Ward took possession. Now, even if it be conceded that Ward's failure to perform was such a breach of the contract as entitled the company to rescind and thereafter to treat Ward as a mortgagee in possession, a bill in equity to enforce such a decision must be presented within a reasonable time. The right to rescind is an affirmative right, asserted by the vendor, the former mortgagor, and, being such, it must be asserted by him within a reasonable time. The answer alleges that on or about October 1, 1895, this agreement was made and the property delivered, but it was not filed until May 16, 1899, more than three years and a half thereafter. During all that time, Ward was in possession of the property, managing and dealing with it as his own. Can it be that a vendor can wait three years and a half, permit the vendee to deal with the property as his own  that property being of a value variable from year to year and requiring constant care to make it prosperous  give his time and labor to its management, take the chances of rise or fall in the market, and then, if it turns out that the business has been prosperous through his efforts, insist on account of some technical failure upon a rescission of the contract, and that the party who has been supposing himself the owner, and acting as such, shall be treated as a mortgagee in possession, and held to account for the success of his business efforts? In Pollock's Principles of Contracts, p. 515, the author says:
*176 "The contract must be rescinded within a reasonable time, that is, before the lapse of a time after the true state of things is known, so long that under the circumstances of the particular case the other party may fairly infer that the right of rescission is waived."
See also Grymes v. Sanders, 93 U.S. 55; McLean v. Clapp, 141 U.S. 429, 432.
But was there any ground for the rescission of the contract? There was no fraud, mistake or false representations. There is no suggestion that the contract was not entered into with full knowledge or that it was unfair in any of its details. The complaint merely is that Ward was guilty of a breach of one of its stipulations. If so, the company was entitled to damages for that breach, but no damages are shown. The company paid nothing; has lost nothing. So far as disclosed it went out of business, and therefore the failure to release the mortgage could not have injured its business credit. But whatever may be the rights, other than a simple claim of damages for breach of contract, possessed by the company and transferred by it to the defendant Sherman, they are equitable in their nature, and in respect to them the general doctrine of laches applies. We have often had occasion to consider the question of laches. In Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U.S. 368, 373, and Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Austin, 168 U.S. 685, are collected the decisions of the court. In the former of these cases it is said, p. 372.
"They (the adjudicated cases) proceed on the assumption that the party to whom laches is imputed has knowledge of his rights, and an ample opportunity to establish them in the proper forum; that by reason of his delay the adverse party has good reason to believe that the alleged rights are worthless, or have been abandoned; and that, because of the change in condition or relations during this period of delay, it would be an injustice to the latter to permit him to now assert them." And again, p. 373:
"But it is unnecessary to multiply cases. They all proceed *177 upon the theory that laches is not, like limitation, a mere matter of time; but principally a question of the inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced  an inequity founded upon some change in the condition or relations of the property or the parties."
And in the last case, p. 698:
"The reason upon which the rule is based is not alone the lapse of time during which the neglect to enforce the right has existed, but the changes of condition which may have arisen during the period in which there has been neglect. In other words, where a court of equity finds that the position of the parties has so changes that equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening rights of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable powers in order to save one from the consequences of his own neglect."
Apply these considerations to the case at bar. The property was turned over on a contract of sale. Ward was left in possession for over three years and a half without a suggestion of any claim that he was only a mortgagee in possession. He had a right to believe that he was the owner. If the contract had not been made he could have foreclosed his mortgage and acquired title by sale under foreclosure proceedings. He dealt with the property as his own. He gave his time, skill and labor to the work of caring for it. It is impossible to replace the parties in the situation they were in at the time the contract was made. It would be grossly inequitable to deprive him of the benefit of his time, skill and labor, and give it to the mortgagor, who all those years did nothing and gave no notice of any question of the completeness of Ward's title. It seems to us that the doctrine of laches applies with force, and that upon the pleadings the court should have adjudged the defendant not entitled either to a rescission of the contract or to hold the vendee as a mortgagee in possession.
If we look beyond the pleadings to the testimony (and that, as we have seen, was by virtue of the statute made a part of the *178 record of the case in the Supreme Court) the error of the trial court is even more apparent.
The agreement of September 12 provided for the transfer and conveyance of all cattle on the Sunflower range, branded with the named brands, "excepting only from the provision of said conveyance such cattle as shall have been sold and delivered by said Sherman-Hardenberg Cattle Company prior or to September 1, 1894, it being understood that all stock cattle which may have been sold subsequent to September 1, 1894, shall be accounted for by the party of the second part to said party of the first part." By this all the cattle belonging to the company on September 1 were to be transferred to the plaintiff, and if any of such cattle had been sold subsequently to September 1 they were to be accounted for by the company to the plaintiff. Further, the agreement stipulated for the delivery and cancellation of the notes and mortgage "in consideration of the said party of the second part conveying to said party of the first part all of the property hereinbefore described within thirty days from the date hereof, and delivering possession of the same to said party of the first part or his authorized agent, in said county of Maricopa aforesaid." By the undisputed testimony two lots of cattle, one of 69 or 70 head and the other of 34 or 35 head, were sold and delivered by the company to other parties than the plaintiff after the first of September. Therefore the company was to account for those cattle so sold and delivered, and the duty resting upon Ward to surrender and cancel the notes and mortgage was conditioned upon the delivery within the county of the property described within thirty days from September 12. In short, the terms of the contract were clear. Ward performed all that he was under obligations to perform. The default was on the part of the company. Ward took possession of the property delivered, managed it successfully for several years, and still the court held that the defaulting party could take advantage of its own default, appropriate the entire profits of Ward's care and ability, and upon that basis adjudged against Ward the *179 return of all the property then in his possession and the payment of over seventeen thousand dollars. But it is said that Ward himself repudiated the agreement because he brought suit on the first of the notes. There may have been a technical mistake in the form of the action, but there was no repudiation of the agreement, as is shown by the fact that the complaint only asked judgment for $1500, and that Ward filed with the complaint an affidavit for an attachment, in which he averred that the payment of the sum due was "not secured by any mortgage or lien upon real or personal property or any pledge of personal property." But equity will not destroy rights on account of a mere technical mistake of counsel. It may be conceded that Ward should have brought an action in form for the value of the cattle not delivered, but it is manifest that that value was all that he was seeking to recover.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Arizona is reversed and the case remanded to that court with instructions to reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case to that court for further proceedings in conformity to the views herein expressed.
