           MICA RINGO, PETITIONER v. COMMISSIONER
             OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT

          Docket No. 29562–12W.             Filed October 6, 2014.

        P filed with R’s Whistleblower Office (W) an application for
      a whistleblower award under I.R.C. sec. 7623. On Nov. 7,
      2012, W mailed to P a letter stating that P was ineligible for
      such an award because P did not provide R with information
      that resulted in the collection of any tax from the target. P
      timely filed a petition with this Court. I.R.C. sec. 7623(b)(4)
      provides that ‘‘[a]ny determination regarding an award under
      paragraph (1), (2), or (3) [of I.R.C. sec. 7623(b)] may, within
      30 days of such determination, be appealed to the Tax Court
      (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect to
      such matter).’’ On June 11, 2013, W notified P that W was
      still considering P’s application and that W had mailed the
      Nov. 7, 2012, letter to P in error. R then moved to dismiss
      this case for lack of jurisdiction. Held: The Nov. 7, 2012, letter
      was a determination and this Court has jurisdiction with
      respect to the matter. Held, further, the fact that R continued
      to consider P’s application after sending the Nov. 7, 2012,
      letter does not terminate this Court’s jurisdiction.

  Thomas C. Pliske and Shine Lin, for petitioner.
  Jonathan D. Tepper, for respondent.

                                 OPINION

   COLVIN, Judge: The Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
Whistleblower Office mailed to petitioner a letter on
November 7, 2012, stating that he was ineligible for a
whistleblower award under section 7623. Petitioner com-
menced this whistleblower proceeding by timely filing a peti-
tion pursuant to section 7623(b)(4). 1 Respondent moves to
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. As discussed below,
we will deny respondent’s motion.
  1 Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all rel-

evant times. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.

                                                                           297
298         143 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                      (297)


  Neither party requested a hearing, and we conclude that
none is necessary to decide respondent’s motion to dismiss.
The following undisputed information appears in the
pleadings or respondent’s motion to dismiss.
  Petitioner resided in Texas when the petition was filed.

                             Background
   On February 17, 2011, petitioner filed with the Whistle-
blower Office a Form 211, Application for Award for Original
Information. Petitioner filed an amended Form 211 with that
office on October 6, 2011.
   On November 7, 2012, the Whistleblower Office mailed to
petitioner a letter (November 7, 2012, letter) stating that he
was ineligible for a whistleblower award under section 7623
because he had not provided the IRS with information that
resulted in the collection of any proceeds. That letter stated:
 Dear Mica Ringo:
 We have considered your application for an award dated February 11,
 2011. Under Internal Revenue Code Section 7623, an award may be paid
 only if the information provided results in the collection of additional
 tax, penalties, interest or other proceeds. In this case, the information
 you provided did not result in the collection of any proceeds. Therefore,
 you are not eligible for an award.
 Although the information you submitted did not qualify for an award,
 thank you for your interest in the administration of the internal revenue
 laws.
 If you have any further questions in regards to this letter, please feel
 free to contact the Informant Claims Examination Team at * * *.
         Sincerely,
         /s
         Cindy Wilde
         Supervisor—Whistleblower Office, Ogden

  Petitioner petitioned the Court on December 7, 2012, to
invoke our jurisdiction under section 7623(b)(4). On June 11,
2013, the Whistleblower Office sent a letter (June 11, 2013,
letter) to petitioner stating that the November 7, 2012, letter
had been sent in error and that the Whistleblower Office was
still considering his application for an award. That letter
said:
(297)                  RINGO v. COMMISSIONER                             299


  Dear Mr Ringo:
  The L–1010 letter dated November 7 2012 [i.e., the November 7, 2012,
  letter] was sent to you in error. We are still considering your application
  for award F–211. We are sorry for this inconvenience.
          Sincerely,
          /s
          Cindy Wilde
          Supervisor—Whistleblower Office, Ogden

                               Discussion
   The Tax Court may exercise jurisdiction only to the extent
expressly provided by Congress. See sec. 7442; Breman v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 61, 66 (1976); see also Rule 13.
Respondent contends that the Court lacks jurisdiction in this
case, and petitioner does not object to respondent’s assertion.
However, our jurisdiction is not expanded or contracted by
the positions of the parties. Thus, it is not dispositive that
both parties claim that we lack jurisdiction. SECC Corp. v.
Commissioner, 142 T.C. 225, 230 (2014); Charlotte’s Office
Boutique, Inc. v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 89, 102 (2003),
aff ’d, 425 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2005). We will independently
decide whether we have jurisdiction.
   In the June 11, 2013, letter, the Whistleblower Office said
it was still considering information petitioner had provided.
Thus, respondent contends that the November 7, 2012, letter
was not a ‘‘definitive determination’’ as to petitioner’s
application and that we lack jurisdiction in this case.
   We disagree. Whether the Court has jurisdiction in a case
depends on facts as of the time that our jurisdiction is
invoked. See Charlotte’s Office Boutique, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 425 F.3d at 1208; NT, Inc. v. Commissioner, 126 T.C.
191, 194 n.2 (2006); see also Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91,
93 n.1 (1957) (‘‘ ‘It is quite clear that the jurisdiction of the
Court depends upon the state of things at the time of the
action brought, and that after vesting, it cannot be ousted by
subsequent events.’ ’’ (quoting Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.))). Once the Court
acquires jurisdiction over a matter, our jurisdiction generally
continues unimpaired until we enter our decision or our
jurisdiction is otherwise terminated by the Court. See NT,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 126 T.C. at 194 n.2; Wagner v.
Commissioner, 118 T.C. 330 (2002); Naftel v. Commissioner,
300           143 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                     (297)


85 T.C. 527, 529–530 (1985); see also Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas
Global Grp. L.P., 541 U.S. 567 (2004); Smith, 354 U.S. at 93
n.1.
   Section 7623(b)(4) provides that ‘‘[a]ny determination
regarding an award under paragraph (1), (2), or (3) may,
within 30 days of such determination, be appealed to the Tax
Court (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction with respect
to such matter).’’ 2 Thus, a whistleblower proceeding is com-
menced under section 7623(b)(4) when (1) the IRS makes a
determination regarding an award under section 7623(b)(1),
(2), or (3); and (2) a petition is timely filed as to that deter-
mination. See Whistleblower 14106–10W v. Commissioner,
137 T.C. 183, 186–187 (2011); Kasper v. Commissioner, 137
T.C. 37, 41 (2011); Cooper v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 70, 73–
74 (2010).
   The November 7, 2012, letter contains a determination for
purposes of section 7623(b)(4). See Cooper v. Commissioner,
135 T.C. at 75–76 (stating that this Court has jurisdiction
under section 7623 with regard to a letter not labeled a
determination where, as here, the letter stated that the
applicant was not entitled to an award and provided an
explanation for that conclusion); see also Kasper v. Commis-
sioner, 137 T.C. at 41. The fact that the Whistleblower Office
said in a letter dated June 11, 2013, that the determination
was not definitive does not terminate this Court’s jurisdic-
tion. The November 7, 2012, letter contains a determination,
and petitioner filed a timely petition invoking our jurisdiction
under section 7623(b)(4) with respect to that matter. Our
jurisdiction is unaffected by the fact that the Whistleblower
Office later told petitioner it was still considering informa-
tion he provided.
   Our conclusion is supported by consideration of rules
relating to notices of deficiency. The Court acquires jurisdic-
tion in a deficiency case when the IRS has determined a defi-
ciency and the taxpayer timely files a petition. See secs.
  2 Para. (1) of sec. 7623(b) generally requires that the IRS pay an indi-

vidual 15% to 30% of the collected proceeds where the IRS proceeds with
any administrative or judicial action based on certain information fur-
nished by the individual. Para. (2) generally lets the IRS pay an individual
up to 10% of the collected proceeds in certain other cases. Para. (3) sets
forth rules under which the IRS may reduce an award otherwise payable
under para. (1) or (2).
(297)                  RINGO v. COMMISSIONER                           301


6212(a), 6213(a). It is the determination of a deficiency,
rather than the existence of a deficiency, that provides the
basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hannan v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C. 787, 791 (1969). Thus, even if a deter-
mination in a notice of deficiency is erroneous or the
Commissioner concedes the determination in full, the notice
is generally not rendered void but continues to provide a
basis for our jurisdiction. See, e.g., Charlotte’s Office Bou-
tique, Inc. v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. at 103 (stating that the
Commissioner’s concession of employment tax issue during a
proceeding in this Court did not deprive the Court of jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter underlying that issue); LTV
Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 589 (1975) (stating that the
Commissioner’s concession of no deficiency for a year did not
deprive the Court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
that year); Cawal v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992–444.
Similarly, the Court does not lose jurisdiction when the
Commissioner wishes to revoke or issues in error a notice of
determination in a collection case. Kim v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2005–96. 3
   On the basis of the foregoing, we hold that we have juris-
diction, and we will deny respondent’s motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction.
                               An appropriate order will be issued.

                            f




  3 In Whistleblower 22231–12W v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014–157, at
*12–*13, we said that ‘‘[s]ince the [Whistleblower] Office was still inves-
tigating * * * [an issue raised in a Whistleblower’s claim], it had not yet
made ‘a final administrative decision regarding petitioner’s whistle-
blower claim in accordance with the established procedures.’ ’’ Our hold-
ing in Whistleblower 22231–12W is consistent with our holding herein be-
cause in Whistleblower 22231–12W there had not been a determination at
the time the petition was filed.
