DANIEL RICHARD BUCZEK, PETITIONER v. COMMISSIONER
        OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT

      Docket No. 8512–14L.             Filed October 6, 2014.

    P timely filed a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due
  Process or Equivalent Hearing, with attachments, in response
  to a final notice of intent to levy to collect P’s unpaid income
  tax liability for 2009. P did not raise any issues specified in

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      I.R.C. sec. 6330(c)(2) or make any allegations that reasonably
      indicated he was raising such an issue. The Appeals Office
      sent P a letter stating that, pursuant to I.R.C. sec. 6330(g),
      it was disregarding P’s hearing request because P’s disagree-
      ment was frivolous and the IRS Collection Division could pro-
      ceed with collecting P’s unpaid tax liability for 2009. This
      ‘‘disregard letter’’ resembles the letters that the Appeals
      Office sent to the taxpayers in Thornberry v. Commissioner,
      136 T.C. 356 (2011). R filed a motion to dismiss for lack of
      jurisdiction. R asserts that, contrary to the Court’s holding in
      Thornberry, this Court does not have jurisdiction when a dis-
      regard letter is issued. R asserts that the holding in
      Thornberry eviscerates I.R.C. sec. 6330(g) and requests that
      the Court overturn it. We decline to do so. Held: The Tax
      Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s deter-
      mination as to whether a taxpayer who has sought judicial
      review under I.R.C. sec. 6330(d)(1) has raised an issue other
      than issues that have been identified by the Secretary as
      frivolous or that reflect a desire to delay or impede the
      administration of Federal tax laws. Thornberry v. Commis-
      sioner, 136 T.C. 356, followed and clarified. Held, further,
      because P did not raise on Form 12153 any issues specified
      in I.R.C. sec. 6330(c)(2) that may be considered in an adminis-
      trative hearing, no portion of P’s request for a hearing is
      excluded from R’s determination to disregard the entire
      request and I.R.C. sec. 6330(g) prohibits further judicial
      review of that determination. Thornberry v. Commissioner,
      136 T.C. 356, distinguished. Held, further, because R’s deter-
      mination that the IRS Collection Division could proceed with
      collecting P’s unpaid tax liability for 2009 was not made in
      response to a proper request for a hearing, i.e., the entire
      request was properly treated as if it had never been sub-
      mitted, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review that determina-
      tion and R’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction will be
      granted. Thornberry v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 356, distin-
      guished.

  Daniel Richard Buczek, pro se.
  John M. Janusz, for respondent.

                                OPINION

   DAWSON, Judge: This collection case is before the Court on
respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Peti-
tioner timely filed the petition for review of the determina-
tion by the Appeals Office to proceed with levy to collect his
unpaid tax assessed for 2009, sent to him in response to his
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request for a hearing pursuant to sections 6320 and 6330 1
(hearing request).
   The determination letter states that, under the authority
of section 6330(g), the Appeals Office was disregarding peti-
tioner’s entire hearing request because his disagreement is
either a position that the Secretary has identified as frivo-
lous or reflects a desire to delay or impede the administra-
tion of Federal tax laws, and therefore, his request was being
returned to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Collection
Division and the Collection Division could proceed with col-
lecting the tax. The determination letter resembles the ‘‘dis-
regard letters’’ the Appeals Office issued to the taxpayers in
Thornberry v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 356 (2011). This Court
held in Thornberry that the statements in disregard letters
that the IRS collection office could proceed with collection
action were determinations for purposes of section 6330(d)(1)
and that this Court had jurisdiction to review the Appeals
Office’s determination that the taxpayer raised only frivolous
arguments. Respondent asserts that, contrary to the Court’s
holding in Thornberry, this Court does not have jurisdiction
when a disregard letter is issued and that he has made no
determination concerning collection action or any other deter-
mination that would confer jurisdiction on this Court with
respect to petitioner’s taxable year 2009. Respondent asserts
that Thornberry was decided incorrectly in that it eviscerates
section 6330(g), which denies judicial review of the portions
of a request for an administrative hearing that the Appeals
Office determined are frivolous. Therefore, respondent
requests that the Court overturn Thornberry. We decline to
overturn Thornberry and explain herein why Thornberry nei-
ther violates nor eviscerates section 6330(g). The administra-
tive hearing requests that the taxpayers in Thornberry sub-
mitted are in stark contrast to petitioner’s request. A
comparison of our review of the section 6330(g) determina-
tion with respect to the taxpayers’ hearing requests in
Thornberry with our review of the determination with
respect to petitioner’s request elucidates the standard we
apply in making such a review.
  1 Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amend-

ed and in effect at all relevant times.
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                         Background
   Petitioner resided in New York when he filed the petition.
   On November 13, 2013, respondent sent petitioner a final
notice of intent to levy to collect his unpaid Federal income
tax and interest assessed for 2009. On November 20, 2013,
petitioner returned the notice of intent to levy to the Appeals
Office with a timely filed Form 12153, Request for a Collec-
tion Due Process or Equivalent Hearing, and seven addi-
tional pages. Each page of the notice of intent to levy was
stamped ‘‘Pursuant to UCC 3–501’’, ‘‘Refused from the
cause’’, ‘‘Consent not given’’, and ‘‘Permission DENIED’’. On
the Form 12153 petitioner did not check any of the boxes but
wrote ‘‘common law hearing’’ on the line where he could have
stated another reason for requesting the hearing. Thus, on
the Form 12153 he did not request a collection alternative,
he did not assert that he could not pay the tax, he did not
request relief under section 6015, and he did not raise any
other relevant issue related to the unpaid tax or proposed
levy. Nor did he raise any relevant issues in the seven addi-
tional pages submitted with the Form 12153.
   On January 27, 2014, petitioner and his wife filed the peti-
tion in docket No. 1390–14, seeking review of a notice of defi-
ciency for an unspecified year. Attached to the petition were
many documents, including a statutory notice of deficiency
issued to petitioner’s wife for 2011 and several collection
notices (i.e., Notice of Levy, Notice of Federal Tax Lien, Final
Notice of Intent To Levy and Notice of Your Right to a
Hearing, and Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your
Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320).
   On March 12, 2014, the Appeals Office sent petitioner a
letter titled ‘‘Appeals is disregarding your request for a
Collection Due Process and/or Equivalent Hearing’’. The
letter indicates that petitioner did not respond to a January
21, 2014, letter from the Appeals Office requesting that he
amend the hearing request to provide a legitimate reason for
the hearing or withdraw the request. The disregard letter
informed petitioner that, under the authority of section
6330(g), the Appeals Office was disregarding his request for
an administrative hearing because it had determined that
his disagreement is:
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  • a ‘‘specified frivolous position’’, identified by the IRS in Notice 2008–
  14 (for Notice 2008–14, refer to the IRS Internet website at http://
  www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0..id=177519,00.html); or
  • a reason that is not a ‘‘specified frivolous position,’’ but is a frivolous
  reason reflecting a desire to delay or impede federal tax administration;
  or
  • a moral, religious, political, constitutional, conscientious, or similar
  objection to the imposition or payment of federal taxes that reflects a
  desire to delay or impede the administration of federal tax laws.

The letter stated that the Appeals Office was returning peti-
tioner’s request to the IRS collection office and that ‘‘Collec-
tion may proceed with collection action as if the hearing
request was never submitted.’’
   On March 20, 2014, petitioner and his wife filed, in docket
No. 1390–14, a notice of appeals letter dated March 12, 2014
(notice of disregard letter), to which they attached a copy of
the March 12, 2014, disregard letter sent to petitioner
regarding the collection of his 2009 tax liability. In the order
dated April 24, 2014, the Court dismissed petitioner from the
case at docket No. 1390–14 for lack of jurisdiction and
ordered the notice of disregard letter to be filed, as of March
20, 2014, as an imperfect petition to commence this case
regarding the collection of his tax liability for 2009. The
Court ordered petitioner to file a proper amended petition on
or before May 15, 2014.
   On May 5, 2014, petitioner filed the amended petition. On
May 16, 2014, petitioner filed a response to the April 24,
2014, order and the ‘‘Notice of Judicial Ruling’’. On June 23
and 27, 2014, petitioner respectively filed the first amended
response to the April 24, 2014, order and a status report. In
those pleadings, petitioner primarily complains about the
conduct of an IRS agent who is not the Appeals officer who
reviewed his request and sent him the March 12, 2014, dis-
regard letter. He raises no justiciable issue with regard to
the Appeals Office’s disregard of his hearing request or its
determination to proceed with the collection of his unpaid
income tax liability for 2009.
   On July 2, 2014, respondent filed the motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction.
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                          Discussion
   Sections 6320(a)(1) and 6330(a)(1), respectively, require the
Commissioner to give a taxpayer written notices when a
notice of Federal tax lien is filed upon the taxpayer’s prop-
erty and when the Commissioner intends to levy upon the
taxpayer’s property. The notices must inform the taxpayer of
the right to request a hearing in the Appeals Office (adminis-
trative hearing). Secs. 6320(a)(3)(B), 6330(a)(3)(B). In the
request for an administrative hearing the taxpayer must
state the grounds for the requested hearing. Secs. 6320(b)(1),
6330(b)(1). If a taxpayer makes a timely written request and
states the grounds for the requested hearing, he is entitled
to a fair hearing conducted by an impartial officer from the
Appeals Office. Secs. 6320(b), 6330(b); Mason v. Commis-
sioner, 132 T.C. 301, 315 (2009).
   During the administrative hearing the taxpayer may raise
any relevant issue related to the unpaid tax or proposed
collection action, including appropriate spousal defenses,
challenges to the appropriateness of collection actions, and
collection alternatives. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(A). The taxpayer also
may raise challenges to the existence or amount of the
underlying tax liability, but only if he/she did not receive a
notice of deficiency for that liability or did not otherwise have
an opportunity to dispute it. Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B). However, the
taxpayer may not properly raise an issue that meets either
of the requirements of section 6702(b)(2)(A)(i) or (ii); i.e., is
based on a position which the Secretary has identified as
frivolous under section 6702(c) or reflects a desire to delay or
impede the administration of Federal tax laws. Sec.
6330(c)(4)(B). If the Appeals officer determines that any por-
tion of the taxpayer’s hearing request is frivolous, he may
treat that portion as if it were never submitted. Sec. 6330(g).
Section 6330(g) denies further administrative or judicial
review of the portions of a hearing request that the Appeals
Office determined are frivolous.
   After the administrative hearing is completed, the Appeals
Office issues a written notice of determination indicating
whether the notice of Federal tax lien should remain in effect
and/or whether the proposed levy may proceed. Sec.
6330(c)(3); secs. 301.6320–1(e)(3), Q&A–E8, 301.6330–1(e)(3),
Q&A–E8, Proced. & Admin. Regs. A taxpayer may appeal the
(301)             BUCZEK v. COMMISSIONER                    307


Appeals Office determination to the Tax Court within 30
days of the determination; and if an appeal is timely filed,
the Court will have jurisdiction with respect to the matter.
Sec. 6330(d)(1); sec. 301.6330–1(f)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs.
   We have jurisdiction to determine our jurisdiction. Cooper
v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 70 (2010). Our jurisdiction under
section 6330(d)(1) depends upon the issuance of a valid notice
of determination and a timely petition for review. Thornberry
v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. at 363; Sarrell v. Commissioner,
117 T.C. 122, 125 (2001); Offiler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.
492, 498 (2000). In Thornberry v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. at
363–364, the Court held that the Appeals Office statement in
the disregard letters that the IRS collection office could pro-
ceed with collection action is a determination for purposes of
section 6330(d)(1). We observed that section 6703(a) clearly
contemplates judicial review with respect to an Appeals
Office determination that a request for an administrative
hearing under sections 6320 and 6330 is a specified frivolous
submission. The Appeals Office determination that a tax-
payer’s entire hearing request is disregarded because his dis-
agreement is frivolous is essentially a determination that the
request is a specified frivolous submission. Indeed, the
Appeals Office frequently imposes the civil penalty under
section 6702(a) on a taxpayer whose hearing request was dis-
regarded because the Appeals Office determined it was frivo-
lous. See, e.g., Kurka v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2014–96.
Consequently, while section 6330(g) prohibits judicial review
of the portion of a request for an administrative hearing that
the Appeals Office determined is frivolous, it does not pro-
hibit judicial review of the determination by the Appeals
Office that the request is frivolous and is disregarded.
Thornberry v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. at 367.
   In Thornberry, the taxpayers timely requested administra-
tive hearings under sections 6320 and 6330 in response to
notices of intent to levy and notices of Federal tax lien filing
sent to them with respect to their unpaid tax liabilities,
including a section 6702 penalty, for 2000, 2001, 2002, and
2007. They checked almost every box on the Forms 12153,
indicating that they requested an installment agreement or
an offer-in-compromise as a collection alternative and
requested subordination, discharge, or withdrawal of the lien.
They set forth additional grounds for their requests in an
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attachment they downloaded from the Web site of an
organization with a history of promoting frivolous arguments
and activities that delay or impede the administration of the
Federal tax laws. Each attachment listed 23 boilerplate
items, of which 21 were checked and 2 were unchecked.
Although many of the grounds listed on the attachment did
not apply to the taxpayers, in their requests they asserted
claims properly allowed under section 6330(c)(2), inter alia
that: (1) collection action would place an undue hardship on
them and they requested collection alternatives; (2) they
qualified for subordination and requested that the notice of
lien be withdrawn; (3) they did not receive notices of defi-
ciency for the assessed income taxes or the section 6702 pen-
alty and had not had an opportunity to contest the tax liabil-
ities; and (4) they were requesting reconsideration of the
income tax deficiencies and the section 6702 penalty.
   In Thornberry v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. at 371, we stated
that it was improper for the Appeals Office to treat those
portions of the taxpayers’ requests that set forth legitimate
issues as if they were never submitted without explaining
how the requests reflected a desire to delay or impede Fed-
eral tax administration. Under Thornberry, unless the
Appeals Office explains how the request reflects a desire to
delay or impede Federal tax administration, the legitimate
section 6330(c)(2) issues raised in a taxpayer’s hearing
request must be excluded, and are deemed to be excluded,
from any portions of the request that the Appeals Office
determined were frivolous. Absent such an explanation, the
portions of the hearing request raising otherwise legitimate
issues may not be treated as if they were never submitted.
   In Thornberry v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. at 367–368, we
held that this Court has jurisdiction to review the Appeals
Office determination that the taxpayer’s request for an
administrative hearing was entirely frivolous or for purposes
of delay and thus properly treated as if it were never sub-
mitted. We remanded the case to the Appeals Office for a
hearing to consider the taxpayers’ challenges to the section
6702 penalty and their requests for collection alternatives,
withdrawal of the lien, and section 6015 relief—legitimate
issues they properly raised in their hearing requests that are
deemed excluded from any portions of the request that the
Appeals Office determined were frivolous. Following the
(301)             BUCZEK v. COMMISSIONER                    309


remand, the Court entered the decision stipulated by the par-
ties that the taxpayers’ income tax liabilities for 2000, 2001,
and 2002 were closed as currently uncollectible by reason of
economic hardship and the section 6702 penalty for 2007 was
abated.
   In Thornberry, the taxpayers’ hearing request, on its face,
clearly raised proper issues set forth in section 6330(c)(2)(A)
and (B), and the taxpayers raised those issues in the petition
they filed in this Court appealing the disregard letter sent by
the Appeals Office. By contrast, petitioner’s hearing request,
which included Form 12153 and the pages attached thereto,
does not challenge the appropriateness of the collection
action, offer or request any collection alternatives, challenge
the existence or amount of the underlying tax liability, or
raise any spousal defenses. Nor does it make any assertions
that would implicitly raise a legitimate issue; for example, it
does not assert that the collection action would cause peti-
tioner undue hardship or that he did not receive a notice of
deficiency or otherwise have an opportunity to challenge the
underlying tax liability.
   Because petitioner did not raise in his hearing request any
issues that may be considered in the administrative hearing,
there are no issues that are deemed to be excluded from any
portions of his request that the Appeals Office determined
were frivolous. In accordance with section 6330(g), we make
no review of the portions of a request for an administrative
hearing that the Appeals Office has determined are frivolous.
Moreover, because respondent’s determination that the IRS
Collection Division could proceed with collecting petitioner’s
unpaid tax liability for 2009 was not made in response to a
proper request for a hearing, i.e., the entire request was
properly treated as if it had never been submitted, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to review respondent’s determination that
collection may proceed, and therefore respondent’s motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction will be granted.
   In conclusion, the decision entered in Thornberry dem-
onstrates the importance of this Court’s review of the
Appeals Office’s determinations under section 6330(g) in pro-
tecting taxpayers from determinations that are arbitrary and
capricious. Our Opinion today demonstrates that our review
does not violate or eviscerate section 6330(g), and we there-
fore decline respondent’s invitation to overturn Thornberry.
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This case is distinguished from Thornberry, and we will
grant respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
on the facts presented here.
  Accordingly,
                   An order of dismissal for lack of jurisdic-
                tion will be entered.

                       f
