                         T.C. Memo. 2002-142



                       UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                 SUSAN L. CASTLE, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 10195-00.               Filed June 6, 2002.


     Gino Pulito, for petitioner.

     Katherine Lee Kosar and Dennis G. Driscoll, for respondent.



             MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION


     CHIECHI, Judge:    This case arises from a request for equita-

ble relief (relief) under section 6015(f)1 with respect to peti-

tioner’s taxable year 1993.   We must decide whether respondent


     1
      Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code in effect at all relevant times. All
Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
                                 - 2 -

abused respondent’s discretion in denying petitioner relief under

that section for that year.   We hold that respondent did not

abuse respondent’s discretion.

                         FINDINGS OF FACT

     Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

     Petitioner resided in Las Vegas, Nevada, at the time she

filed the petition.

     Petitioner is a high school graduate and has completed

approximately 1-1/2 years of college at Lorain Community College

and Columbus State.   During the year at issue, petitioner worked

full-time for BMW Financial Services and part-time for Dairy

Queen.   On October 31, 1993, petitioner married Roger L. Castle

(Mr. Castle).   At the time of the trial in this case, petitioner

worked for Continental Airlines as a flight attendant.

     On August 17, 1994, petitioner and Mr. Castle signed Form

1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return (return), for their

taxable year 1993 (1993 joint return).2     On that date, John Obrig

signed the 1993 joint return as the paid preparer of that return.

The 1993 joint return showed, inter alia, wages totaling $25,625

received by petitioner from Adia Services, Inc. of Ohio and Banc

One Vehicle Finance Corp., income from Mr. Castle’s Schedule C

computer consulting business of $67,849, Federal income tax (tax)


     2
      At a time not disclosed by the record, petitioner and Mr.
Castle applied for and received an automatic extension of time
until Aug. 15, 1994, within which to file the 1993 joint return.
                               - 3 -

of $26,056, tax withheld from petitioner’s wages of $2,344,

estimated tax payments of $255, and tax due of $23,457.

     On April 17, 1996, petitioner filed with the Internal

Revenue Service (IRS) a return for her taxable year 1994 (peti-

tioner’s 1994 return).3   Petitioner did not request or receive an

extension of time within which to file petitioner’s 1994 return.

     On June 24, 1996, almost 2 years after petitioner and Mr.

Castle signed the 1993 joint return, they filed it with the IRS.

At the time they filed the 1993 joint return, petitioner and Mr.

Castle did not pay the tax due shown in that return.

     On August 19, 1996, respondent assessed the following

amounts with respect to the 1993 joint return:   Tax of $26,056,4

penalties of $8,654.47, and interest of $6,290.61.

     At a time not disclosed by the record, but prior to June 2,

1998, petitioner and Mr. Castle separated.   Thereafter, on June

2, 1998, petitioner and Mr. Castle signed a property settlement

agreement (property settlement agreement).   That agreement

provided, inter alia:

          12. The parties hereto do make the following division
     and settlement of their property:

          A.   Wife [petitioner] shall receive as her sole
               and separate property:


     3
      The record does not disclose whether petitioner filed that
return jointly with Mr. Castle.
     4
      Respondent credited $2,344 of withholding shown in the 1993
joint return against the tax assessed.
                         - 4 -

          1)   Any personalty in Wife’s possession; and
          2)   Personal effects of Wife.

     B.   Husband [Mr. Castle] shall receive as his
          sole and separate property:

          1)   Any personalty in Husband’s possession;
               and
          2)   Personal effects of Husband.

     C.   Husband shall assume and pay the following
          debts, holding Wife harmless therefrom:

          1.   All financial and tax obligations as
               follows:

               A)   Internal Revenue Service in the
                    amount of $19,000.00;

               B)   Internal Revenue Service in the
                    amount of $4,207 (Dairy Queen);

               C)   State Industrial Insurance in the
                    amount of $1,600.00;

               D)   Employment taxes in the amount of
                    $406.00 (Nevada);

               E)   Sales taxes in the amount of
                    $6,095.00; and

               F)   Business license fees in the amount
                    of $276.00.

     D.   Wife must file individual tax returns for
          1997 and thereafter, and if requested, sign
          an amended joint tax return with Husband for
          1995 and 1996. Husband shall pay any sums
          due of the 1995 and 1996 tax returns.

     E.   As to the business interest of the parties in
          the corporation known as LANTech, Inc., the
          parties agree that Wife shall convey her 50%
          shareholder interest in the corporation to
          Husband.

     13. The parties agree that all joint checking ac-
counts, savings accounts, mutual funds, etc., maintained by
                                - 5 -

     the parties are to be closed, with the proceeds therein to
     be divided equally between the parties.

               *    *    *      *       *   *   *

          15. All other remaining property, both real and
     personal, has been divided and distributed by and
     between the parties pursuant to oral agreement by and
     between the parties.

     On July 23, 1998, petitioner and Mr. Castle divorced.   The

property settlement agreement was incorporated by reference in,

and made part of, the divorce decree.

     On May 15, 1999, petitioner submitted to respondent Form

8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief, with respect to peti-

tioner’s taxable year 1993.

     On May 25, 1999, petitioner wrote a letter to respondent in

which she stated, inter alia:

     To the best of my recollection a tax return was filed
     for the year 1993 and all taxes if owed paid.

          As stated before I was not married to Roger Castle
     until October 31, 1994 and thus would not have any tax
     obligation for the tax year 1993 as his spouse. I
     believe he has fraudulently claimed himself as married
     on his tax return of 1993. I have no whereabouts of
     Mr. Castle. Furthermore he took all records and tax
     returns after our divorce.

          This has been very disheartening for me, as I pay
     all my taxes if owed. I feel I should not be held
     liable or obligated to pay someone else’s tax responsi-
     bility especially if done unlawfully. I also have been
     threaten by the financial institution where I took out
     a short term loan that was to be paid back by my tax
     return. This has effected my good credit rating.

          I have filled out and am returning form 8857,
     Request for Innocent Spouse Relief. [Reproduced liter-
     ally.]
                               - 6 -

     On May 1, 2000, respondent issued to petitioner a letter in

response to petitioner’s request for relief from joint and

several liability with respect to petitioner’s taxable year 1993.

That letter stated, inter alia:

     Ms. Susan Castle is not entitled to relief from any tax
     liability under the provisions of Internal Revenue Code
     6015(b), 6015(c) nor 6015(f).

     It was determined that Ms. Castle knew or had reason to
     know of the deficiency, and she failed to prove that a
     hardship would result if she were to pay the liability.

     On June 23, 2000, respondent issued to petitioner a final

notice (final notice) of respondent’s determination that peti-

tioner is not entitled to relief from joint and several liability

under either section 6015(b), (c), or (f) with respect to peti-

tioner’s taxable year 1993.   With respect to respondent’s deter-

mination under section 6015(f), the final notice stated:   “It is

determined that you do not qualify for equitable relief under IRC

Section 6015(f).   You have not established all the elements

necessary to grant you relief.”

     At the time of the trial in this case, the total assessed

but unpaid liability with respect to the 1993 joint return (not

including certain accruals) was $31,642.34 (the unpaid 1993

liability).

                              OPINION

     We review respondent’s denial of relief under section
                               - 7 -

6015(f) for abuse of discretion.5   Butler v. Commissioner, 114

T.C. 276, 292 (2000).   Petitioner bears the burden of proving

that respondent abused respondent’s discretion in denying that

relief.   See Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 125 (2002).

     Section 6015(f) grants respondent discretion to relieve an

individual who files a joint return from joint and several

liability with respect to that return.   That section provides:

          SEC. 6015(f). Equitable Relief.--Under procedures
     prescribed by the Secretary, if--

               (1) taking into account all the facts and
          circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the indi-
          vidual liable for any unpaid tax or any deficiency
          (or any portion of either); and

               (2) relief is not available to such individual
          under subsection (b) or (c),

     the Secretary may relieve such individual of such
     liability.

In the instant case, the parties agree that relief is not avail-

able to petitioner under section 6015(b) or (c), thereby satisfy-

ing section 6015(f)(2).

     As directed by section 6015(f), respondent has prescribed

procedures in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447 (Revenue

Procedure 2000-15), to be used in determining whether an individ-

ual qualifies for relief under that section.   Section 4.01 of



     5
      The Court’s jurisdiction in this case is dependent upon
sec. 6015(e)(1). See Ewing v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. __, __
(2002); Fernandez v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 324, 330-331 (2000);
Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 289-290 (2000).
                                - 8 -

Revenue Procedure 2000-15 lists seven conditions (threshold

conditions) which must be satisfied before the IRS will consider

a request for relief under section 6015(f).    In the instant case,

respondent concedes that those conditions are satisfied.    Where,

as here, the requesting spouse satisfies the threshold condi-

tions, section 4.01 of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 provides that a

requesting spouse may be relieved under section 6015(f) of all or

part of the liability in question if, taking into account all the

facts and circumstances, the IRS determines that it would be

inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for such liabil-

ity.

       Where, as here, the requesting spouse satisfies the thresh-

old conditions, section 4.02(1) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 sets

forth the circumstances under which the IRS ordinarily will grant

relief to that spouse under section 6015(f) in a case like the

instant case where a liability is reported in a joint return but

not paid.    As pertinent here, those circumstances, which section

4.02 of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 and we refer to as elements,

are:

            (a) At the time relief is requested, the request-
       ing spouse is no longer married to * * * the
       nonrequesting spouse * * *;

            (b) At the time the return was signed, the re-
       questing spouse had no knowledge or reason to know that
       the tax would not be paid. The requesting spouse must
       establish that it was reasonable for the requesting
       spouse to believe that the nonrequesting spouse would
       pay the reported liability. * * *; and
                              - 9 -

          (c) The requesting spouse will suffer economic
     hardship if relief is not granted. For purposes of
     this section, the determination of whether a requesting
     spouse will suffer economic hardship will be made by
     the Commissioner or the Commissioner’s delegate, and
     will be based on rules similar to those provided in §
     301.6343-1(b)(4) of the Regulations on Procedure and
     Administration. [Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.02(1),
     2000-1 C.B. at 448]

(We shall hereinafter refer to the elements set forth in section

4.02(1)(a), (b), and (c) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 as the

marital status element, the knowledge or reason to know element,

and the economic hardship element, respectively.)

     Section 4.02(2) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 provides that

relief granted under section 4.02(1) of that revenue procedure is

subject to the following limitations:

          (a) If the return is or has been adjusted to
     reflect an understatement of tax, relief will be avail-
     able only to the extent of the liability shown on the
     return prior to any such adjustment; and

          (b) Relief will only be available to the extent
     that the unpaid liability is allocable to the
     nonrequesting spouse.

     Turning to the three elements set forth in section 4.02(1)

of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, the presence of which will ordi-

narily result in a grant of relief under section 6015(f), respon-

dent concedes that the marital status element is present in this

case.

     With respect to the knowledge or reason to know element,

petitioner contends that that element is present in this case

because, “At the time of executing the [1993 joint] return,
                               - 10 -

Petitioner had no reason to believe that any tax obligation

resulting from the filing of the return would not be paid by

Roger L. Castle.”   In support of that contention, petitioner

testified that she did not even know that the 1993 joint return

showed tax due of $23,457 because she was “hurried” when she

signed it.6   Petitioner’s testimony that she did not know that

the 1993 joint return showed tax due of $23,457 is belied by her

testimony that she believed the 1993 joint return to be true and

correct when she signed it.7   We are not required to, and we

shall not, rely on petitioner’s testimony to establish that she

had no knowledge or reason to know that the tax due shown in the

1993 joint return would not be paid.    See Geiger v. Commissioner,

440 F.2d 688, 689-690 (9th Cir. 1971), affg. per curiam T.C.

Memo. 1969-159; Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986).



     6
      In this connection, petitioner testified as follows regard-
ing the circumstances surrounding her signing of the 1993 joint
return:

     I [petitioner] was at work and Mr. Castle called me and
     said that I had to meet him at the accountant’s immedi-
     ately, to get there as quickly as possible, that I had
     to sign this return, that they were closing. So I ran
     in the door. It was a small firm. They laid the sheet
     in front of me. I signed the paper, they stuck it in
     an envelope, and we left.
     7
      Moreover, by signing the 1993 joint return petitioner is
charged with constructive knowledge of, inter alia, the tax due
shown in that return. See Park v. Commissioner, 25 F.3d 1289,
1299 (5th Cir. 1994), affg. T.C. Memo. 1993-252; see also Hayman
v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1256, 1262 (2d Cir. 1993), affg. T.C.
Memo. 1992-228.
                             - 11 -

On the record before us, we find that petitioner has failed to

carry her burden of establishing that the knowledge or reason to

know element is present in the instant case.

     With respect to the economic hardship element,8 petitioner

contends that that element is present in this case because,

“Currently, Ms. Castle is not in a position to pay” the unpaid


     8
      In determining whether a requesting spouse will suffer
economic hardship, sec. 4.02(1)(c) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15
requires reliance on rules similar to those provided in sec.
301.6343-1(b)(4), Proced. & Admin. Regs. Sec. 301.6343-
1(b)(4)(i), Proced. & Admin. Regs., generally provides that an
individual suffers an economic hardship if the individual is
unable to pay his or her reasonable basic living expenses. Sec.
301.6343-1(b)(4)(ii), Proced. & Admin. Regs., provides in perti-
nent part:

          (ii) Information from taxpayer. In determining a
     reasonable amount for basic living expenses the direc-
     tor will consider any information provided by the
     taxpayer including--

               (A) The taxpayer’s age, employment status and
     history, ability to earn, number of dependents, * * *;

               (B) The amount reasonably necessary for food,
     clothing, housing * * *, medical expenses * * *, trans-
     portation, current tax payments * * *;

               (C) The cost of living in the geographic area
     in which the taxpayer resides;

               (D) The amount of property exempt from levy
     which is available to pay the taxpayer’s expenses;

               (E) Any extraordinary circumstances such as
     special education expenses, a medical catastrophe, or
     natural disaster; and

               (F) Any other factor that the taxpayer claims
     bears on economic hardship and brings to the attention
     of the director.
                              - 12 -

1993 liability.   In support of that contention, petitioner

asserts that (1) “she [petitioner] has no assets which can be

liquidated to pay this debt” and that (2) at the time of the

trial in this case, she expected to be “furloughed from the

airline [Continental Airlines]” in about 1 week.

     Petitioner did not proffer any evidence to establish that,

if she were to pay the unpaid 1993 liability, she would not be

able to pay a reasonable amount for her basic living expenses.

Indeed, except for petitioner’s testimony that she expected to be

“furloughed” from her position with Continental Airlines shortly

after the trial in this case, petitioner did not proffer any

evidence relating to the factors that section 301.6343-1(b)(4),

Proced. & Admin. Regs., indicates are to be considered in deter-

mining a reasonable amount for basic living expenses.9   We are

unwilling to rely on petitioner’s self-serving and conclusory

testimony to support her contention that she would suffer eco-

nomic hardship if she were not granted relief under section

6015(f).   On the record before us, we find that petitioner has

failed to carry her burden of establishing that the economic

hardship element is present in this case.



     9
      At trial, petitioner testified that she has a son who was a
minor during at least some part of petitioner’s marriage to Mr.
Castle. Petitioner proffered no evidence to establish at rele-
vant times her son’s age, whether he was her dependent, and the
amount that she spent with respect to him for basic living
expenses.
                              - 13 -

     Although petitioner has not shown that she qualifies for

relief under section 4.02(1) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, the

IRS may nonetheless grant relief to her under section 4.03 of

that revenue procedure.   That section provides a partial list of

positive and negative factors which respondent is to take into

account in considering whether respondent will grant an individ-

ual relief under section 6015(f).   No single factor is to be

determinative in any particular case; all factors are to be

considered and weighed appropriately; and the list of factors is

not intended to be exhaustive.   Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03,

2000-1 C.B. at 448.

     As pertinent here, section 4.03(1) of Revenue Procedure

2000-15 sets forth the following positive factors which weigh in

favor of granting relief under section 6015(f):

          (a) Marital status. The requesting spouse is * * *
     divorced from the nonrequesting spouse.

          (b) Economic hardship. The requesting spouse would
     suffer economic hardship (within the meaning of section
     4.02(1)(c) of this revenue procedure) if relief from
     the liability is not granted.

          (c) Abuse. The requesting spouse was abused by the
     nonrequesting spouse, but such abuse did not amount to
     duress.

          (d) No knowledge or reason to know. In the case of
     a liability that was properly reported but not paid,
     the requesting spouse did not know and had no reason to
     know that the liability would not be paid. * * *

          (e) Nonrequesting spouse’s legal obligation. The
     nonrequesting spouse has a legal obligation pursuant to
     a divorce decree or agreement to pay the outstanding
                             - 14 -

     liability. This will not be a factor weighing in favor
     of relief if the requesting spouse knew or had reason
     to know, at the time the divorce decree or agreement
     was entered into, that the nonrequesting spouse would
     not pay the liability.

          (f) Attributable to nonrequesting spouse. The
     liability for which relief is sought is solely attrib-
     utable to the nonrequesting spouse.

(We shall hereinafter refer to the positive factors set forth in

section 4.03(1)(a), (b), (d), (e), and (f) of Revenue Procedure

2000-15 as the marital status positive factor, the economic

hardship positive factor, the knowledge or reason to know posi-

tive factor, the legal obligation positive factor, and the

attribution positive factor, respectively.)

     We note initially that the parties do not dispute that the

marital status positive factor, the knowledge or reason to know

positive factor, and the economic hardship positive factor set

forth in section 4.03(1)(a), (d), and (b), respectively, of

Revenue Procedure 2000-15 are the same as the marital status

element, the knowledge or reason to know element, and the eco-

nomic hardship element set forth in section 4.02(1)(a), (b), and

(c), respectively, of that revenue procedure.

     With respect to the marital status positive factor set forth

in section 4.03(1)(a) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, respondent

concedes that that factor is present in the instant case.

     With respect to the economic hardship positive factor and

the knowledge or reason to know positive factor set forth in
                               - 15 -

section 4.03(1)(b) and (d), respectively, of Revenue Procedure

2000-15, we have found above that petitioner has failed to carry

her burden of establishing that the economic hardship element and

the knowledge or reason to know element set forth in section

4.02(1)(c) and (b), respectively, of that revenue procedure are

present in the instant case.   On the instant record, we further

find that petitioner has failed to carry her burden of establish-

ing that those same positive factors are present for purposes of

section 4.03(1) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15.

     With respect to the positive factor set forth in section

4.03(1)(c) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 (i.e., the requesting

spouse was abused by the nonrequesting spouse), petitioner does

not allege, and the record does not establish, any abuse by Mr.

Castle.

     With respect to the legal obligation positive factor set

forth in section 4.03(1)(e) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, peti-

tioner contends that that factor is present in the instant case

because Mr. Castle had a legal obligation to pay the unpaid 1993

liability.   In support of that contention, petitioner asserts:

“In accordance with the terms of the Property Settlement Agree-

ment, * * * Roger L. Castle agreed to assume and pay debts

holding Petitioner harmless from all financial and tax obliga-

tions enumerated therein, which included debt to the Internal

Revenue Service.”   The property settlement agreement on which
                              - 16 -

petitioner relies provided that Mr. Castle was to pay, inter

alia, two “debts” (debts) owing to the IRS, one identified in

that agreement as “Internal Revenue Service in the amount of

$19,000.00" and the other identified in that agreement as “Inter-

nal Revenue Service in the amount of $4,207 (Dairy Queen)”.    That

agreement does not indicate what type of Federal tax debts those

amounts represent or to what taxable year or years those debts

relate.   On the instant record, we find that petitioner has

failed to establish that the two “debts” to the IRS referred to

in the property settlement agreement are part of the unpaid 1993

liability.   On that record, we find that petitioner has failed to

carry her burden of establishing that the legal obligation

positive factor set forth in section 4.03(1)(e) of Revenue

Procedure 2000-15 is present in the instant case.

     With respect to the attribution positive factor set forth in

section 4.03(1)(f) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, respondent

concedes on brief that “a significant portion of the unpaid

[1993] liability results from Mr. Castle’s income” and is attrib-

utable to Mr. Castle.   Petitioner does not contend, and the

record does not establish, that the unpaid 1993 liability is

solely attributable to Mr. Castle.     On the record before us, we

find that petitioner has failed to carry her burden of establish-

ing that the attribution positive factor set forth in section

4.03(1)(f) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 is present in the instant
                                - 17 -

case.

     Turning to the negative factors weighing against granting

relief under section 6015(f) set forth in section 4.03(2) of

Revenue Procedure 2000-15, as pertinent here, those factors are:

             (a) Attributable to the requesting spouse. The
        unpaid liability * * * is attributable to the request-
        ing spouse.

             (b) Knowledge, or reason to know. A requesting
        spouse knew or had reason to know * * * that the re-
        ported liability would be unpaid at the time the return
        was signed. This is an extremely strong factor weigh-
        ing against relief. Nonetheless, when the factors in
        favor of equitable relief are unusually strong, it may
        be appropriate to grant relief under § 6015(f) in
        limited situations where a requesting spouse knew or
        had reason to know that the liability would not be paid
        * * *.

             (c) Significant benefit. The requesting spouse has
        significantly benefitted (beyond normal support) from
        the unpaid liability * * *.

             (d) Lack of economic hardship. The requesting
        spouse will not experience economic hardship (within
        the meaning of section 4.02(1)(c) of this revenue
        procedure) if relief from liability is not granted.

             (e) Noncompliance with federal income tax laws.
        The requesting spouse has not made a good faith effort
        to comply with federal income tax laws in the tax years
        following the tax year or years to which the request
        for relief relates.

          (f) Requesting spouse’s legal obligation. The
     requesting spouse has a legal obligation pursuant to a
     divorce decree or agreement to pay the liability.

(We shall hereinafter refer to the negative factors set forth in

section 4.03(2)(a), (b), (d), and (f) of Revenue Procedure 2000-

15 as the attribution negative factor, the knowledge or reason to
                               - 18 -

know negative factor, the economic hardship negative factor, and

the legal obligation negative factor, respectively.)

     We note initially that the parties do not dispute that the

knowledge or reason to know negative factor, the economic hard-

ship negative factor, and the legal obligation negative factor

set forth in section 4.03(2)(b), (d), and (f), respectively, of

Revenue Procedure 2000-15 are the opposites of the knowledge or

reason to know positive factor, the economic hardship positive

factor, and the legal obligation positive factor set forth in

section 4.03(1)(d), (b), and (e), respectively, of that revenue

procedure.   We also note that the parties do not dispute that the

attribution negative factor set forth in section 4.03(2)(a) of

Revenue Procedure 2000-15 is essentially the opposite of the

attribution positive factor set forth in section 4.03(1)(f) of

that revenue procedure.10   We have found above that petitioner

has failed to carry her burden of establishing that the knowledge

or reason to know positive factor and the economic hardship

positive factor set forth in section 4.03(1)(d) and (b), respec-

tively, of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 are present in the instant



     10
      Although we do not believe that those two factors are
exactly opposite because the attribution negative factor does not
contain the word “solely” that appears in the attribution posi-
tive factor, we conclude that respondent’s use of the word
“solely” in describing the attribution positive factor but not in
describing the attribution negative factor does not affect our
findings and conclusions with respect to those factors in the
instant case.
                               - 19 -

case.    On the instant record, we further find that petitioner has

failed to carry her burden of establishing that the knowledge or

reason to know negative factor and the economic hardship negative

factor set forth in section 4.03(2)(b) and (d), respectively, of

that revenue procedure are not present in the instant case.

       With respect to the attribution negative factor set forth in

section 4.03(2)(a) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, we have found

above that petitioner has failed to carry her burden of estab-

lishing that the unpaid 1993 liability is solely attributable to

Mr. Castle.    However, respondent concedes that a significant

portion of that liability is attributable to Mr. Castle.    On the

record before us, we find that a significant portion of the

unpaid 1993 liability is not attributable to petitioner.

       With respect to the legal obligation negative factor set

forth in section 4.03(2)(f) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15, we have

found above that petitioner has failed to carry her burden of

establishing that Mr. Castle had a legal obligation pursuant to

the property settlement agreement to pay the unpaid 1993 liabil-

ity.    However, the property settlement agreement does not estab-

lish that petitioner had a legal obligation to pay that liabil-

ity.    On the record before us, we find that petitioner did not

have a legal obligation under the property settlement agreement

to pay the unpaid 1993 liability.

       With respect to the negative factor set forth in section
                               - 20 -

4.03(2)(c) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 (i.e., the requesting

spouse has significantly benefited from the unpaid liability),

petitioner contends that that factor is not present in this case

because she “received no significant assets or support from Mr.

Castle.”   In support of that contention, petitioner asserts that

when she divorced Mr. Castle “She left with her and her son’s

personal belongings and clothing.”      The terms of the property

settlement agreement do not contradict that assertion.      However,

petitioner and Mr. Castle signed that agreement approximately 5

years after the taxable year at issue and 2 years after they

filed the 1993 joint return.   We conclude that petitioner’s

assertion that when she divorced Mr. Castle she took from her

marriage to him only “her and her son’s personal belongings and

clothing” is not determinative of whether she significantly

benefited from the unpaid 1993 liability.      Petitioner did not

proffer any other evidence to show that she did not significantly

benefit from the unpaid 1993 liability.      On the record before us,

we find that petitioner has failed to carry her burden of estab-

lishing that the negative factor set forth in section 4.03(2)(c)

of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 is not present in the instant case.

     With respect to the negative factor set forth in section

4.03(2)(e) of Revenue Procedure 2000-15 (i.e., the requesting

spouse has not made a good faith effort to comply with the tax

laws in the taxable years following the year to which the request
                               - 21 -

for relief relates), respondent points to the fact that peti-

tioner did not timely file petitioner’s 1994 return as an indica-

tion that she did not make a good faith effort to comply with the

tax laws in at least 1 taxable year following the taxable year to

which petitioner’s request for relief related.    Park v. Commis-

sioner, 25 F.3d 1289, 1299 (5th Cir. 1994), affg. T.C. Memo.

1993-252.    Petitioner gave no explanation as to why she filed

petitioner’s 1994 return more than 1 year past the due date for

filing that return.    On the record before us, we find that

petitioner has failed to carry her burden of establishing that

the negative factor set forth in section 4.03(2)(e) of Revenue

Procedure 2000-15 is not present in the instant case.

     On the record before us, we find that petitioner has failed

to carry her burden of establishing any other factors that weigh

in favor of granting relief under section 6015(f) and that are

not set forth in sections 4.02(1) and 4.03(1) of Revenue Proce-

dure 2000-15.

     Based upon our examination of the entire record before us,

we find that petitioner has failed to carry her burden of showing

that respondent abused respondent’s discretion in denying her

relief under section 6015(f) with respect to the unpaid 1993

liability.

     We have considered all of petitioner’s arguments and conten-

tions which are not discussed herein, and we find them to be
                             - 22 -

without merit and/or irrelevant.

     To reflect the foregoing,

                                      Decision will be entered for

                                 respondent.
