                        T.C. Memo. 2007-153



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



           SEAN M. AND JULIE M. RILEY, Petitioners v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 21124-05.                 Filed June 14, 2007.



     Sean M. and Julie M. Riley, pro sese.

     Blaine Holiday, for respondent.



             MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION


     KROUPA, Judge:   Respondent determined a $3,570 deficiency in

petitioners’ Federal income tax for 2003.     After concessions,1 we

are asked to decide two issues.   First, we are asked to decide

whether petitioner Sean M. Riley (Mr. Riley) was away from home



     1
      See infra note 4 for the concessions of each party.
                                 - 2 -

when he worked as an airline mechanic for Northwest Airlines

(NWA) in Newark to determine whether petitioners are entitled to

deduct expenses for his vehicle, meals, and lodging while Mr.

Riley was away from Prescott, Wisconsin, in the Minneapolis area

where he normally lived.    We conclude that Mr. Riley was not away

from home.   Second, we are asked to decide whether petitioners

substantiated various other expenses.     We conclude that

petitioners have substantiated and are entitled to deduct some of

these other expenses.2

                           FINDINGS OF FACT

     Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

Petitioners resided in Prescott, Wisconsin, at the time they

filed the petition.

Mr. Riley’s Employment With Northwest Airlines

     Mr. Riley began as an airline mechanic for NWA in 1992 and

worked through at least 2004.3    Mr. Riley worked in Minneapolis

from 1992 through April 2003.

     NWA sent layoff notices to some of its employees when it

experienced financial difficulties.      The employees receiving the

notices could either choose to accept the layoff or exercise


     2
      All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for 2003, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court
Rules of Practice and Procedure, unless otherwise indicated.
     3
      There is nothing in the record to indicate whether Mr.
Riley has continued to work for NWA after his 14-month job in
Newark ended in 2004.
                                - 3 -

their seniority.   Seniority depended on the length of time an

employee had worked for NWA, regardless of where the airline

facility was located.    An employee with higher seniority could

bump an employee with less seniority and take that employee’s

position.   The employee with less seniority could then take the

layoff or find another employee with less seniority to bump.

This seniority bumping arrangement was in place across the

country, so that an NWA mechanic looking to keep his or her job

at NWA had to look at several different cities to find a less

senior employee to bump.

     Mr. Riley received a bump notice in April 2003.    Mr. Riley

chose to exercise his seniority and bump another employee rather

than accept the layoff.    Mr. Riley was able to bump to Newark,

New Jersey.   He started working in Newark in May 2003.   Mr. Riley

worked in Newark for 14 months, until July 2004 when he quit the

Newark job.

     Mr. Riley’s position in Newark had no specific end date.

After he was bumped from his position in Minneapolis, no NWA

position was available for him to return to in Minneapolis.    Mr.

Riley was forced to bump other employees and work in a different

city to stay with NWA.    NWA’s needs for mechanics in Minneapolis

as well as the choices of other mechanics also subject to the

seniority system would influence the timing of Mr. Riley’s return

to an NWA position in Minneapolis.
                               - 4 -

     Mr. Riley maintained his Wisconsin residence throughout

2003, although he worked in Newark for 8 months of the year.     Mr.

Riley returned to Wisconsin and stayed at his residence with his

family for 2 nights every week during the 8 months in 2003 that

he worked in Newark.   Mr. Riley had Internet access at his

Wisconsin residence from October 4 through the end of 2003.

     Mr. Riley purchased a Dell desktop computer, monitor, and

printer (computer) after starting work for NWA in Newark.     The

computer remained in petitioners’ Wisconsin residence.   The

computer was used for personal purposes.   NWA did not require Mr.

Riley to perform work for his Newark job on the computer.

     Mr. Riley used some of his own tools in his work for NWA.

Mr. Riley did not produce any receipts showing what tools he

owned, when he purchased the tools, and how much he paid for the

tools.   Mr. Riley testified that he purchased safety glasses for

$80 and safety shoes for $102.   Mr. Riley did not provide any

receipts or other documents showing he purchased these items.

Mr. Riley also had a cellular phone.   His cellular phone number

was the personal contact number he gave NWA.

     Mr. Riley wore a uniform while he worked for NWA.   He

estimated that he worked on average 22 days per month.   Mr. Riley

also wore a jacket while working that occasionally needed to be

drycleaned.
                               - 5 -

Petitioners’ Return

     Petitioners claimed deductions for certain expenses on

Schedule A, Itemized Deductions, on their joint return for 2003.

Respondent examined petitioners’ return for 2003 and issued

petitioners a deficiency notice in which he disallowed many of

the expense deductions.   Of the expenses still in dispute,4

petitioners assert they are entitled to deduct unreimbursed

employee expenses related to Mr. Riley’s NWA mechanic job.     The

unreimbursed employee business expenses petitioners claimed

include $5,596 of vehicle expenses, $38 of travel expenses, and

$3,162 of meals5 while Mr. Riley worked in Newark.   The

unreimbursed employee business expenses also include the

following non-travel related expenses:   $296 for depreciation of

tools, $75 of Internet expenses, $960 of cellular telephone

expenses, $1,106 of equipment expenses, $80 for safety glasses,

$102 for safety shoes, and $822 for maintenance of uniforms.


     4
      Respondent concedes that petitioners are entitled to deduct
State and local income taxes, real estate taxes, home mortgage
interest, gifts to charity, tax preparation fees and a portion of
the union dues claimed on the return for 2003. Petitioners
concede the deductions claimed for miscellaneous supplies, costs
of tools, investment fees, IRA fees, and $4 of the $708 union
dues.
     5
      The gross amount of meals expenses petitioners claimed on
the return is $4,864. Petitioners multiplied the meals expenses
by 65 percent, the applicable percentage allowable only for
employees subject to Department of Transportation hours of
service limits (DOT percentage). Sec. 274(n)(3). We need not
decide whether petitioners are entitled to use the DOT percentage
as Mr. Riley was not away from home.
                                 - 6 -

     Petitioners timely filed a petition.

                                OPINION

     The parties resolved many of the disputed expense deductions

before trial.    We are asked to determine whether petitioners are

entitled to deduct the remaining expenses.      We begin by

considering whether Mr. Riley was away from home when he incurred

expenses for his vehicle, meals, and lodging in Newark.

Travel Expenses While Away From Home

     We begin by briefly outlining the rules for deducting travel

expenses.     A taxpayer may deduct reasonable and necessary travel

expenses such as vehicle, meals, and lodging expenses incurred

while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business.

Secs. 162(a)(2), 262(a).    A taxpayer must show that he or she was

away from home when he or she incurred the expense, that the

expense is reasonable and necessary, and that the expense was

incurred in pursuit of a trade or business.       Commissioner v.

Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470 (1946).       The determination of whether

the taxpayer has satisfied these requirements is a question of

fact.   Id.

     The purpose of the deduction for expenses incurred away from

home is to alleviate the burden on the taxpayer whose business

needs require him or her to maintain two homes and therefore

incur duplicate living expenses.     Kroll v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.

557, 562 (1968).    The duplicate costs are not deductible where
                                 - 7 -

the taxpayer maintains two homes for personal reasons.       Sec. 262;

Commissioner v. Flowers, supra at 474.

     A taxpayer may deduct the expenses he or she incurred while

away from home.   Sec. 162(a)(2).    The word “home” for purposes of

section 162(a)(2) has a special meaning.      It generally refers to

the area of a taxpayer’s principal place of employment, not the

taxpayer’s personal residence.      Daly v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.

190, 195 (1979), affd. 662 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1981); Kroll v.

Commissioner, supra at 561-562.

     There is an exception to the general rule that a taxpayer’s

tax home is his or her principal place of employment.        Peurifoy

v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59, 60 (1958).       The taxpayer’s tax home

may be the taxpayer’s personal residence if the taxpayer’s

employment away from home is temporary.       Id.; Mitchell v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-283.       On the other hand, the

exception does not apply and the taxpayer’s tax home remains the

principal place of employment if the employment away from home is

indefinite.   Kroll v. Commissioner, supra at 562.      A taxpayer is

not temporarily away from home during any period of employment if

the employment lasts longer than a year.      Sec. 162(a).

     It is presumed that a taxpayer will generally choose to live

near his or her place of employment.       Frederick v. United States,

603 F.2d 1292, 1295 (8th Cir. 1979).      A taxpayer must, however,

have a principal place of employment and accept temporary work in
                                - 8 -

another location to be away from home.    Kroll v. Commissioner,

supra.    A person who has no principal place of business nor a

place he or she resides permanently is an itinerant and has no

tax home from which he or she can be away.    Deamer v.

Commissioner, 752 F.2d 337, 339 (8th Cir. 1985), affg. T.C. Memo.

1984-63; Edwards v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-396.

     All the facts and circumstances are considered in

determining whether a taxpayer has a tax home.    See Rev. Rul. 73-

529, 1973-2 C.B. 37 (describing objective factors the

Commissioner considers in determining whether a taxpayer has a

tax home).   The taxpayer must generally have some business

justification to maintain the first residence, beyond purely

personal reasons, to be entitled to deduct expenses incurred

while temporarily away from that home.    Hantzis v. Commissioner,

638 F.2d 248, 255 (1st Cir. 1981); Bochner v. Commissioner, 67

T.C. 824, 828 (1977); Tucker v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 783, 787

(1971).    Where a taxpayer has no business connections with the

primary residence, there is no compelling reason to maintain that

residence and incur substantial, continuous, and duplicative

expenses elsewhere.    See Henderson v. Commissioner, 143 F.3d 497,

499 (9th Cir. 1998), affg. T.C. Memo. 1995-559; Deamer v.

Commissioner, supra; Hantzis v. Commissioner, supra.      In that

situation, the expenses incurred while temporarily away from that

residence are not deductible.    Hantzis v. Commissioner, supra;
                                 - 9 -

Bochner v. Commissioner, supra; Tucker v. Commissioner, supra;

see McNeill v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-65; Aldea v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-136.

     Once Mr. Riley was bumped from Minneapolis, he had no job to

return to there.    His choices were to be laid off and have no

work, or to bump other employees and move to a different city to

continue working.    NWA gave Mr. Riley no end date for his

position in Newark.    NWA no longer required Mr. Riley to perform

any services whatsoever in Minneapolis once he was bumped.

Although Mrs. Riley remained in the family residence in the

Minneapolis area with visits from Mr. Riley while he worked in

Newark, this fact alone does not dictate that Mr. Riley’s tax

home was in Prescott, Wisconsin, where the family residence was

located.   Unlike traveling salespersons who may be required to

return to the home city occasionally between business trips, Mr.

Riley’s business ties to Minneapolis ceased when he was bumped.

     The Court understands that the NWA mechanics’ lives were

unsettled and disrupted.    Mechanics did not know how long they

would have a job in one specific location.    They only knew the

system was based on seniority.    They could bump less senior

employees, and they could be bumped by more senior employees.

While we acknowledge that Mr. Riley would have liked to return to

the Minneapolis area, Mr. Riley did not know when such a return

would be possible due to the NWA seniority system.    The
                              - 10 -

likelihood of Mr. Riley’s return to a NWA position in Minneapolis

depended on NWA’s needs for mechanics there as well as the

choices of more senior mechanics.   Mr. Riley did not know how

long he would be in Newark or where he might go next.    It was not

foreseeable that he would be able to return to Minneapolis at any

time due to the seniority system.   Thus we conclude there was no

business reason for petitioners to maintain a home in the

Minneapolis area.   Petitioners kept the family residence in the

Minneapolis area for purely personal reasons.   Petitioners have

failed to prove that Mr. Riley had a tax home in 2003.

Accordingly, Mr. Riley was not away from home in Newark, and the

expenses he incurred while there are not deductible.6

Substantiation of Expenses

     We next turn to the substantiation issues to determine

whether petitioners are entitled to deduct the remaining

expenses.   We begin by noting the fundamental principle that the

Commissioner’s determinations are generally presumed correct, and

the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that these

determinations are erroneous.7   Rule 142(a); INDOPCO, Inc. v.


     6
      Even if we had found that Mr. Riley’s tax home during 2003
was Prescott, Wisconsin, Mr. Riley may not be treated as
temporarily away from home while he worked in Newark because the
position lasted over a year. See sec. 162(a).
     7
      Petitioners do not claim the burden of proof shifts to
respondent under sec. 7491(a). Petitioners also did not
establish they satisfy the requirements of sec. 7491(a)(2). We
                                                   (continued...)
                              - 11 -

Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992); Welch v. Helvering, 290

U.S. 111 (1933).   Moreover, deductions are a matter of

legislative grace, and the taxpayer has the burden to prove he or

she is entitled to any deduction claimed.   Rule 142(a); Deputy v.

du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New Colonial Ice Co. v.

Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934); Welch v. Helvering, supra.

This includes the burden of substantiation.   Hradesky v.

Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 90 (1975), affd. per curiam 540 F.2d

821 (5th Cir. 1976).

     A taxpayer must substantiate amounts claimed as deductions

by maintaining the records necessary to establish he or she is

entitled to the deductions.   Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner,

supra.   The taxpayer shall keep such permanent records or books

of account as are sufficient to establish the amounts of

deductions claimed on the return.   Sec. 6001; sec. 1.6001-1(a),

(e), Income Tax Regs.   The Court need not accept a taxpayer’s

self-serving testimony when the taxpayer fails to present

corroborative evidence.   Beam v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-

304 (citing Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986)),

affd. without published opinion 956 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1992).




     7
      (...continued)
therefore find that the burden of proof remains with petitioners.
                                - 12 -

Unreimbursed Employee Business Expenses

     We shall now consider whether petitioners are entitled to

deduct the unreimbursed employee business expenses they claimed

on Schedule A.   In general, all ordinary and necessary expenses

paid or incurred in carrying on a trade or business during the

taxable year are deductible, but personal, living, or family

expenses are not deductible.    Secs. 162(a), 262.   Services

performed by an employee constitute a trade or business.

O’Malley v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 352, 363-364 (1988); sec.

1.162-17(a), Income Tax Regs.

     If a taxpayer establishes that he or she paid or incurred a

deductible business expense but does not establish the amount of

the deduction, we may approximate the amount of the allowable

deduction, bearing heavily against the taxpayer whose

inexactitude is of his or her own making.     Cohan v. Commissioner,

39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930).     For the Cohan rule to

apply, however, a basis must exist on which this Court can make

an approximation.    Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731, 742-743

(1985).   Without such a basis, any allowance would amount to

unguided largesse.   Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d 559, 560

(5th Cir. 1957).

     Certain business expenses may not be estimated because of

the strict substantiation requirements of section 274(d).       See

sec. 280F(d)(4)(A); Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 823, 827
                               - 13 -

(1968), affd. per curiam 412 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1969).     For such

expenses, only certain types of documentary evidence will

suffice.

Internet Access Expenses

     We now examine those expenses not subject to the strict

substantiation requirements.   Petitioners claimed $75 for

Internet access expenses during 2003.     We have previously

characterized Internet expenses as utility expenses.      Verma v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-132.      Strict substantiation

therefore does not apply, and we may estimate the business

portion of utility expenses under the Cohan rule.      See Pistoresi

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-39.

     Petitioners introduced a copy of an invoice showing they

paid PressEnter, L.L.P., $107 for Internet access from October 4,

2003, to April 4, 2004, of which $52 was for Internet access

during 2003.   Mr. Riley testified that the $23 difference between

the amount claimed on the return for Internet access and the

amount shown on the PressEnter receipt is attributable to the

purchase price of software that had to be installed on

petitioners’ computer to make the computer Internet accessible.

The PressEnter charges were incurred during the time Mr. Riley

worked in Newark while the computer was in Wisconsin.     In

addition, Mr. Riley failed to introduce documentation showing
                               - 14 -

that his employer, NWA, required him to have Internet access

while he worked in Newark.

     Petitioners have not proven that Mr. Riley’s employer

required him to have Internet access for his work at NWA or that

he used the computer for his work at NWA.    Petitioners are

therefore not entitled to deduct their Internet access expenses

as employee business expenses for 2003.

Safety Glasses and Safety Shoes Expenses

     Petitioners claimed $80 for safety glasses and $102 for

safety shoes for 2003.   A taxpayer is entitled to deduct

unreimbursed employee expenses only to the extent that the

taxpayer demonstrates that he or she could not have been

reimbursed for such expenses by his or her employer.    Sec.

162(a); Podems v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 21, 23 (1955).

     Petitioners did not provide any documentation showing that

Mr. Riley purchased safety glasses or safety shoes in 2003.

Moreover, the parties introduced the NWA airline mechanics’ union

contract (union contract), which contradicts petitioners’ claimed

deductions for safety glasses and safety shoes expenses.     The

union contract shows that NWA provided its mechanics with safety

glasses and safety shoes.    Alternatively, NWA would reimburse

employees up to $90 for each of the safety glasses and the safety

shoes if the employee chose to buy his or her own.    Even if

petitioners had shown that Mr. Riley had purchased safety glasses
                              - 15 -

and safety shoes in 2003, petitioners have failed to demonstrate

that Mr. Riley was not, and could not have been, reimbursed for

such expenses by NWA.   See Podems v. Commissioner, supra at 23.

Petitioners are therefore not entitled to a deduction for safety

glasses or safety shoes as employee business expenses for 2003.

Cleaning Expenses for Uniforms

     Petitioners claimed $822 for cleaning expenses for Mr.

Riley’s NWA uniforms.   Expenses for uniforms are deductible if

the uniforms are of a type specifically required as a condition

of employment, the uniforms are not adaptable to general use as

ordinary clothing, and the uniforms are not worn as ordinary

clothing.   Yeomans v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 757, 767-769 (1958);

Beckey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-514.

     We are satisfied that petitioners incurred deductible

expenses during 2003 for cleaning uniforms.    Petitioners

introduced the portion of the NWA flight technician’s agreement

requiring Mr. Riley to wear a uniform.   Mr. Riley worked 22 days

per month on average during 2003.   Mr. Riley gave unclear

testimony, however, on how he calculated the $822 for cleaning

costs.   Petitioners introduced a document on the letterhead of

their CPA that also purports to indicate how the sum was

calculated, but it suggests an excessive amount.    The document

alleges that Mr. Riley separately washed his uniform shirt and

pants 22 times per month at $1.50 for each wash cycle and each
                                - 16 -

dry cycle and drycleaned his uniform jacket six times per month

at $6 per drycleaning.

     We may estimate the amount of these expenses under the Cohan

rule.   We adopt the unit cost of $1.50 listed on petitioners’

exhibit as the cost to wash or dry one load of laundry.    We find

that approximately eight loads of laundry for each of the months

Mr. Riley worked is a reasonable number to yield 22 clean shirts

and pants and a jacket per month.    Petitioners are therefore

entitled to deduct $288 of uniform cleaning expenses during 2003.

Depreciation Expenses

     Petitioners deducted $296 for depreciation of the tools Mr.

Riley used at his job at NWA.    The cost of tools with useful

lives greater than a year is recoverable by depreciation.    Secs.

167(a), 168(b); Seawright v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 294, 305

(2001); Clemons v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1979-273.     Mr. Riley

testified that he acquired his tools on January 1, 2001.

     Mr. Riley admitted he had no receipts and that the $2,000

reported was his estimate of the replacement costs.    The only

documentary evidence petitioners introduced to support their

claimed deduction were two lists of minimum tools for mechanics

required by NWA.   Petitioners failed to introduce any documentary

evidence to show their purchase price or the purchase date.      Mr.

Riley also did not describe what specific tools he depreciated

nor the tools’ expected useful lives.
                              - 17 -

     Petitioners have not substantiated that they are entitled to

a depreciation deduction.   Further, we are unable to estimate any

amount for depreciation under the Cohan rule because the evidence

petitioners introduced is inadequate.    Petitioners are therefore

not entitled to deduct any amount for depreciation.

Expenses Subject to Strict Substantiation Requirements

     We now consider those expenses that are subject to the

additional strict substantiation requirements under section

274(d).   Expenses subject to strict substantiation may not be

estimated under the Cohan rule.   Sanford v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.

at 827.

Cellular Phone Expenses

     Petitioners claimed $960 of cellular phone expenses for

2003.   Cellular phones are included in the definition of “listed

property” for purposes of section 274(d)(4) and are thus subject

to the strict substantiation requirements.     Gaylord v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-273.     A taxpayer must establish the

amount of business use and the amount of total use for the

property to substantiate the amount of expenses for listed

property.   Nitschke v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-230; sec.

1.274-5T(b)(6)(i)(B), Temporary Income Tax Regs., 50 Fed. Reg.

46016 (Nov. 6, 1985).

     Petitioners provided copies of their cellular phone bills,

but they failed to establish that they incurred any expenses to
                                - 18 -

use Mr. Riley’s cellular phone for business purposes in addition

to those they would have incurred had he used it only for

personal purposes.     Moreover, petitioners did not prove that NWA

required Mr. Riley to have a cellular phone.    Petitioners are

therefore not entitled to deduct any cellular phone expenses as

employee business expenses for 2003.

Equipment Expenses

     Petitioners claimed $1,106 of equipment expenses for the

purchase of a computer.    Computers and peripheral equipment are

“listed property” and are therefore subject to the strict

substantiation requirements.    Sec. 280F(d)(4)(A)(iv).

     Petitioners introduced a $1,069 receipt from Dell for a

computer they ordered in August 2003, after Mr. Riley had been in

Newark for 3 months.8    Petitioners have not proven that Mr.

Riley’s employer required him to purchase and use the computer

for his work at NWA.    Moreover, the computer remained in the

Wisconsin residence while Mr. Riley was working in Newark.      We

find that the evidence petitioners introduced on this issue does

not satisfy the strict substantiation requirements.    Accordingly,

petitioners are not entitled to deduct any of the equipment costs

for the computer.




     8
      Petitioners introduced no evidence to explain the $37
difference between the amount of equipment expenses they claimed
and the amount shown on the receipt from Dell.
                        - 19 -

To reflect the foregoing and the concessions of the parties,


                                   Decision will be entered

                              under Rule 155.
