                                          Filed:     February 12, 1996


                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

                        FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT



                             No. 95-2463
                         (CA-94-1416-6-21AK)



Seyvelle Parks,

                                               Plaintiff - Appellant,

           versus

Piedmont Technical Center,

                                                 Defendant - Appellee.




                              O R D E R


    The Court amends its opinion filed January 31, 1996, as

follows:
    On page 3, second full paragraph, line 3 -- the spacing in the

words "in the" is corrected.

                                       For the Court - By Direction



                                          /s/ Bert M. Montague

                                                      Clerk
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

SEYVELLE PARKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.                                                               No. 95-2463

PIEDMONT TECHNICAL COLLEGE,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville.
William B. Traxler, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-94-1416-6-21AK)

Submitted: January 16, 1996

Decided: January 31, 1996

Before WIDENER, MURNAGHAN, and LUTTIG,
Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Seyvelle Parks, Appellant Pro Se. Thomas Allen Bright, Anna Maria
Conner, HAYNSWORTH, BALDWIN, JOHNSON & GREAVES,
P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Seyvelle Parks appeals from the district court's orders granting
summary judgment against him on his action under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West
1994), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West 1994), and breach of contract. Find-
ing no error, we affirm.

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.
Foster v. American Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 168 (4th Cir.
1994). Parks primarily contends that Piedmont Technical College, his
former employer, discriminated against him by dismissing him from
his position as a program director. However, the district court cor-
rectly determined that Piedmont is immune from § 1981 and breach
of contract liability under the Eleventh Amendment. Absent waiver or
consent, Moreno v. University of Maryland, 645 F.2d 217, 220 (4th
Cir. 1981), aff'd, 458 U.S. 1 (1982), the Eleventh Amendment bars
suit by private parties to recover money damages from the state or its
alter egos acting in their official capacities. Huang v. Board of
Governors, 902 F.2d 1134, 1138 (1990). The bar is equally applicable
to pendent state law claims. Id. (citing Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984)). Piedmont is an alter
ego of the state of South Carolina, as any judgment against it would
be satisfied with state funds. See Hess v. Port Authority Trans-
Hudson Corp., ___ U.S. ___, 63 U.S.L.W. 4009, 4014 (U.S. Nov. 14,
1994) (No. 93-1197); Bockes v. Fields, 999 F.2d 788, 790 (4th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. #6D6D 6D#, 62 U.S.L.W. 3486, 62 U.S.L.W.
3491 (U.S. Jan. 24, 1994) (No. 93-818). Because the state has not
waived Eleventh Amendment immunity, Piedmont is immune from
§ 1981 and breach of contract liability.

Further, the district court properly granted summary judgment on
Parks's Title VII claim because he failed to show that Piedmont inten-
tionally discriminated against him. An employer can rebut a claim-
ant's Title VII prima facie case by presenting a non-discriminatory
reason for taking its challenged action. Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227,
230-31 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 892 (1981). The claimant
may still succeed, though, if he presents evidence that the employer's

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proffered reason is merely a "pretext" for intentional discrimination.
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256
(1981). The claimant must show both that the employer's proffered
reason is false and that the employer intended to discriminate against
him by taking the challenged action. Jiminez v. Mary Washington
College, 57 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 64
U.S.L.W. 3311, and 64 U.S.L.W. 3316 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1995) (No. 95-
396) (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, ___ U.S. ___, 61
U.S.L.W. 4782 (U.S. June 25, 1993) (No. 92-602)).

Parks's claim fails because he did not show that Piedmont inten-
tionally discriminated against him. Piedmont presented evidence that
Parks's dismissal was motivated by his unsatisfactory performance.
Parks then merely rebutted this claim by arguing that his performance
was satisfactory; he failed to present any evidence that Piedmont
intentionally discriminated against him.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's orders. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
quately presented in the material before the court and argument would
not aid the decision process.

AFFIRMED

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