                         T.C. Memo. 1997-191



                       UNITED STATES TAX COURT


       WARREN G. BUCK AND JUDITH A. BUCK, Petitioners, v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 5719-95.                       Filed April 24, 1997.


     Glenn H. Ripa, for petitioners.

     John Aletta, for respondent.



             MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

     CHIECHI, Judge:    Respondent determined the following addi-

tions to petitioners' Federal income tax:

                              Additions to Tax
    Year   Sec. 6653(a)(1)1     Sec. 6653(a)(2)   Sec. 6661(a)
    1983       $1,393                  *             $6,965


1
   All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the year at issue. All Rule references are to the Tax
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
                                - 2 -

                             Additions to Tax

    * 50 percent of the interest due on $27,859.

     The issues for decision are:

     (1)   Are petitioners liable for 1983 for the additions to

tax under section 6653(a)(1) and (2)?    We hold that they are.

     (2)   Are petitioners liable for 1983 for the addition to tax

under section 6661(a)?    We hold that they are.

                          FINDINGS OF FACT

     Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

     Petitioners resided in Plainfield, New Jersey, at the time

the petition was filed.

     Starting around 1979 upon completion of his medical train-

ing, petitioner Warren G. Buck,2 a physician specializing in

internal medicine and cardiology, was employed by the Menlo Park

Medical Group (Menlo Group), where he has remained employed

during all relevant periods.    During 1983, the year at issue,

petitioner Judith A. Buck was employed by Victory Memorial

Hospital as a registered nurse, and as of the date of the trial

herein she was employed as a nurse practitioner at Lutheran

Medical Center.

     Around 1974, petitioners began using the accounting and tax

return preparation services of Peter J. Amsterdam (Mr. Amster-


2
   Hereinafter, references to petitioner in the singular are to
petitioner Warren G. Buck.
                              - 3 -

dam), a certified public accountant, who was a partner of Nicho-

las J. Coscia (Mr. Coscia) in the accounting firm of Coscia and

Amsterdam (Coscia and Amsterdam).   Petitioners never had any

problems with Mr. Amsterdam's tax return preparation services.

     Sometime during the early 1980's, petitioner asked Mr.

Amsterdam on several occasions for recommendations regarding

possible investment opportunities, but Mr. Amsterdam declined to

make any such recommendations until around 1983.   Around that

year, Mr. Amsterdam recommended to petitioner that he invest in

Ridge Energy Systems (Ridge Energy), a limited partnership in

which both Mr. Amsterdam and Mr. Coscia had invested and which

Mr. Amsterdam described to petitioner as a "good investment" that

would allow petitioner to reduce his taxes through a tax credit

and at the same time make a profit.

     Based on petitioner's discussions with Mr. Amsterdam and his

review of a document that petitioner believed was a prospectus

(prospectus), it was petitioner's understanding that Saxon Energy

Corporation (Saxon Energy) was to lease certain energy-saving,

cost-efficient heating and cooling systems (energy systems) to

Ridge Energy, Ridge Energy was to re-lease those systems to

various businesses interested in reducing their heating and

cooling costs, and Ridge Energy was to derive a profit for its

partners from that leasing activity.

     Before deciding whether to invest in Ridge Energy, peti-

tioner did not (1) review a copy of any lease agreement that
                               - 4 -

Ridge Energy may have had with Saxon Energy, (2) have or attempt

to obtain an appraisal of the energy systems used by Ridge

Energy, (3) know how those energy systems were to be marketed, or

(4) know specifically how Ridge Energy was to make a profit.

     During 1983, based on the advice of Mr. Amsterdam and his

review of the prospectus, petitioner invested approximately

$13,000 in, and became a 14.1-percent partner of, Ridge Energy.

During that year, Ridge Energy had 15 partners, including Mr.

Amsterdam and Mr. Amsterdam's partner Mr. Coscia.

      At all relevant times before and after petitioner invested

in Ridge Energy, the investments of one or both petitioners

consisted of their residence, certain savings bonds, interest-

bearing accounts at certain financial institutions, a life

insurance policy, two mortgages that petitioner inherited from

his father around 1975, and an interest in Tricat, a facility in

which petitioner invested around the time he joined the Menlo

Group on the advice of another physician employed by that group,

at which certain medical tests were administered, and to which

certain physicians employed by the Menlo Group referred many of

their patients.

     On August 9, 1984, Ridge Energy filed Form 1065 (U.S.

Partnership Return of Income) for 1983 (1983 partnership return)

in which Ridge Energy claimed a loss of $98,900 that consisted of

lease expenses of $96,000, management fees of $2,800, and legal

fees of $100.   Ridge Energy claimed a basis of $1,485,000 for
                               - 5 -

investment tax credit purposes in the energy systems that it

leased from Saxon Energy.

     Petitioners filed a joint Federal income tax return for 1983

(return) on or before April 15, 1984, that was prepared by Mr.

Amsterdam.   They did not know how partnership deductions, losses,

and investment tax credits are calculated for Federal income tax

purposes, and they relied on Mr. Amsterdam to determine, inter

alia, any such deductions, losses, and/or credits that they

claimed in their 1983 return, including those arising as a result

of petitioner's partnership interest in Ridge Energy.   Petition-

ers claimed a total partnership loss of $21,279 in Schedule E

(Supplemental Income Schedule) of their 1983 return (1983 Sched-

ule E).   An attachment to petitioners' 1983 Schedule E showed

that that loss is attributable to a $7,360 loss with respect to

Tricat, the medical facility in which petitioner invested, and a

$13,919 loss with respect to Ridge Energy, the partnership in

which petitioner invested.   In Form 3468 (Computation of Invest-

ment Credit) included as part of their 1983 return, petitioners

claimed a basis for investment tax credit purposes of $210,863,

of which $208,990 is attributable to Ridge Energy, and an invest-

ment tax credit of $21,086, of which $20,899 is attributable to

Ridge Energy.

     On August 6, 1987, respondent issued a Notice of Final

Partnership Administrative Adjustment (FPAA) to the tax matters

partner for Ridge Energy in which respondent disallowed the loss
                                - 6 -

and the investment tax credit claimed by that partnership for

1983.   On January 7, 1988, an action was commenced in this Court

in Ridge Energy Systems, Nicholas J. and Sandra Coscia, A Partner

Other Than the Tax Matters Partner v. Commissioner, docket No.

413-88, contesting the adjustments made in the FPAA.   On March

11, 1994, this Court entered a decision under Rule 248(b) sus-

taining respondent's disallowance of the deductions and the basis

for investment tax credit purposes reported by Ridge Energy in

its 1983 partnership return.

     Respondent determined in the notice of deficiency (notice)

that petitioners are liable for 1983 for the additions to tax

under sections 6653(a)(1) and (2) and 6661(a).   Respondent

imposed those additions to tax because of the underpayment in

petitioners' 1983 return that is attributable to the loss of

$13,919 and the investment tax credit of $20,899 with respect to

Ridge Energy that they claimed in that return.

                               OPINION

     Petitioners bear the burden of proving that respondent's

determinations in the notice are erroneous.   Rule 142(a); Welch

v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).

Section 6653(a)(1) and (2)

     Section 6653(a)(1) imposes an addition to tax equal to five

percent of the entire underpayment if any part of it is due to

negligence or intentional disregard of rules or regulations.    If

that addition to tax is imposed, section 6653(a)(2) imposes a
                                 - 7 -

further addition to tax in an amount equal to 50 percent of the

interest payable with respect to the portion of the underpayment

that is attributable to negligence or intentional disregard of

rules or regulations.

     Negligence is defined as a lack of due care or failure to do

what a reasonable and prudent person would do under similar

circumstances.    Allen v. Commissioner, 925 F.2d 348, 353 (9th

Cir. 1991), affg. 92 T.C. 1 (1989).      Under certain circumstances,

a taxpayer may avoid the additions to tax for negligence by

showing that he or she reasonably relied on the advice of a

competent professional.     Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 849,

888 (1987), affd. 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990), affd. 501 U.S.

868 (1991).   However, a taxpayer bears the responsibility for any

negligent errors of his or her professional adviser.     See Ameri-

can Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1100, 1116-1117

(1957), affd. per curiam 262 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1958).     Reliance

on a professional adviser, standing alone, is not an absolute

defense to negligence; it is only one factor to be considered.

Freytag v. Commissioner, supra at 888.      In order for reliance on

a professional adviser to excuse a taxpayer from the additions to

tax for negligence, the taxpayer must establish that the profes-

sional adviser on whom he or she relied had the expertise and

knowledge of the relevant facts to provide informed advice on the

subject matter.   See id.
                               - 8 -

     Petitioners argue that they are not liable for the additions

to tax under section 6653(a)(1) and (2) because petitioner

reasonably relied on his tax adviser when he invested in Ridge

Energy and they reasonably relied on that adviser when they

claimed in their 1983 return the loss and credit with respect to

that partnership.3   Petitioners contend that their reliance on

Mr. Amsterdam was reasonable because Mr. Amsterdam had been their

tax adviser from sometime around 1974 through the time of the

trial in this case; during that time they never had any problems

with Mr. Amsterdam's tax return preparation services; prior to

Mr. Amsterdam's recommending to petitioner that he invest in

Ridge Energy, petitioner had asked Mr. Amsterdam on several

occasions for recommendations regarding possible investment

opportunities, but Mr. Amsterdam declined to make any such

recommendations; and both Mr. Amsterdam and Mr. Coscia were

investors in Ridge Energy.

     Respondent counters that petitioners were negligent in

relying on their tax adviser in investing in Ridge Energy and in

3
   Petitioners argued at trial that, because this Court entered a
decision pursuant to the parties' agreement in Coscia v. Commis-
sioner, docket No. 11093-95S (Mar. 28, 1996), that the taxpayers
in that case are not liable for the additions to tax under sec.
6653(a)(1) and (2) with respect to adjustments attributable to
their investment in Ridge Energy, petitioners in this case should
not be held liable for those additions to tax. We reject that
argument. We are not bound in this case by any decision that we
entered in another case involving additions to tax imposed upon
another taxpayer who, like petitioner, was a partner in Ridge
Energy and that was based on the agreement of the parties in that
other case.
                               - 9 -

claiming in their 1983 return the loss and credit with respect to

that partnership.4   We agree with respondent.

     Claims of reasonable reliance upon an adviser have been

rejected when the adviser upon whom the taxpayer relied knows

nothing about the business in which that taxpayer invested.

E.g., Goldman v. Commissioner, 39 F.3d 402, 408 (2d Cir. 1994),

affg. T.C. Memo. 1993-480.   Petitioners have failed to show that

Mr. Amsterdam, upon whom petitioner claims he relied, and/or Mr.

Coscia, the only person whom the record discloses Mr. Amsterdam

consulted about Ridge Energy, (1) knew anything about the energy

management activities of Ridge Energy, (2) had any investment or

other experience that qualified them to be in a position to

recommend that petitioner invest in Ridge Energy,5 (3) had, or

attempted to obtain, an appraisal of the energy systems leased by

that partnership; or (4) were not promoters for Saxon Energy.

Nor did petitioners establish that they otherwise took steps to

ensure themselves of the bona fides of investing in Ridge Energy.

     Petitioner testified that Mr. Amsterdam gave him the

prospectus which petitioner reviewed and that that prospectus

contained, inter alia, (1) a statement from a law firm that


4
   Respondent does not argue that petitioners are liable for the
additions to tax under sec. 6653(a)(1) and (2) because they
intentionally disregarded rules or regulations.
5
   Indeed, petitioner testified that he was not aware whether or
not Mr. Amsterdam had any expertise in the area of energy manage-
ment systems.
                               - 10 -

respondent audited a taxpayer who, petitioner believed, had

invested in Ridge Energy around 1981 and that that audit did not

give rise to additional taxes; (2) figures showing how a profit

was supposed to be earned; and (3) the identity of the chairman

of the board of Saxon Energy, who was a certified public accoun-

tant.    There is no prospectus that is part of the trial record in

this case.6   Based on petitioner's incomplete description of the

contents of the prospectus that he testified he reviewed, we do

not find that it was reasonable and prudent to rely upon the

promotional materials in it in deciding to invest in Ridge

Energy.    See, e.g., Marine v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 958, 992-993

(1989), affd. without published opinion 921 F.2d 280 (9th Cir.

1991).

     Although petitioner testified that he invested in Ridge

Energy with a good faith intention to make a profit, any such

subjective profit motive is not dispositive in deciding whether

he acted negligently, and the record does not establish that he

(or petitioner Judith A. Buck) made any independent investigation

to determine how that profit was to be derived.   Instead, peti-

6
   We note that petitioners attached to their trial memorandum
that the Court had filed in this case a document that purports to
be an "information memorandum" that apparently was prepared on
behalf of Saxon Energy and that was to be used "only by prospec-
tive lessees of Saxon Energy". Assuming arguendo that that
information memorandum were part of the trial record in this
case, we would not find that it was reasonable and prudent to
rely on it in deciding to invest in Ridge Energy. See, e.g.,
Marine v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 958, 992-993 (1989), affd.
without published opinion 921 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1991).
                               - 11 -

tioner relied on Mr. Amsterdam's representation that Ridge Energy

was a "good investment".    In addition, although petitioner's

testimony demonstrated that he understood that Ridge Energy

proposed to lease the energy systems from Saxon Energy and, in

turn, lease them to various businesses, he did not know at the

time he invested in Ridge Energy how those systems were to be

marketed, nor did he know specifically how Ridge Energy was to

make a profit.   Moreover, when petitioner was asked on direct

examination about whether he was concerned that during 1983 he

invested approximately $13,000 in Ridge Energy and yet claimed in

his 1983 return a loss of $13,919 and an investment tax credit of

$20,899 with respect to that partnership, petitioner replied:

"Well, I didn't have an opinion about it.    I thought that the

deductions which were figured out by the certified public accoun-

tant would be correct."    There is no evidence in the record

indicating that petitioners questioned Mr. Amsterdam about the

loss and the credit claimed in their 1983 return with respect to

Ridge Energy.    This Court and other courts have found that a

reasonable and prudent person would have asked a competent tax

adviser whether a windfall similar to the one realized by peti-

tioners were "'too good to be true.'"    See, e.g., Pasternak v.

Commissioner, 990 F.2d 893, 903 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting McCrary

v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 827, 850 (1989)), affg. Donahue v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1991-181.
                              - 12 -

     We believe that a reasonable and prudent person, who was

earning over $200,000 a year at the time petitioner decided to

invest in Ridge Energy and who claims that he intended to earn a

profit from an investment of approximately $13,000 in certain

energy systems allegedly worth $1,485,000, would have independ-

ently investigated the potential profitability of such an invest-

ment or would have relied upon an adviser who had expertise in

such an investment to make such an investigation.    This is

especially true in the case of petitioner who is highly educated,

lacks significant investment experience, and apparently has no

expertise in the area of energy systems.

     Petitioners cite Reile v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-488,

and Eubanks v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1990-227, to support

their position that their reliance upon Mr. Amsterdam was reason-

able and prudent under the circumstances presented here.    How-

ever, both of those cases are distinguishable from the facts in

this case.   In the Reile case, we found that the taxpayers there

involved, one of whom had only a high school education and the

other of whom had one year of college and who invested solely on

the advice of their financial and tax adviser in a partnership

that was a tax shelter, were not liable for the additions to tax

under section 6653(a)(1) and (2) because they reasonably relied

on that adviser.   Unlike the taxpayers in Reile v. Commissioner,

supra, petitioners are highly educated.    In addition, unlike

petitioners' adviser Mr. Amsterdam, the adviser in the Reile case
                              - 13 -

was a financial planner, as well as an accountant, and the

taxpayers in that case established that that adviser had investi-

gated the partnership involved in that case and had concluded and

advised the taxpayers therein that that partnership was of "high

quality", that it would "best satisfy * * * [their] investment

goals", that he had spoken to representatives of that partner-

ship, and that he was satisfied with the investment.   Reile v.

Commissioner, supra.

     In Eubanks v. Commissioner, supra, certain of the taxpayers

were physicians (taxpayer-physicians) who owned and operated a

medical clinic (clinic) that leased certain space (leased space)

in an office building.   The clinic assigned its rights under that

lease to a real estate partnership (Partnership) in which those

taxpayer-physicians were partners, and the Partnership made

certain expenditures to renovate the leased space and subleased

it back to the clinic.   The taxpayers in Eubanks relied upon

professional tax return preparers to prepare their individual

returns and the Partnership's Form 1065.   The Partnership claimed

qualified rehabilitation expenditures in its Form 1065, and the

taxpayer-physicians claimed investment tax credits arising from

their respective shares of the Partnership's claimed rehabilita-

tion expenditures.   Although the taxpayer-physicians in Eubanks

v. Commissioner, supra, testified that they provided their return

preparers with all the information that they had regarding their

tax returns, they could not specifically state whether that
                              - 14 -

information included a copy of the Partnership's lease for the

leased space.   Respondent disallowed the investment tax credits

claimed by the taxpayers in Eubanks and imposed the additions to

tax under section 6653(a)(1) and (2) because of, inter alia, the

taxpayers' respective underpayments attributable to such claimed

credits.   In contrast to respondent's position in the present

case, respondent did not contend in Eubanks v. Commissioner,

supra, that the tax return preparers should have further investi-

gated the leasing transaction at issue in that case.   Moreover,

unlike the instant case where respondent does not contend that

there was some document or other information that petitioners

withheld from Mr. Amsterdam, in Eubanks respondent contended that

the taxpayers must be found negligent because they did not show

that they gave their return preparers a copy of the Partnership's

lease for the leased space and that they therefore did not

establish that they provided their return preparers with complete

information, as required to avoid the imposition of the additions

to tax for negligence.   We found in the Eubanks case that the

taxpayers were not liable for the additions to tax for negligence

that were attributable to the claimed investment tax credits

because they reasonably relied on the advice of professional tax

return preparers on a tax matter that was not "self-evident".    In

so holding, we found that the Partnership's lease was not fa-

cially relevant to the investment tax credits claimed in the

taxpayers' returns and that to require them to have had the level
                                - 15 -

of expertise necessary for them to have understood the relevance

of that lease to their returns would be tantamount to holding

those taxpayers to a higher standard than that of a reasonable

and prudent person.

      Based on the entire record before us, we find that peti-

tioners have failed to satisfy their burden of proving that they

did not act negligently when they claimed in their 1983 return a

loss of $13,919 and an investment tax credit of $20,899 with

respect to Ridge Energy.    Accordingly, we sustain respondent's

determination for that year imposing the additions to tax under

section 6653(a)(1) and (2).

Section 6661(a)

     Section 6661(a) imposes an addition to tax equal to 10

percent of the amount of any underpayment attributable to a

substantial understatement of income tax.     An understatement of

income tax exists where the amount of tax shown in the taxpayer's

return is less than the amount required to be shown in his or her

return.   Sec. 6661(b)(2)(A).   In the case of an individual, an

understatement is substantial where it exceeds the greater of

$5,000 or 10 percent of the tax required to be shown in the

taxpayer's return.    Sec. 6661(b)(1)(A).   In a case involving a

tax shelter like the Saxon Energy leasing program in question,7

7
   Petitioner does not dispute that the Saxon Energy leasing
program in question is a tax shelter. See Schillinger v. Commis-
sioner, T.C. Memo 1990-640, affd. without published opinion 1
                                                   (continued...)
                              - 16 -

the amount of the understatement is reduced by the portion of it

that is attributable to the tax treatment of any item with

respect to which the taxpayer has or had substantial authority

for his or her position and for which the taxpayer reasonably

believed that the tax treatment was more likely than not the

proper treatment.   Sec. 6661(b)(2)(B) and (C).

     Petitioners argue that they had substantial authority for

the loss of $13,919 and the investment tax credit of $20,899 that

they claimed in their 1983 return with respect to Ridge Energy,

but they presented no evidence and make no argument that they

believed that that return position regarding those items was more

likely than not the proper treatment.   Petitioners further argue

that they reasonably and in good faith relied upon their tax

adviser in claiming those items and that they are not liable for

the addition to tax under section 6661(a).

     Respondent counters that petitioners did not have substan-

tial authority for the tax treatment of the items that they

claimed in their 1983 return with respect to Ridge Energy, that

it was not reasonable for them to rely on their tax adviser, and

that therefore petitioners are liable for the addition to tax

under section 6661(a).

     The regulations under section 6661 provide in pertinent

part:

7
 (...continued)
F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 1993).
                              - 17 -

     Conclusions reached in * * * legal opinions or opinions
     rendered by other tax professionals * * * are not
     authority. The authorities underlying such expressions
     of opinion where applicable to the facts of a particu-
     lar case, however, may give rise to substantial author-
     ity for the tax treatment of an item. * * * [Sec.
     1.6661-3(b)(2), Income Tax Regs.]

     Although petitioner testified that he relied upon petition-

ers' tax adviser Mr. Amsterdam to determine the loss and the

credit in question, there is no evidence in the record regarding

what, if any, authority Mr. Amsterdam relied on in determining

petitioners' entitlement to those items.

     Although not altogether clear, petitioners appear to argue

that they are entitled under section 6661(c) to a waiver of the

addition to tax under section 6661(a) because their understate-

ment of income tax was the result of relying upon Mr. Amsterdam

when petitioner invested in Ridge Energy and when they filed

their 1983 return.   Section 6661(c) allows respondent to waive

all or a portion of the addition to tax under section 6661(a)

upon a showing by the taxpayer that there was reasonable cause

for the understatement (or a part thereof) and that the taxpayer

acted in good faith.   The regulations under section 6661(c)

provide in pertinent part:

     In making a determination regarding waiver of the
     penalty under section 6661, the most important factor *
     * * will be the extent of the taxpayer's effort to
     assess the taxpayer's proper tax liability under the
     law. * * * In addition, circumstances that may indicate
     reasonable cause and good faith include an honest
     misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasonable in
     light of the experience, knowledge, and education of
     the taxpayer. * * * Reliance on an information return
                                - 18 -

     or on the advice of a professional (such as an ap-
     praiser, an attorney, or an accountant) would not
     necessarily constitute a showing of reasonable cause
     and good faith. Similarly, reliance on facts that,
     unknown to the taxpayer, are incorrect would not neces-
     sarily constitute a showing of reasonable cause and
     good faith. Reliance on an information return, profes-
     sional advice, or other facts, however, would consti-
     tute a showing of reasonable cause and good faith if,
     under all the circumstances, such reliance was reason-
     able and the taxpayer acted in good faith. * * * [Sec.
     1.6661-6(b), Income Tax Regs.]

     Section 6661(c) does not state that the taxpayer's proof of

reasonable cause and good faith will excuse the taxpayer from

being held liable for the addition to tax imposed by that provi-

sion.     Rather, that section provides that respondent may waive

imposition of that addition to tax in cases in which she deter-

mines that the taxpayer's failure was due to reasonable cause and

was premised on good faith.

        Petitioners have not established that they submitted to

respondent information relating to their reliance on their

adviser Mr. Amsterdam that would show that there was reasonable

cause for their understatement of tax for 1983 and that they

acted in good faith.     However, assuming arguendo that petitioners

requested a waiver under section 6661(c) that respondent refused

to grant, the standard for review of respondent's decision not to

grant any such request is whether respondent abused her discre-

tion.     Mailman v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 1079, 1084 (1988).

        We have found that petitioners failed to prove that they

acted reasonably in claiming a loss and an investment tax credit
                              - 19 -

in their 1983 return with respect to Ridge Energy.    On the record

before us, we further find that, assuming arguendo that petition-

ers sought a waiver under section 6661(c), they have not estab-

lished that respondent abused her discretion in not granting any

such request.

     Based on the entire record before us, we find that petition-

ers have failed to satisfy their burden of proving that for 1983

they had substantial authority for claiming in their 1983 return

the loss of $13,919 and the investment tax credit of $20,899 with

respect to Ridge Energy, that that return position was more

likely than not the proper treatment, and that, assuming arguendo

that petitioners requested a waiver under section 6661(c),

respondent abused her discretion in not granting any such re-

quest.   Accordingly, we sustain respondent's determination

imposing for 1983 the addition to tax under section 6661(a).

     To reflect the foregoing,



                                      Decision will be entered for

                                 respondent.
