UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

RANDY J. SLAGER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                                      No. 97-2301
DOUGLAS DUNCAN, County
Executive; MONTGOMERY COUNTY,
MARYLAND,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-97-1598-AW)

Submitted: May 29, 1998

Decided: August 28, 1998

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Alan B. Fischler, LAW OFFICES OF ALAN B. FISCHLER,
Bethesda, Maryland; Charles H. Fleischer, MARSH, FLEISCHER &
QUIGGLE, Chtd., Bethesda, Maryland, for Appellant. Charles W.
Thompson, Jr., County Attorney, Linda B. Thall, Chief Counsel,
Karen L. Federman Henry, Principal Counsel for Appeals, Sharon V.
Burrell, Associate County Attorney, Rockville, Maryland, for Appel-
lees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Randy J. Slager appeals the district court order granting the Defen-
dants' motion to dismiss and denying Slager's motion for summary
judgment in his action brought under Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1995 &
Supp. 1998) (ADA). Finding no error in the judgment, we affirm.

Slager is a Montgomery County, Maryland, resident. He suffers
from a permanent, disabling spinal condition. Slager alleges that
when he drives over speed humps his spine is jarred, causing him pain.1
Slager resides on Michaels Drive. He contends that by installing
speed humps on Michaels Drive and Greentree Road, the County
would restrict his access to the roads in violation of the ADA. Slager
also asserts that the ADA requires the County to consider the impact
of speed humps on disabled individuals in the form of pain and dis-
comfort as a part of the analysis conducted prior to installing the
speed humps.

Title II is violated when a qualified individual with a disability is
prevented from participating in or benefitting from a public service,
program, or activity, by reason of a qualifying disability, regardless
of whether the entity intended to discriminate against the disabled
person. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994); Patton v. TIC United Corp.,
77 F.3d 1235, 1245-46 (10th Cir.), cert. denied , 518 U.S. 1005
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1 Appellant explained the distinction between a speed "hump" and a
speed "bump." The Appellees do not dispute the definition. According to
the Institute of Transportation Engineers, a speed hump is a three to four
inch raised area in the roadway pavement surface extending traversely
across the travel way, with a travel length of approximately twelve feet.
A speed bump is a more abrupt obstruction typically found on private
roadways and parking lots.

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(1996). The County contends that Slager is not being discriminated
against or denied the benefits of the County's services, programs, or
activities.

The ADA addresses discrimination against individuals with dis-
abilities in regard to transportation barriers. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)
(1994).2 Slager argues that the streets with speed humps and the
streets that are planned to have speed humps constructed on them are
no longer readily accessible to him. He alleges that he has to avoid
routes with speed humps and thus his freedom of movement is lim-
ited. However, Slager did not state or provide any evidence that
because he must avoid the speed humps he is denied access to trans-
portation available to non-disabled persons. He did not put forth any
specific evidence regarding alteration of driving routes or driving
speed over the humps to decrease his pain. Slager's general state-
ments of pain and discomfort when driving over speed humps, with-
out more, are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).

We therefore affirm the district court's order. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
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2 To achieve the goals of the ADA, Congress charged the Department
of Justice with developing regulations to implement Title II. See 42
U.S.C. § 12134(a) (1994). The Department of Justice promulgated a
Technical Assistance Manual to set out the requirements under the ADA.
The Title II Technical Assistance Manual does not contain any provi-
sions regarding the installation of speed humps or bumps. While the
Technical Assistance manual is not exhaustive of requirements for gov-
ernments to meet under Title II, it is persuasive evidence that speed
humps are not deemed to be a primary transportation barrier.




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