
98 U.S. 104 (____)
BRADLEY
v.
UNITED STATES.
Supreme Court of United States.

*108 Mr. J. Hubley Ashton and Mr. Nathaniel Wilson for the appellants.
The Solicitor-General, contra.
*111 MR. JUSTICE CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Leases, like deeds or other written instruments, must receive a reasonable construction, as derived from the language employed, without the aid of extrinsic evidence beyond what may be necessary to identify the premises and to disclose the circumstances surrounding the transaction when the instrument was executed. Quackenboss v. Lansing, 6 Johns. (N.Y.) 49; Taylor, Landlord and Tenant, sect. 160, note.
Sufficient appears from the findings of the court below to show that, on the 6th of June, 1873, an indenture of lease was executed by the appellant to the United States, whereby the former, in consideration of the rents, covenants, and agreements in the instrument specified, demised and leased to the United States the premises described in the petition for the term of three years from and after June 5, 1873, with the privileges to the lessees of a renewal of the term for the further period of two years, at and for the annual rent, during the said term and subsequent renewal thereof, of $4,200, payable quarterly on the days specified in the indenture of lease exhibited in the record.
Both sides concede what the lease and record show, that the premises were leased by the United States for the convenience of the Post-Office Department, and that the Postmaster-General took immediate possession of the same, and that the premises have ever since been used for the purposes of his department.
Four other findings of the court below should be noticed in this connection: 1. That the lessor sold and conveyed the *112 premises to Alexander R. Shepherd and assigned the lease to him, and that he, the assignee, conveyed and assigned the same to the other persons named in the petition. 2. That the premises were used by the United States for the purposes mentioned for the whole period alleged. 3. That the holders of the lease have been paid the whole rent, except for the last year, for which they have been paid nothing. 4. Adequate appropriations were made by Congress authorizing the payments which have been made, but Congress refused to appropriate more than $1,800 for the last year.
Pursuant to those findings, the court below held that the plaintiffs could only recover the sum appropriated, and rendered judgment in their favor for that amount, from which judgment the plaintiffs appealed to this court. Since the appeal was entered here, the appellants assign for error that the court below erred in the construction given to the indenture of lease, and to the two acts of Congress referred to in the findings of fact.
Due appropriation of the sum of $1,800 was made by Congress to pay the rental for the last year; and the court below rendered judgment in favor of the appellants for that sum, which exhausts the appropriation made by Congress for that purpose, the only question for decision being whether the appellants can recover in this case the balance of their claim which has never been appropriated by Congress.
Moneys not appropriated cannot be drawn from the treasury; and it is equally clear that the parties, by the terms of the lease, understood and agreed with each other that the lease was made subject to an appropriation by Congress for the payment of the stipulated rental, and "that no payment shall be made" to the lessor "on account of such rental until such an appropriation shall become available;" that as soon as practicable after such an appropriation shall become available, the arrears of rent then due shall be paid in full, and that payment thereafter shall be made at the times and in the manner stipulated in the indenture of lease.
Prior to that time, Congress had enacted that it shall not be lawful for any department of the government to expend in any one fiscal year any sum in excess of the appropriation made by *113 Congress for that fiscal year, or to involve the government in any contract for the future payment of money in excess of such appropriation; and both parties concur in the proposition that that provision was in full force and operation at the time the indenture of lease under consideration was executed. 16 Stat. 231; Rev. Stat., sect. 3679.
Such contracts or purchases for the future were forbidden by the act of the 2d of March, 1861, unless the same were authorized by law or were made under an appropriation adequate to their fulfilment, except for clothing, subsistence, forage, fuel, quarters, or transportation, in the War or Navy Department; nor could those departments make any such contracts, even for those purposes, beyond the necessities of the current year. 12 Stat. 220; Rev. Stat., sect. 3732.
Forty years earlier, Congress enacted that neither the Secretary of State, or of the Treasury, or of War or Navy Department, should thereafter make any contract other than such as were necessary for the subsistence and clothing of the army and navy, and contracts for the quartermaster's department, except under a law authorizing the same, or under an appropriation adequate to its fulfilment. 3 Stat. 768.
Congress passed an act directing the Secretary of the Navy to cause floating dry-docks to be constructed at three of the national navy-yards, and specified appropriations were made towards constructing the several docks. Proper measures were adopted by the Secretary to ascertain what each structure would cost, from which it appeared that the appropriation for each was greatly insufficient. In view of these facts, the Secretary doubted whether he could lawfully contract to have the work done, and submitted the question to the Attorney-General, who decided that the facts as stated brought the case directly within the prohibition of the act last named, and that the contracts could not lawfully be made. 4 Op. Att'y-Gen. 600.
Cases arise, as there stated, where the authority to contract for the work is expressly given in the appropriation act, and in such cases it is clear, as there admitted, that the power to contract exists even though the price to be paid exceeds the amount appropriated. Examples of the kind are given in that *114 opinion, to which many more might be added; but when no such authority is given, and nothing is contained in the act appropriating the money from which such an authority may be implied, it is clear that the head of the department cannot involve the government in an obligation to pay any thing in excess of the appropriation.
Argument to show that money cannot be drawn from the treasury before it is appropriated is unnecessary, as the Constitution provides that "no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of an appropriation made by law;" nor is it necessary to enter into much discussion to show that the act of Congress making it unlawful for the head of a department to involve the government in any contract for the future payment of money in excess of an appropriation is a valid act, and of binding obligation, as such regulations and prohibitions in one form or another have been in operation without question throughout nearly the whole period since the adoption of the Constitution.
Acts of Congress of the kind, it must be admitted, are both valid and salutary in their operation; and it is equally clear that the party who drafted the indenture of lease intended to incorporate into the instrument the substance of the provision which prohibits the head of a department from involving the government in any contract for the future payment of money in excess of the appropriation made for its fulfilment. Well-founded doubt upon that subject cannot be entertained, and the court is of the opinion that the words of the indenture are amply sufficient to effect the object which the person who drafted the instrument intended to accomplish.
Both parties agreed that the indenture was subject to an appropriation to be made by Congress for the payment of the rental, and that no payment should be made to the lessor on account of such rental until such an appropriation should become available. Concede that these stipulations are valid, of which there can be no doubt, and it is clear to a demonstration that the claim of the appellants in excess of the amount allowed by the court below is utterly groundless.
Even suppose that is so, still it is insisted by the appellants that Congress, by subsequent legislation, has committed the *115 United States to the annual payment of the stipulated rental for the whole term of three years specified in the indenture of lease, and that they are entitled to judgment for the entire rental of the third year which remained unpaid when the suit was commenced, irrespective of the fact that the judgment rendered in their favor by the court below exhausts the whole amount of the money appropriated by Congress for that purpose.
Two annual appropriations were made by Congress, which in the aggregate were sufficient to pay the stipulated rental of the premises for the first two years; and the findings of the court below show that the payments for those two years were duly made, and that nothing more is claimed by the appellants in that regard. Of these, the first was simply an appropriation of the amount required to pay the stipulated annual rental, without any explanation whatever beyond what was necessary to describe the premises leased, from which it is plain that nothing can be inferred from that act to support the theory of the appellants. 18 Stat. 107.
Annexed to the second appropriation, which is for the sum of $4,488.86, is the following proviso, to wit: that hereafter no contract shall be made for the rent of any building, or part of any building in Washington, not now in use by the government, to be used for the purposes of the government, until an appropriation therefor shall have been made in terms by Congress. Id. 144.
Specific appropriations by these two acts were made available to pay the rental of the premises leased for the first two years; but it is clear as any thing in legal decision can be, that they furnish no ground whatever to support the theory that Congress entered into any legal obligation to make such an appropriation for the third year. Instead of that, the inference, if any, to be drawn from the last act tends to negative the appellants' theory, and to show that Congress intended to adhere to the stipulations of the lease,  that it was made subject to an appropriation by Congress for the payment of the rental stipulated, and that no payment should be made to the lessor on account of such rental until such an appropriation should become available.
*116 Unsupported as that theory is by those two appropriation acts, or by any thing else exhibited in the record, it may well be dismissed as destitute of merit, without further consideration.
If the indenture of lease had been for three years without any covenant that it was made subject to an appropriation by Congress, and that no payment on account of rental should be made until such an appropriation became available, it may be that the theory of the appellants, that the contract was for three years as an entire term, might be maintained; or if not, that it might perhaps be held that Congress had ratified the instrument by appropriating money to pay the rental for the first two years. Be that as it may, it is still true that no ratification of the present indenture by any such act would benefit the appellants in that regard, so long as it contains the covenant that no payment of the rental shall be made until an appropriation for the purpose becomes available.
Viewed in that light, as the case should be, a few observations will be sufficient to show that nothing is found in the remaining appropriation act to warrant a judgment in favor of the appellants for any sum beyond what was allowed by the court below.
Eighteen hundred dollars were appropriated by Congress for the third year, several months before the second year expired. Appended to that appropriation is the proviso that the above sum shall not be deemed to be paid on account of any lease for years of said building, which shows conclusively that Congress intended to negative the theory of the appellants that the indenture gave them the right to recover any thing of the United States beyond the sum appropriated by Congress.
Confirmation of that proposition is also derived from a second proviso annexed to the same appropriation, by which it is enacted that at the end of the present fiscal year the Postmaster-General be directed, upon demand of the lessor, to deliver up the possession of the said premises. Id. 367.
Construed as those provisions should be, in view of the subject-matter and the surrounding circumstances, it is clear that Congress intended to give seasonable notice to the lessor of the premises that no more than the sum appropriated would be paid as rental of the same for the third year, and that he might *117 take possession of the same if he did not see fit to accept the sum appropriated for their use and occupation.
Corresponding views were expressed by the court below, and they held, and well held, that inasmuch as the appellants never demanded the redelivery of the premises, it must be determined that they acquiesced in and assented to the terms of rent offered by Congress for the third year.
Public officers, in such a case, having no funds in the treasury and being without authority to bind the United States, can only agree to pay the stipulated rental, provided the money is appropriated by Congress, and if the lessor, voluntarily and without any misrepresentation or deception, enters into a lease on those terms, he must rely upon the justice of Congress; nor do the circumstances in this case disclose any hardship, as the appellants were seasonably notified that they would not be paid for the third year any greater rent than the sum appropriated for the purpose. Churchward v. The Queen, Law Rep. 1 Q.B. 199.
For these reasons the court is of the opinion that there is no error in the record.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE MILLER, with whom concurred MR. JUSTICE FIELD, MR. JUSTICE STRONG, and MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.
I am of opinion that the two annual appropriations expressly for the sum due for each year's rent, according to the terms of the lease, were recognitions of the validity of that contract which bind the United States, and that the claimant was entitled to recover the same amount for the third year.
