
79 U.S. 317 (____)
12 Wall. 317
ROGERS
v.
RITTER.
Supreme Court of United States.

*319 Messrs. M. Blair and F.A. Dick, for the plaintiff in error.
*320 Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.
The objection to the grant, which, supposing it genuine, is insisted on in the first place, in this court, by the counsel of the plaintiff in error, presents a question which in the state of the record this court is not called upon to decide; for it does not appear that the objection was taken in the court below. It is true that the grant was attacked there, but on an entirely different ground. The main controversy concerning it was, whether or not it was genuine. Its validity, if genuine, does not seem to have been questioned. We are not, therefore, required to travel through the various laws of Mexico, the acts of California governors, and the proceedings of Departmental Assemblies to determine at what period of time the powers of justices of the peace, acting as alcaldes, to grant building lots within their jurisdiction, ceased.
It is insisted, in the second place, that comparison of handwriting is in no case legal evidence, and as it was admitted to prove the genuineness of the disputed paper, the judgment should, on that account, be reversed. It is certainly true that the ancient rule of the common law did not allow of testimony derived from a mere comparison of hands, and equally true that there has been a great diversity of opinion, in the different courts of this country, in relation to this species of evidence. But in England this rule of the common law, as it respects civil proceedings, has been abrogated by the legislature, so that in the courts there, at the present day, in civil suits, the witness can compare two *321 writings with each other, in order to ascertain whether they were both written by the same person.[*] It is, however, not necessary for the purposes of this case to discuss the subject in all its bearings, nor to depart from the rule laid down by this court in Strother v. Lucas,[] that evidence by comparison of hands is not admissible when the witness has had no previous knowledge of the handwriting, but is called upon to testify merely from a comparison of hands. The witnesses who testified in this case had previous knowledge of Sanchez's handwriting. It is true this knowledge was not gained from seeing him write, nor from correspondence with him, but in a way equally effectual to make them acquainted with it. Sanchez was for many years, under Mexican rule in California, in official position, acting as justice of the peace, transacting the duties of alcalde, corresponding with the governor, and exercising for a time the power conferred upon him to grant small parcels of land to deserving persons.[] Necessarily, in the course of the administration of the duties of his office, he had occasion frequently to attach his signature to papers of importance. These papers, after the United States took possession of the country, were deposited in the recorder's office of San Francisco, and the Surveyor-General's office, where the Mexican archives are kept. Sanchez also, as did most of the native Californians and Mexicans who had been in public life, appeared before the United States land commission, which sat in San Francisco to determine the validity of Spanish grants, and gave his depositions. These depositions, with the other papers of the commission, at the expiration of it, were taken to the office of the Land Commissioner at Washington. As no question was raised on the trial of the genuineness of these various writings  Sanchez was present and interposed no objection  they must be considered, if not as having been acknowledged by him, at least as having been proved to the satisfaction of the court.
In this condition of things, Sears, Hopkins, and Fisher *322 were called upon to testify upon the subject of the disputed signatures; and the inquiry is, did the court err in its ruling on this point? Obviously, the evidence is not obnoxious to the objection that it is a mere comparison of hands; that is, a comparison by a juxtaposition of two writings, in order to enable a witness, without previous knowledge of the handwriting of the party, to determine by such comparison whether both were written by the same person.
The witnesses in this case were conversant with the signature of Sanchez, and swore to their belief, not by comparing a disputed with an acknowledged signature, but from the knowledge they had previously acquired on the subject. The text-writers all agree, that a witness is qualified to testify to the genuineness of a controverted signature if he has the proper knowledge of the party's handwriting. The difficulty has been in determining what is proper knowledge, and how it shall be acquired. It is settled everywhere, that if a person has seen another write his name but once he can testify, and that he is equally competent, if he has personally communicated with him by letter, although he has never seen him write at all. But is the witness incompetent unless he has obtained his knowledge in one or the other of these modes? Clearly not, for in the varied affairs of life there are many modes in which one person can become acquainted with the handwriting of another, besides having seen him write or corresponded with him. There is no good reason for excluding any of these modes of getting information, and if the court, on the preliminary examination of the witness, can see that he has that degree of knowledge of the party's handwriting which will enable him to judge of its genuineness, he should be permitted to give to the jury his opinion on the subject.
This was done in this case, and it is manifest that the three witnesses told enough to satisfy any reasonable mind that they were better able to judge of the signature of Sanchez, than if they had only received one or two letters from him, or saw him write his name once.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[*]  2 Taylor on Evidence, §§ 1667-8.
[]  6 Peters, 763.
[]  Colonial History of San Francisco, by Dwinelle.
