UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 96-4390

DONALD LEE WRAY,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Spartanburg.
Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-95-896)

Submitted: April 17, 1997

Decided: May 1, 1997

Before NIEMEYER and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

R. Scott Davis, Spartanburg, South Carolina, for Appellant. Harold
Watson Gowdy III, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTOR-
NEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Donald Lee Wray pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1994). On appeal, Wray's attorney has filed a brief
in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), con-
cluding that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but raising
one issue: whether the district court had authority to sentence Wray
as a career offender. Wray has filed his own brief alleging that the
district court erred by sentencing him for distributing 1.1 kilograms
of "crack" cocaine when the evidence revealed he only possessed
cocaine base. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

We address the arguments in turn. First, as noted by counsel, the
district court did not sentence Wray as a career offender, see USSG
§ 4B1.1,* so whether the district court had authority to sentence Wray
as a career offender is irrelevant. Second, Wray's claim that district
court erred by sentencing him to crack rather than cocaine base fails
because the record reveals that: Wray pled guilty to possession with
intent to distribute "crack cocaine;" Wray failed to object to portions
of the Presentence Investigation Report stating that he was responsi-
ble for 1.1 kilograms of a "beige rock-like substance . . . crack
cocaine;" and the lab reports which Wray now proffers as evidence
that he only possessed cocaine base in fact state the substance was
crack cocaine. Also, the sentencing guidelines specifically state that
the Sentencing Commission used the term "cocaine base" to refer to
"crack." USSG § 2D1.1(c) n.* (D). Accordingly, we do not find that
the district court committed plain error by sentencing Wray under the
crack cocaine guidelines. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,
734 (1993) (claim raised for the first time on appeal cannot justify
reversal unless the error is "clear under current law").

As required by Anders, we have independently reviewed the record
and all pertinent documents. We have considered all possible issues
presented, and we conclude that there are no nonfrivolous grounds for
_________________________________________________________________
*United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov.
1995).

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appeal. Because the record discloses no reversible error, we affirm
Greene's sentence.

This court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Coun-
sel's motion must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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