UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WAYNE BULLARD, a/k/a Michael
                                     No. 97-4205
Harrod, a/k/a Glenn Ekanger, a/k/a
Jeffrey L. Cosby, a/k/a Alan Van
Peavy, a/k/a Johnnie Graham, a/k/a
Kevin Jhingory, a/k/a Ivan Jasper,
Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WAYNE BULLARD, a/k/a Michael
                                     No. 97-4206
Harrod, a/k/a Glenn Ekanger, a/k/a
Jeffrey L. Cosby, a/k/a Alan Van
Peavy, a/k/a Johnnie Graham, a/k/a
Kevin Jhingory, a/k/a Ivan Jasper,
Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
                                     No. 97-4207
VANCE EVANS, a/k/a Nancy Evans,
a/k/a Georgia Johnson,
Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KEVIN MICHAEL WELLS, a/k/a
                                                                      No. 97-4208
Charles Rainey, a/k/a Bernard
Taylor, a/k/a Barnard Tyler, a/k/a
Christopher Westbrooks, a/k/a
Zermee Pryor, a/k/a McCullen Pitts,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-95-46, CR-95-48)

Submitted: November 25, 1997

Decided: January 20, 1998

Before WILKINS, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Clarke F. Ahlers, Columbia, Maryland; J. Dennis Murphy, Jr., Annap-
olis, Maryland; Timothy J. Sullivan, SULLIVAN & SULLIVAN,
College Park, Maryland, for Appellants. Lynne A. Battaglia, United
States Attorney, Maury S. Epner, Assistant United States Attorney,
Sandra Wilkinson, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted the Appellants, Vance Evans, Wayne Bullard, and
Kevin Michael Wells, of conspiring to commit bank fraud.1 Addition-
ally, the jury found Bullard and Wells guilty of actually committing
bank fraud.2 On appeal, we affirmed Evans's, Bullard's, and Wells's
convictions; however, because the district court failed to determine
whether the amount of fraud loss was reasonably foreseeable to the
Appellants, we remanded the case for resentencing. 3 At the resentenc-
ing hearing, the district court heard testimony and argument on the
amount of fraud loss before reimposing sentences of thirty months
imprisonment for Evans, and sixty-three months imprisonment for
Wells and Bullard. Again, Evans, Bullard, and Wells appeal their sen-
tences arguing that the district court erroneously computed the fraud
losses attributable to them. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the
sentence of each Appellant.

The sentencing guidelines provide a base offense level of six for
crimes involving fraud or deceit,4 and incrementally increase the
offense level according to the amount of fraud loss. 5 Because fraudu-
lent losses come about through an ever-expanding variety of means
and each case must be determined on its own facts, 6 we will vacate
Evans's, Bullard's, and Wells's sentences only if the district court's
fraud loss determinations were clearly erroneous. 7 Additionally, the
_________________________________________________________________
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
2 See 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
3 See United States v. Evans, Nos. 95-5603, 95-7884, 95-5820 (4th Cir.,
Nov. 27, 1996) (unpublished).
4 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL§ 2F1.1 (1995).
5 See USSG § 2F1.1(b)(1)(A)-(S).
6 See United States v. Mancuso, 42 F.3d 836, 849 (4th Cir. 1994).
7 See United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1274 (4th Cir. 1995) (cit-
ing United States v. West, 2 F.3d 66, 71 (4th Cir. 1993)).

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district court need only to support its findings by a preponderance of
the evidence,8 and losses may be characterized as "directly attribut-
able" loss under USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), or"reasonably foreseeable"
loss under USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).

At resentencing, in order to ascertain the type and amount of losses
that could be attributed to each Appellant, the district court heard tes-
timony from David Thomas, a Special Agent of the United States
Secret Service, and received summaries prepared by him which were
offered by the Government as calculations of the losses attributable
to each Appellant. In addition, the district court heard arguments from
the parties about whether certain losses could be"directly attributed"
to or "reasonably foreseen" by a particular Appellant. Essentially, the
Appellants fraudulently inflated multiple checking accounts and used
various aliases to negotiate multiple fraudulent checks for consumer
goods and substantial amounts of cash. Moreover, the Appellants con-
spired with numerous people to accomplish their scheme.

The court determined that Evans was responsible for a total fraud
loss of $189,950. Evans did not challenge that $41,039 was "directly
attributable" to him, and the court reviewing all the evidence and rele-
vant conduct found that an additional $148,911 was"reasonably fore-
seeable" based upon the common victims, similar methods of fraud,
and the common aliases of those involved in the conspiracy. Further,
the court found that the combined fraud loss of $189,950 resulted in
a total offense level of 13.9 Given Evans's criminal history category
of IV, a base offense level of 13 results in a guideline range of
twenty-four to thirty months. Accordingly, the district court did not
err by sentencing Evans to thirty months imprisonment.

Next, using the same evidence and procedure, the district court
determined that Bullard was responsible for a total fraud loss of
$403,577. The court found that $81,466 was "directly attributable" to
Bullard, and that an additional $323,131 was "reasonably foreseeable"
to him. The court calculated a base offense level of 15,10 and assigned
two more points for more than minimal planning, 11 resulting in an
_________________________________________________________________
8 See United States v. Morgan, 942 F.2d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 1991).
9 See USSG § 2F1.1(b)(1)(H).
10 See USSG § 2F1.1(b)(1)(J).
11 See USSG § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A).

                    4
adjusted base offense level of 17. Because Bullard was also convicted
for possession of a firearm by a felon,12 the district court combined
the fraud and firearm offense levels and recomputed a total offense
level of 22.13 A total offense level of 22, with a criminal history cate-
gory of IV, gave Bullard a guideline range of sixty-three to seventy-
eight months; thus, the district court's sentence of sixty-three months
imprisonment was within the properly calculated guideline range.

Finally, the district court assigned Wells a total fraud loss of
$403,577, and a base offense level of 15.14 The court found that
$83,285 was "directly attributable" to Wells, and that an additional
$320,292 was "reasonably foreseeable to him. Wells received two
more points for more than minimal planning,15 and an additional two
points for obstructing justice.16 Combining the base offense level for
Wells's conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon17 with the
base offense level for fraud, the district court correctly computed a
total offense level of 20. An offense level of 20, with a criminal his-
tory category of IV, gave Wells a guideline range of fifty-one to
sixty-three months. As with Bullard, the district court did not err by
sentencing Wells to sixty-three months imprisonment.

Because each case of fraud loss must be determined on its own facts,18
we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in determining
that Evans was responsible for fraud loss totaling $189,950, and Bul-
lard and Wells for fraud loss totaling $403,577. Accordingly, we
affirm the sentences imposed by the district court. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
_________________________________________________________________

12 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g) (West 1976 & Supp. 1997).
13 See USSG § 3D1.4.

14 See USSG § 2F1.1(b)(1)(J).

15 See USSG § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A).
16 See USSG § 3C1.1.

17 See USSG § 2K2.1(a)(6).

18 See Mancuso, 42 F.3d at 849.

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