UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

In Re: AUSTIN B. SPROUSE,
Debtor.

ROY V. WOLFE, III,
                                                                      No. 95-2401
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

AUSTIN B. SPROUSE,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg.
James H. Michael, Jr., Senior District Judge.
(CA-95-21-H, BK-94-241-5)

Argued: May 8, 1996

Decided: June 28, 1996

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and LUTTIG and MICHAEL,
Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: Charles Lawson Ricketts, III, ALLEN & CARWILE,
Waynesboro, Virginia, for Appellant. Roy Vergil Wolfe, III, JULIAS,
BLATT & WOLFE, P.C., Harrisonburg, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Austin B. Sprouse, the debtor in this Chapter 7 bankruptcy case,
appeals from the district court's reversal of the bankruptcy court's
conclusion that two promissory notes created tenancies by the entirety
in the payees and therefore were shielded from the creditors of Mr.
Sprouse (a payee on the notes). Because we agree with the district
court's conclusion that the notes did not create tenancies by the
entirety, we affirm.

The two promissory notes in this case are proceeds of real estate
sold by Mr. Sprouse. The first note (for $56,000) is made payable to
"Austin B. Sprouse and Mary R. Sprouse, or the survivor of them."
The second (for $38,000) is made payable to "Austin B. Sprouse and
Mary R. Sprouse, or the survivor." The Sprouses are husband and
wife.

We must determine whether the language of the notes created ten-
ancies by the entirety because if it did, the notes are exempt from the
claims of the creditors of either spouse alone. Jones v. Conwell, 314
S.E.2d 61, 64 (Va. 1984).1 All debts in this case are those of Austin
Sprouse alone.

Section 55-20 of the Virginia Code abolishes survivorship between
joint tenants.2 Section 55-21 provides that § 55-20 shall not apply "to
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1 If the notes create anything other than tenancies by the entirety, they
are not shielded from Mr. Sprouse's creditors. See, e.g., Jones, 314
S.E.2d at 64 (joint tenancy with right of survivorship is subject to parti-
tion by a judgment lien creditor of one of the several joint tenants).
2 Va. Code § 55-20 provides:

          Survivorship between joint tenants abolished. When any joint
          tenant shall die, before or after vesting of the estate, whether the

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an estate conveyed or devised to persons in their own right when it
manifestly appears from the tenor of the instrument that it was
intended the part of one dying should then belong to the others." Va.
Code § 55-21. "Manifest" as used in§ 55-21 means "obvious to the
understanding, evident to the mind, not obscure or hidden, and . . .
synonymous with open, clear, visible, unmistakable, indubitable,
indisputable, evident and self-evident." Hoover v. Smith, 444 S.E.2d
546, 548 (Va. 1994). However, "`no particular words are necessary'
to create a survivorship estate." Id. (quoting Wallace v. Wallace, 190
S.E. 293, 298 (Va. 1937)).

Mr. Sprouse argues that §§ 55-20 and 55-21 do not abolish tenancy
by the entirety, but simply abolish the presumption of survivorship
unless the intent for survivorship is manifest. According to him the
key inquiry is not whether the intent to create a particular estate is
manifest, but rather whether the intent to create a right of survivorship
is manifest. Because, Mr. Sprouse says, a survivorship intent is mani-
fest in this case, the statute is satisfied and common law principles
govern the question of what survivorship estate is created. Finally, he
argues, at common law any conveyance of property to a husband and
wife creates an estate by the entirety.

We reject Mr. Sprouse's interpretation of §§ 55-20 and 55-21. The
Virginia Supreme Court has said that, as a result of these provisions,
"tenancy by entireties is itself abolished, except where the deed or
will manifests an intent that it shall continue." Allen v. Parkey, 149
S.E. 615, 618 (Va. 1929) (dicta). In Allen the court held that it was
manifest that the following language created a tenancy by the entirety:

        Now should the said W.P. Allen survive his wife, Mary Ely
        Allen, the said tract of land to be his property to dispose of
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        estate be real or personal, or whether partition could have been
        compelled or not, his part shall descend to his heirs, or pass by
        devise, or go to his personal representative, subject to debts,
        curtesy, dower, or distribution, as if he had been a tenant in com-
        mon. And if hereafter any estate, real or personal, be conveyed
        to a husband and his wife, they shall take and hold the same by
        moieties in a like manner as if a distinct moiety had been given
        by a separate conveyance.

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          as he sees proper and the same applies to the said Mary Ely
          Allen.

149 S.E. at 617. The language of the instrument in Allen referred to
one party as the wife of the other. We agree with the district court that
Allen indicates that the intent to create a tenancy by the entirety is not
manifest absent some mention of the marital relationship. Here, the
promissory notes make no mention of the marital status of Austin and
Mary Sprouse. Accordingly, we hold that the notes do not create ten-
ancies by the entirety.3

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
affirmed.

AFFIRMED
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3 We reject Mr. Sprouse's suggestion that we look beyond the faces of
the notes to determine the marital status of the Sprouses at the time the
notes were executed and delivered. Absent some ambiguity on the face
of the notes, we are limited to the four corners of the notes to discern
their meaning. See Wilson v. Holyfield, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (Va. 1984).
On the face of the notes there is no suggestion of a marital relationship,
and there is thus no ambiguity in the notes about whether the Sprouses
were attempting to take as husband and wife.

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