UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                             No. 98-4481

MOHAMMAD HUSSAIN,
Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                             No. 98-4525

ROBERT MARK,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Deborah K. Chasanow, District Judge.
(CR-97-475)

Submitted: June 1, 1999

Decided: June 22, 1999

Before HAMILTON and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges,
and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Martha P. Rogers, OBER, KALER, GRIMES & SHRIVER, Wash-
ington, D.C.; Charles T. Smith, II, OBER, KALER, GRIMES &
SHRIVER, Baltimore, Maryland; Gabriel J. Christian, GABRIEL J.
CHRISTIAN & ASSOCIATES, Bowie, Maryland, for Appellants.
Lynne A. Battaglia, United States Attorney, Sandra Wilkinson, Assis-
tant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

In these consolidated cases, Mohammad Hussain and Robert Mark
appeal their convictions and sentences imposed after a jury found
them guilty of offenses arising from a scheme to deal in stolen phar-
maceuticals. Hussain was convicted of one count of conspiracy to
introduce into interstate commerce misbranded drugs, 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (1994), one count of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994), and
one count of selling sample drugs, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 331(t), 333(b)(1)
(West 1972 & Supp. 1999). Mark was convicted of one count of con-
spiracy to introduce into interstate commerce misbranded drugs, 18
U.S.C. § 371, and one count of introduction into interstate commerce
misbranded drugs, 21 U.S.C. § 331(a). Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.

Hussain contends that the district court improperly denied his
motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his pharmacy
pursuant to a warrant. We find that the search warrant was supported
by probable cause and was sufficiently particular. See, e.g., United
States v. Vitek Supply Corp., 144 F.3d 476, 481 (7th Cir. 1998); cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 67 U.S.L.W. 3178, 67 U.S.L.W. 3262, 67
U.S.L.W. 3515, 67 U.S.L.W. 3524 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1999); United

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States v. Lalor, 996 F.2d 1578, 1581 (4th Cir. 1993). Hussain also
contends that he was improperly denied the opportunity to confront
a witness with allegedly perjured grand jury testimony. We find that
the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting cross-examination.
Hussain also contends that prosecutors improperly induced a witness
to testify in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (1994). This argument
is without merit. See United States v. Singleton , 165 F.3d 1297 (10th
Cir. 1999) (en banc). Finally, Hussain contends that his offense level
was improperly enhanced by two levels for risk of bodily injury under
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2F1.1(b)(4)(A) (1997). We find
that the court applied the appropriate legal analysis and its determina-
tion was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Loayza, 107 F.3d
257, 265 (4th Cir. 1997).

Mark contends that the court erred by denying his motion to sup-
press a tape recording of a telephone conversation between Mark and
Hussain concerning a drug transaction. Contrary to Mark's argument,
the tape recording was not the fruit of a suppressed statement. We
also find that the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mark's
motion to sever. See United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 883 (4th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253 (1997). Finally, the court's
factual findings with regard to Mark's offense level for sentencing
purposes were not clearly erroneous.

Accordingly, we affirm the Appellants' convictions and sentences.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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