
112 U.S. 514 (1884)
THE ELIZABETH JONES.
THE WILLIS.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued November 13, 1884.
Decided December 15, 1884.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.
*519 Mr. Wirt Dexter, for appellants.
Mr. Robert Rae, for appellees.
MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court. He recited the facts as above stated, and continued:
There is a bill of exceptions, containing exceptions by the claimants of the Jones to the first, third and fourth conclusions of law. Our review of the decree below is limited by statute to a determination of the questions of law which arise on the record, under the facts stated by the Circuit Court. The opinion of that court, although, as required by a rule of this court, annexed to and transmitted with the record, is no part of it.
When this collision occurred, the regulations in force for preventing collisions on the water were those prescribed by the act of April 29, 1864, 13 Stat. 58. Articles 11, 12, 18, 19, and 20 of the "Steering and Sailing Rules" in that act have a bearing on this case, and are as follows:

"TWO SAILING SHIPS MEETING.
ARTICLE 11. If two sailing ships are meeting end on, or nearly end on, so as to involve risk of collision, the helms of both shall be put to port, so that each may pass on the port side of the other.

TWO SAILING SHIPS CROSSING.
ARTICLE 12. When two sailing ships are crossing so as to involve risk of collision, then, if they have the wind on different sides, the ship with the wind on the port side shall keep out of *520 the way of the ship with the wind on the starboard side, except in the case in which the ship with the wind on the port side is close-hauled, and the other ship free, in which case the latter ship shall keep out of the way. But if they have the wind on the same side, or if one of them has the wind aft, the ship which is to windward shall keep out of the way of the ship which is to leeward."

"CONSTRUCTION OF ARTICLES 12, 14, 15 AND 17.
ARTICLE 18. Where, by the above rules, one of two ships is to keep out of the way, the other shall keep her course subject to the qualifications contained in the following article:

PROVISO TO SAVE SPECIAL CASES.
ARTICLE 19. In obeying and construing these rules due regard must be had to all dangers of navigation, and due regard must also be had to any special circumstances which may exist in any particular case rendering a departure from the above rules necessary in order to avoid immediate danger.

NO SHIP UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES TO NEGLECT PROPER PRECAUTIONS.
ARTICLE 20. Nothing in these rules shall exonerate any ship, or the owner, or master, or crew thereof, from the consequences of any neglect to carry lights, or signals, or of any neglect to keep a proper lookout, or of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice of seamen, or by the special circumstances of the case."
A reference to the statements of the original answer of the Jones, and of her original cross-libel, shows, that the case she first attempted to make was one under Article 11, of two sailing vessels meeting end on or nearly end on, so as to involve risk of collision, where both are required to port. This is shown by the averments that the Willis "was approaching the Jones in an opposite direction from the course of the Jones; that, when the light of the Willis was first seen, it was almost dead ahead, and continued on that line as the vessels approached *521 each other;" and that the Jones, seeing danger of a collision, ported, but the Willis starboarded. After the trial before the District Court, the amended answer and the amended cross-libel set up a case where the Jones saw, on her port bow, the red light of the Willis; that light continued to show more on the port bow of the Jones; the Willis did not see the green light of the Jones; and immediately before the collision, the Jones began to port her helm, but, seeing that the Willis was starboarding, changed her helm to starboard. This new theory on the part of the Jones as to her defence indicates plainly that she was conscious that her porting was a wrong manuvre, and that she undertook to account for the collision by alleging that she saw the red light of the Willis on her port bow, and that it opened more on that bow, and that the Willis, by starboarding after that, came across her path. This theory is negatived by the findings of the Circuit Court.
The salient facts exhibited in those findings are as follows: The Willis was sailing east by north. The Jones was sailing a general course southwest by west half west, steering by the wind. The collision occurred at a quarter before two A.M. At twelve midnight the wind was east. At twenty minutes past one, twenty-five minutes before the collision, the wind was southeast. At that time, if the Jones was sailing southwest by west half west, her course was nine points and a half from the wind, and she was not close-hauled. She could certainly, though a bark, hold the wind at seven points off. At the same time, the Willis, if sailing east by north, was five points from the wind. The wind being a six-knot breeze, it is plain, in view of the combined speed of the vessels, that they had not yet seen each other twenty-five minutes before the collision. The wind was hauling to the southward, and changed the four points, to south, in those twenty-five minutes. If, because of that change of the wind, the Jones, to hold the wind, fell off to seven points from the wind, she would be heading west by south, or directly opposite to the east by north course of the Willis.
The Willis made the green light of the Jones about half a point on her starboard bow, about three miles off, and continued *522 to see that green light till the Jones was within a length off, when the Jones opened her red light. As soon as the Willis saw the green light of the Jones, she put her own green light against it by starboarding, and went off a point, and then steadied; that is, she headed east-northeast. It follows, that she showed her green light to the Jones. This starboarding by the Willis was when the vessels were about three miles apart, and from fifteen to eighteen minutes before the collision, as their combined speed was from ten to twelve miles an hour. The Jones must have seen that the Willis was falling off, and trying to get out of her way. Green light to green light was safety. When the Willis thus headed east-northeast, the green light of the Jones was one point and a half on her starboard bow. When the vessels were about two miles apart, that is, from ten to twelve minutes, the Willis fell off one point more, to northeast by east, and the green light of the Jones got to be two points on her starboard bow. All this time the Willis was trying to get out of the way of the Jones. She did so in a proper manner, by carrying her own green light away from the green light of the Jones, and by taking a course which did not and could not cross the course of the Jones. When the Willis thus, at two miles distance from the Jones, headed northeast by east, the Jones, with the wind south, would, if close-hauled at seven points from the wind, head no farther off than west by south. At the collision, the Willis was heading northeast, or one point more off; and the starboard side of the stem of the Jones struck the starboard side of the Willis amidships, at about right angles. To do this, the Jones must have headed about northwest, which was a change, by porting, of five points from her course of west by south, which latter course, with the wind south, would have allowed her, at seven points off, to be close-hauled, and have her sails full.
The Jones ran into danger by porting. She did not port to avoid collision or immediate danger. She ported when she must have seen, all the time, that the Willis was going away from her. This porting by the Jones was no part of keeping her course, and it caused the collision. It was a departure, by *523 the Jones, from the course which the Willis, constantly seeing the green light of the Jones, had a right to think the Jones would keep, especially in view of the persistent falling off of the Willis. It was, therefore, a change of course by the Jones. It was a change, by her, across the course of the Willis, to the extent of five points beyond her close-hauled course of west by south.
Conceding it to have been the duty of the Willis, under article 12, to keep out of the way of the Jones, it was equally the duty of the latter not to baffle or prevent the efforts of the Willis to that end. Her departure from the requirement of article 18, that she should keep her course, cannot be justified under article 19, because there were no special circumstances which rendered such departure necessary in order to avoid immediate danger. In The Elizabeth Jenkins, L.R. 1 P.C. App. 501, it is laid down, that if a ship bound to keep her course under article 18, justifies her departure from that course under the words of article 19, she takes upon herself the obligation of showing, both that her departure was, at the time it took place, necessary, in order to avoid immediate danger, and that the course adopted by her was reasonably calculated to avoid that danger. Under article 20, the special circumstances of the case required that the Jones should be careful not to port as and when she did. Article 20 was in force at the time of this collision, although it is not re-enacted in the Revised Statutes. Why it was omitted is not apparent, as it had not been repealed. It was one of the articles in the British act of 1862, 25 and 26 Vict., ch. 63, from which our act of 1864 was taken, and it still remains an article in the regulations promulgated by the British order in council of August 14, 1879, 4 P.D. 241, which states that it has been made to appear that the government of the United States is willing that those regulations shall apply to ships of the United States, whether within British jurisdiction or not, after September 1, 1880. We do not intend to intimate, however, that the precautions it enacts are not to be enforced as parts of the general law of navigation, though not now embodied in any statute.
*524 The Circuit Court held that each of the changes recited in the findings of fact, as having been made by the Jones, was improper; and that the changes recited therein as having been made by the Willis were proper. In regard to the Jones, it is contended for her that she was at liberty to make such variations from her course as the wind rendered necessary, to enable her to keep her sails filled and keep on her port tack. It must be concluded, from the fourth finding of fact and the third conclusion of law, that the Jones was manuvred on two occasions in such a manner as, first, to allow her sails to shake, and, second, to allow her to fall off and fill her sails; that this falling off was effected by putting her helm up or to port; and that the Circuit Court regarded these manuvres as changes and as improper ones. In view of what it is found the Willis was doing, it is plain that these changes were calculated to baffle the efforts of the Willis, by starboarding, to get away from the Jones; and that they amounted to a following up of the Willis by the Jones. Although the wind had got as far as south, the Jones had no right to persist in falling off toward the Willis to an extent sufficient to produce a collision, when the Willis was all the while going away in the same direction. The duty of the Jones to keep her course did not permit her to do so in such a way as to bring about a collision with a vessel whose green light was constantly receding. There is no idea appertaining to keeping a course which justifies holding to it in such way as to bring on a peril. The only principle inherent in it is to so act as to enable the other vessel, on whom the duty rests, to adopt with success means of getting out of the way.
It is apparent that, notwithstanding the alleged endeavor of the Jones to keep close-hauled, with the wind south, the Willis, by her starboarding two points, from a course east by north to a course northeast by east, would have gone clear of the Jones, but for the porting of the Jones, as found in the fifth finding of fact, which carried her head around at least five points towards the Willis. The following diagram illustrates the courses and bearings of the two vessels, prior to any starboarding by the Willis and to any porting by the Jones:
*525 
It shows the Willis on a course east by north, and the Jones on a course southwest by west half west, five points and a half from south. At that time the vessels were three miles apart, or fifteen to eighteen minutes. When they were two miles apart, or ten to twelve minutes, after the Willis had twice starboarded, and to northeast by east, the green light of the Jones bore two points on the starboard bow of the Willis. Then, with any proper falling off of the Jones to hold a south wind, even to the extent of seven points, or to west by south, when the Willis was on a course northeast by east, or two points away from the course of the Jones, there would have been no collision, if the Jones had not ported five points more.
It is contended for the Jones that the Willis should have ported, instead of starboarding. But, as she saw the green light of the Jones on her starboard bow, to have ported would have thrown her across the course of the Jones, as shown by the following diagram:

By starboarding and going away from the green light of the Jones, the Willis took a course of safety, and, in the language of the cases "determined the risk." Article 12 applies only to cases where the vessels "are crossing so as to involve risk of collision." Even assuming, on the facts found, that these vessels were crossing, so as to involve risk of collision, when they first sighted each other, the Willis "determined the risk" when *526 she had gone off two points by starboarding, and brought green light to green light. This is the point in judgment in The Earl of Elgin, L.R. 4 P.C. App. 1.
But it is urged for the Jones that the porting mentioned in the fifth finding was a porting in extremis, and, therefore, excusable. The finding is not to that effect. The changes made by the Willis are found to have been proper and were proper. This being so, no fault of the Willis induced the final act of porting by the Jones. To be an excusable mistake in extremis, a pardonable manuvre, though contributing to or inducing a collision, when the manuvre would have been faulty if not excusable, it must be one produced by fault or mismanagement in the other vessel. New York & Liverpool Steamship Co. v. Rumball, 21 How. 372, 383; The Nichols, 7 Wall. 656, 666; The Carroll, 8 Id. 302, 305; The Dexter, 23 Id. 69, 76; The Bywell Castle, 4 P.D. 219. The last case is a well-considered judgment by Lords Justices James, Brett and Cotton, in the Court of Appeal, and the rule there formulated is, that "where one ship has, by wrong manuvres, placed another ship in a position of extreme danger, that other ship will not be held to blame if she has done something wrong, and has not been manuvred with perfect skill and presence of mind."
On the whole case, we are of opinion that
The decree of the Circuit Court must be affirmed, but without interest on the amount of that decree.
