IN THE COURT ()F` COMMON PLEAS FOR THE STATE ()F DELAWARE
IN AND F()R NEW CASTLE COUNTY

STATE OF DELAWARIE,

Case No. 1306021398

V.

DALE A. MARTINI, JR.,

\-»/\-J\J\é\\.»/\¢_./\_/\__/\-.J

Defendant.
Submitted: March 26, 2014
Decided: April 2, 2014

Christina Kontis, Esq. Dale A. Martini

Deputy Attorney Generaf c/o Kedar Anshari Ptah-El
Defaware Department of Justice 414 North C<)x Street

820 N. French Street, 7“‘ Floor Middletown, Deiaware 19709
Wilmington, DE 19801 Pro~Se Defendam

Attorney_foz‘ the Stale

I)ECISION AFTER TRIAL

RENNIE, J.

INTRODUCTION

On .lune 23, 2013, Deferrdant Dale Martini (hereinafter "Deferidaiit") was arrested after
New Castle County police received a report of a suspicious mate in an abandoned house.
Defendant was arrested and charged with Crilninal Trespass Second Degree pursuant to ll De[.

C. § 822. l Trial was held on March 26, 2014, and the Court reserved its decision

FACTUAL BACKGR()UNI)

The State’s only witness at trial was Officer l\/latthew Donovan (hereinafter "Officer
Donovan") of the New Castle County Police Department. Ofticer Donovan testified that on june
23, 2013, he was working on routine patrol in New CastIe. At approximately l0:00 p.m., Officer
Donovan received a call about a 911 Complaint. The caller reported a suspicious person in an
abandoned residence at 45 Chestertield Drive in the Garfield Park section of New Castle.
Ofticer Donovan testified that upon arrival, the property appeared abandoned The grass was
overgrown and there was an "abandoned" sticker on the front door. Oficicer Donovan and two
other officers discovered an unsecured door at the rear of the residence, and all entered the horne
and announced their presence. ln response, Defendant walked out from the rear of the residence.
Defendant advised the officers that he had rights to the residence, and was there to drop off
supplies Officer Donovan testified that there appeared to be nothing in the house that could be
considered "supplies," but that he did observe numerous alcoholic beverage containers and a
cooler with ice and snack foods.

Defendant identified himself as Kedar Anshari Ptah-El. The officers searched their

databases for the name, but the search provided no results. Defendant then provided officers

l "A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the second degree when the person knowingly enters or reinains
unlawfully in a building or upon real property which is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner rnanifestly
designed to exclude intruders."

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with an alias name of Dale Martini, which did appear in the system.z Defendant also provided
the officers with an unsigned petition from the justice of the Peace Court, which demonstrated
that Def`endant was not the owner of the home, but had intentions of obtaining possession of the
horne. The officers then arrested Defendant for criminal trespass.

Officer Donovan testified that a later title search confirmed that 45 Chesterfield Drive
was owned by a Frances Hollis, who had recently passed away. The State submitted two self-
authenticating documents into evidence: l) the Deed to 45 Chestertield Drive, naming Frances
Hollis as owner, and which did not list Defendant’s name; and 2) the Last Will and Testament of
Frances I~Iollis, which does not mention Defendant, but which does direct the executor of her
estate to sell the horne.

The defense’s only witness was Crystal Gabri El, who testified to Defendant’s position as

an Assistant Grand Sheik and confirmed that he is a Moorish American.

DISCUSSI()N
I. jurisdiction
Defendant argued that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his claim,
because an "injured party" did not appear to claim damages against him, and the State’s attorney

did not produce proof of her right to practice law in Delaware. The Court ruled that it possessed

subject niatter jurisdiction over the matter.

2 Dcfendant acknowledged that his birth name is Dale Ma:tirii, but he now carries the name of Kedar Anshari Ptali-
Bl.

ll. Officers Possessed Both Reasonable Articulable Suspicion and Probable Cause

In his closing argument, Defendant raised the issue that the arresting officers lacked
reasonable articulable suspicion to question him and probable cause to arrest him. The Court is
satisfied that the officers, after receiving a 911 dispatch to 45 Chesterfield Drive, regarding a
suspicious person on the property, had reasonable articulable suspicion to question any
individuals encountered on the property. Then, after receiving documentation from Defendant
that confirmed that Defendant had no right to be on the property, the officers had probable cause
to arrest Defendant for trespass.

Defendant argued that the officers did not produce an arrest warrant at the time of his
arrest. However, as Officer Donovan testified, because the officers were dispatched to a "crirne
in progress," the production of the warrant did not need to occur at the scene. Thus, both
reasonable articulable suspicion to question Defcndant, and probable cause to arrest Defendant,

existed in this matter.

Ill. Criniinal Trespass Second Degree

To find an individual guilty of criminal trespass in the second degree, the State must
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant "knowingly enter[ed] or remain[ed]
unlawfully in a building or upon real property which is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner
manifestly designed to exclude intruders."3 Officer Donovan testified that he and two other
officers responded to a 911 dispatch regarding a suspicious individual entering an abandoned
building Upon entering the premises and announcing their presence, Defendant appeared. The

officers questioned his presence in the home, and Defendant produced documentation that

” ii nat c. §322.

purported to prove his legal right to the dwelling. Upon further inspection, however, the officers
noted that the document, a petition filed in justice of the Peace Court 13, was not signed by a
inag'istratejudge. The petition, therefore, did not give Defendant either a legal right or title to the
property.

Defendant argued at trial that pursuant to 25 Del. C. §§ 4001, 4002, and 4003, he has a
legal right to the property. Defendant’s argument is misplaced These sections of the statute
relate to abandoned personal proj)erty and not real property.ii Moreover, even if the statute
related to real property, Defendant did not possess a signed order following a petition that
entitled him to legal right to the property.

The police encountered Defendant in a home for which Defendant did not possess title,
and Defendant produced no proof of a legal or equitable interest in the property. Officer
Donovan testified that in one of the rooms, the officers discovered a mattress with blankets and
they discovered a cooler with food. 'l`hese discoveries demonstrate that Defendant was not
simply passing through the area, but had established the property as his dwelling, with an intent
to remain in the property for some time. The property was not open to the public, and indeed,
the closed doors and windows, coupled with the prominently displayed "abandoned" notice on
the front door, show that there existed an intent to exclude uninvited individuals. Additionally,
the State introduced into evidence the Last Will and Testament of Frances Hollis and the Deed to

45 Chesterf`ield Drive, both of which demonstrate that Defendant does not have an interest in the

4 Pursuant to § 4001, "abandoned personal properly" is "property which the rightful owner has left in the care or
custody of another person and has failed to maintain, pay for the storage of, exercise dominion or control over, and
has failed too otherwise assert or declare the ownership rights to the tangible per~sonal properly for a period of l
year."‘i Section 4002 of the statute states that the Court may order "any person who holds, stores, safekeeps or
otherwise is tell with possession of any abandoned personal pr'operty, including but not limited to automobiles,
rnotorcycles, boats and furnishings, which has been abandoned by the owner. ..shall be vested with complete and
absolute title to said abandoned personal proper'!_v." In addition, section 4003 provides that to receive title to the
abandoned per.vonal proper'ty, the individual must file a petition with the appropriate court (Emphasis addcd).

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