
70 U.S. 603 (1865)
3 Wall. 603
THE ADMIRAL.
Supreme Court of United States.

*610 *611 It was argued fully by Mr. Donahue for the appellants, and by Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Ashton (who had argued it also in the courts below), for the United States.
Mr. Justice CLIFFORD delivered the opinion of the court.
Capture of the ship, together with the cargo, was made on the eleventh day of December, 1861, as lawful prize of war, and both were regularly prosecuted as such in the District Court. Claim for the ship was presented by the master on behalf of Fernie Brothers & Co., of Liverpool, in which he alleged that they were British subjects, and the true, lawful, and sole owners and proprietors of the vessel, her tackle, apparel, and furniture. Record also shows that the master filed at the same time a claim for the cargo on behalf of W. & R. Wright, of St. John's, in the province of New Brunswick, in which he alleged that they were the true, lawful, and sole owners and proprietors of the same, and that they also were British subjects. Accompanying the claims for the ship and cargo is the test affidavit of the master, which was filed at the same time, and which contains substantially the same allegations. Preparatory proofs were duly taken, and the parties were fully heard.
District Court entered a decree condemning the vessel as lawful prize, but acquitted the cargo, and ordered that the same be restored to the owners. Claimants of the vessel appealed to the Circuit Court of the United States for that district where the decree of the District Court condemning the vessel was affirmed, and thereupon the claimants appealed to this court.
1. Appeal to the Circuit Court was allowed before the passage of the act of the third of March, 1863, which requires that appeals from the District Courts in prize causes *612 shall be made directly to the Supreme Court.[*] Prior to the passage of that act the Supreme Court had no appellate jurisdiction in prize causes, except when the same were removed here from the Circuit Courts. Exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was by the ninth section of the Judiciary Act conferred upon the District Courts, and it was conclusively determined, at a very early period in our history, that prize jurisdiction was involved in the general delegation of admiralty and maritime powers as expressed in the language of that section.[] First decision to that effect was that of Jennings v. Carson,[] but the question was shortly afterwards authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in the same way.[§]
Admiralty and maritime causes, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeded the sum or value of three hundred dollars, might under the Judiciary Act be removed by appeal from the District Courts to the Circuit Courts, but such causes could only be transferred from the Circuit Courts to the Supreme Court by writ of error.[]
Provision, however, for appeals from the Circuit Courts to the Supreme Court was afterwards made in cases of equity, of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and of prize or no prize, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars.
Same act also reduced the minimum sum or value required for appeals from the District Courts to the Circuit Courts to the sum or value of fifty dollars exclusive of costs, and made it the duty of the Circuit Courts to hear and determine all such appeals.[¶] Present case was appealed from the District Court to the Circuit while the last-mentioned provision was as applicable to prize causes as it still is to all the other matters of jurisdiction therein specified, and consequently *613 the case under consideration is properly before the court.
2. Coming to the merits of the controversy, it is proper to refer to the evidence exhibited in the record, and to deduce from it as far as possible the real character of the adventure, which is the subject of investigation. Owners of the ship were Fernie Brothers & Co., of Liverpool, and the charterers were W. & R. Wright, of St. John's, New Brunswick. Charter-party was dated at Liverpool on the ninth day of September, 1861, and the principal stipulation as to the voyage was that the ship should proceed off the port of Savannah, and if the blockade was raised, then to proceed into port and deliver the cargo as per bill of lading; but if the blockade was not raised, then the ship was to proceed to St. John's, New Brunswick, and there to deliver the same with the usual despatch of the port. Stipulated freight was thirty shillings per ton if the cargo should be landed at Savannah, and fifteen shillings per ton if landed at St. John's, for which latter port the vessel was cleared, as represented in the clearance certificate. Charterers furnished the cargo, but the owners were to have an absolute lien on the same for all freight, dead freight, primage, and demurrage. Vessel sailed for the port of Savannah, and there is not a fact or circumstance in the case tending to show that her primary destination was such, or was ever intended to be such, as is described in the clearance. On the contrary, the owners, in their letter of instructions to the master, admit that the charterers, being anxious to procure a particular cargo from Savannah, made it a condition in taking the ship that she should proceed off that port, so that if the port was open they might secure the very first shipment. When the ship sailed the mate supposed that she was bound for St. John's, but he soon found, as he states, that she was going too far to the southward for such a voyage, and he at once began to suspect that the master intended to go into a southern port. Master's instructions evidently contemplated that the ship might speak other vessels as she approached the coast of the United States, and that the master would be enabled through those *614 means to ascertain the exact state of affairs, but the master was not directed in any event to abandon the voyage and return.
Substance of the directions in that event was that he was to be guided by any information he might thus obtain, so as not to infringe the blockade regulations, but the clear inference from the document is that the ship was nevertheless to proceed off the blockaded port, and then if met by a blockading vessel to get the officer in command to indorse on the register that the ship had been warned off. Specific directions to the master are that he is to run no risk with the ship, but he is to proceed on the voyage and rather endeavor to satisfy himself as to the blockade, and then find the blockading vessel and get his register indorsed. Cautious as these instructions are, still there is enough in them to show the criminal motives of their authors, especially when it is considered that the ship, under the eye of the owners, sailed from the port of departure under a clearance expressing a false destination. Shippers doubtless expected considerable profits from the sale of the outward cargo, but their controlling motives in chartering the ship were the anticipated profits of the return voyage from the blockaded port. Shipowners were also deeply interested in the success of the adventure, as they were to receive double the amount for freight if the outward cargo was landed at the port of primary destination. Full proof of these facts is exhibited in the record, and it is shown beyond the possibility of doubt that the master, the charterers, and the owners had full knowledge of the existence of the blockade at the inception of the voyage, and there can be no doubt that it was the knowledge of that fact which induced the parties to commence the voyage under a clearance which misrepresented the primary destination of the vessel.
3. Settled rule as established by a majority of this court is that a vessel which has a full knowledge of the existence of a blockade is liable to capture if she attempts to enter the blockaded port in violation of the blockade regulations, and that it is no defence against an arrest made under such circumstances *615 that the vessel arrested had not been previously warned of the blockade, nor that such previous warning had not been indorsed on her register.[*]
4. Unlike what is usual in cases of this description it is conceded in this case that the primary destination of the vessel was to the blockaded port; but it is insisted that the mere act of sailing to a port which is blockaded at the time the voyage is commenced is not an offence against the law of nations where there is no premeditated intention of breaking the blockade. Take the proposition as stated, and it is undoubtedly correct, but it is equally well established that it is illegal for a ship having knowledge of the existence of a blockade to attempt to enter a blockaded port in violation of the blockade, and this court decided at the last term that after notification of a blockade the act of sailing for a blockaded port with the intention of violating the blockade is in itself illegal.[]
5. But it is unnecessary even to consider any extreme rule in this case, as every pretence of innocence is negatived by the circumstances. Fraud is stamped upon the adventure from the commencement of the voyage to the moment of capture. Such a misrepresentation as that expressed in the clearance might be used to advantage by the master, if his vessel was met by a cruiser in mid ocean as a means to allay suspicion, and it was doubtless intended for some such purpose. While sailing for the blockaded port such a document might be very effectual to enable the master before he had passed the port of pretended destination to deceive belligerents and elude the vigilance of their cruisers. Successful use of that means of deception, however, could not be made at the time of the capture, because the vessel was then off Tybee Island, more than a thousand miles from the proper course to the port specified in the clearance. Seeing that such a pretence would not be likely to avail, the master did *616 not present the certificate of clearance, but resorted to the terms of the charter-party and the letter of instructions, and insisted that those showed that the vessel did not intend to violate the blockade regulations. Arrested, as the ship was, when near the blockaded port, and when heading for the land, and when in point of fact she was in the act of entering the port, the master then, instead of presenting the clearance for the port which he had passed, set up the pretence that his purpose was to inquire whether the blockade had been raised, and claimed that he must be first notified of a fact, which he knew when the ship sailed, before the capture could lawfully be made. Such a defence is without merit, and finds no support in any decided case, or in any acknowledged principle applicable to prize adjudications.
Inculpatory force of the evidence is much increased by the fact that the inception of the voyage is marked by a full knowledge of the existence of the blockade; and that the vessel, instead of touching at the port for which she was properly cleared, where inquiry might have been made, proceeded directly for the prohibited destination. Conduct of the master also, in withholding from the mate all knowledge of the real destination of the vessel, shows that the clearance certificate was evidently obtained in the form referred to as the means, if it became necessary to use it for that purpose, of deceiving belligerents and of eluding the vigilance of national eruisers. None of these circumstances can be successfully controverted; and the claimants admit that the course of the vessel was directly for the blockaded port, and that she was heading for the land at the moment of capture. Every pretence that the vessel intended to desist from her unlawful purpose, if she found that the port was blockaded, is negatived by the circumstances. Those in charge of her knew before she sailed that the port was blockaded, and they also knew that they had no reason to suppose that it was to be raised before her arrival, consequently they made no inquiry and did not wish to make any until it became necessary to do so as a defence or excuse for an illegal act.
DECREE AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[*]  12 Stat. at Large, 760.
[]  1 Id. 77.
[]  1 Peters's Admiralty, 7.
[§]  Glass v. The Sloop Betsey, 3 Dallas, 16; 1 Kent's Commentaries, 389; 2 Stat. at Large, 761.
[]  1 Stat. at Large, 83, 84.
[¶]  2 Id. 244.
[*]  The Barque Hiawatha, 2 Black, 677.
[]  The Circassian, 2 Wallace, 135; Medeiros v. Hill, 8 Bingham, 234; The Neptune, 2 Robinson, 110; The Panaghia Rhomba, 12 Moore, Privy Council, 168.
