
122 U.S. 535 (1887)
THORN WIRE HEDGE COMPANY
v.
FULLER.
Supreme Court of United States.
Submitted May 10, 1887.
Decided May 27, 1887.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA.
*538 Mr. Charles D. Kerr for plaintiffs in error.
Mr. Thomas Wilson for defendants in error.
*540 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WAITE, after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.
We have been referred by the parties to the following sections of c. 66 of the General Statutes (1878) of Minnesota as authority for the intervention of the execution creditor and his sureties in the action:
*541 "SECTION 131. Intervention.  Any person who has an interest in the matter at litigation, in the success of either of the parties to the action, or against either or both, may become a party to any action or proceeding between other persons, either by joining the plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or by uniting with the defendant in resisting the claim of the plaintiff, or by demanding anything adversely to both the plaintiff and defendant, or either of them, either before or after issue has been joined in the cause, and before the trial commences. The court shall determine upon the issues made by the intervention at the same time that the issue in the main action is decided, and the intervenor has no right to delay; and if the claim of the intervenor is not sustained, he shall pay all the costs of the intervention. The intervention shall be by complaint, which must set forth the facts on which the intervention rests; and all the pleadings therein shall be governed by the same principles and rules as obtain in other pleadings. But if such complaint is filed during term, the court shall direct a time in which an answer shall be filed thereto."
"SECTION 154. Claim of property by third person  affidavit  indemnity by plaintiff.  If any property levied upon or taken by a sheriff, by virtue of a writ of execution, attachment, or other process, is claimed by any other person than the defendant or his agent, and such person, his agent or attorney, makes affidavit of his title thereto, or right to the possession thereof, stating the value thereof, and the ground of such title or right, the sheriff may release such levy or taking, unless the plaintiff, on demand, indemnify the sheriff against such claim, by bond executed by two sufficient sureties, accompanied by their affidavit that they are each worth double the value of the property as specified in the affidavit of the claimant of such property, and are freeholders and residents of the county; and no claim to such property by any other person than the defendant or his agent shall be valid against the sheriff, unless so made; and, notwithstanding such claim, when so made, he may retain such property under levy a reasonable time to demand such indemnity.
*542 "SECTION 155. Plaintiff to be impleaded with sheriff in action against him.  If, in such case, the person claiming the ownership of such property commences an action against the sheriff for the taking thereof, the obligors in the bond provided for in the preceding section, and the plaintiff in such execution, attachment, or other process, shall, on motion of such sheriff, be impleaded with him in such action. When, in such case, a judgment is rendered against the sheriff and his codefendants, an execution shall be immediately issued thereon, and the property of such codefendants shall be first exhausted before that of the sheriff is sold to satisfy such execution."
The record does not state in direct terms which of the forms of proceeding provided for in these sections was adopted. The intervenors claim they went into the suit under §§ 154 and 155, and the plaintiffs that it was under § 131. In the view we take of the case this question is quite immaterial. The intervenors, in their answer, state in positive terms that Larson in all that he did acted under the express direction of the Thorn Wire Hedge Company and upon the indemnity furnished him for that purpose, and that they are the parties primarily liable for his acts and doings. In their petition for removal they are even more explicit, and say that he "was at all such times, and in all such matters, so far as said plaintiffs are concerned, the mere agent for the petitioners provided for them by law." In other words, they have by their pleadings placed themselves on record as joint actors with the sheriff in all that he has done, and as promoters of his trespass, if it be one. The suit, therefore, stood at the time of the removal precisely as it would if it had been begun originally against all the defendants upon an allegation of a joint trespass. By coming into the suit the intervenors did not deprive the plaintiffs of their right of action against the sheriff. He is still, so far as they are concerned, a necessary party to the suit. The intervenors may unite with him to resist the claim of the plaintiffs, but by their doing so the nature of the action is in no way changed. The cause of action is still the original alleged trespass. At first the suit was against him who actually committed *543 the trespass alone; now it is against him and his aiders and abettors, who concede, upon the face of the record, that they are liable if he is. As the case stood, therefore, when it was removed, it was by citizens of Minnesota against another citizen of Minnesota and citizens of Illinois, for an alleged trespass committed by all the defendants acting together and in concert. If one is liable, all are liable. The judgment, if in favor of the plaintiffs, will be a joint judgment against all the defendants.
That such a suit is not removable was decided in Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 U.S. 41, and Sloane v. Anderson, 117 U.S. 275. The fact that if the intervention was had under §§ 154 and 155, the property of the intervenors must first be exhausted on execution before that of the sheriff is sold, does not alter the case. The liability of all the defendants upon the cause of action is still joint, so far as the plaintiffs are concerned. By getting the intervenors in, the sheriff will be able to establish his right of indemnity from them, but that does not in any way change the rights of the plaintiffs. The intervenors do not seek to relieve themselves from liability to the sheriff if he is bound, but to show that neither he nor they are liable to the plaintiffs.
It follows that the order to remand was properly made, and it is, consequently,
Affirmed.
