UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

HENRY TANNER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                                      No. 95-3058
SHIRLEY S. CHATER, COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston.
Jerry D. Hogg, Magistrate Judge.
(CA-95-242-2)

Submitted: September 20, 1996

Decided: October 3, 1996

Before NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Belinda S. Morton, Fayetteville, West Virginia, for Appellant.
Charlotte Hardnett, Chief Counsel, Region III, Shawn Carver, Assis-
tant Regional Counsel, Office of General Counsel, SOCIAL SECUR-
ITY ADMINISTRATION, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Rebecca A.
Betts, United States Attorney, Stephen M. Horn, Assistant United
States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Henry Tanner appeals the magistrate judge's refusal to disturb the
Secretary's determination that he was not entitled to supplemental
security income benefits.* In support of his appeal, Tanner contends
that the Secretary's decision was not supported by substantial evi-
dence. Tanner also objects to the weight the administrative law judge
(ALJ) assigned to his own testimony denying any mental disability.
This court, like the district court, will uphold the Secretary's disability
determination if it is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) (1994); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir.
1987); see Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Substan-
tial evidence "consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence but
may be somewhat less than a preponderance. If there is evidence to
justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then
there is `substantial evidence.'" Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456
(4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Laws v. Celebrese, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th
Cir. 1962)). Because substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings
here, there is no reason to disturb the decision of the Secretary.
Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate judge's order.

In a disability case, the ALJ must consider objective medical facts
and opinions and the diagnoses of treating and examining doctors,
which constitute a major part of the proof in disability cases. McLain
v. Schweiker, 715 F.2d 866, 869 (4th Cir. 1983). Here, the medical
evidence of record was divided, but sufficiently supported the ALJ's
conclusion that Tanner was not mentally disabled. Tanner's own testi-
mony denying any mental disability notwithstanding, the evidence of
record supports the ALJ's finding.
_________________________________________________________________

*The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1994).

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After a protracted evaluation at Huntington State Hospital, Dr. Gal-
vez concluded that Tanner exhibited no psychiatric symptoms, nor
was there any evidence to substantiate a previous diagnosis of psychi-
atric disorders. A psychologist also evaluated Tanner and reported
that he was an appropriate candidate for rehabilitation services with-
out recommending specific psychiatric treatment. Since his stay at the
state hospital, Tanner has not undergone any psychiatric treatment or
taken medication to treat any mental or emotional problem. Although
Tanner's anti-social behavior following the initial denial of benefits
is some evidence of instability, there is substantial evidence to sup-
port the ALJ's conclusion that Tanner was not mentally disabled.
Consequently, we decline to disturb the Secretary's decision denying
Tanner's benefits.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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