                       T.C. Memo. 1995-545



                     UNITED STATES TAX COURT


                 ESTATE OF DORIS L. RICKMAN, DECEASED,
            DORIS K. RICKMAN, EXECUTRIX, Petitioner, v.
           COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent


     Docket. No. 13468-94.              Filed November 16, 1995.


     T. Scott Tufts, for petitioner.

     James E. Gray, for respondent.


                       MEMORANDUM OPINION


     ARMEN, Special Trial Judge:   This case is before the Court

on petitioner's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, as

Amended, and petitioner's Motion to Strike.    The issue for

decision concerns the validity of the notice of deficiency issued

in this case and whether respondent "determined" a deficiency in
                                - 2 -


petitioner's Federal estate tax within the meaning of section

6212(a).1

Background

     Petitioner is the Estate of Doris L. Rickman.    Doris L.

Rickman (decedent) died on October 24, 1990, in Franklin,

Georgia.    Decedent's husband, James R. Rickman, died on October

19, 1990, 5 days before decedent died.

     Doris K. Rickman, decedent's daughter, was duly appointed

executrix of the decedent's estate under letters testamentary

issued by the clerk of the Superior Court of Macon County, North

Carolina, on October 30, 1990.2   Doris K. Rickman is also the

duly appointed executrix of the Estate of James R. Rickman.      At

the time the petition herein was filed, Doris K. Rickman resided

in Franklin, North Carolina.

     On or about March 22, 1991, Doris K. Rickman filed separate

Forms 709 (United States Gift Tax Return) on behalf of both James

R. Rickman (Mr. Rickman) and decedent for the taxable years

ending on the date of their deaths.     Schedule A of Form 709 filed

on behalf of Mr. Rickman lists the following gifts:




     1
        All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code,
as amended, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of
Practice and Procedure.
     2
        The record in this case indicates that Doris K. Rickman
is also known as Kaye Rickman.
                                 - 3 -


               Donee               Date                Amount

         1. Doris K. Rickman      1/1/90              $10,000
                                  10/16/90            227,583
         2. Janet R. Tipton       10/16/90            207,583
                                  10/16/90             16,255
         3. James O. Tipton       10/16/90             20,000

Janet R. Tipton and James O. Tipton are identified as decedent

and Mr. Rickman's daughter and son-in-law, respectively.

     Form 709, lines 12 through 18, permit a taxpayer to elect to

split gifts with his or her spouse as prescribed under section

2513; i.e., to have gifts made by the taxpayer and his spouse to

third parties during the calendar year considered as made one-

half by each.     Lines 12 through 17 of the Form 709 filed on

behalf of Mr. Rickman indicate that gifts made by Mr. Rickman

during the taxable period would be split with decedent.     In

particular, decedent is identified by name and Social Security

number, and it is acknowledged that Mr. Rickman was married to

decedent during the taxable period, and that a gift tax return

will be filed by decedent for the same period.     However, line 18,

which provides space for decedent's signature signifying her

consent to the gift-splitting election, was not signed on

decedent's behalf.     The only marks on line 18 are the handwritten

letters "SRB".3

     3
        Although the parties agree that the letters "SRB" were
entered by one of respondent's examiners, they disagree as to
their meaning. Respondent contends that the letters signify that
the spouse's return is in the same batch of returns as the return
                                                   (continued...)
                               - 4 -


     The Schedule A of Form 709 filed on behalf of decedent lists

the following gifts:

               Donee               Date                Value

         1. Doris K. Rickman   3/22/90               $10,000

         2. Janet R. Tipton    3/22/90               $10,000

Lines 12 through 18 of the Form 709 filed on behalf of decedent

indicate that gifts made by decedent during the taxable period

would be split with Mr. Rickman.    Line 18 of the Form 709 is

signed "Kaye Rickman, Executrix".

     During July 1991, Doris K. Rickman filed separate Forms 706

(United States Estate Tax Return) on behalf of both the Estate of

James R. Rickman and petitioner.    Schedule A of Form 706 filed on

behalf of the Estate of James R. Rickman lists 7 parcels of real

estate included in the gross estate as follows:

         Description                       Value at date of death

     1 LOT AND BRICK HOME                           $59,500
       86 GOLFVIEW DRIVE; FRANKLIN, N.C.
       VALUE BASED ON APPRAISAL, COPY
       WHICH IS ATTACHED

     1 LOT AND BRICK HOME                           $135,500
       92 GOLFVIEW DRIVE; FRANKLIN, N.C.
       VALUE BASED ON APPRAISAL, COPY
       WHICH IS ATTACHED

     1 LOT AND BRICK HOME                           $47,000
       96 GOLFVIEW DRIVE; FRANKLIN, N.C.

     3
      (...continued)
under examination. In contrast, petitioner contends that the
letters serve as an instruction to send the return back to the
return preparer.
                                - 5 -


       VALUE BASED ON APPRAISAL, COPY
       WHICH IS ATTACHED

     1 LOT; PALMER STREET BUILDING                 $250,000
       FRANKLIN, N.C. VALUE BASED ON
       APPRAISAL, COPY WHICH IS ATTACHED

     3 ACRES; ROAD 1314; FRANKLIN, N.C.            $17,520
       VALUE BASED ON CURRENT YEAR
       COUNTY APPRAISAL

     3 ACRES; CARSON PROPERTY; ROAD 1315           $17,520
       FRANKLIN, N.C. VALUE BASED ON
       CURRENT YEAR COUNTY APPRAISAL

     2.25 ACRES; ROAD 1164; FRANKLIN, N.C.         $10,260
       VALUE BASED ON CURRENT YEAR
       COUNTY APPRAISAL.

The Form 706 filed on behalf of the Estate of James R. Rickman

includes a statement that his entire estate passed to decedent

(Doris L. Rickman) outright.

     The Form 706 filed on behalf of petitioner includes a

Schedule A identical in all respects to the Schedule A included

with the Form 706 filed on behalf of the Estate of James R.

Rickman.    Line 4 on the Form 706 filed on behalf of petitioner,

relating to the amount of adjusted taxable gifts, is blank.

     On May 20, 1994, respondent issued a notice of deficiency

addressed to the Estate of Doris L. Rickman, Deceased, Doris K.

Rickman, in care of T. Scott Tufts, petitioner's counsel.     The

notice of deficiency sets forth respondent's determination of a

deficiency in petitioner's Federal estate tax in the amount of

$190,785.   There is no dispute that the notice of deficiency
                              - 6 -


lists decedent's correct Social Security number and date of

death.

     The notice of deficiency includes an explanation of

adjustments which states:

     (a) The decedent and her spouse filed Federal Gift Tax
     Returns for the period ending December 31, 1990, and elected
     to split the gifts made by each to third parties. The gift
     tax returns did not correctly reflect this election. The
     adjusted taxable gift of the decedent is determined to be
     $85,711.00, rather than zero as reported at Line 4 of Page 1
     of the Federal Estate Tax Return. Exhibits A and B of this
     notice indicate how the gift tax returns should have been
     filed. The corrections to the gift tax returns include the
     determination that all gifts by both donors must be split
     and that the gifts reported by the decedent's spouse were
     overstated because a portion of the spouse's gifts were
     incomplete and should not have been reported. See Item (i)
     of this notice for a related adjustment.

         Accordingly, the taxable estate is increased $85,711.00.

     (b) On the controlling valuation date (date of decedent's
     death) the fair market value of the real property identified
     at Item 1 of Schedule A of the Federal Estate Tax Return was
     $74,500, rather than $59,500.00 as reported.

         Accordingly, the taxable estate is increased $15,000.

     (c) On the controlling valuation date the fair market value
     of the real property identified at Item 3 of Schedule A was
     $61,000, rather than $47,000.00 as reported.

         Accordingly, the taxable estate is increased $14,000.

     (d) On the controlling valuation date the fair market value
     of the real property identified at Item 4 of Schedule A was
     $311,580, rather than $250,000.00 as reported.

         Accordingly, the taxable estate is increased $61,580.00.

     (e) On the controlling valuation date the fair market value
     of the real property identified at Item 5 of Schedule A was
     $16,430, rather than $17,520.00 as reported.
                              - 7 -


         Accordingly, the taxable estate is decreased $1,090.00.

     (f) On the controlling valuation date the fair market value
     of the real property identified at Item 6 of Schedule A was
     $23,520, rather than $17,520.00 as reported.

         Accordingly, the taxable estate is increased $5,750.00.

     (g) On the controlling valuation date the fair market value
     of the real property identified at Item 7 of Schedule A was
     $16,000, rather than $10,260.00 as reported.

         Accordingly, the taxable estate is increased $5,740.00.

     (h) When the decedent died she was the sole heir of her
     predeceased spouse, James R. Rickman, who died on October
     19, 1990. On August 8, 1990, James R. Rickman transferred
     $20,000.00 to Janet and James O. Tipton by a check which
     indicated that such funds were a loan on a home. It is
     determined that this note was part of the estate of James R.
     Rickman which passed to the decedent and that the such loan
     is included in her gross estate.

         Accordingly, the taxable estate is increased $20,000.00.

     (i) When the decedent died she was the sole heir of her
     predeceased spouse, James R. Rickman, who died on October
     19, 1990. On August 17, 1990, James R. Rickman directed the
     First Union National Bank of North Carolina to transfer two
     U.S. Treasury Notes totalling $300,000 to Kaye Rickman,
     Janet Tipton and James Tipton. James R. Rickman died before
     the bank transferred the Treasury Notes to the designated
     donees. Therefore, the Treasury Notes were part of the
     estate of James R. Rickman which passed to the decedent and
     the value of the Treasury Notes are included in her gross
     estate.

         Accordingly, the taxable estate is increased
$300,000.00.

The parties agree that exhibits A and B referred to in paragraph

(a) of the explanation of adjustments were not attached to the

notice of deficiency that was sent to petitioner.   Respondent

also concedes that there are two errors in the second sentence of
                               - 8 -


paragraph (i) of the explanation of adjustments.    In particular,

respondent admits that the second sentence should have read:      "On

October 17, 1990, James R. Rickman directed the First Union

Brokerage Services of North Carolina to transfer two U.S.

Treasury Notes totalling $300,000 to Kaye Rickman, Janet Tipton

and James Tipton."   (Emphasis added.)

     In response to the notice of deficiency, petitioner filed a

timely petition for redetermination with this Court.    Shortly

after respondent filed her answer to the petition, the parties

became embroiled in both a discovery dispute and a disagreement

over whether either party should be granted leave to file an

amendment to their initial pleading.     A hearing was scheduled in

Washington, D.C., on June 28, 1995, for the purpose of resolving

five pending motions stemming from these particular disputes.      On

the eve of this hearing, petitioner filed both a Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and a Motion for Summary

Judgment.4

     In the meantime, by letter dated June 22, 1995, Doris K.

Rickman wrote to the Internal Revenue Service District Director

in Greensboro, North Carolina, and requested a written statement

pursuant to section 7517 explaining the property valuations


     4
        Although the June 28, 1995, hearing was conducted as
scheduled, the Court decided to reserve ruling on the various
collateral matters in dispute in favor of first ruling on the
jurisdictional issue raised in petitioner's motion to dismiss.
                               - 9 -


determined by respondent in the notice of deficiency that was

issued to petitioner.   Although it does not appear that the

District Director responded to this request, we observe that

petitioner's counsel was apparently provided with a copy of the

revenue agent's report on or about July 27, 1995.

     Petitioner's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is

premised on the theory that the notice of deficiency is invalid

on the ground that respondent failed to make a valid

"determination" as required by Scar v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d

1363 (9th Cir. 1987), revg. 81 T.C. 855 (1983).   Petitioner

subsequently filed an amendment to its motion to dismiss.

Relying primarily on Durkin v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1329, 1402

(1986), affd. 872 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. 1989), and Pearce v.

Commissioner, 95 T.C. 250 (1990), revd. without published opinion

946 F.2d 1543 (5th Cir. 1991), petitioner contends that the

notice of deficiency should be declared invalid on the grounds

that each of the adjustments set forth therein is without merit

and reflects the "gross ineptitude" of the persons involved in

preparing the notice.

     Respondent filed an objection to petitioner's motion to

dismiss.   Respondent maintains that the adjustments set forth in

the notice of deficiency were determined based upon a review of

petitioner's estate tax return, and, therefore, the notice of

deficiency is valid under Scar v. Commissioner, supra.   Attached
                                - 10 -


as exhibits A and B to respondent's objection are the two

exhibits (referred to in paragraph (a) of the explanation of

adjustments portion of the notice of deficiency) that respondent

failed to attach to the notice of deficiency issued to

petitioner.5

     Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion to Strike specific

portions of respondent's objection.      In particular, petitioner

requests that we strike any reference to exhibits A and B

attached to respondent's objection on the ground that petitioner

was prejudiced by the fact that those exhibits were not attached

to the notice of deficiency.6    Petitioner further moves to strike

that portion of respondent's objection in which respondent refers

to the issue that respondent seeks to place in dispute by way of

her pending Motion for Leave to File Amendment to Answer.

     Upon due consideration of the foregoing matter, we fail to

see any meaningful prejudice to petitioner in respect of the

concerns expressed in its Motion to Strike.     Consequently, and in

view of the action that we propose to take in respect of

     5
        The two exhibits in question are separate Forms 3233
(Report of Gift Tax Examination Changes) prepared by an Internal
Revenue Service examiner relating to a review of the previously
mentioned gift tax returns filed on behalf of decedent and Mr.
Rickman.
     6
        Although not particularly relevant to the jurisdictional
issue to be decided, we note that counsel for petitioner disputes
representations appearing in the Reports of Gift Tax Examination
Changes that the reports either were discussed with him or that
he agreed with the adjustments set forth therein.
                                - 11 -


petitioner's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, we shall

deny petitioner's Motion to Strike.

     A second hearing was conducted in this case, again in

Washington, D.C., on September 13, 1995.       Counsel for both

parties appeared at the hearing and presented argument in respect

of petitioner's motion to dismiss.       During the course of the

hearing, petitioner's counsel raised an issue whether

respondent's failure to comply with section 7517 provides an

alternative ground for holding the notice of deficiency invalid.7

Discussion

     The issue to be decided is whether the notice of deficiency

issued in this case is invalid on the ground that respondent

failed to make a determination within the meaning of section

6212(a).     As explained in greater detail below, we agree with

respondent that the notice of deficiency is valid.

     This Court's jurisdiction to redetermine a deficiency

depends upon the issuance of a valid notice of deficiency and a

timely filed petition.     Rule 13(a), (c); Levitt v. Commissioner,

97 T.C. 437, 441 (1991); Monge v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 22, 27

(1989); Normac, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 142, 147 (1988).


     7
        At present, there are no fewer than eight motions pending
in this case. Regrettably, and despite a legal file now
comprised of four thick volumes, little or nothing has been done
in the way of preparing this case for trial. At this particular
juncture in the proceedings, this case serves as an excellent
illustration of petty bickering and unnecessary quarrelsomeness.
                               - 12 -


Section 6212(a) expressly authorizes respondent, after

determining a deficiency, to send a notice of deficiency to the

taxpayer by certified or registered mail.

     At a minimum, a notice of deficiency must indicate that

respondent has determined a deficiency in tax in a definite

amount for a particular taxable year and that respondent intends

to assess the tax in due course.     Olsen v. Helvering, 88 F.2d

650, 651 (2d Cir. 1937); Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 382,

400 (1965), affd. 373 F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1967).      Although section

7522(a) provides the general rule that a notice of deficiency

shall describe the basis for, and identify the amounts (if any)

of tax due, an inadequate description shall not invalidate the

notice under that provision.

     In Scar v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1987),

revg. 81 T.C. 855 (1983), the taxpayers, after receiving a notice

of deficiency that disallowed a deduction from a partnership with

which the taxpayers had no connection, argued that the

Commissioner failed to determine a deficiency as contemplated

under section 6212(a).   A review of various statements attached

to the notice of deficiency revealed that the Commissioner had

issued the notice without reviewing the taxpayers' tax return

(which admittedly had been filed).      Further, the Commissioner

admitted to having done so "to protect the government's

interest".   Scar v. Commissioner, supra at 1365.
                              - 13 -


     After invoking this Court's jurisdiction, the taxpayers

filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.   We held the

notice of deficiency to be valid and denied the taxpayers' motion

to dismiss.   Scar v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 855 (1983).

     In analyzing the issue on appeal, the Court of Appeals for

the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Commissioner must consider

information relating to a particular taxpayer before it can be

said that the Commissioner determined a deficiency with respect

to that taxpayer.   Scar v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d at 1368.      With

this standard in mind, the court found the notice of deficiency

to be invalid under section 6212(a) because the notice on its

face revealed that the Commissioner had not reviewed the

taxpayers' return or otherwise made a determination respecting

the taxpayers' liability for the particular taxable year.     Scar

v. Commissioner, supra at 1370.

     Significantly, the courts applying Scar, including both this

Court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, have

limited the rule established in that case to its facts.    See

Sealy Power, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 46 F.3d 382, 387-388 (5th Cir.

1995); Kantor v. Commissioner, 998 F.2d 1514, 1521-1522 (9th Cir.

1993); Clapp v. Commissioner, 875 F.2d 1396, 1402 (9th Cir.

1989); Campbell v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 110, 114-115 (1988);

Pope & Associates, P.C. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-213;

Burnside v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1994-308; Stinnett v.
                             - 14 -


Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-429.    Simply stated, the rule set

forth in Scar v. Commissioner, supra, applies in the narrow set

of circumstances where the notice of deficiency on its face

reveals that respondent failed to make a determination.

     The following excerpt from Kantor v. Commissioner, supra,

reflects the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's view of the

applicability of Scar.

          Before issuing a notice of deficiency pursuant to
     26 U.S.C. [sec.] 6212(a), the Commissioner must make an
     actual determination of the taxpayer's liability.
     Scar, 814 F.2d at 1370. As a general rule, however, we
     will not "look behind a deficiency notice to question
     the Commissioner's motives and procedures leading to a
     determination." Id. at 1368.

          We recognized an exception to this rule in Scar,
     where the notice of deficiency revealed on its face
     that a determination had not been made using the
     taxpayer's return. Id. * * *

          We later emphasized in Clapp v. Commissioner,
     however, that the kind of review exercised in Scar is
     applicable "[o]nly where the notice of deficiency
     reveals on its face that the Commissioner failed to
     make a determination." 875 F.2d at 1402 (emphasis
     added). In Clapp, we determined that the notices of
     deficiency were adequate to establish jurisdiction
     where they indicated various adjustments to income and
     the fact that these adjustments were based upon the
     disallowance of deductions. The taxpayers in Clapp
     attempted to show that the Commissioner had not made an
     actual determination of their deficiency by introducing
     internal IRS documents which suggested that at the time
     the notices were issued, the IRS had not decided which
     legal theory it would rely upon to secure a deficiency
     judgment. We nevertheless refused to question the
     Commissioner's determination because there was no
     indication on the face of the notices that a
     determination had not been made. Id. at 1400-01. The
     disallowed deductions did not refer to unrelated
     entities, nor had the tax rate been arbitrarily set.
                              - 15 -


          After reviewing appellant's 1981 notice of
     deficiency, we conclude that it was sufficient to
     establish jurisdiction. The notice clearly indicates
     that appellants' PCS, Ltd., pass-through deduction of
     $12,500 was being disallowed, that their tax was being
     recomputed, and that a negligence penalty was being
     imposed. There is neither blatant error nor any
     statement which would suggest that the Commissioner had
     not made a determination using appellants' tax return.

Kantor v. Commissioner, supra at 1521-1522.

     Applying the principles discussed in Kantor v. Commissioner,

and by this Court in Campbell v. Commissioner, supra, to the

notice of deficiency issued to petitioner in the present case, we

are not convinced, as petitioner contends, that respondent failed

to make the requisite determination.   There is no dispute that

the notice of deficiency relates to the decedent's estate and

that respondent correctly listed the decedent's social security

number.   It is also evident that respondent's determination of a

deficiency in petitioner's Federal estate tax derived from a

review of both the estate tax and gift tax returns filed on

behalf of both petitioner and the Estate of James R. Rickman.

Specifically, we need go no further than to point out that the

valuation adjustments in respect of the 6 parcels of real estate

set forth in the notice of deficiency directly coincide with real

estate reported on petitioner's estate tax return.   In sum, the

evidence is irrefutable that respondent examined petitioner's

estate tax return.
                             - 16 -


     Petitioner contends that respondent failed to make a

determination as required under section 6212(a) on the grounds:

(1) The adjustment described in paragraph (a) of the explanation

of adjustments was not adequately supported due to respondent's

failure to attach exhibits A and B referred to therein to the

notice of deficiency; (2) the valuation adjustments in respect of

the real estate listed on petitioner's return are purportedly

based on local real estate tax assessments for 1991 (as opposed

to 1990); (3) the adjustment described in paragraph (h) of the

explanation of adjustments has no basis in law or fact; and (4)

the adjustment described in paragraph (i) of the explanation of

adjustments contains certain errors in respect of both the date

of the transfer in question and the identity of the financial

institution involved in the transfer.   In short, we are not

impressed with any of these contentions.    Taking the notice of

deficiency as a whole, the errors and flaws that petitioner

relies on, while perhaps causing minor confusion, do not

demonstrate that respondent failed to make the requisite

"determination" contemplated by section 6212(a).    See Mayerson v.

Commissioner, 47 T.C. 340, 348-349 (1966); Saint Paul Bottling

Co. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 1137 (1960).

     We likewise reject petitioner's invitation to "carve out a

narrow extension of Scar", to be applied in cases involving so-
                              - 17 -


called "gross ineptitude".8   In our view, an extension of Scar in

this manner would, as a general rule, directly conflict with the

well-settled rule that, absent extraordinary circumstances, we

will not look behind a notice of deficiency.     Riland v.

Commissioner, 79 T.C. 185, 201 (1982); Jackson v. Commissioner,

73 T.C. 394, 400 (1979); Greenberg's Express, Inc. v.

Commissioner, 62 T.C. 324, 327-328 (1974).     We fail to see any

extraordinary circumstances in the present case justifying a

probe into respondent's motives and procedures leading to the

issuance of the notice of deficiency.

     In addition to arguing that the notice of deficiency is

invalid under Scar, petitioner maintains that the notice of

deficiency might be deemed invalid by virtue of respondent's

failure to comply with section 7517.    Section 7517, enacted as

section 2008(a)(1) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-455,

90 Stat. 1520, 1891, provides in pertinent part:

          (a) General Rule.--If the Secretary makes a
     determination or a proposed determination of the value
     of an item of property for purposes of the tax imposed
     under chapter 11, 12, or 13, he shall furnish, on the
     written request of the executor, donor, or the person
     required to make the return of the tax imposed by
     chapter 13 (as the case may be), to such executor,

     8
        Petitioner's reliance on Pearce v. Commissioner, 95 T.C.
250 (1990), revd. without published opinion 946 F.2d 1543 (5th
Cir. 1991), is misplaced. For the reasons explained in Stinnett
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-429, we shall not reconsider our
opinion in Pearce v. Commissioner, supra, or its reversal by the
Fifth Circuit, in deciding this case. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.1,
47.5.2, 47.5.3.
                                - 18 -


     donor, or person a written statement containing the
     material required by subsection (b). Such statement
     shall be furnished not later than 45 days after the
     later of the date of such request or the date of such
     determination or proposed determination.

          (b) Contents of Statement.--A statement required
     to be furnished under subsection (a) with respect to
     the value of an item of property shall--

            (1) explain the basis on which the valuation was
     determined or proposed,

            (2) set forth any computation used in arriving
     at such value, and

            (3) contain a copy of any expert appraisal made
     by or for the Secretary.

     Initially, we find it significant that section 7517 does not

include an enforcement mechanism.     Although petitioner has

suggested that respondent's failure to comply with section 7517

may provide grounds for holding the notice of deficiency invalid,

petitioner has failed to cite any authority for this proposition

and we are aware of none.     In the absence of express language

declaring that a notice of deficiency will be deemed invalid as a

consequence of respondent's failure to comply with a written

request under section 7517, we will not graft such an extreme

remedy onto the provision.9

     9
        On the whole, petitioner's reliance on sec. 7517 seems
superficial. Although the District Director may not have
responded to petitioner's request pursuant to sec. 7517, we note
that petitioner's counsel was apparently provided with a copy of
the revenue agent's report on or about July 27, 1995. Moreover,
our Rules provide the means for petitioner to obtain such
information either through the required informal exchange of
                                                   (continued...)
                              - 19 -


     Finally, we observe that Congress has provided adequate

remedies for taxpayers confronted with an inaccurate deficiency

determination.   In light of remedies such as shifting the burden

of proof to respondent and/or awarding litigation costs,

petitioner's call for an expanded substantive review of the

matters leading to respondent's determination is unwarranted.

See Clapp v. Commissioner, 875 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1989);

Powers v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 457 (1993).

     Consistent with the foregoing, we shall deny petitioner's

motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

     To reflect the foregoing,



                                      An order denying petitioner's

                                 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

                                 Jurisdiction, As Amended, and

                                 petitioner's Motion to Strike will

                                 be issued.




     9
      (...continued)
information contemplated under Rule 70(a) or later through formal
discovery requests such as a request for production of documents.
