                        T.C. Memo. 1997-82



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT


                  JEFF R. TAYLOR, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 8493-96.               Filed February 18, 1997.




     John C. Meaney, for petitioner.

     Shirley M. Francis, for respondent.




                        MEMORANDUM OPINION


     PARR, Judge:   Respondent moves for partial summary judgment

under Rule 121,1 arguing that petitioner's plea of guilty to

criminal fraud under section 7201 collaterally estops him from


1
     All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect for the taxable year in issue, and all Rule references are
to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, unless
otherwise indicated. All dollar amounts are rounded to the
nearest dollar.
                                - 2 -

rebutting her determination for the taxable year 1987 that he is

liable for civil fraud under section 6653(b) for filing a false

and fraudulent income tax return with the intent to evade income

tax.    Respondent further maintains that the deficiency in income

tax and the additions to tax due from petitioner for 1987 may be

assessed at any time under section 6501(c)(1).    Respondent

supports her motion with two exhibits; namely, (1) a grand jury

indictment (Indictment) of petitioner and (2) petitioner's plea

agreement (Plea Agreement).

       Petitioner asserts that the doctrine of collateral estoppel

does not apply for 1987, because he pleaded guilty under duress,

and that the 3-year limitation period under section 6501(a) bars

the assessment and collection of the deficiency and additions to

tax for 1987.

       The respondent's motion for partial summary judgment is

based on the pleadings filed in this case.

       We must decide whether petitioner is collaterally estopped

from contesting that the deficiency in his income tax for 1987

was due to fraud within the meaning of section 6653(b) on account

of his plea of guilty to a violation of section 7201.    We hold he

is.

 Background

       Respondent determined a deficiency in, and additions to,

petitioner's Federal income tax for the taxable year 1987 as

follows:
                               - 3 -



                               Additions to Tax
Year Deficiency Sec. 6653(b)(1)(A) Sec. 6653(b)(1)(B) Sec. 6661
1987 $67,508    $50,631            50 percent of the $16,877
                                   interest due on
                                   $67,508

     Petitioner resided in Tigard, Oregon, at the time he

petitioned this Court to redetermine respondent's determination

of a deficiency in his income tax and additions to tax as set out

above. For 1987, respondent determined that petitioner had

$199,796 of unreported income.2

     The petitioner herein was the defendant in the criminal case

of United States v. Taylor, which was docketed in the U.S.

District Court for the District of Oregon.

     Petitioner was indicted on April 14, 1993, with respect to

the criminal matter.   The indictment charged that petitioner

knowingly and willfully attempted to evade Federal income tax for

1987 by filing a false and fraudulent joint Federal income tax

return in violation of section 7201.   The indictment charged that

petitioner and Janet Taylor reported taxable income of $0, and a

tax due and owing of $0 on their 1987 joint Federal income tax

return (Form 1040), knowing that their taxable income for 1987

was substantially in excess of such amount.




2
     Respondent's motion is for partial summary judgment with
respect to the issue of civil fraud pursuant to sec. 6653(b).
The amount of the underlying deficiency for 1987 remains to be
adjudicated.
                              - 4 -

     In connection with the criminal case, petitioner, who was

represented by counsel, pleaded guilty on December 6, 1993, to

tax evasion for 1987 in violation of section 7201 in return for a

recommendation of a lenient sentence.

     Prior to sentencing, petitioner moved to withdraw his guilty

plea and requested that the court grant him a jury trial on the

ground that his guilty plea was coerced and involuntary, thus

violating both his First and Fifth Amendment rights.    The

District Court denied petitioner's motion.    The Court of Appeals

affirmed the conviction, and the United States Supreme Court

denied review.

     Petitioner ultimately served 3 years' probation, with 4

months of home detention while attending graduate school in

Phoenix, Arizona.

Discussion

     Summary judgment is intended to expedite litigation and

avoid unnecessary and expensive trials.    Florida Peach Corp. v.

Commissioner, 90 T.C. 678, 681 (1988).    Rule 121(a) provides that

either party may move for summary judgment upon any or all parts

of the legal issues in controversy.   When either party makes such

a motion, the opposing party must file "An opposing written

response, with or without supporting affidavits, * * * within

such period as the Court may direct."    Rule 121(b).   A decision

on the merits of a party's claim will be rendered by way of

summary judgment "if the pleadings, answers to interrogatories,
                                - 5 -

depositions, admissions, and any other acceptable materials,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that a decision may be

rendered as a matter of law."    Id.; Sundstrand Corp. v.

Commissioner, 98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th

Cir. 1994).   The moving party bears the burden of proving that

there is no genuine issue of material fact, and factual

inferences are viewed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party.   United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,

655 (1962); Preece v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 594, 597 (1990).      The

existence of any reasonable doubt as to the facts will result in

denial of the motion for summary judgment.    Hoeme v.

Commissioner, 63 T.C. 18, 20 (1974).

     The instant case is ripe for partial summary judgment.     It

is well established that petitioner's conviction of criminal tax

evasion, under section 7201, collaterally estops him from denying

that the deficiency in his income tax for the year in issue was

due to fraud for purposes of section 6653(b).    DiLeo v.

Commissioner, 96 T.C. 858, 885-886 (1991), affd. 959 F.2d 16 (2d

Cir. 1992).   The elements of criminal tax evasion under section

7201 are not dissimilar to the elements of civil tax fraud under

section 6653(b), and a guilty plea is equivalent to a conviction

after trial for the purpose of collateral estoppel.      See, e.g.,

Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 722 (5th Cir. 1995); Gray v.

Commissioner, 708 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1983), affg. T.C. Memo.
                               - 6 -

1981-1; Brooks v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 413, 431 (1984), affd.

without published opinion 772 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1985); Amos v.

Commissioner, 43 T.C. 50 (1964), affd. 360 F.2d 358 (4th Cir.

1965).   Moreover, it is generally assumed that a guilty plea is

made voluntarily.   Huff v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-564.

     In the case at bar, it is uncontroverted that the

petitioner, a college graduate with several years of experience

in business, who was represented by counsel, pleaded guilty to a

charge of tax evasion, under section 7201 for 1987.    Petitioner

asserts, however, that the Supreme Court, in Montana v. United

States, 440 U.S. 147, 155, (1979), expressly states that prior to

invoking collateral estoppel, a court should inquire into any

special circumstances which would warrant "an exception to the

normal rules of issue preclusion".     It is petitioner's position

that his allegedly coerced and involuntary plea of guilty to

fraud for 1987 is such an exceptional circumstance.    We disagree.

     Petitioner raised the issue of coercion on appeal and failed

to persuade the Court of Appeals, which affirmed his conviction,

and the Supreme Court denied review.    The judgment in his

criminal case is final.   We caution petitioner's counsel that his

objection to respondent's motion borders on the behavior

proscribed by section 6673(a)(2)(A) (in regard to multiplying the

proceedings unreasonably) and Rule 33(b) (in regard to signing a

pleading not well grounded in fact nor warranted by existing law,
                                 - 7 -

and interposed for an improper purpose), and may invite

sanctions.

     We thus hold that petitioner is estopped from denying, for

purposes of this case, that he filed a false and fraudulent

Federal income tax return, with the intent to evade income tax

for 1987.

     Finally, because petitioner's fraudulent intent, for

purposes of the additions to tax under sections 6653(b)(1)(A) and

(B) has been established for 1987, it follows that the assessment

and collection of the deficiency in income tax and the additions

to tax are not barred by the expiration of the statutory

limitation period.   Sec. 6501(c)(1).

     Respondent's motion for partial summary judgment will be

granted.

     To reflect the foregoing,



                                              An appropriate order

                                         will be issued.
