UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                      No. 96-4344

GERALD ANTHONY HALL,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Graham C. Mullen, District Judge.
(CR-94-195-MU)

Submitted: February 10, 1998

Decided: March 17, 1998

Before LUTTIG and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and PHILLIPS,
Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Randolph Marshall Lee, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Mark T. Calloway, United States Attorney, David C. Keesler, Assis-
tant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Gerald Anthony Hall appeals from his convictions of conspiracy to
commit carjacking, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994); aiding and abetting car-
jacking, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2119 (1994); aiding and abetting the use and
carrying of a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,
924(c) (1994); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (1994), for which he was sentenced to a total term of 240
months imprisonment. Hall's only claim on appeal is that the district
court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, Fed. R.
Crim. P. 29, based on the Government's alleged failure to establish
an interstate commerce nexus to support the conviction for carjacking
charged in Count Two of the indictment. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm.

The evidence presented at Hall's trial, viewed in the light most
favorable to the Government, see Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 80 (1942), established that on October 29, 1994, Hall and a juve-
nile male attempted to carjack a Jeep Cherokee in a convenience store
parking lot in Lowell, North Carolina. Prior to trial, Hall and the Gov-
ernment entered into the following stipulation, which was read to the
jury after the Government's opening statement:

          [T]he Jeep Cherokee vehicle that was the subject of the
          attempted carjacking at England's Carload Market in Low-
          ell, North Carolina on October 29, 1994 was not manufac-
          tured in North Carolina, and therefore, had previously been
          transported, shipped or received in interstate or foreign com-
          merce.

Hall claims that, despite this stipulation, the Government failed to
present evidence sufficient to establish an interstate commerce nexus
because the car was purchased in North Carolina and only driven in
North Carolina and, therefore, "there was no showing of any connec-
tion with interstate commerce beyond the fact that the car had been
manufactured outside of North Carolina." (App. Br. at 4).

                    2
Hall waived the requirement that the Government produce evi-
dence with respect to the interstate commerce nexus by virtue of his
stipulation to that element of the crime. See United States v. Clark,
993 F.2d 402, 406 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Reedy, 990 F.2d
167, 169 (4th Cir. 1993). We find that the facts as stipulated were suf-
ficient evidence as to the interstate commerce element of the crime of
carjacking. See United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1112 (4th Cir.
1995) ("`where a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation
to commerce, the de minimis character of individual instances arising
under that statute is of no consequence.'") (quoting United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)). To the extent that Hall challenges
the carjacking statute in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Lopez (invalidating a provision of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994)), we reject this claim as has every
circuit to address the issue. See United States v. McHenry, 97 F.3d
125, 126 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 65 U.S.L.W.
3570 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1997) (No. 96-7188); United States v. Coleman,
78 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 65 U.S.L.W.
3263 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 96-5304); United States v. Hutchinson,
75 F.3d 626, 627 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 65 U.S.L.W.
3264 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1996) (No. 96-5397); United States v. Bishop, 66
F.3d 569, 585 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, #6D 6D6D# U.S. ___, 64 U.S.L.W. 3416
(U.S. Dec. 11, 1995) (No. 95-6678); United States v. Robinson, 62
F.3d 234, 236 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547,
550 (9th Cir. 1995).

Accordingly, we affirm Hall's convictions. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pres-
ented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.

AFFIRMED

                    3
