                  T.C. Memo. 2004-100



                UNITED STATES TAX COURT



            JOHN A. ROBERTS, Petitioner v.
     COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



Docket No. 7316-02L.           Filed April 9, 2004.



     P timely petitioned this Court to review R’s
determination to proceed with collection of assessments
against P for 1982, 1987, and 1988. P alleges that
extensions of the sec. 6502(a)(1), I.R.C., period of
limitations on collection of those assessments were
improperly obtained and are, therefore, invalid. P
further alleges that the extension covering 1982 is
untimely as applied to a 1983 assessment for that year
because it was executed after the sec. 6502(a)(1),
I.R.C., period of limitations on collection with
respect to that assessment had expired.

     1. Held: Pursuant to the presumption of official
regularity, the extensions are deemed to be validly
obtained.

     2. Held, further: The determination by R’s
Appeals officer that the extension covering 1982 was
timely with respect to a 1983 assessment is supported
by the evidence.
                               - 2 -


          3. Held, further: R’s determination does not
     constitute an abuse of discretion and is sustained.



     Hersy Jones, Jr., for petitioner.

     Alvin A. Ohm, for respondent.



                        MEMORANDUM OPINION


     HALPERN, Judge:   Pursuant to section 6330(d), petitioner

seeks review of respondent’s determination to proceed with

collection of income taxes and additions to tax for calendar

years 1982, 1987, and 1988 (sometimes, the years in issue).

     Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to

the Internal Revenue Code as amended, and all Rule references are

to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.   All dollar

amounts have been rounded to the nearest dollar.

                            Background

     This case was submitted for decision without trial, pursuant

to Rule 122.   Facts stipulated by the parties are so found.   The

stipulation of facts, with attached exhibits, is included herein

by this reference.   Petitioner objects to two of the exhibits as

being irrelevant.

     At the time the petition was filed, petitioner resided in

Coppell, Texas.
                                 - 3 -

     Respondent assessed taxes, interest, and penalties for the

years in issue as follows:

                 Date of
     Year       Assessment       Tax        Interest     Penalties

     1982         6/6/83       $11,468        $235          $834
     1982         8/12/85        2,321         --          1,161
     1982         9/17/01         --            55           --
     1987        11/28/88        6,835         147            36
     1988         7/17/89        9,209         117            53

     Literal transcripts (MFTRA-X1) of petitioner’s accounts for

the years in issue show that, after application of petitioner’s

payments for those years, the outstanding balances due (including

interest and penalties not yet assessed), as of December 31,

2001, were as follows:

                                          Accrued       Accrued
         Year            Tax             Interest      Penalties

         1982           --               $60,391          --
         1987         $1,682               4,232         $442
         1988          3,548               6,940          793

     On October 8, 1991, petitioner signed two Internal Revenue

Service (IRS) Forms 900, Tax Collection Waivers, which, on their

face, extend the period of limitations on collection of assessed

     1
        “A literal transcript is a transcript in ‘plain English’
with a minimum of ‘computerese’.” Keene v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2002-277 n.7. Each of the transcripts in evidence is
derived from current account information in respondent’s master
file. In general, transcripts are obtained by entering various
command codes (such as MFTRA or TXMODA) into respondent’s
integrated data retrieval system (IDRS) in order to obtain a
particular transcript. (IDRS is essentially the interface
between respondent’s employees and respondent’s various computer
systems.) See Crow v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-149 n.6.
                               - 4 -

amounts outstanding (plus interest, penalties, and other

additions) for 1982 until December 31, 2005, and for 1986 and

1987 until December 31, 2004 (together, the 1991 extensions).

     The TXMODA transcript of petitioner’s account for 1982

reflects the October 8, 1991, extension to December 31, 2005, and

what appear to be three earlier extensions of the period of

limitations on collection of 1982 liabilities:

          Date of Extension              New Expiration Date

               5/26/88                        12/31/93
               3/29/90                        12/31/92
               5/11/90                        12/31/94

The MFTRA-X transcript for 1982 only reflects the October 8,

1991, extension to December 31, 2005.

     On July 13, 1992, petitioner executed an IRS Form 433-D,

Installment Agreement, covering the years in issue (as well as

other taxable years not involved herein) pursuant to which he

agreed to make monthly payments of $200 beginning August 5, 1992,

and for each month thereafter, until his liability for all years

was paid in full.   The MFTRA-X transcripts reflect a series of

$200 (and, in a few cases, lesser) payments beginning May 4,

1994, and continuing, generally on a monthly basis for some (but

not all) years, until January 4, 2001, when the last payment was

credited to petitioner’s account.   All but six of the payments

were credited to 1982.
                               - 5 -

     On July 3, 2001, respondent mailed a Final Notice-Notice of

Intent to Levy and Notice of Right to a Hearing (the notice of

levy) to petitioner.   The notice of levy states that petitioner

owes $4452 of tax for 1982, $1,682 of tax and $4,495 in

“statutory additions” for 1987, and $3,548 of tax and $7,673 in

“statutory additions” for 1988.   The notice of levy also states

that “the amount(s) shown does not include accured [sic]

penalties and/or interest.”

     On or about July 10, 2001, petitioner submitted to the IRS

Appeals office an IRS Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due

Process Hearing.   In his request, petitioner states his grounds

for requesting the hearing as follows:

          I did not consent to extension of time to
          collect the taxes. The Form was blank when I
          signed it.

     On December 21, 2001, Appeals Officer Dan Mazaroli sent a

letter to petitioner’s representative and, on January 8, 2002, he

sent a letter to petitioner, both letters requesting that he be

contacted in order to schedule the requested hearing.     An

exchange of letters between Appeals Officer Mazaroli and

petitioner’s representative dated January 16, 2002, and


     2
        Both the certificate of assessments and payments and the
MFTRA-X transcript for 1982 show that, subsequent to the July 3,
2001, issuance of the notice of levy, a $500 “overpaid credit”
and an offsetting $55 interest assessment were applied to 1982,
which would account for the zero balance of tax owed for that
year, as of Dec. 31, 2001, that is reflected on both.
                                - 6 -

January 18, 2002, respectively, confirms that a telephone

conference between the two had taken place and that petitioner’s

opposition to collection of his outstanding liabilities for the

years in issue was based primarily upon the following facts

alleged by petitioner:

     (1) On October 8, 1991, while residing in Los Angeles,

California, petitioner met with an employee of respondent’s Los

Angeles office (the IRS employee) for the purpose of negotiating

and executing an installment payment agreement as a means of

discharging his outstanding liabilities for several tax years,

including the years in issue.

     (2) The IRS employee told petitioner that he would be

required to sign extensions of the period of limitations on

collection (Forms 900) in order to obtain an installment

agreement.

     (3) Petitioner signed two extensions in blank; they were

filled in and signed later by an IRS employee, not in

petitioner’s presence.   Copies of the completed extensions were

furnished to petitioner approximately 2 weeks after he signed

them.

     (4) Respondent’s Los Angeles office did not afford

petitioner an opportunity to enter into an installment payment

agreement.
                              - 7 -

     (5) On July 13, 1992, after petitioner had become a

Louisiana resident, he entered into an installment payment

agreement with respondent’s office in Shreveport, Louisiana.

     In an “Appeals Case Memorandum”, which formed the basis for

his subsequent determination letter to petitioner, Appeals

Officer Mazaroli set forth his findings regarding petitioner’s

claim that the extensions he signed were invalid:

     My Finding: My contact with the IRS Collection
     Division did not uncover any evidence in support of (or
     against) the taxpayer’s allegation that the extension
     of the * * * [statute of limitations on collection] is
     invalid. Since the taxpayer raised the issue and the
     only evidence presented was a copy of the completed and
     signed Form 900, which matches the one sent to Appeals
     by California Collections, there is insufficient
     evidence upon which to find that the extension is
     invalid. The taxpayer contends that the Form 900 was
     signed by him in blank and later completed by the
     Revenue Officer. As evidence of this, he provided a
     copy of a completed Form 900 that has the Revenue
     Officer’s signature dated after the taxpayer’s
     signature date. I do not find this to be sufficient
     evidence to overcome the correctness of the Form 900.
     In my experience with the IRS, I find it to be a common
     practice for an IRS employee to solicit an agreement
     from a taxpayer, and not sign the agreement form until
     it is reviewed by the employee and discussed with a
     manager.

     Since it is the practice of the IRS to solicit an
     extension or other agreement prior to review and
     approval and prior to IRS signature, the presumption is
     that the Form 900 was completed and then signed by the
     taxpayer and the Form 900 subsequently reviewed and
     signed by the Revenue Officer (The Tax Court has found
     that the presumption of official regularity justifies
     the conclusion that the Service carried out it [sic]
     procedures in the appropriate manner unless there is
     convincing evidence that shows otherwise. Sego v.
     Commissioner, 114 T.C. No. 37 (June 30, 2000)).
     Therefore I do not find that the taxpayer’s evidence is
                                - 8 -

      sufficient to overcome the presumption of correctness
      in regard to the existing signed Form 900.

      On March 5, 2002, respondent mailed to petitioner a Notice

of Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) under Section

6320 and/or 6330 (the notice of determination) determining that

the tax assessments made against petitioner were valid and

appropriate, all requirements of various applicable law and

administrative procedures were followed, and issuance of the

notice of levy was appropriate given the facts and circumstances

presented by petitioner.    In an attachment to the notice of

determination (“Attachment - 3193"), respondent rejected

petitioner’s claim that the extensions signed by him were

invalid:

      Issue Raised by You

      You state that you dispute the validity of the
      collection statute extension. It was determined by our
      office that there is no evidence to support your claim
      that the extension to extend the collection statute of
      limitations is invalid.

                             Discussion

I.   Introduction

      If any person liable for Federal tax liability neglects or

refuses to make payment within 10 days of notice and demand, the

Secretary is authorized to collect the tax by levy on that

person’s property.   Sec. 6331(a).   As a general rule, at least 30

days before taking such action, the Secretary must provide the

person with a written final notice of intent to levy that
                               - 9 -

describes, among other things, the administrative appeals

available to the person.   Sec. 6331(d).

     Upon request, the person is entitled to an administrative

review hearing before respondent’s Appeals Office.    Sec.

6330(b)(1).   If dissatisfied with the Appeals Office

determination, the person may seek judicial review in the Tax

Court or a Federal District Court, as appropriate.    Sec.

6330(d)(1).   Generally, action on the proposed levy and the

running of the section 6502 period of limitations on collection

are both suspended during the pendency of the administrative

review hearing and any judicial review proceeding.    Sec.

6330(e)(1).

     Section 6330(c) prescribes the relevant matters that a

person may raise at an Appeals Office hearing, including spousal

defenses, the appropriateness of respondent’s proposed collection

action, and possible alternative means of collection.    A taxpayer

may contest the existence or amount of the underlying tax

liability at an Appeals Office hearing only if the taxpayer did

not receive a statutory notice of deficiency with respect to the

underlying tax liability or did not otherwise have an opportunity

to dispute that liability.   Sec. 6330(c)(2)(B).

     Where, as here, the underlying tax liability is not at

issue, we generally review determinations made by the Appeals

Office for an abuse of discretion.     E.g., Magana v. Commissioner,
                                  - 10 -

118 T.C. 488, 493 (2002).    In deciding whether the Appeals Office

abused its discretion we must decide whether that office acted

arbitrarily, capriciously, or without sound basis in fact.        See

Jonson v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 106, 125 (2002).

II.    Arguments of the Parties

       Petitioner asks us to void respondent’s determination

sustaining the proposed levy on the ground that, for the years in

issue, the section 6502 period for collection after assessment

(the section 6502 period) has expired.        In support of his

position, petitioner argues that the 1991 extensions are invalid.

For 1982, petitioner additionally argues that the section 6502

period with respect to the June 6, 1983, tax assessment (the 1983

assessment) had expired before October 8, 1991, the date on which

the 1991 extensions were executed.         Therefore, petitioner argues

that respondent’s determination was “arbitrary and capricious”,

thereby constituting an abuse of discretion.        Respondent asks us

to reject petitioner’s arguments and sustain his determination.

III.    Petitioner’s Relevancy Objections

       As a preliminary matter, petitioner objects, on the basis of

relevancy, to our receiving into evidence two of the stipulated

exhibits:    Exhibit 18-J, the TXMODA transcript reflecting

petitioner’s account for 1982, and Exhibit 19-J, the Transaction

Codes Pocket Guide, Document 11734, published by the IRS (the

transaction codes guide).
                               - 11 -

     Although largely duplicative of other stipulated documents,

viz, the certificate of assessments and payments and the MFTRA-X

transcript for 1982, the TXMODA transcript similarly reflects

petitioner’s post-1991 payments in discharge of a portion of his

outstanding liabilities for 1982.   Therefore, it is relevant to

respondent’s contention (discussed in Section IV) that petitioner

failed to repudiate the 1991 extensions after he signed them3 and

that, in fact, he sought to benefit from them by avoiding

immediate, enforced collection of those liabilities.   In

addition, the TXMODA transcript indicates that petitioner

extended the section 6502 period with respect to his 1982

assessed liabilities beyond October 8, 1991, on three separate

occasions beginning in 1988.   Therefore, it is also relevant to

and supportive of respondent’s argument that the section 6502

period with respect to the 1983 assessment had not expired when

petitioner signed the 1991 extension covering 1982 on October 8,

1991.

     The transaction codes guide identifies the numerical codes

keyed to the entries on the TXMODA transcript.   Therefore, it is

an aid to understanding that transcript.



     3
        The payments reflected in the transcripts (and, in
particular, payments made after expiration of the statutory
period of limitations on collection provided for in sec.
6502(a)(1) applicable to the years in issue) are evidence of
petitioner’s continuing belief that the assessed liabilities
remained subject to collection because of the 1991 extensions.
                               - 12 -

      For the foregoing reasons, we find that both Exhibits 18-J

and 19-J are relevant to the issues raised herein.    Therefore, we

overrule petitioner’s objections to our receiving into evidence

those exhibits.

IV.   Validity of the Extensions

      A.   Alleged Procedural Irregularities

      The parties have stipulated the admission into evidence of

the 1991 extensions, which, together, purport to extend the

limitations period on collection, for 1982, until December 31,

2005, and, for 1987 and 1988, until December 31, 2004.    Both

extensions were signed by petitioner on October 8, 1991, and by

Revenue Officer Michael J. Quinn, on October 15, 1991.    Appeals

Officer Mazaroli concluded that, in accordance with customary IRS

practice, the 1991 extensions were completed by the revenue

officer, submitted to petitioner for his signature, and, after

review by the revenue officer and “a manager”, signed and dated

by the revenue officer.    Petitioner disputes that finding and

states that he was required to, and did, sign the 1991 extensions

in blank (without knowledge of the extension dates) as a

condition precedent to the IRS agreeing to enter into an

installment payment agreement with petitioner.    Petitioner’s

stipulated testimony is that he received filled-in, executed

copies of the 1991 extensions approximately 2 weeks after he

signed them; i.e., on approximately October 22, 1991.
                              - 13 -

     Because the 1991 extensions, on their face, do not indicate

whether the extension particulars (i.e., taxable years,

assessment dates, outstanding liabilities, and extension

expiration dates) were filled in before or after petitioner

signed them, Appeals Officer Mazaroli’s finding that petitioner

signed completed, not blank, extensions was based upon the

presumption of official regularity.    That presumption “supports

the official acts of public officers, and, in the absence of

clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have

properly discharged their official duties.”     United States v.

Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926); see also R.H.

Stearns Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 54, 63 (1934) (“Acts done

by a public officer ‘which presuppose the existence of other acts

to make them legally operative, are presumptive proofs of the

latter.’”).   We have repeatedly applied the presumption to

sustain official acts by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

See, e.g., Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 611 (2000);

Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 382, 398 (1965), affd. 373

F.2d 45 (10th Cir. 1967); Lillis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

1983-142, affd. 740 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1984).    In this case,

petitioner relies solely upon his stipulated testimony that,

approximately 2 weeks after he signed the 1991 extensions, he

received his copies from the IRS, which “had been completed with

the statutory period for collection extended to December 31, 2004
                               - 14 -

for his 1987 and 1988 tax years and to December 31, 2005 for his

1982 tax year.”    Petitioner made the same claim (that the 1991

extensions were signed by him in blank and later completed by an

IRS employee) to Appeals Officer Mazaroli.

     Petitioner’s actions, of which there is evidence, belie his

testimony.    He received filled-in, executed copies of the 1991

extensions approximately 2 weeks after he signed them; i.e., on

approximately October 22, 1991.    The consequence of the

extensions, to extend the period of limitation for collection, is

plain on the face of the extensions; yet, apparently, petitioner

did not contact the IRS to repudiate the extensions or to

complain about any irregularity in their execution.    Between

October 8, 1991, when the extensions were signed by petitioner,

and July 3, 2001, when respondent issued the notice of levy

(almost 10 years), petitioner entered into and made numerous

payments pursuant to an installment agreement with respondent,

which effectively forestalled enforced collection against him (an

obvious benefit) until he ceased making payments pursuant to that

agreement.    Those actions indicate that petitioner’s claim of

invalidity is motivated by a desire to avoid any additional

collection, by levy, of his remaining liabilities to respondent

rather than by a bona fide belief in the invalidity of the

extensions.    Under those circumstances, the evidence before

Appeals Officer Mazaroli falls far short of the “clear evidence”
                              - 15 -

necessary to negate the presumption of official regularity upon

which he relied.

     Petitioner’s actions after he signed the 1991 extensions

also amount to a ratification of the extensions, even assuming

they were blank when he signed them and, therefore, improperly

obtained.   See United States v. Vassallo, Inc., 274 F.2d 791, 794

(3d Cir. 1960); Crown Willamette Paper Co. v. McLaughlin, 81 F.2d

365, 368 (9th Cir. 1936).   Moreover, respondent’s willingness to

forgo enforced collection, enter into an installment agreement,

and accept small monthly payments over a 10-year period

demonstrates respondent’s reliance on the validity of the

extensions.   “A waiver proper on its face, relied on by the

Commissioner, cannot be later repudiated by the taxpayer.”     Cary

v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 754, 763 (1967).

     We sustain Appeals Officer Mazaroli’s finding that the 1991

extensions were valid and were not improperly obtained.

     B.   Whether the 1991 Extension Covering 1982 Is
          Effective To Permit Collection of Accrued Interest
          Relating to the 1983 Assessment

     Petitioner alleges that the 1991 extension covering 1982,

even if validly obtained, was not effective to extend the section

6502 period for collection of interest4 attributable to the 1983


     4
        Because petitioner’s account for 1982 shows a zero
balance of tax owed, petitioner’s argument necessarily concerns
the accrued interest attributable to the 1983 assessment. See
sec. 6601(g), allowing interest on any tax to be assessed and
                                                   (continued...)
                                  - 16 -

assessment, which he alleges had already expired on June 6, 1989,

6 years after the date of the assessment.

       Petitioner’s argument is based upon the fact that, until it

was amended in 1990, section 6502(a)(1) provided a 6-year statute

of limitations on collection.       In that year, Congress amended

section 6502(a)(1) to extend the period of limitations for the

collection of taxes after assessment to 10 years.       Omnibus Budget

Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA), Pub. L. 101-508, sec.

11317(a), 104 Stat. 1388-458.       The 10-year limitations period

applies to taxes assessed after November 5, 1990, and to taxes

assessed on or before that date if the 6-year limitations period

under prior law had not expired as of that date.       Id. subsec.

(c).       Petitioner argues that, because the 6-year limitations

period applicable to the 1983 assessment under prior law expired

prior to November 5, 1990, that period is not extended to 10

years by the 1990 amendment.5

       Respondent does not dispute petitioner’s analysis of the

law, but argues that, because petitioner had timely executed


       4
      (...continued)
collected at any time during the period within which the
underlying tax may be collected.
       5
        Petitioner apparently agrees that, because the 6-year
limitations period applicable to the $2,321 tax assessment for
1982 on Aug. 12, 1985, did not expire until after Nov. 5, 1990,
the 10-year limitations period applies to the collection of
interest attributable to that assessment, and a valid extension
executed on Oct. 8, 1991, with respect to the collection of that
interest is timely.
                              - 17 -

three prior extensions of the section 6502 period for 1982

(sometimes, the earlier extensions), each of which extended that

limitations period beyond October 8, 1991, the 1991 extension

covering 1982 was, in fact, timely.    In making that argument,

respondent points to the TXMODA transcript for 1982, which, he

claims, reflects the existence of the earlier extensions.

     The TXMODA transcript lists three dates (May 26, 1988, March

19, 1990, and May 11, 1990) to the right of code number 550R.      To

the right of and one line below each of those dates is the

notation “COLL - EXT - DT” (presumably standing for collection

extension date) immediately followed by a later date (December

31, 1993, opposite May 26, 1988; December 31, 1992, opposite

March 19, 1990; and December 31, 1994, opposite May 11, 1990).

The TXMODA transcript also reflects the 1991 extension covering

1982 by means of the same type of entry except that it refers to

code number 550, not 550R.   Appeals Officer Mazaroli’s case

memorandum shows that he reviewed a TXMODA transcript during his

consideration of the case.

     Petitioner argues that the entries contained in the TXMODA

transcript do not constitute evidence that he agreed to the

earlier extensions, and he concludes:    “It was arbitrary and

capricious for the IRS to issue a Notice of Determination with

respect to the June 6, 1983, assessment”.    Petitioner supports

his position, on brief, as follows:
                              - 18 -

          It should be noted that * * * [the earlier
     extensions] on * * * [the TXMODA transcript] do not
     appear on * * * [the MFTRA-X transcript for 1982]. The
     latter * * * contains the October 8, 1991, extension of
     the statute, and identifies such as a code “550"
     transaction; whereas, the alleged extensions on * * *
     [the TXMODA transcript] are listed as codes [sic]
     “550R” transactions. Whereas * * * [the transaction
     codes guide] identifies transaction code “550" as
     “Collection Status Extension”, it does not contain a
     “550R” transaction code.

     We find that the TXMODA transcript entries indicating

petitioner’s execution of the earlier extensions constitute

evidence of their existence, notwithstanding petitioner’s

argument to the contrary.   We have repeatedly approved

respondent’s reliance on TXMODA transcripts as verification of

the information and actions reflected therein.    See, e.g.,

Tornichio v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-291; Schroeder v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-190.     Moreover, section 6330(c)(1)

“does not require the Commissioner to rely on a particular

document to satisfy the verification requirement imposed by that

section.”   Roberts v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 365, 371 n.10

(2002).   The reference to transaction code “550R” rather than

“550", although unexplained, is of little consequence in light of

the specific reference in each instance to a collection extension

date (“COLL-EXT-DT”) and the entry of a specific date immediately

thereafter; and although there is no explanation for the omission

of any reference to the earlier extensions in the MFTRA-X

transcript for 1982, we draw no negative inference from that
                              - 19 -

omission given petitioner’s failure to show that such information

is customary in a MFTRA-X transcript as compared to a TXMODA

transcript.   Therefore, we find that Appeals Officer Mazaroli’s

determination that the 1991 extension covering 1982 was timely

executed with respect to the 1983 assessment is supported by a

preponderance of the evidence.6




     6
        We note, in passing, that the Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 1998), Pub. L. 105-206,
sec. 3461, 112 Stat. 764 enacted a new sec. 6502(a)(2) to provide
that extensions of the 10-year statute of limitations on
collection may only be made in connection with the simultaneous
execution of an installment agreement. That rule is effective
for extension requests made after Dec. 31, 1999. RRA 1998 sec.
3461(c)(1). RRA 1998 sec. 3461(c)(2) provides that pre-2000
extensions (not made in conformity with the new requirement)
shall expire on the latest of (1) the last day of the 10-year
collection period provided in sec. 6502(a)(1), (2) Dec. 31, 2002,
or (3) in the case of an extension executed in connection with an
installment agreement, the 90th day after the expiration of such
extension. Assuming arguendo that the 1991 extensions are not
covered by the last of the three alternative expiration dates for
pre-2000 extensions (because they were executed too long, more
than 9 months, before the July 13, 1992, installment agreement),
and even though the statutory 10-year limitations period on
collection with respect to all of the assessments for the years
in issue has expired and we are beyond Dec. 31, 2002, the
transition rule for pre-2000 extensions does not prevent
collection herein. That is because respondent commenced
collection by issuing the notice of levy on July 3, 2001, well
before the Dec. 31, 2002, alternative expiration date for pre-
2000 extensions. Petitioner’s filing of a request for a
Collection Due Process hearing on July 10, 2001, suspended the
running of the period that otherwise would have ended on Dec. 31,
2002, pursuant to sec. 6330(e)(1), which provides, in relevant
part, that “the running of any period of limitations under
section 6502 * * * shall be suspended for the period during which
* * * [the] hearing, and appeals therein, are pending.” That
suspension is still in effect.
                              - 20 -

V.   Conclusion

      Appeals Officer Mazaroli’s determination affirming the

proposed levy action against petitioner was not an abuse of

discretion.   That determination is hereby sustained.


                                         Decision will be entered

                                    for respondent.
