                         T.C. Memo. 2003-83



                       UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                 ARLENE WILLIAMS, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 3070-01L.             Filed March 24, 2003.



     Arlene Williams, pro se.

     Wendy S. Harris, for respondent.



                         MEMORANDUM OPINION


     CHIECHI, Judge:    This case is before the Court on respon-

dent’s motion for summary judgment (respondent’s motion).1    We

shall grant respondent’s motion.




     1
      Although the Court ordered petitioner to file a response to
respondent’s motion, petitioner failed to do so.
                                - 2 -

                            Background

     The record establishes and/or the parties do not dispute the

following.

     Petitioner resided in Las Vegas, Nevada, at the time she

filed the petition in this case.

     On January 11, 1998, petitioner filed late a Federal income

tax (tax) return for her taxable year 1996 (1996 return).    In her

1996 return, petitioner reported total income of $0 and total tax

of $0.   Petitioner attached a document to her 1996 return (peti-

tioner’s attachment to her 1996 return) that contained state-

ments, contentions, and arguments that the Court finds to be

frivolous and/or groundless.2

     On December 11, 1998, respondent issued to petitioner a

notice of deficiency (notice) with respect to her taxable year

1996, which she received.   In that notice, respondent determined

a deficiency in, an addition under section 6651(a)(1)3 to, and an

accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) on, petitioner’s

tax for her taxable year 1996 in the respective amounts of

$5,474, $1,369, and $1,095.


     2
      Petitioner’s attachment to her 1996 return is very similar
to the documents that certain other taxpayers with cases in the
Court attached to their tax returns. See, e.g., Copeland v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-46; Smith v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2003-45.
     3
      All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in
effect at all relevant times. All Rule references are to the Tax
Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
                              - 3 -

     Petitioner did not file a petition in the Court with respect

to the notice relating to her taxable year 1996.   Instead, on

March 5, 1999, in response to the notice, petitioner sent a

letter (petitioner’s March 5, 1999 letter) to the Internal

Revenue Service that contained statements, contentions, argu-

ments, and requests that the Court finds to be frivolous and/or

groundless.4

     On September 13, 1999, respondent assessed petitioner’s tax,

as well as an addition to tax, a penalty, and interest as pro-

vided by law, for her taxable year 1996.   (We shall refer to

those assessed amounts, as well as interest as provided by law

accrued after September 13, 1999, as petitioner’s unpaid liabil-

ity for 1996.)

     On September 13, October 18, and December 27, 1999, respon-

dent issued to petitioner separate notices of balance due with

respect to petitioner’s unpaid liability for 1996.

     On August 19, 2000, respondent issued to petitioner a final

notice of intent to levy and notice of your right to a hearing

(notice of intent to levy) with respect to her taxable year 1996.

On or about September 15, 2000, in response to the notice of

intent to levy, petitioner filed Form 12153, Request for a


     4
      Petitioner’s March 5, 1999 letter is very similar to the
letters that certain other taxpayers with cases in the Court sent
to the Internal Revenue Service in response to the notices issued
to them. See, e.g., Copeland v. Commissioner, supra; Smith v.
Commissioner, supra.
                                - 4 -

Collection Due Process Hearing (Form 12153), and requested a

hearing with respondent’s Appeals Office (Appeals Office).

Petitioner attached a document to her Form 12153 (petitioner’s

attachment to Form 12153) that contained statements, contentions,

arguments, and requests that the Court finds to be frivolous

and/or groundless.5

     On January 31, 2001, respondent’s Appeals officer held an

Appeals Office hearing with petitioner with respect to the notice

of intent to levy.    At the Appeals Office hearing, the Appeals

officer gave petitioner a summary record of assessments with

respect to her taxable year 1996.

     On February 6, 2001, the Appeals Office issued to petitioner

a notice of determination concerning collection action(s) under

section 6320 and/or 6330 (notice of determination).    An attach-

ment to the notice of determination stated in pertinent part:

     Applicable Law and Administrative Procedures

     Based on the information available, the requirements of
     applicable law and administrative procedures have been
     met.

     Internal Revenue Code Section 6331(d) requires that the
     Internal Revenue Service notify a taxpayer at least 30
     days before a Notice of Levy can be issued. The 30-day
     notice was mailed to you at the last known address via


     5
      Petitioner’s attachment to Form 12153 contained statements,
contentions, arguments, and requests that are very similar to the
statements, contentions, arguments, and requests contained in the
attachments to Forms 12153 filed with the Internal Revenue
Service by certain other taxpayers with cases in the Court. See,
e.g., Fink v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-61.
                         - 5 -

certified mail.

Internal Revenue Code Section 6330(a) states that no
levy may be made unless the Internal Revenue Service
notifies a taxpayer of the opportunity for a hearing
with the Internal Revenue Service Office of Appeals.
Letter 1058 “Final Notice,” was mailed to the taxpayer
via certified mail. The taxpayer responded timely.
Internal Revenue Code Section 6330(c) allows the tax-
payer to raise any relevant issue relating to the
unpaid tax or the proposed levy at the hearing, includ-
ing appropriate spousal defenses, challenges to the
appropriateness of collection actions and offers of
collection alternatives. The taxpayer may also raise
at the collection due process hearing challenges to the
existence or amount of the underlying tax liability for
any tax period if the taxpayer did not receive any
statutory notice of deficiency for such tax liability
or did not otherwise have an opportunity to dispute
such tax liability.

A Collection Due Process Hearing was held and you
acknowledged receipt of the statutory notice of defi-
ciency. No petition was filed. It was explained to
you that under IRC 6330(c)(2)(B) there was an opportu-
nity to dispute the tax liability but you chose not to
not [sic] petition to the United States Tax Court and
the only item of discussion are collection alterna-
tives. You were not willing to discuss collection
alternatives but wanted to address the underlying
liability instead.

This Appeals Officer has had no prior involvement with
respect to these liabilities.

Relevant Issues Presented by the Taxpayer

You have stated in your Request for a Collection Due
Process Hearing in regard to the Notice of Federal Tax
Lien, “I am challenging the existence of the underlying
tax liability.” I explained to you that you do not
have the right to challenge the existence of the under-
lying tax liability because you received a statutory
notice of deficiency. During the Collection Due Pro-
cess Hearing I provided you a Summary Record of Assess-
ment. I have been satisfied all administrative proce-
dures have been met.
                               - 6 -

     No collection alternatives were presented other than
     what is stated above.

     Balancing Efficient Collection and Intrusiveness

     No other collection alternatives have been presented as
     a more efficient manner of collecting the amount of tax
     due. Levy action is the most efficient manner of
     collection.

                            Discussion

     The Court may grant summary judgment where there is no

genuine issue of material fact and a decision may be rendered as

a matter of law.   Rule 121(b); Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner,

98 T.C. 518, 520 (1992), affd. 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir. 1994).    We

conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact

regarding the questions raised in respondent’s motion.

     Where, as is the case here, the validity of the underlying

tax liability is not properly placed at issue, the Court will

review the determination of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue

for abuse of discretion.   Sego v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 604, 610

(2000); Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 181-182 (2000).

     Based upon our examination of the entire record before us,

we find that respondent did not abuse respondent’s discretion in

determining to proceed with the collection action as determined

in the notice of determination with respect to petitioner’s

taxable year 1996.

     Although respondent does not ask the Court to impose a

penalty on petitioner under section 6673(a)(1), the Court will
                                 - 7 -

sua sponte determine whether to impose such a penalty.    Section

6673(a)(1) authorizes the Court to require a taxpayer to pay to

the United States a penalty in an amount not to exceed $25,000

whenever it appears to the Court, inter alia, that a proceeding

before it was instituted or maintained primarily for delay, sec.

6673(a)(1)(A), or that the taxpayer’s position in such a proceed-

ing is frivolous or groundless, sec. 6673(a)(1)(B).

     In Pierson v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 576, 581 (2000), we

issued an unequivocal warning to taxpayers concerning the imposi-

tion of a penalty under section 6673(a) on those taxpayers who

abuse the protections afforded by sections 6320 and 6330 by

instituting or maintaining actions under those sections primarily

for delay or by taking frivolous or groundless positions in such

actions.

     In the instant case, petitioner advances, we believe primar-

ily for delay, frivolous and/or groundless contentions, argu-

ments, and requests, thereby causing the Court to waste its

limited resources.   We shall impose a penalty on petitioner

pursuant to section 6673(a)(1) in the amount of $1,600.

     We have considered all of petitioner’s contentions, argu-

ments, and requests that are not discussed herein, and we find

them to be without merit and/or irrelevant.

     On the record before us, we shall grant respondent’s motion.

     To reflect the foregoing,
- 8 -

        An order granting respondent’s

motion and decision will be entered

for respondent.
