                  T.C. Summary Opinion 2005-135



                     UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                   TRACIE YOUNG, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 6276-04S.             Filed September 14, 2005.


     Tracie Young, pro se.

     James R. Rich, for respondent.



     GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge:   This case was heard pursuant

to the provisions of section 7463 of the Internal Revenue Code in

effect at the time the petition was filed.   The decision to be

entered is not reviewable by any other court, and this opinion

should not be cited as authority.   Unless otherwise indicated,

subsequent section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in

effect for the year in issue, and all Rule references are to the

Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
                                - 2 -

     This case arises from a request for relief under section

6015 with respect to petitioner’s 1995 taxable year.    Respondent

determined that petitioner was not entitled to any relief under

section 6015.   Petitioner timely filed a petition under section

6015(e)(1) seeking review of respondent’s determination.

     The issue for decision is whether respondent’s denial of

petitioner’s request for relief pursuant to section 6015 was an

abuse of discretion.

                             Background

     Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are

incorporated herein by this reference.    Petitioner resided in

Greenville, North Carolina, on the date the petition was filed in

this case.

     Petitioner and her former spouse, John E. Glaze, Jr. (Mr.

Glaze), were married in 1993.   Mr. Glaze was employed as a truck

driver who was on the road for long periods of time.    For the

taxable year 1995, Mr. Glaze received wage income from Melton

Truck Lines and Mayflower Transit, Inc. (Mayflower) of $12,666.01

and $36,400, respectively.

     During 1995, petitioner was employed as a nurse by Scottish

Rite Children’s Medical Center (Scottish Rite).    Petitioner

received wages from Scottish Rite for taxable year 1995 of

$14,715.16.
                               - 3 -

     During 1995, petitioner and Mr. Glaze maintained a joint

checking account.   Both petitioner and Mr. Glaze deposited their

respective income into the joint checking account.    Petitioner

occasionally reviewed the bank statements regarding their joint

checking account and used the joint checking account to pay joint

household expenses.

     Petitioner knew that Mr. Glaze drove a truck for Mayflower

and knew he was receiving wage income from Mayflower.    Also,

during 1995, petitioner received gifts from Mr. Glaze, one of

which was $500 that she used as a downpayment for the purchase of

a 1984 Toyota Corolla.

     On October 18, 1996, petitioner and Mr. Glaze delinquently

filed their 1995 joint Federal income tax return.    On their Form

1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return, petitioner and Mr. Glaze

reported wage income of $27,382.1   Petitioner and Mr. Glaze also

reported $35,831 in unreimbursed employee business expenses on

their 1995 joint income tax return.    However, petitioner and Mr.

Glaze failed to report:   (1) $36,400 of wage income received by

Mr. Glaze from Mayflower; and (2) $24 of interest income received

jointly by petitioner and Mr. Glaze from the U.S. Treasury.

     Petitioner and Mr. Glaze’s 1995 joint income tax return

reported a refund due of $2,265.    Petitioner and Mr. Glaze


     1
      This amount consists of petitioner’s wage income received
from Scottish Rite and Mr. Glaze’s wage income received from
Melton Truck Lines, rounded to the nearest dollar.
                               - 4 -

received the refund in full, and petitioner used the moneys from

the refund to pay joint household liabilities.

     Petitioner and Mr. Glaze’s 1995 joint income tax return was

prepared by Jackson Hewitt Tax Service.   Petitioner “took all the

information from my [petitioner’s] tax return from Scottish Rite

Hospital, and the information that he [Mr. Glaze] had given me

from his tax returns” to the Jackson Hewitt Tax Service Center.

Petitioner reviewed the 1995 joint income tax return before

filing it with the Internal Revenue Service.   Both petitioner and

Mr. Glaze voluntarily signed their 1995 joint income tax return.

     On November 21, 1997, respondent issued petitioner and Mr.

Glaze a notice of deficiency for taxable year 1995, in which

respondent determined that they had unreported income of $36,424

and were liable for an income tax deficiency of $8,237, an

addition to tax pursuant to section 6651(a)(1) of $1,493, and an

accuracy-related penalty pursuant to section 6662 of $1,647.

Neither petitioner nor Mr. Glaze filed a petition with this Court

with respect to the notice of deficiency.   Accordingly, on or

about April 6, 1998, respondent assessed the tax liability,

addition to tax, and the accuracy-related penalty that were

reflected in the notice of deficiency for taxable year 1995.

     Petitioner and Mr. Glaze were divorced on May 26, 1999, by a

divorce decree entered by the Circuit Court of Shelby County,

Tennessee.   The divorce decree refers to a “written Marital
                               - 5 -

Dissolution Agreement” which provides for a settlement of

property rights of the parties.   Petitioner has not provided

respondent, respondent’s counsel, or this Court with a copy of

the aforesaid agreement.

     On or about April 1, 2002, respondent applied petitioner’s

2001 Federal income tax refund of $2,434 toward petitioner and

Mr. Glaze’s 1995 income tax liability.

     On June 3, 2002, petitioner filed a Form 8857, Request for

Innocent Spouse Relief, with respondent, requesting innocent

spouse relief with respect to the 1995 taxable year.   On February

25, 2003, respondent issued petitioner a letter advising her of

the preliminary determination denying relief from liability on

the 1995 joint return.   On March 29, 2004, respondent sent

petitioner a letter advising her of the final determination

denying her relief from liability for the deficiency, addition to

tax, and penalty for the 1995 taxable year.   On April 12, 2004,

petitioner filed a petition with this Court for review of

respondent’s determination denying her request for relief from

joint and several liability with respect to the 1995 tax year.

                           Discussion

     In general, taxpayers filing a joint Federal income tax

return are each responsible for the accuracy of their return and

are jointly and severally liable for the entire tax liability due

for that year.   Sec. 6013(d)(3); Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C.
                                - 6 -

276, 282 (2000).   In certain circumstances, however, a spouse may

obtain relief from joint and several liability by satisfying the

requirements of section 6015.

     Section 6015 applies to tax liabilities arising after July

22, 1998, and to tax liabilities arising on or before July 22,

1998, that remain unpaid as of such date.   Internal Revenue

Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. 105-206,

sec. 3201(g), 112 Stat. 740.    In the present case, petitioner and

Mr. Glaze’s tax liabilities arose during taxable year 1995.

However, these liabilities remained unpaid as of July 22, 1998;

therefore, section 6015 applies to the case at bar.   See

Washington v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 137, 155 (2003).

     Section 6015(a)(1) provides that a spouse who has made a

joint return may elect to seek relief from joint and several

liability under section 6015(b) (dealing with relief from

liability for an understatement of tax on a joint return).

Section 6015(a)(2) provides that a spouse who is eligible to do

so may elect to limit that spouse’s liability for any deficiency

with respect to a joint return under section 6015(c).   Relief

from joint and several liability under section 6015(b) or (c) is

available only with respect to a deficiency for the year for

which relief is sought.   Sec. 6015(b)(1)(D) and (c)(1); see H.

Conf. Rept. 105-599, at 252-254 (1998), 1998-3 C.B. 747, 1006-

1008.   If relief is not available under either section 6015(b) or
                               - 7 -

(c), an individual may seek equitable relief under section

6015(f), which may be granted by the Commissioner in his

discretion.

     In this case, petitioner contends that she is entitled to

full relief from liability under section 6015.2   Our jurisdiction

to review petitioner’s request for relief is conferred by section

6015(e), which allows a spouse who has requested relief from

joint and several liability to contest the Commissioner’s denial

of relief by filing a timely petition in this Court.   We address

petitioner’s request for relief under subsections (b), (c), and

(f) of section 6015 in turn.

     A.   Section 6015(b)

     Section 6015(b)(1) authorizes the Commissioner to grant

relief from joint and several liability if the taxpayer satisfies

each requirement of subparagraphs (A) through (E).   Section

6015(b)(1) provides:



     2
      Presumably, petitioner’s claim for relief includes a refund
of her 2001 overpayment of $2,434 which the Commissioner applied
toward petitioner and Mr. Glaze’s 1995 income tax liability.
Sec. 6015(g) governs the allowance of credits and refunds in
cases where the taxpayer is granted relief under sec. 6015.
Except as provided otherwise in sec. 6015(g) and in secs. 6511,
6512(b), 7121, and 7122, a credit or refund is allowed or made to
the extent attributable to the application of sec. 6015. Sec.
6015(g)(1). A tax credit or refund is allowed only if petitioner
qualifies for innocent spouse relief under sec. 6015(b) or if the
Internal Revenue Service exercises its authority to provide
equitable relief pursuant to sec. 6015(f). No credit or refund
is allowed where a taxpayer obtains relief after making a
separate liability election. See sec. 6015(g)(3).
                               - 8 -

          SEC. 6015(b). Procedures for Relief From Liability
     Applicable to All Joint Filers.--

               (1) In general.--Under procedures prescribed by
          the Secretary, if--

                     (A) a joint return has been made for a
                taxable year;

                     (B) on such return there is an understatement
                of tax attributable to erroneous items of one
                individual filing the joint return;

                     (C) the other individual filing the joint
                return establishes that in signing the return
                he or she did not know, and had no reason to
                know, that there was such understatement;

                     (D) taking into account all the facts and
                circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the other
                individual liable for the deficiency in tax for
                such taxable year attributable to such
                understatement; and

                     (E) the other individual elects (in such form
                as the Secretary may prescribe) the benefits of
                this subsection not later than the date which is 2
                years after the date the Secretary has begun
                collection activities with respect to the
                individual making the election,

          then the other individual shall be relieved of
          liability for tax (including interest, penalties, and
          other amounts) for such taxable year to the extent such
          liability is attributable to such understatement.

The requirements of section 6015(b)(1) are stated in the

conjunctive.   Therefore, if the requesting spouse fails to meet

any one of them, she does not qualify for relief.   Alt v.

Commissioner, 119 T.C. 306, 313 (2002), affd. 101 Fed. Appx. 34

(6th Cir. 2004).   Except as provided by section 6015, the

requesting spouse bears the burden of proving that she satisfies
                               - 9 -

each requirement of section 6015(b)(1).   See Rule 142(a).   We

find that petitioner fails to meet the requirement of section

6015(b)(1)(C); therefore, we need not, and do not, decide whether

petitioner satisfies the other requirements of section

6015(b)(1).

      Pursuant to section 6015(b)(1)(C), petitioner must

establish that she did not know and further had no reason to know

of the understatement in tax on the joint return which she filed

with her husband.   This Court has held that “where a spouse

seeking relief has actual knowledge of the underlying transaction

that produced the omitted income, innocent spouse relief is

denied.”   Cheshire v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 183, 192-193 (2000),

affd. 282 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002).

     In the present case, petitioner and Mr. Glaze maintained a

joint checking account.   Both petitioner and Mr. Glaze deposited

their respective wage income into said joint checking account.

Petitioner occasionally reviewed the bank statements regarding

their joint checking account, and she personally used moneys from

the joint checking account to pay joint household expenses.

Further, petitioner knew that Mr. Glaze drove trucks for

Mayflower and knew he was receiving wages from Mayflower.

Petitioner also reviewed the 1995 joint income tax return before

filing it with the Internal Revenue Service.
                               - 10 -

     Upon the basis of the facts of the present case, we find

that petitioner was well aware of the income received by Mr.

Glaze from Mayflower for his services, and that such income was

not reported as gross income on their 1995 joint Federal income

tax return.   Therefore, we conclude that petitioner may not claim

that she did not have knowledge of the income received by Mr.

Glaze.

     Further, petitioner had actual knowledge of the interest

income received from the U.S. Treasury of $24, because such

income was jointly received in the names of both petitioner and

Mr. Glaze.    Accordingly, we hold that petitioner is not entitled

to relief under section 6015(b).

     B.   Section 6015(c)

     Section 6015(c) grants relief from joint and several tax

liability for electing individuals who filed a joint return and

are no longer married, are legally separated, or are living

apart.    Generally, this type of relief treats spouses, for

purposes of determining tax liability, as if separate returns had

been filed.    Sec. 6015(d)(3)(A); Grossman v. Commissioner, 182

F.3d 275, 278 (4th Cir. 1999), affg. T.C. Memo. 1996-452;

Charlton v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 333, 342 (2000); Rowe v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-325.      The allocation, however, is

not permitted if the Secretary shows by a preponderance of the

evidence that the electing individual had “actual knowledge, at
                               - 11 -

the time such individual signed the return, of any item giving

rise to a deficiency (or portion thereof) which is not allocable

to such individual”.    Sec. 6015(c)(3)(C); Culver v. Commissioner,

116 T.C. 189, 194-195 (2001); Cheshire v. Commissioner, supra at

193-194.

     Respondent argues that petitioner had actual knowledge of

the unreported income because:   (1) She had access to the

proceeds of Mr. Glaze’s wage income from Mayflower in the joint

checking account; (2) she occasionally reviewed the bank

statements regarding their joint checking account; (3) she used

moneys from Mr. Glaze’s wage income to pay joint household

expenses; and (4) the interest income received from the U.S.

Treasury was received jointly by petitioner and Mr. Glaze.

     In the present case, “the knowledge standard for purposes of

section 6015(c)(3)(C) is an actual and clear awareness * * * of

the existence of an item which gives rise to the deficiency”.

Cheshire v. Commissioner, supra at 195.

     Petitioner is not entitled to relief from joint and several

liability under section 6015(c).   As discussed above, petitioner

had actual knowledge of the $24 of interest income.   Also, as

discussed above, petitioner was fully aware of all the underlying

factual circumstances concerning the wage income received by Mr.

Glaze from Mayflower.    See Cheshire v. Commissioner, supra.

Consequently, petitioner had actual knowledge of the factual
                                - 12 -

basis for the unreported income, and she cannot rely on ignorance

of the law for relief from liability.    Mitchell v. Commissioner,

292 F.3d 800, 805 (D.C. Cir. 2002), affg. T.C. Memo. 2000-332.

     C.   Section 6015(f)

     Therefore, the only remaining opportunity for relief

available to petitioner is section 6015(f).    Section 6015(f)

provides as follows:

          SEC. 6015(f). Equitable Relief.--Under procedures
     prescribed by the Secretary, if-–

                (1) taking into account all the facts and
           circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the
           individual liable for any unpaid tax or any
           deficiency (or any portion of either); and

                (2) relief is not available to such individual
           under subsection (b) or (c),

     the Secretary may relieve such individual of such liability.

     As directed by section 6015(f), the Commissioner has

prescribed guidelines in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447,3 to

be considered in determining whether an individual qualifies for

relief under section 6015(f).    Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.01,

2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists threshold conditions which must be



     3
      This revenue procedure was superseded by Rev. Proc. 2003-
61, 2003-2 C.B. 296. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, is
effective either for requests for relief filed on or after Nov.
1, 2003, or for requests for which no preliminary determination
letter was issued as of Nov. 1, 2003. In the present case, the
request for relief was filed on June 3, 2002, and the preliminary
determination letter was issued on Feb. 25, 2003; therefore, Rev.
Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447 is applicable in the present
situation.
                                - 13 -

satisfied before the Commissioner will consider a request for

relief under section 6015(f).    Respondent concedes that

petitioner meets these threshold conditions for equitable

innocent spouse relief.

     Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, 2000-1 C.B. at 448, lists

nonexclusive factors that the Commissioner will consider in

determining whether, taking into account all the facts and

circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the requesting spouse

liable for all or part of the unpaid income tax liability

or deficiency, and full or partial equitable relief under section

6015(f) should be granted.   Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03(1),

provides that the following factors weigh in favor of the

Commissioner’s granting equitable relief:    (1) Marital status,

(2) economic hardship, (3) abuse, (4) no knowledge or reason to

know, (5) nonrequesting spouse’s legal obligation, and (6)

attributable to nonrequesting spouse.    Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec.

4.03(2), 2000-1 C.B. at 449, provides that the following factors

weigh against the Commissioner’s granting equitable relief:     (1)

Attributable to requesting spouse, (2) knowledge, or reason to

know, (3) significant benefit, (4) lack of economic hardship, (5)

noncompliance with Federal income tax laws, and (6) requesting

spouse’s legal obligation.   Further, Rev. Proc. 2000-15, supra,

provides that no single factor will be determinative, but that
                              - 14 -

all relevant factors, regardless of whether the factor is listed

in Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03, will be considered and weighed.

     To prevail under section 6015(f), petitioner must show that

respondent’s denial of equitable relief from joint liability

under section 6015(f) was an abuse of discretion.    See Washington

v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. at 146; Jonson v. Commissioner, 118

T.C. 106, 125 (2002) (citing Butler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. at

292), affd. 353 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003).    Action constitutes

an abuse of discretion under this standard where it is arbitrary,

capricious, or without sound basis in fact or law.     Woodral v.

Commissioner, 112 T.C. 19, 23 (1999).   The question of whether

respondent’s determination was arbitrary, capricious, or without

sound basis in fact is a question of fact.     Cheshire v.

Commissioner, 115 T.C. at 198.   In deciding whether respondent’s

determination that petitioner is not entitled to relief under

section 6015(f) was an abuse of discretion, we consider evidence

relating to all the facts and circumstances.

     Respondent contends:   (1) Petitioner voluntarily signed the

1995 joint Federal income tax return which reported gross income

of $27,382; (2) the proceeds of Mr. Glaze’s wage income from

Mayflower were put into a joint checking account to which

petitioner had access; (3) petitioner obtained benefits due to

Mr. Glaze’s wage income received from Mayflower through the use

of those moneys to pay off household expenses; (4) petitioner
                               - 15 -

would not suffer economic hardship if the Service did not grant

relief from the income tax liability; (5) petitioner had actual

knowledge that in 1995, Mr. Glaze worked for and received income

from Mayflower; and (6) petitioner had actual knowledge of the

$24 of interest income received jointly by petitioner and Mr.

Glaze from the United States Treasury.    Respondent asserts that

these factors weigh against granting relief to petitioner.     We

now address each of the factors of Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03,

separately.

1.   Marital Status

      During 1995, petitioner and Mr. Glaze were married and

resided in the same household; however, Mr. Glaze was frequently

away from home driving a truck for Melton Truck Lines and

Mayflower.    Petitioner and Mr. Glaze were divorced on May 26,

1999.   This factor weighs in favor of granting relief to

petitioner.

2.   Economic Hardship

      Respondent contends that petitioner offered no evidence that

she would suffer economic hardship if relief were denied.

Pursuant to section 301.6343-1(b)(4)(ii), Proced. & Admin. Regs.,

economic hardship exists if a levy will cause a taxpayer to be

unable to pay his/her reasonable basic living expenses.

Respondent maintains that respondent’s collection activity would
                              - 16 -

not leave petitioner unable to pay her basic living expenses.4    In

addition, respondent asserts that petitioner provided no

documentation to contradict these contentions or to demonstrate

an economic hardship.

     It appears from the record that petitioner earns sufficient

income and has assets such that she would not experience economic


     4
      Sec. 301.6343-1(b)(4)(ii), Proced. & Admin. Regs.,
provides:

     (ii) Information from taxpayer. In determining a reasonable
     amount for basic living expenses the director will consider
     any information provided by the taxpayer including–-

          (A) The taxpayer’s age, employment status and history,
          ability to earn, number of dependents, and status as a
          dependent of someone else;

          (B) The amount reasonably necessary for food, clothing,
          housing, (including utilities, home-owner insurance,
          home-owner dues, and the like), medical expenses
          (including health insurance), transportation, current
          tax payments (including federal, state, and local),
          alimony, child support, or other court-ordered
          payments, and expenses necessary to the taxpayer’s
          production of income (such as dues for a trade union or
          professional organization, or child care payments which
          allow the taxpayer to be gainfully employed);

          (C) The cost of living in the geographic area in which
          the taxpayer resides;

          (D) The amount of property exempt from levy which is
          available to pay the taxpayer’s expenses;

          (E) Any extraordinary circumstances such as special
          education expenses, a medical catastrophe, or natural
          disaster; and

          (F) Any other factor that the taxpayer claims bears on
          economic hardship and brings to the attention of the
          director.
                               - 17 -

hardship if required to pay some or all of the tax deficiency.

Petitioner has not entered into evidence any documentation or

testimony to contradict the above claims or the determination of

respondent; therefore, we find that petitioner will not suffer

economic hardship if relief is not granted.   This factor favors

denying relief.

3.   Abuse

      There is no evidence in the record that petitioner was

abused by Mr. Glaze.   Spousal abuse is a factor listed in Rev.

Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03(1), that will weigh in favor of

equitable relief if found but will not weigh against equitable

relief if not present in a case.   Therefore, this factor is

neutral.

4.   Knowledge or Reason To Know

      In the case of an income tax liability that arose from a

deficiency, the fact that the requesting spouse did not know and

had no reason to know of the item giving rise to the deficiency

is a factor in favor of granting relief.   Rev. Proc. 2000-15,

sec. 4.03(1)(d).   By contrast, the fact that the requesting

spouse knew or had reason to know of the item giving rise to the

deficiency is a factor weighing against relief.   Rev. Proc. 2000-

15, sec. 4.03(2)(b).
                                - 18 -

      Petitioner contends that she did not know and had no reason

to know that Mr. Glaze did not report his wage income received

from Mayflower.

      However, as previously stated, petitioner voluntarily signed

the 1995 joint return and admitted that she did review the joint

return before filing.   Petitioner and Mr. Glaze maintained a

joint checking account.   Both petitioner and Mr. Glaze deposited

their respective income into said joint checking account.

Petitioner occasionally reviewed the bank statements regarding

their joint checking account.   Petitioner personally used moneys

from the joint checking account to pay household expenses.

Further, petitioner knew that Mr. Glaze drove a truck for

Mayflower and knew he was receiving wage income from Mayflower.

Also, the interest income from the U.S. Treasury was received in

both petitioner’s and Mr. Glaze’s names.   Thus, petitioner knew

or had reason to know of the unreported income which gave rise to

the taxable year 1995 deficiency, addition to tax pursuant to

section 6651(a)(1), and the accuracy-related penalty pursuant to

section 6662.   This factor favors denying relief to petitioner.

5.   Nonrequesting Spouse’s Legal Obligation

      As previously noted, petitioner and Mr. Glaze were divorced

on May 26, 1999, and a divorce decree was entered by the Circuit

Court of Shelby County, Tennessee.   The divorce decree refers to

a “written Marital Dissolution Agreement” which provides for a
                               - 19 -

settlement of property rights of the parties.   However,

petitioner has not provided respondent’s counsel or this Court

with a copy of the aforesaid agreement.

     Rev. Proc. 2000-15, sec. 4.03(1)(e), indicates that if Mr.

Glaze had a legal obligation under the judgment for dissolution

of marriage to pay the tax liabilities, then that fact would

weigh in favor of granting relief to petitioner.   Likewise, if

the judgment for dissolution of marriage had placed the

obligation to pay the taxes on petitioner, then that fact would

weigh against granting relief to her as indicated in Rev. Proc.

2000-15, sec. 4.03(2)(f).   In the present case, the divorce

decree has not been offered into evidence.   Thus, this is a

neutral factor.

6.   Attributable to Nonrequesting Spouse

     As previously stated, $36,400 of petitioner’s and Mr.

Glaze’s unreported income for taxable year 1995 is attributable

to wages earned through Mr. Glaze’s employment with Mayflower.

The additional $24 of interest income was received by petitioner

and Mr. Glaze in both their names and is therefore attributable

to both petitioner and Mr. Glaze.   As to the $36,400 of

petitioner’s and Mr. Glaze’s unreported income for taxable year

1995, this factor favors granting petitioner equitable relief.
                               - 20 -

7.   Significant Benefit

      Respondent contends that petitioner received benefits from

the proceeds of Mr. Glaze’s wage income received from Mayflower

in the form of payment of joint household expenses.

      Petitioner admitted at trial that she and Mr. Glaze were

personally liable for the household expenses which were paid by

the moneys received by Mr. Glaze as wage income from Mayflower.

Petitioner also testified at trial that during 1995 she received

gifts from Mr. Glaze, one of which was $500 that she used as a

downpayment for the purchase of a 1984 Toyota Corolla.

Therefore, we find that petitioner did benefit from the

unreported wage income received by Mr. Glaze from Mayflower.

8.   Noncompliance With Federal Income Tax Laws

      There is no evidence in the record as to this factor.

Therefore, we consider this factor neutral.

9.   Conclusion

      The factors that weigh against granting relief to petitioner

outweigh those factors favoring relief.   Therefore, under these

facts and circumstances, we hold that respondent did not abuse

his discretion in denying equitable relief to petitioner under

section 6015(f).
                             - 21 -

    Reviewed and adopted as the report of the Small Tax Case

Division.


                                  Decision will be entered

                             for respondent.
