                        T.C. Memo. 2010-91



                     UNITED STATES TAX COURT



          MAHMOUD M. AND SIRI L. SOLTAN, Petitioners v.
           COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 22757-07.              Filed April 29, 2010.



     Mahmoud M. Soltan and Siri L. Soltan, pro se.

     Blaine Holiday, for respondent.



             MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION


     MORRISON, Judge:   On July 6, 2007, respondent (the

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, whom we refer to here as the

IRS) mailed petitioner Mrs. Siri L. Soltan notices of deficiency

for the taxable years 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2005.    In those

notices, the IRS determined the following deficiencies in income
                              - 2 -

tax, with additions to tax for late filing, late payment, and

failure to pay estimated income tax:1

                                         Additions to Tax
                               Sec.           Sec.           Sec.
    Year      Deficiency    6651(a)(1)     6651(a)(2)        6654
    2000        $1,534       $345.15         $383.50         -0-
    2001           979        220.28          244.75         -0-
    2002           971        218.48          237.90         -0-
    2005         3,036        683.10          197.45        $121.78

By separate notice also mailed on the same date to petitioner

Mahmoud M. Soltan the IRS determined the following deficiency,

and additions to tax for late filing, late payment and failure to

pay estimated income tax:

                                         Additions to Tax
                               Sec.           Sec.           Sec.
    Year      Deficiency    6651(a)(1)     6651(a)(2)        6654
    2005        $3,374       $759.15         $219.31        $135.33

The issues for decision affecting Mrs. Soltan are:      (1) Whether

she is liable for income tax on her wages earned in 2000, 2001,

2002, and 2005; (2) whether she is liable for the section

6651(a)(1) late-filing addition to tax for 2000, 2001, 2002, and

2005; (3) whether she is liable for the section 6651(a)(2) late-

payment addition to tax for 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2005; and (4)



     1
      Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the years at issue, and
all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and
Procedure.
                                 - 3 -

whether she is liable for the section 6654 failure-to-pay-

estimated-tax addition to tax for 2005.       The issues for decision

affecting Mr. Soltan are:    (1) Whether he is liable for income

tax on his wages earned in 2005; (2) whether he is liable for the

section 6651(a)(1) late-filing addition to tax for 2005; (3)

whether he is liable for the section 6651(a)(2) late-payment

addition to tax for 2005; and (4) whether he is liable for the

section 6654 failure-to-pay-estimated-tax addition to tax for

2005.

                           FINDINGS OF FACT

     Some of the facts have been deemed established for purposes

of this case in accordance with Rule 91(f).2      We incorporate

these facts into our findings by this reference.       The Soltans are

married and resided in Minnesota when the petition was filed.

        In 1996, the Soltans operated a business from leased

premises--before their landlord evicted them.       Seeking to recover

compensation for the eviction, the Soltans filed an insurance

claim with the State Farm insurance company.       The Soltans now

claim that their loss from this eviction was deductible, and that


     2
      At trial in St. Paul, Minnesota on February 10, 2009, the
Soltans were orally ordered to show cause as to why proposed
facts and evidence should not be accepted as established under
Rule 91(f). On the same date, this Court made the order to show
cause under Rule 91(f) absolute and deemed established the facts
and evidence as set forth in the IRS’s proposed stipulation of
facts for purposes of this case. The Court also received into
evidence Exhibits 1-J through 16-J, attached to the proposed
stipulation of facts.
                              - 4 -

the loss produced a net operating loss that must be carried

forward to the tax years at issue.    Deductions for these losses

would have presumably been reflected in income tax returns filed

for 1996, but the Soltans did not file a return for that year.

The eviction in 1996 is also significant, according to the

Soltans, because they argue that the federal government was

liable for their claim against State Farm and that this liability

can be used to wipe out their federal tax obligations.   The

Soltans admit that their insurance claim was never reduced to an

actual judgment against State Farm, much less against the federal

government.3


     3
      The Soltans submitted documents after trial that shed some
light on their insurance claim against State Farm. The documents
are summarized in the paragraph below. The documents do not, on
their face, seem unreliable. However, we decline to re-open the
record to admit these documents into evidence for reasons
explained further below. Thus, the paragraph that follows is not
incorporated in our official findings of fact.

     The excluded documents suggest the Soltans operated a gift
shop in the Radisson hotel building in St. Paul. The premises of
the gift shop was leased from the landlord by Mr. Soltan. In
1996, the landlord evicted Mr. Soltan from the shop, thus
impairing or wiping out the value of the business. To recoup
this loss, the Soltans filed an insurance claim with their
insurance company, State Farm. State Farm denied the claim
repeatedly over the ensuing 12 years because it said that none of
the provisions of the policy required State Farm to reimburse the
Soltans for their loss. One provision of the policy protected
the Soltans from suits by their tenants for wrongful eviction.
But it did not cover the Soltans for the losses from being
wrongfully evicted by their landlord. In 2009, Mr. Soltan
attempted to reformulate the insurance claim to squeeze it into
the wrongful-eviction provision of the insurance policy. Mr.
Soltan told State Farm that he had subleased the shop to his wife
                                                   (continued...)
                               - 5 -

     The Soltans did not file timely tax returns during the years

at issue in this case.   These years are:   For Mrs. Soltan, 2000,

2001, 2002, and 2005; and for Mr. Soltan, the 2005 year.4    Both

Soltans submitted Form W-4s to their employers in which they

certified that they were exempt from income tax withholding.    As

a consequence, no income tax was withheld from the Soltans’

earnings for the years at issue.    Mrs. Soltan earned the

following wages during each year:




     3
      (...continued)
and that he had wrongfully evicted his wife from the shop in
1996. Mr. Soltan urged State Farm to pay him money to compensate
him for his wife’s unfiled claim against him for wrongful
eviction. Not surprisingly, State Farm rejected the reformulated
claim.

     In his trial testimony, Mr. Soltan gave a less
comprehensible version of the off-the-record story we have pieced
together above. He testified:

     When * * * [the landlord] seized * * * [the business]
     from me and not from her, but the insurance it cover
     her and it [did not] cover me. And since I wasn’t
     covered she was the one that’s covered by that policy,
     but so the only way we can receive it is if she blamed
     me for it because that’s how they set up the insurance
     policy. So we filed a claim. We just waiting to
     receive our money from the insurance company because
     the insurance company had a subrogation issue with
     * * * [the landlord]. [sic]
     4
      The record does not reveal whether Mr. Soltan filed returns
for the taxable years 2000 through 2002.
                                 - 6 -

      Year                     Employer                  Wages
      2000        Giannis LLC                           $12,206
      2000        Grazzi Italian Cafe, Inc.               5,230
      2001        Giannis LLC                            15,983
      2002        Giannis LLC                            16,049
      2002        Kelber Catering, Inc.                     125
      2005        CSM Lodging Services, Inc.              1,001
      2005        Kelber Catering, Inc.                   1,356
      2005        Bloomington Hotel, Inc.                28,523

In 2005, Mr. Soltan earned wages of $817 from CSM Lodging

Services, Inc., $1,362 from Kelber Catering, Inc., and $30,921

from Bloomington Hotel, Inc.     The Soltans received each item of

wage income above and received Forms W-2 reflecting all of the

income.

     On May 9, 2007, the IRS prepared substitute for returns

pursuant to section 6020(b) for Mrs. Soltan for the 2000, 2001,

2002, and 2005 taxable years.    It also prepared a substitute for

return for Mr. Soltan for the 2005 taxable year.    The filing

status was listed as single in each substitute for return.

     The IRS issued a separate notice of deficiency for each of

those tax years on July 6, 2007, determining the deficiencies and

additions to tax listed above.

     Mrs. Soltan finally submitted Form 1040s, dated September

29, 2007, to the IRS for the taxable years 2000, 2001, and 2002.

She listed her filing status as married, filing separately.       The
                               - 7 -

Form 1040s contained zeroes in all boxes except for question

marks placed in the wage and adjusted gross income boxes.    She

wrote “EXEMPT STATUS ON EMPLOYER’s W-4" in the exemptions section

of the forms and she left blank the box in which a taxpayer

claims the total number of exemptions.

     The Soltans sent to the IRS a Form 1040X, Amended U.S.

Individual Income Tax Return, for the 2005 taxable year in which

they reported $63,983.87 of adjusted gross income, $10,000 of

itemized deductions, and $53,983.87 of taxable income.     Both Mr.

and Mrs. Soltan signed the Form 1040X, which the IRS received on

September 10, 2007.   They left the filing status blank.   They

wrote “EXEMPT STATUS” where the form requests the dollar amount

associated with the number of exemptions claimed.   The Soltans

also wrote “EXEMPT STATUS ON EMPLOYER’s W-4’s” in the section

requesting the correct number of exemptions.   In the section

entitled “Explanation of Changes”, they stated:   “We did not file

a tax return for tax year ending December 31, 2005.   We claimed

‘EXEMPT STATUS’ on our Employer’s W-4’s.”

     The Soltans filed a timely petition with this Court on

October 3, 2007, in which they requested that the Court “[p]lease

note the tax exempt status that was filed on the W-4’s with our

Employers.”   They filed an amended petition on November 15, 2007

in which they explained:   “The relief that we request is that we

receive a redetermination that we are not deficient in our income
                                 - 8 -

tax for the above-referenced tax periods.      We claimed EXEMPT on

our Employer’s W-4 forms.     Therefore, Federal taxes were not

withheld from our income.”

     This case was called from the calendar for the trial session

of this Court on February 10, 2009, at St. Paul, Minnesota, and a

trial was held.

                                OPINION

I.   Deficiencies

     The Soltans bear the burden of proof as to the determination

of the deficiencies contained in the notices.      See Rule 142(a);

Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).       Section 61(a)(1)

states that gross income includes compensation for services.      The

Soltans earned the wages determined to be income in the notices

of deficiency and received Form W-2s from their various employers

reporting to the Soltans (and to the IRS) that they received the

wages.    The Soltans proffer two arguments why they nevertheless

have no tax liability for the tax years at issue.

     A.     Offset Argument

     First, the Soltans assert that their claim against State

Farm should offset their federal tax liability because State Farm

is reinsured by the U.S. Treasury.       But the Soltans submitted no

evidence that they reduced their breach-of-contract claim to a

judgment against State Farm, much less a judgment directly

against the federal government.     To the contrary, they admitted
                               - 9 -

at trial that they were still dealing with State Farm through its

internal claims process.   This Court cannot decide offset claims

against the federal government that require us to adjudicate

underlying non-tax disputes that are outside of this Court’s

limited jurisdiction.   Broemer v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-

72 (the Court cannot adjudicate an offset claim because it has no

jurisdiction over tort claims against the U.S. government related

to an alleged conspiracy); Watts v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

1995-196 (the Court cannot resolve an offset claim because it has

no jurisdiction over a taxpayer’s claim for back wages for

purportedly serving as President of the United States); Akins v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-256 (the Court cannot decide an

offset claim because it has no jurisdiction over a taxpayer’s

claim that he sustained injury due to federal government’s

failure to enforce criminal laws), affd. without published

opinion 35 F.3d 577 (11th Cir. 1994); Randall v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 1993-207 (the Court cannot adjudicate an offset claim

because it has no jurisdiction over a taxpayer’s claim for

insurance reimbursement by a U.S. Government-owned medical

insurer for medical services performed for an insured patient),

affd. without published opinion 29 F.3d 621 (2d Cir. 1994).    The

Broemer Court explained, in the context of a tax collection case:

          The Tax Court is a Court of limited jurisdiction
     lacking general equitable powers. Commissioner v.
     McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987). While we may apply
     equitable principles in deciding matters over which we
                              - 10 -

     are specifically granted jurisdiction, we may not
     exercise general equitable powers to expand that
     statutorily prescribed jurisdiction. Woods v.
     Commissioner, 92 T.C. 776, 784-787 (1989).

          At the time of the CDP hearing petitioner's tort
     claims had not been liquidated or established.
     Evaluating the Appeals officer's decision to reject his
     offset argument would require us to determine the
     merits and value of the underlying claims. None of the
     cases petitioner cites give the Court jurisdiction to
     adjudicate torts. * * *

Broemer v. Commissioner, supra.   We cannot render a decision on

the merits of the Soltans’ breach-of-contract claim and thus have

no jurisdiction over their offset claim.

     B.   Deduction for Loss of the Business and the Resulting
          Net Operating Loss

     The Soltans argue that the loss of their business on account

of their eviction in 1996 entitled them a deduction under section

165(a) for the 1996 tax year, and that they had a net operating

loss for 1996 that they should be permitted to carry over to the

tax years at issue.   They claim that the net operating loss

exceeds their cumulative gross income in all of the tax years at

issue.

     A net operating loss occurs in a tax year when deductions,

as modified by section 172(d), exceed gross income for that year.

Sec. 172(c).   Section 172(b)(1)(A), as in effect before the

passage of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, P.L. 105-34, 111

Stat. 788, provides that a net operating loss is first carried

back 3 taxable years and then carried forward for 15 taxable
                               - 11 -

years.   The taxpayer may elect to waive the carryback but

otherwise cannot choose the year in which to apply the loss.

    We may determine the amount of a net operating loss for a

year, even if an assessment of tax for that year is barred, in

order to help determine the correct amount of a net operating

loss carryover to the tax years at issue.    Sec. 6214(b) (the

Court may consider facts related to other tax years in order to

redetermine the amount of deficiency for the tax year at issue);

Calumet Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 257, 274 (1990).

Thus, we may determine the amount of the net operating loss in

1996, and can do so even if 1996 is a time-barred year, to allow

us to determine the Soltans’ tax liability for the years at

issue.    These years are 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2005 for Mrs.

Soltan, and 2005 for Mr. Soltan.

     To claim any deduction, the taxpayer must identify the

deduction and prove that he or she meets the requirements for

claiming it.    INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79, 84

(1992); New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440

(1934); Wilson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-139.    A taxpayer

must maintain records sufficient to substantiate the amounts of

deductions claimed and has the burden of proving that amount.

Sec. 6001; Hradesky v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 89-90 (1975),

affd. 540 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1976); sec. 1.6001-1(a), Income Tax

Regs.    If a taxpayer establishes that an expense is deductible
                                - 12 -

but is unable to substantiate the precise amount, we may estimate

the amount, bearing heavily against the taxpayer whose

inexactitude is of his own making (the “Cohan rule”).     Cohan v.

Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir. 1930).     The taxpayer

must present sufficient evidence for the Court to form an

estimate because without such a basis, any allowance would amount

to “unguided largesse.”     Williams v. United States, 245 F.2d 559,

560-561 (5th Cir. 1957); Vanicek v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 731,

742-743 (1985).

      Section 165(a) allows a deduction for “any loss sustained

during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or

otherwise.”   The Soltans have failed to substantiate the amount

or character of any loss.    Under these circumstances the Soltans

are not entitled to a deduction under section 165(a).

Accordingly, we allow no net operating loss deduction to either

petitioner for any tax year at issue.    We sustain the IRS’s

deficiency determinations in the notices of deficiency for all of

the tax years at issue.

II.   Additions to Tax

      The IRS bears the burden of production with respect to the

additions to tax determined under sections 6651(a)(1) and (2) and

6654.   Sec. 7491(c).    This means that once the taxpayer files a

petition alleging an error in the determination of an addition to

tax, the taxpayer’s challenge will succeed unless the IRS
                                - 13 -

produces evidence that the addition to tax is appropriate.        Swain

v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 358, 364-365 (2002).     Once the IRS has

produced the evidence demonstrating that the addition to tax is

appropriate, the taxpayer must provide the Court with sufficient

evidence to convince the Court that the IRS’s determination is

incorrect.     Higbee v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 438, 447 (2001).

The burden of proof remains on the taxpayer regarding various

defenses that the taxpayer can assert in response to various

additions to tax, such as that the taxpayer had reasonable cause

for engaging in the conduct.     Id. at 446.

     A.      Section 6651(a)(1) Failure-To-File Addition to Tax

     The IRS determined that Mrs. Soltan was liable for the

section 6651(a)(1) late-filing addition to tax for the tax years

2000, 2001, 2002, and 2005 and that Mr. Soltan was liable for the

addition to tax for 2005.    Section 6651(a)(1) imposes an addition

to tax for failing to file a return by the filing deadline

(determined by taking into account any extensions), unless such

failure is due to reasonable cause and not due to willful

neglect.   The late-filing addition to tax is 5 percent of the net

amount required to be shown as tax on the return for each month

such failure continues, not to exceed 25 percent in the

aggregate.    Sec. 6651(a)(1), (b)(1).   The five-percent addition

to tax is reduced by the amount of the addition to tax under

section 6651(a)(2) for late payment, that is, 0.5 percent for
                              - 14 -

each month in which both penalties apply.   Sec. 6651(c)(1).

Therefore, the effective late filing rate for the period in which

both additions to tax apply is 4.5 percent per month.   Sec.

6651(a)(1), (c)(1).

     The Soltans admitted at trial that they did not file returns

for any of the years at issue until September 2007, long after

the expiration of the late-filing penalty periods applicable to

the tax years at issue.   Consequently, the IRS has met its burden

of producing evidence that the late-filing addition to tax should

be imposed for each of the tax years at issue.

     The Soltans have not demonstrated that they have reasonable

cause for their failure to file timely returns.   At trial, Mr.

Soltan testified that “we always filed jointly for the last 25

years.”5   Thus, the Soltans were familiar with their obligation

to file a return.   Mr. Soltan explained their failure to file:

“We were probably under the impression that since we were exempt

and there wasn’t any withholding we maybe didn’t see the need to

file a return.”   The Soltans filled out Form W-4s claiming that

they were exempt from withholding because, for each tax year,

they certified that they expected to have no tax liability for

the year, and that they had no tax liability for the prior year.

These certifications were false.   They were based, according to


     5
      We infer that Mr. Soltan meant that he and his wife filed
joint returns for the 25 years before 1996. There is nothing in
the record to indicate that they filed timely returns after that.
                                - 15 -

the Soltans, on their supposed net operating loss and their

unfiled insurance lawsuit against the federal government.       An

individual taxpayer must file a return if gross income exceeds

the threshold amount specified by section 6012(a)(1).     The

Soltans undertook no steps to determine if they had an obligation

to file.   They did not consult a tax professional.    See Huang v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1997-257; sec. 1.6664-4(b)(1), Income

Tax Regs.; see also Vezey v. United States, 84 AFTR 2d 99-6192,

at 99-6194, 99-2 USTC par. 50,863, at 89,865 (9th Cir. 1999)

(“some degree of diligence on the taxpayer’s part is required”);

Guterman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2008-283.   Even if we were

to believe that the Soltans had honestly believed they did not

have to file a return, their mistaken belief does not constitute

reasonable cause.   See Henningsen v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 528,

536 (1956) (“there is no showing that advice of counsel was in

fact sought or relied upon.   Mere uninformed and unsupported

belief by a taxpayer, no matter how sincere that belief may be,

that he is not required to file a tax return, is insufficient to

constitute reasonable cause for his failure so to file.”), affd.

243 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1957).

     The Soltans also argued that the couple could not file

returns until they received payment on their insurance claim.

Only then would they know the amount of their unreimbursed loss

that they could claim as a section 165 deduction.     See sec.
                              - 16 -

1.165-1(d)(2)(i), Income Tax Regs. (taxpayer who suffers a

deductible casualty loss and has a reasonable prospect of

collecting reimbursement is barred from treating the loss as

sustained until the year in which it can be ascertained with

reasonable certainty whether reimbursement will be forthcoming).

The Soltans were not relieved from their obligation to file tax

returns.   See sec. 6012(a)(1).

     Finally, the returns filed in September 2007 contained zeros

and question marks; this act demonstrates a continued

unwillingness to comply with the law.   The Soltans are therefore

liable for the section 6651(a)(1) addition to tax for each tax

year at issue.

     B.    Section 6651(a)(2) Late-Payment Addition to Tax

     The IRS determined that Mrs. Soltan was liable for the

section 6651(a)(2) late-payment addition to tax for the tax years

2000, 2001, 2002, and 2005 and that Mr. Soltan was liable for the

addition to tax for 2005.   Section 6651(a)(2) imposes an addition

to tax for failing to pay the tax shown on a return on or before

the date prescribed for payment, unless such failure is due to

reasonable cause and not due to willful neglect.   Sec. 301.6651-

1(a)(2), Proced. & Admin. Regs.   The late-payment addition to tax

is 0.5 percent of the net amount due at the beginning of each

month for each month such failure continues, not to exceed 25

percent in the aggregate.   Sec. 6651(a)(2), (b)(2).    When a
                                 - 17 -

taxpayer does not file a return, the IRS may create a substitute

return.    Sec. 6020(b).   Such a return is treated as the return

filed by the taxpayer for the purposes of the section 6651(a)(2)

addition to tax.    Secs. 6020(b), 6651(g)(2).

     The Soltans have not paid their taxes for the years in

dispute.    They admit that they did not authorize the withholding

of any income tax and that they did not make any estimated tax

payments for the tax years at issue.      They did not make any tax

payments when they filed Form 1040s in September 2007.

     The returns that the IRS prepared on the Soltans’ behalf for

each tax year at issue qualify as substitute for returns under

section 6020(b).    Consequently, the IRS has met its burden of

production that the Soltans are liable for the late-payment

addition to tax for the tax years at issue.

     The Soltans have not demonstrated that they had reasonable

cause for their failure to pay the tax shown on their substitute

for returns.    The Soltans were not correct that they had a net

operating loss that would entirely offset their income tax

liability or that they had a right to offset their entire income

tax liability against an amount they merely believed the federal

government owed them.      Thus they were not correct that they had

no tax liability for the years at issue.     The Soltans did not

consult a tax professional to discuss their obligation to pay

income taxes in light of these theories.     Their unsupported and
                                  - 18 -

uninformed mistaken beliefs, even if honestly held, do not

constitute reasonable cause.      See Henningsen v. Commissioner,

supra at 536.    Therefore, the Soltans are liable for the section

6651(a)(2) additions to tax for the tax years at issue.

     C.      Section 6654(a) Failure-To-Pay-Estimated-Tax Addition
             To Tax

     The IRS determined that the Soltans were each individually

liable for the section 6654(a) addition to tax for failing to pay

estimated income tax for the tax year 2005.      The addition to tax

is calculated by applying the section 6621 underpayment interest

rate to the amount of the underpayment from the due date of each

installment until April 15 following the close of the taxable

year.     Sec. 6654(a), (b)(2).   The amount of the underpayment is

(for calendar-year taxpayers) “the excess of

* * * the required installment” less “the amount (if any) of

the installment paid on or before the due date for the

installment.”     Sec. 6654(b)(1).   The “required installment” is

due at four times during the year and is 25 percent of the

“required annual payment.”     Sec. 6654(c)(1), (d)(1)(A).   A

“required annual payment” is equal to

     the lesser of--

                  (i) 90 percent of the tax shown on the
             return for the taxable year (or, if no return
             is filed, 90 percent of the tax for such
             year), or
                              - 19 -

               (ii) 100 percent of the tax shown on the
          return of the individual for the preceding
          taxable year.

     Clause (ii) shall not apply if the preceding taxable
     year was not a taxable year of 12 months or if the
     individual did not file a return for such preceding
     taxable year.

Sec. 6654(d)(1)(B); Wheeler v. Commissioner, 127 T.C. 200, 210-

211 (2006), affd. 521 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 2008).   The Soltans

did not file a 2005 return.   Thus, the clause (i) amount is 90

percent of the tax liability for 2005.   This tax liability for

2005 is at issue in this case, and our decision will fix the

liability.   It is more complicated to compute the clause (ii)

amount, which is “100 percent of the tax shown on the return of

the individual for the preceding taxable year.”   The “preceding

year” is 2004, but there is no evidence in the record as to

whether the Soltans filed a 2004 return, or if they did, the tax

liability shown on the return.   It was the IRS’s burden to

produce evidence of the tax shown on the 2004 return.6    Wheeler

v. Commissioner, supra at 210-212 (“respondent’s burden of

production under section 7491(c) [requires] him to produce

evidence that petitioner [has] a required annual payment * * *

under section 6654(d)”.).   We therefore hold that the Soltans are

not liable for the section 6654(a) addition to tax for 2005.


     6
      Alternatively, the IRS could have produced evidence that
the Soltans filed no return for 2004. Sec. 6654(a)(1)(B) (clause
(ii) not relevant if taxpayer did not file return for the
preceding year). The IRS failed to produce such evidence.
                             - 20 -

III. Motion to Reopen the Record

     The Soltans filed a motion to reopen the record on March 30,

2009 (after the trial) to introduce six documents into evidence,

claiming they were essential to the issues raised in their brief.

The six documents were:

     (1) A copy of the business insurance policy issued by State

Farm in the names of both Mr. and Mrs. Soltan for the period

beginning on October 1, 1996, and ending on October 1, 1997;

     (2) A judgment dated August 15, 1995, by the Mr. Soltan’s

landlord, Carlson Real Estate Company, against Mr. Soltan

evicting him from the leased space the Soltans used to operate

their gift shop;

     (3) The first page of a Lease for retail space between Mr.

Soltan and Carlson Real Estate Company, dated May 8, 1989, for

the term beginning on May 5, 1989, and ending on May 4, 1990

(signature page was not attached);

     (4) A Lease Extension and Modification Agreement between Mr.

Soltan and Carlson Real Estate Company, dated April 9, 1990,

extending Mr. Soltan’s lease from May 5, 1990, until May 4, 1995;

     (5) A letter, dated July 15, 2002, from Lee J. Smiertelny, a

claims manager with State Farm, to Mr. Soltan; and

     (6) A letter, dated January 23, 2009, from Mr. Soltan to

Edward B. Rust, Jr., President of State Farm.
                              - 21 -

     In its objection to petitioners’ motion to reopen the

record, the IRS argues that the standing pretrial order required

the parties to exchange documents they expected to use at trial

at least 14 days before the first day of the trial calendar.    The

IRS argues further that

     the evidence at issue is not newly found matter which
     the petitioners were previously prevented from
     producing. It is also not some relevant and material
     event that has transpired subsequent to the trial.
     Petitioners had numerous chances to provide the
     evidence at issue prior to trial and at trial and
     repeatedly refused and failed to do so.

The IRS objects to the introduction of the evidence on the

grounds that the documents are irrelevant and not authenticated.

It also states that to admit the letter to Rust into evidence

would amount to “additional testimony without an opportunity for

cross-examination” because it was dated 18 months after the

notices of deficiency were issued in this case.   The IRS objects

to admission of the letter by Smiertelny on the grounds of

hearsay, as its author never testified in this case.

     Reopening the record for the submission of additional

evidence lies within the discretion of the Court.   Butler v.

Commissioner, 114 T.C. 276, 286-287 (2000) (citing Zenith Radio

Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 331 (1971)).     It

is the general policy of this Court “to try all of the issues

raised in a case in one proceeding to avoid piecemeal and

protracted litigation.”   Link v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2006-
                                - 22 -

146.   We have recognized that “Proper judicial administration

demands that there be an end to litigation and that bifurcated

trials be avoided.”     Cloes v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 933, 937

(1982).    Thus, this Court “will not grant a motion to reopen the

record unless, among other requirements, the evidence relied on

is not merely cumulative or impeaching, the evidence is material

to the issues involved, and the evidence probably would change

the outcome of the case.”     Butler v. Commissioner, supra at 287;

Coleman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1989-248.     The IRS makes

legitimate objections to the lack of authenticity with respect to

all of the documents.    Fed. R. Evid. 901.   Even if we were to

ignore such objections, admission of the documents into evidence

would not change the outcome of the case in favor of the Soltans.

We therefore shall deny the Soltans’ motion to reopen the record.

       In reaching our holdings here, we have considered all

arguments made, and, to the extent not mentioned above, we

conclude they are moot, irrelevant, or without merit.

       To reflect the foregoing,


                                           An appropriate order and

                                      decision will be entered.
