                        T.C. Memo. 2003-307



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                  LAWRENCE MOORE, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 12424-02.             Filed November 6, 2003.


     Lawrence Moore, pro se.

     Dennis G. Driscoll and Michelle M. Lippert, for respondent.



                        MEMORANDUM OPINION


     GOLDBERG, Special Trial Judge:   Respondent determined a

deficiency in petitioner’s Federal income tax of $2,301 for the

taxable year 2000.   Unless otherwise indicated, section

references are to the Internal Revenue Code in effect for the

year in issue.
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     The issue for decision is whether petitioner is liable for

the alternative minimum tax (AMT) in the amount determined by

respondent.

     Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

The stipulation of facts and the attached exhibits are

incorporated herein by this reference.    Petitioner resided in

Toledo, Ohio, on the date the petition was filed in this case.

     Petitioner filed a Federal income tax return for taxable

year 2000.    As is relevant here, petitioner reported on his

return gross income of $1,824 from a refund of taxes; a personal

exemption deduction of $2,800; an itemized deduction of $5,445

for taxes paid; miscellaneous itemized deductions of $27,057 for

unreimbursed employee business expenses; taxable income of

$21,569; and a tax liability of $3,236.    Petitioner did not

report AMT liability in any amount.     In the notice of deficiency,

respondent did not adjust any of the above items reported by

petitioner.    Respondent’s sole adjustment was his determination

that petitioner was liable for the AMT in the amount of $2,301.

     We have reviewed respondent’s calculation of the AMT imposed

by section 55(a) and conclude that it is in accordance with the

provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.    This calculation, and

the underlying provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, can be

summarized as follows:
                                  - 3 -
     Taxable income reported by petitioner                         $21,569
     Refunded taxes included in gross income by petitioner          (1,824)
     Exemption deduction claimed by petitioner                       2,800
     Miscellaneous itemized deductions claimed by petitioner        27,057
     Itemized deduction for taxes paid claimed by petitioner         5,445
     Alternative minimum taxable income under sec. 55(b)(2)1        55,047
     Exemption amount pursuant to sec. 55(d)(1)(B)                 (33,750)
     Taxable excess under sec. 55(b)(1)(A)(ii)                      21,297
     Tentative minimum tax under sec. 55(b)(1)(A)(i) (in this
           case equal to 26% of the taxable excess)                  5,537
     Regular tax under sec. 55(c)(1) as reported by petitioner      (3,236)
     AMT liability under sec. 55(a)                                  2,301
           1
             The adjustments to taxable income required in this case to
     calculate alternative minimum taxable income are found, respectively, in
     sec. 56(b)(1)(D) and (E) and (A)(i) and (ii).

There are no facts relevant to this calculation other than those

underlying the items that petitioner himself reported on his tax

return.   Thus, there are no disputed relevant facts.

     Petitioner has set forth various arguments as to why he

should not be liable for the AMT.       In these arguments, he calls

into question the integrity and fairness of this Court,1 and he

makes various generalized assertions that respondent and the IRS

acted inappropriately, both with respect to him and with respect



     1
      For example, petitioner asserts that respondent and the
Court have engaged in improper ex parte communications in a
collusive effort to undermine petitioner’s case. Petitioner’s
primary support for this argument lies in two letters which
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Appeals officers sent to
petitioner. The first letter notified petitioner that the IRS
Appeals Office was reviewing his case, and the second letter
requested that petitioner settle the case by signing a stipulated
decision document. Because the letters were sent to petitioner
after he filed the petition in this case (and because the second
letter was dated on the same date as the Court’s Notice Setting
Case For Trial), petitioner interprets these letters to indicate
the existence of ex parte communications. However, we find
nothing in the letters suggesting ex parte communications; the
letters merely represent a proper attempt by the IRS Appeals
Office to resolve this case before trial.
                                - 4 -

to society as a whole.    We find these and the rest of

petitioner’s arguments to be unfounded and frivolous.

Petitioner’s legal arguments do little more than recite law or

legal principle which is irrelevant, taken completely out of

context, or otherwise misapplied.    “We perceive no need to refute

these arguments with somber reasoning and copious citation of

precedent; to do so might suggest that these arguments have some

colorable merit.”    Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417, 1417

(5th Cir. 1984).    Furthermore, many of petitioner’s arguments

advocate amendment or repeal of the AMT.    This Court is not the

proper place for these arguments.    The function of this Court is

to accurately and justly apply the laws as they were written by

Congress.

     Nevertheless, we briefly address one aspect of petitioner’s

arguments.   Throughout the trial and in petitioner’s various

documents filed in this Court, including his brief, petitioner

focuses on his inability to conduct discovery in this case.

Petitioner misunderstands the nature of discovery.    The purpose

of discovery in this Court is to ascertain facts which have a

direct bearing on the issues before the Court, not to conduct a

“fishing expedition”.    Estate of Woodard v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.

457, 459-460 (1975).    There are no factual disputes in the case

at hand--respondent merely calculated petitioner’s AMT liability

under the relevant statutes using information which petitioner
                               - 5 -

himself provided.   It is therefore the Court’s responsibility to

apply the law to the undisputed facts in order to ascertain

petitioner’s correct tax liability.    Penn-Field Indus., Inc. v.

Commissioner, 74 T.C. 720, 722 (1980).    We have done so and, as

discussed above, have concluded that respondent’s determination

is correct under the law.

     Section 6673(a)(1) gives this Court the discretion to

require a taxpayer to pay to the United States a penalty not in

excess of $25,000 where it appears that proceedings before the

Court have been instituted or maintained by the taxpayer

primarily for delay, or that the taxpayer’s position is frivolous

or groundless.   Petitioner has advanced only frivolous arguments

and groundless assertions in this case.   Furthermore, this is the

second case petitioner has brought in this Court concerning the

application of the AMT provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.

In Moore v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-196, we upheld

respondent’s determination that petitioner was liable for the AMT

in a situation nearly identical to the present case.   Petitioner

has made no attempt to distinguish the two cases.   After the

trial of the present case, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit affirmed the decision of this Court in petitioner’s prior

case, stating:

          We further conclude that Moore’s arguments relating to
     discovery and recusal of the tax court judge are without
     merit. First, the determination of whether Moore is liable
     for payment of an AMT is a legal question that is not
                                 - 6 -

     dependent upon any facts. Therefore, discovery of
     unspecified facts allegedly in possession of the
     Commissioner is simply unnecessary in this case. Second,
     Moore offers no facts or evidence to establish that the
     impartiality of the tax court judge might reasonably be
     questioned. Moore’s subjective beliefs and the tax court’s
     adverse rulings in his case are insufficient to demonstrate
     that the tax court judge was biased and prejudiced against
     him. * * *

Moore v. Commissioner, 66 Fed. Appx. 625, 626 (6th Cir. 2003).

     In part because petitioner’s appeal was not decided before

the present case went to trial, we decline to require petitioner

to pay a penalty under section 6673(a)(1) at this time.

Nevertheless, the imposition of such a penalty remains within the

discretion of this Court if petitioner continues to advance

frivolous arguments which waste limited judicial and

administrative resources.

     To reflect the foregoing,


                                              Decision will be entered

                                         for respondent.
