UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DOONEY & BOURKE, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

YONG HEE LEE;OK JA LEE; WAN
LEE,
Defendants-Appellants,
                                                                  No. 98-1544
and

D. B. TRADING CORPORATION; KIM
ALLISON; CHONG MIZE; IN SUK
ROCHA; KYONG SUN WATERS; JANE
DOE; JOHN DOE,
Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville.
Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-96-2918-20-6, CA-96-2239-20-6)

Submitted: November 17, 1998

Decided: December 17, 1998

Before WILKINS, LUTTIG, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Yong Hee Lee, Ok Ja Lee, Wan Lee, Appellants Pro Se. Oscar Wil-
liam Bannister, Jr., HILL, WYATT & BANNISTER, LLP, Green-
ville, South Carolina; Cort Flint, Jr., Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellants Yong Hee Lee, Ok Ja Lee, and Wan Lee appeal from
the district court's judgment, after a jury trial, awarding Dooney &
Bourke, Inc., damages due to trademark infringements. For the rea-
sons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

The Lees raise two nonmeritorious claims on appeal. First, we find
no support in the record that Dooney & Bourke transacts business in
the state of South Carolina such that it would be required to obtain
a certificate of authority. See S.C. Code Ann. § 33-15-102(a) (Law.
Co-op. 1990) (South Carolina's "door-closing statute" prohibits com-
panies who transact business without a certificate of authority from
filing suit in a S.C. court). In addition, even if § 33-15-102(a) is appli-
cable to Dooney & Bourke (which we do not find), the Lees have pro-
vided no authority for the proposition that a South Carolina statute
may bar a federal court action based upon federal question jurisdic-
tion. Rather, § 33-15-102(a) has only been used to bar actions based
on state law. See Chet Adams Co. v. James F. Pedersen Co., 413
S.E.2d 827 (S.C. 1992); Cost of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Shaw, 357 S.E.2d
20 (S.C. 1987); cf. Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20
(1974) (holding that a Mississippi door-closing statute may not
impede a diversity action concerning interstate or foreign commerce
brought in a federal court). Second, the Lees' argument that the dis-
trict court lacked personal jurisdiction over them fails because they
voluntarily appeared before the court and testified at the trial. See
Maybin v. Northside Correctional Ctr., 891 F.2d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir.
1989) (holding that the issue of personal jurisdiction is waived unless
the party appears before the court solely to contest such jurisdiction).

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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dis-
pense with oral argument as the facts and legal contentions have been
adequately presented before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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