UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BENJAMIN N. EARLY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                                    No. 96-2830
THE AEROSPACE CORPORATION;
RONALD K. SABLE; VINCENT C.
BOLES,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Albert V. Bryan, Jr., Senior District Judge.
(CA-96-548-A)

Submitted: February 10, 1998

Decided: February 26, 1998

Before WIDENER, ERVIN, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Patricia Ann Smith, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas
Cawley, Kimberly A. Newman, HUNTON & WILLIAMS, Washing-
ton, D.C.; Linda M. Lawson, Patricia A. Ellis, Brian M. Holbrook,
MESERVE, MUMPER & HUGHES, Los Angeles, California, for
Appellees.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Benjamin N. Early appeals from the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Defendants in his employment discrim-
ination action alleging racial discrimination and retaliation in
violation of Title VII, and wrongful discharge in violation of Virginia
public policy. Because we find no reversible error, we affirm.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See Henson v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 61 F.3d 270, 274 (4th Cir. 1995). If there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact, the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Early first claims
that he was subject to different disciplinary standards and eventually
terminated on account of his race. To establish a prima facie case for
such a claim, Early must show that: (1) he is a member of a class pro-
tected by Title VII; (2) the prohibited conduct in which he engaged
was comparable in seriousness to misconduct of employees outside
the protected class; and (3) the disciplinary measures enforced against
him were more severe than those enforced against other employees.
See Cook v. CSX Transp. Corp., 988 F.2d 507, 511 (4th Cir. 1993).
A plaintiff need not present comparatives with precisely the same
alleged employment problems. Rather, he need only present problems
of "comparable seriousness." See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 (1976). Although Early alleges that others
engaged in similar conduct and possessed similar deficiencies and
were not disciplined, he points to no other employee with a cumula-
tive comparable history of employment problems. Accordingly we
conclude that this claim fails.*
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*Early argues that the above prima facie case was inappropriately
applied to his factual situation and asserts that the court should instead
have asked: (1) whether he was a member of a protected class; (2)
whether he was subject to an adverse employment action; (3) whether he

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Early next asserts that he was terminated in retaliation for his filing
a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Even if Early established
a prima facie case of retaliation in violation of Title VII, we find that
he has failed to demonstrate that his employer's legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reasons for its actions were pretext for actual retaliatory
motives. Accordingly, we find summary judgment was properly
granted on both Title VII claims.

Turning to the state wrongful discharge claim, Early argues that his
claim arises under the common law of Virginia as espoused in
Lockhart v. Commonwealth Education Systems Corp., 439 S.E.2d 328
(Va. 1994), and not under the Virginia Human Rights Act as stated
by the district court. In 1995, however, the Act was amended to pro-
vide for private causes of action in specifically enumerated circum-
stances not present in this case. This amendment abrogated common
law causes of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public pol-
icy. See Doss v. Jamco, Inc., 492 S.E.2d 441, 447 (Va. 1997).
Accordingly, we conclude that summary judgment was properly
granted.

We therefore affirm the district court's order. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
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was performing his job at a level that met his employer's expectations;
and (4) whether his functions were assumed by someone outside the pro-
tected class. We find that even if Early could establish this prima facie
case, he is unable to demonstrate that his employer's proffered legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the disputed actions are pretext for
unlawful race discrimination.

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