
USCA1 Opinion

	




        July 5, 1996            [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT                                 ____________________        No. 95-1960        No. 95-2018                             MARC E. WILDER, II, ET AL.,                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,                                          v.                              DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION,                                    JOHN MARSHALL,                                Defendants, Appellees.                                 ____________________                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS                   [Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]                                              ___________________                                 ____________________                                        Before                                Torruella, Chief Judge,                                           ___________                            Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges.                                           ______________                                 ____________________            Marc E. Wilder, II and Russell J. Carey on brief pro se.            __________________     ________________            Nancy  Ankers  White,  Special  Assistant  Attorney  General,  and            ____________________        Margaret  Melville, Counsel,  Department of  Correction, on  brief for        __________________        appellees.                                 ____________________                                 ____________________                 Per  Curiam.     Prior  to   its  repeal   in  1994,   a                 ___________            Massachusetts  statute providing for  the award  of good-time            credits to state prisoners specifically withheld such credits            from  inmates  who  had  been  convicted  of  enumerated  sex            offenses.   See Mass.  Gen. L., ch.  127,   129.   Plaintiffs                        ___            here, a group of prisoners serving sentences for  sex crimes,            have brought  an action  under 42  U.S.C.   1983  challenging            this statutory exclusion on various  constitutional grounds.1                                                                        1            The  lower court rejected each of their claims at the summary            judgment stage.  On  the arguendo assumption that plaintiffs'                                     ________            contentions are cognizable  in a civil-rights  action (rather            than a habeas corpus proceeding), we summarily affirm for the            reasons recited by the magistrate-judge in his June 23,  1995            report.  We add only the following.                 Underlying   several  of   plaintiffs'  claims   is  the            assertion  that their inability  to obtain  good-time credits            constitutes a separate "punishment" apart from that  incurred            at sentencing.   This is  mistaken.  The  statutory exclusion            was enacted in 1965,  see Amado v. Superintendent,  366 Mass.                                  ___ _____    ______________            45, 48 (1974) (reviewing  statutory history)--long before any            of  the plaintiffs  had been  convicted.   Accordingly, their            ineligibility  for such credits can only be viewed as part of                                            ____________________               1   Of the  more than fifty  plaintiffs who  joined in the               1            action  below, only  some fourteen  are participating  in the            instant appeals.    We  assume  arguendo  that  each  of  the                                            ________            appellants has properly invoked this court's jurisdiction.                                           -2-            the punishment  imposed by the sentencing  court after trial.            Plaintiffs'  assertion that the  exclusion constitutes a bill            of  attainder fails  for this  reason (among  others).   See,                                                                     ___            e.g.,  United  States v.  Brown,  381 U.S.  437,  450 (1965).            ____   ______________     _____            Their  additional claim  that the  exclusion  violates double            jeopardy (a claim which we assume arguendo is properly before                                              ________            us) falters on  the same ground.  Even  if the exclusion were            viewed  as  a cumulative  punishment  for  the same  offense,            double  jeopardy would  not be  offended.  See,  e.g., United                                                       ___   ____  ______            States  v.  Centeno-Torres, 50  F.3d 84,  85 (1st  Cir.) (per            ______      ______________            curiam), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 208 (1995).                     ____________                 The allegation that the  exclusion violates due  process            proves  equally unavailing.   Plaintiffs  possess no  liberty            interest in  receiving good-time credits.   See, e.g., Sandin                                                        ___  ____  ______            v. Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2297 (1995); Riddle v. Mondragon,               ______                                ______    _________            83  F.3d 1197, 1206-07 (10th  Cir. 1996).   And the statutory            scheme found violative of substantive due process in Young v.                                                                 _____            Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744, 748-51 (W.D. Wash. 1995), a case on            ______            which plaintiffs rely, bears no resemblance to the one before            us.   Finally,  the  contention that  the exclusion  violates            equal  protection  runs into  a  wall  of caselaw  indicating            otherwise.   See, e.g., Riddle, 83 F.3d at 1207-08; Artway v.                         ___  ____  ______                      ______            Attorney General  of New  Jersey, 81  F.3d 1235,  1267-68 (3d            ________________________________            Cir. 1996);  Lustgarden v. Gunter,  966 F.2d  552, 555  (10th                         __________    ______                                         -3-            Cir.), cert. denied, 506  U.S. 1008 (1992); Amado,  366 Mass.                   ____________                         _____            at 46-51.                 Affirmed.  See Loc. R. 27.1.                 ____________________________                                         -4-
