UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                      No. 99-4248

SEAN DARRELL JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.
William L. Osteen, District Judge.
(CR-98-138)

Submitted: December 22, 1999

Decided: February 8, 2000

Before MICHAEL, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Michael W. Patrick, HAYWOOD, DENNY & MILLER, L.L.P., Dur-
ham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Walter C. Holton, Jr., United
States Attorney, Michael F. Joseph, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Sean Darrell Johnson pled guilty to one count of possession with
intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.
§ 841(a)(1) (West 1999). On appeal, Johnson contends that the Gov-
ernment violated 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (1994), by offering leniency
and immunity to cooperating witnesses in exchange for their testi-
mony. Johnson also contends that the court erred in its determination
of the amount of crack cocaine attributed to him for sentencing pur-
poses and by enhancing his base offense level for possession of a dan-
gerous weapon. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Johnson's contention regarding § 201(c)(2) has been rejected by
this court and is without merit. See United States v. Richardson, 195
F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 98-4139), cert. denied, 2000 WL 12507
(U.S. Jan. 10, 2000) (No. 99-7186); United States v. Feurtado, 191
F.3d 420, 425 (4th Cir. 1999).

A district court's factual finding of the relevant quantity of drugs
at sentencing is reviewed for clear error. See United States v.
Fletcher, 74 F.3d 49, 55 (4th Cir. 1996). Because quantity is not a
substantive element of the offense, but is merely a sentencing factor,
the government need only prove the quantity by a preponderance of
the evidence. See United States v. Goff, 907 F.2d 1441, 1444 (4th Cir.
1990). We find that the court did not err in relying on the testimony
of the three cooperating witnesses. See United States v. Sampson, 140
F.3d 585, 592 (4th Cir. 1998) (court may rely on the testimony of lay
witnesses to establish drug quantity); United States v. Lamarr, 75
F.3d 964, 973 (4th Cir. 1996) (uncorroborated co-conspirator's testi-
mony lent support to the court's findings). In addition, this court
affords great deference to the sentencing court's credibility findings.
See United States v. D'Anjou, 16 F.3d 604, 614 (4th Cir. 1994). We
find that the court did not clearly err.

We also find that the district court did not err by enhancing John-
son's base offense level for possession of a dangerous weapon. See
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b) (1998). This enhance-
ment "should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly

                    2
improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense." USSG
§ 2D1.1, comment. (n.3).

In the instant appeal, we find that the two level enhancement was
proper for both the guns found at the co-conspirator's home in close
proximity to the drugs and the gun seized at Johnson's home. There
was sufficient evidence establishing that Johnson knew that his co-
conspirator possessed dangerous weapons connected with the conspir-
acy. See United States v. Hunter, 19 F.3d 895, 896 (4th Cir. 1994).
There was also sufficient evidence showing that the gun seized at
Johnson's home was connected with his drug dealings.

Accordingly, we affirm Johnson's conviction and sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argu-
ment would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

                    3
