                                  IN THE
                          TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                                 No. 10-14-00287-CR

CHRISTOPHER WAYNE DOUGLAS,
                                                             Appellant
v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                                             Appellee



                           From the 82nd District Court
                             Robertson County, Texas
                          Trial Court No. 13-10-19777-CR


                          MEMORANDUM OPINION


       Appellant   Christopher    W. Douglas was charged by             indictment    with

assault/family (“dating relationship”) violence by impeding the normal breathing or

blood circulation of the victim by applying pressure to the victim’s throat or neck. A jury

found him guilty, and the trial court assessed an eight-year prison sentence. This appeal

ensued. We will affirm.

       In accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493

(1967), Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed a brief and motion to
withdraw, stating that his review of the record yielded no grounds of error upon which

an appeal can be predicated. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements of Anders; it presents

a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance

on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas,

an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds

none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set

out pertinent legal authorities.”); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App.

1991).

         In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.]

1978), Appellant’s counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority,

there is no reversible error in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has informed us that he

has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal; (2)

served a copy of the brief and counsel’s motion to withdraw on Appellant; and (3)

provided Appellant with a copy of the record and informed him of his right to file a pro

se response. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3;

see also Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. Appellant did not file a pro se response.

         Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80, 109 S.Ct. 346, 349-50, 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record

and counsel’s brief and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See

Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of

Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs

Douglas v. State                                                                         Page 2
and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the

requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

        In accordance with Anders, Appellant’s attorney has asked for permission to

withdraw as counsel for Appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S.Ct. at 1400; see also

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (quoting Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779-80 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must

withdraw from representing the appellant.                  To withdraw from representation, the

appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the

appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”)). We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

Within five days of the date of this opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this

opinion and this Court’s judgment to Appellant and to advise him of his right to file a

petition for discretionary review.1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also Schulman, 252 S.W.3d

at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).




                                                          REX D. DAVIS
                                                          Justice



1New appellate counsel will not be appointed for Appellant. Should Appellant wish to seek further review
of this case by the Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for
discretionary review or must file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary
review must be filed within thirty days from the date of this opinion or from the date the last timely motion
for rehearing was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review
must be filed with the Clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. at R. 68.3. Any petition for
discretionary review should comply with the requirements of rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure. See id. at R. 68.4; see also Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.22.

Douglas v. State                                                                                      Page 3
Before Chief Justice Gray,
       Justice Davis, and
       Justice Scoggins
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed May 21, 2015
Do not publish
[CR25]




Douglas v. State                           Page 4
