                          T.C. Memo. 2013-263



                    UNITED STATES TAX COURT



ESTATE OF DIANE TANENBLATT, DECEASED, ROY L. GREENBAUM,
           PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, Petitioner v.
      COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



  Docket No. 26176-10.                          Filed November 18, 2013.



         This is an estate tax valuation case in which R has increased
  the value of an interest in an LLC included in the value of the gross
  estate. The parties have stipulated copies of the pleadings. In the
  petition, P avers that he has obtained a new appraisal, "a copy of
  which" is attached to the petition. R admits only that a new appraisal
  is attached to the petition. P argues that the appraisal was admitted in
  evidence by stipulation and must be considered by us as expert
  testimony notwithstanding P's failure to qualify the author of the
  appraisal as an expert pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 702 or to satisfy Rule
  143(g), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, addressing expert
  witness reports, and the provisions of our standing pretrial order
  addressing expert testimony.

         Held: We exclude the appraisal from evidence for failure of P
  to satisfy the preconditions to our receiving expert testimony.
                                         -2-

[*2]         Held, further, the value of the interest in the LLC is
       determined.



       William Jay Palmer and Peter A. Lagonowicz, for petitioner.

       Brian A. Pfeifer and William Lee Blagg, for respondent.



             MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION


       HALPERN, Judge: By notice of deficiency (notice), respondent determined

a deficiency of $309,547 in Federal estate tax. The only issue for decision is the

fair market value of a 16.667% interest (subject interest) in a New York limited

liability company, 37-41 East 18th Street Realty Co., LLC (LLC), included in the

value of Diane Tanenblatt's (decedent's) gross estate.

       Unless otherwise stated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code

in effect for the date of decedent's death, and all Rule references are to the Tax

Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

       Petitioner bears the burden of proof.
                                          -3-

[*3]                            FINDINGS OF FACT

Background

       Decedent died testate on February 23, 2007 (date of death). When he filed

the petition, petitioner resided in Pennsylvania.

Estate Tax Return

       Petitioner timely filed Form 706, United States Estate (and Generation-

Skipping Transfer) Tax Return, electing thereon alternate valuation as provided

for in section 2032. Schedule G, Transfers During Decedent's Life, attached to the

Form 706, includes the subject interest, reporting the interest to be worth

$1,788,000 both on the date of decedent's death and on August 23, 2007, the

alternate valuation date (valuation date). Petitioner described the subject interest

on Schedule G as a "16.67 PER CENT MEMBERSHIP INTEREST IN [the

LLC]". Petitioner included the subject interest on Schedule G because decedent

had before her death transferred the subject interest in trust to herself, as trustee

(trust), retaining the power to revoke that transfer, which power she possessed at

her death.

       Petitioner determined the $1,788,000 that he reported on the Schedule G as

the value of the subject interest from an appraisal prepared for him by

Management Planning, Inc. (MPI appraisal). The MPI appraisal was based in part
                                        -4-

[*4] on an appraisal of the LLC's principal asset, a commercial building at 37-41

East 18th Street, New York, New York (building), prepared by individuals at

Jacques O. Tuchler & Associates (building appraisal). To determine the value of

the building, the building appraisal took two approaches: a sales comparison

approach, which indicated a value for the building of $22,800,000, and an income

capitalization approach, which indicated a value for the building of $19,960,000.

Assigning no weight to the sales comparison approach, the building appraisal

concluded on the basis of the income approach that the value of the building on

the date of death was $19,960,000. The MPI appraisal added to the value

conclusion of the building appraisal the amount of the LLC's cash and other

current assets ($851,337), subtracted the LLC's liabilities ($183,116), and

concluded that the value (net asset value) of the LLC on the date of death was

$20,628,221. The MPI appraisal then applied to that net asset value, sequentially,

discounts of 20% for lack of control and of 35% for lack of marketability, to reach

a value conclusion of $1,788,000 for the fair market value of the subject interest.

Examination

      Respondent examined the Form 706 and determined that petitioner had

underreported the fair market value of the subject interest. Respondent's

explanation of his adjustment increasing the reported fair market value of the
                                         -5-

[*5] subject interest shows that he accepted MPI's calculation of the net asset

value of the LLC ($20,628,221) as a starting point for determining the value of the

interest, but, rather than allowing 20% and 35% discounts for lack of control and

lack of marketability, respectively, he allowed discounts of only 10% and 20%.

On the basis of those 10% and 20% discounts, he determined that the fair market

value of the subject interest on the valuation date was $2,475,882, rather than

$1,788,000, as reported by petitioner, which increased the taxable estate by

$687,882. On the basis of that increase, respondent determined the aforesaid

deficiency in estate tax of $309,547.

Petition

      Petitioner timely petitioned for redetermination of the deficiency, assigning

error to the notice, averring on the basis of an appraisal by Dr. Laura J. Tindall

(Tindall appraisal) that the true value of the subject interest for estate tax purposes

was $1,037,796, and praying that we redetermine a deficiency of zero and an

overpayment of estate tax entitling him to a refund. Petitioner attached a copy of

the Tindall appraisal to the petition.

Pertinent Facts With Respect to the Building and the LLC

      The building is a 10-story mezzanine, cellar and subcellar, concrete/steel/

masonry, semi-fireproof class C elevator loft building with office space and grade
                                        -6-

[*6] level retail located in the Midtown South/Ladies Mile sector of Manhattan.

The building has a gross building area of approximately 67,050 square feet above

grade and a gross rentable area of 77,725 square feet. The building was fully

leased on the valuation date.

      An operating agreement (operating agreement) governs operation of the

LLC. The term "member" is defined in the operating agreement as one who has

signed the operating agreement or who, thereafter, becomes a party to the

agreement. Members participate in management and control of the LLC. The

term "membership interest" is defined as the member's percentage interest in the

LLC's capital. Membership of the LLC is divided among three family groups, and

transfers of membership interests outside of those groups are restricted. A

nonfamily member transferee cannot become a member of the LLC without the

unanimous approval of all of the members. A nonfamily member transferee who

receives a membership interest but who does not become a member is entitled to

receive the distributions and allocations of profits and losses appurtenant to that

membership interest but has no right to participate in management and control of

the LLC. The death of a member dissolves the LLC unless it is continued by

majority vote.
                                         -7-

[*7] Petitioner was a member of one of the family groups when she transferred

the subject interest to the trust. She was not a member of the LLC on the date of

death. On the date of death, the trust was a member of the LLC, and it owned the

subject interest. Following decedent's death, the trust continued to own the subject

interest.

Testimony With Respect to Value

       At trial, respondent offered John A. Thomson as an expert in business

valuation. Mr. Thomson is vice president and managing director of the Long

Beach, California, office of Klaris, Thomson & Schroeder, Inc. He is also an

accredited senior appraiser of the American Society of Appraisers, is a member of

the Appraisal Institute, and has directed and conducted numerous valuation

appraisals of various business enterprises. The Court accepted Mr. Thomson as a

business valuation expert and received his written report into evidence as his

direct testimony as to the value of the subject interest.

       Mr. Thomson valued the subject interest as of the valuation date. Because

he considered the LLC to function primarily as a real estate holding company, he

excluded the market and income approaches to valuation, and he relied exclusively

on a cost approach; i.e., what he described as "the discounted net asset value

approach." He described that approach as follows:
                                         -8-

[*8] As applied to the valuation of a nonmarketable, minority equity
     interest, the cost approach calls for a summation of the fair market
     value of the entity's assets and a reduction of that aggregate by the
     entity's total liabilities, with the resulting value then being multiplied
     by the subject ownership percentage to arrive at the net asset value
     (NAV) of the interest. To arrive at the estimated fair market value of
     the interest[,] the indicated net asset value is reduced by appropriate
     valuation discounts.

Mr. Thomson accepted $20,628,221 as the LLC's net asset value, on the basis of

LLC's 2006 partnership tax return and the building appraisal. He determined that

discounts of 10% and 26% for lack of control and lack of marketability,

respectively, were appropriate. Applying these discounts to the subject interest,

Mr. Thomson concluded that the rounded fair market value was $2,303,000.

                                      OPINION

I.    Introduction

      As stated supra, the only issue we must decide is the fair market value of the

subject interest on the valuation date. Respondent initially determined that the fair

market value of the subject interest on the valuation date was $2,475,882, but,

now, on the basis of Mr. Thomson's expert testimony, he concedes (and we accept)

that the fair market value of the subject interest on the valuation date was no

greater than $2,303,000. Petitioner argues that the fair market value of the subject

interest on the valuation date was less; indeed, not greater than the $1,037,796
                                         -9-

[*9] determined in the Tindall appraisal. We conclude that on the valuation date,

the fair market value of the subject interest was $2,303,000, and we redetermine

the deficiency accordingly.

II.   Evidentiary Issues

      A.     Introduction

      Before proceeding to the merits of the case, we must dispose of an

evidentiary issue raised by petitioner, viz, whether the Tindall appraisal is in

evidence. We conclude that it is not.

      B.     Background

      Among petitioner's averments in the petition, in support of his claim that, on

the Form 706, he overvalued the subject interest (and is entitled to a refund of tax),

is the following (averment):

             The Petitioner's initial appraiser in this case also failed to
      utilize the proper method of valuation and failed to properly classify
      the Interest. Consequently, Petitioner has obtained a new appraisal
      (the "Appraisal"), a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B,"
      which properly characterizes the Interest as an assignee interest, gives
      the proper weight to both the income approach and the net asset value
      approach, and applies the appropriate applicable discounts.

Respondent answered the averment: "Admits that a new appraisal is attached to

the petition as Exhibit B. Denies for lack of sufficient information that Petitioner

obtained the new appraisal that is attached to the petition. Denies the remaining
                                         - 10 -

[*10] allegations." The new appraisal that the parties are referring to is what we

have styled (and shall continue to refer to) as the Tindall appraisal.

      Before trial, petitioner untimely moved to compel respondent to stipulate

either the Tindall appraisal or, alternatively, the entire petition (including the

attached Tindall appraisal). Petitioner alternatively moved to sanction respondent

for failing to so stipulate. We denied petitioner's pretrial motions and proceeded

to hold trial. The parties have stipulated copies of the petition and the answer,

which are attachments to the stipulation, and have stipulated separately the text of

the averment. They did so subject to the caveat that the stipulations "show the

parties' pleadings in this case and are not admitted in evidence." Petitioner asks

that we reconsider our prior rulings with respect to the Tindall appraisal or

otherwise allow it into evidence and consider it expert testimony.

      Petitioner's path for attempting to introduce the Tindall appraisal into

evidence as expert testimony is, to say the least, unusual. Generally, a party

obtains the testimony of an expert witness by calling that witness to testify. See

Rule 143(g)(1). Pursuant to that Rule, the expert witness must prepare a written

report, which is marked as an exhibit and, after having been identified by the

witness and adopted by him, received into evidence as his direct testimony unless

the Court determines that the witness is not qualified as an expert. The Rule
                                         - 11 -

[*11] further provides that, not less than 30 days before the call of the trial

calendar on which a case appears, a party calling an expert witness shall serve on

each other party and submit to the Court a copy of the expert's report. Finally, the

Rule also provides that, generally, we will exclude an expert witness' testimony

altogether for failure to comply with the Rule. Those requirements are echoed in

our standing pretrial order, which was served on petitioner.

      Petitioner's chosen means for seeking to introduce the Tindall appraisal into

evidence is perhaps explained by a conversation we had with his counsel at the

hearing during which we considered petitioner's pretrial motions along with

respondent's motion in limine to exclude the Tindall appraisal on various grounds,

including that petitioner had not submitted and served a copy of the report as

required by Rule 143(g)(1) and our standing pretrial order. Petitioner had filed no

response to respondent's motion in limine, and, at the hearing, in response to the

Court's question as to whether petitioner was just relying on his own motions (with

respect to stipulating the Tindall appraisal into evidence), petitioner's counsel

candidly responded: "Probably. Your honor, because right now my client's in a

fee dispute with the appraiser, so right now I cannot get the appraiser to come in

and testify." Apparently, counsel's time is less dear than was Dr. Tindall's.
                                         - 12 -

[*12] C.     Discussion

             1.     Tax Court Rules

      The Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure govern all proceedings and

cases before the Court. See Rule 2(a). Pleadings are governed by Rules 30

through 41; stipulations for trial are governed by Rule 91, and evidentiary matters

are addressed by Rule 143. In general, the Court conducts trials in accordance

with the rules of evidence for trials without a jury in the U.S. District Court for the

District of Columbia, and, accordingly, we follow the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Sec. 7453; Rule 143(a); Clough v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 183, 188 (2002).

      In pertinent part, Rule 143(c) provides: "Ex parte affidavits or declarations,

statements in briefs, and unadmitted allegations in pleadings do not constitute

evidence." (Emphasis added.) In answering the averment, respondent admitted

only that a new appraisal (the Tindall appraisal) was attached to the petition. He

denied the claims that petitioner's initial appraiser erred, that petitioner obtained a

new appraisal, and that the new appraisal properly characterized the subject

interest and otherwise properly valued it.

      Rule 91(a)(1) provides:

      The parties are required to stipulate, to the fullest extent to which
      complete or qualified agreement can or fairly should be reached, all
      matters not privileged which are relevant to the pending case,
                                        - 13 -

[*13] regardless of whether such matters involve fact or opinion or the
      application of law to fact. Included in matters required to be
      stipulated are all facts, all documents and papers or contents or
      aspects thereof, and all evidence which fairly should not be in
      dispute. * * * Documents or papers or other exhibits annexed to or
      filed with the stipulation shall be considered to be part of the
      stipulation.

      Rule 91(c) governs the filing of stipulations, and it provides: "Executed

stipulations prepared pursuant to this Rule, and related exhibits, shall be filed by

the parties at or before commencement of the trial of the case, unless the Court in

the particular case shall otherwise specify. A stipulation when filed need not be

offered formally to be considered in evidence." (Emphasis added.)

             2.     Petitioner's Argument

      As best we understand petitioner's argument for our receiving the Tindall

appraisal into evidence as expert testimony, it is as follows. Respondent cannot

fairly dispute the authenticity of the petition, including the attached Tindall

appraisal. Respondent must therefore stipulate the authenticity of the copy of the

petition presented by petitioner. The authenticity of the petition having been

stipulated, it (including the Tindall appraisal) is in evidence, subject to any

reservation noted as to materiality or relevance. Because the Tindall appraisal is

in evidence, the requirements governing the admission of expert testimony found

in Rule 143(g) and our standing pretrial order are beside the point.
                                        - 14 -

[*14] The following two sentences from petitioner's answering brief capture his

argument (although they refer to another appraisal, the MPI appraisal, which is

attached to the Form 706):

              Respondent states that "this Court will not admit an appraisal
      report as evidence of fair market value unless the author of the expert
      [sic] testifies at trial and is available for cross examination." (Resp.
      Br., p. 44.) This is true, but the MPI Appraisal was admitted in
      evidence by stipulation so that it was not necessary to have it
      admitted by the Court through Rule 143, which also should only
      apply if Petitioner called the appraiser to testify, which he did not.

      Clearly, petitioner relies on the Tindall appraisal for Dr. Tindall's expert

opinion. On the basis of appraisal, he proposes that we find the following fact:

"The Tindall Appraisal determined that the proper weight in valuing the LLC to be

given to the NAV and the historical distributions of the LLC is 20% and 80%,

respectively." He argues:

             The Tindall Appraisal explains why Petitioner disavows those
      portions of the 706 by explaining why the value of the Decedent's
      interest should be $1,037,796.00 because the decedent's interest to be
      valued is an assignee interest instead of membership interest, and
      because the LLC is, at least, in part an operating company instead of a
      holding company. The Tindall Appraisal not only explains why
      Petitioner disavows these admissions in the 706 and the MPI
      Appraisal but also places the admissions in the 706 in proper context.
      The Tindal Appraisal also explains how the values of the LLC and the
      Decedent's interest are substantially understated [sic] in the 706. The
      basis for disavowing the admissions cannot be fully and impartially
      understood without admitting the Tindall Appraisal in evidence under
      Federal Rule of Evidence 106.
                                        - 15 -

[*15]         3.    Federal Rules of Evidence

        Rule 701 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a lay witness may

not offer an opinion based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.

Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits expert testimony: "A witness

who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise". Whether a

particular witness possesses the necessary qualifications is a question of fact,

which is for the court to decide, before the witness' testimony is received. See

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 569 (1993).1 The procedures

for presenting expert testimony to the Tax Court are, as described supra, set forth

in Rule 143(g) and in our standing pretrial order. Petitioner misreads our Rules if

he thinks that Rule 91, governing stipulations for trial, can be used to end-run our

procedural rules with respect to expert testimony or to prevent this Court from

exercising its gatekeeper function with respect to expert testimony.


        1
       In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme
Court charged trial judges with the responsibility of acting as gatekeepers to
exclude unreliable expert testimony, and the Court in Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), clarified that that gatekeeper function applies to
all expert testimony, not just testimony based in science. Fed. R. Evid. 702 was
amended in 2000 in response to Daubert and the many cases applying it, including
Kumho. See Fed. R. Evid. 702 advisory committee's note (2000 amendment), 28
U.S.C. app. at 893-896 (2000).
                                          - 16 -

[*16]         4.    Stipulation Process

        The stipulation process is "the bedrock of Tax Court practice" and is

designed "as an aid to the more expeditious trial of cases as well as for settlement

purposes." Branerton Corp. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 691, 692 (1974). The

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not contain a comparable rule. Initially, our

Rules, i.e., the Rules of our predecessor, the United States Board of Tax Appeals,

contemplated only stipulations of facts. See Rule 30, 1 B.T.A. 1291.2 Now the

stipulation process has broad scope and is not confined to the stipulation of facts

or evidence. See Rule 91(a) note, 60 T.C. 1118; Willamette Indus., Inc. v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1995-150, aff'd, 149 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1998).

Often, for instance, the parties in a case before the Tax Court will stipulate settled

issues. See, e.g., Koons v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-94, at *2 ("Several

issues were settled by the parties as reflected in a stipulation of settled issues filed

on February 9, 2011."). Facts are stipulated and come into evidence without the

necessity of findings, see, e.g., Rule 91(c); Kensico Cemetery v. Commissioner, 35

B.T.A. 498 (1937), aff'd, 96 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1938), although often we will

explicitly find stipulated facts and incorporate them by reference into our findings,

        2
       Providing in relevant part: "The taxpayer and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue may, by stipulation in writing filed with the Board, or presented at the
hearing, agree upon any facts involved in the case."
                                        - 17 -

[*17] see, e.g., Martell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-115, at *2 ("Some of

the facts have been stipulated and are so found. The stipulation of facts is

incorporated herein by this reference."). Certainly documents and papers are to be

stipulated, and documents, papers or other exhibits annexed to or filed with it are

considered part of the stipulation. Rule 91(a). A paragraph in a stipulation

reciting that Exhibit X attached to the stipulation is an appraisal of Blackacre is

conclusive that it is. Likewise, a stipulation that attached Exhibit Y is a nonparty's

deposition is conclusive that it is. The authenticity of the documents is

established, and that fact need not be found. If filed, the stipulation need not be

offered into evidence. Rule 91(c). If offered by a party for the truth of the matters

asserted, however, and not adopted by the declarant testifying at the current trial or

hearing, both documents constitute hearsay, see Fed. R. Evid. 801, which may or

may not be admissible, see id. 802. Rule 91 does not require that a hearsay

objection be reserved in a stipulation, so were we to conclude that a deposition or

appraisal is in evidence merely on account of its being attached to a stipulation,

then a party's subsequent hearsay objection would be unavailing. Likewise, the

specification in Rule 143(c) that "unadmitted allegations in pleadings do not

constitute evidence" would have no force with respect to unadmitted averments in

a pleading identified in, and attached to, a stipulation. Certainly, that cannot be
                                         - 18 -

[*18] so. In Minnick v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-345, principally

involving the value of a conservation easement contributed to charity, the parties

executed a stipulation of facts stating that "all exhibits attached to the stipulation

'may be accepted as authentic' and 'are incorporated in this stipulation and made a

part hereof '." Id. at *18. The taxpayers objected to four stipulated exhibits,

appraisals of certain land, on the grounds that the exhibits were in substance

expert witness reports that had not been exchanged in accordance with Rule 143

and had not been exchanged 14 days before trial as required by our standing

pretrial order. We thought that the taxpayers' objection had merit, and, although

we admitted the four exhibits into evidence for other purposes, we declined to rely

on them to the extent they opined on the value of the conservation easement. Id. at

*20.3

        3
        Although we have on occasion said that exhibits attached to a stipulation
filed by the parties are in evidence or are part of the evidentiary record, the
circumstances of those statements must be taken into account. For example, in
Siegal v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1992-334, T.C.M. (RIA) para. 92,334, at 92-
1714 n.5, we said that tax returns attached to the parties' stipulation of facts
"become part of the evidentiary record when the stipulation is filed with the
Court." The taxpayers had reserved relevancy objections to the returns, which
were their only objections and which we had overruled. Id., T.C.M. (RIA) para.
92,334, at 92-1712 n.2, 92-1714 n.5. In Hamdi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1993-38, 1993 WL 20169, at *8 n.8, aff'd without published opinion, 23 F.3d 407
(6th Cir. 1994), quoting Rule 91(c), we said: "Under the Court's stipulation
procedures the parties executed stipulation and the exhibits attached thereto, when
                                                                         (continued...)
                                          - 19 -

[*19]         5.     The Tindall Appraisal

        Petitioner did not call Dr. Tindall as a witness but asks us to rely on her

report (which, under our Rules, would serve as her direct testimony) as her expert

opinion. Petitioner has neither qualified Dr. Tindall as an expert entitled pursuant

to rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence to give her opinion on technical

matters nor has he satisfied our procedural rules for expert testimony, found in

Rule 143(g) and in our standing pretrial order. In other words, petitioner has

failed to satisfy the preconditions for our receiving Dr. Tindall's opinion into




        3
        (...continued)
filed with the Court, 'need not be offered formerly to be considered in evidence.'"
(Emphasis added.) The stipulation contained few statements of fact beyond the
parties' stipulation that the various attached documents were submitted by the
taxpayer to the Internal Revenue Service. Id., 1993 WL 20169, at *1 n.1. The
Commissioner did not concede the probative value of the documents but "agreed
to this type of stipulation in an effort to place something before the Court." Id.
Evidently concluding that the parties' intent in stipulating the documents was to
put the documents in evidence, we nevertheless cautioned: "However, the fact
that these documents are considered 'in evidence' does not thereby endow them
with evidentiary weight and value they do not otherwise possess." Id. at *8 n.8.
In Warner v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1984-582, T.C.M. (P-H) para. 84,582, at
84-2350 n.2, we dismissed the taxpayer's posttrial contention that certain jointly
stipulated documents relied on by the Commissioner were not in the record. We
said that, although in the stipulation the taxpayer had expressly reserved the right
to object to the admissibility of the documents attached thereto, he had failed to
raise any objection at trial. We concluded: "Thus, the record in this case includes
all of the exhibits attached to the stipulation."
                                         - 20 -

[*20] evidence. Because her report (i.e., the Tindall appraisal) is not in evidence,

we may not consider her opinion.

       D.    Conclusion

       The Tindall appraisal is excluded.4

III.   Fair Market Value of Subject Interest

       A.    Introduction

       Petitioner called no witness to testify to the value of the subject interest on

the valuation date. Petitioner finds fault both with the MPI appraisal, on which he

relied in reporting the value of the subject interest on the Form 706, and on Mr.

Thomson's opinion as to the value of that property. He contends that there is

sufficient evidence in the record from which the Court could determine the fair

market value of the subject interest on the valuation date without relying on the

conclusions either in the MPI appraisal or of Mr. Thomson. He contends that that

value is less than the $1,788,000 he reported on the Form 706.

       4
        A different appraisal, the MPI appraisal, is attached to the Form 706, which
(including the MPI appraisal) is identified in the stipulation and attached as an
exhibit. The MPI appraisal is offered by neither party solely as expert testimony,
so that we do not exclude it, as we do the Tindall appraisal, for failing to satisfy
the relevant rules relating to expert testimony. We do not, however, rely on it as
expert testimony. See, e.g., Minnick v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-245, at
*20 (admitting into evidence but not relying on appraisals not conforming to Rule
143 to the extent they opined on the value of the conservation easements in
question).
                                         - 21 -

[*21] To determine the fair market value of the subject interest, each of (1) the

MPI appraisal, (2) respondent in explaining his adjustment to the value of the

subject interest in the notice, and (3) Mr. Thomson started with $20,628,221 as the

net asset value of the LLC. Each then made adjustments for lack of control and

for lack of marketability (and those adjustments are the only thing about which

they disagree). Petitioner first finds fault with the common starting point,

claiming that the value of the LLC should not have been defined exclusively by

reference to its net asset value (the excess of the value of its assets over its

liabilities): "[T]he LLC is at least in part an operating company that should be

valued giving some weight to the LLC['s] earnings and/or distributions."

Petitioner next finds fault with respondent's (and Mr. Thomson's) classification of

the subject interest as a membership interest in the LLC: "The Notice of

Deficiency erroneously classified the Decedent's interest in the LLC for valuation

purposes as a membership Interest. Such erroneous classification resulted in the

failure of the experts to reflect appropriately the * * * [limitations attending a

nonfamily member's interest] in determining the amount of the discounts for * * *

minority interest [status] and for lack of marketability." Finally, petitioner finds

fault generally with the amounts of Mr. Thomson's discounts.
                                          - 22 -

[*22] B.     Discussion

             1.     Member's Interest

                    a.     Introduction

      Addressing first the second fault petitioner ascribes to respondent and Mr.

Thomson's positions, we understand petitioner's argument to be that both

respondent and Mr. Thomson erred in (1) not classifying the subject interest as a

nonfamily member's interest (assignee's interest), and (2) failing to value the

subject interest as an assignee's interest under the willing buyer-willing seller

standard prescribed in section 20.2031-1(b), Estate Tax Regs. Specifically,

petitioner contends that, in applying the willing buyer-willing seller standard, the

hypothetical willing buyer must be assumed to be a nonfamily member, who

would, in effect, be purchasing an assignee's interest since he could not become a

member of the LLC without unanimous approval of all membership interests.

                    b.     Underlying Principles of Law

      Section 2001(a) imposes a tax "on the transfer of the taxable estate of every

decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United States." The value of the

taxable estate is derived from the value of the gross estate. See sec. 2051. Section

2033 broadly provides that the "value of the gross estate shall include the value of

all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his
                                         - 23 -

[*23] death." Sections 2034 through 2045 then explicitly mandate inclusion of

several more narrowly defined classes of assets.

      The value of the subject interest was included in the value of the gross

estate under section 2038(a), which includes in the value of a decedent's gross

estate the value of all interests in property transferred before death where, on the

date of death, the transfer was subject to change through the decedent's exercise of

a power to "alter, amend, revoke, or terminate the transfer."

      Generally, the value of an item of property included in the decedent's gross

estate is the fair market value of the item at the time of the decedent's death or, if

an election is made, on the alternate valuation date. See sec. 20.2031-1(b), Estate

Tax Regs. "The fair market value is the price at which the property would change

hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any

compulsion to buy or to sell and both having reasonable knowledge of relevant

facts." Id.

                    c.     Discussion

      We must determine whether respondent and Mr. Thomson erred in

classifying the subject interest as a member's interest rather than classifying it as

an assignee's interest. A member's interest is more valuable than an equivalent

percentage interest of an assignee because the member's interest can participate in
                                         - 24 -

[*24] management and control of the LLC. We think respondent and Mr.

Thomson did not err. Decedent was a member of the LLC when she transferred

the subject interest to the trust. We assume, therefore, that, until she made the

transfer, she enjoyed all of the benefits and was saddled with all of the burdens

attendant upon being a "member" of the LLC. The term "member's interest" (or

the term "membership interest", which the parties use, but which we do not,

because it is a term defined in the operating agreement to mean a member's

proportional interest in capital) is both a convenient and an accurate classification

for indicating that decedent's interest in the LLC was of the fullest kind; i.e., she

shared in management and control and did not merely share in profits and losses.

For the same reasons, the term is a convenient and accurate classification for the

subject interest in the hands of the trust, which also was a member of the LLC.

Moreover, there is no evidence that, on or before the valuation date, the trust

distributed, sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of the subject interest, so that,

possibly, on that date, it could more accurately be described as an assignee's

interest. Therefore, because the term "member's interest" conveniently and

accurately describes the rights inherent to a subject interest on the date decedent

transferred it, on the date she died, and on the valuation date, neither respondent
                                        - 25 -

[*25] nor Mr. Thomson erred in classifying it as such (or, in their terms,

classifying it as a "membership interest").

      The fair market value of the subject interest on the valuation date is

determined under the objective willing buyer-willing seller standard discussed

supra. The willing buyer and willing seller are purely hypothetical persons, and

their characteristics are not necessarily the same as the personal characteristics of

the actual seller or a particular buyer. E.g., Chapman Glen Ltd. v. Commissioner,

140 T.C. __ (May 28, 2013). Certainly, in applying the willing buyer-willing

seller standard to determine the value of the subject interest, it would be

appropriate to take into consideration limitations in the operating agreement on the

rights of a nonfamily member transferee to participate in control and management

of the LLC and limitations on the transferee's rights otherwise to be treated as a

member. Petitioner, however, seeks to collapse the two steps of the valuation

process--i.e., (1) identify the property to be valued and its nature and character,

and (2) objectively determine its value--into a single step. Petitioner would

expand section 20.2031-1(b), Estate Tax Regs., beyond its intended scope by

using the provision to redefine the character of the subject interest as an assignee's

interest. See Kerr v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 449, 469 (1999), aff'd, 292 F.3d (5th

Cir. 2002). As discussed in the immediately preceding paragraph of this report, on
                                         - 26 -

[*26] the valuation date the subject interest was a member's interest. The holder

of that interest, at that time, enjoyed fully the benefits and burdens of being a

member of the LLC, including his or her inability to transfer all of those benefits

and burdens to a nonfamily member transferee. The hypothetical willing buyer

and hypothetical willing seller--"both having reasonable knowledge of relevant

facts", sec. 20.2031-1(b), Estate Tax Regs.--would understand a member's interest

to be so restricted, and would take that restriction into account in their

negotiations of what a member's interest was worth. Mr. Thomson considered

restrictions imposed on transferability of an interest in the LLC as a factor in his

marketability discount analysis.

                    d.    Conclusion

      Neither respondent nor Mr. Thomson erred in classifying the subject interest

as a member's interest.

             2.     Appraisal Procedures

                    a.    Introduction

      As found supra, Mr. Thomson considered the LLC to function primarily as a

real estate holding company and, for that reason, relied exclusively on the

discounted net asset value approach in valuing the subject interest. Petitioner
                                        - 27 -

[*27] finds fault with Mr. Thomson's exclusive reliance on that approach.

Petitioner explains:

      The Decedent's interest in the LLC to be valued is an assignee
      interest, * * * and the hypothetical purchaser would not have any say
      in the LLC's decisions to make distributions, to sell the Building, or
      to liquidate, so the hypothetical purchaser's primary concern would be
      historical earnings and distributions. * * * Accordingly, this LLC
      must be valued giving primary weight in the valuation of the LLC to
      the capitalization of the historical distributions to its members.

                    b.    Discussion

      It is perhaps a sufficient answer to petitioner's argument that we do not

agree that the subject interest was an assignee's interest. Moreover, any concern

that petitioner might have about a member's (or, indeed, an assignee's) lack of

influence on decision making is properly addressed in the context of the lack-of-

control discount applied by Mr. Thomson in determining the fair market value of

the subject interest. Mr. Thomson explained that discount (describing it,

alternatively, as a "minority interest discount") as follows: "The hypothetical

minority interest investor cannot control, or has little influence on, the disposition

of assets, the payment of distributions, the appointment of management, or other

prerogatives of control. Therefore, a lack of control discount is applied to account

for the absence of these control features."
                                        - 28 -

[*28] It is true that Mr. Thomson considered the LLC to function primarily as a

real estate holding company, and, for that reason, he excluded the market and

income approaches to valuation, relying exclusively on a discounted net asset

value approach. The LLC's principal asset, however, was the building, the value

of which ($19,960,000) Mr. Thomson accepted from the LLC's partnership return

and the building appraisal. The $19,960,000 value from the building appraisal

was based exclusively on an income approach that used a discounted cashflow

analysis. The authors of the building appraisal projected building income for six

years, capitalized the sixth year's income to determine a terminal value, and

discounted the resulting income stream to present value ($19,960,000). Thus,

while Mr. Thomson's valuation of the LLC was based on the net asset value of the

LLC's assets, the value he accepted for the LLC's principal asset, the building, was

based on an income approach.

      We have said: "It is well established that, in general, an asset-based method

of valuation applies in the case of corporations that are essentially holding

corporations, while an earnings-based method applies for corporations that are

going concerns." Estate of Smith v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-368, 1999

WL 1001184, at *5. That rule of thumb is no doubt based in part on the notion

that a holding or investment company may be managed not for current income but,
                                        - 29 -

[*29] rather, for appreciation in the value of its holdings. If ownership interests in

a holding or investment company are not traded in an established market, then net

asset value may be the best indicator of the firm's value. See, e.g., Hess v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-251, 2003 WL 21991627, at *9; Estate of Ford

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1993-580, 1993 WL 501917, at *13, aff'd, 53 F.3d

924 (8th Cir. 1995). The point is well stated in Rev. Rul. 59-60, sec. 5(a), 1959-1

C.B. 237, 242: "In general, the appraiser will accord primary consideration to

earnings when valuing stocks of companies which sell products or services to the

public; conversely, in the investment or holding type of company, the appraiser

may accord the greatest weight to the assets underlying the security to be valued."

      The LLC undoubtedly provided services to the public, viz, a fully leased

gross rentable area of 77,725 square feet. And although the members of the LLC

may have had in mind the future appreciation of the building, we cannot but

conclude that the LLC managed a going concern. We have on occasion been

presented with, and sanctioned, the valuation of a closely held real estate firm

using a weighted approach, i.e., using both a net value approach and an income

capitalization approach, attaching weight to each. E.g., Estate of Andrews v.

Commissioner, 79 T.C. 938, 956-957 (1982); Estate of Weinberg v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-51. We have here no evidence that an explicitly
                                        - 30 -

[*30] income-based approach to valuing the subject interest would necessarily

have reached a different valuation conclusion, or what that valuation conclusion

would be.

      Finally, the net asset value that Mr. Thomson was instructed to (and did) use

was the same net asset value used in the MPI appraisal, which petitioner relied on

in reporting the value of the subject interest on the Schedule G. "[V]alues or

discounts reported or claimed on an estate tax return may be considered

admissions and, to some extent binding or probative, restricting an estate from

substituting a lower value without cogent proof that those admissions are wrong."

Estate of Deputy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-176, 2003 WL 21396789, at

*5 n.6; accord Estate of Hall v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 312, 337-338 (1989). We

have no cogent proof that the value that petitioner relied on in reporting the value

of the subject interest on the Schedule G is wrong.

                   c.     Conclusion

      The evidentiary record shows that the value of the LLC before

determination of decedent's proportionate interest therein and application of

discounts for lack of control and lack of marketability was no less than

$20,628,221, the amount relied on by Mr. Thomson.
                                          - 31 -

[*31]          3.    Discounts

        The parties do not dispute that, in valuing the subject interest, it is

appropriate to take account of discounts for both lack of control and lack of

marketability. Indeed, we have accepted both discounts when valuing stock of

closely held corporations. See, e.g., Estate of Newhouse v. Commissioner, 94

T.C. 193, 249 (1990). Petitioner disagrees, however, with Mr. Thomson's

discounts of 10% and 26% for lack of control and lack of marketability,

respectively. And while petitioner criticizes Mr. Thomson's methodologies for

determining both discounts, he has provided no expert testimony from which we

might draw different, greater values in those technical areas of analysis.

IV.     Conclusion

        The value of the subject interest on the valuation date was $2,303,000, the

value conceded by respondent. We redetermine a deficiency in Federal estate tax

accordingly.

        To reflect the foregoing,


                                                        Decision will be entered under

                                                   Rule 155.
