UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                    No. 98-4390

LARRY BYRON RAPP,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Anderson.
William B. Traxler, Jr., District Judge.
(CR-96-820)

Submitted: May 18, 1999

Decided: June 2, 1999

Before LUTTIG, WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

C. Timothy Sullivan, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. E.
Jean Howard, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Larry Byron Rapp was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to dis-
tribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.§ 846 (West
Supp. 1999). The jury found Rapp not guilty of possession of
methamphetamine. Rapp's attorney has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that Rapp's
appeal does not present any meritorious issues, but raising four issues:
(1) the prosecutor violated 18 U.S.C.A. § 201(c)(2) (West Supp.
1999) by offering lenient sentences to two Government witnesses; (2)
the verdicts are inconsistent; (3) the court erred by considering double
hearsay in enhancing Rapp's offense level; and (4) counsel was inef-
fective for misplacing two items of evidence. Rapp was informed of
his right to file a pro se supplemental brief and has not done so. Find-
ing no reversible error, we affirm.

Rapp cites United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir.
1998), for the proposition that Government prosecutors violated
§ 201(c)(2) by offering leniency to two of Rapp's co-conspirators in
exchange for their testimony. This claim is meritless. Singleton has
been rejected by the Tenth Circuit in an en banc opinion, see United
States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc), petition
for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S. Mar. 31, 1999) (No. 98-8758),
and we find the rationale of that opinion persuasive.

Insofar as the verdicts appear inconsistent, that inconsistency is no
basis for vacating a verdict or ordering a new trial. See United States
v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1984).

The court's reliance, in part, on double hearsay to enhance Rapp's
offense level for obstruction of justice was not an abuse of discretion.
At sentencing, the court may properly consider almost any informa-
tion, including uncorroborated hearsay, so long as the defendant has
an opportunity to rebut or explain. See United States v. Terry, 916
F.2d 157, 160-61 (4th Cir. 1990). Rapp testified at trial that he could
not have made certain telephone calls to co-conspirators because he
was at work. According to the presentence investigation report, an
FBI agent reported that the owner of the business where Rapp

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claimed to have been working at the time the incriminating phone
calls were made did not recall whether Rapp worked for him. Rapp
could have offered evidence at sentencing to rebut the FBI agent's
report of the business owner's statement. Thus, the district court's
admission of the statement was not error.

We do not review claims of ineffective assistance on direct appeal
unless the record conclusively establishes that counsel did not provide
effective assistance. See United States v. Smith , 62 F.3d 641, 651 (4th
Cir. 1995). In this case, we do not so find. Rapp may pursue any such
claims in a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp.
1999).

Pursuant to the requirements of Anders, we have reviewed the
record for potential error and have found none. Therefore, we affirm
Rapp's conviction and sentence. This court requires that counsel
inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If the client requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw
from representation. Counsel's motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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