

Heeja Yoon-Jeong v Bhandari (2017 NY Slip Op 05426)





Heeja Yoon-Jeong v Bhandari


2017 NY Slip Op 05426


Decided on July 5, 2017


Appellate Division, Second Department


Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.


This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.



Decided on July 5, 2017
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P.
L. PRISCILLA HALL
JEFFREY A. COHEN
ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.


2016-07453
 (Index No. 701788/14)

[*1]Heeja Yoon-Jeong, appellant,
vRekha Bhandari, et al., respondents.


Sim & Record, LLP, Bayside, NY (Sang J. Sim of counsel), for appellant.
DeSena & Sweeney, LLP, Bohemia, NY (Shawn P. O'Shaughnessy of counsel), for respondents.

DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Weiss, J.), entered June 6, 2016, which granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that she did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied.
The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the plaintiff's left shoulder did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614).
In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether she sustained a serious injury to her left shoulder under the permanent consequential limitation of use and significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
MASTRO, J.P., HALL, COHEN and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Aprilanne Agostino
Clerk of the Court


