                                 IN THE
                         TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                                No. 10-14-00225-CR

MICHAEL LUDWIG,
                                                            Appellant
v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                                            Appellee



                           From the 66th District Court
                               Hill County, Texas
                              Trial Court No. 33,883


                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In 2005, appellant, Michael Anthony Ludwig, was charged by indictment with

unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.07 (West 2011).

Pursuant to a plea bargain with the State, appellant pleaded guilty to the charged

offense; the trial court deferred an adjudication of guilt and placed appellant on

community supervision for a term of two years.

      Thereafter, the State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt, alleging that appellant had

violated seventeen conditions of his community supervision. Appellant pleaded “true”
to the allegations contained in the State’s motion to adjudicate, and the trial court

extended his community supervision an additional eighteen months and ordered that

appellant serve eighty-eight days in the Hill County Jail, among other things.

       Later, the State filed a second motion to adjudicate guilt, asserting that appellant

violated six conditions of his community supervision. Appellant pleaded “true” to five

of the six allegations contained in the State’s motion. After a hearing, the trial court

found the State’s allegations to be true and subsequently sentenced appellant to two

years’ incarceration in the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice with a $200 fine. Appellant appeals, and we affirm.

                                       I.     ANDERS BRIEF

       Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L. Ed. 2d

493 (1967), appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed a brief and a motion to

withdraw with this Court, stating that her review of the record yielded no grounds of

error upon which an appeal can be predicated. Counsel’s brief meets the requirements

of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no

arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9

(Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance

‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to

the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins

v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343-44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v.

State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).



Ludwig v. State                                                                         Page 2
        In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel

Op.] 1978), appellant’s counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling

authority, there are no reversible errors in the trial court’s judgment. Counsel has

informed this Court that she has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable

grounds to advance on appeal; (2) served a copy of the brief and counsel’s motion to

withdraw on appellant; and (3) informed appellant of his right to review the record and

to file a pro se response.1 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400; Stafford, 813

S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than an adequate

period of time has passed, and appellant has not filed a pro se response. 2 See In re

Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409.

                                       II.     INDEPENDENT REVIEW

        Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80, 109 S. Ct. 346, 349-50, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988). We have reviewed the entire

record and counsel’s brief and have found nothing that would arguably support an

appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the

nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised


        1 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “‘the pro se response need not comply with
the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the
court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether
the case presents any meritorious issues.’” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696-97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).

        2Nowhere in the record or in the documents received by the Court does appellant suggest that he
wants or sought the record but was unable to obtain it. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 321-22 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2014).

Ludwig v. State                                                                                  Page 3
in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of

appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813

S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                       III.     MOTION TO WITHDRAW

        In accordance with Anders, appellant’s attorney has asked this Court for

permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at

1400; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776,

779-80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous,

he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation,

the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing

the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)).                       We grant

counsel’s motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court’s opinion,

counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court’s judgment to appellant

and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review.3 See TEX. R. APP.

P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670,

673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).




        3 No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this
case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for
discretionary review or must file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary
review must be filed within thirty days from the date of this opinion or the last timely motion for
rehearing or timely motion for en banc reconsideration was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P.
68.2. Any petition and all copies of the petition for discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of
the Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. at R. 68.3. Any petition for discretionary review should comply
with the requirements of rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See id. at R. 68.4; see also In
re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.22.

Ludwig v. State                                                                                       Page 4
                                               AL SCOGGINS
                                               Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,
       Justice Davis, and
       Justice Scoggins
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed December 4, 2014
Do not publish
[CR25]




Ludwig v. State                                              Page 5
