                        T.C. Memo. 2002-316



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                BRENDA H. ROBINSON, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 2020-01L.              Filed December 30, 2002.



     Brenda H. Robinson, pro se.

     J. Craig Young, for respondent.



             MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION


     COLVIN, Judge:   Petitioner filed the petition in this case

under section 6330(d) seeking our review of respondent’s

determination that collection by levy was appropriate.
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       The issues for decision are:

       1.    Whether petitioner may contest her underlying tax

liabilities for tax years 1993 and 1994.        We hold that she may

not.

       2.    Whether respondent’s determination to proceed with

collection with respect to petitioner’s 1993 and 1994 tax years

was an abuse of discretion.       We hold that it was not.

       3.    Whether petitioner is liable for a penalty under section

6673.       We hold that she is, in the amount of $2,500.

       Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code in

effect for the applicable years.

                             FINDINGS OF FACT

       Some of the facts have been stipulated and are so found.

       Petitioner resided in Charlotte, North Carolina, when she

filed the petition in this case.

A.     Petitioner’s Failure To File Tax Returns, Respondent’s
       Notices of Deficiency for 1993 and 1994, and Petitioner’s
       Correspondence With Respondent

       Petitioner did not file income tax returns for 1993 and

1994.       On January 26, 1996, respondent issued a notice of

deficiency to petitioner for 1993 in which respondent determined

that petitioner had a deficiency of $18,954 and was liable for

additions to tax of $4,711 under section 6651(a) and $791 under

section 6654(a).       Petitioner received the notice of deficiency

for 1993 but did not file a petition in the Tax Court for 1993.
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     On March 25, 1996, petitioner wrote to respondent stating

that she was not liable for income tax because she was a “state

sovereign” and not a citizen or resident of the District of

Columbia.

     Respondent sent a notice of deficiency to petitioner for

1994 on January 17, 1997, in which respondent determined that

petitioner had a deficiency of $13,257 and was liable for

additions to tax of $3,257 under section 6651(a) and $670 under

section 6654(a).   Petitioner received the notice of deficiency

but did not file a petition in the Tax Court for 1994.   On

February 13, 1997, petitioner returned the notice of deficiency

to respondent stamped “Refused for CAUSE--NOT dishonored!”

Petitioner attached to the notice of deficiency a letter in which

she requested copies of the assessment and the delegation order

from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Director of the

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) service center who signed the

notice of deficiency.

     On April 21, 1997, petitioner wrote to respondent stating

that she was a “Sovereign Citizen of the Florida Republic”, she

did not reside or earn income in “any Territory, Possession,

Instrumentality, or Enclave” under the jurisdiction of the United

States, and she was “not a citizen of the Federal United States

subject to its jurisdiction.”   On May 6, 1997, respondent wrote

to petitioner that the information in petitioner’s letters did
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not justify any change in respondent’s proposed adjustments for

her 1994 tax year.   Petitioner stamped that letter “REFUSED FOR

FRAUD F.R.C.P. 9(b)” and returned it to respondent with an

attachment in which she raised 33 frivolous questions purportedly

related to her income tax liability.

B.   The Notice of Intent To Levy

     On February 23, 2000, respondent issued to petitioner a

Notice of Intent to Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing

relating to petitioner’s 1993 and 1994 tax years.

     On March 22, 2000, petitioner filed a Form 12153, Request

for a Collection Due Process Hearing for 1993 and 1994.     In a

letter attached to her request for a hearing, petitioner asked

that the Appeals officer have at the hearing the Treasury

regulation that requires her to pay tax and the delegation of

authority to IRS agents to enforce payment.

     Respondent’s Appeals Officer, Catherine L. Lacienski

(Lacienski), scheduled petitioner’s hearing for December 7, 2000.

Lacienski sent petitioner copies of certified transcripts of

account for petitioner’s 1993 and 1994 tax years.

     Petitioner wrote to Lacienski and asked that her hearing be

rescheduled for December 18, 2000.     In that letter petitioner

said that she had not received a valid notice of deficiency or

notice and demand for payment, and she requested the following to

be provided to her at the hearing:     (1) The signed returns that
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were used to make the assessment; (2) authority of the person(s)

making the assessment to do so; (3) a job description of the

officer(s) included in this conference; (4) proof that the

statutory notices of deficiency for each year in question were

sent to her, and copies of those notices; (5) proof that the

notice and demand for each year in question was sent to her, and

copies of those notices; and (6) the law that requires an

American to pay income taxes.

     On December 19, 2000, Lacienski conducted a hearing in

petitioner’s case for tax years 1993 and 1994.   At the hearing,

petitioner contended that the Tax Court is not a valid court,

assessments can only be made from a filed return, there is no law

which requires her to pay income tax, the certificate of

assessment must be present at the hearing, respondent’s agents

and employees lack authority to collect tax, she had a right to

receive Lacienski’s job description, and she was not receiving a

fair and impartial hearing.

     On January 31, 2001, petitioner wrote to Lacienski and

claimed that she had not received a fair hearing by an impartial

officer and that the Appeals officer did not have at the hearing

the delegation orders, signed returns from which assessments were

made, documents showing that respondent had sent notices of

deficiency and notice and demand to her, and copies of the law

showing that she was liable for income tax.   Petitioner stated
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that the notices of deficiency issued to her were not valid

because they lacked a valid signature.   She contended that the

only persons required to pay income tax are wage earners,

distillers, winemakers, brewers, tobacco dealers, and firearms

dealers; and that she was not one of those persons.

C.   Respondent’s Notice of Determination

     On February 1, 2001, respondent sent petitioner a Notice of

Determination Concerning Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320

and/or 6330 (the lien or levy determination), in which respondent

determined that collection from petitioner of her tax liabilities

for 1993 and 1994 would proceed.

                               OPINION

A.   Whether Petitioner May Dispute Her Underlying Tax
     Liabilities for 1993 and 1994

     Petitioner contends that she was improperly precluded at the

section 6330(b) hearing from disputing her underlying tax

liabilies for 1993 and 1994.   She bases this contention on the

claim that the notices of deficiency she received were invalid

because respondent did not provide a copy of the delegation order

showing that the notices were issued by persons with authority to

do so and because respondent may not determine an income tax

deficiency if she did not file a return.    Petitioner’s

contentions lack merit.

     The Secretary or his or her delegate, including the

Commissioner, may issue notices of deficiency.    Stamos v.
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Commissioner, 95 T.C. 624, 629 (1990), affd. without published

opinion 956 F.2d 1168 (9th Cir. 1992).    The Commissioner may

redelegate that authority to his or her subordinates.    Id. at

629-630.   Petitioner cites no authority, and we know of none,

which requires the Commissioner to provide a copy to a taxpayer

of the delegation orders for a notice of deficiency to be valid.

     Petitioner’s contention that she must file a return before

the Commissioner may determine an income tax deficiency is also

without merit.   Respondent may determine a deficiency for a

taxpayer who has not filed a return.     Hartman v. Commissioner, 65

T.C. 542, 545-546 (1975).

     A taxpayer may dispute his or her underlying tax liability

at the section 6330 hearing only if he or she did not receive a

notice of deficiency for the taxes in question or did not

otherwise have an opportunity to dispute the tax liability.      Sec.

6330(c)(2)(B).   Petitioner received notices of deficiency for

1993 and 1994.   Thus, petitioner was not entitled to dispute the

existence or amount of her tax liabilities for those years at the

section 6330 hearing.   Id.

B.   Whether Respondent’s Determination To Proceed With
     Collection as to Petitioner’s 1993 and 1994 Tax Years Was an
     Abuse of Discretion

     Petitioner contends that she did not receive a fair hearing

and that respondent’s determination to proceed with collection of

her 1993 and 1994 tax liabilities was an abuse of discretion
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because:   (1) The notices of deficiency are invalid; (2) the

persons sending the notices of levy and determination did not

have authority to do so; (3) respondent did not produce

delegation orders showing that authority; (4) respondent did not

produce verification from the Secretary that requirements of

applicable law and administrative procedure have been met; and

(5) respondent did not give petitioner copies of the law which

makes her liable for income taxes.

     We rejected petitioner’s first and second arguments in

paragraph A, above.   We reject her third argument because

internal revenue laws and regulations do not require the Appeals

officer to give the taxpayer a copy of the delegation of

authority from the Secretary to the person (other than the

Secretary) who signed the verification required under section

6330(c)(1).    Nestor v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 162, 166-167

(2002).    We reject her fourth argument because section 6330(c)(1)

does not require the Appeals officer to give the taxpayer a copy

of the verification that the requirements of any applicable law

or administrative procedure have been met.    Id. at 166.    Section

301.6330-1(e)(1), Proced. & Admin. Regs., requires that the

Appeals officer obtain verification before issuing the

determination, not that he or she provide it to the taxpayer.     In

any event, the Appeals officer gave petitioner copies of the

certified transcripts of account for 1993 and 1994.   We reject
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her fifth argument because there is no requirement that the

notice of intent to levy or the Appeals officer identify the Code

sections which establish the taxpayer’s liability for tax,

additions to tax, or penalties.    Nestor v. Commissioner, supra at

167.    We conclude that petitioner had a fair hearing under

section 6330(b) and that respondent’s determination to proceed

with collection of her 1993 and 1994 tax liabilities was not an

abuse of discretion.

C.     Whether Petitioner Instituted or Maintained Proceedings
       Primarily for Delay or Whether Petitioner’s Position Is
       Frivolous or Groundless

       The Court may require a taxpayer to pay a penalty to the

United States of not more than $25,000 if the taxpayer instituted

or maintained proceedings primarily for delay, if the taxpayer’s

position is frivolous or groundless, or if the taxpayer

unreasonably failed to pursue administrative remedies.    Sec.

6673(a).    Petitioner contends that her argument is not frivolous

and that she did not use this case for delay.    We disagree.

       A taxpayer’s position is frivolous or groundless if it is

contrary to established law and unsupported by a reasoned,

colorable argument for change in the law.    Coleman v.

Commissioner, 791 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1986).    Petitioner’s

contention that respondent must identify the Code sections which

establish her liability for tax is frivolous.    Nestor v.

Commissioner, supra.    Her argument that she was not the taxpayer
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named in the notice of deficiency because the name on the notice

of deficiency was spelled in capital letters is also frivolous.

See Johnson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1999-312, affd. without

published opinion 242 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2000).

     Petitioner relies on Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332

U.S. 380, 384 (1947), for the proposition that her position is

not frivolous.   She contends that Fed. Crop Ins. Corp. stands for

the proposition that--

     anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government
     takes the risk of having accurately ascertained that he
     who purports to act for the Government stays within the
     bounds of his authority. * * * this is so even though
     * * * the agent himself may have been unaware of the
     limitations upon his authority.

Petitioner contends that she acted as she did because she did not

want to risk dealing with employees of respondent who lacked

authority to act.   We disagree.

     It is well settled that the argument that the Commissioner

and his or her delegates have no power or authority to administer

the internal revenue laws because of invalid or nonexistent

delegations of authority is frivolous.   Lonsdale v. United

States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1445-1447 (10th Cir. 1990).

     Respondent wrote to petitioner on December 19, 2001, and

warned her that if she continued asserting frivolous arguments,

respondent might seek an award of damages under section 6673.

Respondent also warned petitioner about damages under section

6673 in respondent’s response to petitioner’s request for
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admissions filed January 8, 2002, in respondent’s trial

memorandum, and at the beginning of trial.    Petitioner continued

to assert the same arguments during and after trial.    We conclude

that petitioner maintained these proceedings primarily for delay

and that her position is frivolous.    Under these circumstances,

we require petitioner to pay to the United States a $2,500

penalty under section 6673(a).

     Accordingly,

                                           An appropriate order and

                                      decision will be entered.
