
227 U.S. 489 (1913)
ZIMMERMAN
v.
HARDING.
HARDING
v.
ZIMMERMAN.
Nos. 771, 894.
Supreme Court of United States.
Submitted January 10, 1913.
Decided February 24, 1913.
APPEALS FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR PORTO RICO.
*491 Mr. N.B.K. Pettingill for Zimmerman.
Mr. H.H. Scoville and Mr. Willis Sweet for Harding.
*492 MR. JUSTICE LURTON, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
We agree with the court below that although there was no express stipulation as to the duration of the partnership agreement, it was by implication to continue during the term of the lease of the hotel property. The term had, therefore, not expired when on August 9, 1911, Mrs. Zimmerman, of her own motion, declared it at an end. Her right to withdraw or terminate the agreement at her own will, the agreement being for the term of the lease, depends primarily upon the law of Porto Rico, rather than the general law applicable elsewhere. The matter is regulated by §§ 1607 and 1609 of the Civil Code of Porto Rico. These sections are set out in the margin.[1]
The suggestion is that § 1607 applies only to a case where one partner desires to turn over the business and responsibility to the other. This is too narrow. The plain mandate is that a dissolution shall occur at the will or withdrawal of one partner only when the duration of the partnership has not been fixed. Section 1609 obviously deals with a dissolution upon application to a court for sufficient reason shown. But whether a dissolution declared on the motion of one of the members might be justified when later challenged, if sufficient reason for the *493 act was shown, is academic, so far as this appeal is affected, because the court below upon oral evidence, including that of both parties, found that no good reason in law or fact existed for the dissolution declared on August 9, 1911 by Mrs. Zimmerman. The oral evidence heard by the court in relation to the matter has not been sent up and we must presume the conclusion sound. We shall therefore assume that the partnership continued in law, until dissolved by decree for sufficient reason on May 18, 1912. As the court refused to appoint a receiver pendente lite upon Harding's application when his bill was filed and permitted Mr. Zimmerman to continue to conduct the partnership business, she was justly held accountable for Harding's share in the profits made during that time.
The principal argument has turned upon the consequence to be attached to the action at law brought by Harding. The claim made by the appellant, Mrs. Zimmerman, is that the bringing of that action was a conclusive election between two inconsistent remedies, and that it operated as a bar to any remedy under the present bill. If this is the case the result must be deplored, for the dismissal of this bill would leave Mrs. Zimmerman in full possession of the fruits of her lawless conduct in excluding Harding from all interest and control of the joint business, with only the right to begin over again an action at law to recover his damages.
But we think the doctrine of the election of remedies has no proper application here. The essential element of that rule is that there must have been a right of choice between two remedies which are inconsistent with each other. Bierce v. Hutchins, 205 U.S. 340. The argument is that the bringing of the suit at law was an election to treat the contract of partnership as at an end, and to recover damages for the breach, including profits prevented, while the bill in equity was based upon the theory that the partnership was continuing.
*494 But that is a misconception of the bill. It states the same facts stated in the suit at law and alleges the illegality of the defendant's declaration of dissolution and the plaintiff's illegal exclusion from the control and possession of the joint property. But the bill does not seek a restoration of the partnership relation, nor a restoration to the joint possession or management of the partnership business. Upon the contrary, it states that a continuance of such relation is impossible. It therefore asked to have the business placed at once in the hands of a receiver and the partnership affairs liquidated and the partnership dissolved. This latter relief is but an incident to the liquidation sought of a precautionary character.
Whether the partnership had been effectually dissolved by the declaration of Mrs. Zimmerman on August 9, 1911, or not, her action in excluding Harding from joint possession and control until the affairs had been wound up was, upon either hypothesis, wholly indefensible. The partnership property continued to be partnership property after as well as before dissolution.
When she assumed the right to take possession for herself and to carry on the business with the partnership property, Harding had a clear right to call her to account for his share in all of the joint property and at his election to require her to account for the profits, by way of damages or otherwise, which he had been prevented from making by his wrongful exclusion from the business. Ambler v. Whipple, 20 Wall. 546; Pearce v. Ham, 113 U.S. 585, 593; Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328, 337; Holmes v. Gilman, 138 N.Y. 369.
Neither is the remedy in equity for a breach of a partnership agreement exclusive. There may be at law a recovery of all the damages which result, including damages for profits prevented by a wrongful dissolution. Thus if one member assumes to dissolve a partnership before the end of the term, the other may bring an action for *495 damages for the breach and recover not only his interest, but also his share of the profits which might have been made during the term. He need not wait until the expiration of the period and need not go into equity for an accounting, but may at law show the probable profits which he has been deprived of. Bagley v. Smith, 10 N.Y. 489; Dennis v. Maxfield, 10 Allen (Mass.), 138; Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328, 337.
The remedy at law was in every substantial feature consistent with that sought by his bill in equity, and no other form of suit was admissible in the local court. Both suits were pecuniary. Both sought compensation upon the same facts. In one Harding sought a judgment for damages which would include all that he could have in equity as the result of an accounting. The jurisdiction in equity in suits for winding up partnerships is based upon its jurisdiction in matters of complicated accounts. A dissolution, or a receivership, are mere incidents to its principal ground of jurisdiction. That in his equity suit Harding sought relief in respect to some matters not involved in or beyond the jurisdiction of the law court does not affect the question of election. That he asked to have the partnership formally declared dissolved by reason of the conduct of Mrs. Zimmerman was not antagonistic to any position he assumed in his suit at law. It was a mere incident to his right to hold her to an accounting for his share in the business. He sought to have the business wound up by a receiver. This Mrs. Zimmerman prevented and she was suffered to remain in sole possession. If she has been held to account for the profits made during that time, she cannot complain.
It has been assigned as error that Mrs. Zimmerman was allowed salary for her service in the management of the business after she assumed to be managing for herself. The partnership contract made no provision for the allowance of salaries to either partner. In the view *496 of the court below the exclusion of Harding from joint possession and management was without authority. In such circumstances it seems inconsistent that Mrs. Zimmerman should be allowed for services which she wrongfully took upon herself because she had unlawfully excluded Harding from participation. Probably upon the theory that her management had resulted in profit in which Harding was permitted to share it was thought equitable that she should be compensated. However this may be and reluctant as we are to its allowance (Karrick v. Hannaman, cited above) we are unable to find that any exception was filed to the allowance in the auditor's report. It does appear that the court directed the auditor to reduce the amount, which was done. But whether that was done upon an exception to the amount as excessive, or to any allowance at all, we have no information.
There is also an objection to a charge against Harding of $618 on account of some trouble with his accounts for bar receipts. The credit was made by order of the court in the final decree. There is no trace of the item in either the auditor's or master's reports. This would be ordinarily enough to justify us in shutting the item out. But this case seems to have been proceeded with in a most irregular way. There are references in the opinion and in the auditor's report to oral evidence and oral statements which have not been made a part of the transcript. If the parties elect to try a case in such an irregular way, we must presume that the decree, so far as it stands upon questions of fact, was supported by evidence not objected to.
All of the assignments must be overruled and the decree affirmed.
NOTES
[1]   Section 1607. The dissolution of the partnership by the will or withdrawal of one of the partners shall only take place when a term for its duration has not been fixed, or if this term does not appear from the nature of the business. In order that the withdrawal may be of effect, it must be made in good faith at the proper time; notice thereof shall also be given to the other partners.

Section 1609. No partner can demand the dissolution of a partnership which either, by a provision of the articles or by the nature of the business, has been constituted for a specified time unless there should exist sufficient reason, such as when one of the partners fails to comply with his obligations, or when he becomes incapacitated for the partnership business, or any other similar cause, in the judgment of the courts.
