                        T.C. Memo. 2005-85




                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                ARVIN E. MITCHELL, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 10988-03.             Filed April 12, 2005.


     Arvin E. Mitchell, pro se.

     Russell K. Stewart, for respondent.



                        MEMORANDUM OPINION


     MARVEL, Judge:   This matter is before the Court on

respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution.    By

notice of deficiency, respondent determined the following income

tax deficiencies and additions to tax with respect to

petitioner’s Federal income taxes:
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                                           Additions to tax
     Year           Deficiencies           Sec. 6651(a)(1)

     1998                $41,022             $10,255.50
     2000                 27,094               6,773.50

     All Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice

and Procedure, and all section references are to the Internal

Revenue Code in effect for the years at issue.

Background

     On July 10, 2003, we filed petitioner’s timely petition for

redetermination with respect to his 1998 and 2000 taxable years.1

Petitioner resided in Thorofare, New Jersey, when the petition

was filed in this case.    The petition contains the following

allegations of error:2

     Virtually all of the taxes shown should be excluded or
     dismissed. There were procedural and legal issues in
     the handling of my case that were never properly
     addressed. These relate specifically to the
     calculation of depreciation expense.



     This case was first set for trial during the Court’s

     1
      Petitioner also sought a redetermination concerning 1997,
but no notice of deficiency for 1997 was attached to the
petition. By order dated Mar. 4, 2005, we directed petitioner to
show cause by Mar. 18, 2005, why his claim for relief with
respect to 1997 should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner did not respond. By order dated Mar. 28, 2005, we
dismissed petitioner’s claim regarding 1997 for lack of
jurisdiction.
     2
      The petition does not contain a specific allegation
assigning error to respondent’s determination that petitioner is
liable for additions to tax under sec. 6651(a)(1). Because
petitioner did not contest the additions to tax in the petition,
they are deemed conceded in accordance with Rule 34(b)(4).
                              - 3 -

February 9, 2004, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, trial session.    A

notice setting case for trial, dated September 4, 2003, and a

standing pretrial order were sent to petitioner.   On January 15,

2004, petitioner moved for a continuance on the grounds that he

needed more time to negotiate a settlement with the Appeals

officer and to liquidate the assets necessary to satisfy any tax

liability resulting from the settlement.    Petitioner’s motion for

continuance stated in part the following:

     There are a litany of reasons for my request for
     continuance. As a courtesy I will just specify one of
     the main ones. * * *

     I need a continuance in order to work out the
     settlement. The glitch is in the payoff of the
     settlement. If [the Appeals officer] * * * and I agree
     on a “low-end” settlement amount then I can just give
     him a check and the matter is concluded. If however
     the settlement amount is near the high end of the
     spectrum, I will have to pay using non-cash assets. It
     can take several months to establish the value of these
     assets since the potential buyers are scattered
     throughout the country. [The Appeals officer’s] * * *
     patience and flexibility in dealing with these asset
     liquidation issues is material to settlement of the
     case--for without these I would likely be motivated to
     pursue the litigation option. The postponement of my
     court date by at least several months would be ideal,
     although I’m realistic enough to know you may have
     limits.

     Again, if you find this reason to be insufficient,
     please notify me and I can have additional reasons
     overnighted to you since there are so many reasons.
     * * *

Respondent objected to the continuance, stating that petitioner

failed to attend every conference that counsel for respondent or

the Appeals officer had scheduled, after providing notice of his
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intention not to appear on the day before or the day of each

scheduled conference.    Respondent stated that, as a result,

petitioner never discussed settling his case.    Respondent further

explained that petitioner had never produced any documents since

his 1998 and 2000 taxable years were selected for examination,

and that petitioner had failed to comply with the Court’s

standing pretrial order requiring the production of documents and

preparation of a stipulation of facts.

     In a written response to respondent’s reply to the motion

for continuance, a copy of which petitioner faxed to respondent,

petitioner advanced several other reasons for requesting the

continuance.   Petitioner attributed his failure to meet with

respondent to “significant health issues” and explained that he

was unable to produce many of the relevant documents because of

“serious” problems with the personal computer on which the

documents were stored.    Petitioner further stated that many of

the documents respondent requested disclosed the identities of

third parties and that, pursuant to confidentiality agreements,

disclosure of such information might subject petitioner to

liability for liquidated damages.

     Before the February 9, 2004, trial session, petitioner met

with counsel for respondent but did not produce all of the

requested documents.    The Court also received from petitioner a
                                - 5 -

document dated February 5, 2004, which we filed as petitioner’s

supplement to petitioner’s motion for continuance, that stated in

part the following:

     I unexpectedly came across some information that will
     certainly satisfy my original continuance motion’s
     requirement of extenuating circumstances or “compelling
     reasons.” This new evidence will absolutely pass
     muster with respect to justifying and legitimizing my
     request for continuance. Therefore I request now
     and/or I will do so in court next week (whichever is
     appropriate), that I be granted a continuance in light
     of the new evidence.

     This new evidence is fairly involved and will be time-
     consuming to present. Thus it is more practical and
     useful that I do a “show and tell” as opposed to just
     trying to verbally explain it to you. In fact, verbal
     explanation alone will be useless.

     I look forward to presenting the new evidence in court
     next week.

On February 9, 2004, the day of the calendar call, petitioner

faxed a letter to the Court stating that he was physically unable

to appear in Court because of injuries he sustained in an

accident.   Petitioner later provided documentation to establish

that he had been discharged from the hospital on the day before

the calendar call.    By order dated February 13, 2004, the case

was continued generally.

     The case was recalendared, and a notice dated April 1, 2004,

was sent to petitioner informing him that the case had been set

for trial during the Court’s September 7, 2004, Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania, trial session.    The notice warned petitioner that

“YOUR FAILURE TO APPEAR MAY RESULT IN DISMISSAL OF THE CASE AND
                               - 6 -

ENTRY OF DECISION AGAINST YOU.”   A standing pretrial order dated

April 1, 2004, was also sent to petitioner, which specifically

stated that “The parties shall begin discussions as soon as

practicable for purposes of settlement and/or preparation of a

stipulation of facts”; “Continuances will be granted only in

exceptional circumstances”; and “The Court may impose appropriate

sanctions, including dismissal, for any unexcused failure to

comply with this Order.”

     By letters dated May 26 and July 1, 2004, respondent

requested that petitioner produce documents to support his

position with respect to the deficiencies at issue, but

petitioner did not respond to the letters.   On or about August

20, 2004, respondent mailed to petitioner copies of respondent’s

pretrial memorandum and respondent’s proposed motion to dismiss

for lack of prosecution.

     On September 3, 2004, the Friday afternoon before the

September 7, 2004, calendar call, petitioner faxed to respondent

a motion for continuance and a response to respondent’s motion to

dismiss.   On the day of the calendar call, the Court received by

overnight mail copies of petitioner’s motion for continuance and

response to respondent’s motion to dismiss, both of which we

filed on September 7, 2004.   Petitioner cited medical problems as

the reason for his requesting a continuance but did not provide

any documentation to prove the existence of a medical condition

that would prevent him from attending the scheduled trial, other
                               - 7 -

than his notarized statement asserting that the statements in the

motion for continuance regarding his health were true.

Petitioner’s motion for continuance further stated the following:

     Though I will try, it is unlikely I will be able to
     make it to trial next week. I have waited until this
     time to request the continuance because I have been
     going beyond the call of duty to take the steps that
     would enable me to make it to trial, at least on a
     part-time basis. Thus, up until now I fully hoped and
     expected to make it in to trial.

     Had the Respondent not waited until just two weeks ago
     to contact me, Respondent would have learned of my
     condition, probably from my family members in that I
     have been sidelined by health issues and may not have
     been able to follow-up on any communications from
     Respondent.

               *    *    *     *       *      *    *

     Though it may be difficult, painful and/or may require
     assistance from others, I should be able to respond to
     any fax on the same day and I should be able to
     overnight you anything you request.

     On September 7, 2004, respondent’s counsel appeared at the

calendar call and presented a motion to dismiss for lack of

prosecution, which the Court filed.        There was no appearance by

or on behalf of petitioner.   On September 7, 2004, we denied

petitioner’s motion for continuance and scheduled a hearing on

respondent’s motion to dismiss for September 9, 2004.

     On the afternoon of September 7, 2004, respondent’s counsel

faxed a letter to petitioner informing him that the Court had

scheduled a hearing on the motion to dismiss for September 9,

2004, and advising him that the Court was likely to dismiss the

case for lack of prosecution if he failed to appear at the
                                 - 8 -

hearing.   Respondent’s counsel also called petitioner on

September 7 and 8, 2004, and left messages reiterating the

information set forth in the letter.     On September 8, 2004, the

day before the hearing, petitioner faxed a letter to respondent’s

counsel indicating that his physicians had advised him to avoid

any physical activity that might aggravate his medical condition

and that he would call the Court in Washington, D.C., on the

following day to inform the Court as to whether he would appear

at the hearing.   Petitioner did not provide any documentation

concerning the existence of a medical condition that would

prevent him from attending the hearing.

     On September 9, 2004, the case was called for hearing.

There was no appearance by or on behalf of petitioner, but

petitioner had called the Court to state that he would not appear

at the hearing that afternoon.    Counsel for respondent appeared

and presented oral arguments and produced documentary evidence in

support of the motion to dismiss.    We took respondent’s motion to

dismiss under advisement.

     Respondent’s motion to dismiss represents that:    (1) All

material allegations of fact set forth in the petition in support

of the assignments of error have been denied in the answer; (2)

petitioner has not raised any issues upon which respondent has

the burden of proof, and respondent has not conceded any error

assigned in the petition; (3) petitioner has not produced any

evidence to support the assignments of error in the petition; and
                                 - 9 -

(4) petitioner has failed to respond to respondent’s letters

requesting that petitioner attend a conference and produce his

records for respondent’s review.

     Petitioner requests that the Court deny respondent’s motion

to dismiss, alleging in his September 7, 2004, response to

respondent’s motion that

     Had respondent not been less than diligent in his
     prosecution of this case, even given my medical
     situation there is a reasonable chance we could have
     brought this case to closure. As it stands, Respondent
     has clearly dropped the ball and it is only fair and
     reasonable that I be relieved of further prosecution.

Discussion

     The Court may dismiss a case at any time and enter a

decision against the taxpayer for failure properly to prosecute

his case, failure to comply with the Rules of the Court or any

order of the Court, or for any cause which the Court deems

sufficient.   Rule 123(b).    Dismissal is appropriate where the

taxpayer’s failure to comply with the Court’s Rules and orders is

due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault.     Dusha v. Commissioner,

82 T.C. 592, 599 (1984).     In addition, the Court may dismiss a

case for lack of prosecution if the taxpayer inexcusably fails to

appear at trial and does not otherwise participate in the

resolution of his claim.     Rule 149(a); Rollercade, Inc. v.

Commissioner, 97 T.C. 113, 116-117 (1991); Smith v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2003-266, affd. sub nom. Hook v. Commissioner, 103

Fed. Appx. 661 (10th Cir. 2004).
                              - 10 -

     Petitioner has disregarded the Court’s Rules and standing

pretrial order by failing to cooperate meaningfully with

respondent to prepare this case for trial.    Petitioner’s pattern

of canceling scheduled conferences, providing notice of his

intent not to attend shortly before each conference was to take

place, and ignoring respondent’s requests for production of

records made it impossible for the parties to exchange

information, conduct negotiations, or prepare a stipulation of

facts before trial.   Petitioner also failed to prepare and submit

a pretrial memorandum before either of the scheduled trial

sessions, and he still has not produced all of the documents

relevant to his case.   Petitioner intentionally attempted to

delay the proceedings by filing a motion for continuance before

the September 7, 2004, trial session.    See Williams v.

Commissioner, 119 T.C. 276, 279-280 (2002).    Petitioner’s motion

for continuance was filed less than 30 days before trial and

failed to verify the existence of any exceptional circumstances

that justified postponing the trial.    See Rule 133.   Moreover,

petitioner failed to appear at the September 7, 2004, calendar

call.   Despite respondent’s attempts to contact petitioner about

the September 9, 2004, hearing and respondent’s warning that the

Court might dismiss the case if petitioner failed to attend,

petitioner did not appear at the hearing on September 9, 2004, or

provide proof of any legitimate reason for his failure to do so.

     Petitioner’s allegations that he was unable to communicate
                               - 11 -

with respondent or produce documents because of his medical

condition lack credibility because petitioner apparently had

access to a facsimile machine and managed to contact respondent

shortly before the September 7, 2004, trial session was scheduled

to begin.    Moreover, petitioner’s arguments implying that

respondent has not diligently prosecuted this case are unfounded.

Respondent has given petitioner ample opportunity to participate

in the resolution of his claim and has contacted petitioner on

numerous occasions to inform him of the status of the case.

     We find that petitioner has failed to comply with this

Court’s Rules and orders and has failed properly to prosecute

this case.    See Rollercade, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 116-

117; Smith v. Commissioner, supra.      Petitioner’s course of

conduct throughout the proceedings demonstrates that these

failures are due to petitioner’s willfulness, bad faith, or

fault, and we conclude that dismissal of this case is

appropriate.    Petitioner has not raised any issue upon which

respondent has the burden of proof.     See Rule 142(a); Welch v.

Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933) (Commissioner’s determinations in




the notice of deficiency are presumed correct; taxpayer bears the

burden of proving them wrong).3

     3
      Because petitioner has not introduced any credible evidence
                                                    (continued...)
                             - 12 -

     Accordingly, we grant respondent’s motion to dismiss this

case for lack of prosecution, and we shall enter a decision

sustaining respondent’s determination of the deficiencies and

additions to tax as set forth in the notice of deficiency.



                                             An appropriate order

                                        of dismissal and decision

                                        will be entered.




     3
      (...continued)
with respect to any factual issue and has failed to cooperate
with respondent’s requests for information, documents, meetings,
and interviews, the burden of proof does not shift to respondent.
See sec. 7491(a). In addition, respondent has no obligation
under sec. 7491(c) to produce evidence that the sec. 6651(a)(1)
additions to tax are appropriate because petitioner is deemed to
have conceded the additions to tax by failure to assign error to
the additions to tax in the petition. See Funk v. Commissioner,
123 T.C. 213 (2004); Swain v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 358, 363-364
(2002).
