                                                                                       ACCEPTED
                                                                                   14-15-00463-CV
                                                                   FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                                HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                                                             11/18/2015 7:33:39 PM
                                                                             CHRISTOPHER PRINE
                                                                                            CLERK

                             14-15-00463-CV

                                                                   FILED IN
                                                            14th COURT OF APPEALS
                     COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE                  HOUSTON, TEXAS
                   FOURTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS             11/18/2015 7:33:39 PM
                           Houston, Texas                   CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
                                                                     Clerk


                   CROSSLAND ACQUISITION, INC.,

                                        Plaintiff - Appellant,

                                   V.

                          HNTB CORPORATION,

                                        Defendant - Appellee.

             ____________________________________________

                         APPELLANT’S BRIEF
             ____________________________________________

Bryant S. Banes                  Neel, Hooper & Banes, P.C.
 State Bar No. 24035950          1800 West Loop South, Suite 1750
Sean D. Forbes                   Houston, Texas 77027
 State Bar No. 24040916          713-629-1800
Stormy N. Mayfield               713-629-1812 (Fax)
 State Bar No. 24067656          Email: bbanes@nhblaw.com
                                 Email: sforbes@nhblaw.com
                                 Email: smayfield@nhblaw.com

                                 Attorneys for Crossland Acquisition, Inc.



                     ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
                           IDENTITY OF COUNSEL

      The following parties and counsel listed are involved in this matter. See TEX. R.

APP. P. 38.1(a).

   Plaintiff/Appellant:

   Crossland Acquisition, Inc.

   Defendant/Appellee:

   HNTB Corporation

   Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:

   Bryant S. Banes
   Sean D. Forbes
   Stormy N. Mayfield
   Neel, Hooper & Banes, P.C.
   1800 West Loop South, Suite 1750
   Houston, Texas 77027

   Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:

   P. Randall Crump
   Shook Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P.
   600 Travis, Suite 3400
   Houston, Texas 77002-2926




                                          ii
                                          TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                                                          PAGE NO.

IDENTITY OF COUNSEL ...................................................................................... ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................................................................................... v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... vii

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ............................................ viii

ISSUES PRESENTED ..............................................................................................ix

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS................................................................................ 2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT......................................................................... 7

STANDARD OF REVIEW ....................................................................................... 8

ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................... 12

    I. The trial court erred in ruling that the parties’ contract required
       Crossland’s completion of all services for all land parcels for a
       firm, fixed price, despite plain contract language to the contrary .................. 12

PRAYER .................................................................................................................. 17

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................ 18

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ....................................................................... 18

                                                    APPENDIX

Order on Defendant HNTB Corporation’s Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment
Signed on January 20, 2015 ...................................................................................... A


                                                            iii
Amended Order on Summary Judgment Signed on February 16, 2015.................... B

Final Judgment Signed on May 1, 2015 .................................................................... C

Master Agreement between HNTB Corporation and Consultation ......................... D

Task Order 3 .............................................................................................................. E

Supplemental Agreement 1 to Task Order 3 ............................................................. F

Supplemental Agreement 2 to Task Order 3 ............................................................. G

Supplemental Agreement 3 to Task Order 3 ............................................................. H

Task Order 4 ............................................................................................................... I

Supplemental Agreement 1 to Task Order 4 .............................................................. J




                                                             iv
                                       TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:                                                                                                     PAGE NO:

Beverick v. Koch Power, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 145 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2005, pet. denied) .....................................................................................................12

Black Lake Pipe Line Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80 (Tex.1976),
overruled on other grounds by Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686
(Tex.1989) ................................................................................................................11

Bluelinx Corp. v. Texas Const. Sys., Inc., 363 S.W.3d 623 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) ..................................................................................11, 12

City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex.2005) ...............................................9

Forbes, Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167 (Tex. 2003) ............8, 9

Frost Nat’l Bank v. L & F Distribs., Ltd., 165 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. 2005) .................11

Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41
(Tex.1965) ..................................................................................................................9

Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 252 S.W.2d 929 (Tex.1952) ..............................9

Heritage Res., Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996)...........................10

In Re Polybutelene Plumbing Litig. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 23 S.W.3d 428
(Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) ..........................................................12

Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844
(Tex.2009) ..................................................................................................................9

MMP, Ltd. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 59 (Tex.1986)........................................................9

Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1994)............11

Randall's Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640 (Tex.1995) ....................9

                                                              v
S. Cnty. Mut. Ins. v. Sur. Bank, N.A., 270 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2008, no pet.).....................................................................................................passim

Seagull Energy E & P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. 2006)....10

Taylor–Made Hose, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 21 S.W.3d 484 (Tex.App.-San Antonio
2000, pet. denied) .......................................................................................................9

Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex.2005) ...............................9

STATUTES AND RULES:                                                                                      PAGE NO:

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1 .................................................................................................. ii

TEX. R. APP. P. 39 .................................................................................................. viii

TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a ...................................................................................................9




                                                            vi
                              STATEMENT OF THE CASE


Nature of the Case:                           Breach of contract and quantum meruit arising
                                              from HNTB Corporation’s (“HNTB”)
                                              requiring Crossland Acquisition, Inc.
                                              (“Crossland”) to continue providing right-of-
                                              way acquisition and relocation services in
                                              connection a State government contract
                                              without payment. (CR 36-63) 1.

Style of the Case:                            Cause     No.      2013-63341;   Crossland
                                              Acquisition, Inc. vs. HNTB Corporation.

Trial Court:                                  The 190th District Court of Harris County,
                                              Texas, the Honorable Patricia J. Kerrigan.

Trial Court’s Disposition:                    Both parties moved for summary judgment on
                                              Crossland’s breach of contract claims. (CR
                                              66-1095). Subsequently, HNTB also filed a
                                              motion for summary judgment on Crossland’s
                                              quantum meruit claims. (CR 1801-2048).
                                              Ultimately, the trial court granted summary
                                              judgment in HNTB’s favor as to Crossland’s
                                              breach of contract and quantum meruit claims.
                                               (CR 1790; CR 2737).




1 “CR   __” refers to a page number from the Clerk’s Record in this case.

                                                vii
              STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

      Appellant/Plaintiff does believe oral argument would be helpful to the Court.

The judgment appealed from is based on omissions of facts and legal matters in

connection with a complex commercial contract and, given such, the matters presented

herein require amplification for the court to understand the precise nature of the

dispute. See TEX. R. APP. P. 39.




                                        viii
                              ISSUES PRESENTED

I.   Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the parties’ contract required

     Crossland Acquisition, Inc.’s completion of all services for all land parcels for a

     firm fixed price, despite plain contract language to the contrary.




                                          ix
                                 14-15-00463-CV


                        COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
                      FOURTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
                              Houston, Texas


                      CROSSLAND ACQUISITION, INC.,

                                              Plaintiff - Appellant,

                                         V.

                            HNTB CORPORATION,

                                              Defendant - Appellee.

                 ____________________________________________

                             APPELLANT’S BRIEF
                 ____________________________________________

To The Honorable Fourteenth Court of Appeals:

      Crossland requests that this Court reverse the trial court’s grant of summary

judgment on its breach of contract and quantum meruit claims and render judgment on

the contract interpretation issue presented herein. Alternatively, Crossland requests

reverse and remand for further proceedings. In support thereof, Crossland would show

the following:




                                         1
                         STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

      On June 12, 2006, HNTB entered into a contract with the Texas Department of

Transportation (“TxDOT”) in connection with the construction of transportation

improvements along the US 290/Hempstead corridor, which extends from IH 610 to

FM 2920. (CR 389-523). According to TxDOT, the construction of transportation

improvements along the US 290/Hempstead corridor was a high-profile project. (CR

646; CR 799 at 233:9-233:18; see also CR 1007 at 78:20-79:21 and 80:9-80:20). This

was also an extremely complex and unique project for TxDOT. (CR 653; CR 664 at

35:18-35:21; CR 710 at 218:19-220:24). Right-of-way acquisition and relocation

services were a key component of HNTB’s contract with TxDOT. (CR 390).

However, HNTB did not have the expertise in the State of Texas to handle those types

of services. (CR 799 at 233:9-233:18; CR 1007 at 78:20-79:21 and 80:9-80:20).

Consequently, and because Crossland had expertise in right-of-way acquisition and

relocation within the State of Texas, HNTB contracted with Crossland to provide those

services. (Id.).

      HNTB’s contract with Crossland actually consisted of a master contract and

multiple supplemental agreements thereto. (See CR 381-616). The master contract is

the July 5, 2006 agreement between HNTB and Crossland (the “Master Agreement”),

which incorporated all portions of HNTB’s contract with TxDOT that were “pertinent

to [Crossland’s] responsibilities, compensation, and timing of Services and not in
                                         2
conflict with any provision” of the Master Agreement. (CR 381-548).                  The

supplemental agreements referred to by the parties as “Task Orders” provided authority

for Crossland to perform right-of-way acquisition and relocation services along the US

290/Hempstead corridor. (CR 381 (“Task orders shall be used to describe the parties’

mutual agreement on the scope of the Services, schedule, compensation and other

particulars as stated therein.”); see also CR 550 and CR 595). While there were

several Task Orders, those at issue in this appeal are the ones referred to by the parties

as “Task Order 3” and “Task Order 4.” (See CR 550-616).

      Task Orders 3 and 4 contained specific time limitations, i.e., they had

termination dates. (CR 553-54; CR 556-57; CR 559; CR 561-62; CR 564-65; CR 569;

CR 597; CR 600; CR 602; CR 605-06; CR 610; CR 613). The first line of Exhibit B to

Task Order 3 states: “This task order is for the initial period from execution through

September 30, 2011.” (CR 553). Exhibit B then repeats 11 times that the scope of

services applied during “the initial period of this Task Order.” (CR 553-54; CR 556-

57; CR 559; CR 561-62; CR 564-65; CR 569). Likewise, Task Order 4 was from

execution through June 30, 2012 (CR 613; see also CR 618), and Exhibit B thereto

repeats 7 times that the scope of services applied during the “initial period of this Task

Order.” (CR 597; CR 600; CR 602; CR 605-06; CR 610). Moreover, there was a

supplemental agreement executed solely for the purpose of extending Task Order 3’s

termination date. (CR 577).
                                            3
        During the time limitations of Task Orders 3 and 4, Crossland was contractually

obligated to provide “deliverables.” (CR 381 at “Article 4 – Scope of Services;” CR

550; CR 570; CR 595; CR 611; CR 851-52 at 48:6-48:21, 49:3-49:7 and 49:20-50:8).

A “deliverable” is “a unit or increment of work required by the contract, including such

items as goods, services, reports or documents.” (CR 1474).                                Crossland’s

“deliverables” were monthly status reports and “budget projections and anticipated

funding requirements every thirty (30) days and more frequently as requested by the

State during this Task Order.” (CR 570; CR 611) (emphasis added). 2 These

“deliverables” were the “foregoing obligations” Crossland had to perform in order to

get paid under the contract. (CR 550; CR 595; CR 851 at 49:3-49:7 (“Yeah. I’m not

sure. I know that the total – all the deliverables would have to be completed within that

total dollar amount, the total scope – the total fee. But I’m not sure if it was --”)).

        With respect to payment, Crossland was to be paid an hourly rate for each hour


2
  The exception to this lies in Supplement 1 to Task Order 4. (CR 618-26; see also CR 1444-46).
Supplement 1 to Task Order 4, which was the subject of the duress portion of Crossland’s claims
(CR 46 at ¶ 26; CR 57-58 at ¶ 57), contains different “deliverables” and a different method of
payment. (Compare CR 550, 570 and 575 with CR 618, 621, and 625; see also CR 1444-46). Due
to these different “deliverables’ and different method of payment, for work under Supplement 1 to
Task Order 4 (and only that supplement to that task order), Crossland was contractually required to
complete all listed services for all parcels listed therein for the maximum amount set forth therein.
(CR 509 at “Unit Cost;” CR 1510 at “Firm Fixed Price;” CR 618-26; see also CR 1444-46). While
HNTB may try to suggest otherwise, this supplement: does not apply to Task Order 3 (CR 618);
only applies to Task Order 4 after the date of its execution (id.); and its only relevance to this appeal
is to help illustrate that, for the relevant portions of Task Orders 3 and 4, the parties’ contract did not
require Crossland to complete all services for all parcels for the maximum amount set forth in the
task orders. (Compare CR 550, 570 and 575 with CR 618, 621, and 625; see also CR 1444-46).

                                                    4
worked. 3 (CR 511; CR 540; CR 550; CR 575; CR 587-88; CR 592-93; CR 595; CR

615-16). Task Order 3 stated:

               In return for the performance of the foregoing obligations,
               HNTB shall pay to [Crossland] the maximum amount of
               $1,988,636.46, payable in accordance with Attachment E
               and E-1 of the Master Agreement and the attachment
               Exhibit D – Fee Schedule.

(CR 550). Task Order 4 was identical except for the amount of compensation. (CR

595). Exhibit D to the Task Orders and Attachment E to the Master Agreement each

identified “specified rate” as the method of payment. (CR 511; CR 540; CR 550; CR

575; CR 587-88; CR 592-93; CR 595; CR 615-16). “Specified Rate” was defined as

follows:

               Payment shall be based on the actual hours worked
               multiplied by the specified rate for each type of labor plus
               other agreed to special direct cost items. The specified rate
               includes direct labor and indirect cost and fixed fee.

(CR 509).

        While the task orders set forth a “maximum amount” to be received by

Crossland in return for the “deliverables,” nothing contractually required Crossland to

complete all services for all land parcels for that “maximum amount.” (See CR 381-




3
 As indicated in note 1, the exception to this is Supplement 1 to Task Order 4. (CR 618-26; see also
CR 1444-46). For work performed in connection with Supplement 1 to Task Order 4, Crossland was
to be paid a firm fixed price for each indicated milestone it reached (“unit cost”). (Id.; CR 509).

                                                 5
616). 4 Nowhere does the parties’ agreement state that Crossland had to complete all

services for all land parcels for the task orders’ “maximum amount.” (Id.). Rather, the

contract explicitly states and contemplates that Crossland need not complete all

services for all land parcels for the task orders’ “maximum amount.” (See CR 550; CR

554-55; CR 570; CR 595; CR 611; CR 851 at 49:3-49:7; see also CR 2453 at ¶¶ 6-7;

CR 2456-64).

       As set forth above, completion of all services for all land parcels was not a

“deliverable.” (CR 550; CR 570; CR 595; CR 611; CR 851 at 49:3-49:7). In fact, there

were no specific parcels identified in the “deliverables” or the fee schedules for the

Task Orders. 5 (Id.; CR 575; CR 615-16; see also CR 2453 at ¶¶ 6-7; CR 2456-64).

Further, the contract’s express language stated that Crossland need not complete all

services for a task order within the specified time limits. (CR 554-55). For example,

Task Order 3 stated:

              The Services on this Task Order are generally for major
              elements during Preliminary and Final Design Development
              and many of these services have started in the previous
              Task Orders (Crossland Acquisition Task Order #1 and

4
  Again, this is where Supplement 1 to Task Order 4 differs. Due to the changed language in
Supplement 1 to Task Order 4 regarding deliverables and payment method, Supplement 1 to Task
Order 4 set forth that, for the work performed under that supplement (and only that work), the
“maximum amount” was the total amount due Crossland for all services for all land parcels listed
therein. (CR 509 at “Unit Cost;” CR 618-26; CR 1510 at “Firm Fixed Price;” see also CR 1444-46).
5
 By way of comparison, Supplement 1 to Task Order 4 did list specific land parcels in the
“deliverables” and fee schedule. (CR 621; CR 625).


                                               6
              Crossland Acquisition Task Order #2) and/or will be
              completed or continued in subsequent Task Orders as
              deemed necessary by the State.

(Id.) (emphasis added). This is consistent with Crossland’s method of payment under

the Task Orders. (CR 1511 at description of “Time and Material”). It is also

consistent with the parties’ course of dealing whereby supplements were executed

adding to the “maximum amount.” (CR 581; CR 590).

                          SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

       Did the parties’ contract require Crossland to complete all services for all land

parcels for a firm fixed price? That was the central question before the trial court on

HNTB’s motions for summary judgment, and it is the central question in this appeal.

(See CR 66-77; CR 1790; CR 1801-1811; CR 2737). If the answer to this question is

no, reversal and/or remand is required.

       In its motion for summary judgment regarding Crossland’s breach of contract

claims, HNTB alleged that the language of the parties’ agreement required Crossland

to complete all services for all land parcels (i.e.¸ the alleged “foregoing obligations”)

for a fixed sum (i.e., the “maximum amount”) that could not be increased (i.e., the

changes clauses incorporated into the Master Agreement were not applicable to

Crossland). (CR 66-77). 6 In its motion for summary judgment regarding Crossland’s


6
 Crossland also filed for summary judgment on its breach of contract claims. (CR 335-1095). In
that motion and its response to HNTB’s initial motion for summary judgment, Crossland argued that
(CONT.)
                                                7
quantum meruit claims, HNTB alleged that quantum meruit was unavailable because

the services were covered by the parties’ contract (i.e., Crossland had to complete all

services for all land parcels for the “maximum amount”). (CR 1801-11). Thus, in

order to grant summary judgment as it did, the trial court’s answer to this central

question was in the affirmative. 7 However, as set forth in more detail below, this is

wholly based on an incomplete reading of the parties’ contract and renders multiple

provisions in same meaningless. It also constitutes a redrafting of the terms of the

parties’ agreement. This was improper.

                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW

        The appellate court must review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de

novo. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848


the sums claimed were within the scope of the contract because of the contract’s changes clauses.
(Id.; CR 1440-1709). In response, HNTB alleged that the changes clauses were not applicable to
Crossland’s contract despite same being incorporated therein and previously utilized by the parties.
(CR 66-323; CR 1162-1437). In order to grant summary judgment in HNTB’s favor on the contract
claims, the trial court had to incorrectly find the changes clauses inapplicable to Crossland’s contract.
 (Id.; CR1790). Therefore, under the trial court’s ruling, once Crossland was outside of the
contract’s time limits or maximum amount, it was outside the scope of the contract. Hence,
Crossland’s quantum meruit claims. (See CR 2051-2661).
7
  HNTB also brought a no evidence motion for summary judgment in response to Crossland’s
quantum meruit claims. However, despite Crossland’s production of significantly more than a
scintilla of evidence (see CR 2051-2661), HNTB did not provide a response that could overcome all
of that evidence in a way that would justify the grant of a no evidence summary judgment motion.
(See CR 2663-2729); accord Forbes, Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex.
2003). Consequently, the trial court’s quantum meruit judgment was clearly based on HNTB’s claim
that the services were within the scope of the contract. To the extent it was not, as can be seen from
this brief and Crossland’s brief below, any grant of a no evidence summary judgment would have
been improper. See Taylor–Made Hose, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 21 S.W.3d 484, 488 (Tex.App.-San
(CONT.)
                                                  8
(Tex.2009); Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex.2005). To

prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a party must conclusively establish the

absence of any genuine question of material fact, and that he is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a. A movant must either negate at least one

essential element of the nonmovant's cause of action or prove all essential elements of

an affirmative defense. See Randall's Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640,

644 (Tex.1995); see also MMP, Ltd. v. Jones, 710 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex.1986). Since the

burden of proof is on the movant, and all doubts about the existence of a genuine issue

of material fact are resolved against the movant, a court must view the evidence and its

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Great Am.

Reserve Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex.1965);

see also Fielding, 289 S.W.3d at 848; see also City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d

802, 827 (Tex.2005). The court is not required to ascertain the credibility of affiants or

to determine the weight of evidence in the affidavits, depositions, exhibits, and other

summary judgment proof. See Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 252 S.W.2d 929,

932 (Tex.1952). The only question is whether or not an issue of material fact is

presented. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).

       The court's primary concern when interpreting a contract is to ascertain and give

effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the contract. Seagull Energy E & P,


Antonio 2000, pet. denied); accord Forbes, Inc., 124 S.W.3d at 172.
                                               9
Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc., 207 S.W.3d 342, 345 (Tex. 2006). When construing a

written contract, the court ascertains the true intentions of the parties as expressed in

the instrument. Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983). The court presumes

that the parties intended for every clause to have some effect. Heritage Res., Inc. v.

NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118, 121 (Tex. 1996). Put another way, “[t]o achieve this

objective, courts should examine and consider the entire writing in an effort to

harmonize and give effect to all the provisions of the contract so that none will be

rendered meaningless.” Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393 (emphasis in original). “No single

provision taken alone will be given controlling effect; rather, all the provisions must be

considered with reference to the whole instrument.” Id. And courts will not construe

contracts to produce an absurd result when a reasonable alternative construction exists.

S. Cnty. Mut. Ins. v. Sur. Bank, N.A., 270 S.W.3d 684, 689 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

2008, no pet.).

      Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law to be determined “by

looking at the contract as a whole in light of the circumstances present when the

contract was entered.” Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 394. If the written instrument is so

worded that it can be given a definite or certain legal meaning, then the contract may

be construed as a matter of law. Seagull Energy, 207 S.W.3d at 345.

      A contract is ambiguous when its meaning is susceptible to more than one

reasonable interpretation. Frost Nat’l Bank v. L & F Distribs., Ltd., 165 S.W.3d 310,
                                           10
312 (Tex. 2005). Only when a contract is first determined to be ambiguous may the

courts consider the parties’ interpretation and admit extraneous evidence to determine

the true meaning of the instrument. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907

S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1994). A patent ambiguity is evident on the face of the contract,

while a latent ambiguity arises when a contract, unambiguous on its face, is applied to

the subject matter with which it deals, and an ambiguity appears by reason of some

collateral matter. Id. When a contract is found to be ambiguous, the parties’ intent is a

determination for the fact finder. Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 395. “When a contract contains

an ambiguity, the granting of a motion for summary judgment is improper because the

interpretation of the instrument becomes a fact issue.” Id. at 394.

      The right to recover in quantum meruit is based upon a promise implied by law

to pay for beneficial services rendered and knowingly accepted. Black Lake Pipe Line

Co. v. Union Constr. Co., 538 S.W.2d 80, 86 (Tex.1976), overruled on other grounds

by Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686 (Tex.1989). A party may recover in

quantum meruit when there is no express contract covering the services furnished. Id.;

Bluelinx Corp. v. Texas Const. Sys., Inc., 363 S.W.3d 623, 627 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.). However, the existence of an express contract does not

preclude recovery in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of services rendered and

accepted which are not covered by the contract. Black Lake, 538 S.W.2d at 86;

Beverick v. Koch Power, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 145, 154 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
                                           11
2005, pet. denied); Bluelinx, 363 S.W.3d at 627.

                                   ARGUMENT

I.    The trial court erred in ruling that the parties’ contract required
      Crossland’s completion of all services for all land parcels for a firm, fixed
      price, despite plain contract language to the contrary.

      As a reading of the entirety of Crossland’s contract with HNTB makes clear,

Crossland was not required to complete all services under Task Orders 3 and 4 for all

parcels for the “maximum amount.”         (See CR 381-616).       To find otherwise

impermissibly ignores multiple provisions in the parties’ agreement and renders them

meaningless. Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393; S. Cnty. Mut. Ins., 270 S.W.3d at 689.

Moreover, finding otherwise constitutes an impermissible redrafting and/or variance of

the contract’s explicit terms. In Re Polybutelene Plumbing Litig. v. Hoechst Celanese

Corp., 23 S.W.3d 428, 437 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.); American

Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154, 162 (Tex. 2003).

      As the contract makes clear, Crossland’s “deliverables” under Task Orders 3 and

4 consisted of monthly status reports and “budget projections and anticipated

funding requirements every thirty (30) days and more frequently as requested by the

State during this Task Order.”      (CR 570; CR 611) (emphasis added).         These

“deliverables” were Crossland’s “foregoing obligations” under the contract. (CR 381

at “Article 4 – Scope of Services;” CR 550; CR 570; CR 595; CR 611; CR 851-52 at

48:6-48:21, 49:3-49:7 and 49:20-50:8; see also CR 1474). HNTB’s own officers agree
                                         12
with this fact. (CR 851-52 at 48:6-48:21, 49:3-49:7 and 49:20-50:8). Nothing herein

suggests that the completion of all services for all parcels within the “maximum

amount” was a requirement. (CR 570; CR 611). To the contrary, the primary

“deliverable” of delivering “budget projections and anticipated funding requirements”

counsels squarely against such a reading. Accord Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393; S. Cnty.

Mut. Ins., 270 S.W.3d at 689.

      If HNTB wanted to require the completion of all services for all parcels as the

“foregoing obligations,” it would have done so because that is what it did in instances

where such was required. (Compare CR 550, 570 and 575 with CR 618, 621, and 625;

see also CR 1444-46). More specifically, HNTB would have removed the references

to budget projections and anticipated funding requirements as a “deliverable.” (Id.).

HNTB would have also made specific reference to the land parcels at issue as part of

the “deliverables.” (Id.). As set forth below, other language in the contract similarly

(and explicitly) demonstrates this fact even further.

      The task orders make clear that specific services and parcels would be assigned

at a later date and were subject to change. (See CR 550; CR 554-55; CR 570; CR 595;

CR 611; CR 851 at 49:3-49:7; see also CR 2453 at ¶¶ 6-7; CR 2456-64). For example,

they say that “[t]he State, at its option, may elect to expand, reduce or delete the extent

of each work element . . . .” (CR 554; CR 597) (emphasis added). Exhibit B to Task

Order 3 repeats 10 times that the services only apply to “select limited parcels as
                                            13
assigned along US 290.” (CR 562-65; CR 567; CR 569) (emphasis added). It also says

that “[t]here is no guarantee that any or all of the services described in this Task Order

will be assigned by the State and/or HNTB during the term of this Task Order.” (CR

555) (emphasis added). Moreover, Task Order 3 specifically states that “many of

these services have started in previous Task Orders” and/or they “will be

completed or continued in subsequent Task Orders.” (CR 554-55) (emphasis

added). To hold that Crossland has to complete all services for all land parcels in

return for a fixed sum that cannot be increased, as the trial court did here, utterly

ignores these provisions and impermissibly renders them meaningless. Accord Coker,

650 S.W.2d at 393. It also leads to an absurd result. Accord S. Cnty. Mut. Ins., 270

S.W.3d at 689.

        Again, the task orders did not specify the number or type (commercial,

residential, land-only, multi-family dwelling, etc.) of parcels on which Crossland was

required to perform right-of-way and relocation services. (CR 550; CR 570; CR 575;

CR 595; CR 611; CR 615-16; CR 851 at 49:3-49:7; see also CR 2453 at ¶¶ 6-7; CR

2456-64). Rather, they only say that parcels may be assigned by the State or HNTB at

their discretion, and the work may be expanded. (Id.). Indeed, HNTB did just this,

i.e., assigned parcels separate from, and after execution, of the task orders. (CR 2453

at ¶¶ 6-7; CR 2456-58). The task orders had set time limits, i.e., termination dates.

(CR 553-54; CR 556-57; CR 559; CR 561-62; CR 564-65; CR 569; CR 597; CR 600;
                                           14
CR 602; CR 605-06; CR 610; CR 613). Further, HNTB alleged (and the trial court

presumably accepted) that, despite being incorporated into Crossland’s Master

Agreement and same having been utilized in other supplements, the changes clauses

were not applicable to Crossland’s contract. (See supra at n.6) Therefore, under the

trial court’s interpretation, HNTB could assign an indefinite number of parcels to

Crossland, and Crossland would have to complete the services for all of the parcels at

its own cost, and perhaps beyond the termination date. This is an absurd result. See S.

Cnty. Mut. Ins., 270 S.W.3d at 689.

      Finally, the trial court’s interpretation renders the payment terms in Crossland’s

contract with HNTB meaningless. The task orders specifically provided that the

“maximum amount” was “payable in accordance with” Attachment E to the Master

Agreement Exhibit D to the task orders. (CR 550; CR 595). Attachment E to the

Master Agreement and Exhibit D to the task orders identified “specified rate” as the

method of payment. (CR 511; CR 540; CR 550; CR 575; CR 587-88; CR 592-93; CR

595; CR 615-16). “Specified Rate” was defined in Attachment E to the Master

Agreement as follows:

             Payment shall be based on the actual hours worked
             multiplied by the specified rate for each type of labor plus
             other agreed to special direct cost items. The specified rate
             includes direct labor and indirect cost and fixed fee.

(CR 509). It also provided that “Contract Rates are to be billed” and that the rates are

                                          15
not subject to audit. (Id.). Yet, under the trial court’s interpretation, Crossland would

only be paid the contract rates up to the “maximum amount,” and, afterwards,

Crossland must complete the remaining services for all parcels for free.

      Crossland cannot be paid “in accordance with” Attachment E or Exhibit D to the

task orders if it is to work for free after reaching the “maximum amount.” Thus, the

trial court’s interpretation also renders the “specified rate” provisions in Crossland’s

contract meaningless and, again, leads to an absurd result. Accord Coker, 650 S.W.2d

at 393; S. Cnty. Mut. Ins., 270 S.W.3d at 689. This is especially true given that, where

Crossland was required to complete all services for all parcels within the “maximum

amount,” the Master Agreement allowed for alternative payment methods meant to

achieve same, and the parties’ actually utilized them. (Compare CR 550, 570 and 575

with CR 618, 621, and 625; see also CR 1444-46).

      In sum, all of the foregoing demonstrates that the trial court’s interpretation

impermissibly rendered numerous contractual provisions meaningless, rewrites the

parties’ agreement and produces absurd results. Alternatively, and at a minimum, the

foregoing demonstrates that Crossland’s interpretation of the agreement is reasonable.

This is especially true given that same is in line with the general interpretation of other

contracts containing similar “deliverables” and methods of payment. (CR 1511 at

description of “Time and Material”). Either way, it was improper for the trial court to

grant summary judgment. Accord Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393-94; S. Cnty. Mut. Ins.,
                                            16
270 S.W.3d at 689.

                                      PRAYER

      For the foregoing reasons, the Appellant respectfully requests that this Court

reverse the trial court’s judgment and render all questions of law in its favor and/or

remand this matter back to the trial court for further proceedings.



                                        Respectfully submitted,



                                        _____________________________________
                                        Bryant S. Banes
                                        State Bar No. 24035950
                                        Sean D. Forbes
                                        State Bar No. 24040916
                                        Stormy N. Mayfield
                                        State Bar No. 24067656
                                        Neel, Hooper & Banes, P.C.
                                        1800 West Loop South, Suite 1750
                                        Houston, Texas 77027
                                        713-629-1800
                                        713-629-1812 (Fax)

                                        Attorneys for Crossland Acquisition, Inc.




                                          17
                         CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

      The undersigned certifies that a true and correct copy of Appellant’s Brief has

been forwarded to counsel of record for HNTB Corporation, Appellee/Defendant, via

email, on this 18th day of November, 2015.

      P. Randall Crump
      PCRUMP@shb.com



                                       ____________________________________
                                       Bryant S. Banes


                      CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

      This is to certify that Appellant’s Brief contains 4,313 words.



                                       ____________________________________
                                       Bryant S. Banes




                                         18
                                                     APPENDIX



Order on Defendant HNTB Corporation’s Traditional Motion for Summary

Judgment Signed on January 20, 2015 ..................................................................... A

Amended Order on Summary Judgment Signed on February 16, 2015................... B

Final Judgment Signed on May 1, 2015 ................................................................... C

Master Agreement between HNTB Corporation and Consultation ......................... D

Task Order 3.............................................................................................................. E

Supplemental Agreement 1 to Task Order 3 ............................................................ F

Supplemental Agreement 2 to Task Order 3 ............................................................ G

Supplemental Agreement 3 to Task Order 3 ............................................................ H

Task Order 4............................................................................................................... I

Supplemental Agreement 1 to Task Order 4 ............................................................. J
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