
86 U.S. 640 (____)
19 Wall. 640
INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
FOGARTY.
Supreme Court of United States.

*642 Mr. W.M. Evarts, for the plaintiff in error; Mr. S.P. Nash, contra.
Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.
The question presented in this case for consideration has been often in the courts, and the discriminations between *643 what is total loss and what is not are frequently very nice and delicate. The authorities are by no means uniform or consistent with each other, when, as in the present case, the line of distinction is very narrow. Several cases bearing upon the one before us have been decided in this court, and perhaps a short review of them may aid us here better than a more extended examination of the numerous other authorities on the subject.
In the case of Biays v. Chesapeake Insurance Co.,[*] the plaintiff was insured upon hides, the whole number of which was 14,565. Of these, 789 were totally lost by the sinking of a lighter, and 2491 of those sunk were fished up in a damaged condition and sold. The hides were memorandum articles, and this court held that inasmuch as less than 800 hides insured as part of a much larger number of the same kind was lost, it could not be a total loss, and overruled the argument that it was a total loss as to the 789 hides.
In the case of Marcardeir v. Chesapeake Insurance Co.,[] it is said that "it seems to be the settled doctrine that nothing short of a total extinction either physical or in value of memorandum articles at an intermediate port would entitle the insured to term the case a total loss, where the voyage is capable of being performed. And perhaps even as to an extinction in value, where the commodity specifically remains, it may yet be deemed not quite settled whether, under like circumstances, it would authorize an abandonment for a total loss."
In the case of Morean v. The United States Insurance Co.,[] more than half of a cargo of corn was thrown overboard and lost. The remainder was saved in a damaged condition and sold at about one-fourth the market value of sound corn. This was held not to be a total loss, because part of the corn was saved, and though damaged was of some value. It was, therefore, only a partial loss.
The next case is that of Hugg v. The Augusta Insurance Co.[§]*644 The question there arose on an insurance of jerked beef of four hundred tons, part of which was thrown into the sea and part of the remainder so seriously damaged that the authorities of the city of Nassau refused to allow more than 150 of it to be landed. This was wet and heated, and not in a condition for reshipment. In answer to a question on this subject, certified to this court by the judges of the Circuit Court, it was replied, "that if the jury found that the jerked beef was a perishable article within the meaning of the policy, the defendant is not liable as for a total loss of the freight, unless it appears that there was a destruction in specie of the entire cargo so that it had lost its original character at Nassau, or that a total destruction would have been inevitable from the damage received if it had been reshipped before it could have arrived at Matanzas, the port of destination." And though there are some very strong expressions of the judge who delivered the opinion as to the necessity of the total destruction of the thing insured to establish a total loss in memorandum articles, no doubt the language here certified is the true expression of the court's opinion. And it will be observed that in this case, as in the case of Marcardeir v. Chesapeake Insurance Co., the destruction spoken of is destruction as to species, and not mere physical extinction. Indeed, philosophically speaking, there can be no such thing as absolute extinction. That of which the thing insured was composed must remain in its parts, though destroyed as to its specific identity. In the case of the jerked beef, for instance, it might remain as a viscid mass of putrid flesh, but it would no longer be either beef or jerked beef. And when the case went back for trial in the Circuit, the charge of Taney, C.J., to the jury places this point in a very clear light.[*] He says there was not a total loss at Nassau, because a part of the jerked beef remained in specie, and had not been destroyed by the disaster. And if there was reasonable ground for believing that a portion of this beef could, by repairing the vessel, have been transported to *645 Matanzas, although it might arrive there in a damaged condition, but yet retaining the character of jerked beef, there was no total loss. The jury found there was a total loss. The case of Judah v. Randal,[*] where a carriage was insured and all was lost but the wheels, is another illustration of the principle. A part of the carriage, namely, the wheels, a very important part, was saved; but the court held that the thing insured, to wit, the carriage, was lost  that it was a total loss. Its specific character as a carriage was gone.
In the case of Wallerstein v. The Columbian Insurance Co.,[] the whole doctrine is ably reviewed with a very full reference to previous decisions, and it is there shown that there is far from unanimity in the language in which the rule is expressed; and the extreme doctrine of an absolute extinction or destruction of the thing insured is not the true doctrine, or, at least, is not applicable in all cases as a criterion of total loss.
The Circuit Court was right in holding that what was insured was machinery  pieces or parts of a machine  pieces made and shaped to unite at points with other pieces, so as to make a sugar-packing machine. If parts of them were absolutely lost, and every piece recovered had lost its adaptability to be used as part of the machine; had lost it so entirely that it would cost as much to buy a new piece just like it, as to repair or adapt that one to the purpose, then there was a total loss of the machinery. If no piece recovered was of any use, or could be applied to any use connected with the machine of which it was a part, without more expense on it than its original cost, then there was no part of the machinery saved, however much of rusty iron may have been taken from the wreck. The court went quite as far in behalf of the defendant as the law justified, when it told the jury that the plaintiff could not recover if any piece or portion of the machinery insured arrived at its destination in a condition so perfect that it could have been used with its corresponding or connecting pieces, had they also arrived in good condition.
*646 We are of opinion that the charge of the court put the case very fairly to the jury, as we understand the law, and the judgment is, therefore,
AFFIRMED.
NOTES
[*]  7 Cranch, 415.
[]  8 Id. 47.
[]  1 Wheaton, 219.
[§]  7 Howard, 595.
[*]  Taney's Decisions, 168.
[*]  2 Caine's Cases, 324.
[]  44 New York, 204.
