UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BARBARA J. GRASSO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JIM BERG, t/a Len Stoler Lexus;
BARRY SEGAL, t/a Len Stoler Lexus;
WILLIAM RAULSTON, t/a Lexus
Financial Services, Toyota Motor
Credit Corporation; DOUGLAS                                         No. 96-1123
SEABREEZE, t/a Lexus Financial
Services, Toyota Motor Credit
Corporation,
Defendants-Appellees,

and

LEN STOLER, t/a Len Stoler Lexus,
Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Claude M. Hilton, District Judge.
(CA-95-492-A)

Submitted: April 29, 1997

Decided: May 22, 1997

Before NIEMEYER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges,
and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL

Barbara J. Grasso, Appellant Pro Se. Anthony Eugene Grimaldi,
DOHERTY, SHERIDAN & GRIMALDI, Fairfax, Virginia; Madeline
Agnes Trainor, TYLER, BARTL, BURKE & ALBERT, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Barbara Grasso appeals from a district court judgment order
entered in favor of the Appellees after the court granted their motion
for judgment as a matter of law at the conclusion of Grasso's trial evi-
dence. In this diversity action, Grasso alleged that the Defendants,
employees of a Lexus automobile dealership and of Toyota Motor
Credit Corporation, fraudulently induced her to enter into an agree-
ment to lease a Lexus automobile, and also breached that agreement.
We review de novo a district court's decision to grant or deny a
motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) for judgment as a matter of law.
See Gairola v. Virginia Dep't of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1285
(4th Cir. 1985).

The record discloses that Barry Segal, a Lexus salesman, was the
only Defendant to discuss the lease terms with Grasso prior to its exe-
cution. A misrepresentation, or a concealment of a fact, arising after
formation of a contract, cannot constitute fraudulent inducement to
enter into a contract. See Ware v. Scott, 257 S.E.2d 855, 857 (Va.
1979). Therefore, of the several Defendants in this action, only Segal
could have induced Grasso to enter into the lease agreement.

The record, however, reveals no fraudulent misrepresentations by
Segal to Grasso. Grasso's claims of fraud stem from her allegations

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that she signed the lease based on assurances from Segal that he
would later provide further written information explaining the terms
of the lease, but that he never kept his promises. Fraud generally must
relate to a pre-existing fact, and cannot be predicated on unfulfilled
promises or statements as to future events. See Patrick v. Summers,
369 S.E.2d 162, 164 (Va. 1988). Although an exception applies where
the promise is made with the intent of not performing it, Grasso made
no allegations regarding Segal's intentions at the time of the alleged
promises, and submitted no evidence relating to intent. We therefore
conclude that the district court properly found that a reasonable jury
could not have found fraudulent inducement in this case.

We also agree with the district court's finding that Grasso submit-
ted no evidence of breach of contract. In short, Grasso identifies no
provision in her lease agreement which has been breached. The judg-
ment order of the district court is, accordingly, affirmed. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are ade-
quately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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