                        T.C. Memo. 2003-261



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                 GREGORY R. BROWN, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 8368-02L.               Filed September 9, 2003.



     Jerry Arthur Jewett, for petitioner.

     Michelle M. Lippert, for respondent.



                        MEMORANDUM OPINION


     HAINES, Judge:   The petition in this case was filed in

response to a Notice of Determination Concerning Collection

Action(s) Under Section 6320 and/or 6330.     The issues for

decision are whether respondent abused his discretion in

determining that collection action could proceed for 1998 and
                                - 2 -

whether the Court should impose a penalty under section 6673.

Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the

Internal Revenue Code for the relevant year.   Amounts are rounded

to the nearest dollar.

                            Background

     All of the facts have been stipulated.    The stipulated facts

and the attached exhibits are incorporated herein by this

reference.   Petitioner resided in Coraopolis, Pennsylvania, at

the time he filed the petition.

     During 1998, petitioner was paid $49,859 as an employee of

U.S. Airways.   Additionally, in 1998, petitioner received $29,091

as a distribution from a qualified retirement plan with Capital

Guardian Trust Co., and $39 in interest from the U.S. Airways

Federal Credit Union.

     Petitioner timely filed a Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income

Tax Return, for 1998, reporting a tax liability of zero and

income taxes withheld of $9,804.   As a result, petitioner

requested a refund of $9,804.   On October 11, 2000, respondent

sent petitioner a notice of deficiency, determining a deficiency

of $20,099 and a penalty under section 6662(a)(1) and (d)(1).

After petitioner failed to file a petition with the Court in

response to the notice of deficiency, respondent assessed the tax

and penalty.
                               - 3 -

     On March 2, 2001, respondent received from petitioner a

claim for refund of the 1998 tax.   On March 29, 2001, respondent

advised petitioner that the claim for refund was disallowed.

     Respondent sent a Final Notice--Notice of Intent to Levy and

Notice of Your Right to a Hearing to petitioner on June 2, 2001.

The tax owed with penalties and interest for 1998, as set forth

in the final notice, was $29,145.   On July 6, 2001, petitioner

filed a Form 12153, Request for a Collection Due Process Hearing

(hearing request).   The hearing request included typical tax-

protester arguments, including:

     Also, since Section 6330(c)(1) requires that “The
     appeals officer shall at the hearing obtain
     verification from the Secretary that the requirements
     of any applicable law or administrative procedure have
     been met,” I am requesting that the Appeals Officer
     have such verification with him at the Appeals
     Conference. However, if the verification called for by
     6330(c)(1) is signed by someone other then [sic] the
     Secretary himself, than [sic]- in line with the Supreme
     Court’s holding in Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merril,
     92 L.Ed. 11 - I am requesting that the Appeals officer
     also have a Delegation Order from the Secretary
     delegating to that person the authority to prepare such
     a “verification.”

     On January 29, 2002, Jerry Jewett (Mr. Jewett) executed a

Form 2848, Power of Attorney and Declaration of Representative,

with respondent, on behalf of petitioner.

     On February 7, 2002, respondent sent petitioner a letter

scheduling the hearing.   Further, respondent advised petitioner:

“Taxpayers who institute or maintain a lien or levy action

primarily for delay or advance frivolous and groundless arguments
                               - 4 -

can have penalties imposed per IRC § 6673(a)(1).”   Respondent

included a Form 4340, Certificate of Assessments, Payments, and

Other Specified Matters, for 1998 with this letter.

     On March 8, 2002, Mr. Jewett sent to the Internal Revenue

Service Appeals Office a letter incorporating and adding to

petitioner’s frivolous arguments contained in the hearing

request.   Mr. Jewett’s letter consisted of 37 pages of tax-

protester boilerplate, including:

          1. The individual or individuals named above are not
     “persons or a person liable for the income tax or required
     to file a Form 1040, by virtue of non-residence in, or lack
     of income earned within, or effectively connected to, any
     U.S. territory, Possession and/or enclave deriving authority
     from Article I, Sec. 2 C1.17 or Article 4, Sec., 3, C1.2 of
     the Constitution of the United States. The individuals
     named herein are natural born Citizens of one of the 50
     Republic states, under the Constitution and Law.

     A hearing pursuant to petitioner’s hearing request was

conducted on March 28, 2002, with a court reporter, petitioner,

Mr. Jewett, and Settlement Officer Mark Kennedy and Appeals

Office Team Manager Ronald Albert for the Internal Revenue

Service, present.   A transcript of the proceedings was made.    Mr.

Jewett repeated his frivolous arguments.   For example, Mr. Jewett

argued:

          MR. JEWETT: Now, one of the items that I mentioned in
     my letter to you was that the - - this document, which the
     I.R.S. says is a notice of deficiency, was not signed by the
     Secretary. * * * So, therefore, unless the Internal
     Revenue Service can produce to you a delegation order
     indicating that this individual had authority to sign this
     notice of deficiency on behalf of the Secretary, for that
     reason alone, sir, you must make a determination that the
                               - 5 -

     enforced collection action against my client can’t lawfully
     proceed. Okay.

At the hearing, Mr. Jewett presented the Appeals Office with

various exhibits filled with basic tax-protester arguments.

     On April 10, 2002, a Notice of Determination Concerning

Collection Action(s) Under Section 6320/6330 was sent to

petitioner.   The notice stated:

          During the March 28, 2002 office hearing, Mr. Jewett
     and yourself were advised of the above limitations on issues
     that could be raised or would be considered at the hearing.
     You were advised of possible sanctions under IRC §6673 for
     maintaining frivolous arguments. You were advised Appeals
     is relying on Form 4340 to verify that a valid assessment
     was made, IRC §6303(a), Notice and Demand, and IRC §6331,
     Notice of Intent to Levy were issued, and your own
     acknowledgment of receipt of the notice of deficiency to
     limit challenges to the underlying liability.

          Additional correspondence was received from Mr. Jewett
     and yourself, which have been considered in the
     determination. No other non-frivolous issues were raised.

As a result, respondent sustained the proposed levy with regard

to the 1998 tax liability.

     In the petition in this case, signed by Mr. Jewett,

petitioner asserted:

     The decision of the hearing officer is incorrect for the
     reasons set forth in the attached supplement to this
     Petition, in addition to the fact that the IRS has not
     complied with the applicable laws and administrative
     procedures, the collection procedures are inappropriate and
     illegal, and Gregory R. Brown has no liability for the taxes
     and penalties at issue.

Mr. Jewett attached to the petition a six-page supplement filled

with similar tax-protester arguments.   The same arguments were
                                 - 6 -

repeated in petitioner’s trial memorandum signed by Mr. Jewett

and filed with the Court.

     Before the calendar call for the instant case, Mr. Jewett

had been advised by the Court in a conference call with

respondent’s counsel in a substantially identical case that the

arguments presented were frivolous and that the taxpayers could

have penalties imposed against them under section 6673.

     At the call of the calendar, Mr. Jewett acknowledged the

Court’s warning to him.   Mr. Jewett also confirmed that he had

informed petitioner of the possibility that penalties could be

imposed against him.   Petitioner authorized Mr. Jewett to proceed

with the same arguments in spite of the warning.

                               Discussion

     During the trial session held in Cleveland, Ohio, beginning

June 2, 2003, four cases, including the instant case, were

submitted fully stipulated.1    Mr. Jewett represented the taxpayers

in each of the four cases.

     Dunham v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-260, and Brodman v.

Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-230, were the first two of the four

cases to be decided.   We concluded in both cases that the

taxpayers raised no bona fide issues, proposed no alternatives to



     1
        James Benson and Melanie A. Dunham, docket No. 7029-02L;
Gregory R. Brown, docket No. 8368-02L; Harold V. and Imogene N.
Pahl, docket No. 11572-02L; Charles and Teresa Brodman, docket
No. 16598-02L.
                               - 7 -

collection, and presented frivolous arguments.    We held in both

cases that there was no abuse of discretion, and collection was

allowed to proceed.   We also imposed a penalty of $5,000 under

section 6673(a)(1) upon the taxpayers in both cases.

     Similarly, petitioner did not raise any bona fide issues or

collection alternatives.   Rather, petitioner presented a

“hodgepodge of unsupported assertions, irrelevant platitudes, and

legalistic gibberish” similar to those previously rejected by

this Court.   Crain v. Commissioner, 737 F.2d 1417, 1418 (5th Cir.

1984); see Dunham v. Commissioner, supra; Brodman v.

Commissioner, supra; Kish v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1998-16;

Fisher v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-277.     “We perceive no

need to refute these arguments with somber reasoning and copious

citation of precedent; to do so might suggest that these

arguments have some colorable merit.”   Crain v. Commissioner,

supra at 1417.   The Court rejects these boilerplate tax-protester

types of arguments as frivolous and without merit.    As a result,

we hold that respondent did not abuse his discretion in

determining that collection should proceed.

     In the instant case, petitioner was specifically warned on

three occasions of the likelihood of a penalty under section

6673(a)(1) if he continued with these arguments.2    Despite the


     2
         Sec. 6673(a)(1) provides:

                                                      (continued...)
                                 - 8 -

warning given by letter dated February 7, 2002, at the section

6330 hearing on March 28, 2002, and by the Court, petitioner

authorized Mr. Jewett to continue to assert frivolous arguments.

     Petitioner should be treated the same as other taxpayers

similarly situated.   Petitioner is not entitled to a free ride.

Dunham v. Commissioner, supra; Brodman v. Commissioner, supra.

As a result, we hold that a penalty of $5,000 against petitioner

is awarded to the United States in this case pursuant to section

6673(a)(1).

     Mr. Jewett’s arguments do not present justiciable issues and

ignore established law.   All of Mr. Jewett’s arguments on behalf

of petitioner had been rejected by the Court in numerous cases.

See Dunham v. Commissioner, supra; Brodman v. Commissioner, supra

(and the cases cited therein).

     Mr. Jewett’s approach is an abuse of the judicial system

which can result in penalties being imposed upon him under


     2
      (...continued)
               (1) Procedures instituted primarily for delay,
     etc.--Whenever it appears to the Tax Court that--

          (A) proceedings before it have been instituted or
     maintained by the taxpayer primarily for delay,

          (B) the taxpayer’s position in such proceeding is
     frivolous or groundless, or

          (C) the taxpayer unreasonably failed to pursue
     available administrative remedies,

     the Tax Court, in its decision, may require the taxpayer to
     pay to the United States a penalty not in excess of $25,000.
                                 - 9 -

section 6673(a)(2).3   Because no justiciable issues were

presented, the bringing of the case in and of itself is nothing

more than a delaying tactic requiring the use of Government and

Court resources that could otherwise be applied to hear

legitimate taxpayer concerns.    While no penalty is being imposed

in this line of cases, Mr. Jewett is reminded of the consequences

if he repeats or persists in similar arguments in the future.

See sec. 6673(a)(2); Takaba v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 285, 296-

305 (2002); Edwards v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-149.

     In reaching our holdings herein, we have considered all

arguments made, and to the extent not mentioned above, we

conclude them to be moot, irrelevant, or without merit.

     To reflect the foregoing,

                                               Decision will be

                                          entered for respondent.




     3
         Sec. 6673(a)(2) provides, in part, as follows:

                (2) Counsel’s liability for excessive
           costs.--Whenever it appears to the Tax Court that
           any attorney or other person admitted to practice
           before the Tax Court has multiplied the
           proceedings in any case unreasonably and
           vexatiously, the Tax Court may require--

                     (A) that such attorney or other person
                pay personally the excess costs, expenses,
                and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred
                because of such conduct * * *
