
43 U.S. 376 (____)
2 How. 376
JOHN CATTS, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
JAMES PHALEN, AND FRANCIS MORRIS, DEFENDANTS IN ERROR.
Supreme Court of United States.

*379 Coxe and Semmes, for the plaintiff in error.
Jones and Brent, for the defendants in error.
*380 Mr. Justice BALDWIN delivered the opinion of the court.
Phalen and Morris brought an action in the court below, to recover from Catts the sum of $12,500, which they alleged he had received for their use, and being so indebted, promised and assumed to pay, to which the plaintiff plead the general issue.
It appeared in evidence on the trial, that the legislature of Virginia had authorized lotteries, to raise money for improving a turnpike road in that state, which were placed under the superintendence of commissioners appointed under those laws, who, by articles of agreement contracted with the plaintiffs to manage and conduct the drawing *381 of the lotteries authorized by the laws, on certain terms therein stipulated, one of which took place in Virginia, under the circumstances set forth in the statement of the case by the reporter.
In the argument for the plaintiff in error here, it has been contended that this lottery was illegal by the suppressing act of 1834, which precluded a recovery of the money he received; but as, in our opinion, this cause can be decided without an examination of that question, we shall proceed to the other points of the case, assuming for present purposes the illegality of the lottery.
Taking, as we must, the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs below, to be in all respects true after verdict, the facts of the case present a scene of a deeply concocted, deliberate, gross, and most wicked fraud, which the defendant neither attempted to disprove or mitigate at the trial, the consequence of which is, that he has not, and cannot have any better standing in court than if he had never owned a ticket in the lottery, or it had never been drawn. So far as he is concerned, the law annuls the pretended drawing of the prize he claimed; and in point of law, he did not draw the lottery; his fraud avoids not only his acts, but places him in the same position as if there had been no drawing in fact; and he had claimed and received the money of the plaintiffs, by means of any other false pretence, and he is estopped from avowing that the lottery was in fact drawn.
Such being the legal position of Catts, the case before us is simply this: Phalen and Morris had in their possession $12,500, either in their own right, or as trustees for others interested in the lottery, no matter which, the legal right to this sum was in them, the defendant claimed and received it by false and fraudulent pretences, as morally criminal as by larceny, forgery, or perjury; and the only question before us is, whether he can retain it by any principle or rule of law.
The transaction between the parties did not originate in the drawing of an illegal lottery; the money was not paid on a ticket which was entitled to, or drew the prize; it was paid and received on the false assertion of that fact; the contract which the law raises between them, is not founded on the drawing of the lottery, but on the obligation to refund the money which has been received by falsehood and fraud, by the assertion of a drawing which never took place. To state is to decide such a case, even if the instructions prayed by the defendant had been broader than they were. The instructions prayed were, 1. That if the jury believed from the evidence, that the lottery was drawn under the law of Virginia, and the contract referred to, then *382 the lottery was illegal; and if plaintiffs paid the amount of said prize, under the belief that said ticket had been fairly drawn, the plaintiff cannot recover. 2. That if the jury shall believe from the evidence, that in December, 1840, when the lottery was drawn, the defendant was an infant, the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover in this action.
A party cannot assign for error, the refusal of an instruction to which he has not a right to the full extent as stated, and in its precise terms; the court is not bound to give a modified instruction varying from the one prayed: here they were asked to instruct the jury, that the belief of the plaintiff that the ticket had been fairly drawn, and the consequent payment, prevented a recovery, without referring to the fact in evidence, that that belief was caused by the false and fraudulent assertions of the defendant.
The second instruction asked was, that the plaintiffs could not recover, if the defendant was a minor in December, 1840, which the court properly refused, because they were not asked to decide on the effect of his minority when the money was received in February, 1841; and because, if he had then been a minor, it would have been no defence to an action founded on his fraud and falsehood.
The first instruction, if granted, would have excluded from the consideration of the jury, all reference to the fraud which produced such belief in the plaintiff, and they must have given it the same effect, whether it was founded in fact, or caused by the false asseveration of the fact by the defendant, knowing it was a falsehood, and thus depriving the jury of the right to decide on the whole evidence.
The second instruction asked would, if granted, have also taken from the jury the right of finding for the plaintiff, if the defendant had been of full age when the fraud was successfully consummated by the receipt of the money, which was the only fact on which the law could raise a promise to repay, for certainly none could be raised at any previous time; so that had these instructions been given, the verdict must have been rendered for the defendant without taking into view the only evidence on which the plaintiff relied, whether it was available in law or not.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Circuit Court is affirmed, with costs.

ORDER.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the county of Alexandria, and was argued *383 by counsel. On consideration whereof, It is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed with costs and damages, at the rate of six per cent. per annum.
