                        T.C. Memo. 2003-137



                      UNITED STATES TAX COURT



                   PAUL EVERMAN, Petitioner v.
          COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent



     Docket No. 13268-02L.             Filed May 14, 2003.


     Jerry Arthur Jewett, for petitioner.

     Michelle M. Lippert and Julie A. Pals, for respondent.



                        MEMORANDUM OPINION


     ARMEN, Special Trial Judge:   This matter is before the Court

on respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, as

supplemented.   Respondent contends that the Court lacks

jurisdiction over the petition on the grounds that: (1) The

petition was not filed within the 90-day period prescribed in

sections 6213(a) and 7502(a); and (2) respondent did not issue to
                                 - 2 -

petitioner a notice of determination concerning collection

actions that would allow petitioner to invoke the Court’s

jurisdiction under sections 6320 and/or 6330.1   As discussed in

detail below, we shall grant respondent’s motion to dismiss, as

supplemented.

Background

     The record establishes and/or the parties do not dispute the

following:

     A.   Notice of Deficiency

     On February 9, 2000, respondent mailed to petitioner a

notice of deficiency.   In the notice of deficiency, respondent

determined deficiencies in petitioner’s Federal income taxes for

1996, 1997, and 1998 in the amounts of $73,516, $3,619, and

$4,549, respectively.   Respondent also determined that petitioner

was liable for accuracy-related penalties under section 6662(a)

for 1996 and 1997 in the amounts of $14,703.20 and $723.80,

respectively.

     The notice of deficiency was issued by the Internal Revenue

Service (IRS) District Director in Cincinnati, Ohio.   The notice

of deficiency was signed “C. Ashley Bullard by BL”.    At the time

that the notice of deficiency was issued, C. Ashley Bullard was




     1
        Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to
the Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and all Rule references
are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
                                - 3 -

the IRS District Director in Cincinnati, Ohio.2

     Petitioner did not file a petition for redetermination with

the Court within the 90-day period prescribed in section 6213(a).

Consequently, on July 3, 2000, respondent assessed the determined

deficiency and accuracy-related penalty for 1997, as well as

statutory interest.    On August 7, 2000, respondent assessed the

determined deficiency and accuracy-related penalty for 1996, as

well as statutory interest.    Presumably, respondent also assessed

the determined deficiency and accuracy-related penalty for 1998,

but that year is not part of the present case.

     B.    Notice of Federal Tax Lien

     On March 9, 2001, respondent sent to petitioner, by

certified mail, a Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your

Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320 (the notice required by section

6320).    The notice required by section 6320 listed petitioner’s

unpaid tax liabilities for 1996 and 1997.    Three days later, on

March 12, 2001, respondent filed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien

with the Recorder of Mercer County in Celina, Ohio, with regard

to petitioner’s unpaid tax liabilities for 1996 and 1997.    Brenda

McCullough, Acting Technical Support Group Manager responsible

for collection matters, authorized the issuance of the notice

required by section 6320 and the filing of the Notice of Federal




     2
          The record does not definitively reveal “BL’s” identity.
                                  - 4 -

Tax Lien.3    At that time, Ms. McCullough was classified as a GS-

14 employee.    Petitioner received the notice required by section

6320.

     C.    Final Notice of Levy

     On May 7, 2001, respondent mailed to petitioner, by

certified mail, a Final Notice–Notice of Intent to Levy and

Notice of Your Right to a Hearing (final notice of intent to

levy) under section 6330 in respect of petitioner’s unpaid tax

liabilities for 1996 and 1997.     The final notice of intent to

levy, which was not signed, was issued by Revenue Officer John

Stetsko; the final notice identified Mr. Stetsko as the “person

to contact” and provided his contact telephone number and

employee identification number.     At that time, Mr. Stetsko was

classified as a GS-12 employee and a GS-1169 series revenue

officer.     Petitioner received the final notice of intent to levy

on May 12, 2001.

     D.    Petitioner’s Request for a Hearing

     On June 18, 2001, petitioner filed with respondent a Request

for a Collection Due Process Hearing in respect of his unpaid tax

liabilities for 1996 and 1997.     Petitioner’s Request for a Due



     3
        In authorizing the issuance of the notice required by
section 6320 and the filing of the Notice of Federal Tax Lien,
Ms. McCullough acted at the request of Group Manager Robert
Winship. As a group manager, Mr. Winship was the supervisor of
John Stetsko, a revenue officer who was assigned petitioner’s
account for collection. See infra C.
                                - 5 -

Process hearing expressly referenced the final notice of intent

to levy.

      E.   The Appeals Office Hearing

      On January 16, 2002, petitioner attended an administrative

hearing conducted by an Appeals officer at the IRS Appeals Office

in Toledo, Ohio.

      At the start of the hearing, the Appeals officer stated that

because petitioner’s request for an administrative hearing was

received more than 30 days after the issuance of the final notice

of intent to levy (and, a fortiori, more than 30 days after the

issuance of the notice required by section 6320), the hearing

would be conducted as an “equivalent” hearing.

      During the hearing, petitioner requested that the Appeals

officer verify that the persons who issued the final notice of

intent to levy and the notice required by section 6320 and who

filed the Notice of Federal Tax Lien were all authorized to do

so.   Petitioner also questioned the validity of the final notice

of intent to levy because it was not signed.

      F.   Respondent’s Decision Letter

      On July 12, 2002, the Appeals Office issued to petitioner a

Decision Letter Concerning Equivalent Hearing Under Section 6320

and/or 6330 (the decision letter) with regard to petitioner’s

unpaid tax liabilities for 1996 and 1997.   In the decision

letter, the Appeals Office concluded: “The collection actions,
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filing the notice of Federal Tax Lien, and proposed enforcement

actions, including levies, are upheld.”

     G.   The Petition

     On August 15, 2002, petitioner filed with the Court a

petition challenging (1) respondent’s deficiency determinations

for the taxable years 1996 and 1997 as set forth in the notice of

deficiency dated February 9, 2000, and (2) the decision letter

dated July 12, 2002.4    The petition includes a number of

attachments, including a copy of the notice of deficiency, which

is stamped “REFUSED FOR FRAUD F.R.C.P. 9(b)”.    The petition also

includes statements indicating that petitioner is challenging the

validity of the notice of deficiency.5    With regard to the

decision letter dated July 12, 2002, the petition states in

pertinent part:


     Because the final notice of intent to levy * * * sent
     to Petitioner was not sent by the Secretary or his
     authorized delegate, even though petitioner’s appeal
     was filed after the 30 day time period, it is still
     timely, and the Appeals Office determination to only
     grant petitioner an equivalency hearing was in error.




     4
        At the time that the petition was filed, petitioner
resided in Celina, Ohio.
     5
        The petition states in pertinent part: “Exhibit A: note
that deficiency notice is not signed by Secretary”; and “no
notice of deficiency was sent by the Secretary or his authorized
delegate”.
                                - 7 -

     H.    Respondent’s Motion To Dismiss

     As stated, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of

Jurisdiction.    Respondent contends that the Court lacks

jurisdiction on the grounds that: (1) The petition was not timely

filed with regard to the notice of deficiency dated February 9,

2000; and (2) respondent did not issue to petitioner a notice of

determination concerning collection actions under sections 6320

or 6330.    Petitioner filed a notice of objection to respondent’s

motion.

     Pursuant to notice, this matter was called for hearing at

the Court’s motions session in Washington, D.C.    Counsel for

respondent appeared at the hearing and offered argument in

support of respondent’s motion to dismiss.    Although there was no

appearance by or on behalf of petitioner at the hearing,

petitioner filed with the Court a written statement pursuant to

Rule 50(c).

     After the hearing, the Court issued Orders directing

respondent to file supplements to his motion to dismiss.

Respondent complied with the Court’s Orders.

Discussion

     The Tax Court is a court of limited jurisdiction.      We may

exercise jurisdiction only to the extent expressly authorized by

statute.    Breman v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 61, 66 (1976).
                               - 8 -

     1. The Court’s Jurisdiction To Redetermine a Deficiency

     The Court's jurisdiction to redetermine a deficiency depends

on the issuance of a valid notice of deficiency and a timely

filed petition.   Rule 13(a), (c); Monge v. Commissioner, 93 T.C.

22, 27 (1989); Normac, Inc. v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 142, 147

(1988).   Section 6212(a) expressly authorizes the Commissioner,

after determining a deficiency, to send a notice of deficiency to

the taxpayer by certified or registered mail.     The taxpayer, in

turn, has 90 days (or 150 days if the notice is addressed to a

person outside of the United States) from the date the notice of

deficiency is mailed to file a petition in this Court for a

redetermination of the deficiency.     Sec. 6213(a).   Pursuant to

section 7502(a), a timely mailed petition will be treated as

though it were timely filed.

     The record shows that respondent mailed the notice of

deficiency in question to petitioner on February 9, 2000.

However, the petition in this case was not filed until August 15,

2002-–over a year and a half after the mailing of the notice of

deficiency.   It follows that the petition was not filed within

the 90-day statutory period under section 6213(a).

     Petitioner’s only contention is that the notice of

deficiency is invalid because it was not signed by the Secretary

or an authorized delegate.   Petitioner’s argument is meritless.
                               - 9 -

     The notice of deficiency in question was issued by the IRS

District Director in Cincinnati, Ohio, and was signed “C. Ashley

Bullard [the IRS District Director in Cincinnati, Ohio] by BL”.

It is well settled that the Secretary or his delegate may issue

notices of deficiency.   Secs. 6212(a), 7701(a)(11)(B) and

(12)(A)(i).   The Secretary’s authority to issue notices of

deficiency has been delegated to District Directors and to

Directors of IRS Service Centers.   See Nestor v. Commissioner,

118 T.C. 162, 165 (2002), and cases cited therein.   Moreover,

there is no requirement that a notice of deficiency be signed.

Sec. 6212; Pendola v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 509, 513-514 (1968);

Elmore v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2003-123; Fox v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 1993-277 n.4, affd. without published opinion 69 F.3d

543 (9th Cir. 1995).

     Consistent with the foregoing, we reject petitioner’s

contention that the notice of deficiency dated February 9, 2000,

is invalid.   We shall grant that part of respondent’s motion that

moves to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as to the notice of

deficiency.

     2.   The Court’s Jurisdiction To Review Collection Actions

     Sections 6320 and 6330 generally provide that the

Commissioner must give a taxpayer notice that a Federal tax lien

has been filed and notice that the Commissioner intends to levy

on the taxpayer’s property and offer the taxpayer an opportunity
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for an administrative review of those matters (in the form of an

Appeals Office hearing).   If the taxpayer is dissatisfied with an

Appeals Office determination regarding a collection action, the

taxpayer may seek judicial review of the administrative

determination in the Tax Court or Federal District Court, as

appropriate.   See Davis v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 35, 37 (2000);

Goza v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 176, 179 (2000).

     Sections 6320(a) and 6330(a) provide in pertinent part that

the Secretary shall notify a person in writing of his or her

right to an Appeals Office hearing regarding (1) a notice

required by section 6320 or (2) a final notice of intent to levy

by, among other methods, mailing such notice by certified or

registered mail to the person’s last known address.   Further,

sections 6320(a)(3)(B) and 6330(a)(3)(B) provide that the

prescribed notification shall explain that the person has the

right to request an Appeals Office hearing during a specified 30-

day period.

     Where the Appeals Office issues a determination letter to a

taxpayer following an administrative hearing regarding a notice

required by section 6320 and/or a final notice of intent to levy,

sections 6320(c) and 6330(d)(1) provide that the taxpayer shall

have 30 days following the issuance of such determination letter

to file a petition for review with the Tax Court or Federal

District Court, as appropriate.   See Offiler v. Commissioner, 114
                               - 11 -

T.C. 492, 498 (2000).   We have held that this Court’s

jurisdiction under sections 6320 and 6330 depends on the issuance

of a valid notice of determination and the filing of a timely

petition for review.    See Sarrell v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 122,

125 (2001); Offiler v. Commissioner, supra at 498.

     The record shows that respondent sent petitioner (1) a

notice required by section 6320 on March 9, 2001, and (2) a final

notice of intent to levy on May 7, 2001.   However, petitioner did

not file his request for an administrative hearing with

respondent until June 18, 2001.   After concluding that petitioner

had failed to file his request for an administrative hearing

within the 30-day period prescribed in section 6330(a)(2) and

(a)(3)(B), the Appeals officer informed petitioner that

petitioner would be offered an equivalent hearing as opposed to

the administrative hearing contemplated by section 6330.   See

Craig v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252, 258 (2002) (describing the

genesis for equivalent hearings).   Following the hearing, the

Appeals Office issued to petitioner a decision letter stating

that the proposed collection actions were appropriate.

     Respondent cites Kennedy v. Commissioner, 116 T.C. 255

(2001), in support of his motion to dismiss that part of the

petition challenging the decision letter dated July 12, 2002.    In

Kennedy v. Commissioner, supra, we held, under similar

circumstances, that a decision letter issued by an Appeals Office
                               - 12 -

following an equivalent hearing did not constitute a notice of

determination under section 6330(d), and, therefore, the decision

letter did not provide a basis for the taxpayer to invoke this

Court’s jurisdiction.   See Moorhous v. Commissioner, 116 T.C.

263, 270-271 (2001).

     Petitioner concedes in his petition that his request for an

administrative hearing was not filed with respondent within the

30-day period prescribed in section 6330(a).     Petitioner

nevertheless contends that the Appeals Office erred in conducting

an equivalent hearing, as opposed to an administrative hearing

under section 6330, on the ground the final notice of intent to

levy was invalid because it was not signed by the Secretary or an

authorized delegate.    We disagree.

     It is well settled that the Secretary or his delegate

(including the Commissioner) may issue a notice required by

section 6320 or a final notice of intent to levy.     Secs. 6320(a),

6330(a), 7701(a)(11)(B) and (12)(A)(i), 7803(a)(2); see Craig v.

Commissioner, 119 T.C. 252, 263 (2002); Wilson v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2002-242; secs. 301.6320-1(a)(1), 301.6330-1(a)(1),

301.7701-9, Proced. & Admin. Regs.      The Commissioner’s authority

to file a notice of Federal tax lien and/or issue a final notice

of intent to levy has been delegated to a host of Internal

Revenue Service personnel, including (in the case of Federal tax

liens) various managers responsible for collection matters and
                              - 13 -

GS-9 and above revenue officers and (in the case of levies on

property in the hands of third parties) GS-9 and above revenue

officers.   See Delegation Order No. 191 (Rev. 2; Oct. 1, 1999)

(Rev. 3; June 11, 2001), pertaining to levies; Delegation Order

No. 196 (Rev. 4; Oct. 4, 2000), pertaining to liens.   Consistent

with these delegations of authority, the Notice of Federal Tax

Lien and the notice required by section 6320, which were

initiated by Revenue Officer John Stetsko and authorized by

Acting Technical Support Group Manager Brenda McCullough, and the

final notice of intent to levy, which was issued by Revenue

Officer Stetsko, are valid.   Finally, in connection with the

foregoing, we observe that there is no statutory requirement that

a final notice of intent to levy be signed.   Cf. Pendola v.

Commissioner, 50 T.C. 509, 513-514 (1968) (a notice of deficiency

need not be signed in order to be valid); Fox v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 1993-277 n.4 (same), affd. without published opinion

69 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 1995); Elmore v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.

2003-123 (same for notice of determination to proceed with levy).

     Consistent with the preceding discussion, we conclude that

we lack jurisdiction in this case for the reasons set forth in

respondent’s motion to dismiss, as supplemented.
                        - 14 -

In order to give effect to the foregoing,



                         An order granting respondent's

                    motion to dismiss for lack of

                    jurisdiction, as supplemented,

                    will be entered.
