  LAW OFFICE OF JOHN H. EGGERTSEN P.C., PETITIONER v.
   COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT*
         Docket No. 15479–11.             Filed October 1, 2014.

       R filed a motion for reconsideration of findings or opinion
     in Law Office of John H. Eggertsen P.C. v. Commissioner, 142
     T.C. 110 (2014) (Eggertsen I), and a motion to vacate decision
     (collectively, R’s motions). In Eggertsen I, we addressed
     whether I.R.C. sec. 4979A(a) imposes a Federal excise tax
     (excise tax) on P for its taxable year 2005. We held that it
     does. We also addressed in Eggertsen I whether the period of
     limitations for assessing that tax has expired (statute of
     limitations issue). It was R’s position with respect to the
     statute of limitations issue in Eggertsen I that I.R.C. sec.
     4979A(e)(2)(D), not I.R.C. sec. 6501, controls resolution of that
     issue. In Eggertsen I, we accepted that position. We held that
     the period of limitations under I.R.C. sec. 4979A(e)(2)(D) for
     assessing the excise tax that I.R.C. sec. 4979A(a) imposes on

  * This Supplemental Opinion supplements Law Office of John H.
Eggertsen P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. 110 (2014).

                                                                         265
266           143 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                          (265)

      petitioner has expired. It is R’s position in R’s motions that
      I.R.C. sec. 6501, not I.R.C. sec. 4979A(e)(2)(D), controls resolu-
      tion of the statute of limitations issue. According to R,
      because P did not file Form 5330, Return of Excise Taxes
      Related to Employee Benefit Plans, or any other document
      that qualifies as a return for I.R.C. sec. 4979A(a) excise tax
      purposes within the meaning of I.R.C. sec. 6501(a), I.R.C. sec.
      6501(c)(3) permits R to assess at any time the excise tax that
      I.R.C. sec. 4979A(a) imposes on P. Held: Upon reconsideration
      of the statute of limitations issue in Eggertsen I, I.R.C. sec.
      6501, not I.R.C. sec. 4979A(e)(2)(D), controls resolution of that
      issue because P did not file Form 5330 or any other document
      that qualifies as a return for I.R.C. sec. 4979A(a) excise tax
      purposes within the meaning of I.R.C. sec. 6501(a). I.R.C. sec.
      4979A(e)(2)(D) serves only to extend under the circumstances
      set forth therein the period of limitations prescribed by I.R.C.
      sec. 6501. Held, further, the excise tax that I.R.C. sec.
      4979A(a) imposes on P for its taxable year 2005 may be
      assessed at any time under I.R.C. sec. 6501(c)(3).

  Stephen Wasinger, for petitioner.
  David S. Weiner, John W. Stevens, and Shawn P. Nowlan,
for respondent.

                       SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION
  CHIECHI, Judge: This case is before us on respondent’s
motion for reconsideration of findings or opinion (respond-
ent’s motion for reconsideration) and respondent’s motion to
vacate decision (respondent’s motion to vacate). 1 We shall
grant respondent’s motions.

                          Background
  We incorporate herein by reference the facts set forth in
Law Office of John H. Eggertsen P.C. v. Commissioner, 142
T.C. 110 (2014) (Eggertsen I). 2 We repeat here only those
facts relevant to this Supplemental Opinion.
  1 Respondent filed a memorandum (respondent’s memorandum) in sup-

port of respondent’s motion for reconsideration. (We shall refer collectively
to respondent’s motion for reconsideration, respondent’s motion to vacate,
and respondent’s memorandum as respondent’s motions). Petitioner filed a
response to each of respondent’s motion for reconsideration and respond-
ent’s motion to vacate, and respondent filed a reply to each of those re-
sponses.
  2 The parties stipulated all of the facts in Law Office of John H.

Eggertsen P.C., v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. 110 (2014), and submitted the
case under Rule 122, Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
(265)   LAW OFFICE OF JOHN H. EGGERTSEN P.C. v. COMM’R      267


   At all relevant times, 100% of the stock of petitioner was
allocated to John H. Eggertsen under an employee stock
ownership plan that petitioner, an S corporation, maintained
(ESOP in question).
   Around April 26, 2006, petitioner filed Form 1120S, U.S.
Income Tax Return for an S Corporation, for its taxable year
2005 (2005 Form 1120S). Petitioner attached to that form
Schedule K–1, Shareholder’s Share of Income, Deductions,
Credits, etc.
   In petitioner’s 2005 Form 1120S, petitioner showed, inter
alia, that during 2005 the ESOP in question owned 100% of
the stock of petitioner.
   On a date not established by the record during 2006, the
ESOP in question filed Form 5500, Annual Return/Report of
Employee Benefit Plan (employee benefit plan 2005 annual
return), for its taxable year 2005. The ESOP in question
attached to that form Schedule E, ESOP Annual Information.
The ESOP in question also attached to the employee benefit
plan 2005 annual return Schedule I, Financial Information—
Small Plan, and Schedule SSA, Annual Registration State-
ment Identifying Separated Participants With Deferred
Vested Benefits.
   In the employee benefit plan 2005 annual return, the
ESOP in question showed that (1) its effective date was
January 1, 1999; (2) it was maintained by petitioner during
2005; (3) it had three participants during 2005, two of whom
were not identified and were described as ‘‘Active partici-
pants’’ and one of whom was identified as Kerry C. Duggan
and described as ‘‘Other retired or separated participants
entitled to future benefits’’; (4) it held assets at the end of
2005 valued at $401,500; and (5) its assets consisted exclu-
sively of ‘‘Employer securities’’.
   On a date not established by the record, the ESOP in ques-
tion filed an amended Form 5500 (amended employee benefit
plan 2005 annual return) for its taxable year 2005. The
ESOP in question attached to that form Schedule I.
   In the amended employee benefit plan 2005 annual return,
the ESOP in question showed information that was identical
in most respects to the information that it had showed in the
employee benefit plan 2005 annual return, except that (1) the
ESOP in question did not identify in the amended employee
benefit plan 2005 annual return the individual described in
268           143 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                       (265)


that return as ‘‘Other retired or separated participants enti-
tled to benefits’’ and (2) the ESOP in question showed in the
amended employee benefit plan 2005 annual return that it
held assets at the end of 2005 valued at $868,833, which
included ‘‘Employer securities’’ valued at that yearend at
$401,500.
   Petitioner did not file Form 5330, Return of Excise Taxes
Related to Employee Benefit Plans, for its taxable year 2005.
Respondent filed a substitute for Form 5330 for petitioner for
that taxable year.
   In Eggertsen I, we addressed whether section 4979A(a) 3
imposes a Federal excise tax (excise tax) on petitioner for its
taxable year 2005. We held that it does. We also addressed
in Eggertsen I whether the period of limitations for assessing
that tax has expired (statute of limitations issue). In
Eggertsen I, it was respondent’s position that section
4979A(e)(2)(D), not section 6501, controls resolution of the
statute of limitations issue. On brief, respondent argued in
Eggertsen I:
  I.R.C. § 6501(a) is not the governing period of limitations under the facts
  of this case. By its terms * * * I.R.C. § 4979A(e) (2) (D) is the applicable
  statute of limitations in this case.4
     The specific triggering requirement to begin the running of the statute
  under the circumstances of this case is the later of the date of the alloca-
  tion or ownership at issue or the date when the taxpayer provides
  notification to the respondent of the ownership or allocation at issue.
  I.R.C. § 4979A(e) (2) (D).
     By contrast, the event that triggers the running of I.R.C. § 6501 is the
  filing of an original return. I.R.C. § 6501(a); See also, Beard v. Commis-
  sioner, 82 T.C. 766, 780 (1984). This specific triggering device (i.e. the
  filing of a return) was not incorporated into I.R.C. § 4979A.
  4To   the extent I.R.C. §§ 4979A and 6501 might create differing results
  here, this Court should be guided by the rules of resolving statutory con-
  flicts. First, the Court should look for means to harmonize apparently
  conflicting statutes. Beal v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 677, 683 (1928). If
  they may not be harmonized, only when two statutes irreconcilably con-
  flict and the conflict cannot be resolved by interpretation, then the more
  specific statute controls over the more general one. Estate of Morgens v.
  Commissioner, 133 T.C. 402, 423 (2009) (citing 2B Singer & Singer, Stat-
  utes and Statutory Construction, sec. 51:2, at 216218 (7th ed. 2008)). In
  addition, where two irreconcilably conflicting statutes are involved, the
  more recent of the two prevails. Id.

  3 All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code (Code) in effect

for the year at issue.
(265)   LAW OFFICE OF JOHN H. EGGERTSEN P.C. v. COMM’R                    269


    In this case, if the Court applies these statutory conflict rules, both
  rules point to the primacy of I.R.C. § 4979A(e) (2) (D) over I.R.C. § 6501.
  First, § 4979A is the more specific statute, and second, it was more
  recently amended.

   In Eggertsen I, we accepted respondent’s position that sec-
tion 4979A(e)(2)(D), not section 6501, controls resolution of
the statute of limitations issue. We held that the period of
limitations under section 4979A(e)(2)(D) for assessing the
excise tax that section 4979A(a) imposes on petitioner has
expired.

                                Discussion
  The granting of a motion for reconsideration rests within
our discretion. See Westbrook v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 868,
879 (5th Cir. 1995), aff ’g per curiam T.C. Memo. 1993–634;
Estate of Quirk v. Commissioner, 928 F.2d 751, 759 (6th Cir.
1991), aff ’g in part, remanding in part T.C. Memo. 1988–286;
Klarkowski v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir.
1967), aff ’g T.C. Memo. 1965–328. A motion for reconsider-
ation will be denied unless substantial error or unusual cir-
cumstances are shown. See Westbrook v. Commissioner, 68
F.3d at 879; Estate of Quirk v. Commissioner, 928 F.2d at
759; Alexander v. Commissioner, 95 T.C. 467, 469 (1990),
aff ’d without published opinion sub nom. Stell v. Commis-
sioner, 999 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1993); Vaughn v. Commis-
sioner, 87 T.C. 164, 167 (1986).
  In Eggertsen I, it was respondent’s position that section
4979A(e)(2)(D), not section 6501, controls resolution of the
statute of limitations issue. In support of that position,
respondent advanced the following arguments on brief in
Eggertsen I:
  I.R.C. § 6501(a) is not the governing period of limitations under the facts
  of this case. By its terms * * * I.R.C. § 4979A(e) (2) (D) is the applicable
  statute of limitations in this case.4
     The specific triggering requirement to begin the running of the statute
  under the circumstances of this case is the later of the date of the alloca-
  tion or ownership at issue or the date when the taxpayer provides
  notification to the respondent of the ownership or allocation at issue.
  I.R.C. § 4979A(e) (2) (D).
     By contrast, the event that triggers the running of I.R.C. § 6501 is the
  filing of an original return. I.R.C. § 6501(a); See also, Beard v. Commis-
  sioner, 82 T.C. 766, 780 (1984). This specific triggering device (i.e. the
  filing of a return) was not incorporated into I.R.C. § 4979A.
270           143 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                       (265)

  4To   the extent I.R.C. §§ 4979A and 6501 might create differing results
  here, this Court should be guided by the rules of resolving statutory con-
  flicts. First, the Court should look for means to harmonize apparently
  conflicting statutes. Beal v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 677, 683 (1928). If
  they may not be harmonized, only when two statutes irreconcilably con-
  flict and the conflict cannot be resolved by interpretation, then the more
  specific statute controls over the more general one. Estate of Morgens v.
  Commissioner, 133 T.C. 402, 423 (2009) (citing 2B Singer & Singer, Stat-
  utes and Statutory Construction, sec. 51:2, at 216218 (7th ed. 2008)). In
  addition, where two irreconcilably conflicting statutes are involved, the
  more recent of the two prevails. Id.
     In this case, if the Court applies these statutory conflict rules, both
  rules point to the primacy of I.R.C. § 4979A(e) (2) (D) over I.R.C. § 6501.
  First, § 4979A is the more specific statute, and second, it was more
  recently amended.

   In Eggertsen I, we accepted respondent’s position that sec-
tion 4979A(e)(2)(D), not section 6501, controls resolution of
the statute of limitations issue. We held that the period of
limitations under section 4979A(e)(2)(D) for assessing the
excise tax that section 4979A(a) imposes on petitioner has
expired.
   In respondent’s motions, it is the position of respondent
that section 6501, not section 4979A(e)(2)(D), controls resolu-
tion of the statute of limitations issue. In support of that
position, respondent advances the following arguments in
respondent’s motions:
  [T]he limitations period under I.R.C. § 4979A(e)(2)(D) supplements but
  does not replace the general limitations period under I.R.C. § 6501 or the
  specific limitations period under I.R.C. § 6501(c)(3). In this case, because
  the interaction between I.R.C. § 6501 and I.R.C. § 4979A was not dis-
  cussed, the Opinion contains a substantial error of law when it implies
  that I.R.C. § 4979A replaces I.R.C. § 6501. Instead, because the limita-
  tions period under I.R.C. § 6501 is not superseded and has not expired,
  the period during which Respondent can assess the excise tax under
  I.R.C. § 4979A remains open.
  Upon reconsideration of our holding in Eggertsen I that the
period of limitations under section 4979A(e)(2)(D) for
assessing the excise tax that section 4979A(a) imposes on P
for its taxable year 2005 has expired, we conclude that we
committed substantial error. 4 That is because in so holding
  4 The  circumstances involved here are materially distinguishable from
the circumstances involved in certain other cases where we denied motions
for reconsideration because theories or issues were raised in those motions
that could have been, but were not, raised before we issued our original
(265)   LAW OFFICE OF JOHN H. EGGERTSEN P.C. v. COMM’R                  271


we concluded implicitly, as respondent had argued expressly,
that section 4979A(e)(2)(D), a specific statute applicable to
the excise tax imposed by section 4979A(a), took precedence
over section 6501, a general statute applicable to all taxes
imposed by the Code. We conclude upon reconsideration that
section 4979A(e)(2)(D) serves only to extend under the cir-
cumstances set forth therein the period of limitations pre-
scribed by section 6501. Cf. BLAK Invs. v. Commissioner, 133
T.C. 431, 435–436 (2009); Rhone-Poulenc Surfactants &
Specialties, L.P. v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 533, 542–543
(2000).
   We consider now whether the period of limitations under
section 6501 has expired for assessing the excise tax under
section 4979A(a) for petitioner’s taxable year 2005 that was
triggered by an event described in section 4979A(a)(3). Peti-
tioner is liable for that excise tax. See sec. 4979A(c)(2). Form
5330 is the form that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
has prescribed as the form in which, inter alia, the excise tax
under section 4979A is required to be reported. We found in
Eggertsen I that petitioner did not file Form 5330 for its tax-
able year 2005. Unless petitioner filed another document that
qualifies as a return for section 4979A(a) excise tax purposes
within the meaning of section 6501(a), the excise tax that
section 4979A(a) imposes on petitioner for its taxable year
2005 may be assessed at any time under section 6501(c)(3).
   We shall examine the record that the parties fully stipu-
lated in Eggertsen I, see supra note 2, in order to determine
whether petitioner filed for its taxable year 2005 a document
that qualifies as a return for section 4979A(a) excise tax pur-
poses within the meaning of section 6501(a). In order for a
document filed by a taxpayer to qualify as a return within
the meaning of section 6501(a), it must (1) contain sufficient
information to calculate the taxpayer’s tax liability, (2) pur-

opinion. See, e.g., CWT Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 1054, 1057
(1982) (‘‘We will generally not grant reconsideration to resolve issues
which could have been raised during the prior proceedings[.]’’),
supplementing 79 T.C. 86 (1982), aff ’d, 755 F.2d 790 (11th Cir. 1985);
Lowry v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2004–10, slip op. at 4 (‘‘On motions
for reconsideration we do not, except under extraordinary circumstances,
address any new issue which a party could have addressed but failed to
address prior to the Court’s deciding the case.’’), supplementing T.C. Memo.
2003–225, aff ’d, 171 Fed. Appx. 6 (9th Cir. 2006).
272          143 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS                     (265)


port to be a return, (3) constitute an honest and reasonable
attempt by the taxpayer to satisfy the requirements of the
Federal tax law, and (4) be executed under penalties of per-
jury. 5 See Beard v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 766, 777 (1984),
aff ’d per curiam, 793 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1986).
   The record contains the 2005 Form 1120S that petitioner
filed around April 26, 2006, the employee benefit plan 2005
annual return that the ESOP in question filed on a date not
established by the record during 2006, and the amended
employee benefit plan 2005 annual return that the ESOP in
question filed on a date not established by the record.
   We turn first to petitioner’s 2005 Form 1120S. In that
form, petitioner showed, inter alia, that during 2005 the
ESOP in question owned 100% of the stock of petitioner. In
order for the 2005 Form 1120S to qualify as a return for sec-
tion 4979A(a) excise tax purposes within the meaning of sec-
tion 6501(a), it must, inter alia, contain sufficient informa-
tion to calculate petitioner’s excise tax liability for its taxable
year 2005 under section 4979A(a). See Beard v. Commis-
sioner, 82 T.C. at 777. The information necessary to calculate
petitioner’s excise tax liability under section 4979A(a) for its
taxable year 2005 includes information regarding the total
value of all deemed-owned shares of all disqualified persons
with respect to the ESOP in question. See sec. 4979A(a),
(e)(2)(C). Petitioner’s 2005 Form 1120S did not contain that
information. 6
   On the record in Eggertsen I, we find that petitioner’s 2005
Form 1120S does not qualify as a return for section 4979A(a)
excise tax purposes within the meaning of section 6501(a).
   We turn next to the employee benefit plan 2005 annual
return that the ESOP in question filed on a date not estab-
lished by the record during 2006 and the amended employee
   5 As pertinent here, sec. 6501(b)(4) provides that for purposes of sec.

6501 the filing of a return for a specified period in which an entry has
been made with respect to a tax imposed under, inter alia, sec. 4979A, in-
cluding a return in which an entry has been made showing no liability for
such tax for such period, shall constitute the filing of a return of all
amounts of such tax which, if properly paid, would be required to be re-
ported in such return for such period.
   6 Petitioner made no entry in petitioner’s 2005 Form 1120S with respect

to an excise tax imposed by sec. 4979A, not even an entry that showed no
liability for that tax for taxable year 2005. See supra note 5.
(265)   LAW OFFICE OF JOHN H. EGGERTSEN P.C. v. COMM’R                273


benefit plan 2005 annual return that that ESOP filed on a
date not established by the record. In the employee benefit
plan 2005 annual return, the ESOP in question showed that
(1) its effective date was January 1, 1999; (2) it was main-
tained by petitioner during 2005; (3) it had three participants
during 2005, two of whom were not identified and were
described as ‘‘Active participants’’ and one of whom was
identified as Kerry C. Duggan and described as ‘‘Other
retired or separated participants entitled to future benefits’’;
(4) it held assets at the end of 2005 valued at $401,500; and
(5) its assets consisted exclusively of ‘‘Employer securities’’.
   In the amended employee benefit plan 2005 annual return,
the ESOP in question showed information that was identical
in most respects to the information that it had showed in the
employee benefit plan 2005 annual return, except that (1) the
ESOP in question did not identify in the amended employee
benefit plan 2005 annual return the individual described in
that return as ‘‘Other retired or separated participants enti-
tled to benefits’’ and (2) the ESOP in question showed in the
amended employee benefit plan 2005 annual return that it
held assets at the end of 2005 valued at $868,833, which
included ‘‘Employer securities’’ valued at that yearend at
$401,500.
   As discussed above, petitioner is liable for its taxable year
2005 for the excise tax under section 4979A(a) that we found
in Eggertsen I was triggered by an event described in section
4979A(a)(3). See sec. 4979A(c)(2). The ESOP in question, not
petitioner, filed the employee benefit plan 2005 annual
return and the amended employee benefit plan 2005
annual return. Assuming arguendo that petitioner had filed
those returns, they did not contain the information regarding
the total value of all deemed-owned shares of all disqualified
persons with respect to the ESOP in question that was nec-
essary to calculate petitioner’s excise tax liability under sec-
tion 4979A(a) for its taxable year 2005. 7 See sec. 4979A(a),
(e)(2)(C).

  7 The ESOP in question made no entry in the employee benefit plan 2005

annual return that it filed with respect to an excise tax imposed by sec.
4979A, not even an entry that showed no liability for that tax for taxable
year 2005. See supra note 5.
274        143 UNITED STATES TAX COURT REPORTS            (265)


   On the record in Eggertsen I, we find that neither the
employee benefit plan 2005 annual return nor the amended
employee benefit plan 2005 annual return that the ESOP in
question filed qualifies as a return for section 4979A(a) pur-
poses within the meaning of section 6501(a).
   On the record in Eggertsen I, we find that petitioner did
not file with respondent any document that qualifies as a
return for purposes of section 4979A(a) within the meaning
of section 6501(a). On that record, we hold that the excise tax
under section 4979A(a) for petitioner’s taxable year 2005 may
be assessed at any time under section 6501(c)(3).
   We have considered all of the contentions and arguments
of the parties that are not discussed herein, and we find
them to be without merit, irrelevant, and/or moot.
   To reflect the foregoing,
                  An order granting respondent’s motions
                and vacating the decision for petitioner
                entered on February 12, 2014, and decision
                for respondent will be entered.
