UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.                                                                  No. 97-4109

JOHN PAUL QUINN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
W. Earl Britt, District Judge.
(CR-95-81-BR)

Submitted: August 5, 1997

Decided: September 10, 1997

Before HALL, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

William Arthur Webb, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Janice McKenzie Cole, United States Attorney, Anne M.
Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, J. Benjamin Davis, Third
Year Law Student, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

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OPINION

PER CURIAM:

John Paul Quinn appeals the revocation of his supervised release
and the imposition of a seventeen-month prison sentence. Finding no
error, we affirm.

Quinn pled guilty to conspiring to distribute LSD. Quinn first vio-
lated his supervised release in early 1995. At the court's direction,
Quinn completed a drug treatment program. In late 1996, Quinn vio-
lated his supervised release a second time by missing several appoint-
ments with his probation officer, testing positive for use of a
controlled substance on four occasions, and failing to report to a drug
treatment program ordered by the probation officer for an intake
assessment. The district court revoked the supervised release and
imposed a seventeen-month term of imprisonment. At the revocation
hearing, the court provided the following reason for imprisoning
Quinn:

          The Court: Well, Mr. Quinn, I'm at the point now that it's
          not a matter of punishment. . . . Judge Bryan sentenced you
          in the Eastern District of Virginia and imposed what was
          punishment. At this point I'm more interested in helping you
          and treating you. But I don't believe leaving you here to
          cope with these matters primarily on your own is in your
          best interest. I fully agree with what [the probation officer]
          has said, that you need the benefit of the treatment that can
          be afforded to you in a controlled setting. And it's for that
          reason that I'm going to follow the recommendations of the
          probation office.

(J.A. at 24). Quinn claims that the district court improperly consid-
ered his need for rehabilitation when it revoked supervised release
and determined the length of imprisonment. Because he failed to

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object below, we review Quinn's appeal only for plain error. See
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993).

The district court did not plainly err by considering Quinn's need
for rehabilitation. The statute governing the imposition and revocation
of supervised release expressly permits consideration of a defendant's
need for rehabilitation. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583 (West 1985 & Supp.
1997). Section 3583(e) directs the court to consider the factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997), which
include the defendant's need for "educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment." 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a)(2)(D). Thus, the express language of§ 3583 allows the dis-
trict court to consider Quinn's need for rehabilitation in revoking
supervised release and determining the length of imprisonment. See
United States v. Jackson, 70 F.3d 874, 880 (6th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Giddings, 37 F.3d 1091, 1097 (5th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 278, 282-83 (2d Cir. 1994).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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